july 2011 . Vol 4 . Issue 7

Combating Terrorism Center at West Point CTC Sentinel Objective . Relevant . Rigorous

Contents The JRTN Movement and Iraq’s

FEATURE ARTICLE 1 The JRTN Movement and Iraq’s Next Insurgency Next Insurgency By Michael Knights By Michael Knights

Reports 6 Anwar al-`Awlaqi’s Disciples: Three Case Studies By Alexander Meleagrou-Hitchens 10 Will Al-Qa`ida and Al-Shabab Formally Merge? By Leah Farrall 12 The Somali Diaspora: A Key Counterterrorism Ally By Major Josh Richardson 15 David Hicks’ Memoir: A Deceptive Account of One Man’s Journey with Al-Qa`ida By Ken Ward 17 Hizb al-Tahrir: A New Threat to the Pakistan Army? By Arif Jamal 20 The Significance of Fazal Saeed’s Defection from the Pakistani Taliban By Daud Khattak JRTN leader Izzat Ibrahim al-Duri, seen here in 1999. - Photo by Salah Malkawi/Getty Images 22 Recent Highlights in Terrorist Activity he stabilization of iraq This article argues that one driver for 24 CTC Sentinel Staff & Contacts has become wedged on a the ongoing resilience, or even revival,

plateau, beyond which further of Sunni militancy is the growing improvement will be a slow influence of the Jaysh Rijal al-Tariq al- Tprocess. According to incident metrics Naqshabandi (JRTN) movement, which compiled by Olive Group, the average has successfully tapped into Sunni Arab monthly number of insurgent attacks fear of Iraq’s Shi`a-led government and between January and June 2011 was the country’s Kurdish population, while 380.1 The incident count in January offering an authentic Iraqi alternate to About the CTC Sentinel was 376, indicating that incident levels al-Qa`ida in Iraq (AQI). The features of The Combating Terrorism Center is an remained roughly stable in the first half JRTN are becoming clearer, providing independent educational and research of 2011. One reason behind this stability an interesting case study of an insurgent institution based in the Department of Social is the ongoing virulence of northern movement that learned from the mistakes Sciences at the United States Military Academy, and central Iraqi insurgents operating of other militants and has successfully West Point. The CTC Sentinel harnesses within Sunni Arab communities. Five created a hybrid of Islamist themes and the Center’s global network of scholars and predominately Sunni provinces and nationalist military expertise. practitioners to understand and confront western Baghdad were responsible for contemporary threats posed by terrorism and an average of 68.5% of national incidents Birth and Evolution of JRTN other forms of political violence. each month in 2011.2 When JRTN formally announced its establishment after Saddam Hussein’s execution on December 30, 2006, The views expressed in this report are those of 1 All of the data in this article is drawn from Olive Group the movement was initially a subject the authors and not of the U.S. Military Academy, operations. Olive Group is a major private security com- the Department of the Army, or any other agency of the U.S. Government. pany operating in Iraq. 2 Ibid. The five predominately Sunni Arab provinces are Anbar, Salah al-Din, Mosul, Diyala and Kirkuk.

1 july 2011 . Vol 4 . Issue 7 of curiosity because of its apparent The Naqshbandi layer of the former Liberation (HCJL) in October 2007. Like connection to the Naqshbandi order of regime was not widely recognized the Islamic State of Iraq—a coalition Sufi Islam. In fact, JRTN’s adoption of during the early years of the insurgency dominated by one large group, AQI— Naqshbandi motifs reflected patronage in 2003-2005. Small hints of the use HCJL is built almost entirely around networks that coalesced during Saddam’s of Naqshbandi identity as a mobilizing JRTN. In the years after 2007, JRTN rule. In northern Iraq, the Naqshbandi principle began to surface in 2005 when exploited the disintegration of other order had many adherents, both Arab insurgent katibat (battalions) emerged in groups—including parts of AQI—and and Kurdish, but the most politically Mosul and Kirkuk provinces bearing the grew in strength. It emerged as the only significant strand of the movement were name of Shaykh Abd al-Qadir al-Gilani, Iraqi insurgent group to have grown Arabs who pragmatically collaborated the founder of the Qadiri order of Sufism, stronger during and since the U.S.- with the Ottoman Empire, the British an order related to the Naqshbandi.6 A led “surge.” Indeed, U.S. statements Mandate and later the various Iraqi number of events coincided in 2005- on JRTN have arguably added to its governments. According to Iraqi 2006 to provide an opening for al- credibility and potential for recruiting expert Professor Amatzia Baram, this Duri and his supporters to develop an and fundraising.9 insurgent umbrella movement that “The taped execution blended Iraqi nationalism, protection JRTN’s Organizational Structure of the Sunna (Iraq’s Sunni Arabs), Estimates concerning the size of JRTN of Saddam Hussein by and orthodox Islamic themes. During range from 1,500 to 5,000 members, Shi`a militiamen in 2006, insurgent movements led by but these figures do little to improve Iraqi Salafists (most notably the Islamic understanding of the concentric circles December 2006 provided Army or Jaysh al-Islami) clashed with of involvement in such a movement.10 a springboard for JRTN to AQI and splintered. From 2006 onward, According to multiple accounts, JRTN has contracted the services of JRTN appears to have a small core of announce its existence at many ailing Sunni insurgent groups. permanent members by design; outside the start of 2007.” of a compact national leadership, the The taped execution of Saddam Hussein only “card-carrying” members appear by Shi`a militiamen in December 2006 to be a cadre of facilitators, financiers, provided a springboard for JRTN to intelligence officers and trainers.11 Izzat Arab strand of Iraq’s Naqshbandis announce its existence at the start of Ibrahim al-Duri is the leader of JRTN used the movement as a political and 2007. Against a backdrop of increasing and HCJL, and he remains in adequate business fellowship—perhaps similar sectarian violence, the manner of health and is politically active within to freemasonry—to advance their joint Saddam’s chaotic execution by hanging, Iraq.12 His role in the organization is interests.3 Under the Ba`athist regime, a criminal’s death, prompted a wave of the Naqshbandi cultivated Izzat Ibrahim outrage and fear among former regime 9 Since 2009, when JRTN was designated by the United 7 al-Duri, Iraq’s vice president and deputy elements. In early 2007, the growth of States as a terrorist group, U.S. statements have had chairman of the Iraqi Revolutionary al-Duri’s ambitions led to a split in the the unintended impact of boosting JRTN’s credentials. Command Council, as their sponsor. New Ba`ath Party. One faction allied Alongside AQI, JRTN is the other main insurgent move- During the late 1970s and early 1980s, with Muhammad Younis al-Ahmed, a ment cited as a threat by U.S. officials, many of whom al-Duri was rushed through the process Saddam family consigliore with close identify JRTN as the greater threat. One U.S. officer of confirmation as a Naqshbandi ties to Syrian intelligence and with the told Jane’s, “the US and other security forces potentially 8 shaykh, officially connecting his al-Awda insurgent movement. Others played into [JRTN’s] hands by building JRTN up to be spiritual lineage (silsilah) directly to the aligned with al-Duri, who formed stronger than they actually were.” See Jo Sharp, “Iraq’s 4 Prophet Muhammad. Al-Duri initiated the Higher Command for Jihad and Sufi-Baathist Insurgency,” Jane’s Terrorism and Security numerous military families into the Monitor, March 8, 2010. Also see “U.S. Treasury Depart- Naqshbandi order during the Iran- this campaign. As Amatzia Baram noted, “Saddam was ment Freezes Assets of Iraqi Insurgent Group,” U.S. Iraq War and throughout the gradual the ‘Mr Islam’: Izzat Ibrahim was ‘Mr Sufi.’ Al-Duri was Treasury Department, December 23, 2009. Islamification of the Ba`athist regime in always careful not to overshadow Saddam.” Personal 10 The aforementioned Jane’s article refers to “1,500 to the 1990s, using the order to strengthen interview, Professor Amatzia Baram, Washington, D.C., 2,000” members. The author has heard other estimates his personal loyalty and patronage February 10, 2011. by U.S. military officers that range from 3,000 to 5,000 5 networks. 6 Ali, “Sufi Insurgent Groups in Iraq.” Abd al-Qadir al- members of various kinds. Gilani formed the Qadira during the 11th century. 11 Personal interviews, U.S. intelligence analysts, Skype, 3 Personal interview, Professor Amatzia Baram, Wash- 7 Saddam had asked to be executed by firing squad. telephone and face-to-face interviews, dates and loca- ington, D.C., February 10, 2011. Many committed republicans and Ba`athists felt this tions withheld at the request of interviewees. 4 Rafid Fadhil Ali, “Sufi Insurgent Groups in Iraq,” Ter- was appropriate, to honor the office of the president if 12 Ibid. Al-Duri’s credentials within the Ba`athist mi- rorism Monitor 6:2 (2008). Without al-Duri’s assistance, not Saddam himself. The manner of Saddam’s death— lieu cannot be overstated. From 1963 to 1968, al-Duri the Naqshbandi would have been treated to the same amidst Shi`a religious chanting—was taken as a sectar- was Saddam’s shadow, serving with him in the intelli- intense surveillance and intimidation of other secret so- ian affront by many Sunni Arabs. Personal interview, gence and peasants sections of the Ba`ath Party and later cieties such as Iraq’s freemason lodges, which became Professor Amatzia Baram, Washington, D.C., February spending time in jail together. From the Ba`ath return dormant under the Ba`ath. 10, 2011. to power in 1968 until the regime’s fall in 2003, al-Duri 5 Al-Duri is typically associated with the “Return to 8 Rafid Fadhil Ali, “Reviving the Iraqi Ba’ath: A Profile served as Saddam’s most trusted deputy, being careful Faith” campaign of the early 1990s. In fact, al-Duri ap- of General Muhammad Yunis al-Ahmad,” Terrorism not to threaten Saddam’s position. The relationship was pears to have avoided the public spotlight entirely during Monitor 7:3 (2009). not even weakened when al-Duri’s daughter divorced

2 july 2011 . Vol 4 . Issue 7 tending to the coalition of tribal and strength in Abu Ghurayb and parts as the Special Republican Guard or factional relationships, a role to which of the Falluja to Ramadi corridor.17 Republican Guard as operational he is ideally suited by temperament and Due to old Ba`athist ties to southern affiliates.21 Candidates are identified by experience.13 The national leadership of tribes, JRTN probably has the ability personal recommendations, and vetting JRTN and the HCJL command staff are to conduct limited attacks in southern is undertaken through former regime one and the same, with five main sub- Iraq as well.18 networks. Training programs are used sections: Military Affairs, Religious to refresh military skills and discipline, Affairs, Financial Affairs, Media, and JRTN sponsors large numbers of attack including extended “90-day” courses Operational Security.14 cells across northern and central Iraq where recruits are subjected to physical to strike specified types of targets, abuse by former warrant officers.22 JRTN’s mid-level operatives were almost always for payment on delivery initially drawn from a select group of of a video proving the attack was Operators are slowly introduced to former military and intelligence officers undertaken. In some cases, specific operational tasks, progressing from who had attained ranks between targets may also be identified by JRTN reconnaissance to simple attacks and lieutenant colonel and brigadier general core members (particular bases, vehicle finally to weapons caching and complex under the Ba`athist regime. The first routes or persons). If necessary, JRTN attacks.23 Instruction to new cells cadres of JRTN operators appear to stresses the need to adopt low-risk have been recruited primarily from “All attack videos tactics (such as sniper fire and rocket former Republican Guard and military attacks) to conserve personnel and intelligence officers with connections publicized by JRTN to progressively adapt more complex to the pre-2003 Naqshbandi lodges exclusively show strikes on attacks only after patiently profiling within the Saddam military. Security the enemy.24 New members are assigned personnel from Saddam’s inner-most U.S. bases and forces; other a serial number that is intended circle were not favored due to their high types of attacks, such as to be used in lieu of their name in profile.15 The tribal make-up of JRTN communications.25 JRTN likes to parade mirrors the professional backgrounds JRTN’s numerous under- a ceremonial platoon of its soldiers in of members, with a significant number vehicle IED intimidation videos, stressing uniform elements of of Jubburis from Hawija, Sharqat and armament and clothing; its deployed Kirkuk; Ubaydis from Rashad and Tuz attacks on security forces, cells are also given platoon, company, Khurmatu; Azzawis from Lake Hamrin are disavowed.” battalion and brigade designations, and northern Diyala; and Harbis although the order of battle is not (including al-Duri’s tribal relatives) as structured as this nomenclature from Salah al-Din. In keeping with suggests.26 Saddam-era policies, a patchwork may also provide access to weapons quilt of small sub-tribes and clans are and explosives.19 JRTN seems to JRTN also appears to fully outsource aligned with JRTN, rather than entire carefully choose its “contractors” and some commissioned attacks to existing federations or tribes.16 Since 2009, even provides a degree of training insurgent movements. In some cases, the movement has gained significant and recruitment support to help these are the remnants of formerly form such cells. One U.S. intelligence significant insurgent groups like Jaysh Saddam’s son Uday. officer described the trainers sent out al-Islami, Hamas al-Iraq, Ansar al- 13 Al-Duri’s special skill was always in the field of as “mid-level guys in their early- to Sunna and Jaysh Muhammad. The foot relationship-building. While others in the progressive mid-30s with technical expertise in soldiers of these movements are often Ba`athist government sneered at religious and tribal [improvised explosive devices, IEDs], not informed by their leaders that 27 powerbrokers in the first decades of Ba`ath rule, al-Duri sniping, things like that, farming out JRTN contracted their services. Some was busy forging long-term links to sects and tribes their knowledge into other areas of 20 across Iraq. Despite his limited military background, Iraq.” JRTN prefers to use former 21 Colonel Mike Marti, “Intelligence Operations in Iraq,” al-Duri mixed well with professional soldiers during members of elite military units such U.S. Department of Defense Bloggers Roundtable, May his long tenure as deputy commander of Iraq’s armed 19, 2010. forces. 17 Personal interviews, U.S. intelligence analysts, Skype, 22 Ibid. Also drawn from personal interview, U.S. intel- 14 Abdul Hameed Bakier, “Ex-Baathists Turn to Naqsh- telephone and face-to-face interviews, dates and loca- ligence analyst, date and location withheld at the request bandi Sufis to Legitimize Insurgency,”Terrorism Focus 5:1 tions withheld at the request of interviewees. of interviewee. (2008). 18 Many former Ba`athists and Ba`athist-affiliated tribal 23 Personal interview, private security analyst with ac- 15 Only a small number of Special Republican Guard, shaykhs lost status after 2003 and continue to be legally cess to Iraqi brigade tactical operation centers in north- Special Security Organization (Amn al-Khass), and Pres- ostracized by the Islamist parties in the south. These out- ern Iraq, March 27, 2011. idential Guard (himaya) have been associated with JRTN. casts sometimes assist former regime elements in carry- 24 Bakier. Intelligence personnel in JRTN tend to be from the mili- ing out attacks in the south, such as the attacks over the 25 Ibid. tary intelligence or general intelligence rather than Sadd- last year in Basra Province. Izzat Ibrahim al-Duri also 26 Personal interview, U.S. intelligence analyst, date and am’s creation, the Mukhabarat. Saddam Fidayin, widely maintained close ties with a number of southern tribes, to location withheld at the request of interviewee. disliked by Iraqi military men, were also not included in whom he acted as benefactor during the Saddam years. 27 A U.S. soldier told a reporter, “Sometimes some of the JRTN’s core personnel. 19 Personal interview, U.S. intelligence analyst, date groups perceive, in fact, that they’re working for their or- 16 Saddam’s own tribe, the Albu Nasir, does not appear withheld at the request of interviewee. ganization only to discover later that several tiers up they to be strongly involved in JRTN. 20 Sharp. are actually being facilitated by another.” For details, see

