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Home , French space program, Interkosmos, OTRAG, OTRAG (rocket), Skylark (rocket), TDF 1

Chapter 7 INTERNATIONAL EFFORTS IN SPACE Contents

Page Introduction ...... 175 Soviet Union...... 204 Communications ...... 205 European Space Agency and joint European Remote Sensing...... 206 Efforts ...... 176 Materials Processing ...... 207 Policy and Budget ...... 177 Launch Vehicles and Manned Current and Projected Applications Operations ...... 207 Programs ...... 177 Cooperation and Competition With Communications ...... 177 Other Countries ...... 208 Remote Sensing ...... 179 People’s Republic of China ...... 209 Materials Processing ...... 179 India ...... 211 Launch Vehicles ...... 181 Future Plans ...... 185 Other Space programs ...... 212 Cooperation/Competition With the Canada ...... 212 United States ...... 185 Brazil ...... 213 Cooperation ...... 185 Domestic/Regional Communications Competition ...... 186 Systems ...... 213 European National Programs ...... 187 Remote Sensing in Developing Countries 214 France ...... 187 Current Applications Programs ...... 188 West Germany ...... 192 Applications Programs ...... 192 LIST OF TABLES Great Britain ...... 194 Table No. Page Organization and Funding ...... 195 17. Contributions of Member States to the Current Applications Programs ...... 195 Principai ESA Programsin 1981 . . . . . 178 Italy ...... 196. 18. Capacity ofAriane and U.S. Launch Other European Programs ...... 196 Vehicles ...... 181 Japan ...... 197 19. Total Successful Orbital Launches . . . 204 Organization and Policy ...... 197 Current and Projected Applications Programs ...... 198 LIST OF FIGURES Communications ...... 198 Figure No. Page Remote Sensing...... 201 11. Organizational Structure of the Materials Processing ...... 201 European Space Agency ...... 176 Launch Vehicles ...... 202 12. Schematic Chart of National Organization ‘Cooperation/Competition With the for Space Activities ...... 199 United States ...... 203 13. Japanese Budget for Space Activities. 200 Non-Western Space Programs: Soviet Union, 14. Current and Probable Landsat People’s Republic of China, India . . . 204 Ground Stations ...... 215 Chapter 7 INTERNATIONAL EFFORTS IN SPACE

INTRODUCTION

The shape, direction, and very existence of the tiveness vis-a-vis commercial rivals, particularly U.S. civilian space program owe much to inter- the United States. As the U.S. post-Apollo space national competition. The basic events are well activities, both public and private, have come to known: the launch of Sputnik in 1957 and the concentrate more on potential economic payoffs sudden public discovery of the “space age;” the rather than on large prestige projects, and the continuing series of Soviet space “firsts” in un- Soviet program has turned toward the long-term manned and then manned satellites; and the goal of permanent manned orbital platforms, the sometimes desperate attempts by the United commercial competition in space applications States to catch up, culminating in President technologies and systems from Europe and Japan Kennedy’s 1961 commitment to a manned lunar has become increasingly important. The signifi- landing by 1970, ahead of the Russians. (For a cance of competition between nations has also more detailed description of the early phases of altered, due to the expanded global use of space Soviet-American rivalry in space, see app. G.) technology rising largely out of the successes of the U.S. space program. International organiza- During these years of competition the United tions for global communications, such as States and the Soviet Union had a virtual monop- INTELSAT and INMARSAT, have continued to oly on space systems and technologies: boosters; grow and now include most of the world’s users tracking systems; communications, remote sens- of telecommunications. Through the National ing, and weather satellites; and manned space- Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) craft. Other countries, lacking the military and and the U.S. Agency for International Develop- political motivation, did not at first choose to ex- ment, many developing countries have gained pend the resources needed to develop independ- first-hand experience in the ways satellite com- ent space capabilities. munications and remote-sensing systems can We will not attempt hereto describe the course supply services crucial for economic growth. As of these developments during the 1960’s; the one result, the laws and regulations governing the main elements of the current Soviet space pro- use of outer space have been widely discussed gram will be presented later (see pp. 204-209). by international bodies such as the International Suffice it to say that the U.S. program had, by the Telecommunication Union and the U.N.’S Com- end of the decade, succeeded in demonstrating mittee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space. its superiority in virtually every area—without, Space technology has become an important po- however, forcing the Soviets to abandon their litical resource whose effective use by the United own efforts or to concede permanent U.S. pre- States will be affected by the development of in- eminence. ternational competition. In what follows we will outline, for each major foreign program, its or- The important point is that, beginning in the ganization and goals, its main efforts in the four 1960’s but accelerating rapidly in the 1970’s, applications areas (communications, remote sens- other countries began to enter the field. Political ing, materials processing, and transportation), and motivations, as will be seen, played and continue the prospects for cooperation and/or competition to play a crucial role; to a large extent these were with the United States. identified with maintaining economic competi-

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EUROPEAN SPACE AGENCY AND JOINT EUROPEAN EFFORTS

Since the early 1960’s Europe has attempted At the beginning of the space age, individual to mount a coordinated space program to com- European states recognized that they could not pete with the United States and Soviet programs mount space programs on the scale of those in in key areas and to ensure European participa- the United States or U.S.S.R, unless there was ex- tion in the economic, scientific, and political tensive cooperation among interested parties. benefits of space activities. The latest and most Even so, there was no attempt to match the successful organization to attempt this task is the manned capabilities being competitively devel- European Space Agency (ESA), made up of 11 full oped by the superpowers. European interest has members—Belgiu m, Denmark, France, Ger- been focused on basic science, on applications many, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, satellites for regional use, and on supporting an Sweden, Switzerland, and the united Kingdom– industrial/technical infrastructure that could con- and two associate members—Austria and Nor- tribute to high-technology enterprises. Despite way. ESA is involved in space science, applica- these shared interests, however, there have been tions, and launch vehicle development, as well continuing difficulties caused by: 1 ) differences as the formulation of policy for European coop- between members about what programs to sup- erative ventures (see fig. 1 1). port and general policies to follow, 2) problems

Figure Il.—Organizational Structure of the European Space Agency Ch. 7—Internationa/ Efforts in Space • 177 in allocating contracts between industries in and operations, launch facilities, and space trans- various countries, 3) disagreement about the ap- portation. 3 The major programs, such as Ariane propriate degree of cooperation with, and de- and Spacelab, are optional, which means that pendence on, the United States, and 4) competi- members can request to be specifically excluded. tion between ESA and national programs. Mandatory contributions are based on each state’s national income; however, no one state can contribute more than 25 percent of the total Policy? and Budget budget. For optional projects, interested par- ESA was founded in May 1975 following several ticipants pay a variable percentage which is ne- years of negotiations and compromises among gotiated between the participants. The degree of the major participants. ESA inherited the pro- national support for various programs in 1981 is grams and facilities of its predecessor organiza- given in table 17. tions, the European Space Research Organization (ESRO), the European Launcher Development ESA’S budget for its first full year of operation Organization (ELDO), and the European Space (1976) was approximately $600 million, of which Conference (ESC). (For a description of Europe’s one-third went for mandatory and two-thirds for pre-ESA activities, see app. G.) An important point optional programs. This compares with NASA’s is that, unlike NASA, ESA is specifically allowed fiscal 1976 appropriation (for space) of $3.22 to operate applications systems, once developed, billion. In 1980, ESA’S budget had risen to $846 with the costs being borne by the users of the million, while NASA’s was $4.68 billion. In both system.1 A second difference, one which partially years, the ESA budget was between one-fifth and offsets the first, is that ESA is responsible for one-sixth NASA’S. (These figures do not constitute carrying out an “industrial policy” designed to a complete comparison of United States and “improve the worldwide competitiveness of European civilian space expenditures, since they European industry,” while ensuring that member fail to include non-NASA programs in the United states participate equitably and, in particular, that States, both Government and private sector, as the return to any member state—i.e., the value well as the space budgets of individual European of the contracts let by ESA—is approximately pro- countries). Since ESA’S two most expensive proj- portionate to the members’ contributions (the ects, Ariane and Spacelab, are largely complete principle of “juste retour” or fair return). The ESA and are not likely to be soon replaced by comparable programs, ESA’S budget is not expected convention explicitly states that it shall “exploit 4 the advantages of free competitive bidding in all to increase over the coming years. cases, except when this would be incompatible with other defined objectives of industrial pol- Current and Projected 5 icy. ”z Hence considerations of cost or efficien- Applications Programs cy may have to take a back seat to the principle of fair return, with predictable results for time- Communications liness and cost effectiveness. This is one of the European communications needs and pro- inevitable shortcomings of a mu Itinational agen- grams have been defined largely by the national cy, and a prime reason why operational systems PTTs (postal, telephone, and telegraph agencies) have generally been handled outside of ESA. acting through CEPT (Conference Europeene de Postes et Telecommunications and the European The ESA members contribute to the organization in two ways: mandatory activities, which in- 3“Convention,” art. V. 4As a multinational organization, ESA has had to develop an ac- clude the scientific programs and basic organiza- counting system to provide for changes in exchange rates between tional expenditures; and optional activities, member states. ESA accounts are kept in ESA Accounting Units (AU) which are specific programs for satellite design rather than any single national currency. The value of the AU vis- a-vis other currencies is reevaluated annually; in 1981, one AU =!$1 .4. I “Convention for the Establishment of a European Space Agen- ‘Unless otherwise indicated, figures and information in this sec- cy,” done at Paris May 30, 1975, art. V. tion are taken from Europe’s P/ace in Space, ESA, Paris, January “’Convention,” art. VI], par. 1 sec. d. 1981. —

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Table 17.–Contributions of Member States to the Principal ESA Programs in 1981

Meteosat ECS Ariane General expioita- phase Marecs Marecs develop- budget Science tion Sirio-2 OTS ECS 3 bis A B Spacelab ment Member states: Belgium ...... 4.71 4.49 4.06 3.30 5.17 3.27 3.19 0.95 0.14 5.07 1.92 Denmark...... 2.63 2.51 2.41 — 2.90 0.33 0.74 — — 1.81 0.40 France ...... 22.45 21.40 23.70 7.50 24.69 25.93 26.52 11.92 5.74 12.07 79.34 Germany...... 26.82 25.57 25.66 9.00 25.00 30.68 30.42 19.08 13.29 64.78 5.31 Ireland ...... 0.54 0.54 — — — — — — — — — Italy...... 5.51 12.46 15.07 72.39 14.38 14.78 13.85 2.20 1,28 1.00 5.31 Netherlands...... 6.29 6.00 — 2.50 0.94 1.77 4.63 1.49 2.53 0.34 Spain ...... 5.29 5.04 — 0:50 — 0.17 0.53 0.95 0.34 3.38 4.18 Sweden. , ., ... , . . 4.16 4.25 1.50 4.91 1,62 3.97 2.96 6.61 — 0.63 Switzerland ...... 4.19 3.99 3-48 3.50 4.59 2.13 0.55 — — 1.00 0.08 United Kingdom . . 14.42 13.75 20.60 1.83 15.86 20.15 18.46 55.81 69.89 7.60 2.49 Other participants: Austria ...... 0.68 — — 0.48 — — — — — 0.76 . Canada...... 2.23 — — — — — — — — — — Norway...... 0.08 — — — — — — 1.50 1.22 — — — — — — — — — — — Other income. . . . . — 5.02 ——

SOURCE: From Europe’s Place in Spacer p,9.

Broadcasting Union (EBU). More recently, fore- tor for the estimated $632.8 million program (not casting and coordination have been done within including ground terminals); the first satellite is the Interim Eutelsat Organization, set up within scheduled for an Ariane launch in 1982. CEPT in 1977 to establish a European satellite Marecs.–Marecs is a direct descendant of communications system. Great Britain’s Marots program for ocean com- OTS (Orbital Test Sate//ite).–The OTS project munications, but its design is based, like ECS, on was approved by ESRO in 1971 and launched the experimental OTS. Two satellites will be into geosynchronous orbit in 1978 (aboard a U.S. placed in geostationary orbit over the Atlantic (the Delta 3914) after development by British Aero- Atlantic satellite may eventually be relocated over space Dynamics Group. With a capacity of 3,000 the Indian Ocean) and Pacific to provide ship- telephone circuits, it has been used for various to-ship communications. The international mari- experimental purposes including high-speed sci- time satellite organization, inmarsat, is leasing the entific data transmission and television broad- satellites for its mission. The British Aerospace casting. Current projections are that it may be Dynamics Group is prime contractor, and Britain able to provide useful services for up to 5 more has put up most of the development funding, years. Program cost has been $365.4 million. some 55 percent of Marecs A and almost 70 percent of Marecs B. (In the OTS and ECS programs, ECS (European Communications Satellites).– by contrast, Great Britain contributed a more The OTS was designed to prove the usefulness usual 15 to 20 percent.) Marecs A was launched of an operational European telecommunications on the fourth Ariane test flight December 20, system. In 1978, ESA approved a five-satellite 1981, and Marecs B is scheduled for the first system, based on the OTS design, to provide re- operational flight in September 1982. Program gional communications needs for 10 years. in- cost is $359.8 million. terim Eutelsat will pay user fees for international trunk telephone services and for television trans- L-Sat (large-satellite). –The L-Sat is a descendant mission between members of the European of an earlier program, H-Sat, which was aban- Broadcasting Union. High-speed data transmis- doned by France and Germany in favor of going sion and communication with off-shore oil and ahead with more rapid deployment of their own gas platforms may also be provided. British joint (non-ESA) operational communications and Aerospace Dynamics Group is the prime contrac- television direct broadcast system (see descrip- Ch. 7—international Efforts in Space ● 179 tion, p. 188). As presently envisioned, L-Sat would contractor for the $301 million program was be a very large, advanced experimental commu- Aerospatiale of France. nications satellite to test the feasibility of direct Sirio 2.—Sirio 1 was an experimental Italian TV broadcasting and specialized/business com- communications satellite; the spare, Sirio 2, will munications using small roof-top size terminals. be launched by ESA in 1982 to provide meteor- In addition, it would include equipment for ex- ological data transmission to African ground periments with the as-yet unexploited 30/20 GHz centers, as well as to conduct scientific ex- band. The British have been most enthusiastic periments. Cost for the Italian-built satellite will about L-Sat development, which is seen as com- be $40.6 million. petitive with U.S. technology for future INTELSAT satellites, and British Aerospace has been Earthnet. -A mandatory ESA program, Earth net awarded the prime contract. Still in the design consists of four receiving stations and two proc- definition stage, its estimated launch (either on essing centers which receive remote-sensing and the space shuttle or an advanced Ariane), is set meteorological data from U.S. satellites: Landsat, for 1986. The estimated development cost is $520 Nimbus-7, the Heat Capacity Mapping Mission, million (1 980 price Ievels).b and (formerly) Seasat. The data are available to all ESA members as well as to outside requesters. One of the striking facts in looking at ESA’S communications program is the leading role Spacelab Remote-Sensing Programs. –The first played by Great Britain and British industry. Since Spacelab flight, scheduled for 1983, will carry two there are national and bilateral European projects European remote-sensing experiments. One will being conducted outside ESA, Britain is not the use a very high resolution camera for 1:100,000- only European country fostering satellite telecom- scale mapping. The second involves the develop- munications expertise, but it has one of the ment of a microwave remote sensor to collect broadest and most forward-looking programs (see data through cloud cover. pp. 40-41 for further discussion). ERS 1 (European Remote-Sensing Satellite).– Remote Sensing The Earthnet and Spacelab projects, along with other activities, are designed to prepare for an ESA has been active in both meteorological and advanced remote-sensing satellite, ERS 1. ERS 1 remote-sensing development, though with pri- will be used to monitor icepacks and to sense mary emphasis on the former, coastal and ocean regions; its instruments include Meteosat 7 and 2.—The Meteosat program was a synthetic aperture radar, a radar altimeter, and approved by ESRO in 1972; Meteosat 1 was wind and wave scatterometers. Tentative launch launched (by Thor-Delta) in 1977, and placed in date is mid-1987. (It should be noted that a major a geostationary orbit allowing it to survey Europe, civilian operational/commercial remote sensing Africa, and the Mediterranean. It provides raw system, SPOT, is being undertaken by France, imagery to central European ground-processing Sweden, and Belgium as a national project; the stations for short-term weather forecasting, as well proposed ERS will use the SPOT bus but contain as relaying the processed data to users and trans- different instruments. For a description of SPOT, mitting imagery from U.S. weather satellites sta- see pp. 25-29.) ERS-1 is considered to be one ele- tioned over the Western Hemisphere. Meteosat ment i n a continuing program of Earth observa- 1 has also contributed to global programs set up tion satellites. Studies are underway for further by the World Meteorological Organization. in satellites, including one for land remote sensing. 1979, Meteosat 1 suffered a partial failure of its Materials Processing power system; Meteosat 2 was launched in June 1981 on the third Ariane test flight. The prime ESA does not yet consider materials processing to be an applications area per se, but rather GESA News Release, “New European Telecommunication Satel- lite, Program is Approved,” Dec. 22, 1981. ESA News Release, “ESA an area in which to do basic research that may Microgravity Programme Gets Underway, ” Jan. 18, 1982. someday lead to useful products or processes. 180 ● Civilian Space Policy and Applications

