Civilian Space Stations and the U.S. Future in Space

November 1984

NTIS order #PB85-205391 Recommended Citation: Civilian Space Stations and the U.S. Future in Space (Washington, DC: U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, OTA-STI-241, November 1984).

Library of Congress Catalog Card Number 84-601136

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402 Foreword

I am pleased to introduce the OTA assessment of Civilian Space Stations and the U.S. Future in Space. This study was requested by the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation and the House Committee on Science and Technology, and the request was endorsed by the Senate Committee on Appropriations and the House Committee on the Budget. The study was designed to cover not only the essential technical issues surround- ing the selection and acquisition of infrastructure in space, but to enable Congress to look beyond these matters to the larger context; the direction of our efforts. Given the vast capability and promise available to the country and the world because of the sophisticated space technology we now possess, equally sophisticated and thoughtful decisions must be made about where the U.S. space program is going, and for what purposes. The Advisory Panel for this study played a role of unusual importance in helping to generate a set of possible space goals and objectives that demonstrate the diverse opportunities open to us at this time, and OTA thanks them for their productive commitment of time and energy. Their participation does not necessarily constitute consensus or endorsement of the content of the report, for which OTA bears sole responsibility. It often happens that information generated during the course of an OTA study can be used as legislation moves through Congress. A number of statements presented in Senate and House hearings by OTA and a technical memorandum drawn from the analysis have already contributed to the course of the debate. This report, the culmina- tion of the OTA process, is now a resource for both Congress and the National Com- mission on Space, which Congress has created in order to give full and fundamental review to the basic questions of charting our course. It is OTA’S hope that the publication of the study will also expand the circle of those who can effectively engage in the debate and contribute to the decision process.

Director

. . . Ill —

Civilian Space Stations and the U.S. Future in Space Advisory Panel

Robert A. Charpie Chairman President, Cabot Corp.

Harvey Brooks Moya Lear Benjamin Peirce Professor of Technology and Chairman of the Board Public Policy Lear Avia Corp. Harvard University George E. Mueller, Jr. * Peter O. Crisp President and Chief Executive Officer President System Development Corp. Venrock, Inc. Carl Sagan Freeman Dyson Director of the Laboratories for Planetary Professor Studies Institute for Advanced Studies Cornell University James B. Farley Eugene Skolnikoff Chairman of the Board Director Booz-Allen & Hamilton, Inc. Center for International Studies Massachusetts Institute of Technology Charles E. Fraser Chairman James Spilker Sea Pines Co. President Stanford Telecommunications Inc. Andrew J. Goodpaster President Frank Stanton Institute for Defense Analyses President Emeritus CBS Inc. Charles Hitch Professor James A. Van Allen The Lawrence-Berkeley Laboratory Head, Physics and Astronomy Department University of California, Berkeley University of Iowa Bernard M. W. Knox Director Center for Hellenic Studies

OTA appreciates the valuable assistance and thoughtful comments provided by advisory panel members at many points during the assessment. OTA, however, accepts sole responsibility for the views expressed in this report.

*Retired. iv OTA Civilian Space Stations and the U.S. Future in Space Project Staff

John Andelin, Assistant Director, OTA Science, Information, and Natural Resources Division

William F. Mills* and Nancy Naismith, ** Science, Transportation, and Innovation Program Manager

Thomas F. Rogers, Project Director Philip P. Chandler, Deputy Project Director

R. James Arenz, Senior Analyst Randolph H. Ware, Congressional/ Fellow Paula Walden, Research Assistant Marsha Fenn, Administrative Assistant R. Bryan Harrison, Office Automation Systems Analyst Betty Jo Tatum, Secretary

Contractors

Lewis White Beck Courtland Lewis Charles G. Bell Charles Mathews Hubert Bortzmeyer Peter Ognibene Eva Brann Nicholas Rescher William Capron Alex Roland Computer Sciences Corp. Satellite Systems Engineering William Schneider, Principal Iinvestigator Wilbur Pritchard, Principal Iinvestigator Arthur Danto Kenneth Sayre Leonard David Science & Technology Consultants Eagle Engineering Russell Drew, Principal Iinvestigator Hubert Davis, Sr., Principal Iinvestigator Jerome Simonoff Marc Giget Eugene Skolnikoff Jerry Grey Teledyne Brown Engineering JML, Inc. James E. Wilson John Logdson, Principal /investigator

*Through September 1983. * *After September 1983. Contributors

James Arnold, University of California/ Saunders Kramer, U.S. Department of Energy California Space Institute Louis Laidet, Embassy of France James M. Beggs, National Aeronautics and Gordon Law, Office of Technology Space Administration Assessment William Bumgarner, Computer Sciences Corp. Robert Lottmann, National Aeronautics and Ashton Carter, Massachusetts Institute of Space Administration Technology John McElroy, National Oceanic and William F. Cockburn, Embassy of Canada Atmospheric Administration Anthony Cox, Embassy of the United Wilfred Mellors, European Space Agency, Kingdom Washington Office* David Criswell, University of California/ William Perry, Hambrecht & Quist (Member California Space Institute of Technology Assessment Advisory Troy Crites, Aerospace Corp. Council) Philip Culbertson, National Aeronautics and Irving Pikus, National Science Foundation Space Administration Udo Pollvogt, MBB/Erno Richard Dal Belle, Office of Technology Luther Powell, National Aeronautics and Assessment Space Administration Maxime Faget, Space Industries Ian Pryke, European Space Agency James Fletcher, University of Pittsburgh (Member Eberhardt Rechtin, Aerospace Corp. of Technology Assessment Advisory James Rose, McDonnell Douglas Council) Joseph E. Rowe, Library of Congress Robert F. Freitag, National Aeronautics and Hans Traumann, Embassy of the Federal Space Administration Republic of Germany Robert Frosch, General Motors Corp. Ernesto Valierani, Aeritalia Karl Harr, Aerospace Industries Association Charles Vick, Consultant John Barrington, Communication Satellite David C. Wensley, McDonnell Douglas Corp. Ray Williamson, Office of Technology Allen Hill, Boeing Aerospace Corp. Assessment John Hedge, National Aeronautics and Space Gordon Woodcock, Boeing Aerospace Corp. Administrate ion

* Retired vi Participants in U.S.S.R. Workshop, Dec. 13, 1982 Craig Covault Courtland Lewis Aviation Week & Space Technology Biotechnology, Inc. Philip E. Culbertson James E. Oberg Associate Deputy Administrator Consultant NASA Headquarters Kenneth S. Pederson Merton Davies Director The Rand Corp. International Affairs Division NASA Headquarters Ed Ezell National Museum of American History Geoffrey Perry Smithsonian Institution Consultant John R. Hilliard Paul Rambaut Air Force Systems Command Headquarters NASA Headquarters Andrews Air Force Base p. Diane Rausch Nicholas Johnson NASA Headquarters Principal Technologist Marcia Smith Teledyne Brown Engineering Specialist in Aerospace and Energy Systems Saunders Kramer Science Policy Research Division Consultant Library of Congress

Participants in Skylab Workshop, Jan. 25, 1983

Leland Belew Kenneth Kleinknecht Consultant Manager Procurement, Manufacturing and Tests for David Compton Spacecraft Systems Contractor Martin Marietta Corp. History Office Charles Mathews NASA/Johnson Space Center Consultant

John Disher Edmond Reeves Consultant Chief Astrophysics Payload Branch Herbert Friedman Spacelab Flight Division Chairman NASA Headquarters Commission on Physical Sciences, Mathematics William Schneider and Resources Vice President National Academy of Sciences Control Systems Activity Computer Sciences Corp. Owen Garriott Astronaut Robert Snyder NASA/Johnson Space Center Chief, Separation Processes Branch NASA/Marshall Space Flight Center Roger Hoffer Jesco H. Von Puttkamer Professor Technical Engineer Department of Forestry and Natural Resources Operations Management Purdue University NASA Headquarters

Vli Participants in Low-Cost Alternatives to a Space Station, Apr. 4, 1983 Jacques Collet Kazuo Matsumoto Head of Long-Term Program Representative European Space Agency National Space Development Agency of Japan Paris Office Wilfred Mellors Wilbur Eskite Head (currently retired) Deputy Chief European Space Agency Systems Planning and Development Robert Noblitt National Environmental Satellite, Data, and Senior Systems Analyst Information Service Teledyne Brown Engineering National Oceanic & Atmospheric Administration Alain Perard Edmund J. Habib Long-Term Study Manager Vice President for Engineering CNES Paris Satellite Systems Engineering Udo Pollvogt Tadahico Inada President Washington Representative for NASA ERNO-USA, Inc. National Space Development Agency of Japan Scientific Section Hans Traumann Embassy of Japan Attache Scientific and Technological Affairs Akihiko lwahashi Embassy, Federal Republic of Germany Representative Science and Technology Agency H. J. Weigand Government of Japan Consultant MBB, Space Division Norbert Kiehne DFVLR (Deutsche Forschungs- und Versuchsanstalt fur Luft- und Raumfahrt e. V.)