3 july 2011 . Vol 4 . Issue 7 facilitators used by JRTN have operated that it would be willing to negotiate a in 2009, “all the fighting efforts are with Ansar al-Sunna or AQI previously. cease-fire with the government of Iraq going to be directed totally against the This tactical “co-mingling” of groups is and the United States, but only once invaders (the imperial American forces noted in numerous accounts.28 JRTN many of the changes wrought in Iraq wherever they are on the Iraqi land), appears to employ AQI to undertake since 2003 are reversed, including the and we absolutely forbid killing or deniable attacks on Iraqis, particularly unattainable stated aim of restoring fighting any Iraqi in all the agent state civilian targets. In one well-known all of the 600,000-odd security apparatus of the army, the police, the instance, JRTN contracted AQI to personnel to their former statuses awakening, and the administration, detonate a car bomb at the Ad Dawr and disestablishing all government except in self-defense situations, and if Joint Control Center in December 2006, organs and laws introduced since the some agents and spies in these apparatus part of a successful strategy to eliminate occupation began.34 tried to confront the resistance.” All all rivals to al-Duri’s sub-tribe in the attack videos publicized by JRTN area.29 JRTN has also been linked to From the outset, JRTN appears to have exclusively show strikes on U.S. bases AQI car bombings in Ramadi, Kirkuk tailored its strategic messaging and and forces; other types of attacks, such and Tikrit.30 Some attacks by AQI have its operational activity to appeal to as JRTN’s numerous under-vehicle IED even been jointly claimed by JRTN.31 the population within its operational intimidation attacks on security forces, areas. With a significant nod to Islamic are disavowed.37 Population-Centric Insurgency JRTN’s recruitment material and Integrated Kinetic and Information manifesto is a successful blend of “The apparent focus on Operations political ideas with religious imagery. U.S. forces has earned the JRTN’s branding and messaging The key message of JRTN and HCJL has yielded a number of significant communications is the need for unity movement sympathetic advantages for the group. One private among Sunni insurgent movements. treatment by some parts security analyst with access to U.S. and In a June 2009 communiqué issued to Iraqi Security Force officers stated: celebrate the withdrawal of U.S. forces of the Iraqi security forces “At the operational level, JRTN’s from Iraq’s cities, Izzat Ibrahim al-Duri and judiciary.” appearance of a religious connection stressed the goal of “resistance unity on gives it credibility in the eyes of the the battlefield.”32 One U.S. officer noted: population and therefore increases “We believe now that JRTN’s intent is the support offered and reduces the to coalesce as many insurgent groups… values, JRTN’s video productions have interference by the local population.”38 under a common theme of removing the consistently focused on the concerns of The analyst noted that JRTN’s stated occupiers (the Coalition Forces) from mainstream Sunnis, such as the fear of “policy of only attacking the ‘occupiers’ Iraq and, second, to overthrow the an Iranian-influenced Shi`a government and not the local population (whatever government of Iraq for a Ba`athist regime in Baghdad, concerns about Kurdish their ethnic or religious group) makes it or something similar.”33 JRTN states activities in the disputed areas (termed one of the least ‘interfered with’ terrorist “the occupied territories” by JRTN), and groupings. The population turned its general discontent about the apparent back on many of the foreign fighters but Richard Tomkins, “Analysis: Baathists Beat Nationalist chaos and corruption since the end of JRTN are still seen as Iraqis first.”39 In Drum,” UPI, June 5, 2009. This is echoed in Sharp. Ba`athist rule.35 areas along the federal-Kurdish line of 28 A good example is the interview by U.S. Army Briga- control, JRTN’s anti-Kurdish agitation dier General Craig Nixon, who is quoted in Quil Law- Alongside its messaging, JRTN has issued may have assisted its penetration of rence, “US Sees New Threat In Iraq From Sufi Sect,” targeting guidance to differentiate itself Sunni security forces. Kurdish factions National Public Radio, June 17, 2009. from AQI, most notably a commitment 29 Lieutenant Colonel Pat Proctor, “Fighting to Under- to restrict attacks to “the unbeliever- stand: A Practical Example of Design at the Battalion on personal interview, private security contact, May 12, occupier,” the JRTN descriptor for U.S. Level,” Military Review, March-April 2011. Also see ref- 2011. forces.36 Izzat Ibrahim al-Duri stated erence to this incident in Sharp. 37 In fact, JRTN appears to spend considerable resources 30 For an official statement on a JRTN and al-Qa`ida- on kinetic forms of counterintelligence, targeting judges, affiliated suicide bomb cell, see “Suspected VBIED Cell tacks,” Washington Times, June 4, 2009. police officers and the Sons of Iraq with warnings fol- Leader Arrested in Sulaymaniyah,” Multinational Force- 34 “Iraqi Resistance Announces Founding of Supreme lowed by progressively deadly uses of force. In keeping Iraq, March 2, 2010. Car bombings in Kirkuk and Tikrit Command for the Jihad and Liberation in Baghdad,” al- with Ba`athist practices, JRTN uses not only terrorism, in 2011 have also been linked to JRTN funding. This infor- Basrah.net, October 3, 2007. but also enticement: many police officers in strongholds mation is based on personal interview, U.S. intelligence 35 Izzat Ibrahim al-Duri, “Letter from the Jehad Leader like Ad Dawr receive “two pay checks”—their federal analyst, date withheld at the request of interviewee. of the Iraqi Resistance Izzat Ibrahim ad-Duri,” Jabha- and JRTN stipends—according to U.S. officers quoted in 31 The attack in question was the July 29, 2010 daylight wqs.net, May 29, 2005. Sharp. In the autumn of 2010, JRTN undertook a “con- storming and capture of an Iraqi Army checkpoint in Ad- 36 The main JRTN tactics used are long-range harass- certed campaign to overawe Iraqi Army forces in west hamiya, Baghdad. See Hayder Najm, “Al-Qaeda Main- ing tactics such as rocket fire on U.S. bases and sniper Baghdad” through massed employment of under-vehicle tains its Foothold,” Niqash, August 11, 2010. attacks, or the use of command wire-initiated roadside IEDs, according to a private security contact interviewed 32 Izzat Ibrahim al-Duri, “Message Izzat Ibrahim Al- bombs. JRTN affiliates make use of hand-thrown armor- by the author in May 2011. Duri Supreme Commander of the Fight and Liberation. piercing RKG-3 grenades and have occasionally experi- 38 Personal interview, private security analyst, March The end of June 2009,” Jabha-wqs.net, June 30, 2009. mented with armor-piercing roadside bombs related to 27, 2011. 33 Richard Tomkins, “Ba’athists Aiding Insurgent At- explosively-formed projectiles. This information is based 39 Ibid.

4 july 2011 . Vol 4 . Issue 7 recently accused JRTN of influencing distribution of funds. Larger-scale Duri is the last substantial link to the the 12th Iraqi Army division in southern contract and project-level business Ba`ath government and his leadership Kirkuk and flying JRTN’s flag on Iraqi extortion may be a source, and JRTN credentials are solid compared to other Army vehicles during anti-Kurdish also seems to draw on infusions of cash former regime elements. Nor is al-Duri protests.40 Through sympathizers in from major tribal figures in Iraq.45 The lacking in vision, which he showed the security forces, JRTN is assumed former regime diaspora is an additional when he submitted letters to President by U.S. officers to have at least some source of revenue, particularly former George W. Bush and later President basic insight into the workings of joint Republican Guard officers in Jordan and, Barack Obama, was interviewed by U.S.-Iraqi operations centers, including to a lesser extent, Syria and Yemen.46 Time Magazine, and had pronouncements Unmanned Aerial Vehicle and signals JRTN’s energetic media campaign and read out at the Arab League despite his intelligence.41 its use of Islamic motifs has also allowed changed status since 2003.48 Al-Duri the movement to capture a strong share is more than an important symbol of The apparent focus on U.S. forces (plus of the bigger, yet declining, slice of continuity since Saddam’s time: he is its capacity to intimidate local judges the external contributions coming to also a “quiet professional”—a seasoned and call upon tribal support) has earned Iraq from “armchair jihadists” in the coalition-builder with unparalleled the movement sympathetic treatment Gulf states. Some sources suggest that tribal and political ties in the Sunni by some parts of the Iraqi security Arab intelligence services, notably community. His loss could cause cracks forces and judiciary. One intelligence the Jordanian General Intelligence within the organization as its “spiritual officer from Diyala noted that his Iraqi Department, may be cultivating long- center” is in his home town of Ad Dawr counterparts “rarely stated in public term ties with JRTN with an eye to and in the Naqshbandi mosques he built that JRTN was much of a threat and countering Iranian influence in Iraq.47 there.49 every time we detained a JRTN leader, we had to fight tooth and nail to keep Outlook for JRTN The withdrawal of most or all U.S. forces them detained. In other words they JRTN, like its leader Izzat Ibrahim could be another stressful transition for did not accept that JRTN was a serious al-Duri, is a chameleon, capable of JRTN. The movement’s current raison risk to the [government of Iraq], only assuming the form that will best serve d’être—expelling U.S. forces—could dry to Americans.”42 JRTN appears to have its interests at the time. When Iraq’s up in the coming six months. JRTN is successfully used loopholes in Iraqi Sunni insurgency was stricken by already struggling to maintain the flow law that means “resistance activities” internal divisions between 2005 and of new attack videos due to reduced are not treated as seriously as crimes 2009, JRTN emerged with a message availability of U.S. targets as bases shut with Iraqi victims. According to one of unity. When public support for the down and convoy traffic declines, and analyst, this legal aspect “is one reason resistance was weakened by AQI’s this could stem the movement’s external that [JRTN] is deliberately not leaving a actions against Iraqi Sunnis, JRTN fundraising. As a result, JRTN may trail of evidence and claims connecting committed itself to a public policy of evolve its concept of resistance until it to car bombings or assassinations that not harming Iraqis whenever possible. liberation. Since 2009, JRTN has slowly target Iraqis.”43 The movement’s blend of Islamist and been moving the goalposts by parroting nationalist rhetoric and its appeal to popular fears that Iraq’s Shi`a-led Although opinions differ on the issue, Ba`ath-era nostalgia at a time of weak government is “basically a puppet of most analysts seem to agree that JRTN governance means it is squarely in- Iran and is trying to persecute Sunnis,” is relatively well-funded compared sync with the views of the population in the words of one U.S. officer.50 A to most Iraqi insurgent groups.44 it relies upon for active and passive private security analyst who monitors Localized extortion and intimidation support. Yet the strategic landscape in JRTN communiqués noted that JRTN is a mainstay for many Iraqi insurgent Iraq is changing, not least due to the had “become a more anti-Baghdad groups, including large segments of coming drawdown of U.S. forces. How organization than anti-American.”51 AQI, but JRTN appears to draw its will JRTN adapt to the potential forks in JRTN is also likely to ramp up its funding primarily through top-down the road ahead? anti-Kurdish rhetoric concerning the “occupied territories” along the federal- 40 Personal interview, Kurdistan Regional Government One change factor could be the death or Kurdish line of control. counterterrorism intelligence analyst, Sulaymaniyah, capture of Izzat Ibrahim al-Duri, quite Iraq, May 21, 2011. possibly by natural causes due to his 41 “Partnerships,” Warhorse Intel Blog, September 17, age and recurring health issues. Al- 2010. 42 “Seriously, I just need to let Diyala go,” Warhorse In- tel Blog, January 22, 2011. 45 Personal interviews, U.S. intelligence analysts, dates 43 Personal interview, U.S. intelligence analyst, date withheld at the request of interviewees. 48 “The Next Insurgency: Baathists and Salafis Pool Re- withheld at the request of interviewee. 46 Ibid. For background on the amount of money held sources to Fight Iraqi Government,” Gulf States Newslet- 44 For instance, Lieutenant Colonel Geoffrey Catlett, by former regime elements abroad, see Michael Knights, ter, September 17, 2010. commander of a U.S. battalion in the JRTN heartland of “The Role Played by Funding in the Iraq Insurgency,” 49 “Phase Used in Proctor, Fighting to Understand,” Hawija, stated that the movement was “very well-fund- Jane’s Intelligence Review, August 2005. Military Review, March-April 2011. ed.” For details on his statement, see Michael Gisick, “US 47 “Dancing with Wolves: Maliki’s Envoys Take the 50 Sharp. Targeting Insurgent Group in N. Iraq,” Stars and Stripes, Pulse of Baathists and Generals Outside Iraq,” Gulf States 51 Personal interview, private security analyst, May 10, May 25, 2010. Newsletter, May 4, 2009. 2011.

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Many U.S. analysts relay a sense that Anwar al-`Awlaqi’s can be described as the Western wing JRTN is “playing the long game” or is of the global jihadist movement, which “waiting us out.”52 JRTN may shift its Disciples: Three Case seeks to give more resonance to the balance to non-U.S. targets in a switch Studies Salafi-jihadi ideology among Western toward the second of its stated aims: Muslims. Social scientists have long changing the nature of government in By Alexander Meleagrou-Hitchens debated the importance of leadership Iraq. This may result in a narrowing of in mobilizing and recruiting members its operations and use of affiliates and in since 9/11, the terrorist threat to the of social movement organizations, and greater numbers of deniable operations West has evolved. Attacks planned of particular concern has been how against Iraqis. Although its maximal or carried out against the U.S. and to strike the right balance between aims are unachievable, it is conceivable British homelands increasingly involve acknowledging both the importance of that elements of JRTN could slip onto young Muslims living in the West. individual human agency and the critical the edges of the political spectrum in This new specter of what is commonly role of the Weberian “charismatic Iraq as advocates of the Sunna who referred to as “homegrown terrorism” authority” of a respected and (perceived outwardly shed their affiliations to demonstrates that Salafi-jihadi to be) knowledgeable leader.1 the Ba`ath Party and even al-Duri and messaging and propaganda has to some JRTN. extent succeeded in convincing Western This article argues the importance Muslims that jihad is not strictly a of focusing on the latter, taking into The Ba`ath Party—including a young foreign concept practiced by villagers in account the role of the leader as one who, Izzat Ibrahim al-Duri—spent five years Afghanistan and multimillionaire Arab according to Tarrow, uses “contention seeking to get back into power between war veterans, but is one that they too to exploit political opportunities, create 1963 and 1968. The process of recovering can embrace. In addition, global jihadist collective identities” and mobilize power was incremental and well- ideologues have effectively conveyed individuals “against more powerful planned. It is difficult at the present that the death and suffering meted out opponents.”2 Having now tasked himself time to assess the extent to which JRTN against Muslims is no longer confined with “selling” Salafi-jihadi ideology has contributed to the season of high- to far-away lands, but is evident in their to Western Muslims, al-`Awlaqi’s tempo assassinations in Baghdad, but own countries. From the United States function as a leader who is able to frame a portion of the killings are probably to Sweden, this propaganda argues that the movement’s ideology in a manner traceable to the movement. This kind the “Crusader West’s” long-running that resonates with the interests, values, of carefully parsed violence that kills conspiracy to destroy Islam and Muslims and beliefs of his target audience is few but intimidates many is typical of is real and expanding, and Western crucial, as is his ability to articulate the Ba`ath Party and may point to the Muslims must follow in the footsteps of grievances and apply the religious future evolution of a slimmer, post- the heroes of Islam and take up the call ideology to formulate and justify violent occupation JRTN movement.53 to arms before it is too late. Although responses.3 ahistorical and often counterfactual, Dr. Michael Knights is the Lafer fellow at The this narrative is supported by using As both the United States and a number Washington Institute for Near East Policy. simplistic interpretations of Islamic of European governments create and He has been writing on Iraq since the 1990s scripture and early history, making it adjust policies aimed at countering and is the author of four books and the editor easy to grasp and convincing. domestic radicalization, they will need of one anthology on Saddam-era and post-war to fully comprehend these details. By Iraq. Dr. Knights has operated extensively in Indeed, although the reasons why some examining a number of case studies of Iraq as the head of analysis at Olive Group, Western Muslims have planned or al-`Awlaqi’s followers who have been a security provider with over 3,000 days of carried out attacks within their home mobilized, this article aims to contribute consecutive operations in Iraq. countries are numerous and complex, in to this understanding. the vast majority of recent cases there exists one basic constant: the embrace of a primarily grievance-driven and

religious ideology, often with the aid of 1 For a comprehensive discussion of this debate, see the sermons and lectures of an ideologue Aldon Morris and Suzanne Staggenborg, “Leadership who has an intimate grasp of Western in Social Movements” in David Snow, Sarah Soule and culture and is perceived by his followers Hanspeter Kriesi eds., The Blackwell Companion to Social to be pious and knowledgeable. Movements (Hoboken, NJ: Wiley-Blackwell, 2004). For Weber’s theory of charismatic leadership, see Max We- 52 Personal interview, private security analyst, March As has been well documented, Anwar ber et al., Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive 27, 2011. Also see Colonel Burt Thompson, quoted in al-`Awlaqi is among the most popular Sociology (Somerville, NJ: Bedminster Press, 1968). Tomkins, “Analysis: Baathists Beat Nationalist Drum.” of such ideologues. The question in 2 Sidney Tarrow, Power in Movement: Social Movements 53 Izzat Ibrahim al-Duri laid out the rationale for coun- many cases is not whether al-`Awlaqi and Contentious Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge Univer- ter-stability targeting when he stated: “Kill the traitors successfully conveyed both the “war sity Press, 1998). and stooges, pursue them and strike them down. Do not on Islam” narrative and the religious 3 For more on framing and frame resonance, see Robert allow for any stability, because stability serves the enemy imperative to react with violence, but Benford and David Snow, “Framing Processes and Social and his puppets.” See al-Duri, “Letter from the Jehad rather how he has achieved this. He is Movements: An Overview and Assessment,” Annual Re- Leader of the Iraqi Resistance Izzat Ibrahim ad-Duri.” one of the ideological leaders of what view of Sociology 26 (2000).