The term “materials science” is used instead of riety of test projects. In 1980, NASA contracted materials processing; experiments in both biology to purchase a second spacelab, including a pres- and materials science will be carried out as part surized module and five instrumentation pallets, of an approved 4-year “microgravity pro- for $183.9 million from the prime contractor, the gramme” budgeted at $52.4 million.7 German firm ERN0.8 ESA’S main contribution to materials science Spacelab is Europe’s first attempt at construct- will be through Spacelab, although sounding ing a manned system; partly for this reason, and rockets are also being used. Spacelab will be the also because of internal management problems major facility for space-based experimentation in compounded by continuing changes in the re- the physical and biological sciences during the quirements for integration with the shuttle orbiter, next decade. Spacelab consists of a pressurized the project has cost considerably more than in- module capable of being carried in the payload itially estimated, and has also been subject to bay of the space shuttle and allowing experiment- delay. The 1973 agreement between NASA and ers to work at a variety of projects in a shirt-sleeve ESA called for delivery of the first unit by 1979; environment. There are also pallets that allow however, since the shuttle program has also been equipment to be exposed directly to vacuum and behind schedule, these delays have had little ef- radiation (see artist’s rendition). Equipment for fect. The increase in costs, however, has caused conducting processing experiments will include problems among the ESA supporters. According furnaces and remote manipulators. to the ESA agreement, if costs rose above 120 percent of original estimates, the supporters could Spacelab is ESA’S largest cooperative project withdraw or renegotiate the terms. In 1979, with NASA. ESA is responsible for designing and estimated costs to completion (approximately delivering, free of charge, an engineering model and a first flight unit (delivered in December $860 million; dollar amounts are inexact because of built-in inflation escalators and exchange-rate 1981 ), which NASA is scheduled to launch in fluctuations)9 were 140 percent of the original mid-l983. The first flight program will involve a joint European-American crew conducting a va- a“Europe Competes With U.S. Programs, ” A W&ST, Mar. 3, 1980, p. 89. 7ESA News Release, “ESA Microgravity Programme Gets Under- “’Sweeping Changes Spur Spacelab Pace, ” AW&ST, Feb. 11, way,” Jan. 18, 1982. 1980). ——

Ch. 7—international Efforts in Space ● 181

estimates. Italy in particular felt it could not con- ities most effectively-the United States, the Euro- tinue to fund Spacelab at its original level of 18 peans, or perhaps the Japanese—remains open. percent and threatened to block the project (largely because its share of Spacelab’s industrial Launch Vehicles participation had fallen to 11 to 12 percent) unless The Ariane I launcher, ESA’S most expensive its contribution was reduced. As a result, Italy’s single program, has recently completed a four- contribution dropped from 18 percent in 1979 flight test program; the first operational flight will to 1 percent in 1981, with the shortfall being take place in September 1982. taken up by other contributors in proportion to their level of participation. Ariane I is a three-stage expendable vehicle, including an advanced liquid oxygen/liquid There have also been various tensions between hydrogen third stage. For a comparison with U.S. NASA and ESA over secondary issues. One prob- launch vehicles, see table 18. lem has been the flight schedule for Spacelab missions, especially since the number of shuttle The current design of Ariane is only the first flights for the first several years has recently been in a series of as many as five models; successive cut back. ESA is also concerned that changing designs are planned to improve payload capac- specifications for shuttle payloads will lead to ex- ity and performance through the 1980’s. The ESA pensive redesign of Spacelab components. ” member states have already approved a program Some European scientists think that NASA re- to develop Ariane 2, 3, and 4. Ariane 2 will be quirements for documentation and prior con- able to place 4,4oo lb in a transfer orbit, and sultation on Spacelab experiments are overly Ariane 3,5,280 Ib.ls Ariane 4, under study by ESA stringent and reflect a desire to restrict European and CNES, will more than double the perform- participation .12 NASA counters that preparations ance of Ariane 1; its further development was ap- for manned missions are of necessity more proved in January 1982, and first launch is sched- rigorous than for other types of flights. Some uled for 1985. An even more ambitious improve- Americans think that, despite the money saved ment, a fifth Ariane version having a liquid ox- by cooperative development, an American ygen/liquid hydrogen second stage and able to SpaceJab program would have been faster and launch 12,100 lb into transfer orbit, is also under would have produced a design better suited to consideration for potential development by the U.S. needs and to the shuttle’s capabilities, and end of the decade. that the (politically motivated) inclusion of the Europeans has resulted in a less-than-optimal 1 Jjeffrey Lenorovitz, technology. “Arianespace Completing Payload Plans, ” AW&ST, JUly 6, 1981, pp. 19-20. It is difficult to evaluate these charges and countercharges objectively; in large part, they stem from the inevitable problems of conducting Table 18.—Capacity of Ariane and U.S. (Commercial) any major cooperative program in advanced Launch Vehicles (in lb) technology, especially one with significant poten- Transfer tial economic effects. Since, for budgetary LEO orbit reasons, the alternative to a European Spacelab Ariane 1...... 10,500 3,700a - - was not a U.S. Spacelab, but no Spacelab at all, Space shuttle ...... 65,000 — Space shuttle with Delta upper many U.S. criticisms are strictly hypothetical. The stage ...... — 2,750 question of who will exploit Spacelab’s capabil- Space shuttle with internal upper stage (under development) ...... — 5,000 Thor-Delta ...... 6,490 2,420 ‘Khris Bulloch, “Spacelab Status: Some Action at Last, ” /rtteravia, Atlas-Centaur ...... 11,200 4,510

November 1981, p. 1,168. ite aThe~e flgure~ ~~~ume the Ariane IS launched from the Kourou launch ‘ ‘ear 11 Eric Quistgaa~d, DirectoF General of ESA, statement before the Equater, while U.S. launches are from Kennedy Space Center In Florida. Senate Commerce Committee, Mar. 25, 1981, p. 7. The equatorial site gwes any geostatlonary payload an approximately 15 per. ‘z’’ U.S.-Europe Collaboration Variable, ” A W&ST, Sept. 1, 1980, cent performance improvement over KSC p. 275. SOURCE: Off Ice of Technology Assessment 182 ● Civilian Space Policy and Applications

Utilizing a dual launch system (SYLDA), each Ariane is capable of carrying two separate payloads on each flight. Launches will be made from the French-owned, ESA-funded Kourou spaceport in French Guiana, South America. Located close to the Equator, Kourou is well placed for launching stationary satellites (which orbit over the Equator). With only one pad, it is currently capable of launching five to six flights per year, but construction of a second pad has been approved for operation in 1984 or 1985, allowing for 10 annual launches and providing redundancy. When the Ariane was first proposed, there was considerable skepticism as to whether it could be competitive with the space shuttle and the various U.S. expendable vehicles. There were strong political reasons why several European countries, especially France, desired an independent launch capability (see app. G); in addition, it appears that, as a result of several considerations, the Ariane will be able to compete with the shuttle for many kinds of payloads through the 1980’s. First of all, the shuttle itself is 2 years behind schedule, and has not yet been flown sufficiently to convince users of its reliability. Second, U.S. production of expendable was slowed down and in some cases virtually halted, in expectation that the shuttle would replace all of them during the early 1980’s. As a result, the cost of the Thor-Deltas and Atlas-Centaurs has risen sharply over the last several years. Third, the commercial demand by a number of likely users, especially for communications satellites, is projected to be much larger in the coming decade than was previously thought. Even with the shuttle operating at its initially projected pace, there would be demand for additional launch services.ld However, because of recent and projected budget cutbacks there will be fewer shuttle flights than previously scheduled, another cir- cumstance forcing users to turn to alternate launch vehicles. Fourth, Arianespace is offering customers highly attractive terms, including below-market financing through European banks, and an extended period in whic:h to make repay- Photo credit European Space Agency ment. For these reasons, the Ariane is likely to First launch of Ariane / “Jerry Grey, “Case for a 5th Shuttle and More Expendable Launch Vehicles,” Astronautics and Aeronautics, March 1981. Ch. 7—international Efforts in Space ● 183 have a full manifest for the foreseeable future, prime contractor, and SEP (Societe Europeenne despite the superior capabilities of the shuttle. de Propulsion), which is building the propulsion Frederic D’ Al lest, chairman of Arianespace, proj- system. Overall, France has funded over 60 per- ects continued use of Ariane for at least 20 years cent of the project, rising to 79 percent in 1981. despite competition from reusable spacecraft.15 Perhaps the most interesting aspect of the The Ariane is now scheduled for a series of ESA Ariane program is the arrangement for commer- and INTELSAT launchings (under ESA auspices) cial operation. Instead of leaving it to ESA or in 1982. As of january 1982, there were approx- CNES, a quasi-private corporation called Ariane- imately $350 million worth of firm orders for space has been established to produce, finance, Arianespace, which will take over Ariane opera- market, and launch Ariane vehicles. ESA and tions in 1983.16 There were also a large number CNES remain responsible for further development of reservations, which may be turned into firm of Ariane 2-5, and for operation of the Guiana orders in the future. These include non-European spaceport. customers such as Colombia, Australia, and the Arianespace is incorporated in France and Arabian Satellite Corporation .17 Recently, Ariane- owned by firms from the states that funded space received its first firm order from an Amer- Ariane’s development, by CNES, and by Euro- ican company, General Telephone & Electronics, pean banks. French investors (including CNES to launch two domestic communications satellites itself, which is the largest single shareholder with in 1984.18 Other orders have followed from West- 34 percent), will own 60 percent; German ones ern Union and Southern Pacific Communications. 20 percent; and the remainder is split up into Ariane is being marketed in the United States smaller portions. Its initial capitalization was ap- through an arrangement with Grumman Aero- proximately $20 million. The first chairman of space Inc. Arianespace policy is to sell its services Arianespace, Frederic D’Allest, is the former to “any customer whose payload is designed for CNES project director for Ariane, and the pro- peaceful use;” this includes payloads from the duction and launching teams will be transferred French military, NATO, and a British Defence directly from CNES in 1982.20 Clearly, the new Communications Satellite.19 Control over the firm will be dominated by the French, and it is political aspects of launch policy is retained, ac- not surprising that France was the prime mover cording to ESA’S agreement with Arianespace, by behind Arianespace’s emergence. The idea of a the ESA Council. private firm was first suggested in 1979, with the The development and subsequent operation of original proposal by CNES calling for 70 percent Ariane have been marked by a number of pecu- French ownership. The basic rationale was that liarities. We have seen the dominant role that only a commercially oriented operation could France played in proposing and developing the manage Ariane so as to compete effectively with project. The prime contractor has been not a the shuttle; trying to operate in a framework re- , private firm or industrial consortium, as for other quiring the unanimous consent of 11 sovereign ESA programs, but CNES (Centre National nations would be far too inefficient. 21 In subse- d’Etudes Spatiales or National Center for Space quent negotiations with ESA and the potential Research), the French Government equivalent of partners, the French percentage was reduced to NASA. CNES in turn has let contracts primarily approximately 60 percent. The most difficult part to French firms, in particular Aerospatiale, the was getting the agreement of other ESA members to turn over the technology and facilities, in- I sj~ffrey Lenorovitz, “Arianespace Completing Payload Plans, ” cluding future developments, to Arianespace; AW&ST, jU!y 6, 1981, p. 19. Germany was particularly opposed. In 1980, “’’Why NASA’s Shuttle May be Left in the Dust, ” Business Week, Jan. 18, 1982, p. 38. . France withheld support for Spacelab funding for ‘7’’ Arianespace Press Kit, ” at 34th International Airshow, Paris, 2 months until Germany signed a political dec- June 1981, pp. 10-13. ‘a’’ Europeans Win Orders to Launch 2 GTE Satellites,” Wa// Street zOArianeSPaCe Press Kit. )ourna/, Nov. 25, 1981. 2)’’ Europeans Organize CommercialAriane Satellite Launch Com- lgArianespace Press Kit, p. 13. pany,” AW&ST, July 9 1979, p. 18. 184 ● Civilian Space Policy and Applications

Advertisement from AW&ST, May 1982 Ch. 7—international Efforts in Space ● 185

Iaration agreeing to the transfer to Arianespace.22 not reached, many of these programs may be- Arianespace is currently scheduled to assume re- come exclusively national efforts. sponsibility in 1983 following a series of seven According to an address given by Dr. Massimo ESA flights in 1982 and early 1983. Trella, Technical Director of ESA, at the Paris Air Show in June of 1981, overall European space Future Plans activities will continue to grow in the 1980’s at with the imminent completion of ESA’S two least as rapidly as in the 1970’s, but the division largest applications programs, Spacelab and of responsibility between ESA and national efforts Ariane, the level of ESA activities in the 1980’s can be expected to change. ESA and the various is likely to diminish, For the immediate future the national programs will cooperate in defining and valuable industrial and technical teams organized coordinating a European program, while ESA for these projects will remain occupied building itself “will build up, more than before, its identi- the second Spacelab and designing Ariane 2-5. ty as an R&D organization devoted mainly to No comparable applications projects have yet large projects. More clearly we believe that com- been approved to take their place (though there mercially exploitable systems should be more the has been consideration of a plan to develop responsibility of other initiators in Europe. ” Dr. Spacelab into a free-flying platform as part of a Trella specifically mentioned development of an cooperative program with the United States). A advanced remote-sensing system .25 However, on reduction in ESA activity may reflect the pref- the same occasion Michel Bignier, ESA’S Direc- erence of several member nations for national or tor of Space Transportation Systems, outlined a bilateral programs, especially for commercial ap- future program which emphasized materials processing, development of Ariane 3 and 4, and plications systems, where the cumbersome ESA 2b apparatus can impede timely decisions. It also building and maintaining large space stations. reflects a general worsening of the major Euro- Clearly ESA’S future mix of programs and overall pean economies over the past several years, emphasis remain to be determined. especially those of West Germany and Great Brit- ain. Under its recently elected Director General, Cooperation/Competition With Eric Quistgaard, ESA has been preparing a 10-year the United States plan for the future which is likely to emphasize basic science within an overall reduced budget. Cooperation: The proposed plan estimates a reduction to an The bulk of European cooperative efforts with annual budget of $532 million to $598 million, NASA have been scientific. With one major ex- compared with a 1980 level of $845.8 million .23 ception (to be discussed below) these have in establishing future programs, it will be worked out well. A large number of cooperative necessary for the major partners to compromise missions, in which NASA provided free launch as they did in the past. The British interest in L- services in exchange for scientific experiments Sat development remains high, while the Ger- and data, have been conducted with ESRO and mans are more interested in exploiting Spacelab ESA.27 In general, scientific cooperation is ar- by conducting scientific and materials process- ranged directly between ESA and NASA; only ing missions, and expanding Spacelab’s capabil- Spacelab has required a formal intergovernmental ities. France would like to see aggressive develop- agreement. (Lower level agreements, called ment of the Ariane, including a possible auto-