Participants in Low-Cost Alternatives to a Space Station Workshop, Apr. 27-28, 1983 Hubert Bortzmeyer Russell C. Drew Consultant President Science and Technology Consultants Joseph Carroll California Space Institute Jean-Pierre Fouquet University of California, San Diego Scientific Attache for Space Affairs Embassy of France Jacques Collet George F. Fraser Head of Long-Term Program Chief Engineer, Advanced Engineering European Space Agency Shuttle Orbiter Division Paris Office Rockwell International David Criswell Allen Hill California Space Institute MESA Program Manager University of California, San Diego Space Systems Division Boeing Aerospace Corp. Troy A. Crites The Aerospace Corp. Tadahico Inada Washington Representative for NASA Hubert P. Davis National Space Development Agency of Japan Vice President Scientific Section Eagle Engineering, Inc. Embassy of Japan

viii William A. Johnston Udo Pollvogt Vice-President for Engineering President Fairchild Space Co. ERNO-USA, Inc.

Charles Mathews Wilbur L. Pritchard president Consultant Satellite Systems Engineering Rudy Meiner Anthony Sharpe European Space Agency Manager of Space Station Program Paris Office Teledyne Brown Engineering Wilfred Mellors Thomas C. Taylor Head (currently retired) President European Space Agency Taylor & Associates, Inc. Washington Office Hans Traumann Robert Mory Attache European Space Agency Scientific and Technological Affairs Paris Office Embassy, Federal Republic of Germany

Participants in Unit Cost Workshop, Oct. 18-19, 1983 James Albus William Perkins Chief of Industrial Systems Division Director National Bureau of Standards Strategic Business Management Rockwell International William D. Bumgarner Senior Member of the Executive Staff Donald K. Slay-ton Computer Sciences Corp. President Space Services Inc. Esker K. Davis Pickering Research Corp. William C. Schneider Vice President Fred Esch Control Systems Activity Executive Director Computer Sciences Corp. Spacecraft Technology COMSAT Laboratory Albert A. Sorenson TRW James Graham Senior Research Associate William C. Stone John Deere & Co. Technical Center Research Structural Engineer National Bureau of Standards Jack Barrington Senior Vice President David Wensley Research and Development Chief Program Engineer COMSAT Laboratory Space Stations McDonnell Douglas Astronautics Co. Walter Kapryan Director and Senior Technical Advisor James E. Wilson Lockheed Corp. Consultant Donald H. Novak Project Manager Computer Sciences Corp.

ix Participants in Automation Workshop, Mar. 12, 1984 David Akin Steven Jacobson Professor, Department of Aeronautics and Professor Astronautics Department of Mechanical Engineering Massachusetts Institute of Technology University of Utah James Albus Henry Lum Chief Acting Manager Industrial Systems Division Office of Computer Science and Electronics National Bureau of Standards NASA Headquarters Michael Arbib David Nitzan Graduate Research Center Director University of Massachusetts Robotics Department SRI International Ruzena Bajcsy Professor Marc Raibert Department of Computer and Information Professor Sciences Department of Computer Science Moore School of Electrical Engineering Carnegie-Mellon University University of Pennsylvania Carl Ruoff Michael Brady Jet Propulsion Laboratory Professor Roger Schapell Artificial Intelligence Laboratory Manager, Advanced Automation Technology Massachusetts Institute of Technology Denver Aerospace Rodney Brooks Martin Marietta Corp. Professor Thomas Sheridan Department of Computer Sciences Professor Stanford University Department of Mechanical Engineering Margaret Eastwood Massachusetts Institute of Technology Vice President of Engineering Russell Taylor GCA Corp. Manager of Robot System Technology Charles Fraser T. j. Watson Research Center Chairman IBM Sea Pines Co. James A. Van Allen William isler Chairman Program Manager Department of Physics Systems Science Division University of Iowa Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency

x Contents

Chapter Page 1. Executive Summary ...... 3 2. Issues and Findings ...... 25 3. Space lnfrastructure ...... 49 4. A Buyer’s Guide to Space Infrastructure ...... 85 5. Broadening the Debate ...... 103 6. Toward a Goal-Oriented Civilian Program ...... 113 Postscript: Report of the Second Advisory Panel Meeting ...... 133

Appendix Page A. Results of Principal NASA Studies on Space Station Uses and Functional Requirements ...... 141 B. The Evolution of Civilian In-Space Infrastructure, I. E., “Space Station, ” Concepts in the United States ...... 159 c. International Involvement in a Civilian “Space Station” Program ...... 177 D. Synopsis of the OTA Workshop on Cost Containment of Civilian Space Infrastructure (Civilian “Space Stations”) Elements ...... 206 E. Title II-National Commission on Space (Public Law 98-361) ...... 214 F. Financing Considerations and Federal Budget Impacts...... 217 G Glossary of Acronyms, Abbreviations and Terms...... 227 Chapter 1 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ...

Contents

Page Introduction: Relation of a “Space Station” (i.e., Space Infrastructure) to the U.S. Future in Space ...... 3 Rationale for Space infrastructure ...... 4 Infrastructure Options...... 7 Technology Options ...... 7 Procurement Options ...... 10 Funding Rate Options...... 12 Need for Goals and Objectives ...... 13 Some Possible Goals and Objectives ...... 15 Infrastructure Required by the Proposed Goals and Objectives ...... 17 Technology ...... 17 cost...... 18 Financing ...... 19 Shape of the Space Future ...... 19 International...... , ., ...... 20 Private Sector ...... $, ...... 20 New Role for NASA ...... 21

LIST OF TABLES

Table No. Page 1. Comparison of Some Options for Low-Earth-Orbit independently Operating Infrastructure ...... 8 2. Space Infrastructure Platforms That Could Be Serviced by Shuttle or an Orbital Maneuvering Vehicle ...... 9 3. Some Illustrative Space Infrastructure Acquisitions Possible at Various Annual Average Federal Funding Rates ...... 12 4. Possible Goals and Objectives ...... 16 5. Cost and Schedule to Satisfy Objectives Suggested for Discussion ...... 18

Chapter 1 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

INTRODUCTION: RELATION OF A “SPACE STATION” (I. E., SPACE INFRASTRUCTURE) TO THE U.S. FUTURE IN SPACE

Atter the expenditure of some $200 billion range of in-space facilities and services that would (1984$) since the launch of its first spacecraft in support such activities as “infrastructure. ” early 1958, the United States has obtained the scientific knowledge and developed the techno- Important steps in the considered development Iogical capability and professional expertise to of space have already been taken. By any stand- succeed i n virtualIy any theoreticalIy possible ci- ard, the satellite communications industry is a vilian space venture that it may choose to under- great success; its revenues have reached the mul- take, But America’s second quarter-century of tibillion-dollar per year level and are growing at space activities promises to differ markedIy from an annual rate of 15 percent. Massive Iaunch fa- the first, almost wholly exploratory, era. If space cilities, expendable launch vehicles, and the is to be successfully developed in roughly the space Shuttle now provide routine access to same fashion as have other, more familiar natu- much of near-Earth space; used in conjunction ralI resources and environments, the next stage with a global communications network and sur- will be characterized by establishing and secu r- face data processing facilities, they provide a so- ing the capabilities to support routine, operational phisticated, though limited, range of services to activities there. I n this report, OTA refers to the their users.

Photo credit: National Aeronautics and Space Administration

A large, inhabited “space station” in low-Earth-orbit is one approach to the establishment of a long-term infrastructure in space. The concept shown here (being visited by the space Shuttle) designed and built model used for illustration throughout early 1984.