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Rajib and Tehzeeb Karim acceptable for a Muslim if undertaken Alongside this teaching is also the In late February 2011, British Airways in pursuance of “the jihadi cause.” doctrine of al-wala’ wa’l-bara’ (loyalty and employee Rajib Karim was convicted disavowal), which calls for Muslims in Britain for conspiring with Anwar The e-mails also provide researchers to reject non-Muslim practices and al-`Awlaqi to assist in orchestrating with useful information on what avoid relationships with unbelievers.6 an attack on an airliner, as well as particular elements of al-`Awlaqi’s Described by al-`Awlaqi in “44 Ways pass along critical information on message resonated with Rajib who, to Support Jihad” as a “central element airport security measures.4 In the days unlike his brother, lived in the West. of our military creed,” he argued that immediately following the trial, Scotland In al-`Awlaqi’s translation of Yusuf this doctrine is crucial to the success Yard released transcripts of sections al-`Uyayri’s “Constants on the Path of of jihad in the West. Without a proper of Karim’s e-mail correspondence Jihad,” his primary concern was two- grasp of both their globally conscious with both his Yemen-based brother, fold: to make the global war on Islam Islamic identity and the hatred they Tehzeeb, who was helping him get in a reality for Western Muslims, and to must harbor toward their non-Muslim contact with the ideologue, and with prove that violent jihad or migration neighbors and colleagues, Western al-`Awlaqi himself. These provide rare (hijra) are the only possible and Muslims cannot achieve the goals of the and valuable insights into the mind of religiously acceptable responses. He global movement. an al-`Awlaqi disciple. argued that Muslims in the West are in The stark choices of either flight or Upon reading the messages, Karim’s and “Al-`Awlaqi framed violence offered by al-`Awlaqi clearly Tehzeeb’s reverence for the “shaykh” had an impact on Rajib Karim, who who they considered to be a spiritual attempts by both on January 29, 2010 wrote to him leader is beyond doubt, as is the fact that Western governments describing his fear of becoming a munafiq their resolve to assist in, or carry out, an due to having co-existed peacefully with attack was immeasurably strengthened and many Western non-Muslims in Britain for so long: after making direct contact with him. Muslim organizations to In a message to al-`Awlaqi, Tehzeeb Dear shaykh…I always write to my described how they viewed him as a reinterpret jihad along brother saying how depressed I legitimate interpreter of God’s will: more non-violent lines as am living in Britain and how I hate myself for not making hijra and it fills our heart with happiness to part of the concerted effort also not being able to do anything be in direct communication with to destroy ‘pure’ Islam, and here…from the moment I entered you. only allah knows what we this country my niya [intention] feel about you. and this is from therefore an ideological was to do something for the deen the honor which allah bestows on element of the multifaceted [religion], it was not to make a those who honor his words and his living here and start enjoying life deen [religion] and its sanctities.5 war on the religion and its in this country. As month after followers.” month and then slowly years went Similarly, Rajib told al-`Awlaqi how by without anything happening much “respect and love” he had for him, and also not being able to have and that hearing directly from him was any concrete plans to do anything a “blessing from allah” that “gave me an identical situation to that faced by the here, my iman [faith] was getting hope.” Upon offering to take a job as a Prophet Muhammad and his followers affected. I started feeling like a flight attendant, he informed al-`Awlaqi in pre-Islamic Mecca, where they were real munafiq [hypocrite]. It has been of his concerns about having to take part persecuted and forced to make the hijra three years that I have been living in activities that are forbidden in Islam, to Medina and subsequently fight jihad. here away from the company of such as serving alcohol and non-halal Thus, any Muslim who lives peacefully good brothers and spending a food. In what is an illustration of how in the lands of the “enemies of Islam” good part of my working day with much emphasis he placed on gaining is a munafiq (religious hypocrite), as he the kuffar [non-Muslims]. religious sanction for his actions, as well has rejected jihad, instead choosing as what sort of role al-`Awlaqi plays to “customize” the religion to suit Karim’s e-mails demonstrate that the for potential terrorists, Rajib asked the a particular geographic location. tension between fulfilling the required preacher if he could provide him with Proclaiming that “Muhammad did not criteria laid out by al-`Awlaqi and al- a dalil (Islamic scriptural evidence), customize Islam based on his location… Qa`ida for being a “true” Muslim and which proved that taking the job was he customized the location based on living peacefully among non-Muslims Islam,” al-`Awlaqi framed attempts

4 “Terror Plot BA Man Rajib Karim Gets 30 Years,” by both Western governments and 6 For more on this doctrine, see, for example, Muham- BBC, March 18, 2011. many Western Muslim organizations to mad Saeed al-Qahtani, Al-Wala’ wal Bara’: According to 5 The transcripts of the e-mails between al-`Awlaqi and reinterpret jihad along more non-violent the Aqeedah of the Salaf (London: al-Firdous, 1993); Joas the Karim brothers were released by the Metropolitan lines as part of the concerted effort to Wagemakers, ‘The Transformation of a Radical Concept: Police in February 2011. They have been reproduced here destroy “pure” Islam, and therefore an al wala’ wal bara’ in the Ideology of Abu Muhammed al- in their original syntax, including all spelling and gram- ideological element of the multifaceted Maqdisi,” in Roel Meijer ed., Global Salafism: Islam’s New matical errors. war on the religion and its followers. Religious Movement (London: Hurst & Company, 2009).

7 july 2011 . Vol 4 . Issue 7 in a country run by a secular democratic As with many of his other arguments, Like Rajib Karim, he is also conscious of government can become overwhelming this is by no means an original concept, the ultimatum offered by al-`Awlaqi to for a small number of Western Muslims, yet he is aware that the conceptualization Muslims living peacefully in the West as obliging them to seek out ways to of jihad is one of the defining debates supposed munafiqin, and sees two options counterbalance their situation. being had by Muslims in the West, available for the “true” follower: both among themselves and with wider Faisal Shahzad Western society. As different Islamic I urge my brothers and sisters and In the months following Faisal organizations and sects vie for influence all the Muslims living abroad to Shahzad’s arrest for attempting to either immigrate, migrate as soon detonate a car bomb in New York “By their own accounts, the as possible to the Muslim nation City’s Times Square in May 2010, a or if you die you will die in kufr… video was released by his patrons in the majority of ‘homegrown’ But today, alhamdulillah [praise Pakistani Taliban showing him offering Salafi-jihadis join the God], I am among them [the non- explanations for his actions while Muslims] and planning to wage an training in the mountains of Waziristan global jihad out of a sincere attack inside America.10 in Pakistan. Among the inspirations he belief that they are acting is reported to have cited to interrogators Zachary Adam Chesser (also known as Abu was the work of Anwar al-`Awlaqi, and upon a religious mandate Talha al-Amrikee) a close analysis of the video certainly to defend themselves and The Prophet Muhammad cartoon suggests this to be the case.7 Indeed, controversy that began in Denmark during his address he took a moment to their fellow Muslims from in 2005 and reached its peak during thank “those shaykhs who are spreading what they perceive to be the following four years represented a da`wa in English…talking about jihad, seminal moment for Islam in the West. out loud,” claiming that “it’s because of a conspiracy to destroy Since it began, it has sparked numerous those shaykhs that I’m probably here them.” debates surrounding the reconciliation today.”8 His justifications for violence of Islam and Western society, including appear closely related to those found in whether or not this is a requirement al-`Awlaqi’s “Constants,” in particular and, if so, if it is at all possible. al-`Awlaqi’s interpretation of jihad among young Western Muslims, al- as a duty (fard) equal to, if not above, `Awlaqi seeks to provide ideological Those who have used the issue to prove the more common Islamic practices of ammunition for the minority of Salafi- the fundamental incompatibility of the prayer, fasting and the Hajj pilgrimage. jihadi followers. He also used this two come in many different forms, from Quoting Qur’an 2:216 and 2:183, al- argument as further proof of the war on conservative non-Muslim commentators `Awlaqi argued that: Islam, claiming that by working against who argue that Islam represents a threat jihad, Western governments are actively to some of the basic intellectual precepts Allah says, “Fighting has been preventing Muslims from carrying out of Western civilization, to small groups prescribed upon you and you their divinely ordained duties to both the of Salafi-jihadis who have taken the dislike it, but it is possible that defense and spread of their religion. opportunity to inflame communal you dislike a thing which is good tensions and depict the cartoons as part for you and you love a thing This interpretation of jihad was clearly of the Western campaign to destroy which is bad for you. But Allah not lost on Shahzad, who used the Islam.11 Among the most egregious knows and you know not.” This same Qur’anic references as al-`Awlaqi examples of the latter was a February ayah [verse] says that fighting is (which refer to the ordained obligations 2006 march in London organized by prescribed upon you, so it is a fard, of jihad and fasting respectively) to the now banned Salafi-jihadi group al- it’s an instruction from Allah… make the same point about jihad in his Muhajiroun, in which protesters held They [jihad and fasting] are both video address: up placards calling for the abolition of in Surah al-Baqarah. Fighting is free speech and the murder of anyone prescribed upon you and fasting is One of the most prominent things deemed to have insulted the Prophet prescribed upon you; so how come in Islam...when I came to it, is Muhammad or Islam.12 we are treating them differently? jihad. People do prayer, they... give zakat [obligatory charitable donations], they do fasting, they go to Hajj, but they follow part of it [Islam], but they don’t follow the 7 “Times Square Bomb Suspect had Links to Terror other part of it, which is fighting Preacher,” Daily Telegraph, May 7, 2010; “Sources: in the cause of Allah…I don’t Shahzad Had Contact With Awlaki, Taliban Chief, and understand why people follow one of 10 Ibid. Mumbai Massacre Mastermind,” ABC News, May 6, the commandments, but they don’t 11 For an example of the former, see, Christopher 2010. follow the other commandment... Caldwell, Reflections on the Revolution in Europe (New 9 8 These quotes are drawn from Faisal Shahzad’s video they are equally important. York: Doubleday, 2009). announcement, which was available on various jihadist 12 “Cartoon Controversy Spreads Throughout Muslim web forums. 9 Ibid. World,” Guardian, February 4, 2006.

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Again showing an acute awareness Sword and the One Who Curses the Messenger), Conclusion of issues that concern many Western by medieval Hanbali scholar Ibn In each of the cases cited above, Muslims, al-`Awlaqi used the Taymiyya: al-`Awlaqi’s involvement as the controversy to further develop his “war charismatic, ideological leader appears on Islam” frame and progress the aims He [al-Ashraf] spoke against to be an important factor, with two of of the global jihad. In May 2008, shortly us. He spoke against me and he the three explicitly referring to him as following his release from prison in defamed me with his poetry. the main inspiration for their actions. Yemen, he gave a lecture entitled “The And then he made it clear to the At some stage, both Chesser and Karim Dust Will Never Settle Down,” in which Jews—if any one of you, you the were in e-mail contact with him, and he again interwove Islamic texts and Yahood [Jews], or the mushrikeen though that surely strengthened their history with the present day to justify [polytheists], if any one of you try resolve, it is not necessarily always a the Salafi-jihadi call for violence. Given to defame me through your words, prerequisite for action.17 as a live lecture via an online chat room, this [the sword] will be the way the publicity for the talk was posted on we deal with you. By their own accounts, the majority many of the leading English-language of “homegrown” Salafi-jihadis join Islamist forums. It assured readers After the airing of an episode of the the global jihad out of a sincere belief that the preacher would provide the American-animated TV series South Park, that they are acting upon a religious Islamic solution to this problem and in which the Prophet Muhammad and the mandate to defend themselves and explain “what is the ruling of Shari`a on controversy surrounding his depiction their fellow Muslims from what they such incidents [insulting the Prophet were given the usual satirical treatment perceive to be a conspiracy to destroy Muhammad] and how did the Sahaba by its producers, Trey Parker and Matt them. This has, in part, taken place [followers of the Prophet Muhammad] Stone, the death threats that followed due to the propaganda efforts of al- deal with such people and what do our owed much to al-`Awlaqi. Zachary Qa`ida and its affiliates. Through his scholars say about them.”13 Adam Chesser, who was involved with charismatic delivery and background the English-language Salafi-jihadi as a respected preacher in the United One of the disciples al-`Awlaqi chose website www.revolutionmuslim.com, States, al-`Awlaqi in particular has to illustrate his point is Muhammad used the lecture to legitimize a posting succeeded in putting Salafi-jihadi ibn Maslama who, according to a hadith on the group’s site in which he claimed interpretations of Islam and Islamic in Sahih Bukhari, was tasked by the that: history against the backdrop of Prophet Muhammad to find and kill Western discursive trends and broader Ka’ab ibn al-Ashraf, a poet and Jewish We have to warn Matt and Trey political developments chiefly related tribal leader in pre-Islamic Mecca who that what they are doing is stupid to the position of Muslims in the West, wrote poems insulting the Prophet and they will probably wind up Western foreign policy and the globally Muhammad and lamenting the victory like Theo Van Gogh [a Dutch film conscious concept of the umma. of the Muslims over the Quraish in director murdered after making the Battle of Badr. The passion in al- a film criticizing Islam] if they Work to counter this messaging `Awlaqi’s praise for Ibn Maslama’s zeal do air this show…Join us in this is currently being undertaken by and devotion to the Prophet Muhammad campaign to let Matt Stone & Trey policymakers, think-tanks and other was rivaled only by that shown in Parker know that…the dust will civil society organizations throughout his criticism of modern day Western never settle down.15 the Western world. As these and many Muslims who have allowed this to go other case studies demonstrate, the role unpunished: Chesser, who was by this time in e-mail of ideology and its delivery through contact with al-`Awlaqi, included in charismatic leaders must be firmly How concerned are you? How this posting a video made by Revolution taken into account. concerned are we when it comes to Muslim which announced the beginning the honor of Rasool, when it comes of the “Defense of the Prophet Alexander Meleagrou-Hitchens is a to the honor of Islam, when it Campaign,” depicting pictures from the Ph.D. candidate and Research Fellow at comes to the book of Allah? How South Park episode accompanied by the the International Centre for the Study of serious do we take it?...We want audio of al-`Awlaqi’s lecture. Chesser Radicalisation and Political Violence, the spirit of the Sahaba.14 would later be convicted in the United King’s College, London. He is author of States for providing material support to the forthcoming pamphlet “As American A clear call for violent action against terrorists, communicating threats and as Apple Pie: Anwar al-Awlaki’s Jihad the modern day al-Ashrafs, he quoted soliciting others to threaten violence.16 Against the West.” the Prophet Muhammad’s justification taken from an account given in As-Saram Al-Maslool `Ala Shatim Ar-Rasul (The Drawn 15 This blog has since been removed from the internet. 13 This promotion of al-`Awlaqi’s live online lecture ap- Copies are in the author’s possession. peared on, among other places, www.sunniforum.com. 16 “Man who Threatened ‘South Park’ Creators Gets 25 14 Anwar al-`Awlaqi, ‘The Dust Will Never Settle Years in Prison,” CNN, February 24, 2011; “Abu Talhah 17 See, for example, the British case of Roshonara Down,” May 2008, available on various Islamist web Al-Amrikee: An Extensive Online Footprint,” Anti-Def- Choudhry, who was directly inspired by al-`Awlaqi’s forums. amation League, February 25, 2011. work, but never made any contact with him.