mated processing station (Solaris) or a manned ZSMaSSirnO Trella, “EsA Policy Directions—Collective VETSUS Na- reusable vehicle. 24 If a successful compromise is tional Programmed,” paper delivered at International Aerospace Symposium, Le Bourget, France, June 2-3, 1981. ZZ’’New Commercial Organization to Take Arial~e Responsibil- 2bMichel Bignier, “Expectations for the Future,” International ity,” AW&ST, Apr. 7, 1980, p. 45. Aerospace Symposium, Le Bourget, France, June 2-3, 1981. ZIJeffrey Lenorovitz, “Europeans Making Plans to Meet Long-term zzFor details, see United States C’ki/;an Space programs, 1958-78, Goals?” AW&ST, Mar. 9, 1981, p. 88. report by Science Policy Research Division, Congressional Research ZQpeter Marsh, “what Shou Id Europe Do in Space, ” New SCien- Service, for the House Committee on Science and Technology, tist, Jan. 29, 1981, pp. 290-292. January 1981, pp. 839-841. 186 ● Civilian Space Policy and Applications memoranda of understanding, are made with manned space station based on Spacelab mod- U.S. Department of State (DOS) concurrence, ules.29 while letter agreements require no DOS action In general, the advantages of cooperation tend whatever.) to diminish when the project requires much In the field of applications the cooperative direct contact on a day-to-day level; it is record is somewhat more mixed. Serious strains preferable for work to be done as independent- arose when, in 1972, the United States withdrew ly as possible, to avoid time-consuming joint deci- a previous offer for the Europeans to produce a sions. A second difficulty with cooperation in “Space Tug” as part of the Space Transportation space applications is that the prospect of even- System (see app. G). Further mistrust was aroused tual commercial competition between partners when the United States backed out of the Aerosat can cause suspicion and reduce its attractiveness program in 1977. Aerosat was a combined ESA/ to industrial participants.JO U.S./Canadian project to develop an experimen- Despite these difficulties, international coopera- tal air traffic control satellite system. Beginning tion was strongly stressed in Massimo Trella’s June in 1974, ESA and other partners invested con- address, particularly for high-risk, high-expense siderable time and money only to have the Fed- programs: “ESA intends to take the initiative in eral Aviation Administration (the U.S. participant) this direction in order to explore with all in- withdraw because of its inability to fund further terested partners how a wider and more ambi- development. tious international cooperation could be defined A third example is the recent deletion of the and implemented in a strategic R&D program me U.S. spacecraft from the joint International Solar in space in the next decade.”31 It should be noted Polar Mission (ISPM). Though ISPM is a scientific, that the United States is not specifically men- not an applications project, this withdrawal has tioned; ESA has so far not engaged in cooperative reinforced European doubts about general U.S. programs with the Soviet Union, though some reliability. ISPM was to have involved two space- tentative offers were once made without success. craft, one United States and one European, which Other European countries, notably France, have would simultaneously fly over the Sun’s “north” done so and it cannot be ruled out that ESA, part- and “south” poles. Without U.S. participation, ly out of frustration with U.S. unpredictability, much of ESA’S projected $150 million investment may seek out the Soviets despite the difficulties will have been wasted; nevertheless, the U.S. involved in collaborating across the iron Curtain, spacecraft was eliminated in Reagan administration cuts implemented in February 1981. Though Competition ESA objected vigorously and member states pro- Although the total European civilian space tested at the ambassadorial level, additional funds budget is only a fraction of either U.S. or Soviet 28 were not appropriated. These U.S. actions have expenditures (Europe spends only 0.04 percent raised questions about whether ESA can afford of its gross national product (GNP) on space to to trust future U.S. commitments, given the the United States’ 0.2 percent), the areas in which vagaries of annual executive and congressional European technology is commercially competi- budget decisions and the dependent position of tive with the United States are significant and ESA in most projected cooperative projects. growing. The competition from Ariane is perhaps Despite these problems, preliminary talks have most striking, insofar as launch vehicles are the begun on possibie major areas of future coopera- true symbols of space capabilities and were for tion, including joint processing experiments, so long a U.S.-Soviet monopoly. Perhaps equal- possible expansion of Spacelab into a modular free-flying platform, and joint development of a 29’’ Coming Next–A European Base in Space, ” New Scientist, Nov. 51981, p. 356; see also Craig Covault, “NASA Mulls interna- Zejeffrey Lenorovitz, “ESA Seeks Reinstatement of NASA Solar- tional Effort on Space Station, ” A W&S7; Mar. 1, 1982, p. 20. Polar Effort, ” AW&ST, Mar. 2, 1981, pp. 22-23; statement of Eric 30’’ U.S.-Europe Collaboration Variable, ” AW&ST, Sept. 1, 1980, Quistgaard, Senate Commerce Committee hearing, Mar. 25, 1981, p. 275. pp. 1-5. 31 Trella, “ESA Policy Directions, ” p. 7. Ch. 7—international Efforts in Space Ž 187 equally significant, however, are European suc- ● focus on relatively few high-opportunity cesses in gaining contracts from INMARSAT and areas; Arabsat for communications satellites, and plans ● assimilation of U.S. technology in key areas, to bid for future generations of INTELSAT satellites avoiding unnecessary duplication; as well. The French SPOT remote-sensing system ● sustained support by the major countries, (discussed below), is scheduled to offer an alter- particularly France and West Germany; and native to U.S. Landsat data beginning in 1984. ● the ability to compromise when necessary, Though it can be argued that some of the Euro- founded on a strong perception that building pean success may be attributed, not to superior and maintaining an industrial base in space technology, but to the desire of international technology is necessary for Europe’s long- organizations and non-U. S. purchasers to de- term economic vitality. crease their dependence on the United States, Though decisions made through ESA may take it is clear that European systems are in many cases more compromise and negotiation than com- equivalent, if not superior, in capabilities and cost parable U.S. program choices, they are less like- effectiveness. However, U.S. objections that ly to be precipitously changed or canceled; the European space technologies, in particular government-to-government character of agree- Ariane, benefit from unfair financial practices, ments gives them considerable weight. As long such as government-subsidized below-market as these conditions remain in effect, the United financing for users, are likely to lead to strains States can expect a high level of competition from between the U.S. and European agencies, ESA and its member states. European success, despite lower expenditures, is related to several factors:

EUROPEAN NATIONAL PROGRAMS

In addition to their participation in ESA, which while avoiding dependence on the United States for most countries constitutes the bulk of their or U. S. S. R., particularly for launch services; 2) ex- space spending, several European states have tensive cooperation between government agen- substantial separate national or bilateral pro- cies and industry; and 3) the development of grams. The activities of France, West Germany, military capabilities associated with France’s in- Britain, and Italy are of particular interest. dependent nuclear deterrent, including ongoing relationships between civilian and military France programs. The decision to cooperate with both the United The French space program is the largest and States and the Soviet Union is indicative of most comprehensive in Europe and the third France’s longstanding desire to mediate between largest in the world, after the United States and East and West and to avoid exclusive dependence Soviet Union. The French have major programs on either superpower. The idea of France as a in space science, applications, and launch vehi- “third Force,” separate from the United States cles. Activities are carried out in several ways: on and NATO (which France partially withdrew from a national basis; bilaterally with West Germany, in 1959), was strongly promoted by DeGaulle, other European countries, the Soviet Union, the who came to power in 1958. DeGaulle saw United States and several third world countries; France as the natural leader of a resurgent and multilaterally through ESA. Europe, and hence encouraged the formation of The French program has been characterized (presumably French-dominated) European mul- by: 1) an ongoing commitment to developing a tilateral associations. Space was an arena in which comprehensive and independent space program the French felt Europe needed to compete; 188 ● Civilian Space Policy and Applications

France was a major supporter of ESRO and ELDO some objections regarding possible conflict with (particularly the latter) and, eventually, of ESA. INTELSAT–see app. G).35 (For a description of France’s initial space activ- France and West Germany are currently en- ities, see app. G.) In 1964, out of a total civilian gaged in another joint project for direct televi- space budget of $76.8 million, France spent $29.6 sion broadcasting, with each country operating million on ELDO, and $1 million on ESRO. In its own 3-channel satellite for domestic purposes. 1975, the first year of ESA’S existence, $133 mil- The satellites, designated TDF-1 for France and lion out of a total of $254 million, or better than TV-Sat for Germany, are being developed by the percent, went to ESA,32 and in 1981 France 50 Munich-based Eurosatellite Corp., made up of was ESA’S largest contributor with approximate- two French firms, Aerospatiale and Thomson- ly $211.5 million, or 25.06 percent of ESA’S total CSF, and two German ones, Messerschmitt- budget (largely for the Ariane). Blohm-Bolkow and AEG-Telefunken. The French However, the percentage of CNES’S budget go- contribution for development (divided between ing to ESA, as opposed to national and bilateral CNES and government communications agen- programs, has dropped in recent years as ESA cies) is estimated at Ffr 980 million; the satellites spending has slowed and a number of bilateral are scheduled for Ariane launch in late 1984 and and national projects have begun to take shape. eariy 1985.36 The total 1981 budget is Ffr 2,617 million, 37.2 The DBS joint effort was an outgrowth of a pre- percent larger than in 1980; national programs, viously described ESA experimental communica- however, are up 107 percent at 344.82 million, tions project, H-Sat, which was initially backed and bilateral expenditures increased by four times by France, West Germany, and Italy. However, to Ffr 487.52 million.33 In 1982, CNES plans to in 1978 France and Germany withdrew because spend 82 percent more on national programs, of concern over the slow pace of H-Sat develop- within an overall budget that will increase by 18 ment. In particular, the two countries wished to percent. compete in the foreseen European and global The CNES budget comes primarily from the market for DBS satellites and groundstations, Ministry of industry and other civilian ministries; which they saw as expanding rapidly in the in 1981 Ffr 192.8 million came from the Ministry 1980’s. An operational system was felt to provide of Defense, while Ffr 596 million came from greater economic opportunities than another ex- CNES’S own resources.34 perimental system. The agreement to develop TDF-l /TV-Sat was signed in 1979.37 In addition Current Applications Programs to allowing it to enter foreign markets, French na- COMMUNICATIONS tional television estimated that direct broadcast would enable it to provide 100 percent coverage France is currently involved in three major sat- of the entire country for less than half the cost ellite communications programs. The first is a of building additional terrestrial relays. longstanding experimental bilateral effort with West Germany called “Symphonic,” the two sat- Another cooperative venture is the SARGOS ellites of which, launched in 1974 and 1975, are project, part of a joint U.S./Canadian program still partially active. Each Symphonic is a geosyn- called SARSAT designed to provide emergency chronous satellite with a capacity of 200 tele- search and rescue for ships and planes. France phone or 2 TV plus 18 telephone channels. Sym- is supplying three SARGOS units to fly on the U.S. phonic 1 and 2 were built by a consortium NOAA E, F and G satellites. SARGOS is an out- (CIFAS) made up of French and German com- growth of another project, ARGOS, for collect- panies and launched by the United States (after Jsworid.w;de Space Activities, p. 161. 3G’’Space Still a Growth Industry in France, ” p. 406. JZWor/d-W;de Space Programs, p. 168. qzsee “The French Space Effort, ” /rrteravia, june 1979, p. 51 O; 33 ’’ Space Still a Growth Industry in France,” /nterav;a, May 1981, also Roberto Grandi and Giuseppe Richeri, “Western Europe: The p. 406. Development of DBS Systems,” Journa/ of Communication, v. 30, 34 ’’ Budget and Programs of CNES for 1981,” CNES, p. 3. spring 1980, p. 176. Ch. 7—international Efforts in Space Ž 189

ing and processing meteorological data from The SPOT images are produced by a linear ar- remote platforms, i.e., ballons, buoys, etc. The ray “push-broom” scanner that produces a con- total French contribution in 1981 to both pro- tinuous picture 60 km wide on the ground. The grams was Ffr 24.7 million.38 images are transmitted digitally from the satellite France is also engaged in a major national com- to ground receivers or they can be stored on tape munications satellite program called Telecom 1 recorders for delayed transmission. The central which is being funded by the Direction Generale receiving and control station is located at Toulouse in southern France. Other countries will de Telecommunications, with CNES project lead- be able to build their own stations, subject to ership, for a projected 1983 launch. Telecom 1 will provide domestic telephone and telex serv- agreements directly with CNES; or, data and proc- ices within France as well as between France and essed data products will be purchasable through its overseas territories, including some military Spotimage, a joint government-industry organization being set up to market SPOT services. In traffic. A major use will be in providing internal many respects Spotimage will be similar to the business communications similar to those previously described Arianespace; CNES will hold planned for the U.S. Satellite Business Systems 34 percent of the company’s shares, with the re- Corporation .39 mainder split between various French firms and 40 REMOTE SENSING government agencies. SPOT transmissions are designed to be compatible with the U.S. Land- Since 1978, CNES has been engaged in a na- sat and Landsat-D receiving stations, so that coun- tional program (with some support from Belgium tries that already possess receivers for Landsat will and Sweden) to develop an operational land be able to receive SPOT, with some adaptation, remote-sensing system called SPOT (Systeme Probatoire d’ Observation de la Terre). Through Though each SPOT satellite has a design life the prime contractor, Matra, CNES is designing of only 2 years, the system is planned to operate a two part satellite consisting of a multipurpose for at least 10 years, so that users can count on bus with power-supply and stationkeeping sys- continuity of data for long-term remote-sensing tems, and a sensor payload that can be altered programs. After the initial launch, scheduled for as the system develops. The SPOT satellites will April 1984, additional satellites will be orbited to be placed in Sun-synchronous 832 km orbits de- ensure continuous service. These satellites will signed to provide 26-day repetitive coverage of be financed partly by Spotimage, and partly by the entire Earth. The initial design calls for two CNES through its revenues from foreign receiv- types of coverage: 1 ) multispectral observation ing stations.41 with 20 m resolution, and 2) black and white ob- The basic reasons for France’s decision to build servation with 10 m resolution. (This compares its own remote-sensing system are similar to those with Landsat 3’s multispectral resolution of 80 m, for its other space applications projects. These and Return-Beam-Vidicon of approximately 30 include: 1 ) to encourage national high-technol- m). Both of SPOT’s instruments can be pointed ogy enterprises; 2) to gain independence from by remote control so as to cover any area of in- the U.S. civil remote-sensing system, Landsat, and terest within a path 950 km wide; each individual to demonstrate French equivalence to U.S. and swath is 60 km in width. This pointing capability Soviet capabilities; 3) to reap the economic and makes it possible to provide semistereoscopic im- political benefits of providing global coverage to ages, i.e., successive views of the same area from other countries; and 4) to develop an indigenous different angles, which are particularly useful for remote-sensing capability for military purposes. mapmaking and geological interpretation. It also allows for viewing a particular region more often @“FrenCh Marl@lng services of Spot Satellite Network, ” AWLLST, than once every 26 days; such frequent coverage Jan. 11, 1982, p. 99, is necessary for agricultural purposes. 41see ~~SpoT-Satel[ite.Ba~ Remote Sensing System, ” CNES bro- chure, 1980; jean-Pierre Fouquet, “The SPOT Satellite, ” paper pre- 3a ’’ Budget and Programs of CNES for 1981 ,“ p. 23. sented at 19th Goddard Symposium, Washington, D. C., Mar. 26, 39’’ Space Still a Growth Industry in France, ” p. 406. 1981. 190 ● Civilian Space Policy and Applications

