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What to Do with Omar Khadr? Putting a Child Soldier on Trial: Questions of International Law, Juvenile Justice, and Moral Culpability, 41 J

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What to Do with Omar Khadr? Putting a Child Soldier on Trial: Questions of International Law, Juvenile Justice, and Moral Culpability, 41 J The John Marshall Law Review Volume 41 | Issue 4 Article 13 Summer 2008 What to Do With Omar Khadr? Putting a Child Soldier on Trial: Questions of International Law, Juvenile Justice, and Moral Culpability, 41 J. Marshall L. Rev. 1281 (2008) Christopher L. Dore Follow this and additional works at: http://repository.jmls.edu/lawreview Part of the Courts Commons, Criminal Law Commons, Criminal Procedure Commons, Human Rights Law Commons, International Humanitarian Law Commons, International Law Commons, Juvenile Law Commons, Law and Politics Commons, Law and Psychology Commons, and the Military, War, and Peace Commons Recommended Citation Christopher L. Dore, What to Do With Omar Khadr? Putting a Child Soldier on Trial: Questions of International Law, Juvenile Justice, and Moral Culpability, 41 J. Marshall L. Rev. 1281 (2008) http://repository.jmls.edu/lawreview/vol41/iss4/13 This Comments is brought to you for free and open access by The oJ hn Marshall Institutional Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in The oJ hn Marshall Law Review by an authorized administrator of The oJ hn Marshall Institutional Repository. WHAT TO DO WITH OMAR KHADR? PUTTING A CHILD SOLDIER ON TRIAL: QUESTIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, JUVENILE JUSTICE, AND MORAL CULPABILITY CHRISTOPHER L. DORE* I. INTRODUCTION I'm tired of hearing how he is the victim. Who is the victim here? My daughter and son, they are the true victims in this horrible mess. Tabitha Speer, wife of Sergeant Christopher Speer' I'd like to know what they expected him to do, come up with his hands in the air? I mean it's a war. They're shooting at him. Why can't he shoot at you? If you killed three, why can't he kill one? Why does nobody say you killed three of his friends? Why does everybody say you killed an American soldier. Big deal. Maha Elsamnah Khadr, mother of Omar Khadr 2 A. Death on the Battlefield Sergeant Christopher Speer thought everyone in the compound was dead. 3 Moments before, an air strike leveled the building, ending the gunfire and leaving only the silence of the Afghan mountainside. 4 But, the sight of a young boy tossing a * J.D. Candidate, May 2009. The author would like to thank the 2008-2009 Editorial Board of THE JOHN MARSHALL LAW REVIEW for their hard work in publishing this Comment. Additionally, the author would like to recognize his parents, John and Nancy Dore, for their endless support and guidance. Last, the author wishes to thank Kat Leahy for being his most important advisor and editor, both on and off the page. 1. Michael Friscolanti, Khadr's Case: Who is the Real Victim Here?, MACLEANS, June 18, 2007, available at http://www.macleans.ca/article.jsp? content=20070618_106209_106209&source=srch. 2. Frontline: Son of Al Qaeda, Terence McKenna Interview with Maha Elsamnah and Zaynab Khadr, (PBS television broadcast Apr. 22, 2004) (transcript available at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/ khadr/interviews/mahazaynab.html). 3. See Jeff Tietz, The Unending Torture of Omar Khadr, ROLLING STONE MAGAZINE, Aug. 24, 2007, available at http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/ story/11 128331/followomarkhadr from an_al-qaedachildhoodtoagitmo_ cell (providing a detailed account of the battle and Omar's capture). 4. Id. 1281 1282 The John Marshall Law Review [41:1281 grenade from the rubble changed all that. The shrapnel pierced Speer's helmet, and then his brain, dropping him to the ground. 5 He never regained consciousness and died ten days later.6 Speer's fellow soldiers shot the boy three times in the chest, but then administered aid that saved his life.7 After taking him into custody, the military identified the boy as Omar Khadr, a fifteen- year-old Canadian citizen.8 His capture in July of 2002 marked the beginning of a harrowing journey into the heart of United States terrorism policy, but one that his upbringing set in motion long before. This Comment will argue that Omar was a child soldier, indoctrinated with a radical strain of Islam by his family and surroundings. As a child soldier, he possesses a lower degree of moral culpability for his crimes. Because of this status, the United States should not prosecute him, or, if it does, he should not be eligible for a life sentence without parole. 