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one jihadist group in conflict with assassinations, cemetery desecrations Will Al-Qa`ida and Al- another, would have undermined al- and campaigns of intimidation, which Shabab Formally Merge? Qa`ida’s narrative on unity, integration have alienated it from the public, may and growth, and invited criticism from be viewed with concern by al-Qa`ida— By Leah Farrall within the militant milieu. Thus, despite particularly given backlashes it has al-Shabab’s reemphasis of its allegiance previously faced from franchisees’ in september 2009, al-Shabab, in early 2010, no invitation to join al- use of violent tactics against civilian the Somalia-based jihadist group, Qa`ida was forthcoming.4 populations. Another factor may be released a video in which it made a reluctance on the part of al-Qa`ida to public declaration of allegiance to Since then, however, al-Shabab take on a group where, although public al-Qa`ida leader Usama bin Ladin.1 and Hisbul Islamiyya have unified, statements of ideological affinity are The declaration was in support of al- finalizing their lengthy “negotiations” made, the reality on the ground may be Shabab’s campaign to align itself with with a December 2010 agreement and such that a parochial focus dominates al-Qa`ida’s global agenda and to be statement outlining their shared goals.5 its agenda and actions. included under its banner. Despite this The prolonged period of “negotiation” and subsequent statements, however, was primarily over the scope and purpose Perhaps in recognition of the dominance al-Shabab did not secure an invitation of the jihad in Somalia. Hisbul Islamiyya of this focus, al-Qa`ida’s interest in to become an al-Qa`ida franchise. had a more limited geographical focus, Somalia during the last few years of Instead, al-Qa`ida’s senior leadership and a different manhaj (program) than Bin Ladin’s leadership appeared largely maintained its position of general al-Shabab.6 These differences were limited to its value as a location for support for the conflict in Somalia in relation to not only the scope and supporting external operations.9 Al- and provided al-Shabab with behind the methods of jihad in Somalia, but also Qa`ida’s new leader, Ayman al-Zawahiri, scenes assistance. With Bin Ladin dead, the future Islamic state they envisioned appears to have a stronger focus on however, al-Qa`ida’s new leadership for the country and the region more acquiring territory and expanding areas may decide it wants al-Shabab after all, generally.7 Their unification statement under mujahidin control. This focus and that the benefits of a merger at a time showed the triumph, at least on paper, was evident in 2005 when al-Zawahiri when al-Qa`ida needs to project power of al-Shabab and its more global placed emphasis on the importance and influence outweigh any lingering agenda for jihad. This is visible in the of securing territory and establishing concerns about al-Shabab’s suitability. goals outlined in the statement, which emirates in correspondence between Yet how likely is such a merger? included a commitment to work for him and the then leader of al-Qa`ida the restoration of Islamic sanctities, in Iraq.10 Al-Shabab’s nominal control For the past few years, al-Qa`ida has freeing of Muslim prisoners, and the over territory may thus make it a more been cautious in its acquisition of unification of the umma.8 This language attractive candidate for a merger.11 new franchises and avoided taking on was in line with al-Qa`ida’s own manhaj organizations that were not the leading and position. Yet despite al-Shabab’s Al-Zawahiri and others in al-Qa`ida’s group in the territory where they efforts, still no merger has taken place. senior leadership might also take a operated.2 Around the time it made its more positive view of al-Shabab because September 2009 declaration, al-Shabab This article examines the likelihood of a its unification statement with Hisbul was not the unchallenged, leading merger between al-Qa`ida and al-Shabab Islamiyya specifically emphasized group in Somalia. It was embroiled in and analyzes the factors that may lead to a desire to establish an emirate in conflict with Hisbul Islamiyya—another or hinder such a merger taking place. Somalia. Once an emirate is established, jihadist organization whose leadership the narrative can be presented that it is had links to al-Qa`ida.3 Acquiring al- New Leadership, New Position on Al-Shabab? obligatory to help defend it from threat Shabab while it was involved in conflict Al-Qa`ida’s reticence to pursue mergers via providing support and wherever with Hisbul Islamiyya, and supporting with groups whose actions could possible immigrating to assist.12 Thus, bring harm to its “brand” and make it even if the establishment of an emirate 1 The title of the video was “At your service, Osama,” and vulnerable to criticism from within the does not necessarily attract more was released on September 20, 2009. militant milieu may be one reason for internal on-the-ground support or 2 For details on al-Qa`ida’s approach to franchise acqui- the absence to date of a merger between change little in the way the jihad against sition, see Leah Farrall, “How al Qaeda Works,” Foreign the two groups. Al-Shabab’s use of the Transitional Federal Government Affairs, March/April 2011. 3 The links were formed in the early 1990s when al- 4 Sarah Childress, “Somalia’s Al Shabab to Ally with Al 9 This observation is drawn from a review of detainee Qa`ida was providing Somali groups with training for Qaeda,” Wall Street Journal, February 2, 2010. commentary and information contained in the Wikileaks jihad, including some persons who would rise to leader- 5 Harakat al-Shabab al-Mujahideen and Hizbul Islami, Guantanamo detainee document collection. ship positions in Hisbul Islamiyya. For useful informa- “The Year of Unity,” al-Kataib Foundation for Media 10 This correspondence, a July 2005 letter to Abu tion on the nature of these links, see documents covering Production, December 2010. Mus`ab al-Zarqawi, is available at www.globalsecurity. al-Qa`ida’s Somalia sojourn in the Combating Terror- 6 Ibid. org/security/library/report/2005/zawahiri-zarqawi- ism Center’s Harmony database. For a useful summary 7 This future state as envisaged by some militant groups letter_9jul2005.htm. of the conflict between al-Shabab and Hisbul Islamiyya in Somalia is broader than the country’s borders and 11 “The Year of Unity.” that took place in October 2009, see Alex Thurston, “Al encompasses Somali ethnic regions, in what some term 12 This narrative ties into arguments used by militant Shabab, Hizbul Islam, and a War Within Somalia’s Civil “Greater Somalia.” Salafists on the requirement to undertake hijra to help in War,” Sahel Blog, October 5, 2009. 8 Ibid. the building and defense of an Islamic state.

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(TFG) and the African Union Mission based solely on seniority, remains unclear. Al-Shabab may also be less than in Somalia (AMISOM) is conducted, This is because there is little visibility of committed to a merger in spite of public it could have particular potency for al-Shabab’s manhaj—if in fact its manhaj statements to the contrary. As Anzalone those outside Somalia radicalized to a has developed beyond mere sloganeering notes, militant Salafist worldview. In this way, to the point where it addresses issues of declaring the establishment of an emirate merger and unification.16 there is a strong element of can help garner additional material, rhetorical strategy in al-Shabaab financial and ideological support. It is clear, however, that in the leaders’ referencing of OBL and aftermath of Bin Ladin’s death, al- other AQ ideologues. It allows them While al-Shabab and Hisbul Islamiyya Shabab has shown no signs of moving to potentially expand an already presumably authored their unity away from its public support for al- limited recruiting base by tapping statement intending to pursue the Qa`ida. It has recognized al-Zawahiri into broader themes related to “the establishment of an emirate regardless as al-Qa`ida’s new amir and reiterated Ummah,” [but] there is a difference of any future merger, al-Qa`ida’s its oath of allegiance.17 Although words between this ideological affinity and tendency to be predatory may see of allegiance are significant, the reality necessarily wanting to merge with it push for al-Shabab to become a of how such an oath might translate al Qaeda central officially.20 franchise if an emirate is established to into a closer relationship, including exercise influence over it.13 Such a move the possibility of a merger, is more In Anzalone’s view, al-Shabab may may not engender local support.14 In the complex. Christopher Anzalone, a seek to become a franchise if it became past, however, an absence of broad local doctoral candidate at McGill University further weakened and its leadership support has not stopped militant groups who has produced some excellent and “believed that a formal merger would from making such declarations. incisive work on al-Shabab, makes the help them stave off final defeat.”21 These important point that while al-Shabab are all valid points worthy of analytical Additionally, al-Zawahiri and others may be “using a transnational-type consideration. may ascribe to the view shared by some message akin to al Qaeda central,” they figures in al-Qa`ida (and the militant “can get the benefits...that they want Conversely, al-Shabab’s most recent milieu more generally) that a presence from this type of militant transnational statement pledging allegiance to al- in Somalia would hold great strategic Islamism, while still maintaining their Qa`ida’s new amir made particular value for their global jihad. Somalia organizational independence.”18 The reference to the organization’s guiding has long been seen as a useful rear murkiness of al-Shabab’s command role. In this respect, the loss of Fazul base of support for jihadist activity in structure and manhaj means that it is Mohammad as a trusted envoy and source not only Africa, but also the Arabian difficult to discern whether its efforts to of guidance could result in al-Shabab Peninsula. It has also been viewed as a align ideologically are a way of tapping intensifying efforts to seek a closer useful location from where training can into support networks while remaining relationship between the two groups.22 be conducted and external operations independent. It is also difficult to know Additionally, al-Shabab’s leaders planned.15 While al-Qa`ida may push exactly how al-Shabab would approach might follow guidance outlining that forward for these reasons, a key a merger or how much authority it regardless of the strength of their own question is whether al-Shabab would would willingly cede, particularly since position, a newer group should merge willingly cede to its authority. al-Qa`ida’s recent leadership losses with the older, more senior group.23 include Fazul Abdullah Mohammad Here, too, it is difficult to determine Will Al-Shabab Commit? (also known as Fadil Harun), its senior whether al-Shabab adheres to such There is a lack of information of envoy in Somalia who could have played manhaj guidelines and prescriptions. the composition of al-Shabab’s a crucial role in assisting negotiations Yet even if al-Shabab were to pursue senior leadership and in particular between the two groups.19 a merger with al-Qa`ida as the older, knowledge of their position on merger more senior group, the sticking point of and precedence. Al-Shabab clearly 16 For the presentation of the theme of unity and call for ceding authority would likely remain, preferences a doctrine of unity, but in a year of unity, see “The Year of Unity.” Additionally, despite its public welcoming of al- what form it envisages this, and whether Abu Mansoor al-Amriki alleged that al-Shabab follows Qa`ida’s guiding hand. or not it would cede authority to al-Qa`ida al-Qa`ida’s manhaj, although his claim was remarkably short on confirming details. ity of personal connections, important to these types of 13 For an explanation of al-Qa`ida’s predatory history, 17 This statement was first made by radio and has since negotiations. Some reporting has emerged claiming that which while led by Bin Ladin is also codified as an orga- been disseminated by al-Shabab’s media house. For a Fazul Mohammad was betrayed by al-Shabab elements nizational policy of sorts, see Farrall. summary, see “Al-Shabab Al-Mujahideen Pledge Al- unhappy with his role in the organization, however the 14 See Greste’s account of the view of Hassan Had on al- legiance to Al-Zawahiri,” Middle East Media Research veracity of this information remains in doubt. See, for Shabab taking over in Peter Greste, “Somalia: Inside the Institute, June 20, 2011, available at www.thememriblog. example, www.bar-kulan.com/2011/06/15/aswj-says- Land of Bandits” The Telegraph, July 20, 2011. org/blog_personal/en/38601.htm. al-shabaab-behind-fazul%E2%80%99s-death/. 15 This is evident in documentation from al-Qa`ida’s ear- 18 Personal interview, Christopher Anzalone, June 3, 20 Ibid. ly foray into Somalia, available via the Combating Ter- 2011. 21 Ibid. rorism Center’s harmony collection. It can also be seen in 19 Fazul Mohammad died on June 8, 2011 in a gunfight 22 See “Al-Shabab Al-Mujahideen Pledge Allegiance to a review of detainee accounts in the Wikipedia collection with Somali forces at a TFG checkpoint in Mogadishu. Al-Zawahiri.” of documents relating to Guantanamo detainees as well While other substantial links between the groups exist, 23 For an explanation of this in relation to al-Qa`ida’s as in the work of ideologues such as Abu Saad al-Amili. Fazul Mohammad’s had historical depth and continu- franchise acquisition, see Farrall.

11 july 2011 . Vol 4 . Issue 7

Although franchises have operational on support from the Somali diaspora.7 autonomy in terms of local planning, The Somali Diaspora: A Indeed, a number of Western Muslims, this takes place under broadly agreed Key Counterterrorism Ally including Americans, have traveled to upon parameters because in a franchise Somalia to fight with al-Shabab. Some situation, a group conducts operations By Major Josh Richardson of these Westerners became suicide under the al-Qa`ida name. Since al- bombers for the group. The Kampala Shabab retains a strong local and the death of Fazul Abdullah Accord has, in an oddly positive way, regional focus, it may seek to retain Mohammad (also known as Fadil provided the international community the option to pursue attacks related Harun), al-Qa`ida’s top commander in with additional time to press recent to these objectives how it sees fit. It is East Africa, at a Mogadishu checkpoint counterterrorism successes and set the unclear how al-Qa`ida’s new leadership in June 2011 counts as another in a conditions for a more stable Somalia. would view such a move and the loss of string of blows to the global terrorism Engagement with the Somali diaspora Fazul Mohammad may have removed network.1 This rare good news story, is a crucial element toward any future an influential figure who could help however, was bracketed by a number stability. negotiate these issues in al-Qa`ida’s of domestic setbacks in Somalia. A May favor. Two key questions therefore 30 suicide attack carried out in part The Somali Diaspora: Stakeholders in a Stable emerge. How receptive would al-Shabab by a member of the Somali-American Future be to ceding authority in exchange diaspora claimed the lives of two Although some Somalis living outside for operating as a franchise under al- soldiers from the African Union Mission of the homeland left as a result of civil Qa`ida’s banner, particularly with a in Somalia (AMISOM),2 and on June 10 war in the 1980s, the vast majority new leadership in place? How might al- the Somali minister of the interior and emigrated due to the cycles of famine Qa`ida feel about an al-Shabab franchise national security was killed by a suicide and war that have characterized the less inclined to take its direction? bomber in his home, who happened to failed state period since the collapse be his niece.3 The minister’s death came of the Siad Barre regime in 1991.8 The Conclusion one day after the Somali Transitional Somali diaspora is estimated at 1-1.5 Al-Qa`ida has a new leadership that Federal Government (TFG) signed million people worldwide—150,000 finds itself with the strategic imperative the Kampala Accord, extending the of whom live in the United States, of needing to stamp its authority on the government transitional period an half of that number having arrived organization and to find a way to reinforce additional year.4 since 2000.9 Many entered as asylum al-Qa`ida’s power and preeminence. seekers, escaping war and famine only These changed circumstances might As recent statements and actions to cluster in Western urban areas high drive new thinking in relation to the indicate, the United States increasingly in poverty and crime.10 Still, many cost benefit calculations of merging al- views Somalia and the region as a critical others, such as Somalia’s recently Shabab with al-Qa`ida, even with Fazul front in the effort to defeat al-Qa`ida.5 ousted prime minister,11 gain dual Mohammad’s death. A new franchise in This places increased pressure on al- 6 Somalia offers one potential solution to Shabab, an organization that relies pp. 14-16. For a listing of al-Shabab suicide operations al-Qa`ida’s current inaction, and brings from 2006-2009, visit www.longwarjournal.org/ar- with it several appreciable benefits. A 1 For more on Fazul Mohammad, his death, and Soma- chives/2010/01/shabaab_suicide_bomb.php. merger would reinforce its relevance lia’s reaction, see Abdi Sheikh, “Somalia Vows to Defeat 7 This is especially true for its suicide operations. See Bill and unity of purpose. It would also al-Qaida After Killing Fazul Abdullah Mohammed,” Roggio, “Shabaab Suicide Bomber was Danish Citizen,” provide a resource cheap means for Reuters, June 12, 2011. The Long War Journal, December 9, 2009. al-Qa`ida to demonstrate its ongoing 2 The suicide attacker from Minnesota, 27-year-old 8 Khadra Elmi, “Distant Voices and the Ties that Bind importance—perhaps more quickly and Farah Mohamed Beledi, left the United States for So- Identity, Politics and Somali Diaspora Youth,” Accord 21 possibly even more effectively in some malia in October 2009. For more, see Amy Forliti, “FBI (2010). target audiences than undertaking a Confirms 1 Suicide Bomber in Last Week’s Attack in 9 Laura Hammond et al., “Cash and Compassion: The terrorist spectacular. Although much Mogadishu, Somalia, was Minnesota Man,” Associated Role of the Somali Diaspora in Relief, Development and remains unknown about the state of Press, June 9, 2011. Peace-Building,” UNDP Somalia, January 2011, pp. 1, 29. the relationship between al-Shabab 3 Rashid Nuune, Mohamed Odowa, and Yusuf Hagi, 10 Ibid., pp. 29-30. and al-Qa`ida, in light of the changed “Blast Kills Interior Minister: Minister’s Niece is Alleged 11 As stated in paragraph 4.c. of the Kampala Accord: circumstances of both groups, this Suicide Bomber,” SomaliaReport.com, June 10, 2011. “within 30 days of the signing of this agreement, the relationship is one that bears closer 4 The accord acknowledges that Somalia is not stable Prime Minister will resign from his position; and the scrutiny. enough to hold national elections in 2011, and includes a President will appoint a new Prime Minister.” Somali declaration from Ugandan President Museveni to over- Prime Minister Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed’s forced Leah Farrall is the founder of the blog All see the extended mandate. resignation caused widespread protests in Mogadishu. Things Counter Terrorism. She was formerly 5 Mark Mazzetti and Eric Schmitt, “U.S. Expands its Many Somalis noted that he was the only honest politi- a senior counterterrorism intelligence Drone War into Somalia,” New York Times, July 2, 2011. cian in the country; they attributed his ouster to back- analyst with the Australian Federal 6 Harakat al-Shabab al-Mujahideen, also known as al- room politics, and they fear that rampant corruption will Police. Shabaab or “the youth,” is descendent of al-Itihad al-Is- return with his departure. He was living and working in lami (AIAI), a Somali militant group from the mid-1990s. the United States before returning to Somalia to take the For more, see Claude Heller, “Report of the Monitoring position of prime minister. See Jeffrey Gettleman, “So- Group on Somalia Pursuant to Security Council Reso- mali Prime Minister Resigns as Part of a Political Deal,” lution 1853 (2008),” United Nations, March 10, 2010, New York Times, June 19, 2011.