In line with this last motivation, a military recon- of services, including the provision of baseline naissance version of SPOT, known as SAMRO, data for further processing; processed data prod- is already being evaluated. SAMRO would use ucts for specialized purposes; and aid, advice, the SPOT bus, but with higher resolution optics and equipment for potential customers. As with and secure communications links. Such a satellite Landsat, users can arrange directly with CNES to would give France the ability to monitor military receive, archive, and distribute SPOT data activities around the world on a continuous through national or regional receiving stations. basis. 42 A smoothly functioning corporate entity, especially one heavily backed by the French Govern- The success of SPOT in gaining a large share ment, would provide strong competition to any of the global market will depend on several fac- future U.S. system. tors. First, how advantageous will users view SPOT’s 10 to 20 m resolution, as opposed to A key question will be the prices charged by Landsat-D’s 80 m (MSS) and 30 m (TM)? Some both SPOT and Landsat D-D’. Landsat prices are users, particularly agricultural ones, will find the currently government subsidized and in no way increased resolution helpful, while others may reflect the true costs of developing, constructing, find it unnecessarily precise. One of the often and operating either the ground or space seg- mentioned reasons for SPOT’s high resolution is ments. If Landsat or any equivalent is run by a to make it attractive to European agricultural private firm, the prices for clata would have to observors, since European farms are typically rise to reflect these costs. Spotimage prices, smaller than U.S. or Soviet ones.43 However, though not yet established, will also be substan- some countries may be concerned that SPOT’s tially higher than those paid by today’s users; high resolution will provide foreign users with too however, it is not likely that either the U.S. or much information. Political agreements on re- French governments, having invested heavily to stricting dissemination of SPOT data may be re- build a prestigious remote-sensing system, would quired to avoid opposition from a number of allow the other to substantially undercut its prices states, and Spotimage has announced that it will for equivalent service. To maintain a market share abide by agreed-on international regulations re- of commercial buyers, as well as the political garding data dissemination. gains of supplying data to third world and other countries, each operator will need to keep prices The second and probably most important ques- competitive with the other. Whether these prices tion is the status of competition from other will be heavily subsidized for political and public- remote-sensing systems, particularly the U.S. service reasons, as at present, or come closer to Landsat D and proposed D’ satellites, which are reflecting the true costs of land remote sensing planned to be operating at approximately the remains to be seen; all such decisions will depend same time (see ch. 3). at least as much on political as economic factors, SPOT remains unproven both technically and including possible competition from future Soviet institutionally. However, the commitment to a and Japanese systems. long-term operational status through a private corporation, Spotimage, will help greatly in giving SPOT the credibility it needs to attract cus- MATERIALS PROCESSING tomers. In particular, worries about the continuity French MPS activities, at this time, are modest of the system (which are evident among Landsat in scope, with a budget of approximately $1 mil- users on account of Landsat’s currently unre- lion to $2 million per year. Bilateral materials solved budgetary and institutional problems) processing experimentation agreements are in ef- should be much less than with Landsat. Spot- fect with Germany and the U.S.S.R. A Franco- image plans to provide an across-the-board range Soviet crystal growth and solidification experiment was carried out aboard the Soviet manned 42’’ France Studies Reconnaissance Version of SPOT Spacecraft,” AW&ST, Aug. 10, 1981. laboratory, Salyut-6, and future cooperative MPS qJSee “The French Space Effort, ” /nteravia, June 1979, P. 508. research is anticipated. In addition, French ex- Ch. 7—international Efforts in Space • 191 periments on crystal growth and the dynamics FOREIGN COOPERATION/COMPETITION of metal alloy solidification are planned for Aside from ESA, France has major bilateral co- Spacelab 1 and 3. operative programs with West Germany, the In general, the French effort is smaller and more Soviet Union, and the United States; it is the only research directed than German activities. CNES country besides India to deal extensively with has funded a major study, however, on an am- both the major space powers. In 1981, France bitious program called “Solaris,” an unmanned budgeted Ffr 379.8 million for German projects, orbital space station which would be able to con- almost all for joint TDF-1 /TV-Sat development. duct MPS experiments and could be made avail- Thirty-seven million francs were spent with the able during the 1990’s. Solaris would be orbited United States, largely for the ARGOS/ by an Ariane-4 launcher, operating for a lifetime SARGOS project described above, and for up- of up to 15 years. Among its many purposes, the coming experiments on Spacelab. Solaris could serve as an automated orbital ma- Of the 56 million francs earmarked for projects terials processing station, handling up to 2 tons with the Soviet Union, none are for applications of materials in its furnaces. Feedstock would be projects per se.45 However, the fact and extent transported to the station by Ariane-launched un- of cooperative projects are politically significant manned spacecraft. Modules containing proc- in themselves. Furthermore, in light of the his- essed materials would be returned to Earth from torical problems with U.S. commitments, it is Solaris via unpowered reentry vehicles. The proj- clear that the French see access to Soviet launch- ect is still in the conceptual stage and no cost ers and facilities as a potential hedge against U.S. figures are currently available. It is conceivable delays and vacillation. The most visible of upcom- that Solaris might be accepted as a major proj- ing France-Soviet ventures will be the scheduled ect for ESA during the 1980’s, thereby spreading 1982 visit of a French astronaut to the Soviet’s the costs and stimulating MPS research activities Salyut 7 (or a reactivated Salyut 6) space station. in a number of member countries not presently Two French candidates have been training in the pursuing such investigation. Solaris not only Soviet Union since September 1980.% The Soviets represents a major potential French initiative have made a practice of launching non-Soviets utilizing the Ariane launcher, but is a direct for brief orbital stays; to date, however, all such challenge to the U. S./ESA and Soviet manned lab- visitors have been from “fraternal Socialist coun- oratories (Spacelab and Salyut, respectively) tries,” and the flight of an astronaut from a major which currently plan materials-processing ac- Western power can be expected to provide the tivities. CNES plans to study manned facilities Soviets with a great deal of favorable publicity. before deciding on a space-station concept. The French national space program, working LAUNCHERS closely with French industry, will be a major source of commercial competition for the United The Ariane and its future development have States in the 1980’s. French competitiveness is been discussed previously. Among additional result of several factors: possibilities mention should be made of the Hermes manned reusable shuttle, a proposed technically advanced programs in commer- 22,000-lb, 5-man vehicle that might be launched cial areas such as DBS, land remote sensing, by the advanced Ariane V. Though only in a very and launch vehicles; preliminary design stage, the Hermes plan shows establishment of institutions (Arianespace, that the French have by no means resigned them- Spotimage) to market systems aggressively selves to a completely unmanned role in future on a global basis; space activities .44

44’’The French Space Effort,” /nteravia, June 1979, pp. 508-509; 4s’’Budget and Programs of CNES for 1981 ,“ CNES, p. 23. 46~~French Cosmonauts Mission With sOVklS,” “Solaris: France Proposes Large Unmanned Space-Processing Plat- Training for form,” /nteravia, May 1981, p. 822. AW&ST, Dec. 21, 1981, pp. 55-56) 192 ● Civilian Space Policy and Applications

close government-industry collaboration as coordination through the Research Ministry. De- an accepted feature of French commercial spite—or perhaps on account of—the extensive practice; German experience acquired during World War long-standing government commitment to II, there have been no attempts to produce a Ger- building space capabilities on a par with the man launcher, although Germany has been a United States and Soviet Union; and major contributor to Ariane. Instead, Germany support received through agreements with has launched numerous orbital and suborbital ESA and bilateral partners. payloads on U. S., French, Swedish, and British rockets. The first German scientific satellite, called West Germany Azur, was launched by the United States in No- vember 1969. The bulk of West Germany’s space efforts are conducted in association with ESA or bilaterally Applications Programs with other countries. Germany is one of ESA’S major supporters, supplying almost one-fourth of Almost all of Germany’s efforts in communica- its annual budget. The Ministry for Research and tions and remote sensing are being conducted Technology (BMFT) coordinates and funds most through ESA or bilateral projects with France, German R&D efforts; projects are managed by described previously. In 1981, West Germany will the German Research and Test Establishment for provide the largest single share of ESA’S expend- Aeronautics and Space Flight (DFVLR), which itures for Meteosat, OTS, ECS, and Spacelab.Ag manages Government engineering and test In addition to communications, Germany’s centers, and by the German Research Associa- strongest emphasis has been placed on materials tion (DFG), a self-governing organization that science and processing. Since the German firm allocates funds from various public and private ERNO (a subsidiary of VFW-Fokker) is the prime sources to universities and scientific societies.45 contractor for Spacelab, and Germany is the Space-related expenditures in fiscal 1981 major financial contributor (64.78 percent in amounted to $371 million, of which $82 million 1981 ), German interest in Spacelab exploitation went to DFVLR. Total funding from 1978 to 1982 has been high. In addition, chemicals and mate- is projected to be $1.7 billion .48 rials processing have traditionally been areas of Germany’s major aerospace firms also play a German technical and industrial leadership. The Ministry of Science and Technology provided ap- key role in initiating and funding research proj- proximately $57 million for MPS work from 1978 ects; these include Messerschmitt-Bolkow-Blohm (MBB) and VFW-Fokker, which recently merged, to 1980 and is authorized to spend $50 million more between 1982 to 1985. Additional funds are and several large electronics firms such as Siemens and AEG-Telefunken. available from non-Federal sources. so Unlike France, Germany has never aimed at The German MPS program is intended to meet achieving an across-the-board set of space the as yet largely undefined needs of the user capabilities, but rather at encouraging an in- community. The ultimate goal of Government digenous aerospace industry, promoting poten- support is substantial involvement of German in- tially valuable scientific and industrial research, dustry in such areas as chemistry, process tech- and supporting European efforts in various ap- nology, metals, composite materials, and plications areas. Compared with France there has crystals .51 been greater emphasis on industrial and univer- Early West German experiments were carried sity initiatives and participation, with Government on the 1975 Apollo/Soyuz manned mission. A

47’’ Review of National and Co-operative International Space Ac- 49Europe’s Place in Space, ESA, January 1981, P. 9. tivities for the Calendar Year 1980,” UNCOPUOS, A/AC.105/286/ ‘“’’ Foreign Materials Expenditures, ” p. 2. Add. 1, Feb. 19, 1981, pp. 34-35. SICommercja/jzation of Materials Processing and Manufacturing 4“Foreign Materials Processing Expenditures,” internal NASA staff in Space, position paper prepared for OTA by TRW, Inc., Apr. 14, paper, May 1, 1981, p. 1. 1981, p. 25. Ch. 7—international Efforts in Space ● 193

variety of methods are now being followed, using A wholly German Spacelab mission, the suborbital sounding rockets, small self-contained D-1, is now scheduled for September 1984. payload packages (so-called “Getaway Specials”) The D-1 will carry the Biorack for investiga- attached to the space shuttle, and full-scale tions of cell and molecular biology, and an Spacelab missions. Future flight opportunities advanced fluid physics module. These will using “free-flying” automatic experimental units perform a mixture of open experiments, for for longer periods of time than can be attained which data will be freely disseminated, plus with the present shuttle/spacelab system are also a number of closed experiments with poten- being examined. Primary elements of the Ger- tial commercial benefit. For these latter, Ger- man MPS Program are:52 many has proposed to pay a pro rata share of the normal Spacelab users’ fee; the exact ● TEXUS (technological experiments under financial arrangements have not been con- microgravity): Using British-built Skylark cluded. Prime objectives for the mission are sounding rockets, certain experiments are experiments in the fields of metals, mono- being flight tested in advance of future crystals and materials for electronic applica- Spacelab missions. Five TEXUS flights have tions, boundary layer and transport phenom- been accomplished since 1977, and two ena problems, and physical chemistry and launches per year are planned starting in processing. 1981. TEXUS flight results to date indicate this approach is scientifically and technolog- The German program stresses involvement ically useful. West German experiments with the industrial sector in addition to purely have also flown on U. S. SPAR sounding scientific exploration. The Ministry of Science and rockets. Technology is working closely with both MAN, ● MAUS (materials science autonomous ex- Inc., and Volkswagen. The work at MAN involves periments under zero-G conditions) pro- “skin technology”; this is a process by which gram: Instruments partially based on TEXUS complex refractory metal alloys used for turbine program findings are to be carried in 25 Ger- blades can be melted and resolidified in space man-purchased getaway special canisters. with an oxide skin, which is a plasma sprayed These autonomous packages provide ex- on the surface of the container. New immiscible periments with much longer microgravity metal alloys for potential use as bearing materials duration than attainable with sounding are of interest to Volkswagen. sq rockets. Although the German Government has not ● Spacelab: Germany is supporting major ex- supported any launcher-related programs, aside periments on Spacelab, including a materials from Ariane, mention should be made of a private processing laboratory to be flown on Space- German firm called OTRAG (Orbital Transport- Iab 1 in mid-1983. Materials science ex- und-Raketen Aktiengesellschaft), which has spent periments will be conducted in the materials $65 miliion to $70 million since 1974 trying to science double rack, a largely German con- develop a mass-produced expendable rocket for tribution to the first Spacelab mission. The inexpensive satellite launches. To date, OTRAG facilities include the following: 1) high- has claimed four successful test flights and until temperature thermostat, 2) mirror heating recently planned to launch its first orbital flight facility, 3) isothermal heating facility, in 1982.54 OTRAG hopes to attract private firms 4) capillarity measurement equipment, and third world countries by providing relative- 5) cryostat, 6) fluid physics module, 7) gra- ly simple services at prices that Ariane and, the dient heating facility, 8) UHV chamber, and space shuttle cannot match. The rockets would 9) common support equipment. use off-the-shelf components and an extremely cheap fuel made of diesel oil and nitric acid.

‘*See G. Greger, “Science and Technology of the German MPS S3TRW paper, op. cit, pp. 25-26. Missions, ” paper presented at 1980 AAS Annual meeting, Boston, 54’’ German Company Testing Launch Vehicle in Libya,” AlW&ST, Mass., Oct. 20-23, 1980. Mar. 23, 1981, p. 25. ——...... —.—

