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CTC Sentinel Objective JULY 2011 . VOL 4 . ISSUE 7 COMBATING TERRORISM CENTER AT WEST POINT CTC SentineL OBJECTIVE . RELEVANT . RIGOROUS Contents The JRTN Movement and Iraq’s FEATURE ARTICLE 1 The JRTN Movement and Iraq’s Next Insurgency Next Insurgency By Michael Knights By Michael Knights REPORTS 6 Anwar al-`Awlaqi’s Disciples: Three Case Studies By Alexander Meleagrou-Hitchens 10 Will Al-Qa`ida and Al-Shabab Formally Merge? By Leah Farrall 12 The Somali Diaspora: A Key Counterterrorism Ally By Major Josh Richardson 15 David Hicks’ Memoir: A Deceptive Account of One Man’s Journey with Al-Qa`ida By Ken Ward 17 Hizb al-Tahrir: A New Threat to the Pakistan Army? By Arif Jamal 20 The Significance of Fazal Saeed’s Defection from the Pakistani Taliban By Daud Khattak JRTN leader Izzat Ibrahim al-Duri, seen here in 1999. - Photo by Salah Malkawi/Getty Images 22 Recent Highlights in Terrorist Activity he stabilization of iraq This article argues that one driver for 24 CTC Sentinel Staff & Contacts has become wedged on a the ongoing resilience, or even revival, plateau, beyond which further of Sunni militancy is the growing improvement will be a slow influence of the Jaysh Rijal al-Tariq al- Tprocess. According to incident metrics Naqshabandi (JRTN) movement, which compiled by Olive Group, the average has successfully tapped into Sunni Arab monthly number of insurgent attacks fear of Iraq’s Shi`a-led government and between January and June 2011 was the country’s Kurdish population, while 380.1 The incident count in January offering an authentic Iraqi alternate to About the CTC Sentinel was 376, indicating that incident levels al-Qa`ida in Iraq (AQI). The features of The Combating Terrorism Center is an remained roughly stable in the first half JRTN are becoming clearer, providing independent educational and research of 2011. One reason behind this stability an interesting case study of an insurgent institution based in the Department of Social is the ongoing virulence of northern movement that learned from the mistakes Sciences at the United States Military Academy, and central Iraqi insurgents operating of other militants and has successfully West Point. The CTC Sentinel harnesses within Sunni Arab communities. Five created a hybrid of Islamist themes and the Center’s global network of scholars and predominately Sunni provinces and nationalist military expertise. practitioners to understand and confront western Baghdad were responsible for contemporary threats posed by terrorism and an average of 68.5% of national incidents Birth and Evolution of JRTN other forms of political violence. each month in 2011.2 When JRTN formally announced its establishment after Saddam Hussein’s execution on December 30, 2006, The views expressed in this report are those of 1 All of the data in this article is drawn from Olive Group the movement was initially a subject the authors and not of the U.S. Military Academy, operations. Olive Group is a major private security com- the Department of the Army, or any other agency of the U.S. Government. pany operating in Iraq. 2 Ibid. The five predominately Sunni Arab provinces are Anbar, Salah al-Din, Mosul, Diyala and Kirkuk. 1 JULY 2011 . VOL 4 . ISSUE 7 of curiosity because of its apparent The Naqshbandi layer of the former Liberation (HCJL) in October 2007. Like connection to the Naqshbandi order of regime was not widely recognized the Islamic State of Iraq—a coalition Sufi Islam. In fact, JRTN’s adoption of during the early years of the insurgency dominated by one large group, AQI— Naqshbandi motifs reflected patronage in 2003-2005. Small hints of the use HCJL is built almost entirely around networks that coalesced during Saddam’s of Naqshbandi identity as a mobilizing JRTN. In the years after 2007, JRTN rule. In northern Iraq, the Naqshbandi principle began to surface in 2005 when exploited the disintegration of other order had many adherents, both Arab insurgent katibat (battalions) emerged in groups—including parts of AQI—and and Kurdish, but the most politically Mosul and Kirkuk provinces bearing the grew in strength. It emerged as the only significant strand of the movement were name of Shaykh Abd al-Qadir al-Gilani, Iraqi insurgent group to have grown Arabs who pragmatically collaborated the founder of the Qadiri order of Sufism, stronger during and since the U.S.