12 july 2011 . Vol 4 . Issue 7 citizenship, attend universities, and divisions.18 Unregulated economic of the diaspora are less likely to send enter into lucrative careers in their host partnerships with groups in Ethiopia, private remittances to relatives they may countries. Importantly, irrespective of Kenya, Djibouti, Uganda, and Tanzania not know well, but are more interested social or economic status abroad, the in many sectors such as finance, in contributing to community projects diaspora remains intimately connected real estate, and retail services have or traveling to Somalia to give their and heavily invested in the homeland. highlighted that Somalis will seek non- time and expertise.25 This is a unique violent avenues and law and order if it opportunity that host-nations should “You eat with your brother when he is more profitable to them.19 Members of recognize because younger generations has money,” stated one member of the the diaspora are also better at monitoring possess unique skill-sets and are often Somali diaspora who lives in London their investments than the international less bound to certain structures within and supports four uncles and eight community is at monitoring aid projects. traditional Somali society.26 aunts in Somalia through remittances.12 The diaspora can tap into regional and Last year, Somalis in the diaspora local power brokers to ensure oversight Current Obstacle: Radicalization within the sent between $1.5-2 billion to people and prevent corruption, where aid Diaspora back home.13 Remittances were largely organizations have no such leverage.20 While the Somali diaspora’s role is private—sent directly to a person, mostly positive, it has also contributed family or local leader—but also included The dilemma, however, is apparent. some negative elements as well. Youth between $130-200 million sent for The diaspora’s steadfast support has from the diaspora, radicalized for al- development purposes.14 The diaspora created a dependent society in Somalia. Shabab, have been responsible for has long relied on a system known as The statistics seem to confirm it: 80% multiple suicide attacks during the past hawala15 for transferring these funds of small business start-up capital is three years: in October 2008, Shirwa from abroad back into Somalia quickly directly attributed to remittances,21 Ahmed became the first American and at low cost. Hawalas came under and the financial network of hawalas is suicide bomber in an attack in Bosasso;27 intense scrutiny after 9/11, resulting reportedly the number one private sector in December 2009, a member of the in the closure of the industry leader, employer in Somalia.22 Dependency Danish-Somali diaspora attacked a al-Barakaat.16 The institution adapted, breeds spoilers—those who seek to medical school graduation ceremony however, and Somalis have continued maintain instability for personal gain— at the Hotel Shamo in Mogadishu;28 sending remittances. Only recently, and this is a major concern among the in September 2010, Danish-Somalis during the global financial crisis in diaspora, who often give despite their attacked the Mogadishu airport in a 2009, did remittances dip noticeably. own harsh circumstances.23 For the poor suicide operation;29 and in May 2011 They are now back on the rise.17 and professionals alike, remittances are a member of the American-Somali an investment as well as an obligation. diaspora attacked AMISOM soldiers In stark contrast to continued political They are heavily invested in one day in Mogadishu.30 While not exhaustive, fragmentation and failure in Somalia, returning to a safe Somalia to stay, this short list is indicative of al- there are examples of economic and as such should be considered a Shabab’s reliance on foreign youth to cooperation and progress spurred by motivated ally in efforts toward Somali wage its suicide terrorist campaign. Al- the diaspora. Somali businesses have stability. Shabab looms as the primary spoiler to created regional trade networks that Somali stability, yet key weaknesses are defy traditional clan and territorial Also important with respect to the evident. diaspora is an understanding of the age demographic and how different The withdrawal of Ethiopian forces 12 Anna Lindley, “The Early-Morning Phonecall: Remit- generations view remittances. In the from Somalia in January 2009 weakened tances from a Refugee Diaspora Perspective,” Journal of United States, the Somali diaspora is al-Shabab’s narrative. Al-Shabab Ethnic and Migration Studies 35:8 (2009). relatively young, as compared to the used the December 2006 Ethiopian 24 13 The World Bank estimates that $325 billion were re- general population. Younger members invasion and subsequent occupation mitted globally in 2010. Hammond et al., pp. 3, 13; Dilip Ratha and Ibrahim Sirkeci, “Remittances and the Global 18 Lee Cassanelli, “Private Sector Peacemaking: Business tion.pdf. Also see Hammond et al., p. 29. Financial Crisis,” Migration Letters 7:2 (2010). and Reconstruction in Somalia,” Accord 21 (2010). 25 Hammond et al., p. 40. 14 Ibid. 19 Ibid. 26 Cindy Horst et al., “Participation of Diasporas in 15 Hawala means “transfer of debt.” For more on this sys- 20 Hammond et al., p. 20. Peace-Building and Development: A Handbook for Prac- tem, see Anna Lindley, “Between ‘Dirty Money’ and ‘De- 21 Hassan Sheikh and Sally Healy, “Somalia’s Mission titioners and Policymakers,” Peace Research Institute velopment Capital’: Somali Money Transfer Infrastruc- Million: The Somali Diaspora and its Role in Develop- Oslo (PRIO), February 2010. ture Under Global Scrutiny,” African Affairs 108:433 ment,” United Nations, March 2009. 27 This was a key event that led to the revelation that (2009). 22 Hammond et al., p. 44. 20 young men from the Minneapolis area in the United 16 Lindley, “Between ‘Dirty Money.’” For more on leg- 23 Lindley, “The Early-Morning Phonecall: Remittances States had traveled to Somalia to fight for al-Shabab. See islation, see H.R. 3162, USA PATRIOT Act Section 373, from a Refugee Diaspora Perspective.” Heller, p. 31. “Illegal Money Transmitting Businesses,” October 24, 24 Within the U.S. Somali diaspora, fewer are under the 28 Bill Roggio, “Shabaab Suicide Bomber was Danish 2001, p. 178. Also see the Financial Action Task Force, age of five or over the age of 44 than the national average. Citizen,” The Long War Journal, December 9, 2009. “Terrorist Financing,” 2008, p. 24, for their reference to See “Counting the Franklin County Somali Population 29 Alisha Ryu, “Suicide Bombers Attack Mogadishu Air- “alternate remittance systems (ARS)” as remittances in- (CRP data byte no. 2),” Community Research Partners, port,” Voice of America, September 9, 2010. tended for terrorist purposes. 2009, available at www.communityresearchpartners. 30 Sheikh, “Somalia Vows to Defeat al-Qaida after Kill- 17 Hammond et al., p. 43. org/uploads/DataBytes/DataByteNo2_SomaliPopula- ing Fazul Abdullah Mohammed.”

13 july 2011 . Vol 4 . Issue 7 as a reason to break with the exiled Farah Mohamed Beledi, the U.S. citizen local law enforcement43 as well as a Islamic Courts Union (ICU)31 and vie for involved in the May 30, 2011 attack in visit earlier this year by Attorney power as the main Somali opposition to Mogadishu, did not depart the United General Eric Holder have been largely the Ethiopians, whose army occupied States until October 2009,37 some 10 well received and stand as a model that Mogadishu. From its new position months after the Ethiopians withdrew should be expanded upon.44 Somali of power, al-Shabab introduced from Somalia. Analysis of diaspora youth groups, such as the one in St. Paul improvised explosive devices and communities, in general, suggests that that organized Holder’s visit in May, suicide attacks to the Somali battlefield, their members tend to be very active should be the key demographic focus earning a designation as a Foreign when supportive of a certain cause.38 In for efforts at combating radicalism in Terrorist Organization from the United the case of disaffected youth in the Somali the diaspora. States in 2008,32 and courting ties to diaspora, al-Shabab has been able to al-Qa`ida and its regional affiliate, capitalize on this feature, as well as the Conclusion the Yemen-based al-Qa`ida in the fact that these young people do not have The recent focus on Somalia as a key Arabian Peninsula (AQAP).33 While to live with war on a daily basis, making frontier in the fight against al-Qa`ida al-Shabab’s tactics may have been them more susceptible to radicalization increases pressure on al-Shabab and expedient in the face of Ethiopian in a distant environment.39 could provide a key ingredient in occupation, their strategic move to emboldening Somalis to reduce support partner with an international, Salafi- The Importance of Engaging the Diaspora for the group. Popular opposition jihadi terrorist organization runs President Barack Obama’s recently to al-Shabab within Somalia will be counter to many Somali citizens, as released “National Strategy for important as Somalis elect a new the practice of Sufism is widespread in Counterterrorism” both recognizes government in August 2012 and seek the country.34 Today, al-Shabab faces the current threat posed by to take control of their own country. opposition from Somali clan-based radicalization among the diaspora as In the year ahead, vigorous and organizations such as Ahlu-Sunna well as underscores the importance of constructive dialogue between host wal-Jama (ASWJ), which recently engaging diaspora communities as part countries and their Somali diaspora renewed its commitment to defeating of a comprehensive counterterrorism community must accompany lethal al-Shabab in Somalia.35 approach.40 Improved relations counterterrorism efforts as a critical between the diaspora and host element in weakening al-Shabab and Although some reports suggest that countries, especially in the West, paving the way toward a more stable diaspora support for al-Shabab has would prove significant in further Somalia. receded since 2009,36 radicalization weakening al-Shabab and would have clearly continues and al-Shabab has the additional benefit of strengthening Major Josh Richardson is an officer in the shifted focus to AMISOM targets. the diaspora’s ability to positively United States Army and a General Wayne influence Somalia during this critical Downing Scholar, currently pursuing 31 The ICU came to national prominence in June 2006 time. Moreover, it reduces the risk an M.A. in International Relations and by defeating U.S.-supported militia elements in Somalia. of radicalized members of the Somali International Economics at The Johns The group was popular among Somalis, but following diaspora being swayed by the more Hopkins University School of Advanced the December 2006 invasion by Ethiopia it was swiftly transnational propaganda of al-Qa`ida, International Studies in Washington, defeated and reformed in exile in Asmara, Eritrea. While an ominous development. D.C. away, al-Shabab, a more militant wing, broke ranks and rose to power in Somalia. For more, see Ken Menkhaus, The Minneapolis-St. Paul, Minnesota “Stabilisation and Humanitarian Access in a Collapsed area is home to the largest Somali State: The Somali Case,” Disasters 34 (2010). community in the United States—a 32 Ibid. community that wrestles with 41 33 Al-Shabab reportedly formed connections to al-Qa`ida poverty, crime, and radicalization. in 2009. See Heller, p. 14. Somalia’s neighbor, Yemen, is Twenty young men from this diaspora home to the al-Qa`ida surrogate al-Qa`ida in the Arabian community are known to have traveled Peninsula (AQAP). For more on al-Shabab/AQAP link- to Somalia in 2007 and 2008 to fight 42 ages, see Sally Healy and Ginny Hill, “Yemen and Soma- for al-Shabab. Outreach efforts by lia: Terrorism, Shadow Networks, and the Limitations of Statebuilding,” Chatham House, October 2010. More recent connections are discussed in the June 28, 2011, 37 Sheikh, “Somalia Vows to Defeat al-Qaida After Kill- U.S. “National Strategy for Counterterrorism,” as well ing Fazul Abdullah Mohammed.” as Mark Mazzetti and Eric Schmitt, “U.S. Expands its 38 Horst et al., p. 19. Drone War into Somalia,” New York Times, July 2, 2011. 39 Ibid. 34 Sufi Islam is more moderate, described as “a veil 40 Barack Obama, “National Strategy for Counterterror- lightly worn.” For more on Sufi Islam and Somalia, see ism,” U.S. White House, June 28, 2011. 43 Rupa Shenoy, “Somali Community, Law Enforcement Al-Qa`ida’s (Mis)Adventures in the Horn of Africa (West 41 U.S. Census data from 2010 shows that 60,000 So- Try to Keep Open a Dialogue,” Minnesota Public Radio, Point, NY: Combating Terrorism Center, 2006). malis live in the Minneapolis-St. Paul metropolitan area. June 11, 2011. 35 “Ahlu Sunna Group Threatens al-Shabaab in Central This information was drawn from Hammond et al., p. 44 James Walsh, “Attorney General Holder Reaches Somalia,” Shabelle Media Network, June 17, 2011. 29. Out to Somalis, Hears from Protesters,” Minneapolis Star- 36 Heller, p. 25. 42 Heller, pp. 31-32. Tribune, May 27, 2011.

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David Hicks’ Memoir: A A Profile of David Hicks According to Leigh Sales’ work on Deceptive Account of One There is no dispute about the basic facts Hicks, Usama bin Ladin visited the al- of Hicks’ life. An only child of parents Faruq training camp while Hicks was Man’s Journey with who later divorced, Hicks dropped undergoing training there in 2001. Al-Qa`ida out of school at 15, worked on cattle Hicks reportedly complained to Bin stations and then trained horses in Ladin about the lack of training material By Ken Ward Japan. Watching Japanese television, he in English. The al-Qa`ida chief urged was moved by the plight of Kosovo, and Hicks to translate some material into arrested in afghanistan in late 2001, went off directly to train in a camp in English.10 David Hicks became arguably the Albania run by the Kosovo Liberation most prominent Western detainee at Army (KLA). Coming home, he applied After two courses, according to the Guantanamo Bay. A Muslim convert, unsuccessfully to the Australian Defence Pentagon, al-Qa`ida’s military chief, the Australian-born Hicks was Force (ADF), toyed with going to East Muhammad `Atif, recommended to accused by the Pentagon of joining Timor to help its people, adopted Islam Hicks an urban tactics training course al-Qa`ida and training at its terrorist and encountered the Tablighi Jama`at at Tarnak Farm near Kandahar.11 The camps. Yet despite the charges, Hicks missionary Islamic movement.3 After curriculum included marksmanship, was transformed into a folk hero for some time in Pakistan, he switched the use of assault and sniper rifles, the thousands of his compatriots allegiance to Lashkar-i-Tayyiba (LeT) rappelling, kidnapping and assassination who campaigned for his release. and went to fight in Kashmir.4 At LeT’s methods. In August 2001, Hicks was In April 2007, Hicks was released request, he moved to Afghanistan for trained in information collection and from Guantanamo Bay and returned further military training.5 His capture surveillance in an apartment in Kabul. to Australia. After being freed by in December 2001 led to five and a half `Atif then reportedly asked Hicks if he Australian authorities in December years of imprisonment. was willing to carry out a suicide attack, 2007, Hicks would eventually publish but Hicks was uninterested.12 Hicks his memoir in 2010, recounting his More specific details on Hicks’ life are was in Pakistan at the time of the 9/11 life experiences.1 up for contention. According to his attacks, but afterward he traveled back 2004 Pentagon charge sheet, Hicks to Afghanistan “to rejoin his al Qaeda Counterterrorism analysts examining was accused of conspiracy, attempted associates.”13 Hicks’ memoir would expect to uncover murder by an unprivileged belligerent insights into the appeal that radical and aiding the enemy.6 Another charge Hicks’ Own Account Islamic movements have had for Western sheet dated February 2007 only accused As long as the information on which converts. One aspect that makes Hicks’ him of providing material support for the U.S. charges were based remains story especially interesting is the fact terrorism. The charge sheets claim that unpublished, it is not possible to that he eventually renounced Islam after arriving in Albania around May ascertain which data Hicks himself and spent his last years at Guantanamo 1999, Hicks was trained in a KLA camp supplied to Pentagon interrogators.14 In Bay as an object of suspicion for some and “engaged in hostile action” before his book, Hicks described his activities of his fellow inmates. As a result, returning to Australia. Having joined on Kashmir’s LOC: “We stayed for a Hicks’ memoir could have provided a “terrorist organization,” namely LeT, week, and during that time a lot of detail on the process by which converts after going to Pakistan in November fire was exchanged...We did not fire become disillusioned with Islam. This 1999, Hicks “engaged in hostile action upon Indian soldiers or any other article, however, argues that Hicks against Indian forces” on the Line of people. We only participated in the has not aimed at full disclosure in his Control (LOC) between Pakistani and 7 autobiography. While he appears to offer Indian Kashmir. Hicks then allegedly father or mother, combined with the name of the eldest significant details about the conditions went to Afghanistan with LeT funding to son, or eldest daughter if there is no son. For example, 8 of his detention at Guantanamo Bay, be trained by al-Qa`ida. He is accused Bin Ladin’s kunya was Abu Abdullah. Aliases in kunya including several diagrams on the of staying at an al-Qa`ida guesthouse, form have often been adopted even by recruits who have 2 layout of the prison camp, he is vague where he handed over his passport no children. Hicks was the father of two children, from and often incoherent when recounting and said he would use the kunya (alias) whose mother he was long separated. Since “Dawood” is 9 the activities that led to his arrest. The “Muhammed Dawood.” merely Arabic for “David,” it is unlikely that Hicks could result is an extended but implausible have used this as his alias in Afghanistan since it was too cover story meant to explain away his 3 Hicks, p. 71. close to his real name. The second charge sheet corrects presence in Afghanistan at the time of 4 Ibid., p. 93. this error, giving his alias as “Abu Muslim al-Austraili.” the U.S.-led intervention. 5 Ibid., p. 145. 10 Ibid., p. 259. 6 These are available in a book about Hicks by Leigh 11 Ibid. Sales, Detainee 002 (Melbourne: Melbourne University 12 Ibid., pp. 25, 279. Press, 2007), a book Hicks does not refer to in his mem- 13 Ibid., p. 259. 1 David Hicks, Guantanamo, My Journey (Sydney: Heine- oir. The charge sheets are reproduced on pp. 256-260 and 14 Sales reports that Hicks in fact divulged everything mann, 2010). The author is grateful for comments on this 264-270. to anybody interrogating him. She quotes an American article from Greg Fealy and Nelly Lahoud. 7 Ibid., p. 257. prosecutor who saw him as “a total liability on a proper 2 Hicks himself does not state when he left Islam. A for- 8 Ibid. operation: he can’t keep his mouth shut. He talked from mer fellow detainee of his, Moazzam Begg, does so in his 9 Ibid., p. 258. In fact, this name is not a kunya. A kunya the second we caught him. We never had to use any tech- memoir, Enemy Combatant. is a name using the words “Abu” or “Umm,” meaning niques at all on him at Guantanamo.” Ibid., p. 85.