194 ● Civilian Space Policy and Applications

The political controversy surrounding OTRAG nent and subsystem contracts on INTELSAT and has been intense, largely as a result of the loca- other communications satellites. The Research tion of its test facilities. Until 1979, OTRAG Ministry is particularly interested in expanding operated out of a 39,000 mi2 area in Zaire, where German capabilities in this area.58 The experience it had agreed to pay the Mobutu government $50 gained in ESA communications projects and par- million per year or 10 percent of gross revenues, ticularly through joint TV-Sat development with whichever was greater, once commercial opera- France will give German industries the ability to tions commenced.55 However there were numer- compete for complete systems in the emerging ous protests, not only from Zaire’s neighbors, DBS market. who feared the rockets might have military uses, but also from the Soviet Union, which was in- Great Britain tensely concerned at any evidence of German development of an independent launch capabil- During the 1970’s British civilian space spend- ity. The German Government was embarrassed ing has been done almost exclusively as part of and tried various means to put OTRAG out of ESA projects. (For a brief description of early business, including passage in 1978 of the so- British space activities, see app. G). Even within called “Lex OTRAG” prohibiting the export of ESA, Great Britain has chosen to concentrate on OTRAG rockets or components. Eventually in- communications and general science, and has ternational pressure forced Zaire to expel contributed relatively little to ESA’S two largest OTRAG; however, the company soon relocated projects, Spacelab and Ariane. British choosiness its test facilities in Libya, partly, according to has been a function in part of budget restrictions OTRAG president Frank Wukasch, because caused by generally poor economic performance Libya’s ruler Muammar Qaddafi “cannot be compared with its continental partners, and to blackmailed” into expelling the company. 56 a fundamental historical uncertainty as to wheth- OTRAG’S presence in Libya reinforced fears that er to opt for close ties with the United States, with its missiles might be used for military purposes, Europe, or with the Commonwealth, Largely be- perhaps against Israel. Recently, it was reported cause of its traditionally close relationship with that OTRAG had withdrawn from Libya and the United States, Britain has not favored devel- would seek new facilities, perhaps in India or opment of a European launcher, whether the South America. 57 Europa or Ariane, considering it uncompetitive and unnecessary. With a strong university re- COOPERATION/COMPETITION WITH THE search base and relatively weak industries, Brit- UNITED STATES ain has preferred to concentrate on basic science The German attitude towards cooperative ven- and on a few areas, especially communications, tures with the United States has generally been in which British firms such as Marconi and British more positive than the French, as shown by Ger- Aerospace could hope to become international- man willingness to take the lead in building ly competitive. In general, the above constraints Spacelab. A large number of cooperative space have made the formulation and implementation science projects are also underway. Cooperation of any coherent space policy very difficult. There with the Soviet Union has been negligible for is little public or political consensus as to Britain’s political reasons. proper role in space activities, and the major political parties often fail to follow through on in- Though there are few major areas where Ger- itiatives begun by their predecessors. A Sep- man projects will directly compete with the tember 1980 memorandum by the British Royal United States, German aerospace and electronics Society, which proposed establishing a National firms have been strong competitors for compo- Council for Space, pointed out that: “The present U.K. efforts in space science and technology 55A w&sT, Sept. 12, 1977, p. 42. are fragmented and there is a serious lack of 5bBradley Graham, “Rocket Firm’s Third World Ties Test Bonn’s Patience,” Washington Post, Aug. 14, 1981, p. 17. 57’’Otrag Ends Libyan Launch Work,” A W&ST, December 1981. Se’’West German Space Program, ” /nteravia, April 1980, p. 312. Ch. 7—lnternational Efforts in Space ● 195 cohesion to such an extent that there appears to tion of a company called Satellite Broadcasting be no overall domestic space policy.”59 Co., Ltd., to provide common carrier DBS services. Two satellites plus a ground spare would be Organization and Funding required at an estimated cost of L100 million; Government responsibility for space has been services would be leased to British broadcasters split between several organizations. The Depart- such as the BBC and Granada television. ment of Trade and industry has funded civilian Another possible venture would involve BAe programs, while the Space Research Council, part and IBM in a business communications service, of the Department of Education and Science, has similar to the newly created U.S. Satellite Business supported scientific projects, including cooper- Systems, of which IBM is a major partner. It is ative ventures with ESRO and NASA. The Post not clear whether such a plan could succeed Office (now British Telecom) has operated com- within Britain alone, and expansion into the Euro- munications networks including INTELSAT re- pean market, with the attendant difficulties of ceiving stations. operating across national boundaries, may be 64 In 1972, the total budget was $55.1 million, of envision ed. which $15.5 million went to ELDO and ESRO. In a somewhat different field, BAe and Marconi By 1976, the budget had risen to $80,2 million, 60 have joined forces, after pressure from the all of which was spent within ESA. In 1981, Defense Ministry, to build the British Ministry of Great Britain was ESA’S third-largest contributor Defence’s proposed communications satellite, with 14.88 percent of the total budget, amount- Skynet IV/Satcom. Although both BAe and Mar- ing to $125.6 million, and was the majority con- coni had initially sought out U.S. industrial tributor to the Marecs ocean communication sat- 61 cooperation, an all-British program was deemed ellite program. Present plans call for a substan- preferable. Launch is estimated to be in early tial increase in space spending, with emphasis on 1985. 65 British Telecom (formerly the Post Office) 62 nationally funded communications satellites. is planning its own Europeanwide business satellite system which will make use of nine trans- Current Applications Programs ponders; two each placed on all four ECSs, and The area in which the British have been most one leased from France’s Telecom 1. The eight active over the past several years is communica- ECS transponders will cost approximately $150 tions satellites. Within ESA, British Aerospace million. Users will purchase ground stations that (BAe) has been the consortium leader for the will provide access to any point in Europe; the system will be operated through an agreement OTS, ECS, and Marecs systems, and Britain was 66 the prime mover behind ESA’S decision to devel- with Interim Eutelsat. op the experimental L-Sat multipurpose commu- it is clear that British industry is eager to move nications platform. In addition, there has been into the potentially lucrative areas of DBS and considerable activity by British agencies and satellite business communications, if necessary private firms, spurred by the Thatcher govern- in conjunction with foreign partners who can pro- ment’s recent decision to open up private com- vide financial and/or marketing support. A major petition in telecommunications by removing question remains as to whether European opera- British Telecom’s monopoly over network oper- 63 tions will be possible given prospective competi- ations. I n June 1981, BAe announced formation from Eurosatellite (the manufacturer of sqsP~ce~l;g~~, BritiSh ! nterplanetary Society, Feb. 2, 1981 t P. 33; TDF-l /TV-Sat) backed by national PTTs. In addi- see also Johnny Hawkes (former Director of space Dept. Of in- tion there are numerous regulatory pitfalls, as well dustry), “Britain in Space: Time to Consolidate, ” New Scientist, Jan. 14, 1982. b~world-wide space Activities, P. 222. b4’’BAe Aiming To Become Major Satellite Operator?” /ntera via, August 1981, pp. 754-755. 61E”~ope’s place in space, ESA, Paris, January 1981 t P 9. bS’!Sky net IV-NOVV an AJ1-British Military Satcom s)@f21Tl,” /fl- 62peter Marsh, “Britain Plans Big Boost for Space Budget, ” New teravia, September 1981, p. 859. Scientist, Feb. 23, 1982. bK’’Satellite Business Communication Comes to Britai n,” 63 Peter Marsh, “communications in the 1980’s—Satellites or Fibre F/ight /nternationa/, Feb. 7, 1981, p. 342. Optics?” New Scientist, July 23, 1981. 196 ● Civilian Space Policy and Applications as possible challenges from INTELSAT, if the new Compagnia Nazionale Satelliti di Telecomunica- services threaten to take business away from the zioni is prime contractor on the project. Intelsat system.67 It is still early enough in the evolution of satellite systems for any number of Unlike all other European states except Por- developments to occur, including joint ventures tugal, Italy’s participation in INTELSAT is done between British and European companies. BAe through a private firm, Telespazio, rather than a recently formed a partnership with the French national PTT. Since 1976, Telespazio has also op- firm Matra, called Satcom International, to bid erated a Landsat receiving station at Fucino. on satellite hardware, and similar agreements The Italian space program has suffered from may be made for services. lack of central coordination and public support, as well as the strains of Italy’s turbulent economic and political situation. Space activities have been Italy coordinated and funded by the National Re- Italy has been a consistent supporter of Euro- search Council (CNR), which began to fund pean space activities and in 1981 contributed space-related activities in 1960. Other ministries 9.94 percent of ESA’S budget, or around $82.9 and agencies, such as the Post Office and the million. Italy has not taken the lead in any major Defense Ministry, also play a role. In 1972, Italy applications projects, but has chosen to support spent $19.4 million on space, $9.8 million of which went to ELDO and ESRO; in 1976 this had a variety of programs that would provide Italy’s 68 aerospace and electronics industries with con- risen to $60.5 million, almost all in ESA. Recent- tracts for advanced technologies. Difficulties in ly, the government approved a plan to double meeting its financial obligations to the Spacelab Italy’s space expenditures over the next 2 years; program in the face of large cost overruns led Italy most of the increase will go to fund national pro- to reduce its contribution from 18 percent of grams. These may include a national communica- Spacelab funding in 1979 to 1 percent in 1981. tions satellite (Italsat) and a television DBS system, The recent decision to use Italy’s Sirio 2 com- as well as several cooperative ventures with munications satellite for ESA communications has NASA: IRIS, a small booster for the shuttle given Italy the lead role in that project. payload bay; and the so-called “tethered satellite,” which is designed to be attached to the Aside from its European multilateral contribu- shuttle in orbit by a long umbilical cord.69 Italy tions, Italy has maintained a small national pro- has been a strong supporter of ESA’S experimental gram centered around its unique off-shore launch L-Sat communications platform, and will use one platform, located on the Equator off the shore of of the first satellite’s 2 TV-channels for direct Kenya in the Indian Ocean. The San Marcos plat- television broadcasting. form has been the site of numerous small satellite and sounding rocket launches, mostly by U.S. Recently the Italian Defense Ministry has pro- rockets but including British and European ones posed a domestic military communications sys- as well, which have taken advantage of its equa- tem, SICRAL, for secure voice and data transmis- torial position for experimental flights. The first sion and for use in civil emergencies. The satellite Italian satellite, San Marcos 1, was launched by hardware will be designed and manufactured by Italian firms for eventual launch on either the a U.S. Scout in 1964; subsequent San Marcos 70 series satellites were launched from the San Mar shuttle or Ariane. cos platform, also by Scout. Other European Programs In 1977, Italy orbited an experimental geostationary communications satellite, Sirio 1, on a The space efforts of other countries in Europe U.S. Thor-Delta. The ground spare for that proj- have taken place almost entirely within the Euro- ect, Sirio 2, will be launched in April 1982 by ESA G8Wor/d. Wide Space Activities, p. 176. to disseminate meteorological data; the Italian Ggpeter Marsh, “Italy Joins the New European Space Race, ” New Scientist, Apr. 1, 1982. 70Andrea Lorenzoni, “SICRAL: A Proposed Italian Defence Sat- ‘7’’Communications in the 1980’ s,” New Scientist, July 23, 1981. ellite System,” /nteravia, August 1981, p, 793. Ch. 7—international Efforts in Space ● 197 pean agencies, ESRO, ElDO, and now ESA. A few a variety of experimental communications activ- non-ESA projects, however, deserve mention, ities .72 particularly the proposed Nordsat regional com- Another potentially interesting development is munications system to provide television and Compagnie Luxembourgeosie de Telediffusion’s radio broadcasting between Sweden, Norway, (CLT) plan to provide multinational direct televi- Denmark, and Finland. Under discussion since sion programing via satellite by 1985. The com- 1972, the system is designed to promote Scan- pany’s potential difficulties illustrate the problems dinavian cultural unity–the details, which have faced when operating across European bound- been understandably difficult to arrange consider- aries. CLT is Europe’s largest commercial (i. e., ing the many countries involved, are not as yet 71 nongovernment) broadcaster, covering large por- determined. In connection with this proposal, tions of France, Germany, Belgium, Denmark, Sweden is developing a satellite, known as Vik- and the Netherlands. Since it is in direct coming, for 1984 Ariane launch; it will investigate petition with national broadcasters, foreign magnetospheric conditions preparatory to a pos- governments, particularly Germany, have op- sible communications satellite program. Saab- posed ClT’s expansion plans, in part by trying Scania is building the payload, while Boeing pro- to discourage investment in CLT stock. CLT is provides the satellite bus; Viking will provide Sweden posing a three-channel $250-million satellite that with crucial experience in satellite communica- could broadcast simultaneously in French, Ger- tions operation, and will also further the Swedish man, and Dutch, reaching a potential 100 million goal of encouraging an indigenous commercial viewers. Launch reservations have already been space systems industry. Studies have also been made on both Ariane and the Shuttle.73 done for a second Swedish satellite, Tele-X, for

72’’ Sweden Moves Ahead on Research Satellite,” A W&ST, Sept. 71see R, Grandj, and G. Richeri, “Western Europe: The Develop- 1, 1980, p. 49. ment of DBS Systems, ” )ourna/ of Communication, spring 1980, 73’’The No. 1 Broadcaster Fights Back From Space, ” Business pp. 175-176. Week, May 4, 1981, pp. 66-67.

Organization and Policy responsible today for Japan’s scientific programs. Beginning in the late ]9s0’s and through the Japanese interest in space science and tech- 1960’s ISAS developed the Kappa and Lambda nology began in the mid-l 950’s, when mukilat- series of solid-fuel sounding rockets, which eral planning was underway for the International formed the basis for Japanese scientific and ap- Geophysical Year (1957). Alone among the major plications experiments. The difficulties of rocket space-capable countries, Japan’s space efforts development were enhanced by inadequate were not initially prompted by military concerns. guidance and stabilization technology, which was The postwar Japanese constitution specifically in turn due partly to a self-imposed reluctance prohibited the buildup of large military forces, to fund technologies that might give the rockets and public opinion has been consistently op- enough accuracy to be perceived as having mil- posed to any signs of militarism and to large ex- itary capability.TA ISAS went on to develop orbital penditures for military purposes. Because of the rockets; the first successful 24-kg test satellite was worldwide association of space programs with launched by an advanced Lambda, after several military capabilities, Japan carefully placed its first years of failure, in February 1970. The Mu-class space establishment at the University of Tokyo, orbital launcher achieved its first success in 1971 the country’s foremost educational institution. and has been operated by ISAS since then from The Institute of Space and Aeronautical Sciences its Kagosh ima test range. (ISAS) was founded in 1954, and (though it recently became an independent institute) is still TAworjd.wide Space Activ/t/es, p. 185. ————. -—. ..—

198 . Civilian Space Policy and Applications

In 1960, the National Space Activities Commis- sive space program, although it is not necessary sion (NSAC, later SAC) was established in the to produce everything domestically."78 Active in- Prime Minister’s office to give advice on Japan’s ternational cooperation and peaceful develop- overall space program. It operates today as a ment were emphasized as guiding principles, major source of high-level planning, along with the Science and Technology Agency (STA). In Current and Projected 1964, the STA created the National Space De- Applications Programs79 velopment Center to conduct rocket tests; this was due in part to dissatisfaction with ISAS’S pure- Communications ly scientific orientation. In 1969, this became the In December 1977, the Japanese orbited an ex- National Space Development Agency (NASDA), perimental geostationary communications sat- which is today the principal agency for civilian ellite, the CS-Sakura, aboard a U.S. Delta rocket. applications and test programs, launcher devel- 75 The Sakura has been used by the Radio Research opment, and tracking facilities. NASDA operates Labs of the Ministry of Posts and Telecommunica- the Tsukuba Space Center near Tokyo, Japan’s tions for experiments in 30/20 GHz propagation main satellite test facility, as well as the (the first country in the world to do so), and to Tanegashima launch site, located on an island in gain experience in the control and operation of the south of Japan. communications satellites. An operational system Other space-related activities are conducted by consisting of two satellites, the CS-2a and CS-2b, the Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications in is planned for launch in early and mid-l983, re- satellite communications, and the Transport Min- spectively (CS-2b will be an orbital spare); the istry, which operates the weather service, in me- recently developed N-11 launch vehicle will be teorological satellites. A private firm, Kokusai used. The satellites themselves were built by a Denshin Denwa Ltd., is responsible for relations group led by Mitsubishi Electric and Ford Aero- with INTELSAT. NASDA cooperates with other space.80 The operational system will provide ministries and agencies in the research and design emergency communications as well as links with of applications programs, as well as conducting remote islands; the signals will be receivable by launches (see fig. 12). small transportable Earth stations in either K or C band, and will represent the first operational The Japanese budget for space research was 76 use of 30/20 GHz technology, The satellites will very small, though growing, through the 1960’s. be managed by the Telecommunications Satellite With the establishment of NASDA annual funding Corp. of Japan, established in 1979. has increased rapidly, from a total of $23.5 million in 1968 to almost $477 million in 1981. Of this A parallel program in direct television broad- the bulk, almost 80 percent, goes to NASDA, with casting is also being conductecl, with the BSE-Yuri the remainder split between ISAS and other gov- satellite launched in April 1978 by a U.S. Delta ernment programs (see fig. 1 3). for geostationary experiments in audiovisual transmission. The operational system, with two The budget is drawn up by the SAC on a year- satellites, BS-2a and BS-2b, is planned for N-11 ly basis. In addition, the SAC prepares long-range launch in early 1984 and mid-1985. The Ministry comprehensive plans. The latest 15-year pro- of Posts and Telecommunications has funded the posal, drawn up in 1978, calls for a total 15-year system, which will enable it to transmit images expenditure of$14 billion to fund an across-the- to mountainous and outlying areas. al board program in space science, applications, and launch-vehicle development. ” The SAC zsMaSaO yoshiki, Acting Chairman, SAC, “Japan’s Space pro- stressed that “Japan should develop the necessary gram, ” paper delivered at International Aerospace Symposium, technical capabilities to carry out her comprehen- Paris, France, June 2-3, 1981, pp. 1-2. ——— ~lnformation in this section, unless otherwise noted, is taken from Tssee world-wide space Programs, p. 186; also NASDA 80-81, NASDA 80-81, NASDA 1980. National Space Development Agency of Japan, pp. 3-4. “’Japan Gaining Maturity in Satellite Technology,” A W&ST, Mar. Tbsee Wor/d-W;de space Activities, p. 204. 3, 1980, p, 92. 77’’Japanese Commission Proposes Ambitious 15-Year Space 8’ “Japanese Gain Capabilities in Advanced”Space Effort,” A W&ST, Plan,” AW&ST, Mar. 27, 1978, p. 23. Mar. 9, 1981, p. 109. Ch. 7—international Efforts in Space ● 199

Figure 12.—Schematic Chart of National Organization for Space Activities

r Space Activities Commission Prime Minister’s Office I

L 1 HNational Police Agency I

i I Ministry of Foreign Affairs i

\ .-i.&&~ { I ..+ - Ministry of Education . . I Ministry of Agriculture, 8 - Fisheries Agency Forestry and Fisheries

f Agency of Industrial - Ministry of International I Mechanical Engineering Trade and Industry Science and Technology Laboratory + o 9 I

Japan Meteorological -1 1 Meteorological Satellite Center Agency I

Ministry of Construction Geographical Survey Institute I I I ? ? Ministry of Home Affairs Fire Defense Agency ,

Keidanren Space Activities (Federation of k 1 I 1 Member Companies and Economic Organizations) Promotion Council Trade Associations

SOURCE Nat,ional Space Development Agency of Japan 200 ● Civilian Space Policy and Applications

Figure 13.—Japanese Budget for Space Activitiesa

Unit: + 100 million Institute of Space and Astronautical Science (ln- YI “48.0 n stitute of Space and Aeronautical Science, University: of Tokyo, until FY1980) m ;153.5 n National Space Development Agency of Japan (NAS DA)

959.6 * z

1020.1 a 1050.0 d. .:: ““

NOTES: 1. The upper figure in each fiscal year shows the total budget for space actwlties, 2. Figures in parentheses indicate percentage (o/o) as against the total budget for each fiscal year

a“Space in Japan 1981 -1982,” Keldanren, Tokyo, 1981, p. 4 (One dollar = approximately 225 yen, 100 million yen = 444,444 dollars at January 1982 exchange rate,) SOURCE National Space Agency of Japan

