Chapter 7 INTERNATIONAL EFFORTS IN SPACE Contents Page Introduction . 175 Soviet Union... 204 Communications . 205 European Space Agency and joint European Remote Sensing. 206 Efforts . 176 Materials Processing . 207 Policy and Budget . 177 Launch Vehicles and Manned Current and Projected Applications Operations . 207 Programs . 177 Cooperation and Competition With Communications . 177 Other Countries . 208 Remote Sensing . 179 People’s Republic of China . 209 Materials Processing . 179 India . 211 Launch Vehicles . 181 Future Plans . 185 Other Space programs . 212 Cooperation/Competition With the Canada . 212 United States . 185 Brazil . 213 Cooperation . 185 Domestic/Regional Communications Competition . 186 Systems . 213 European National Programs . 187 Remote Sensing in Developing Countries 214 France . 187 Current Applications Programs . 188 West Germany . 192 Applications Programs . 192 LIST OF TABLES Great Britain . 194 Table No. Page Organization and Funding . 195 17. Contributions of Member States to the Current Applications Programs . 195 Principai ESA Programsin 1981 . 178 Italy . 196. 18. Capacity ofAriane and U.S. Launch Other European Programs . 196 Vehicles . 181 Japan . 197 19. Total Successful Orbital Launches . 204 Organization and Policy . 197 Current and Projected Applications Programs . 198 LIST OF FIGURES Communications . 198 Figure No. Page Remote Sensing. 201 11. Organizational Structure of the Materials Processing . 201 European Space Agency . .. 176 Launch Vehicles . 202 12. Schematic Chart of National Organization ‘Cooperation/Competition With the for Space Activities . 199 United States . 203 13. Japanese Budget for Space Activities. 200 Non-Western Space Programs: Soviet Union, 14. Current and Probable Landsat People’s Republic of China, India . 204 Ground Stations . 215 Chapter 7 INTERNATIONAL EFFORTS IN SPACE INTRODUCTION The shape, direction, and very existence of the tiveness vis-a-vis commercial rivals, particularly U.S. civilian space program owe much to inter- the United States. As the U.S. post-Apollo space national competition. The basic events are well activities, both public and private, have come to known: the launch of Sputnik in 1957 and the concentrate more on potential economic payoffs sudden public discovery of the “space age;” the rather than on large prestige projects, and the continuing series of Soviet space “firsts” in un- Soviet program has turned toward the long-term manned and then manned satellites; and the goal of permanent manned orbital platforms, the sometimes desperate attempts by the United commercial competition in space applications States to catch up, culminating in President technologies and systems from Europe and Japan Kennedy’s 1961 commitment to a manned lunar has become increasingly important. The signifi- landing by 1970, ahead of the Russians. (For a cance of competition between nations has also more detailed description of the early phases of altered, due to the expanded global use of space Soviet-American rivalry in space, see app. G.) technology rising largely out of the successes of the U.S. space program. International organiza- During these years of competition the United tions for global communications, such as States and the Soviet Union had a virtual monop- INTELSAT and INMARSAT, have continued to oly on space systems and technologies: boosters; grow and now include most of the world’s users tracking systems; communications, remote sens- of telecommunications. Through the National ing, and weather satellites; and manned space- Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) craft. Other countries, lacking the military and and the U.S. Agency for International Develop- political motivation, did not at first choose to ex- ment, many developing countries have gained pend the resources needed to develop independ- first-hand experience in the ways satellite com- ent space capabilities. munications and remote-sensing systems can We will not attempt hereto describe the course supply services crucial for economic growth. As of these developments during the 1960’s; the one result, the laws and regulations governing the main elements of the current Soviet space pro- use of outer space have been widely discussed gram will be presented later (see pp. 204-209). by international bodies such as the International Suffice it to say that the U.S. program had, by the Telecommunication Union and the U.N.’S Com- end of the decade, succeeded in demonstrating mittee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space. its superiority in virtually every area—without, Space technology has become an important po- however, forcing the Soviets to abandon their litical resource whose effective use by the United own efforts or to concede permanent U.S. pre- States will be affected by the development of in- eminence. ternational competition. In what follows we will outline, for each major foreign program, its or- The important point is that, beginning in the ganization and goals, its main efforts in the four 1960’s but accelerating rapidly in the 1970’s, applications areas (communications, remote sens- other countries began to enter the field. Political ing, materials processing, and transportation), and motivations, as will be seen, played and continue the prospects for cooperation and/or competition to play a crucial role; to a large extent these were with the United States. identified with maintaining economic competi- 175 . 