3 4 . Civilian space stations and the us. Future in Space

Another sign of strength is the maturity of the tion; address “the hard questions”; not only U.S. aerospace industry. This sector is now be- look at what a station can do that cannot be ginning to position itself to provide space assets done better some other way, but also eval- and services independently, and now anticipates uate alternatives to a space station. “In short, conducting some in-space investigations and the assessment should address and docu- commercial-industrial activities, privately fi- ment the real forces driving us to build a nanced, either on its own or in combination with space station. ” other business concerns. And other countries ● House Committee on the Budget: estimate now have capabilities to do many things in space— the effect of a space station’s cost on the capabilities that continue to grow rapidly. NASA budget and the overall Federal budget; and consider the roles of the Department For years, leaders of the U.S. civilian space of Defense, the international community, community have advanced the view that the next and the private sector in the development, major logical step in space should be the acqui- production, and operation of an inhabitable sition of specific, permanent in-space infrastruc- space station. ture: a civilian “space station. ” ● Senate Committee on Appropriations: esti- In this context, Congress, in July of 1982, asked mate the relative merits-of in-habitable and OTA to undertake an assessment of “Civilian u nonhabitable space platforms; estimate the Space Stations”; this report is the product of that role automation/robotics can be expected to request. The OTA assessment was requested orig- play in the construction and eventual use of inally by the Senate Committee on Commerce, space platforms; and estimate the costs asso- Science, and Transportation, later (in October ciated with the range of design options. 1982) by the House Committee on Science and This assessment has attempted to be responsive Technology. The assessment was endorsed in to the entire range of congressional interest, with August 1982 by the House Committee on the the exception of the interest of the House Com- Budget and the Senate Committee on Appropria- mittee on the Budget in the role of the Depart- tions. The various committee interests were stated ment of Defense. as follows: The report has examined the range of technol- ● Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, ogy required of permanent space infrastructure and Transportation: assess the need for a per- as well as the broader policy questions arising manent orbiting facility; examine the major from NASA’s proposal of a particular constella- technological alternatives and their related tion of infrastructure elements. Overall, the con- costs and benefits; focus on the different sidered development of space through the paced space station designs and orbits, the range acquisition of appropriate elements of space in- of feasible applications for the project, the frastructure is a key to maintaining America’s benefits and drawbacks of utilizing existing leadership in space. However, because the Nation concepts, the estimated costs for potential does not have clearly formulated long-range goals missions and design options, and prospec- and objectives for its civilian space activities, pro- tive private sector and international in- ceeding to realize the present NASA “space sta- volvement. tion” concept is not likely to result in the facility Ž House Committee on Science and Technol- most appropriate for advancing U.S. interests into ogy: undertake an independent, rigorous, the second quarter-century of the Space Age. balanced study of the need for a space sta-

RATIONALE FOR SPACE INFRASTRUCTURE

Several countries are competent in the conduct providing growing economic competition for the of space investigations and the development and United States through development, acquisition, use of space technology. These countries are now and operation of their own elements of infrastruc- Ch. l—Executive Summary ● 5 ture. The Soviet Union has made a commitment to the permanent occupancy of space, has operated orbital stations with human work crews for over a decade, and is showing interest in providing competitive space services. Thus, if the United States is to continue as the leader in civilian space activities, Congress must give serious thought to the kind of space infrastructure to be developed, the long-term goals that that infrastructure is to serve, and the public-private and international arrangements that will take best advantage of it. Future development of more sophisticated space science and applications capabilities—e.g., staging of planetary exploration missions or assembly of large communications platforms— wouId be markedly facilitated by the existence of appropriate elements of space infrastructure. It is assumed in this report that, whatever decisions are made regarding space infrastructure, publicly supported space science and space applications will continue at roughly their present level of appropriations (over $1 billion per year, as measured in constant dollars). Although the United States already has acquired some initial elements of space infrastructure, these are insufficient to undertake a number of desirable activities in an efficient and effective manner. The acquisition of some additional permanent in-space infrastructure elements ments, and 2) satellite servicing. However, by the WOU Id : same token, sufficient resources to ensure that ● allow sophisticated experiments in life and these science and applications activities actually materials sciences to be conducted; are undertaken must be assured; otherwise, the ● permit fuel to be stored and supplies to be rationale for the infrastructure vanishes. warehoused in low-Earth-orbit; A persuasive case can also be made for seeing ● initiate more efficient staging of voyages to that some of these permanent infrastructure ele- high orbits, the Moon, planets, and asteroids; ments allow an on-board human work force. This ● allow the initial trial of new instruments, ac- case rests on the fact that automated facilities, tivities, and procedures; and whether relatively autonomous or teleoperated, ● allow the repair and maintenance of increas- capable of supporting all of the activities listed ingly complex and specialized satellites and above will not be available before 2000, even if common carrier platforms. a large automation R&D program is begun im- The ability to undertake these activities, all of mediately. (This does not argue against such an which would support space science and applica- R&D program. Indeed, there is good reason to tions, constitutes a persuasive rationale for acquir- expect that sophisticated automation will be nec- ing appropriate elements of permanent space in- essary for the future development of space as well frastructure. At present, the more appropriate as for non-space-related Earth applications. It would be those which allowed the satisfactory might well be appropriate, therefore, to initiate conduct of: 1) life and materials sciences experi- such a program now. Later, with the results of 6 ● Civilian space Stations and the U.S. Future in Space this program in hand, informed judgments could come available suggests, strongly, that any new be made about the most sophisticated mix of programs must include development and acqui- human and machine workers.) sition of a great deal of new technology, preferably related to having people in space; large num- As the Shuttle development program comes to bers of technologists would be gainfully a close, thousands of in-house engineers and employed both in NASA and in the space indus- technical support staff and, in principle, as much try under contract to NASA. as $2 billion (1984$) per year in contract funds under its present $7 billion (1984$) “budget en- In addition, many believe that NASA might not velope” will be freed up to be applied to one or long survive in its present form without a single, more new programs. If NASA is to maintain its large, “people-in-space” program upon which current size—a size that NASA leaders judge to a majority of its energies are focused. If a num- be acceptable to the general public–the com- ber of smaller programs were initiated instead, bination of people and funds that could soon be- each of them, it is thought, could be terminated Ch. l—Executive Summary ● 7 without widespread objections arising i n the po- t ion of a much smaller Federal agency or to fight litical process. for approval of one or more large, new space “end” programs. Finally, NASA may have thought it prudent to propose a ‘‘space station’ program rather than But while the case to be made for acquiring some other large endeavor(s) (e. g., a return of some long-term, inhabitable infrastructure in low- Americans to the Moon, or sending people on Earth-orbit is persuasive, OTA concludes that there an expedition to Mars, etc.), both because the is no compelling, objective, external case either former had been carefully studied over the years, for obtaining all of the particular array of elements representing, i n NASA’s view, a natural comple- that NASA now describes under the rubric of “The ment to the Shuttle, and because alternative large Space Station, ” or for obtaining this or any other programs seemed too grandiose, have not recent- array in the general manner that NASA is now ex- ly been discussed with the general public, and, pected to pursue, or for paying the particular pub- therefore, were less likely to enlist the required lic cost that NASA now estimates is required. As support, both with in and without the adminis- the infrastructure would be of a broadly general- t ration. purpose nature, to be used to support over 100 conceptual uses (few of which have been sharply All of these considerations, taken together, are defined or have gained wide acceptance as impor- clear incentives for the space technology lead- tant objectives of the space program), there is no ers, both Government and industry, to opt for a necessity for obtaining all of this particular array combination of a Shuttle-like “methods and soon. means’ activity, rather than to accept the posi -

INFRASTRUCTURE OPTIONS

The fact that the United States has already de- As one way of presenting the variety of tech- veloped a wide variety of space capabi Iities no logy options available, OTA has prepared means that it has genuine choices–both of what tables 1 and 2.} infrastructure elements it places in orbit and of There is one fundamental infrastructure option how these elements are to be acquired and used. that requires particular mention: should the ele- It is around these choices that the difficuIt issues ments be wholly automated or shou Id they house lie; by andi large, the technology is either in hand ‘] human crew? Conceptually, useful space infra- or can be readily developed. structure couId be designed either to include a human work crew or to depend on sophisticated Technology Options machines unattended in space or operated via It must be emphasized that the particular con- communication links with the surface. Despite stellation of space infrastructure elements that the fact that the relative efficiency and/or effec- NASA currently aspires to develop, construct, tiveness of these two quite different approaches deploy, and operate is only one alternative in have been extensively debated for years, no gen- a wide range of options. Simply put, there is no eral consensus has emerged. However, if sophis- such thing as “the space station. ” What is under ticated new space activities are to be supported discussion is a variety of sets of infrastructure by in-space infra structure as soon as the early elements, ranging from modest extensions of 1990s, there will have to be a human presence. current capabilities to more sophisticated, capable, and costly ensembles than NASA is now suggesting. 8 ● Civilian Space Stations and the U.S. Future in space

Table I.—Comparison of Some Options’ for Low-Earth-Orbit Independently Operating Infrastructure , -. Free-flying NASA Infrastructure Extended Extended spacelab aspirations Duration Duration (developed Initial Mature, Shuttle Orbiter: Orbiter: as permanent operational fully Orbiter Phase I Phase II infrastructure) capability developed Date available (assuming start in 1985) Now 1988 1990 1990 1992 1996-2000 COSTb (billions of fiscal year 1984 dollars) None 0.2 0.5 2-3 8 20