The impetus toward operational development achieve geostationary orbit when launched in of these systems has come from a desire to 1979 and 1980 by the Japanese N-1 rocket. The develop expertise in the design and operation of first failure was due to a collision with the third communications satellites for commercial/in- stage motor after separation, the second to an ap- dustrial exploitation. Satellite broadcasting is par- parent misfiring of the apogee engine. The reper- ticularly useful for communicating within Japan’s cussions from these consecutive mishaps, which mountainous and far-flung territory, which in- cost the Japanese an estimated $100 million, have cludes many small islands. They were preceded been great; not only was the chairman of NASDA by extensive ground-based R&D during the forced to resign83 but, more importantly, the 1960’s, including cooperative experiments with Japanese were moved to accelerate their efforts NASA on signals propagation, and the assump- to achieve independence from the United States tion of control over NASA’s advanced experimen- in space capabilities. Both failures were traced tal communication satellite, ATS-1, in 1974.82 to probable malfunctions of U.S.-supplied equipment. Though in the past the Japanese have relied In connection with Japan’s communications heavily on the United States, dissatisfaction with program mention should be made of a failed ex- U.S. technology can only mean fewer contracts perimental program, the Ayame and Ayame 2 sat- for U.S. firms and more emphasis on indigenous ellites. Designed to further test satellite control and communications facilities, both failed to > 83’’Tw0 Mission Failures Force Space Official’s Resignation, ” BIWor/d. w/jde Space Activities, p. 200. AW&ST, june 3, 1980, p. 26. Ch. 7—international Efforts in Space ● 201 development and/or deals with European com- lowing ground stations to bounce lasers off it for panics.84 measurement purposes. In the area of ground stations for communica- The most ambitious current program is the tions satellites, Japanese firms have long been Maritime Observation Satellite, MOS-1, which leaders in the manufacture and sale of INTELSAT will be Japan’s first satellite to provide continuous compatible stations and subsystems to develop- global Earth observation. It is designed to observe ing countries. Both Mitsubishi and Nippon Elec- ocean surface phenomena and will include visi- tric have made extensive sales abroad; in addi- ble, infrared, and microwave scanning radio- tion, Japanese firms have obtained subcontracts meters. The primary sensor will be the multi- from Hughes and other U.S. companies for work spectral self-scanning radiometer, a charge- on INTELSAT payloads. coupled device (CCD) providing 50-m resolution imagery. Hence MOS will provide operational ex- Remote Sensing perience with land remote-sensing data collec- Japan has the world’s largest fishing fleet and tion and data-processing, comparable to Land- depends on the oceans not only for food, but for sat and Spot. It is currently scheduled for an N-11 the transportation of vital raw materials and ex- launch in August or September 1986. ports, to a greater extent than any other devel- A proposed follow-onto MOS is the Earth Re- oped country. In addition, Japan is a frequent vic- sources Survey Satellite, ERS-1, a 2,700-lb remote- tim of typhoons formed in the Central Pacific, sensing spacecraft currently in preliminary design. where meteorological facilities are poor and thin- ERS-1 would be launched in 1988 aboard the new ly scattered. Hence there is a special interest in large-capacity H-1A launcher. Possible instru- the development of ocean-monitoring satellites, mentation includes synthetic aperture radar, both for weather prediction and for exploitation stereo camera, and visible infrared measurement of ocean-based resources. systems.86 The ERS-1 would eliminate Japanese Many of the early sounding rockets were used dependence on outside systems such as Land- for meteorological experiments. The first ded- sat and SPOT, and could be used to further the icated Geostationary Meteorological Satellite, search for foreign sources of energy and other GMS-Himawari, was launched in July 1977 by a raw materials. In addition, it would allow Japan U.S. Delta. Still in operation, it has provided the to compete with these systems for the sale of Japan Meteorological Agency with cloud-images remote-sensing data and data products. B’ for public dissemination, along with infrared temperature information, and has disseminated Materials Processing data to other countries in the region. Himawari Japan is cultivating an on-going MPS program was also Japan’s contribution to the World Me- as an element of its 15-year space development teorological Organization’s Global Atmospheric policy. MPS work in developing alloys, com- Research Program (GARP). A second satellite, pound materials, electronic materials, and med- GMS-2, was launched in August 1981 on an N-l! icines, as well as the life sciences, is going for- vehicle; it was developed by a group led by ward with experiments on both the U.S. Space Nihon Electric and Hughes Aerospace.85 The Shuttle and the TT-500-A, a Japanese suborbital GMS-3 is scheduled for launch in the summer of rocket: 1984. ● TT-500-A; This small two-stage suborbital Under development is a geodetic survey sat- rocket with recoverable payload sections ellite, GS-1, for a possible launch in 1985. The provides approximately 7 minutes of micro- GS-1 will be designed to be highly reflective, al- gravity (under 1o-4 G), comparable to the U.S. SPAR and German TEXUS. NASDA has

“’japanese Gain Capabilities in Advanced Space Effort,” AW&ST, Mar. 9, 1981, p. 108. sG’’japanese Gain Capabilities, ” p. 107. as’’japan Gaining Maturity in Satellite Technology,” p. 92. 87’’japan Gaining Maturity,” p. 92. ——— ——

202 ● Civilian Space Policy and Applications

established a space experiment schedule for Delta technology, subject to an agreement not the IT-500-A of two flights per year. An early to transfer it to any third party. The first flight of 1981 launch carried a metallic compound the new N-1 launcher took place in September processing experiment, while an August 1975, when an 85-kg test satellite, Kiku ETS-1, was flight evaluated semiconductor processing placed in a 1,000-km circular orbit. Basically the techniques. N-1 consists of a Thor first stage, built under ● Space Shuttle: NASDA anticipates funding license in Japan by Mitsubishi Industries; a annual missions with Spacelab, inaugurating Japanese developed liquid-fuel second stage; and its use with a first material processing test a U.S. Thiokol third stage. In all, approximately (FMPT) in fiscal year 1985. The FMPT will 67 percent of the N-1 is supplied by Japanese make use of half or one-third of the available firms. The N-1 can lift 130 kg into geostationary space in the shuttle-carried Spacelab. A orbit; in February 1977, it launched Japan’s first Japanese payload specialist will join shuttle geostationary satellite, making Japan the third crews to conduct the FMPT and later shuttle- country in the world, after the United States and based experiments.88 Soviet Union, to do so. Though the Japanese hope for major potential An uprated version, the N-11, had its first suc- gains from MPS investments, they do not expect cessful test flight in February 1981. The N-ii can them in the near future. MPS experimentation is carry 350 kg, or over twice the N-l’s payload, to seen as a way of insuring a competitive position geosynchronous orbit. Mitsubishi Industries is the 10 or 15 years from now. prime contractor; the major differences from the N-1 are the use of additional solid-fuel strap-on Launch Vehicles boosters and the replacement of the Japanese-de- The Japanese have not had an easy time designed second stage by an improved version of veloping their own launch vehicles. During the the U.S. Aerojet second stage used on the Delta. As a result the Japanese contribution to the N-11 1960’s, ISAS was responsible for designing an 89 orbital launcher; after several years of failure a is only 56 percent, less than for the N-1. The N-11 Lambda sounding rocket was able, with the ad- will replace the N-1 by 1983 and is planned for dition of a fourth stage, to launch Japan’s first use through the mid-l 980’s. satellite in 1970. The Mu series of solid-fuel For the latter 1980’s and 1990’s a new booster rockets was more successful, and the first orbit design, the H-1A, is under development. The was achieved in 1971. The Mu launchers have major innovation is a planned liquid oxygen/ been improved with radio guidance and are used liquid hydrogen second stage, to be built by Mit- by ISAS for scientific flights. Nissan Motors is cur- subishi. The initial version of the H-1A will be able rently designing an advanced version, the to place 550 kg into geosynchronous orbit; a pro- M-3-kai-l, which will be used for Japan’s 1st posed follow-on version would be able to launch planetary exploration flights in the mid-1980’s, 800 kg. The H-1A will also use an inertial-guidance including a planned Halley/Venus mission in system instead of the radio guidance of the N-1 1985. series. Projected development costs are $755 mil- in 1969, NASDA assumed primary responsibili- lion; the first operational flight of the full three- ty for launcher development for applications sat- stage rocket is scheduled for 1987.90 The H-1A ellites. Instead of attempting to develop further is necessary for the launch of advanced heavy versions of the Mu launcher, NASDA decided to satellites such as the proposed ERS-1, and will approach the United States for access to technol- give Japan a launcher roughly equivalent to ESA’S ogy for the Thor-Delta launcher and licensing ar- Ariane 1. However, there are currently no plans rangements to manufacture parts of the Delta in to market any projected launchers on a commer- Japan. The U.S.-Japanese Agreement on Space cial basis. Activities, signed on July 31, 1969, gave Japan 89’’japanese Gain Capabilities,” p. 109; “Japan Gaining A4aturi- ty, ” p. 96. 86’’japan’s Space Program,” p. 16. 90’’japanese Gain Capabilities,” p. 109. Ch. 7—international Efforts in Space ● 203 ——

Japan’s launch capabilities have been severe- development of domestic markets, and the mas- ly restricted by agreements with the Japanese tery of techniques for mass production and mar- fishing industry that allow missiles to be fired only keting. Though most of these successes, as in con- at two times of the year, January-February and sumer electronics and automobiles, have not August-Se ptember.91 been in advanced-technology areas, the govern- To date the Japanese have no firm plans for ment and industry have recently been emphasiz- developing a manned launched capability; Jap- ing technically sophisticated products in the belief anese payload specialists will fly on space shut- that Japan must compete there to sustain eco- tle missions during the 1980’s, with the first nomic growth through the end of the century. Japanese astronaut scheduled to fly in fiscal year Space technology is definitely a major area of in- 1985. However, there have been very preliminary terest, and government and industry have been working closely together to prepare for Japanese designs for a “mini-shuttle” capable of carrying a four-man crew plus 1,100 lb of cargo. Such a entry into world markets. vehicle is seen as eventually necessary for full ex- A recent study undertaken by Japan’s influen- ploitation of the scientific and applications pro- tial Ministry of International Trade and Investment grams currently under way.92 (MITI) predicts that by the mid-1 990’s space will be a $4.5 billion per year industry (current sales Cooperation/Competition With of Japanese companies are $480 million, almost the United States entirely to the government). The study empha- sizes not only export potential but technological As is clear from the preceding description of spinoffs; an indigenous space industry is vital its major applications programs, Japan has in the since: “As unilateral introduction of technologies past worked closely with NASA and with U.S. in- from foreign countries is getting more difficult, dustry. The transfer of Thor- Delta technology has it is necesary to strengthen Japan’s own bargain- been the largest single result of that cooperation; ing power through accumulation of necessary in addition there have been numerous scientific technological know-how, ” Recognizing that exchanges. Many of Japan’s applications satellites Japan is some 5 to 10 years behind the United have been designed in part by U.S. firms engaged States and Europeans in key areas, especially in joint ventures with Japanese companies. The launch vehicles, there is emphasis on taking ad- Japanese plan to use Spacelab extensively. vantage of Japanese strengths in quality control, mass production, and marketing. 93 At the same time it is clear that the Japanese intend to use the technology and expertise gained Despite the disadvantages of a smaller eco- through cooperation to build up their own in- nomic and technical base to draw on than either dependent government and private sector capa- the United States, Europe, or the Soviet Union, bilities. The immediately resulting systems have and the lack of major military programs to en- been developed to meet national and public sure political and financial support, Japan has suc- needs in communications, meteorology, and re- ceeded in achieving a position of high technical mote sensing; the major commercial effect has and industrial competence in the entire range of been to begin to remove Japan as a market for space activities. Though not yet able to offer full- U.S. systems and launch vehicles. Eventually, scale commercial products or services (with the however, there is no doubt that Japan will at- exception of ground stations), the development tempt to export its equipment and services. There of this capability is only a matter of time. Japanese is a long and well-known pattern of rapid Jap- success has been the result of a number of fac- anese entry into foreign markets, following on tors, including: successful assimilation of imported technology, ● a sustained commitment to civilian space 9’ “Japan Space Effort Moves Into Operational Phase,” A W&ST, development by government and industry Mar. 8, 1982, p. 107. glMasayoshi Kanabay ashi, “japan Sets Mini-Entry in Space Race, ’ 93//epofl of the Deliberation Council on Basic Problems in the Wa// Street Jourrra/, July 20, 1981. Space /ndustry, MITI, Apr. 20, 1981. 204 ● Civilian Space Policy and Applications

as an integral part of overall plans to keep ticularly strong in Third World countries, where Japan competitive in advanced technology; Japan’s proven ability to provide high-quality ● careful borrowing of technology, mostly products at low cost may give them an edge over from the United States, and assimilation of less reliable European and American competitors. that technology by Japanese industry; In addition, it cannot be ruled out that growing ● close cooperation between government and pressure on Japan to increase its military budget industry, with general coordination by the and regional defense responsibilities may bring Space Advisory Council; about attempts to make use of its expertise in ● strong economic performance over the past space technology for military purposes, with the two decades, together with a rapid matura- additional boost that such a decision would give tion of national scientific and industrial skills; to indigenous aerospace and electronics indus- and tries. Recently, it was reported that Japan was ● willingness by both government and in- considering the deployment of a military recon- dustry to make and adhere to long-range naissance satellite system, which might be built plans. alone or with U.S. cooperation .94

Competition from the Japanese appears assured 94’’japan Reported Making Plans for Reconnaissance Satellite,” during the coming decade and is likely to be par- Aerospace Dai/y, Jan. 11, 1982, p. 45.

NON-WESTERN SPACE PROGRAMS: SOVIET UNION, PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, INDIA

Soviet Union Unfortunately, the extreme secrecy with which the Soviets have surrounded their programs The Soviet Union has for many years main- makes it difficult to accurately evaluate their pres- tained a space program approximately equivalent ent capabilities and future plans. This secrecy is to, and in some areas considerably ahead of, that due to an unwillingness to acknowledge failures of the United States both in terms of total and/or technical backwardness for fear of damage resources allocated and the kinds of missions car- to Soviet prestige; to concern that foreign coun- ried out. During the 15 years since it became tries might steal or imitate Soviet technology; and clear that they would not win the race to land to the military nature of most of the Soviet space a man on the Moon, the Soviets have made in- program and the lack of separation between ci- cremental and continuing improvements to their vilian and military space institutions. It is launcher and manned-vehicle systems, as well as estimated that 70 percent of Soviet space efforts developing operational capabilities in domestic are purely military, 15 percent are dual mili- and international communications, meteorology, tary/civilian, and the remaining 15 percent purely and remote sensing. Over the past several years civil. gs All launches are conducted by the Stra- the Soviets have launched many more satellites tegic Rocket Forces; the Soviet Air Force operates than the United States (see table 19). the Star City cosmonaut training center. Details of the internal organization are not generally Table 19.—Total (Civilian and Military) Successful available and are subject to controversy. impor- Orbital Launches tant planning and advisory roles are played by

United States U.S.S.R. the State Committee on Science and Technology 1978 ...... 32 88 and the Soviet Academy of Sciences. 1979 ...... 16 87 1980 ...... 13 89 SOURCE: Charles Sheldon 11, “United States and Soviet Progress in Space: Summary Data through 1980 and a Forward Look,” Congressional ‘sSoviet ~j/;taV power, U.S. Department of Defense, September Research Service Report #81-27 S, Jan. 15, 1981, p, 49. 1981, p. 79. Ch. 7—international Efforts in Space ● 205

