MĀORI OPPOSITION TO FOSSIL FUEL DEVELOPMENT IN AOTEAROA NEW ZEALAND ZOLTÁN GROSSMAN The Evergreen State College, Olympia, Washington Opposition has intensified in the past five years in Aotearoa New Zealand to foreign corporate deep-sea oil exploration, which opponents view as a threat to fisheries, beaches, tourism, marine mammals, and climate stability. Opponents fear that an oil spill the scale of the Exxon or BP disasters would overwhelm the country’s economy and government’s capacity for clean-up. Despite interest in oil revenues from a few local Māori leaders, growing numbers of Māori are beginning to view oil drilling as a challenge to the Treaty of Waitangi, and proclaim that “Aotearoa is Not for Sale.” I visited Aotearoa for two months earlier this year, as part of my study abroad class “Native Decolonization in the Pacific Rim: From the Northwest to New Zealand,” which I have taught this past year (with my colleague Kristina Ackley) at The Evergreen State College in Olympia, Washington.1 We joined fifteen of our undergraduate students, half of them Indigenous and half non-Native, in the journey to visit Māori and Pasifika (Pacific Islander) communities throughout North Island, and to conduct research projects comparing Pacific Northwest treaty rights and tribal sovereignty to the Treaty of Waitangi and Māori self-determination. It was the second class we took to Aotearoa, building on previous exchanges of Indigenous artists through our campus Longhouse, and graduate students through our Tribal Master’s of Public Administration program. When the students were off doing their projects, and I was visiting with them, I conducted my own research on Māori alliances with Pākehā (European settlers) in the movement against oil drilling, as well as the political intersections between fossil fuel extraction and Māori decolonization. I interviewed two dozen North Island Māori and Pākehā involved in the movement in the East Cape, Waikato, Northland, and Auckland regions. My main question was “How does the Treaty of Waitangi, or Te Tiriti, contribute to collaboration between Māori and Pākehā communities in confronting the fossil fuel industry, and how does this collaboration strengthen the popular understanding of treaty rights as benefiting all New Zealand citizens?” I was not so much interested in the pro’s and con’s of fossil fuel development, nor in the scant Māori support for oil drilling. My study was focused on how Māori have gained such powerful leadership within the opposition, unlike in other western countries where Indigenous priorities have been largely ignored or marginalized within white-led environmental movements. I examined Māori relationships with environmental organizations, such as Greenpeace New Zealand, as well as the local relationship developing between Māori and local Pākehā neighbors, much as my dissertation and upcoming book focuses on similar Native / non-Native rural collaborations in the U.S. (such as the Cowboy Indian Alliance against the Keystone XL pipeline or Pacific Northwest alliances to stop coal and oil terminals). 2 New Zealand has recently become an important center in “Blockadia,” or the places in the world where frontline residents are blocking fossil fuel development (as Naomi Klein 1 The Evergreen State College, Class Report and Student Projects, Native Decolonization in the Pacific Rim: From the Northwest to New Zealand (2015). http://academic.evergreen.edu/g/grossmaz/NZ2015.pdf 2 Zoltán Grossman, “Native/non-Native Alliances Challenging Fossil Fuel Shipping at Pacific Northwest Ports” (2014). http://academic.evergreen.edu/g/grossmaz/NativeFossilFuels2SS.pdf 2 describes climate justice activism in her new book This Changes Everything).3 The 1840 Treaty of Waitangi can be seen a powerful tool to protect the common coastal environment, in much the same way that Northwest treaties help protect salmon habitat. This treaty-based opposition has contributed to the decisions of giant Brazilian and U.S. oil companies to leave Aotearoa, and is now causing great concern to a Norwegian company, and I wanted to learn how this happened, and bring the stories to the alliances developing back home. Treaty wars and environmental conflict The 1840 Treaty of Waitangi was signed by Māori rangatira (chiefs) to safeguard their tino rangatiratanga (self-determination) in the face of British colonization. The Māori version of “Te Tiriti” retained self-determination and limited the British to kawanatanga (governance), but in the English translation the Crown claimed full sovereignty over the entire country. Even the English translation, however, guaranteed the chiefs the “full exclusive and undisturbed possession of their Lands and Estates Forests Fisheries and other properties,” and never ceded the offshore lands that Māori deemed as the