Characteristics Power to users (kW) 7 7 20 6 80 200 Pressurized volume (m3) 60 60 100 100 200 300 (with Spacelab habitat) Nominal crew size 6 5 5 3 8 20 Miscellaneous Can accept No new New technology-. Modest crew Orbital Reusable Spacelab technology required; accommodations maneuvering orbital modest vehicle plus transfer laboratory two free-flying vehicle plus space unpressurized several more platforms platforms Capabilities c Time on Orbit 10 days 20 days 50 days Unlimited Unlimited Unlimited (60-90 day (90 day (90 day resupply) resupply) resupply) Laboratories for: Life sciences Moderate Moderate Considerable Extensive Extensive Extensive Space science/applications Modest Modest Modest Modest Extensive Extensive Materials science Some Some Moderate Moderate Extensive Extensive Technology development Modest Modest Some Moderate Extensive Extensive Observatories No Modest Modest Modest Extensive Extensive Data/communication node No No No No Considerable Extensive Servicing of satellites Modest Modest Modest Modest Considerable Extensive Manufacturing facility (materials No No Modest Modest Considerable Extensive processing) Large structure assembly No No No Modest Moderate Extensive Transportation node No No No No Moderate Extensived Fuel and supply depot No No No No No Considerable

Response to reasons advanced for space infrastructure Maintain U.S. space leadership and No Modest Modest Modest Considerable Extensive technology capability Respond to U.S.S.R. space activities No Modest Modest Modest Considerable Extensive Enable long-term human presence No Modest Modest Considerable Extensive Extensive in space Attention-getting heroic public No Modest Modest Modest Modest Modest spectacle Extended international cooperation Modest Modest Moderate Moderate Moderate Moderate Promote U.S. commercialization of Modest Modest Modest Considerable Considerable Considerable space Maintain vigorous NASA No No No Modest Extensive Extensive engineering capability Enhance national security, broadly No No No Modest Unclear Unclear defined Space travel for non-technicians Modest Modest Modest Modest Considerable Considerable aLi~.ed ~ption~ are illustrative examples; the list is not exhaustive. bcosts include design, development, and ~r~uction; launch and ~perational costs are not included, some costs are estimated by the office Of Technology Assess. ment; others were provided to OTA. cClearly judgmental. dlnclud~ng launch to the Moon, Mars, and some asta:otis. Ch. l—Executive Summary ● 9

Table 2.—Space Infrastructure Platformsa That Could Be Serviced by Shuttle or an Orbital Maneuvering Vehicle

Unpressurized coorbiting platforms Pressurized platforms (serviced by means of extravehicular activity) (serviced internally while docked) Space European Industries’ Modified SPAS MESA LEAS ECRAFT EURECA Platform Spacelab Date available (now, or approximate, assuming Now Now 1986 1987 Late 1980’s 1989 start in 1985) Costb (billions of fiscal year 1984 dollars) 0.005 0.01 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.6

Characteristics Power to users (kW) 0.6 0.1 6 2 20 6 Pressurized volume (f?) None None None None 2,500 3,000 Nominal crew size None None None None 1-3 only 3 when docked Miscellaneous 3,000 lb 200 lb 20,000 lb 2,000 lb 25,000 lb 20,000 lb Payload Payload Payload Payload Payload Payload Capabilitiesc Time on orbit 10 days 8 months Unlimited 6 months 3-6 months Unlimited Laboratories for: Life sciences No No Modest Modest Modest Moderate Space science/applications Modest Modest Modest Modest No Moderate Materials science Modest No Modest Modest Moderate Moderate Technology development No No Modest Modest Moderate Modest Observatories No No Modest Modest Modest Moderate Data/communication node No No No No No No Servicing of satellites No No No No No No Manufacturing facility (materials No No Considerable Modest Extensive Considerable processing) Large structure assembly No No No No No No Transportation node (assembly, No No No No No No checkout, and launch) Fuel and supply depot No No No No No No

Response to reasons advanced for space infrastructure Maintain U.S. space leadership No No Modest No Modest No and technology capability Respond to U.S.S.R. space activities No No Modest No Modest Modest Enable long-term human presence No No No No No No in space Attention-getting heroic public No No No No No No spectacle Extended international cooperation Yes No No Yes No Unclear Promote U.S. commercialization of Unclear Modest Considerable No Considerable No space Maintain vigorous NASA No No No No No No engineering capability Enhance national security, broadly No No No No No No defined Space travel for non-technicians No No No No No No aListed ~latforms are illustrative examples; the list k not exhaustive. bcogtg include degi~n, development, and pr~uctlon; launch and operational costs are not included. SOme costs are estimated by the Office of Techno@y Assess- ment; others were provided to OTA. cClearly judgmental. 10 ● Civilian Space Stations and the U.S. Future in Space

Procurement Options resources to provide a substantial portion of the infrastructure. Inasmuch as there is an affirmative answer ● The international role would be limited. to the question of whether to acquire some long- NASA would not seek the kind of close col- term, in-space infrastructure, the decision of laboration that would result in shared author- how it is to be acquired must be faced. In many ity, even if doing so might result in substan- respects, this second decision is just as impor- tial capital cost reduction for the United tant as the first. The mode of acquiring new, States. long-term, in-space assets and services should be influenced by a clear understanding of the A significantly different acquisition approach– context in which space activities are expected another option—would have the following to be carried on. And the decision as to how to elements: acquire these assets and services will have a sig- ● As much as is reasonably possible, already nificant impact on future space activities. developed, tested, and paid-for technology would be used to achieve an adequate ini- There are four main factors that could heavily tial operating capability, with development influence procurement choices: of new technology undertaken only where Several foreign countries are now capable demonstrably required to lower overall cost of producing and operating substantial ele- of ownership. ments of space infrastructure. ● NASA would prompt our private commer- Using its own resources, the U.S. private sec- cial-industrial-financial sectors to develop tor is now capable of producing much of the and produce, with their own resources and infrastructure currently envisioned and of- on a genuinely competitive basis, as many fering it for sale or lease to the Government of the Government-required civilian “space or the private sector. stat ion’ assets and services as they can; NASA would prefer to acquire the infrastruc- NASA would facilitate their efforts to do so; ture under its own aegis and in the same gen- and they could be offered to NASA on a sale, eral way that it has acquired other large lease or payment-for-service basis. space systems (except for Spacelab). ● NASA, in obtaining the elements not pro- Other large and sophisticated civilian space vided by the private sector, would empha- programs-can be easily imagined that would size management methods specifically de- require professional skills and funds of the signed to take the best advantage of the now kind and magnitude now envisioned for a quite sophisticated U.S. space industry. “space station. ” ● NASA would negotiate collaborative agreements with other cooperating countries that Congress and the President have approved wouId see all partners share in the benefits NASA’s request to initiate a “space station” proof such an initial operating capability at a re- gram, and NASA appears to be moving to acquire duced acquisition cost to the U.S. Govern- such infrastructure in much the same fashion that ment for its share. it acquired the Shuttle: This second approach would imply that NASA ● A great deal of new technology would be de- would hand off much (perhaps most) of the more veloped, acquired, and used, essentially all mundane “space station” work by paying the pri- of which would be publicly funded. vate sector to do it, thereby conserving its skills ● NASA would arrive at and issue detailed en- and resources so that they could be focused on gineering specifications for, and exercise more challenging space goals and objectives, in- close management control over, the technol- cluding development of the very advanced tech- ogy to be acquired. nology (e. g., bipropellant engines, a reusable or- ● This infrastructure would be procured by bital transfer vehicle, etc.) required to address NASA with Federal funds. The U.S. private them—an activity which, for the most part, the sector would not be prompted to use its own private sector cannot justify. Ch. l—Executive Summary ● 11

These two options are at opposite ends of a neeri ng specifications and managing the ac- spectrum of approaches to the acquisition of quisition process in detail; long-term space infrastructure. In determining 5. the effectiveness of NASA’s efforts to per- which approaches from this spectrum are most suade our private sector to develop infra- likely to influence the evolution of space activi- structure assets and services “on their own, ” ties in a desirable direction, Congress may wish and to provide them to the Government at to consider the following questions: purchase, lease, or payment-for-service prices lower than those achievable by the ● Should the Government be allocating its pro- Government; fessional skills and experience to the devel- 6. the effectiveness of NASA’s efforts to effect opment of (a) incremental or (b) fundamen- eventual private sector operation of the in- tal advances in technology? frastructure and its related activities; Which approach is most likely to stimulate 7. the extent to which large and rapid expan- the “commercialization of space?” sion of military space research, develop- What level of international collaboration is ment, test, and evaluation (RDT&E) activi- really desirable? ties increases costs in the civilian space What other large and important space ends sector also;3 should be addressed in the next decade in 8 the extent to which any “Christmas-tree ef- addition to the acquisition of in-space infra- fect” takes place within NASA, whereby the structure methods and means? infrastructure acquisition management is Congress may also wish to keep in mind that persuaded by the NASA Centers to allow the the choice of approach to infrastructure acquisi- cost of desirable but nonessential RDT&E tion will also affect its eventual cost to the tax- activities to be included in the acquisition payer. Beyond the observation that, in some gen- program; and eral fashion, the cost will increase with the 9. the effectiveness of NASA’s efforts to arrive capabiIity and sophistication of the infrastructure, at large-scale collaboration and related cost- accurate cost estimates are very difficult to make.2 sharing arrangements with other countries. However, the following are important cost These points address only the initial capital cost factors: of this infrastructure—to this cost must be added 1. the total capability acquired–which, as sug- its ongoing operation and maintenance costs; the gested by the examples listed in the tables cost of instruments and equipment needed for of infrastructure options, can encompass a scientific experimentation in association with its considerable range; use; and the interest cost of any money borrowed 2. the extent to which already developed, to fund the acquisition program. And it must be tested, and paid-for technology is used, v. remembered, too, that the infrastructure will a focus on new technology with its higher eventually become obsolete or wear out. development cost and greater risk of cost It is clear that there are many opportunities to overruns; reduce infrastructure net cost that could be 3. the substitution, where feasible, of auto- grasped by a vigorous, imaginative, and deter- mated systems for the accomplishment of 4 mined NASA management. tasks previously undertaken only by human beings; These considerations suggest that, over the next 4. the manner by which the infrastructure is ac- year or two, at least as much attention should be quired–i.e., the extent to which NASA puts given to identifying the best ways by which the the engineering challenge on the space in- country should set about the permanent develop- dustry by issuing performance specifications, ment of space as there is given to any technologi- rather than continuing to issue detailed engi-