For these reasons, and because the Soviet pro- technology, and to the system of weighted voting gram is not oriented towards commercial systems whereby influence was determined by a coun- that would be competitive with U.S. or other try’s overall use of the system; the Soviets used space technologies, we will not examine the only 2 to 3 percent of global international traf- Soviet program in as much detail as the European fic, compared with the United States’ s 50 to 60 and Japanese. Brief descriptions of major opera- percent. Instead, in 1968 the Soviet Union and tional applications systems will be given, with em- eight other socialist states (Poland, Czech- phasis on potential international implications. oslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria, Mongolia, and Cuba) proposed an alter- Communications native system, which in 1971 was formally agreed Soviet satellite communications development to and called Intersputnik. Although it is open initially took a different path than that of the to any state, few other countries (Syria, Vietnam, United States. The U.S. satellite communications and Laos), have joined, for both political and industry, after initial experiments in the early technical reasons. There is relatively little com- 1960’s with low-orbit satellites and passive reflec- mercial/private traffic between most Intersputnik tors (such as the Echo series), soon turned to ac- members and the rest of the world; in addition, tive geosynchronous satellites. Because of the since the intersputnik network was initially based relatively well-developed U.S. domestic commu- on use of the Molniya satellites, it was difficult nication network, satellites were at first aimed and expensive for INTELSAT Earth stations, which primarily at the rapidly expanding overseas mar- are designed to work with fixed geosynchronous ket; the United States took the initiative in form- satellites, to make use of the moving Molniyas. ing INTELSAT and designating the newly created in recent years, however, the Soviet Union has COMSAT organization to provide the technology begun to orbit geosynchronous Statsionar satel- and management expertise to make INTELSAT lites which are designed to be more acceptable function. In the Soviet Union, however, improv- to global users. In addition, as their international ing domestic communications, particularly to the communications needs have grown the Soviet less-developed central Asian and Siberian re- Union, Cuba, and Rumania, (to be followed soon gions, was a high priority, while international traf- by Poland) have begun to use INTELSAT through fic was minuscule. The Soviet Molniya 1 system Earth stations on their own territories. Increasing began operations in 1965, using large satellites de facto integration of global satellite communications appears to be occurring, even in the ab- placed in elliptical 1 2-hour orbits. Such orbits are 97 easier to attain than geosynchronous ones, allow- sence of formal agreements. ing heavier satellites to be used; they also pro- The Soviets’ first geostationary communications vide better coverage to areas far north of the satellite was launched in 1974. A large system of Equator, though they require relatively expensive geostationary satellites, called Statsionar, has tracking antennas. Similar orbits have been used been established to serve the Soviet Union and for the Molniya 2 and 3 series, first launched in East Europe with a number of different kinds of 1971 and 1974 respectively. The Molniyas have satellites: the Raduga series, six satellites of which provided domestic telephone and television serv- had been launched through 1980, for domestic ices, including color TV transmissions; as more TV and telephone relay; the Ekran series, with advanced Molniyas have become available, the six satellites, for domestic television; and the Gori- Molniya 1 series appears to have been reserved zont series of four satellites for international and for military requirements.9G domestic television transmission. The current ln- For a number of reasons the Soviet Union and tersputnik system relies heavily on the Statsionar its allies were reluctant to join INTELSAT when it was founded in 1964. The Soviets objected to U. S./COMSAT management, to the use of U.S. gTSee Nicholas Matte, Aerospace Law: Telecommunications Sat- e//ites, prepared by the Centre for Research of Air and Space Law, McGill University, for the Social Sciences and Humanities Research 96’’U.S. and Soviet Progress in Space, ” p. 52. Council of Canada, 1980, pp. 118-123. 206 ● Civilian Space Policy and Applications satellites, and more are expected to be launched tion. The latest such satellite, Cosmos 1151, was in the near future; the Soviets are currently several launched in January 1980.100 years behind in their projections for overall sys- 98 Perhaps the most ambitious civilian-oriented tem deployment. remote-sensing work has been done on manned The Soviets have also announced plans for sev- missions, particularly the Salyut 6. Some 50,000 eral new global communications systems de- photographs have been taken using a large signed to compete with western ones. The Loutch MKF-6m multispectral camera built by Carl Zeiss series of eight satellites is intended to provide Jena in East Germany, and some of the data ob- services comparable to INTELSAT, using 14/11 tained has been shared with allied and develop- GHz frequencies; the Volna mobile communica- ing countries, such as Cuba, Vietnam, Morocco, tions system of seven satellites plans to offer serv- and Angola.l O1 ices to ships and planes similar to those of Marisat The Soviets have been distributing weather and Aerosat. To date none of these planned sat- 99 photos from their Meteor series meteorological ellites have been flown. satellites since 1966; their first retrograde Sun- It would appear that the Soviets, after many synchronous launch, capable of providing daily years of concentrating on domestic and regional coverage of a particular area at the same time of capabilities, are hoping to compete on a more day, was made in 1977. Meteor satellites have global scale. Such an effort stems from: 1) increas- carried a variety of experimental sensors in- ing confidence in their technology, based in part cluding, recently, advanced Earth resources in- on military experience gained in communicating strumentation.1°2 In July 1980, the Soviet Union with a rapidly expanding number of naval vessals launched a prototype remote-sensing satellite and foreign bases and 2) an increase in interna- with three experimental multispectral sensors tional civilian communications with Western and providing ground resolution up to 30 m, with data third world states, due largely to expanded trade to be relayed to the ground via radio. It is planned relations. Not enough is known about the critical to extend this to a full-scale operational system factors to estimate whether Soviet competition with 50-m visible-band resolution .los will be effective: these include the system’s In the U. N., the Soviets have proposed since technical characteristics and reliability, its com- 1979 that distribution of “local,” i.e., 50 m or less, patibility with other global and regional systems, remote-sensing data be subject to the prior con- how the prices charged for services compare with sent of the state being viewed; this does not af- Intelsat and other alternatives, the institutional fect Landsat 3 MSS imagery but would apply to characteristics of any potential user group, and TM data from Landsat D, as well as France’s pro- political considerations. posed SPOT system. The Soviet proposal is de- Remote Sensing signed to restrict the usefulness of U.S. and other Western remote-sensing systems, as well as to The Soviets have no specifically designated limit the dissemination of potentially damaging civilian land remote-sensing system. Large information about the Soviet Union and its allies numbers of short-term film-return Cosmos mis- (e.g., agricultural data that might give foreign sions have been flown for military purposes, and some of these have undoubtedly provided civilian lm’’Review of National and Co-Operative Space Activities for the Calendar Year 1980,” UNCOPUOS, A/AC’. 105/286/Add. 3, May data. Ocean surveillance for the military has been 1, 1981, p. 11. carried out using nuclear-powered active radar 1°’ “The Salyut 6 Mission, ” /nteravia, November 1978, p. 1,084; satellites; two specialized nonnuclear ocean- “Relevance of Space Activities to Monitorifig of Earth Resources and the Environment, ” prepared for 2d U.N. Conference on the ographic satellites are reported to be in opera- Exploration and Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, A/Conf. 101/BP/3, Apr. 28, 1981, p. 8. ‘02’’Craig Covault, “Soviets Initiating Program on Modular Space 98 ’’ Soviets Continue Aggressive Space Drive, ” AW&ST, Mar. 9, Station,” AW&ST,. July 21, 1981; “Review of Space Activities,” p. 10. 1981. 1°3’’ National Paper: USSR, ” prepared fcjr 2d U.N. Conference 99’’ Soviets Increasing Space Activities, ” AlV&ST, Mar. 3, 1980, on the Exploration and Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, A/Conf. 101/ p. 83. NP/30, Sept. 2, 1981, p. 19. Ch. 7—international Efforts in Space ● 207 firms a better bargaining position with Soviet pur- used is the Sapwood (A) launcher, a derivative chasers). The United States opposes such a re- of the original ICBM design dating back to the striction. 104 mid-l950s, which in present modified versions There are presently no known Soviet plans to can launch Soyuz manned vehicles up to 6,575 distribute remote-sensing information outside the kg. The larger Proton (D) launcher can carry U. S. S. R.; entry of the Soviets into the global 20,000 kg to LEO and has been used to launch the Salyut space stations; it is not considered market, even on a selective basis, could have a 108 significant effect on future Western commercial reliable enough for manned launches. systems. The Soviets would be likely to sell/ The Soviets have so far failed to produce ad- distribute data for political purposes, which could vanced ELVS comparable to the U.S. Saturn V, mean undercutting global prices while criticiz- which could lift 136,000 kg to LEO, or a reusable ing Western systems (especially those run as vehicle such as the space shuttle. This has been private commercial enterprises) for being too ex- due in part to their inability to develop high- pensive for and/or violating the sovereignty of energy liquid hydrogen/liquid oxygen propulsion developing countries. systems, without which launching heavy payloads requires a very large number of stages and Materials Processing strap-ens. The Soviets apparently attempted to Processing experiments have had a high priority launch a Saturn-size vehicle on at least three oc- on recent Soviet space flights, especially aboard casions from 1969 to 1972 as part of their manned the Salyut 6 orbiting laboratory.l05o~ Two separate lunar program, but were unsuccessful. There are furnaces, the Splav-01 and Kristall, have been currently unconfirmed reports that the Soviets are used to conduct experiments on semiconductors, once again seeking to launch a very large ELV, crystal growth, alloys, glasses and metal oxides; as well as to develop a reusable vehicle some- samples have been taken to the ground for de- what smaller than the shuttle. Both advances tailed analysis. Approximately 300 to 350 Soviet would be useful in implementing the Soviet aim of developing large permanently manned orbiting scientists are reported to be actively engaged in l09 materials research related to space processing.l06 Space stations. As usual, details of Soviet results are not public- In recent years the main emphasis of the Soviet ly available; activities appear to be at the basic space program has been on developing and using science level, and can be expected to continue the Salyut series of manned orbiting laboratories. with future Soviet manned flights. Soviet spokes- The first Salyut prototype was launched in 1971; men are characteristically optimistic about space since then five more have been orbited, four suc- manufacturing; a typical observation is cos- cessfully. Several (Salyuts 2, 3, and 5) have ap- monaut Konstantin Feoktistov’s recent claim that parently been military in nature, mainly for high- resolution reconnaissance; Salyuts 4 and 6 have there will eventually be “whole plants for man- ll0 ufacturing products in zero-g. ’’107 been civilian. Salyut 6, still in orbit, has been by far the most successful. Weighing 42,000 lb, Launch Vehicles and Manned Operations it has been visited by 13 separate 2- and 3-man Soyuz crews, including a large number of non- The Soviets have developed a number of ex- Soviet nationals. The Salyut 6 has also rendez- pendable launch vehicles; the most commonly voused with unmanned Progress tankers, which ‘wJames Kay, “The Legal Implications of Remote Sensing by Sat- can dock automatically to resupply the men ellite, ” prepared by Centre for Research of Air and Space Law, aboard. This has enabled the Soviets to conduct McGill University, for the Social Sciences and Humanities Research long-duration missions, including the world Council of Canada, March 1981, p. 73. IOSB. BeIitsky, “Soviet Manned Space Flight 20 Years on, ” @aCe- //ight, vol. 23, No. 5, May 1981, pp. 154-155. 1°8’’ U.S. and Soviet Progress in Space, ” pp. 23-25. IWWS. MUSt spend More to Maintain Lead in Space 7-echnology, 1°9Craig Covau It, “Soviets Developing 12-Man Space Station, ” GAO Report FGMSD-80- 32, Washington, D. C., Jan. 31, 1980, p. 8. AW&ST, June 16, 1980, pp. 26-29. ‘07’ ’Soviets Show Assembly of Space Station Units,” AkV&ST, June 11ONicholas johnson, “The Military and Civilian Salyut Space Pro- 29, 1981, p. 21. grammed,” Spacef/ight, August-September 1979, p. 364. 208 ● Civilian Space Policy and Applications

record of 185 days in orbit recorded by Valery in the Soviet Union and spent time on board Ryumin and L. Popov in 1980. Numerous exper- Salyut 6. These missions have helped give the iments and studies have been conducted to test Soviet program a politically valuable international the spacecraft themselves as well as the effects image; further such flights, including cosmonauts of weightlessness on human beings, other plant from non-l nterkosmos nations, such as France and animal life, and inorganic materials. Salyut and possibly India, are being planned. cosmonauts have succeeded in working outside the spacecraft to make repairs and to deploy in- Soviet-U.S. space relations have had several struments, such as a 33-ft radio telescope. 111 ups and downs, generally mirroring the overall political climate. The period of initial rivalry from In June 1981 Salyut 6 was visited by a new large 1957 through the Apollo program was character- (30,000 lb) unmanned craft, designated Cosmos ized by extreme competition and mutual claims 1267, which is twice as large as the Pro- of superiority, often made difficult to verify on gress/Soyuz vehicles. The automatic docking per- account of the secrecy with which the Soviet pro- formed by the two vehicles appears to point the gram was conducted. The Apollo success was way to the construction of large modular space typically downplayed by the Soviets, who stressed stations with many times the interior room of the the superiority of their unmanned Lunokhod current Salyuts.112 The Soviets have consistently lunar explorers and the “wastefulness” of the pointed to the establishment of such stations as U.S. manned program, implying that the Soviets the central goal of their space program and as had never intended to send men to the Moon.113 a necessary step in conducting further space ac- However, even during this period the two coun- tivities, including eventual manned missions to tries found it necessary to cooperate in establish- the Moon and planets. In March 1982 the Soviets ing legal and regulatory principles for space ac- launched a new station, Salyut 7. tivities. In the early 1970’s, as the end of the Viet- nam War allowed closer relations to develop and Cooperation and Competition With “detente” became the official policy of both the Other Countries U.S. and Soviet leadership, planning began for The bulk of Soviet joint and cooperative proj- a cooperative manned mission, the Apollo-Soyuz ects have been conducted with allied socialist test project (ASTP). In May 1972, a comprehen- states. In 1967, the Interkosmos program was sive agreement was signed in Moscow as part of founded to coordinate activities between the the Nixon-Brezhnev Summit. The agreement cov- Soviet Union, its East European allies, and other ered a variety of mutual scientific and technical communist states such as Mongolia, Cuba, and exchanges in addition to ASTP.11A The ostensible more recently Vietnam. A number of scientific rationale for the mission was to develop a joint satellites have been flown using instruments, docking system so that, in case of emergencies, designed by member-states, under the overall spacecraft from either of the two states could direction of the Soviet Union. Instruments and rendezvous with those of the other. However, experiments, such as East Germany’s multispec- the joining together of the two spacecraft became tral camera, have also flown on the Salyut series; symbolic of the then current “thaw” in relations, many of these were associated with the flight of and was seen by proponents as leading towards guest cosmonauts from participating states. To extended cooperation in future space (and non- date, cosmonauts from Czechoslovakia, Poland, space) activities. Critics saw it as an expensive East Germany, Bulgaria, Hungary, Rumania, political stunt which was likely to give the Soviet Mongolia, Vietnam, and Cuba have been trained Union greater benefits than the United States, in-

11 Jjames Oberg, “The Moon Race Cover-Up,” Reason, August ] 1 ‘Craig Covault, “Radio Telescope Erected on Salyut 6,” AW&ST, 1979, pp. 34-37. Aug. 13, 1979, pp. 54-55. 1 ldsoviet space Programs 1971-75, Staff Report for Senate com- I \z)ames oberg, “The Soviet Aim: a permanent base in sPace, ” mittee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences, Aug. 30, 1976, vol. New Scientist, Oct. 1, 1981. 11, p. 105. Ch. 7—international Efforts in Space • 209 sofar as the perceived technical parity between Soviet Union in 1975; in 1979 an Earth-observa- the two systems would tend to elevate the public tion satellite, Bhaskara-1, was launched, and image of the Soviet Union as no longer “behind” Bhaskara-11 was orbited in November 1981. Co- in space technology. For various reasons the July operation with France, outlined earlier in the sec- 1975 rendezvous of Apollo and Soyuz 19, though tion on the French space program, has been pur- spectacular, did not lead to further major coop- sued in materials processing, space biology, and erative activities; this was largely due to the dif- manned flight. ferent directions the two programs took in the The Soviet space effort is large and varied and second half of the 1970’s, as well as to increas- the above has done no more than sketch their ing political tensions. Some of the cooperative major programs. As opposed to the U.S. space projects, such as U.S. biological experiments carried on Cosmos flights in 1975, 1977, and 1979, effort, it seems fair to say that over the past decade, the Soviet program has been character- and exchanges of data from each country’s plan- ized by steady growth and extension of their ca- etary missions have continued, but there are no pabilities. Despite slowness in meeting certain plans for a resumption of major scientific or ap- goals for communications services, ambitious plications exchanges. In 1977, a second agree- programs in communications, remote sensing, ment was concluded between NASA and the and especially the construction and operation of Soviet Academy of Science outlining cooperation orbital stations have been successfully im- in the development of a compatible sea search- plemented. However, it is still an open question and-rescue system, along with further coopera- whether increased Soviet capabilities, and in- tion in manned space flight. Although preliminary creased confidence in their technology, will in- meetings were held, the studies were never com- duce the Soviets to offer applications services to pleted; the Soviets blame the United States for 115 a broader range of global customers. Space tech- not fulfilling this latter part of the agreement. nology is one of the few areas in which the The Soviets and United States are at odds in Soviets could be competitive with the West, and the U.N. over a variety of space issues, such as the political and economic gains of supplying the proper restrictions to be placed on DBS and hardware and services would be attractive. land remote-sensing systems. More importantly, However, Soviet inexperience at operating in a the growing military importance of space tech- competitive business environment may prove, in nologies for surveillance, communications and this as in other fields, to be a major barrier. In navigation has made each side more concerned addition, the marketing of services—as opposed about the other’s capabilities, and less prone to to simple hardware—which require close coop- cooperate directly with the other. The Soviets eration between supplier and customer would have consistently criticized the shuttle as a space run counter to the Soviets’ long-cherished prac- weapon while carrying out active tests of an an- tice of maintaining maximum secrecy about their tisatellite system. technical capabilities, especially in areas where the military is so closely involved. For these Despite extensive publicity for space exploits, reasons it is likely that the Soviets will choose to the Soviets have made only minor attempts to ac- compete selectively, for discrete political aims, tively disseminate either space technology or its rather than enter into general competition for sat- benefits to third-world countries, as the United ellite communications, remote-sensing, or launch States has done through NASA cooperative agree- service markets. ments and the Agency for International Develop- ment (Al D). Outside of allied socialist countries and the United States, significant cooperation has People’s Republic of China (PRC) been pursued with only three countries–France, India, and to a lesser extent, Sweden. India’s first The PRC’S launch technology has been derived satellite, called Aryabhata, was launched by the from the Soviet Union, primarily the SS-4 (Sandal) medium-range liquid-fueled missile, designs for ‘l’’’ National Paper: U. S. S. R,” p. 110. which were given to the Chinese in the late 210 ● Civilian Space Policy and Applications