15 july 2011 . Vol 4 . Issue 7 symbolic exchange of fire.”15 Hicks Last year, the author interviewed a for example, had been “mostly sport- claimed that he left the LOC before he former member of Indonesia’s Jemaah oriented, for there was little funding for could be “launched” as an infiltrator. Islamiya, Amran bin Mansoor. Amran ammunition.”24 LeT’s limited resources By contrast, Hicks told his family participated in a training course in are surprising given that Hicks in a letter excerpted by The Australian 2000 at an al-Qa`ida camp. He was described the group as “a virtual branch newspaper that he and three others one of a group of Southeast Asians of the [Pakistani] government.”25 did indeed cross the LOC, armed with introduced to Bin Ladin at a Kandahar rocket-propelled grenades.16 This claim guesthouse for jihadists from all After the basic training course, Hicks is impossible to verify. If Hicks did not over the world. Bin Ladin spoke to attended a mountain warfare course prove his value to LeT in Kashmir, the at the same camp, then an urban group’s later investment in his further “Hicks provides a warfare course near Kandahar.26 training seems unwarranted. The urban warfare class dealt “with dishonest account of his such situations as are found in Hicks admitted that he undertook Kashmir...when a village would need military training in Afghanistan, involvement with militant to be defended to deter soldiers from but asserted it was in “government- groups in South Asia. entering.”27 His final course was in sanctioned camps.” He claims not even Kabul.28 He offered no detail about this to have heard of al-Qa`ida until he was Rather than provide last course. Yet Feroz Abbasi, another imprisoned at Guantanamo Bay,17 which insight into his conversion inmate at Guantanamo Bay, was also an is one of the most astonishing assertions English-speaker in Afghanistan at the in his book. According to Hicks’ account, to Islam or why he joined time. Abbasi described his training an unnamed LeT friend escorted Hicks radical Islamic groups, in an autobiography he composed to Afghanistan.18 In Kandahar, they in Guantanamo.29 He arrived in went to a large, white building where Hicks’ autobiography is Afghanistan early in 2001. After eight at least 100 non-Afghans were staying. a self-serving document weeks of basic training at al-Faruq, Hicks called it the “Kandahar Hotel.”19 Abbasi took “mountain training” once Not one of the foreigners he met there, meant to ‘explain away’ more at al-Faruq. He then undertook Hicks wrote, had come to prepare for any suggestion that he was “city tactics” training at Kandahar jihad. “No matter how angry they were airport, and finally was trained in the at what was taking place, they never involved with al-Qa`ida or reconnaissance of potential targets in spoke of committing terrorist acts,” terrorist activities.” Kabul. Bin Ladin once gave a lecture at Hicks claimed. “On the contrary, they al-Faruq during Abbasi’s time there. wanted to help their fellow human beings, not to harm them.”20 Hicks failed to see that Abbasi’s the Southeast Asians for 20 minutes, account is actually devastating for his As Hicks considered his course options, according to Amran, discussing among own case.30 Even without seeking to another comrade brought him to a other topics the weather in Malaysia incriminate Hicks, Abbasi has outlined nearby school where “we passed five or and Singapore. Yet nine months after a program that was remarkably similar six visiting Afghan and Arab scholars that session, seated casually with a to Hicks’, except that Abbasi did not sitting on chairs. We...shook the hands group of other “scholars,” as Hicks put claim his camps were “administered of these scholars...After a few minutes, it, Bin Ladin supposedly said nothing to by the local Afghan government.” The my acquaintance...asked if I recognized a Westerner who had come for military chances that both al-Qa`ida and the one in particular [Bin Ladin].”21 His training despite the potential value he Taliban offered courses of identical description of this meeting seems represented for al-Qa`ida. training at roughly the same time somewhat peculiar. Bin Ladin was not seems highly unlikely. always so taciturn and unforthcoming. Regardless, at the camp Hicks had to choose between basic training or going

15 Hicks, p. 113. to another camp. He reluctantly agreed 16 In December 2007, The Australian published a selec- to more basic training at a “mainstream tion of self-incriminating letters that Hicks had sent to camp” that was “administered by the his family from his travels, which had reportedly been local Afghan government” two or 22 seized by the Australian Security Intelligence Organisa- three hours by bus from Kandahar. 24 Ibid., p. 104. 23 tion (ASIO) from Hicks’ parents’ house after his arrest. He spent seven weeks there. Hicks 25 Ibid., p. 147. 17 Hicks, p. 158. offered no details of his training at this 26 Ibid. 18 If Hicks is to be believed, he and his traveling compan- camp, in conformity with his habit of 27 Ibid., p. 146. ion encountered no difficulty crossing the border. giving almost no information about 28 Ibid. 19 Hicks, p. 142. any training he received. In particular, 29 Sean O’Neill and Daniel McGrory, The Suicide Factory 20 Ibid., p. 140. he avoided mentioning any weapon he (London: HarperCollins, 2006), pp. 210-213. 21 This is the only meeting with Bin Ladin that Hicks learned to use. His training in Pakistan, 30 Hicks wrote that this detainee later claimed he had acknowledges in his book. Nothing is learned of Bin La- been mistreated and became convinced “that the only din’s alleged call for Hicks to carry out translations. Ibid., 22 Ibid., p. 146. way to save himself was to bring his own false accusa- p. 143. 23 Ibid. tions against me.” Hicks, p. 320.

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Curtain Fall Hicks was armed, but he did not identify Hizb al-Tahrir: A New In August 2001, Hicks decided that he his weapon.38 According to Hicks, there wanted to leave Afghanistan and go had been some “old and rusty” guns in Threat to the Pakistan home, which is why he was in Pakistan Kandahar that he and some traveling Army? at the time of the 9/11 attacks.31 Yet companions collected. Hicks later sold he has to convincingly explain to his his gun and ammunition to finance a By Arif Jamal readers why several months later, in proposed taxi trip to Pakistan. By then, December 2001, he was captured in however, he was captured and sold to on may 6, 2011, Pakistani authorities Afghanistan by Northern Alliance U.S. forces. arrested Brigadier Ali Khan on charges forces. According to his account, Hicks of ties to Hizb al-Tahrir (HT), an Islamist needed a new Pakistani visa and money Conclusion group that is banned in Pakistan. for his airfare to Australia.32 After Hicks’ chapters on his last months in Shortly after, authorities revealed that taking a taxi to Quetta, he claimed that Afghanistan are the most incoherent in four majors in the Pakistan Army were he left his passport and some Afghan his book. They underline his inability also under investigation for ties to HT.1 clothes in Kandahar. He thought that it to provide a clear picture of his motives In the following weeks, Pakistan’s would be difficult to enter Australia on and actions. This vagueness and security agencies carried out raids on a forged passport, but apparently did evasiveness undermine the very story the homes of HT members across the not think to tell Australian officials in he has set out to construct. In the end, country. They have arrested at least Islamabad that his passport was lost.33 Hicks provides a dishonest account of two prominent members of the group: Therefore, even after watching the his involvement with militant groups Deputy Spokesman Imran Yusufzai and 9/11 attacks on Pakistani television, he in South Asia. Rather than provide Engineer Aftab. decided to travel back into Kandahar insight into his conversion to Islam or supposedly to collect his possessions.34 why he joined radical Islamic groups, These incidents warrant a closer look at Hicks’ autobiography is a self-serving HT’s activities in Pakistan, especially After entering Afghanistan, U.S. document meant to “explain away” any considering the organization’s previous airstrikes began. Hearing that the suggestion that he was involved with stated goal of infiltrating a country’s Pakistani border was closed, Hicks al-Qa`ida or terrorist activities. military to achieve power—with its weighed his options.35 The mountain end objective the creation of an Islamic warfare graduate, who wrote lyrically Unsatisfactory though his story is, Hicks state. about mountains and spent several is still worth studying because of the months in Kashmir, decided against danger that white jihadists peculiarly This article examines the ties between seeking refuge in the mountains near the represent to Western countries due Brigadier Ali Khan and HT, provides a Pakistani border as they “represented to their “insider” status. Elements of profile of HT, and assesses whether the hardship with little food and water, his make-up, and some of his motives Islamist group poses a threat to stability and inadequate warmth in the night.”36 where they can be determined, may in Pakistan. He instead traveled to Kabul, where he well be found in other Western teamed up with an LeT acquaintance.37 recruits. At the same time, Hicks did Profile of Brigadier Ali Khan provide one important, unintentional Brigadier Ali Khan was serving as 31 Hicks, p. 147. contribution, which is that his confused director for rules and regulations at 32 Hicks does not provide any information about how he text is unlikely to inspire other the Army General Headquarters in has financed himself since last leaving Australia in 1999 Westerners to the jihadist path. Rawalpindi when he was arrested beyond admitting he received benefits from LeT, such as for alleged links to HT. He received airfares. Ken Ward is a former Foreign Affairs officer military training in the United States, 33 Hicks, p. 151. and Indonesia analyst at Australia’s Office and had earlier commanded a brigade 34 Ibid., p. 150. Hicks said he had a “collection of local of National Assessments. He is currently a in Kashmir. He hails from a family with 2 clothing he wanted to take back to Australia.” Yet Af- senior research associate of the department strong links to the military. He was set 3 ghan clothes were probably readily available in Quetta, of political and social change, Australian to retire on July 9, 2011. given its large Pashtun population. If Hicks had indeed National University. He researches left his passport in Afghanistan, he might well have Indonesian terrorism. Among his colleagues, Khan is known to found it difficult crossing the Pakistani-Afghan border be highly religious and anti-American. in either direction. Amran bin Mansoor, the Malaysian, In a meeting after the killing of Usama told the writer he had been turned back at the Afghan bin Ladin, Khan was reportedly angry border the first time he tried to cross it and had to go back over what he considered a serious to Quetta. If he was alone in a taxi, it would have been hard for Hicks to pass himself off as a Pashtun to bor- 1 The News International, June 23, 2011. der police. He did not speak Pashtu. If he had wished to 2 He is the son of a junior commissioned officer. His acquire a new Pakistani visa during his visit to Quetta, brother is a colonel and currently serving in an intelli- not having a passport with him to have it stamped would gence agency. His son and son-in-law are serving as cap- have been quite a nuisance. tains in the army. See Shakeel Anjum, “Serving Brigadier 35 Ibid., p. 152. Held for Link with Banned Outfit,” The News Internation- 36 Ibid., p. 153. al, June 22, 2011. 37 Ibid., p. 160. 38 Ibid., p. 155. 3 Dawn, June 22, 2011.

17 july 2011 . Vol 4 . Issue 7 intelligence failure.4 What he saw as Khan’s legal counsel, Inam Ullah, HT has a pyramid-style organizational the intelligence failure, however, was disputed that his client had any ties to structure, with its central leader based the Pakistani military’s inaction in HT. Instead, Ullah attributes Khan’s in the United Kingdom. The Pakistani the face of a U.S. cross-border raid, arrest to the tough questions he asked group considers itself only a chapter of suggesting that Pakistan should have top generals about the Abbottabad the international HT. HT Pakistan has shot down the U.S. helicopters.5 At raid that killed Bin Ladin, and how been extremely secretive, as it is banned the same meeting, he also reportedly U.S. military forces were able to enter in the country. Naveed Butt is the only questioned the “luxurious lifestyle of Pakistani airspace undetected. Ullah official allowed to reveal his identity. the armed forces top brass,” insinuating argues that Khan’s arrest is meant to He told the author, “We are not allowed that they should change their habits.6 dissuade other military officers from to reveal our identity because of the questioning the decisions of Pakistan’s worldwide repression against the Hizb When speaking with reporters, Khan’s military leadership. al-Tahrir.”13 The group is organized in wife denied that her husband or their small cells of five to six members.14 The family had links with HT, saying, “If Regardless, the accusation that Khan is a members are not allowed to reveal their you visit somebody’s home or be visited, major supporter of HT warrants a closer affiliation even to other HT members. a link is automatically established.”7 look at the group’s activities in Pakistan. Another supervising cell coordinates Her statement, however, implies that the activities of a large number of cells. she and her husband may have at least HT Pakistan “The idea is that only a few members visited the homes of HT members, Hizb al-Tahrir is essentially a non- are exposed if one member is arrested,” suggesting that the family had some violent Islamist group. It wishes to explained a member of HT Pakistan.15 sort of connection to those affiliated establish an Islamic state through da`wa with HT. She described her husband and preaching, rather than through HT has adopted peaceful methods to violence. Founded in Jerusalem in 1953, propagate its ideological messages. It “Even if HT does not pose it flourished among Muslims in the distributes pamphlets, and it holds United Kingdom, where its headquarters conferences, seminars and religious any immediate threat is believed to be located. It is active in lectures. Its members also pursue da`wa to the armed forces in more than 40 countries, and Pakistan activities, and propagate HT’s ideology is one of the top five countries that on an individual basis. HT primarily Pakistan, the group should provide the bulk of its membership. The targets the educated classes, as well as be carefully monitored group does not endorse participation prominent groups such as journalists, with democratic political systems. teachers, trade union leaders, the to prevent any rapid ulama, among others.16 It considers recruitment successes. Pakistan’s chapter of HT was formally these categories of citizens to be in founded in November 2000, although the best position to influence public Extremist groups can grow a number of Pakistanis had joined the opinion. HT members are often seen quickly in Pakistan.” group in the preceding decades outside distributing literature outside mosques Pakistan. The founding members of in upscale neighborhoods in urban HT Pakistan were mostly Pakistani areas. They also use text messaging to expatriates from relatively successful spread their message and are present as “a staunch and practicing Muslim” families. HT’s spokesman in Pakistan, on social networking websites such as who believed in the ideology that led Naveed Butt, for example, is a graduate Facebook.17 to the creation of Pakistan. “Pakistan of the University of Illinois. was made in the name of Islam and the The Threat of HT Pakistan Islamic laws should be enforced,” she After the 9/11 attacks and subsequent Despite HT’s non-violent stance, “the said. “This is the ideology of Pakistan.”8 U.S.-led military intervention in group ascribes to a little discussed His wife claimed, however, that she Afghanistan, HT was able to expand its strategy called nusra, which means had never heard of HT before the latest influence in Pakistan.10 According to some it could support a coup d’etat by an charges, although she described it as reports, the founders of HT in Pakistan armed force if that force is pursuing “an organization of intellectual people, I include Imtiaz Malik, a British youth of an Islamist agenda.”18 Indeed, one of guess.”9 Pakistani descent, Dr. Abdul Wajid, and 11 Dr. Abdul Basit Shaikh. Imtiaz Malik is 13 Personal interview, Naveed Butt, Islamabad, Paki- considered to be the underground leader stan, April 11, 2003. of HT Pakistan. Naveed Butt remains 14 Personal interviews, members of HT, Rawalpindi, the public face of the group in Pakistan, Pakistan, September 1, 2006. and he is assisted by two youths, Imran 15 Ibid. 12 4 Umar Cheema, “Brig Al had Raised Questions About Yusufzai and Shahzad Sheikh. 16 Personal interview, Naveed Butt, Islamabad, Paki- Abbottabad Raid,” The News International, June 23, 2011. stan, April 11, 2003. 5 Ibid. 10 Personal interview, Naveed Butt, Islamabad, Paki- 17 Personal interviews, HT members, Karachi, Pakistan, 6 Ibid. stan, April 11, 2003. June 2, 2007. 7 Ibid. 11 Amir Mir, “HT had Coup Plans,” The News Interna- 18 Emmanuel Karagiannis, “Political Islam in Cen- 8 Ibid. tional, June 23, 2011. tral Asia: The Role of Hizb al-Tahrir,” CTC Sentinel 3:2 9 Ibid. 12 Ibid. (2010).