‘ClasSit’Ied m.lterldl M ,~~ not used I n prep.1 rl ng th IS report. 4Cost red u ct 10 n me,~su rw are d ISC u ssed I n .1 pp. D of t h I \ report 12 ● Civilian Space Stations and the U.S. Future in Space cal advances and operational capabilities that are The results of these 12 funding scenarios are to be obtained. given in table 3, which shows the funding rate, number of years, total expenditure, and kinds of Funding Rate Options infrastructure elements acquired. s The elements are divided into those that can operate indepen- Another way of thinking about space infra- dently (e.g., the Shuttle Orbiter and a “space sta- structure is to estimate how much of it could tion” central base) and those that depend on be- be obtained if different annual funding rates ing serviced or maintained from one of the were established. Thus, to provide an independ- independent elements (i.e., by an orbital maneu- ent basis of comparison with the civilian “space vering vehicle, a local in-space transportation sys- station” program now apparently favored by tem operated from a “space station” central ele- NASA, OTA has estimated what new space ca- ment, or directly by the Shuttle). pabilities could be provided, by when, for various Table 3 lists the following (among other) ele- annual average Government funding rates. No ments of space infrastructure that could be ac- changes to present NASA acquisition procedures quired over various acquisition intervals: or NASA anticipated acquisition costs are assumed. Arbitrary annual average funding levels 1. At $0.1 billion per year: probably no “per- of $0.1, $0.3, $1, and $3 billion per year (1984$) manently manned” facility could be ob- were chosen to illustrate the number and kind of space infrastructure elements that could be ac- sAdditional discussion of funding rate options can be found in quired over periods of 5, 10, or 15 years. ch. 4 of this report.

Table 3.—Some Illustrative Space infrastructure Acquisitions Possibie at Various Annuai Average Federai Funding Rates (all amounts in billions of 1984 dollars)

Space acquisition~ Dependent elements Funding Number Total Unpres- Pressur- Space-based Beyond geostationary rate of expenditures Independent infrastructure surized ized plat- transport orbit spacecraft ($&r) years ($) element+ platforms form# vehicles elements e 0.1 5 0.5 EDO If (20 days, 5 crew) 2 — — — 10 1 EDO II (50 days, 6 crew) 3 — — — 15 1.5 EDO II (50 days, 6 crew) 3 1 — — 0.3 5 1.5 EDO II (50 days, 6 crew) 3 1 — — 10 3 Free-flying Spaceiab modules’ 1 1 OMV — (permanent, 3 crew) 15 4.5 2 free-flying Spacelab modules in both 2 1 OMV — 28 degree and polar orbits (3 crew each) 5 5 Space transportation center (4 crew) – — OMV; ROTV — 10 10 NASA initial operating capability 2 1 OMV; ROTV — “space station”g (8 crew) 15 15 NASA growth “space station”g (12 crew) 3 1 OMV;ROTV — 5 15 NASA growth “space station”g (12 crew) 3 1 OMV; ROTV — 10 30 NASA mature “space statlon”g (16 crew) 3 2 OMV;ROTV Lunar capable ROTV; Shuttle-Derived Cargo Vehicle (SDV) staffed Lunar facility 15 45 NASA mature “space station”g 5 3 OMV; ROTV Lunar capable ROTV; (18 crew, SDV) staffed Lunar facility; Mars voyage aTaEle8 1 and 2 pre~nt charactorlatlcs and capabllltles of Infrastructure element8 In detail. b~tend~ Duratl~ Omltem (EOO) am limited In their etays on orbit; other Independent elements am IOnO-term. cplatfms of the LEABECRA~/EURECA type. dplatfoma of t~ m~lfl~ f~.flylm SWcela~pa~ lndugtrl~ ty~ With their own electrical power and pressurization SY8WIIS. eA~ * 1 b~~llonfyr, no Iong.tefm, staffed Infrastructure elements are -Ible. f ~~ i ~=teti ~mtlon o~lter, phaae I) and t~ Spacelab modules have Ilmkd electrical Wwer (abut 7 k~. bhe NASA “space etatlon” elements are expected to operate as transportation and aewiclng centera ae well as laboratories. They would have sufficient power for exten81ve materlale processing. hA Slgniflcant pan of the cost of a human vieit to Mara couid b provided in thle ca~. Ch. l—Executive Summary ● 13

tained even by the year 2000. Further exten- all of the infrastructure now seriously con- sion of capabilities of the Shuttle system and sidered by NASA could be acquired. unpressurized platform developments could 4. At $3 billion per year (assuming that only be obtained. The acquisitions could be: a de- funds, not technology or other factors, velopment of the Extended Duration Orbiter would be the pacing program factor): (EDO) Phase 1, for 20-day orbit stays, over NASA’s fully developed “space station” a 5-year period; or EDO Phase II, for 50-day could become available in somewhat more orbit stays, over 10 years or longer, plus two than 5 years. In 10 years, this infrastructure or three free-flying unpressurized platforms plus a geostationary platform, plus a Shuttle- such as EURECA, LEASECRAFT, and/or the derived cargo vehicle for lower cost fuel and Space Industries’ platform (assuming that the cargo transfer to LEO, plus a lunar facility Government would make an outright pur- ready for occupancy and continuing oper- chase of such platforms). ation would become possible. In 15 years, 2 At $0.3 billion per year: within 5 years, the NASA’s complete infrastructure aspirations acquisitions could be an EDO II plus several and a lunar settlement could be in hand and, (perhaps pressurized) platforms. Over 10 perhaps also, plans for seeing a human crew years, there could be acquired: 1) the first travel to the vicinity of Mars and back could permanently orbiting, Spacelab-derived hab- be well advanced. itable modules in 28.5° LEO that could support three people; 2) an orbital maneuver- These projections are for infrastructure acqui- ing vehicle (OMV) (enabling servicing of sition only; operational costs are not included. Also, there is a basic difference between the costs nearby satellites); and 3) a few free-flying platforms. in 15 years, there could be ob- associated with Shuttle-type vehicles and permanently orbiting facilities. The use of an EDO to tained either: 1) two free-flying Spacelabs, one in polar orbit, one at 28.5° LEO; or 2) conduct extended science or development activ- much more capable permanent infrastruc- ities with a crew would involve launch costs each time it went into orbit; use of a permanent facil- ture at 28.5° than that which could be ac- ity would require resupply several times per year, quired in 10 years. but the cost for each flight could be shared with 3 For $1 billion per year: within 5 years, there other payloads. For example, if 12 dedicated 30- could be acquired: 1 ) a permanent LEO fa- day EDO flights were conducted per year, about cility operating as a transportation node; 2) $1 billion (1984$) in annual transportation costs an OMV; and 3) a reusable orbit transfer ve- would be involved; in comparison, the cost of hicle capable of transporting spacecraft to 4 partial-load Shuttle launches per year to resup- and from higher, including geostationary, or- ply a permanent facility would total $100 million bit. In 10 years the initial operating capabil- to $400 million (1 984$). ity (IOC) infrastructure now favored by NASA could be acquired. In 15 years, nearly

NEED FOR GOALS AND OBJECTIVES

In view of the variety of possible ensembles of which identifiable, serious users have “hard” re- infrastructure, the different methods of acquiring quirements might well be acquired within the next them, and the range of funding rates at which decade. In the meantime, the most effective way they could be acquired, how are the choices to to determine our direction in space would be a be made? In general, these choices should not be national discussion of, and eventual agreement made without prior agreement on the future direc- on, a set of long-range goals which the United tion of the civilian space activities of the United States expects its civilian space activities to States; however, the infrastructure elements for address.