9 Part II of this Comment details Omar's family background, from his birth in 1986, to his current custody and prosecution status. Part II will also provide an overarching view of the child soldier problem worldwide, with specific attention given to the Middle East. Part III analyzes the applicable international law pertaining to child soldiers and children generally. This Comment contrasts this body of law with the current state of juvenile10 justice in the United States, focusing specifically on life-without-parole (LWOP) sentences for juveniles accused of murder. Additionally, Part III examines the growing body of neurological and psychological research arguing that juvenile brains are distinctly different from adult brains, which, in turn, impairs juvenile reasoning and moral judgment. 5. Friscolanti, supra note 1. 6. Id. 7. See Morris v. Khadr, 415 F. Supp. 2d 1323, 1326 (D. Utah 2006) (holding the Khadr family civilly liable to the Speer and Morris families, as well as providing details of the battle). Upon reaching Omar, the medics were not only surprised to hear him speak English, but more so that he begged them to kill him. 60 Minutes: The Youngest Terrorist? (CBS television broadcast Nov. 18, 2007) (transcript available at LexisNexis, CBS News Transcripts) [hereinafter 60 Minutes]. 8. Tietz, supra note 3; see also Isabel Vincent, The Good Son, NATIONAL POST, Dec. 28, 2002 (tracing Omar's life and providing details of the battle and his capture). 9. Life-without-parole (LWOP) involves a jail sentence for the remainder of one's natural life, without the possibility, option, or opportunity for release. Life with parole allows periodic chances for release, but there is no guarantee of eventual parole. 10. Throughout this Comment, the terms juvenile, adolescent, minor, and child will be used interchangeably to represent any person under the age of eighteen. 2008] What to Do With Omar Khadr? 1283 Part IV proposes reform to both international and United States domestic law in order to guarantee uniformity in juvenile criminal law and ensure proper weight is given to diminished juvenile culpability. This reform includes signing, supporting, and abiding by all relevant international law pertaining to children and child soldiers, specifically those laws which endorse eighteen as the minimum age for military participation. In abiding by international law, the United States must prohibit LWOP for juveniles domestically and apply a broader understanding of diminished juvenile culpability throughout its justice system. II. BACKGROUND A. Growing up Al Qaeda Living in Toronto in 1986, Ahmed Said Khadr, an Egyptian, and his wife Maha Elsamnah, a Palestinian, welcomed the fourth of what would be six children, naming him Omar.1 Two years later, the Khadr family moved to Peshawar, Pakistan, an operational outpost of Islamic insurgents in Afghanistan's battle against the Soviet Union. 12 Omar's father took a position with a Canadian charity named Human Concern International (HCI), set up to aid orphans of the Afghan/Soviet war.1 3 An emerging leader in this resistance, Osama Bin Laden, based his new militant army, Al Qaeda, in Peshawar.14 During this time, Ahmed Said built a friendship with Bin Laden, and it is widely believed that Ahmed Said's position with HCI was a personal fagade.15 United States intelligence alleges that through a second organization, Health and Education Project International-Canada, he participated in Al 16 Qaeda fundraising and recruitment. 11. Vincent, supra note 8. Omar has three brothers (Abdullah, Abdurahman, and Abdul Karim) and two sisters (Zaynab and Mariam). Id. 12. Vincent, supra note 8. 13. Id. 14. Id. 15. Id. 16. Id.; see also Charging Brief, United States v. Khadr, No. 07-001 (USMC Feb. 2, 2007) (claiming in regards to Ahmed Said's organization: "despite stated goals of providing humanitarian relief to Afghani orphans, [it] provided funds to Al Qaeda to support terrorist training camps in Afghanistan."). 1284 The John Marshall Law Review [41:1281 In Pakistan, Omar and his siblings enrolled in a madrassah1 7 and spent four years living among the war refugees.1 8 In 1992, Ahmed Said stepped on a land mine and was nearly killed. 19 His connections to Al Qaeda were unknown at the time and the Canadian government flew him and his family back to Canada for medical treatment. 20 Once healed, Ahmed Said brought his family back to Pakistan and resumed his position at HCI.21 In 1996, the Pakistani government arrested Ahmed Said for his financial involvement in the 1995 Egyptian embassy bombing in Islamabad, Pakistan, 22 outing his connections to Ayman al Zawahiri 23 and the Al Qaeda network for the first time. 24 He spent four months in a Pakistani prison under squalid conditions and was only released after intervention by the Canadian government. 25 The Pakistani government also held Omar and his family for a short time. 26 Omar, who was very close to his father, was said to be "traumatized" and "radicalized" by the whole ordeal, 27 and at the age of ten, was "marked for life." After his release from prison, Ahmed Said again moved his family, this time landing in Jalalabad, Afghanistan, at the expansive compound of Osama Bin Laden. 28 Ahmed Said sent Omar and his two older brothers, Abdullah and Abdurahman, to 17. Madrassah, an Arabic word, means school, specifically with an Islamic based education.
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