18 july 2011 . Vol 4 . Issue 7 its former members suggests that HT Brigadier Ali Khan is not the first have been seeking to convert encourages violent coup d’etats by officer arrested for links to HT. In prominent opinion shapers to its members who belong to armies in 2003, the Pakistan Army discovered their supremacist ideology. Once Muslim states.19 According to Rashad that HT had succeeded in recruiting this sector is taken, a military Ali, a former HT leader who now works several army officers while they were coup can be staged by key officers for the anti-extremism organization training at Sandhurst in the United sympathetic to the cause, who called CENTRI, “HT sees Pakistan as a Kingdom. Details about this plot and would in turn face minimal strong nuclear power. It has been doing the names of those arrested were never resistance from society.25 recruitment work in Pakistan for this revealed, but Maajid Nawaz, a former purpose, for a long time.”20 He told The HT member, claimed to have been one Conclusion News International: of their recruiters.23 Brigadier Ali Khan and four Pakistan Army officers may have been the HT are dangerous for Pakistan for Additionally, on May 4, 2009, military cell around which HT Pakistan is three reasons. They will justify the police arrested four persons including organized. After examining HT and the arguments of jihadist terrorists by Colonel Shahid Bashir, the then group’s aims in Pakistan, it is possible declaring the state of Pakistan as commanding officer of the Shamsi Air that the organization was aiming to kufr. They will call for secession Force Base, for his links with HT. Bashir foment a “colonels’ coup” to realize its within the military, when Pakistan was accused of leaking secrets about the goal of establishing an Islamic state in has suffered so much since the start Shamsi airfield, which has been used Pakistan. It is not clear how many other of the war on terror. The fact that by the Central Intelligence Agency for HT cells are operating in Pakistan’s they are approaching the military is launching drone attacks on militants armed forces. a sign that they are seeking to take in the Federally Administered Tribal power through a military coup.21 Areas. According to a December 2009 Even if HT does not pose any immediate report by the BBC, Bashir was court- threat to the armed forces in Pakistan, It is this strategy that makes the martialed on charges of spying and for the group should be carefully monitored allegations of serving members of inciting the armed forces to carry out to prevent any rapid recruitment Pakistan’s military belonging to HT so terrorist acts.24 successes. Extremist groups can grow alarming. quickly in Pakistan. Indeed, the group’s Explaining HT’s strategy in Pakistan, spokesman, Naveed Butt, is encouraged According to various reports, HT’s former HT member Maajid Nawaz about their ability to recruit Pakistani former global leader, Abdul Qadeem explained it best: military officers, saying, “Unlike in Zallum, considered Pakistan as an some other countries, the Pakistani important future Islamic stronghold Indeed, the particular problem of army is not an elitist army. They come after the country carried out its first HT infiltration inside the Pakistan from all strata of society.”26 The thought nuclear weapons test. Around 1999, Army was exported to Pakistan of a successful colonels’ coup must have Zallum asked HT members of Pakistani from Britain. HT advocates had a numbing effect on Pakistan’s top origin to return to their home country violent overthrow of democratic military brass, and it probably explains and organize the group “in the nuclear- states through illegal military their hard line approach to Brigadier armed Pakistan.” Dozens of them left coups in order to enforce a single Ali Khan. their lucrative careers in the United interpretation of Islam…Recruiting Kingdom and elsewhere and went to from the world’s Muslim-majority Arif Jamal is the author of Shadow War: Pakistan. According to an HT member, armies is a fundamental tenet of The Untold Story of Jihad in Kashmir. this trend continues today. “We always their call. And though groups like encourage Pakistani members to return HT are not terrorists, this only to their country after completing their makes them even more able to education if they can,” said one member. recruit from the Pakistani elite for “Our members sacrifice their rewarding their paralysing call…Groups such careers to work for the Hizb al-Tahrir. as HT do not seek to launch a mass The reason is Pakistan is more likely movement; rather they specifically to be first Muslim country to have an target the intellectual elite and the Islamic country.”22 military apparatus of the countries in which they operate. For years, leading journalists and the intellectual elite of Pakistan have been targeted by highly educated

19 Maajid Nawaz “How to Fight Back,” Dawn, June 26, English-speaking Islamists. They 2011. 20 Murtaza Ali Shah, “HT is Obsessed with Nuclear 23 Nawaz; Ahmed Rashid, “Pakistan Army Officers Ar- Pakistan,” The News International, June 23, 2011. rested in Terror Swoop,” Telegraph, September 1, 2003; 21 Ibid. Nicola Smith, “British Islamists Plot Against Pakistan,” 25 Nawaz. 22 Personal interview, HT member, London, March Sunday Times, July 4, 2009. 26 Mahan Abedin, “‘Stooges’ Time is Up in Pakistan,” 2007. 24 The News International, June 22, 2011. Asia Times Online, July 8, 2011.

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The Significance of Fazal the group’s primary asset in Kurram.5 Shi`a traveling on the road. On March He opposes Pakistan’s alliance with the 13, armed militants killed 11 passengers Saeed’s Defection from the United States, but is equally against in the Mamo Khwar area of Tal tehsil. On Pakistani Taliban attacks inside Pakistan. He supports March 25, armed men attacked a convoy fighting against U.S. and NATO forces of passengers, killing 13 and abducting By Daud Khattak in Afghanistan and shows allegiance to more than 25 Shi`a in Bhaggan village. Afghan Taliban leader Mullah Omar. These violations crippled the peace at the end of June 2011, Tehrik-i- agreement only weeks after it went into Taliban Pakistan (TTP)1 experienced Saeed’s support in Kurram extends effect.9 a major blow when senior commander beyond his involvement with the Taliban. Fazal Saeed Zaimusht defected from the Kurram is geographically separated The violations are reportedly one reason group and formed his own organization, between Sunni and Shi`a Muslims, why Fazal Saeed separated from the Tehrik-i-Taliban Islami Pakistan and there have been historic hostilities TTP. According to sources in the region, (TTIP).2 Fazal Saeed revolted against between the two sects in Kurram. Fazal Saeed believed that the TTP had the TTP leadership less than two Tribesmen in Kurram rallied behind no interest in supporting the Sunni- months after the killing of Usama bin Saeed to create a united militia against Shi`a peace agreement in Kurram—a Ladin, marking the first split in the TTP rival Shi`a militias. The ongoing conflict position to which he disagreed.10 since its formation in 2007. The rift is between Sunni and Shi`a has displaced When explaining his reasons behind widely perceived as part of an effort by thousands of families from Upper and leaving the TTP, he said, “We abhor the Pakistani security establishment Lower Kurram. Leaders of both sides killing innocent people through suicide and the Haqqani network to court an finally negotiated, and they signed the attacks and bomb blasts, attacks on important faction of the TTP: Fazal Murree Agreement in November 2008.6 our own army and destruction of social Saeed’s militia in Kurram Agency. As part of the agreement, both sides infrastructure.”11 Fazal Saeed also Although the split may weaken the agreed that the Pakistani government apparently no longer wanted to pay TTP, many analysts believe that it will should remove armed outsiders and the TTP a percentage of the funds he strengthen the Haqqani network and conduct an operation against militant earns from imposing taxes on Kurram the militant factions that are focused forces in the agency. The agreement, traders. solely on fighting in Afghanistan— however, was never implemented, activities in which the Pakistani exacerbating the conflict. Saeed’s defection should have a security establishment appears to have positive effect for stability in Kurram, some involvement. In February 2011, the Murree Agreement an outcome wanted by both the was revitalized after negotiations Haqqani network and the Pakistani This article explains the importance of occurred in Islamabad. Saeed, who was security establishment. The Haqqani Fazal Saeed, and places his defection leading the TTP in Kurram at the time network seeks stability in Kurram so from the TTP in context with the interests of the February peace accord, welcomed that it can increase its presence in the of both the Haqqani network and the the agreement during a news conference tribal agency. Kurram is viewed as a Pakistani security establishment. and pledged that his loyalists would strategic territory for executing attacks take action against any side found to inside Afghanistan. In addition to The Role of Fazal Saeed be violating the truce.7 Various reports bordering Afghanistan, it also borders Fazal Saeed, 39-years-old, is from Uchat also suggest that the Haqqani network Pakistan’s North Waziristan Agency, village in Central Kurram district.3 supported the peace agreement as well. Orakzai Agency, Khyber Agency, and He enjoys the support of hundreds of A key element of the Haqqani family, Hangu District. Due to its location, local tribesmen in Kurram Agency, Haji Ibrahim, for example, attended the it is considered coveted territory for which is located in Pakistan’s Federally February talks.8 militants in Waziristan to cross into Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) on Afghanistan to conduct attacks against the border with Afghanistan. Saeed Although the Peshawar-Tal-Parachinar U.S. and NATO troops. By providing joined the TTP when it was founded roadway—a key route that Shi`a in the Shi`a with peace and stability in by Baitullah Mehsud in 2007.4 Since Upper Kurram use to travel—was Kurram, the Haqqani network and then, he played an active role in the opened in February 2011 after more other Afghanistan-focused militants TTP on various levels, but he has been than three years of closure, the first will expect the Shi`a to allow Sunni violation of the peace agreement came militants to traverse their territory in on March 5 when militants killed four Upper Kurram to access the agency’s

1 The TTP is an umbrella of a dozen militant organiza- northern border with Afghanistan. tions in the Pakistani tribal areas. The organization was 5 Ibid. formed in December 2007 with Baitullah Mehsud as its 6 Farhat Taj, “A Report From Kurram,” Daily Times, head. Baitullah was killed in a drone strike in 2009. January 1, 2011. 2 “Taliban Commander Fazal Saeed Leaves TTP,” Dawn, 7 “Taliban Welcome Kurram Truce,” Dawn, February 8, 9 “Militants Kill 8, Kidnap Dozens in Kurram Ambush,” June 27, 2011. 2011. Express Tribune, March 25, 2011. 3 Rahimullah Yusufzai, “Rebel TTP Commander Claims 8 A key tribal elder, who attended the talks in Islam- 10 A key elder, who joined all the peace talks, told this to his Group is Getting Offers of Support,” The News Interna- abad, confirmed to the author that Haji Ibrahim, brother the author in an interview. tional, June 30, 2011. of Jalaluddin Haqqani, attended the meetings and urged 11 Hussain Afzal, “Kurram Commander Quits TTP over 4 Ibid. the two sides to sign the peace accord. Suicide Attacks,” Dawn, June 28, 2011.

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The Role of the Pakistani State in Kurram to provide another safe to the IDPs, it would be difficult for the The Pakistani security establishment haven for Haqqani fighters, where they United States to avoid collateral damage has played an important role in can further establish their presence if it were to escalate drone strikes over developments in Kurram as well. and continue cross-border attacks in Kurram. Elements in Pakistan’s security Afghanistan.12 Convincing the TTP’s establishment largely distinguish Kurram asset, Fazal Saeed, to defect Conclusion militants operating in the country is key to this possible strategy. For Fazal Saeed’s declaration on June 27 of between so-called “good Taliban” and Pakistan, a strong Haqqani network establishing the TTIP is a serious blow “bad Taliban.” The “good Taliban” are with access to all the key areas of to the TTP. The rift could encourage those fighters solely focused on attacking Afghanistan would provide its security rebellion among other TTP factions.16 targets in neighboring Afghanistan. establishment with sizeable influence This becomes especially relevant These militants use Pakistan as a safe in any future government in Kabul. considering that Hakimullah Mehsud haven where they are largely free from has not been seen on the ground or in the attacks by U.S. and NATO forces— As evidence of this strategy, Pakistan media during the past several months. although they remain the target of recently launched a counterterrorism Therefore, while Saeed’s decision repeated drone strikes. Moreover, there operation in Kurram Agency. Yet the may increase stability in Pakistan, are allegations by Western governments, operation has not targeted Fazal Saeed it could have the opposite effect in journalists, and analysts that Pakistan’s or his militia in Kurram. Additionally, Afghanistan. Stability in Kurram may security establishment provides some many Pakistani analysts believe that allow the Haqqani network and other support to these fighters to maintain one of the motives behind the Kurram Afghanistan-focused fighters more political influence in Afghanistan. The operation is to help provide cover to territory to recruit and train, as well best example of the so-called “good Haqqani assets. As stated by Mohammad as provide them with more territory Taliban” is the Haqqani network. Taqi in the Daily Times, to access Afghanistan. It will also make it more difficult to convince the The “bad Taliban,” on the other hand, A side benefit of the chaos created Pakistani security establishment to are those fighters that see the Pakistani in the Kurram Agency is that focus its resources on defeating militias state as an enemy, and regularly target it would be a lot easier to hide that have no interest in attacking Pakistani forces and interests. These the jihadists in the midst of the Pakistani interests—but only targets in fighters may be involved in executing internally displaced people (IDP), neighboring Afghanistan. attacks in Afghanistan, but they making the thugs a difficult target also seek to destabilize the Pakistani for precision drone attacks. Daud Khattak is Senior Editor with RFE/ government due to its counterterrorism Also, the establishment’s focus RL’s Mashaal Radio in Prague, Czech support to the United States, among has been to “reorient” the TTP Republic. Besides working in Afghanistan other motives. The best example of completely towards Afghanistan. as Editor at Pajhwok Afghan News from the “bad Taliban” are those fighters The breaking away from the TTP 2005-2008, Mr. Khattak worked with associated with the TTP. of the crook from Uchat village, Pakistani English daily newspapers Fazl-e-Saeed Zaimusht (who now covering the situation in KP and FATA. For Pakistan’s security establishment, interestingly writes Haqqani after He also worked for Sunday Times London launching operations against the his name) is the first step in the and contributed articles to the Christian “good Taliban” is likely seen as establishment’s attempt to regain Science Monitor. In 2010, his paper counterproductive and against the full control over all its jihadist on the situation in Swat, “The Battle for country’s interests. If it were to execute proxies.13 Pakistan: Swat Valley,” was published by attacks against the Haqqani network, the New America Foundation. for example, it would turn those fighters A number of displaced families who against it, thus strengthening the are living in the newly-established IDP ranks of the “bad Taliban” and fighters camp in New Durrani area of Sadda town intent on attacking the Pakistani complained that the same militants who state. Moreover, by supporting the used to terrorize them are now living “good Taliban,” the Pakistani security with them inside the camp.14 “The establishment increases its ability to terrorists who used to impose taxes influence developments in neighboring on us are living among us in the camp Afghanistan, especially after the and getting more facilities than us,” eventual departure of international said one of the IDPs.15 Moreover, due troops.