- with the Ottoman Empire, the British an order related to the Naqshbandi.6 A led “surge.” Indeed, U.S. statements Mandate and later the various Iraqi number of events coincided in 2005- on JRTN have arguably added to its governments. According to Iraqi 2006 to provide an opening for al- credibility and potential for recruiting expert Professor Amatzia Baram, this Duri and his supporters to develop an and fundraising.9 insurgent umbrella movement that “The taped execution blended Iraqi nationalism, protection JRTN’s Organizational Structure of the Sunna (Iraq’s Sunni Arabs), Estimates concerning the size of JRTN of Saddam Hussein by and orthodox Islamic themes. During range from 1,500 to 5,000 members, Shi`a militiamen in 2006, insurgent movements led by but these figures do little to improve Iraqi Salafists (most notably the Islamic understanding of the concentric circles December 2006 provided Army or Jaysh al-Islami) clashed with of involvement in such a movement.10 a springboard for JRTN to AQI and splintered. From 2006 onward, According to multiple accounts, JRTN has contracted the services of JRTN appears to have a small core of announce its existence at many ailing Sunni insurgent groups. permanent members by design; outside the start of 2007.” of a compact national leadership, the The taped execution of Saddam Hussein only “card-carrying” members appear by Shi`a militiamen in December 2006 to be a cadre of facilitators, financiers, provided a springboard for JRTN to intelligence officers and trainers.11 Izzat Arab strand of Iraq’s Naqshbandis announce its existence at the start of Ibrahim al-Duri is the leader of JRTN used the movement as a political and 2007. Against a backdrop of increasing and HCJL, and he remains in adequate business fellowship—perhaps similar sectarian violence, the manner of health and is politically active within to freemasonry—to advance their joint Saddam’s chaotic execution by hanging, Iraq.12 His role in the organization is interests.3 Under the Ba`athist regime, a criminal’s death, prompted a wave of the Naqshbandi cultivated Izzat Ibrahim outrage and fear among former regime 9 Since 2009, when JRTN was designated by the United 7 al-Duri, Iraq’s vice president and deputy elements. In early 2007, the growth of States as a terrorist group, U.S. statements have had chairman of the Iraqi Revolutionary al-Duri’s ambitions led to a split in the the unintended impact of boosting JRTN’s credentials. Command Council, as their sponsor. New Ba`ath Party. One faction allied Alongside AQI, JRTN is the other main insurgent move- During the late 1970s and early 1980s, with Muhammad Younis al-Ahmed, a ment cited as a threat by U.S. officials, many of whom al-Duri was rushed through the process Saddam family consigliore with close identify JRTN as the greater threat. One U.S. officer of confirmation as a Naqshbandi ties to Syrian intelligence and with the told Jane’s, “the US and other security forces potentially 8 shaykh, officially connecting his al-Awda insurgent movement. Others played into [JRTN’s] hands by building JRTN up to be spiritual lineage (silsilah) directly to the aligned with al-Duri, who formed stronger than they actually were.” See Jo Sharp, “Iraq’s 4 Prophet Muhammad. Al-Duri initiated the Higher Command for Jihad and Sufi-Baathist Insurgency,” Jane’s Terrorism and Security numerous military families into the Monitor, March 8, 2010. Also see “U.S. Treasury Depart- Naqshbandi order during the Iran- this campaign. As Amatzia Baram noted, “Saddam was ment Freezes Assets of Iraqi Insurgent Group,” U.S. Iraq War and throughout the gradual the ‘Mr Islam’: Izzat Ibrahim was ‘Mr Sufi.’ Al-Duri was Treasury Department, December 23, 2009. Islamification of the Ba`athist regime in always careful not to overshadow Saddam.” Personal 10 The aforementioned Jane’s article refers to “1,500 to the 1990s, using the order to strengthen interview, Professor Amatzia Baram, Washington, D.C., 2,000” members. The author has heard other estimates his personal loyalty and patronage February 10, 2011. by U.S. military officers that range from 3,000 to 5,000 5 networks. 6 Ali, “Sufi Insurgent Groups in Iraq.” Abd al-Qadir al- members of various kinds. Gilani formed the Qadira during the 11th century. 11 Personal interviews, U.S. intelligence analysts, Skype, 3 Personal interview, Professor Amatzia Baram, Wash- 7 Saddam had asked to be executed by firing squad. telephone and face-to-face interviews, dates and loca- ington, D.C., February 10, 2011. Many committed republicans and Ba`athists felt this tions withheld at the request of interviewees. 4 Rafid Fadhil Ali, “Sufi Insurgent Groups in Iraq,” Ter- was appropriate, to honor the office of the president if 12 Ibid. Al-Duri’s credentials within the Ba`athist mi- rorism Monitor 6:2 (2008). Without al-Duri’s assistance, not Saddam himself. The manner of Saddam’s death— lieu cannot be overstated. From 1963 to 1968, al-Duri the Naqshbandi would have been treated to the same amidst Shi`a religious chanting—was taken as a sectar- was Saddam’s shadow, serving with him in the intelli- intense surveillance and intimidation of other secret so- ian affront by many Sunni Arabs. Personal interview, gence and peasants sections of the Ba`ath Party and later cieties such as Iraq’s freemason lodges, which became Professor Amatzia Baram, Washington, D.C., February spending time in jail together.
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