1950’s before relations between the two coun- mission tests using the France-German Sym- tries broke down. The central impetus for the phonic have included video teleconferencing and development of further launchers and satellites high-resolution facsimile transmission. According has been to meet security needs: to carry nuclear to terms of the “1979 Understanding on Coopera- warheads to the population centers of the Soviet tion in Space Technology” (part of the United Union, and to provide military reconnaissance States-China Agreement on Cooperation in Sci- and communications. ence and Technology), the Chinese Communica- tions Satellite Corporation indicated a desire to The first Chinese satellite, the 173 kg China 1, purchase a U.S. communications satellite (to be was launched in April 1970 by a CSL-I (Long launched by NASA) including ground equipment, March 1 ) launcher. Since then 10 more satellites but plans have been postponed indefinitely due have been launched (including a recent three- to financial constraints. Discussions also took in-one payload of scientific satellites). Little is place in 1979 and 1980 with non-U.S. partners known about their characteristics, though some such as West Germany’s Messerschmitt-Bolkow- were clearly for military reconnaissance and com- Blohm.119 munications. Starting with China 3 in 1975, launches were made with the FB-1 (Storm) vehi- PRC currently receives meteorological data cle, a version of their CSS-X-4 ICBM, approx- from the U.S. Tires-N and NOAA- 6, and the imately equivalent in size to the U.S. Atlas. The Japanese GMS-1 satellites through indigenous FB-1 can launch a satellite of up to 2 tons into receiving stations. The Central Meteorological LEO.1l6 Bureau had planned to launch a Sun-synchronous weather satellite in 1982, and a com- The Chinese are known to be working on a plementary geosynchronous satellite in 1985. The new launcher, the Long March 3, which would 1982 satellite’s radiometer was to have a 4-km use the two stages of the FB-1 plus a liquid resolution (compared with the U.S. ITOS’ resolu- oxygen/liquid hydrogen upper stage. If successful, tion of 1 km). Due to cutbacks in Chinese R&D this would make them third in the world, after expenditures, the status of these plans is the United States and ESA (perhaps fourth if the uncertain. Japanese succeed first), to use high-energy cryogenic fuels. The Chinese recently announced In remote sensing, the Chinese plan to use that the Long March 3 would be launched in 1983 Landsat and SPOT data extensively before devel- or 1984 and would probably carry China’s first oping their own system; the “1979 Understand- experimental geosynchronous communications ing” indicates China’s intention to purchase a satellite. 117 Landsat ground station from U.S. industry, and procurement activities are continuing. The To date the PRC has no operational commu- Shanghai Institute of Technical Physics is reported nications, meteorological or remote-sensing to be working on various sensors including a satellites, but plans are under way to develop all multispectral scanner.l20 In January 1980, NASA three technologies. Since 1972 and the United and the Chinese Academy of Sciences concluded States-Chinese rapprochement, China has re- a memorandum of understanding giving the PRC ceived significant data and know-how from the direct access to Landsat data. United States. INTELSAT-compatible receiving stations have been bought and established near There have been several reports that the Peking and Shanghai. An experimental COMSAT, Chinese are planning seriously for eventual the STW-2, is scheduled for a 1983 or 1984 manned flights and have begun to train astronauts launch over the Pacific, and indigenous Earth sta- for future missions.l2l However, China’s recent tions and transmitters have been built.118 Trans- reassessment of internal economic and scientific

1 IGEdelson Haas et al., “Eyewitness Report on Chinese Satellite 119’’MBB, Chinese Discuss TV Satellite,” AlV&ST,, Mar. 31, 1980, Work,” Aeronautics and Astronautics, February 1980, p. 44. p. 63. “z’’ China Launches Three-in-One Satellite Payload, ” Aerospace 120’’ Eyewitness Report, ” p. 43. Dai/y, Sept. 22, 1981, pp. 113-114. ‘z’ See David Ritchie, “Dragon in the Sky: China’s Space Pro- 8 11 ’’ Eyewitness Report,” p. 41. gram, ” Technology Review, October 1981, pp. 53-54. Ch. 7—international Efforts in Space • 211

priorities has apparently resulted in a postpone- INCOSPAR was absorbed by the Indian Space Re- ment of plans for manned flights in the 1980’s.’22 search Organization (ISRO), which in 1972 became the central body of the newly created Until recently China’s space capabilities were Department of Space. barely known. Since the death of Mao and the determination of China’s new leadership to Unlike China’s, India’s space activities have not modernize the country by increasing foreign been motivated by military concerns (the military trade and educational/scientific exchanges with has a separate interest in antitank and antiaircraft the West, a number of official and unofficial missiles). Although India is an underdeveloped foreign delegations have been allowed to visit country, it has, because of its size and long- Chinese space facilities. In turn, large numbers standing contacts with the West, a considerable of Chinese have visited U. S., European, and Jap- pool of scientific and administrative talent. The anese facilities, and many Chinese students are space program is designed to use these resources now attending Western engineering and graduate to encourage development, to foster technical programs in the sciences. Up to now, except for and scientific leadership, and to serve as an ex- initial aid from the Soviet Union, Chinese efforts ample (in accord with India’s overall position of have been almost exclusively home-grown. Mil- neutrality between East and West and a leader itary requirements have been paramount, but of the nonaligned movement) of indigenous Third there has also been recognition that satellites World achievements in areas usually considered could play a large role in upgrading China’s in- the preserve of advanced developed countries. ternal communications and television networks, Hence there is an emphasis on developing a com- in locating and managing mineral and energy re- prehensive space capability, and especially sys- sources, and in agricultural planning. Given the tems for rural communications, land manage- previous lack of access to outside technology, ment, and weather forecasting. Foreign assistance Chinese capabilities are impressive, and are likely has been welcomed from a number of countries, to expand rapidly in the near future if outside largely for demonstration projects and joint pro- contacts increase and internal constraints are grams, with the intention of building on the ex- relaxed. The major difficulties are likely to be a perience gained to provide similar services with shortage of trained scientists and technicians, due indigenous resources. Through 1979, India’s total to the educational disruptions of the cultural investment had amounted to some $230 million, revolution; lack of capital and other strains with somewhat higher expenditures anticipated caused by ambitious plans for rapid moderniza- in fulfilling the latest 10-year plan. 123 tion of the entire economy; and lack of foreign India has built and launched a large number exchange for the purchase of outside technology. of Rohini sounding rockets, in addition to pro- Though Mao’s absolute insistence on domestic viding a launch platform for U.S. and Soviet self-reliance has been relaxed, China is likely to sounding rocket experiments.124 In July 1980, be interested in such purchases primarily as a way India successfully tested its four-stage solid fuel of gaining access to technology to be copied or SLV-3 launcher, orbiting the 76-lb Rohini I otherwise appropriated; hence, although China will not in the near future be competing with research satellite; in 1981, it launched a second Rohini, which failed to achieve orbit. Plans are foreign firms or governments for commercial con- under way to produce an augmented SLV, using tracts, it is also not likely to be a major buyer of strap-on boosters, that could place 330 lb into space systems. India LEO, as well as to develop a new launcher capable of orbiting a 600-lb remote-sensing satellite India has had a formal space program since the by the mid-1980 ’s. Though strongly denied by formation of the Indian National Committee for India, there are fears, especially in Pakistan, that Space Research (l NCOSPAR) in 1962. In 1969,

’23H, P. Mama, “India’s Space Program: Across the Board on a 1 Zzsee ‘Jchinese Astronauts Train in Simu Iators, ’ A W&ST, Jan. Shoe String,” /nteravia, January 1980, p. 60. 26, 1981, p. 63. ‘Z4’’ World-Wide Space Activities, ” p. 119. 212 ● Civilian Space Policy and Applications

India’s launchers may be used as, or be the pre- major cooperative communications satellite proj- cursor to, a delivery system for nuclear weapons. ects, one with the United States and the other with Europe. The Satellite Instructional Television India’s first satellite, the Aryabhata, was launched by the Soviet Union in 1975; it was Experiment (SITE), which lasted for 1 year from August 1, 1975, to July 31, 1976, was a joint pro- largely Indian-built and designed, with Soviet gram with NASA using the ATS-6 large commu- assistance. In 1979, the Soviets launched India’s nications satellite to broadcast educational televi- Bhaskara I remote-sensing satellite, which suffered a partial power failure. The Bhaskara 11, con- sion programs to 5,000 Indian villages. India was responsible for maintenance of the ground equip- taining two television cameras and three micro- ment and for developing the programs; the over- wave radiometers~, was launched in November 1981, and has provided television pictures of the all reaction proved highly favorable and enabled sub-continent. the Government to disseminate important information on health care, agricultural techniques, Another cooperative venture was the June 1981 and birth control to previously inaccessible launch of an experimental communications sat- areas. Additional experiments, including telecon- ellite, the Apple (Ariane Passenger Payload Ex- ferencing and emergency communications, were periment), on ESA’S third Ariane test vehicle. The conducted through the Symphonic Telecommu- satellite suffered a partial failure of its solar- nications Experimental Project (STEP) from July powered electrical system but has continued to 1977 to mid-l 979, using the French-German ex- function with reduced capability.l25 perimental Symphonic communications satellite. India plans to establish an operational com- In remote sensing, India is one of 11 foreign munications system, called Insat, using two countries to have a Landsat receiving station. satellites purchased from Ford Aerospace and Located at Hyderabad, it is operated by the Na- launched by the U.S. Insat-1 was launched in tional Remote Sensing Agency. Current plans call April 1982, and will relay messages and data be- for a remote-sensing satellite to be developed and tween approximately 32 proposed ground sta- launched sometime in the mid-1980’s, building tions, as well as provide direct television service on experience with the Bhaskara series. to rural communities via several thousand inex- 126 India has amassed a large amount of experi- pensive antennas. Insat will also carry a VHRR to provide’ meteorological information. Eventual- ence in designing, building and operating a varie- ly, ISRO plans to produce its own follow-on ty of applications systems. The commitment to achieving an independent capability to use space system, building on experience gained with Ap- technology is longstanding and based on the ben- ple and Insat. eficial results of past usage. Though direct compe- India’s commitment to Insat has been due tition with Western or Japanese systems is not largely to the positive experience gained with two likely in the near future, Indian experience in adapting space capabilities to developing coun- 125’’ Apple Satellite Operational Despite Panel Failure,” AlV&ST, try needs could eventually give them an advan- Sept. 14, 1981, p. 19. 12bBen jamin Elson, “U.S. to Launch Insat Satellite for India,” tage in providing services and/or hardware to AW&ST, Apr. 5, 1982, pp. 56-63. Third World countries.

OTHER SPACE PROGRAMS

Canada ipated in a large number of joint scientific projects with the United States, including the Canada’s space activities are coordinated by Canadian-built Alouette and ISIS ionospheric the Interdepartmental Committee on Space (ICS), research satellites, launched by NASA. The with overall responsibility in the Minister of State Department of Communications cooperated with for Science and Technology. Canada has partic- NASA and ESA in operating the experimental Ch. 7—lnternational Efforts in Space ● 213

Communications Technology Satellite (CTS) from tions and remote sensing to manage its far-flung 1976 to 1979, which pioneered operational use territories and to assist in the development of the of the 14/12 GHz band. Spurred by the difficulties Amazon Basin. The Centro Tecnico Aerospecial of communicating with remote regions in the (CTA) has been responsible for developing the North, Canada in 1972 became the first Western Sonda series of sounding rockets, which are country to initiate operational domestic com- launched from Brazil’s launch facility at Natal in munications via satellite; the Anik A series of three the northeast part of the country. The United comsats were built by Hughes and launched by States, Germany, and other countries have also the United States. In 1978, Telesat Canada began used Brazil’s facilities; a new launch center is now using RCA’s Anik B for voice, data, and televi- being prepared closer to the Equator. sion transmissions. Three Hughes-built Anik C spacecraft are scheduled for launch beginning in In 1975, Brazil and NASA conducted the SACI November 1981. (Advanced Satellite for Interdisciplinary Com- munications) experiment, using NASA’s ATS-6 Canada is also engaged in a major bilateral pro- satellite to transmit television programs to remote gram with NASA to develop a remote manipu- primary schools. Brazil currently leases four lator arm for the U.S. space shuttle. Spar Aero- transponders from INTELSAT for domestic use space Ltd. is developer for the $100 million proj- (with plans to increase this to 81/2 transponders ect. The first arm flew on the second shuttle flight by 1986), and plans to purchase its own comsat in November 1981. As with ESA’S Spacelab, Can- (with provision for technology transfer), to be ada has agreed to pay for development of the arm launched in 1985. and the first prototype, in return for a NASA commitment to purchase additional arms from Brazil is, after the United States, the largest user Spar.127 of Landsat data, and has operated a Landsat ground station since 1973, along with process- Brazil ing facilities. There are currently plans to design and build four remote-sensing and meteorolog- Brazil has had an active interest in space ac- ical satellites, with the first one to be launched tivities since 1961, especially satellite communica- in 1988.128

‘27Craig Covault, “Remote Arm Aids Shuttle Capability,” A W&ST, lzBjim Brooke, “Brazil’s Space Program Prepared to Launch 4 Sat- Sept. 7, 1981, pp. 57-58. ellites by 1993, ” Washington Post, Nov. 26, 1981, p, A22.

DOMESTIC/REGIONAL COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS In addition to the national programs outlined ber 1983. France’s Aerospatiale is the prime con- previously, there are a number of regional satel- tractor, with Ford Aerospace the major U.S. par- lite communications systems that are either ticipate. Australia’s Australsat is planned for the already in operation or in various stages of mid-l 980s. Regional systems have been discussed planning, for Southern Africa and South America, particularly the Andean region, prompted by Col- Indonesia has had the two Hughes-built sat- ombia’s well-developed plans for its Satcol ellites of its Palapa A system operating since 1976 telephone and TV system.12g Currently, a large to link its widespread island area. Spare channels number of countries lease spare transponders have been leased by other countries in the from INTELSAT satellites and purchase ground region. The first Palapa B satellite is scheduled stations for domestic use. This activity, along with for launch in 1983 and will be used by the Philip- the national and regional systems mentioned, in- pines, Thailand, and Malaysia. The Arabsat system, with 21 Middle Eastern countries as par- lz%ee Theo Pirard, “Space Systems Operated and Prepared by ticipants, is scheduled for a first flight in Decem- Developing Countries, ” Spacef/ight, May 1981, pp. 137-139. 214 ● Civilian Space Policy and Applications dicates the scale of global interest in satellite serv- supported by increasingly competitive private ices. This is important, first because of the im- and national suppliers of telecommunications plications for the current international com- equipment, who encourage the purchase of spe- munications system, i.e., for INTELSAT; and also cialized services. The long-term effects on because, given the stakes, competition for sales INTELSAT are unclear but may lead to higher of satellites, ground equipment, and launch serv- prices or reduced service, which would be ices between U. S., European, and Japanese firms” especially harmful to those countries that are too is likely to be fierce. The proliferation of satellites small or poor to purchase their own system.130 for local and regional use threatens to take A possible solution would bean expansion of the business away from INTELSAT, damaging its fi- INTELSAT system to provide local and regional nancial viability. As communications needs services. This would require a satellite-ground- become greater and more specialized, and as it station system designed to operate in low-density becomes progesssively more difficult to allocate rural areas, perhaps including direct-broadcast scarce orbital slots and frequencies, many coun- capabilities. tries are determined to have their own system, or a share of a local system, regardless of whether 130See john McLucas, “Global Cooperation in Satellite Commu- such a move is warranted by local demand or nications in a Decade of Policy Divergence, ” paper presented at by financial considerations. Such decisions are International Aerospace Symposium, Paris, France, June 2, 1981.

REMOTE SENSING IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES In the field of land remote sensing, the ana- ment and also by other developed countries and Iogue to INTELSAT has been the U.S. Landsat international organizations, to enable various system, which has provided black-and-white and countries to use Landsat. Effective use requires multispectral photographs on a global basis for skilled technicians and equipment to process the the cost of reproduction. U.S. policy was estab- data, as well as integration of satellite informa- lished in 1969, when President Nixon stated at tion with many other information resources. Mul- the 24th U.N. General Assembly that “this pro- tilaterally funded training centers to encourage gram will be dedicated to produce information these capabilities are being established in Upper not only for the United States but also for the Volta, Kenya, and Thailand. world community. ” Foreign nations and agencies can either purchase data from the EROS Data As was discussed above, other global land Center, or receive it directly by establishing their remote-sensing systems besides Landsat are own receiving station, which can (with the cur- planned for the mid-l 980’s. Though such com- rent Landsat satellites) provide images over a petition may eventually improve the quality of 2,700-km radius (see map). Especially in develop- services available, much depends on whether the ing countries where maps are often incomplete competition is political or commercial in nature. and outdated, and information about land use, Private-sector operation of !-andsat, which could forest cover, drainage patterns, mineral deposits put remote sensing on a more commercial basis, and the like is difficult and expensive to obtain, is of concern to many developing countries who satellite imagery has been used extensively to aid see such a move leading to higher prices as well in economic development.’s’ Over the years, as possible violations of their sovereignty by substantial assistance has been provided, large- private companies outside effective government ly by the U.S. Agency for International Develop- control. On the other hand, a “price war” between, say, politically motivated Landsat, SPOT, MOS, and possible Soviet systems might prove 131 For a outline n of some of these uses, see “Relevance of Space beneficial to users but might also undermine the Activities to Monitoring of Earth Resources and the Environment, ” background paper for second U.N. Conference on the Exploration willingness of the sponsoring governments to and Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, A/Conf. 101/BP/3, Apr. 28, 1981. continue their operation. The multiplication of Ch. 7—lnternational Efforts in Space ● 215

1 1 1 1 1 I 1 I 1 I 1 e

SOURCE” National Aeronautics and Space Administration

Globesat section in chapter 10 of this report. At the present, however, no country or organization has taken the lead in proposing such a system or in establishing the institutional and financial framework that would be needed. Discussion of ways to better use and integrate remote-sensing data, along with other issues of concern to developing countries, will be on the agenda at the upcoming second U.N. Conference on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (UNISPACE 1982) to be held at Vienna this coming August. A number of proposals to establish new U.N. bodies dealing with space activities and/or to expand the scope of existing ones will be proposed at the Conference and passed on by the General Assembly in the fall of 1982.