12 Hasan Khan, “No Peace in Kurram,” Dawn, April 6, This explains why the Pakistani security 2007. 16 The faction led by Faqir Muhammad in Bajaur Agency, establishment has been reluctant to 13 Mohammad Taqi, “The Sham Operation in Kurram,” for example, invites closer scrutiny. Faqir Muhammad launch a military operation against Daily Times, July 7, 2011. was the deputy of former TTP chief Baitullah Mehsud. Haqqani fighters in North Waziristan 14 Personal interviews, IDPs and their family members Upon Baitullah’s death, Faqir declared himself as the Agency. Analysts believe that both living in Peshawar and in the camp, via telephone, June/ new “acting chief” of the TTP. He adopted a meaningful the Pakistani security establishment July 2011. silence, however, after Hakimullah Mehsud was named and the Haqqanis are seeking peace 15 Ibid. as the new, permanent TTP leader.

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June 3, 2011 (IRAQ): A bomb exploded Australia, Belgium and Canada with 85 Recent Highlights in in Tikrit’s fortified government percent. In other ISAF nations, Poland Terrorist Activity compound, killing 18 people. – Los Angeles had 83 percent who felt the killing was Times, June 4 justified, followed by Italy (81 percent), June 1, 2011 (PAKISTAN): Approximately Hungary (79), Germany (76), Sweden 200-500 militants crossed into Pakistan June 3, 2011 (IRAQ): A suicide bomber (71), Turkey (71) and Spain (70).” No from Afghanistan and attacked the detonated his explosives inside the Middle Eastern nations were polled, Shaltalu security checkpoint in Upper Tikrit hospital as Sunni Muslim however. – Reuters, June 7 Dir District of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa parliament member Mutasher Samarrai Province, killing 23 policemen and five visited, killing five people. Samarrai June 7, 2011 (GLOBAL): The head civilians. A police officer in the region escaped injury, however. – Los Angeles of Interpol said that al-Qa`ida and stated, “Militants were in military Times, June 4 affiliated groups remain the world’s uniform when they attacked the check biggest threat to security despite the post and then went into forest.” The June 3, 2011 (PAKISTAN): A U.S. aerial killing of Usama bin Ladin. “The airline assault lasted through the following drone possibly killed Ilyas Kashmiri, and air industry continues to be a prime day. The Pakistani Taliban claimed a high value militant with links to al- target for terrorists, but we’ve seen responsibility. – International Business Qa`ida. Kashmiri, one of the most senior from recovered intelligence etc that they Times, June 1; AFP, June 1; Reuters, June 3 operatives in Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islam are also focusing a lot on mass transit,” (HuJI), was reported killed near Wana, said Interpol Secretary General Ronald June 2, 2011 (UNITED STATES): U.S. South Waziristan Agency. – Los Angeles Noble. “But airlines continue to be a Secretary of Homeland Security Janet Times, June 5 special target.” – Reuters, June 7 Napolitano warned that Lashkar- i-Tayyiba “is a potent terrorist June 3, 2011 (YEMEN): Rockets struck June 7, 2011 (SOMALIA): Somali forces organization. It could be construed as a the presidential palace in Sana`a, killing killed Fazul Abdullah Mohammad (also threat to the United States.” – AFP, June 2 seven people and injuring Yemeni known as Fadil Harun) in Mogadishu. President Ali Abdullah Salih. Yemen’s Mohammad was a top al-Qa`ida June 2, 2011 (IRAQ): At least three military blamed the attack on al-Qa`ida operative wanted for his role in the explosions ripped through Ramadi, in the Arabian Peninsula. As a result U.S. Embassy bombings in East Africa Anbar Province, killing 10 people. The of his injuries, Salih traveled to Saudi in 1998. A British security official later bombs targeted provincial government Arabia for medical attention. – Reuters, told reporters that “the Ritz Hotel in offices. – AFP, June 2 June 5 London and the elite private school Eton were among a handful of possible June 3, 2011 (GLOBAL): U.S.-born June 5, 2011 (PAKISTAN): A bomb in a British terror targets that [Fazul] was al-Qa`ida operative Adam Gadahn pick-up truck exploded on the outskirts considering before he was killed.” appeared in a new video message of Peshawar, killing six people. – Los – Reuters, June 11; AP, June 17 calling on Muslims living in the United Angeles Times, June 6 States to execute one-man terrorist acts June 8, 2011 (UNITED STATES): FBI using automatic weapons purchased at June 5, 2011 (PAKISTAN): A suicide Director Robert Mueller told Congress gun shows. “Let’s take America as an bomber detonated explosives at a that an initial review of documents example,” Gadahn said. “America is crowded bakery in Nowshera District of captured in Usama bin Ladin’s absolutely awash with easily obtainable Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Province, killing at Abbottabad compound suggest that al- firearms. You can go down to a gun show least 18 people. – Los Angeles Times, June 6 Qa`ida remains committed to attacking at the local convention center and come the U.S. homeland. – AP, June 8 away with a fully automatic assault June 6, 2011 (AFGHANISTAN): The rifle, without a background check, and beheaded body of Bamiyan provincial June 9, 2011 (UNITED STATES): The most likely without having to show an council chief Jawad Zahak was found in FBI confirmed that a Minnesota man identification card. So what are you the mountainous Ghorband valley. The was involved in a suicide bombing waiting for?” Gadahn also suggested Taliban later admitted killing the ethnic in Somalia on May 30. The man was targeting major institutions, showing Hazara. – BBC, June 8 identified as Farah Mohamed Beledi. the logo of Exxon and Bank of America, The terrorist and insurgent group al- and said, “I mean we’ve seen how a June 7, 2011 (GLOBAL): A 22-country Shabab earlier took credit for the May woman knocked the Pope to the floor survey found that approximately 30 attack, saying that “the bomber was during Christmas mass, and how Italian 75% of those polled believed that the Abdullahi Ahmed, 25, of Minneapolis.” leader Berlusconi’s face was smashed United States was justified in killing – AP, June 7 during a public appearance. So it’s just al-Qa`ida chief Usama bin Ladin. a matter of entrusting the matter to According to Reuters, “The poll showed June 9, 2011 (UNITED STATES): A Allah and choosing the right place, the that countries that were part of the Chicago court convicted Tahawwur right time, and the right method.” – ABC International Security Assistance Force Rana on two terrorism counts, but he News, June 3 (ISAF) in Afghanistan were among was acquitted of the third charge that he those with the highest approval rating, helped plot the 2008 Mumbai terrorist led by the United States with 95 percent, attacks. He was, however, found France and Britain with 87 percent and guilty of helping plot a never-executed

22 july 2011 . Vol 4 . Issue 7 attack on a Danish newspaper, as well armed with assault weapons and suicide June 18, 2011 (AFGHANISTAN): Three as providing support to Lashkar-i- bombers who detonated explosives- militants armed with suicide vests and Tayyiba. – Bloomberg, June 10 laden belts inside the building, security assault rifles stormed a police station in officials said.” – Washington Post, June 14 Kabul, killing four Afghan security force June 9, 2011 (PAKISTAN): personnel and five civilians. According Approximately 150 militants attacked June 15, 2011 (AFGHANISTAN): A to Agence France-Presse, “One of the a security checkpoint on the border of suicide bomber detonated an explosives- attackers detonated his explosives at North and South Waziristan Agency, laden vehicle in Kapisa Province, killing the entrance to the compound, allowing killing eight soldiers. – Reuters, June 9 four policemen and four civilians. The his two accomplices into the building… bomber targeted the governor’s office. Once inside, they fired at police, June 10, 2011 (GLOBAL): According – Dawn, June 15; Voice of America, June 15 sparking a gun battle which lasted for to Bloomberg, “The U.S. is asking the around two hours before the pair were United Nations Security Council to June 16, 2011 (GLOBAL): Ayman al- killed.” – AFP, June 18 distinguish between Taliban and al- Zawahiri has been named the new overall Qaeda followers in enforcing sanctions, leader of al-Qa`ida. His succession June 19, 2011 (UNITED STATES): a bid to encourage Taliban reconciliation comes in the wake of Usama bin Ladin’s U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates with Afghanistan’s government.” death in May 2011. – BBC, June 16 told reporters that al-Qa`ida has been – Bloomberg, June 10 “significantly weakened. There’s just no June 16, 2011 (NIGERIA): A car two ways about it…We have taken a real June 10, 2011 (AFGHANISTAN): A bomb exploded at the national police toll on them over the last, particularly suicide bomber killed four police officers headquarters in the Nigerian capital of the last two years…The question is at a memorial service for General Daoud Abuja, killing at least two people. Initial whether Zawahiri, the new leader Daoud in Kunduz Province. – New York reports stated that the blast was from a taking bin Laden’s place, can hold Times, June 10 suicide bomber; however, subsequent these groups together in some kind of a evidence has cast that initial claim in cohesive movement, or whether it begins June 10, 2011 (SOMALIA): A suicide doubt. The northern Nigeria based to splinter, and they become essentially bomber killed Somali Interior Minister militant Islamist group Boko Haram regional terrorist groups that are more Abdishashakur Sheik Hassan at his claimed responsibility. – Voice of America, focused on regional targets. And we just home in Mogadishu. The bomber was June 16; Bloomberg, June 20; AFP, June 22 don’t know that yet.” – AFP, June 19 the minister’s niece. Al-Shabab claimed responsibility. – RTT News, June 10; New June 17, 2011 (UNITED STATES): June 19, 2011 (AFGHANISTAN): A York Times, June 10 A 22-year-old Ethiopian-American, suicide bomber in a vehicle targeted Yonathan Melaku, was arrested around a NATO convoy in Kunduz Province, June 11, 2011 (PAKISTAN): Two blasts 2 AM after he drew suspicion walking killing at least three people. The Taliban killed at least 34 people in Peshawar. around Arlington Cemetery in northern claimed responsibility. – CNN, June 19 According to Agence France-Presse, “A Virginia. Upon being confronted at small initial blast late on Saturday night the cemetery, Melaku, a U.S. Marine June 21, 2011 (AFGHANISTAN): A drew onlookers and emergency services Corps Reserve lance corporal, fled, suicide bomber targeted the compound before a second more powerful blast, and when police caught him they of the governor for Parwan Province, believed to be from a suicide strike, discovered a backpack with four ziplock killing at least two people. The governor was detonated.” The Pakistani Taliban bags containing a substance labeled was unharmed. – AFP, June 21; CNN, June denied responsibility. – Reuters, June 11; ammonium nitrate, as well as a notebook 21 AFP, June 13 with the words “al qaeda,” “Taliban rules,” “mujahidin,” and “defeated June 21, 2011 (PAKISTAN): Pakistan’s June 13, 2011 (IRAQ): A suicide bomber coalition forces.” The man, who joined military arrested Brigadier Ali Khan in a vehicle detonated his explosives the Marine Corps Reserve on September for suspected ties to the radical Islamist outside a police compound in Basra, 4, 2007, had been awarded the National group Hizb al-Tahrir (HT). HT is banned killing five people. – Reuters, June 13 Defense Service Medal and the Selected in Pakistan. – Wall Street Journal, June 21 Marine Corps Reserve medal. Upon June 13, 2011 (PAKISTAN): A suicide further investigation, authorities charge June 21, 2011 (YEMEN): The Yemeni bomber attacked a bank in Islamabad, that Melaku was responsible for a string Defense Ministry announced that killing one person. – Voice of America, of shootings at the Pentagon and other overnight airstrikes in Abyan Province June 13 military targets in the Washington, D.C. killed 20 militants affiliated with al- area. – ABC News, June 18; AP, July 20 Qa`ida in the Arabian Peninsula. – AP, June 14, 2011 (IRAQ): Militants executed June 21 a complex attack and took control June 17, 2011 (SOMALIA): Somalia’s al- of a government building in Diyala Shabab insurgent and terrorist group June 22, 2011 (AFGHANISTAN): A Province. As stated in the Washington Post, welcomed Ayman al-Zawahiri as the suicide bomber killed six police officers “The assault on the provincial council new head of al-Qa`ida. – Shabelle Media at a checkpoint in Ghazni Province. headquarters in Baqubah, about 35 miles Network, June 17 – CNN, June 22 northeast of Baghdad, included a car bombing and attacks carried out by men

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June 22, 2011 (YEMEN): More than 60 June 27, 2011 (PAKISTAN): Senior CTC Sentinel Staff prisoners escaped from the Mukalla Pakistani Taliban leader Fazal Saeed prison in Hadramawt Province. Reports Zaimusht defected from Tehrik-i- Editor-in-Chief stated that 57 of the escapees are known Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and established Erich Marquardt al-Qa`ida militants. – Huffington Post, June his own group called Tehrik-i-Taliban Senior Editor, CTC 22 Islami (TTI). Saeed was the TTP’s main asset in Kurram Agency, where he has Editorial Board June 23, 2011 (SOMALIA): A U.S. drone the support of local tribesmen. He said COL Michael J. Meese, Ph.D. aircraft reportedly fired on two senior that he will now fight against the TTP, Department Head members of al-Shabab in Somalia. – al- as well as U.S. troops in neighboring Department of Social Sciences (West Point) Jazira, July 1; New York Times, July 1 Afghanistan. – Reuters, June 27

COL Cindy R. Jebb, Ph.D. June 24, 2011 (GLOBAL): A U.S. official June 28, 2011 (AFGHANISTAN): A Deputy Department Head told reporters that documents seized handful of insurgents attacked the Department of Social Sciences (West Point) in Usama bin Ladin’s Abbottabad Western-style Intercontinental Hotel compound reveal that the al-Qa`ida in Kabul. As stated by Time Magazine, LTC Liam Collins chief considered changing the group’s “The assault left between 18 and 21 Executive Director, CTC name to improve its “brand.” According dead and 13 wounded, Ministry of to the Associated Press, “He suggested Interior spokesman Sadiq Sadiqi told possibly Taifat al-Tawhed Wal-Jihad, TIME. Local news said nine civilians, or Monotheism and Jihad Group, and two policemen, one Spanish national Jama’at I’Adat al-Khilafat al-Rashida, and nine suicide bombers were killed translated as Restoration of the and that 13 civilians, five government Caliphate Group, the official said.” As officials and two NATO soldiers were stated by the Guardian, “A name change wounded.” – Los Angeles Times, June 28; Contact would allow al-Qaida to distance itself Washington Post, June 28 Combating Terrorism Center from growing criticism within the U.S. Military Academy Islamic world that it was responsible June 29, 2011 (PAKISTAN): Pakistani 607 Cullum Road, Lincoln Hall for killing large numbers of Muslims, Defense Minister Ahmed Mukhtar told West Point, NY 10996 Bin Laden wrote.” – AFP, June 24; Guardian, state media that his government told Phone: (845) 667-6383 June 24 the United States to leave the remote Email: [email protected] Shamsi airbase, which is reportedly Web: www.ctc.usma.edu/sentinel/ June 25, 2011 (AFGHANISTAN): A used to deploy U.S. unmanned aerial suicide bomber in a vehicle killed at vehicles. – AFP, June 29 * For Press Inquiries: (845) 667-6383 least 27 people at a hospital in Logar Province. According to the Los Angeles June 30, 2011 (AFGHANISTAN): An Times, “The attacker, driving a black improvised explosive device destroyed sport utility vehicle, first targeted the a bus in Nimroz Province, killing 20 Azra district police headquarters but Afghan civilians. – Dawn, July 1 was confronted by officers, district support police chief Bakhtiyar Gul Ashrafi The Combating Terrorism Center would said. The assailant then drove toward like to express its gratitude to its financial a nearby 40-bed hospital filled with supporters, for without their support and patients, visitors and staff members, shared vision of the Center products like the detonating his explosives outside… CTC Sentinel could not be produced. If you The blast leveled the maternity ward are interested in learning more about how and much of the rest of the building, to support the Combating Terrorism Center, trapping scores of people under the please visit http://www.ctc.usma.edu or call rubble.” – Los Angeles Times, June 25 Kristin Sorenson at West Point’s Association of Graduates at 845-446-1561. June 25, 2011 (PAKISTAN): A husband and wife team carried out a suicide attack at a police station in Kolachi, South Waziristan Agency. – BBC, June 26

June 26, 2011 (IRAQ): A suicide bomber in a wheelchair detonated his explosives The views expressed in this report are those of at the entrance to a police station in the authors and not of the U.S. Military Academy, Tarmiya, 30 miles north of Baghdad. the Department of the Army, or any other agency Three people were killed in the blast. of the U.S. Government. – AP, June 27

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