14 ● Civilian Space Stations and the U.S. Future in space

B Photo credit” Aeronautics and Space Administration One alternative to the development of new technology is to use the space Shuttle for many advanced operations in low-Earth-orbit. Shown here: (A) servicing satellite in April 1984; (B) assembly of a large structure in orbit— here simulated in water; and (C) a deployable antenna. Ch. I—Executive Summary • 15

Today, unfortunately, there is general agree- Such a set of goals and objectives would allow ment neither on such a set of long-range goals a clear determination of the basic characteristics nor on a set of specific objectives which, as they of the infrastructure elements actually needed, are addressed, would serve as milestones of prog- and of the means and rate whereby these ele- ress toward those goals. If future civilian space- ments should be acquired. In the absence of such related goals and objectives are to be effective goals and objectives, and with the great uncertain- i n providing direction to U.S. space efforts, they ties in the estimate of any infrastructure cost to should be such as to command widespread at- the public, OTA concludes that it is impossible to tention; have inherent humanitarian and scien- judge, objectively, whether or not most of the in- tific interest; foster development of new technol- frastructure elements proposed to date—and, in ogy; have relevance to global issues; prompt particular, many of the set currently proposed by international cooperation; and involve major par- NASA—are truly appropriate and worth their sub- ticipation of our private sector. stantial cost.

SOME POSSIBLE GOALS AND OBJECTIVES

I n order to prompt the formulation and subse- OTA has also formulated, as milestones to mark quent discussion of future space goals and ob- progress toward these goals, the following family jectives, OTA has prepared a list of possible long- of 10 objectives. Table 4 relates these objectives range goals and a set of nearer-term objectives to the six goals. Some of the objectives are readily designed to address those goals. Although OTA achievable; others may not be, but still represent does not recommend either this particular set of legitimate targets.6 They are not rank-ordered. goals or its supporting family of objectives, they 1. A space-related, global system/service are intended to exemplify the kind of goals and could be established to provide timely and objectives around which consensus might well useful information regarding potentially be formed so as to provide sensible guidance for hazardous natural circumstances found in the Nation’s future space activities. The Advisory the Earth’s space and atmosphere, and at Panel of this assessment has taken an unusually and below its surface. active role in helping to formulate these goals and 2 A transportation service could be estab- objectives. It is the panel’s judgment that the lished to and from the Earth’s Moon, and goals and objectives proposed for discussion are a modest human presence established reasonable and important. there, for scientific and other cultural and The national goals proposed for discussion are economic purposes. as follows: 3. Space probes could be used to obtain the information and experience specifically re- ● to increase the efficiency of space activities quired to plan for further exploration of the and reduce their net cost to the general planet Mars and some asteroids. public; 4. Medical studies of direct interest to the gen- ● to involve the public directly in space activ- eral public, including study of the human ities, both on Earth and in space; aging process, could be conducted through ● to derive scientific, economic, social, and scientific experiments that compare phys- political benefits; iological, emotional, and social experience ● to increase international cooperation and in the absence of gravity with experience collaboration in and regarding space; gained in the conduct of related surface ● to study and explore the Earth, the solar sys- stud ies. tem, and the greater physical universe; and ● to spread life, in a responsible fashion, throughout the solar system. ‘A full dl~cussion of the objectik es appear~ [n ch, 6 of this report. 16 ● Civilian Space Stations and the U.S. Future in Space

Table 4.—Possible Goals and Objectives

Goals Increase Derive space activities’ Involve the scientific, Increase Study and Bring life efficiency; general Derive political, inter- explore the to the reduce their public economic and social national physical physical net cost directly benefits benefits cooperation universe universe Objectives: 1. Establish a global information system/ N N P Y Y N N service re natural hazards 2. Establish lower cost reusable Y P P Y Y Y Y transportation service to the Moon and establish human presence there 3. Use space probes to obtain information N N N Y Y Y N re Mars and some asteroids prior to early human exploration 4. Conduct medical research of direct N N P Y P N N interest to the general public 5. Bring at least hundreds of the general N Y Y Y Y N Y public per year into space for short visits 6. Establish a global, direct, audio broad- N P P Y Y N N casting, common-user system/sewice 7. Make essentially all data generated by N Y P Y Y N N civilian satellites and spacecraft directly available to the general public 8. Exploit radio/optical free space N N Y P Y N N electromagnetic propagation for long- distance energy distribution 9. Reduce the unit cost of space transpor- Y N Y Y N N N tation and space activities 10. Increase space-related private sector Y N Y N N N N sale& aThlg w~ld advance the proapects of successfully addressing aii other “9~is.”

Y: Yes; N: No; P: Perhaps; depends on how carried out.

5. At least hundreds of members of the gen- lunar, and remote Earth locations for dis- eral public per year, from the United States tribution throughout the world. and abroad, could be selected on an equi- 9. The unit cost of space transportation, for table basis and brought into space for short people and equipment, between the visits there. Earth’s surface and low-, geosynchronous-, 6. A direct audio broadcasting, common-user and lunar-Earth orbit could be sharply system/service could be established that reduced. would be available to all of the countries 10. Space-related commercial-industrial sales of the world on an economical and equi- in our private sector could be stimulated table basis. to increase at a rate comparable to that of 7. In general, all of the nonclassified and non- other high-technology sectors, and our private communications from, and non- public expenditures on civilian space assets proprietary data generated by, all Govern- and activities could reflect this revenue ment-supported spacecraft and satellites growth. could be made widely available to the gen- Congress and the President have now agreed on eral public and our educational institutions legislation that will establish a National Commis- in near-real-time and at modest cost. sion on Space. This commission will be well-posi- 8. Radio and optical free-space electromagnetic propagation techniques could be ex- tioned to initiate and sponsor a national debate on the future direction of U.S. space activities. The ploited in an attempt to allow reliable and goals and objectives suggested here may provide economic long-distance transmission of large amounts of electrical energy, both a substantial starting point for further discussion. into space for use there, and from space, Ch. I—Executive Summary ● 17

INFRASTRUCTURE REQUIRED BY THE PROPOSED GOALS AND OBJECTIVES Technology would address objectives (1), (2), (3), (6), (9), and possibly (8)]; and Some of these objectives, if they are to be d. a storage facility in LEO would allow use of achieved, will require certain elements of in- full Shuttle loads, helping objective (9), and space infrastructure; others, depending on how staffed LEO laboratory facilities could pro- they would be carried out, may or may not remote (1 O). quire such elements; still others will require none. The manner in which the United States obtains Of course, if such infrastructure elements were any of this infrastructure should reflect, as much available for the specific purposes that justify their as possible, our already great investment in space acquisition, they could be used for additional pur- technology and operations; whenever reasonably poses also. possible, it should be obtained at the lowest cap- Note that, in essence, provision of the infra- ital, and operations and maintenance, cost to the structure needed to pursue two of the larger-scale public purse. objectives [(2) and (4)] could accommodate most If the Government’s large capital costs for de- of the needs of all of the other eight. In what fol- velopment and production are to be minimized lows, therefore, the cost of this infrastructure is and the private sector strengthened, then serious included under these two objectives. consideration might well be given to encourag- And note that no Government development of ing the private sector to provide infrastructure ele- free-flying platform infrastructure elements is ments that meet Government performance spe- called for; these elements (e.g., MESA, SPAS, cifications, rather than detailed engineering spe- EURECA, LEASECRAFT, the Space Industries plat- cifications. These elements could be provided to form, etc.) could and probably would be de- others as well as to the Government through sale, signed, developed, and installed by our private long-term leases, or on the basis of charges for actual service use. The main elements of longer term space infrastructure called for in pursuing the family of 10 objectives are:’ a. an LEO capability to assemble and check out the large and sophisticated satellites and space structures needed to provide both the hazard-prevention and the direct audio broadcast global system/service [objectives (1) and (6)]; b. an LEO human residential and working space to be used for medical research [objective (4)], and possibly for space visits [objective (5)]; c. a transport staging facility to support efficient travel to geostationary orbit, the Moon, and beyond, using reusable orbital transfer vehicles or other vehicles. [this Photo credit: National Aeronautics and Space Administration

Free-flying platforms such as the one depicted in this 7 N0 additional space infrastructure elements are needed to artist’s concept offer one option for relatively low-cost achieve objective (7). space infrastructure elements. 18 ● Civilian Space Stations and the U.S. Future in Space sector, and/or other countries, and offered to the cost civilian space community—both Government and private interests—under appropriate sale or Attaining all of the proposed objectives would, lease arrangements, where they could be used overall, cost a great deal of money. In the accom- for remote sensing, the conduct of scientific re- panying table S, rough estimates are made for the search, or the production of various materials cost of each of them, and the length of time over under microgravity conditions. which each would be pursued to completion. It is a fundamental assumption that maximum use Finally, note that very large amounts of very will be made of: 1 ) already developed and paid- costly electrical power in LEO (with an initial cap- for technology, 2) the most truly competitive pro- ital cost of as much as $10,000 per watt) are not curement methods, and 3) the most modern and called for; some 20 kilowatts would appear to be least burdensome acquisition strategies and pro- sufficient. Larger amounts appear to be needed cedures. only for any eventual commercial-industriaI ma- 8 terials processing, and could then be provided A first rough estimate of the total cost of at- and financed by the private sector in anticipation taining all 10 of the proposed objectives is no less that such processing will prove to be profitable. BApp. F of this report discusses costs in detail.