176 ● Civilian Space Policy and Applications .————— .- EUROPEAN SPACE AGENCY AND JOINT EUROPEAN EFFORTS Since the early 1960’s Europe has attempted At the beginning of the space age, individual to mount a coordinated space program to com- European states recognized that they could not pete with the United States and Soviet programs mount space programs on the scale of those in in key areas and to ensure European participa- the United States or U.S.S.R, unless there was ex- tion in the economic, scientific, and political tensive cooperation among interested parties. benefits of space activities. The latest and most Even so, there was no attempt to match the successful organization to attempt this task is the manned capabilities being competitively devel- European Space Agency (ESA), made up of 11 full oped by the superpowers. European interest has members—Belgiu m, Denmark, France, Ger- been focused on basic science, on applications many, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, satellites for regional use, and on supporting an Sweden, Switzerland, and the united Kingdom– industrial/technical infrastructure that could con- and two associate members—Austria and Nor- tribute to high-technology enterprises. Despite way. ESA is involved in space science, applica- these shared interests, however, there have been tions, and launch vehicle development, as well continuing difficulties caused by: 1 ) differences as the formulation of policy for European coop- between members about what programs to sup- erative ventures (see fig. 1 1). port and general policies to follow, 2) problems Figure Il.—Organizational Structure of the European Space Agency Ch. 7—Internationa/ Efforts in Space • 177 in allocating contracts between industries in and operations, launch facilities, and space trans- various countries, 3) disagreement about the ap- portation. 3 The major programs, such as Ariane propriate degree of cooperation with, and de- and Spacelab, are optional, which means that pendence on, the United States, and 4) competi- members can request to be specifically excluded. tion between ESA and national programs. Mandatory contributions are based on each state’s national income; however, no one state can contribute more than 25 percent of the total Policy? and Budget budget. For optional projects, interested par- ESA was founded in May 1975 following several ticipants pay a variable percentage which is ne- years of negotiations and compromises among gotiated between the participants. The degree of the major participants. ESA inherited the pro- national support for various programs in 1981 is grams and facilities of its predecessor organiza- given in table 17. tions, the European Space Research Organization (ESRO), the European Launcher Development ESA’S budget for its first full year of operation Organization (ELDO), and the European Space (1976) was approximately $600 million, of which Conference (ESC). (For a description of Europe’s one-third went for mandatory and two-thirds for pre-ESA activities, see app. G.) An important point optional programs. This compares with NASA’s is that, unlike NASA, ESA is specifically allowed fiscal 1976 appropriation (for space) of $3.22 to operate applications systems, once developed, billion. In 1980, ESA’S budget had risen to $846 with the costs being borne by the users of the million, while NASA’s was $4.68 billion. In both system.1 A second difference, one which partially years, the ESA budget was between one-fifth and offsets the first, is that ESA is responsible for one-sixth NASA’S. (These figures do not constitute carrying out an “industrial policy” designed to a complete comparison of United States and “improve the worldwide competitiveness of European civilian space expenditures, since they European industry,” while ensuring that member fail to include non-NASA programs in the United states participate equitably and, in particular, that States, both Government and private sector, as the return to any member state—i.e., the value well as the space budgets of individual European of the contracts let by ESA—is approximately pro- countries). Since