domain of the ocean deity Tangaroa. Within only a few years after the treaty signing, settlers began to violate its terms, and the Crown responded to Māori resistance by confiscating the chiefs’ lands. As war raged in Taranaki in the early 1860s over British land confiscations, one of the first oil wells in the world (and the first in the Commonwealth), was drilled on the New Plymouth foreshore in 1865.4 A century later, in the 1960s and ‘70s, extensive oil and gas fields were developed onshore and offshore in Taranaki, making the district the New Zealand equivalent of Texas or Alberta. Māori iwi (tribes) and hapu (subtribes) were alarmed by the contamination and could do little to stop it, but have tried to mitigate the effects, such as diverting pipelines from their urupa (cemeteries). 5 Public awareness of threats to the moana (ocean) environment increased in the 1980s, exemplified by activists’ sea blockades of French nuclear weapons testing near the Māori homeland in Polynesia. The 1985 French bombing of the Greenpeace boat Rainbow Warrior in Auckland Harbour left one dead.6 In the same year, the strengthening of the Waitangi Tribunal opened up a process whereby grievances and claims could be filed on violations of the Treaty since 1840. The treaty signing is commemorated in Waitangi every February 6th. Pākehā support for land returns and Māori cultural and language revitalization grew concurrently with their stronger environmental consciousness. The Treaty of Waitangi was officially embedded into most environmental legislation. The 1991 Resource 3 Naomi Klein, This Changes Everything: Capitalism vs. the Climate (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2014). 4 Sorell Hoskin, “Moturoa black gold: ‘the good oil,’” Puke Ariki (2004). http://pukeariki.com/Learning- Research/Taranaki-Research-Centre/Taranaki-Stories/Taranaki-Story/id/371/title/moturoa-black-gold-the- good-oil 5 Mike Smith and Hinekaa Mako, Personal interview, Auckland (Feb. 18, 2015). 6 David Robie, Eyes of Fire: The Last Voyage of the Rainbow Warrior (Auckland: Asia-Pacific Network, 2005). 3 Management Act required consultation on both onshore and offshore development with coastal tangata whenua (people of the land), meaning they had to at least be informed of any plans in their fishing grounds.7 This requirement stemmed from the Treaty; corporations have no such obligation to consult with coastal Pākehā communities, leaving them largely out of the loop. Foreshore and Seabed Act The confluence of Pākehā support for Indigenous rights and environmental protection was severely tested in 2004, when a South Island hapu planned to raise mussels in Marlborough Sound. Since the Treaty never ceded the foreshore and seabed, or takutaimoana, to the Crown, the Court of Appeals ruled that Māori could seek customary title. The media and the conservative National Party raised hysterical fears that if the Labour government of Helen Clark allowed Māori iwi to assert rights to harvest shellfish, they could also restrict public access to beaches, an integral part of New Zealander or Kiwi identity as an island nation. In reality, as Pākehā treaty workers Moea Armstrong and Tim Howard pointed out, the “iwi” never intended to prevent other “kiwis” from having a “picnic at the beach,” but to protect the beaches and safeguard their own access to them under the Treaty. Armstrong compared Māori title over the area as even benefiting Pākehā, in the same way that hospitals’ concessions to create large rooms for visiting Māori whanau (extended families) also benefited Pākehā families. She asserted, “it upsets the mainstream discourse but if it's good for Māori , it's good for everybody … Māori sovereignty is good for all New Zealanders.”8 Yet most Pākehā, including many environmentalists, jumped on the bandwagon, and Helen Clark’s Labour government passed the Foreshore and Seabed Act to unilaterally extend Crown control beyond the tidal line.9 Māori raised strong objections to what amounted to the largest single land confiscation in their history (even if it was mostly land underwater). A hikoi (march) of 40,000 in Wellington involved one-tenth of the entire Māori population, with a handful of Pākehā allies.10 But they didn’t get what they wanted. In angry response to the Act, top Māori leaders left the Labour Party to found the new Māori Party. The government’s strategy pit Māori and Pākehā against each other, appealing to deep settler anxieties, or in the words of Mike Smith to the “colonial fear of being pushed into the sea…sent back in ships.”11 Armstrong saw the government’s “massive treaty breach” as an “insidious” strategy “to take it back to us versus them.”12 7 Parliamentary Counsel Office, “Resource Management Act 1991.” http://www.legislation.govt.nz/act/public/1991/0069/latest/DLM230265.html