Table 5.—Cost and Schedule to Satisfy Objectives Suggested for Discussion

Total costa Duration Objectives (billions, 1984 dollars) (years) 1. Establish a global information system/service 2 10 re natural hazards 2. Establish lower cost reusable transportation 20 15, 25 service to the Moon and establish human presence ther# 3. Use space probes to obtain information re 2 15 Mars and some asteroids prior to early human exploration 4. Conduct medical research of direct interest to 6 5, 25 the general public 5. Bring at least hundreds of the general 0.5 5, 25 public per year into space for short visitsg 6. Establish a global, direct, audio broadcasting, 2 10 common-user system/service 7. Make essentially all data generated by 0 25 civilian satellites and spacecraft directly available to the general public 8. Exploit radio/optical free-space electro- 0.5 10 magnetic propagation for long-distance energy distribution 9. Reduce the unit cost of space transportation 5 15 and space activitiesg’h 10. Increase space-related private sector salesh 0.5 25 -$401 acO~t~ are for @VelOprnent and acqulsltlorr. o~ratlona and maintenance costs are nOt included, excePt for some iaunch and Oparationa costs noted for objectives 2, 3, and 4.

b15 ~eam t. eatabliah t~ settlement, and 3 visits/year at $0.1 billion each (pius tMSiC Shuttle launch costs) over the followin9

c~~~~~maverage, one pro~ eveV 3 yeara and S0.4 billion each. d~ billion over 5 Yearn t. establish a iife sciences laboratory in LEO, and $0.2 billionhear thereafter to oPerate it. This laboratory could also be used for materials science and other research. e5 years t. establish a LEO “ldgts-habitat,)’ and its continuin9 use thereafter. f $OU billion/year in addition to DOD expenditures. g~.3 billion~ear for a l~year t~hnolqy development efforf to reduce space transportation Unit COStS. %his would also help efforts directed toward the other objectives. i The actual cost couid ~ as high as $80 billion (1984 dollars), if costs exceed initial pr~ictions by WO/O Ch. l—Executive Summary ● 19 than $4o billion and perhaps considerably more equal to one-third of this subtotal, we could look (as much as $60 billion [1 984$]) over the next 25 forward to approximately the following amounts years. Table 5 itemizes the estimated costs for all being available for the initial 10 objectives: the objectives. Given that these estimates are Reprogramming of the Shuttle made at an early stage, there cannot be great con- development effort fund level fidence in their detailed accuracy, but such ac- of $2 billion per year for 25 curacy is unnecessary for the illustrative purposes years – $ 50 billion being served here. 1 percent per year “real If work were to commence on all of them now, growth” over 25 years applied the bulk of the cost would occur over the next to these objectives – $ 25 billion 15 years. Cost-sharing by other countries – $ 25 billion Space transportation costs are not included in Total – $100 billion these estimates, except for an additional $0.1 bil- Amounts spent for related space research, devel- lion (1984$) or so for each flight from low- opment, test, and evaluation by the U.S. private Earth-orbit to lunar orbit. Rather, it is assumed sector would be added to this total. that some 10 Shuttle surface-LEO flights per year at an average cost of about $0.1 billion (1 984$) As these figures are considered, it should be each by early in the next decade would be bud- kept in mind that space is a high-technology do- geted for all Government-sponsored civilian R&D main. Increasing private sector interest in exploit- purposes, including those considered here. ing the economic potential of space invites comparison of growth rates in other high-technology Financing sectors. If private sector space-related sales continue at a rate of 10 percent per year (a conserv- There are many matters that must be given ative estimate for high-technology sectors), the carefuI consideration before a national commit- tax revenues derived therefrom would, over the ment to undertake such large, lengthy, and costly next quarter-century, be quite substantial. And public activities could be made. Certainly among to the extent that public funding of Government the most important are the sources and magni- space activities is understood as “offset” by these tude of funds that can be reasonably expected tax revenues (as they sometimes are in the aero- to be available. nautics area) the net cost to the public for such space activities would be substantially reduced. g If the funding previously spent on Shuttle development (approximately $2 billion per year) is Clearly, under such circumstances, funding lim- continued but reallocated towards the initial ob- itations would not prevent the United States from jectives, and if the NASA appropriation (approx- undertaking an ambitious publicly supported ci- imately $7 billion per year) is augmented by a vilian space program throughout the next quar- real growth of 1 percent per year, and if truly col- ter of a century. laborative cost-sharing international agreements could be reached whereby other friendly countries would contribute, say, an additional amount 9App. F of this report discusses these prospects at length.

SHAPE OF THE SPACE FUTURE

There are important changes under way in how rity considerations are already the subject of space activities are carried on. The number of im- widespread debate. If the United States is to portant players is increasing as space expertise maintain its leadership role in civilian space activ- and experience spreads, economic considera- ities, it must be prepared to make fundamental tions are becoming more important, and secu- shifts i n policy and practice.

20 • Civilian Space Stations and the U.S. Future in Space

Photo credit: Aeronautics and Space Administration

Communications satellites in geosynchronous orbit (such as Webster Vl, shown here) can provide continuous coverage of large of the Earth’s surface for relay of radio, television, and telephone signals.

International ‘ States and other friendly countries might, in concert, develop, operate, and use long-term in-orbit International space activities will continue to infrastructure. expand, both in numbers of countries involved and in absolute magnitude of their capabilities. There is every reason to expect that the spacefar- Private Sector ing nations of the world will find it in their inter- To date, private sector interest in space has est to participate in the considered development been confined primarily to the successful satel- of near-Earth space, and perhaps all countries lite communications business and the support of would like to engage in civilian space activities Government activities. However, there is tangi- to some extent. The OTA report on International ble evidence that a number of private concerns Cooperation and Competition in Civilian Space will soon begin to offer assets and services on a 10 Activities addresses a wide range of issues aris- fee-for-service or lease basis, both to the Govern- ing in this area, and appendix C of this report dis- ment and to other private interests. The projected cusses the variety of ways in which the United needs of space science and space applications, and Competition in Civilian Space for example, constitute a ready market for pro- Activities, Office of Technology Assessment, U.S. Congress, viders of various future infrastructure system/ in press. services. Ch. I—Executive Summary ● 21

New Role for NASA lated capacities, confidence, and commitment. And it could emphasize such cooperation in the In view of the significant changes in the way acquisition of in-space infrastructure—i. e., a that space activities will be carried on in the fu- “space station .“ ture, NASA may well have to make certain fundamental shifts of attitude and operation. I n the Released from its present relatively near-term past, it has been NASA’s responsibility to meet focus, NASA could concentrate more of its own any given national space objective by itself; in professional activities on the most important and the future, it should be NASA’s responsibility to exciting of everything else in and concerning see that the objective is met. That is, NASA should space, the things that no one else can or will do: now aspire to the much broader role of seeing the very best of space-related science; the cutting that others in our private sector and throughout edge of space-related technology development; the world do much more of what it does today. the boldest of space-related explorations and developments. In the simplest of terms: if NASA is to rise successfully to the challenges now emerging in the Finally, NASA and other space-related offices national and international space arena, it should i n the executive branch shouId see that their ac- place relatively less emphasis on accomplishing tivities continue to be conducted, and the results by itself those things that our private sector or thereof continue to be used, not only to increase other friendly nations can satisfactorily do, either knowledge and to address important social and alone or with NASA assistance. It can succeed political goals, but now also to enable our pri- in this only by continuing to cooperate with both, vate space sector to increase its non-Government and by broadening this cooperation so as to sales—the sales that generate the taxes that help prompt and assist both to extend their space-re- to pay for Government space activities.

38-798 0 - 84 - 3 : QL 3 Chapter 2 ISSUES AND FINDINGS Contents

Page General ...... 25 NASA’s Circumstances ...... 25 Transitions ...... 28 National Commission on Space ...... 30 Civilian “Space Stations” ...... 31 The Case for infrastructure in Low-Earth-Orbit ...... 31 The Concerns About Low-Earth-Orbit Infrastructure ...... 32 The Cost of Low-Earth-Orbit Infrastructure ...... 33 Alternatives...... 33 Our Future in Space ...... 35 Long-Term Space Goals and Objectives ...... 35 Long-Term Space Strategies ...... 37 Cost Reduction ...... 37 The Private Sector ...... 38 International Space Cooperation ...... 39 Space as an Arena of Peaceful Cooperation ...... 40 NASA’s Changing Role ...... 41 Non-Government Policy Studies ...... 42 Possible Legislative Initiatives...... 43 Strategies for Acquiring Any New In-Space Civilian Infrastructure ...... 43 Civilian Space Policies, Goals, Objectives, and Strategies ...... 45 The Creation of Space Policy Study Centers ...... 46 Chapter 2 ISSUES AND FINDINGS

GENERAL

NASA’s Circumstances public, here and abroad, and serves the important national objective of projecting the civil- A general and most important conclusion of ian technological prowess of the United States this assessment, one that touches on all its other on the world stage. findings, is that any serious discussion of the Nation’s future civilian space aspirations and From the viewpoint of the technologists who activities, both publicly funded and privately make up most of the continuing leadership of the sponsored, must be carried on with a full appre- U.S. publicly funded space effort, these major ciation of the present and near-term circum- NASA programs serve several important objectives: stances of the National Aeronautics and Space ● they keep NASA in the public eye in a par- Administration (NASA). ticularly gratifying fashion; ● Since soon after NASA’s inception, its space they attract the services and loyalty of out- programs have had two major components: 1) standing space engineers both within NASA a core of continuing space science and space ex- and the closely related sections of the U.S. ploration activities, later joined by space appli- private space industry; ● cations activities, and the development of that they allow the development of a great deal technology specifically required to conduct of new technology otherwise difficult to them; and 2) singular major technological for- justify on a piecemeal basis–technology that ays, centering on people in space. It is worth allows further space advances subsequently; ● noting that while the core science and explora- they are more difficult to interrupt or cancel tion activities were mandated in NASA’s founding than smaller and/or less generally appreci- charter, the National Aeronautics and Space Act ated space activities; of 1958, as amended, the succession of big pro- ● once approved, they require relatively little grams seems to continue as a matter of tradition– further engagement by engineers in “politi- with the explicit approval of the President and cal justification” activities for some time; and Congress. ● they provide perhaps the most visible and apparently effective civilian response to the Such major undertakings as Mercury, Gemini, widely publicized in-space activities of So- Apollo, Skylab, and Shuttle take years, even a viet cosmonauts. decade, to complete, involve a large fraction of And to date, it is this kind of activity that has NASA’s engineering staff, and cost billions or tens obtained the most attention, and approval, of the of billions of dollars. Because the magnitude of president and Congress. But these large programs NASA’s commitment to these undertakings is so also have another, rather troubling set of char- complete, other, smaller programs—including the acteristics. Because they are primarily technologi- core science and exploration activities—are al- cal in nature, they are inherently difficult to ex- ways at some risk of seeing part of their funding plain satisfactorily to those who are not delayed or transferred to cover overruns in the professionals or not particularly interested. They big programs. A small percentage overrun in a are initiated by Government technologists and major program component can represent the their supporters who are convinced of their value, whole of a smaller, but perhaps equally impor- rather than being initiated in response to large tant science or application program. segments of the general public’s specifically call- For the most part, it is this spectacular kind ing on NASA to provide them. ’ Perhaps most im- of activity that takes most of NASA’s attention ‘The implication here is not that there is no public support for and resources, is of most interest to the general the civilian space program in general or the big technological spec-

26 ● Civilian Space Stations and the U.S. Future in Space

Photo credit: National Aeronautics and Space Administration

Dramatic manned space missions such as the Apollo 11 lunar landing have generated public support for NASA,

portant, the completion of any one of the large, confronting this problem again. Within a rela- high-technology, “manned” programs faces tively few years thereafter, either another large NASA’s management either with making a fun- new program would have to begin, or a number damental move toward a more equal distribu- of relatively small existing programs would have tion of agency funds among all its R&D pro- to be considerably enlarged (or new ones initi- grams, or with creating and securing support for ated)—or else as many as one-quarter of NASA’s another program of the same general charac- professional staff and approximately $2 billion per ter and size. year would be lost. Thus, the first successful flight of a Shuttle or- Without an internal or external mandate to biter in early 1981 found the NASA management achieve a more nearly equal distribution of funds among all its R&D programs, NASA leaders opted to pursue another large, high-technology, in particular, but that this support might be broadened if “manned” program. The particular program wide public discussion were encouraged. One need only compare chosen has been the subject of study and dis- the extent to which the public, to date, interests itself in space issues with the extent to which it interests itself in education, health serv- cussion within the civilian space community for ices delivery, housing, defense, transportation, etc. decades: “the space station” program. After Ch. 2—issues and Findings ● 27 detailed engineering study, the public acquisition oped, space-qualified, and already paid-for tech- of in-space infrastructure under this program nology. It could prompt the U.S. private space would proceed for several years at an average industry to come forward with proposals to pro- rate of some $2 billion per year. It would involve vide major infrastructure elements to NASA in an the development of high technology, much of economical fashion, elements that the private which would address the problems attendant on sector, using its own resources (including private seeing people reside and work in space in a per- funds), would design to the Government’s permanent fashion under safe and sanitary condi- formance specifications (rather than to detailed tions. Its buildup could be phased to match the design specifications under contract). lt could reduction in the Shuttle development program seek international collaborative arrangements so that, overall, NASA’s present and anticipated under which foreign partners would bear a sub- “budget envelope” could be maintained, and the stantial fraction of the present $8 billion estimate,2 Shuttle program’s professional skill mix could be thereby significantly reducing the cost to U.S. tax- satisfactorily reassigned. payers. However, with the two givens, these new approaches could result in an insufficient pro- Given, first, its institutional end of maintain- gram base to maintain the agency’s present size ing its current size and, second, its choice of a and, perhaps, even its present character as an in- space infrastructure program as means to attain dependent, civilian, national resource. that end, NASA has been somewhat reluctant to consider new modes of acquiring the infra- In view of NASA’s internal circumstances and structure envisioned. For example, NASA could the many other external desiderata which its re- choose to employ a great deal of already devel- sources could alternatively address, the question arises: is a “space station” program the best way for NASA to spend the foreseeably available $2 billion per year3 to serve the needs of the Na- tion—and the world? The President and Congress have just approved a “space station” program in principle, and allocated $150 million to commence engineering studies—studies now expected to take 2 years. Decisions as to the character, magnitude, and pace of this program would be made after the completion of these studies, and any others that Congress might request. If: 1) NASA’S basic decision not to move toward a more nearly equal distribution of funds among all its R&D programs remains unchanged, 2) its overall aspirations for its “space station” program are not realized, and 3) no adequate substitutes appear and are approved within the next 2 years, then the basic character of the present U.S. publicly funded civilian space pro-

zlt is imw~ant to appreciate that this $8 billion figure covers only the initial capital outlay, not the continuing operations and maintenance costs or subsequent capital outlays to acquire additional capabilities. JThe $2 billion per Year figure is predicated upon two Projec- tions: that NASA’s overall budget will remain level in constant (1984$) dollars at somewhat over $7 billion per year, and that the roughly $2 billion per year currently spent for Shuttle development will be made available for space infrastructure acquisition. 28 Civilian Space Stations and the U.S. Future in Space gram itself could be placed in question. If and desirable changes in the NASA program mix NASA’s professionals were convinced that they and/or acquisition processes and/or international could not see a reasonable future for the exer- collaboration policies must also be made within cise of the skills they so successfully displayed in that time. Making such moves effectively would the Shuttle program, they would soon begin to call for a high degree of institutional imagination explore employment alternatives—and the more and political statesmanship by both branches, accomplished, more imaginative, and more inde- and NASA particularly. pendent employees, which any outstanding R&D Whatever else the executive branch and Con- organization simply must retain, would be the gress decide to do at this decision point, they ones most likely to do so. One of the clear alter- should resolve that they will not be required to natives would be to work on what now appears face such circumstances again. The publicly to be another rapidly growing high-technology funded civilian space program of the United space program area—that of the space elements States is too important, and the scientists and of the new military Strategic Defense Initiative technologists heading the program too compe- (SDI), a program now headed by a former asso- tent and responsible, to continue to be treated ciate administrator of NASA who was responsi- with the form of “benign neglect” that has been ble for the Shuttle development program. the rule since the successful completion of the If large numbers of professionals left NASA, and grand Apollo program. if their leaving the civilian space R&D area were accompanied by similar departures from that part Transitions of the private space industry long associated with NASA, an already significant and increasing im- Transitions are under way. And they are so balance between our military and civilian pub- fundamental, and moving so rapidly, that we licly funded space programs would be magnified. A vigorous, independent NASA has served the Nation well; any trend toward reducing it to mere adjunct status cannot be viewed, in the overall national security context, without concern. Thus, the NASA management may have “bet the company” on the successful outcome of a campaign to obtain approval for one more large, new, high-technology, publicly funded civilian space program. Unfortunately, even if approval is received, such a program could foreclose, perhaps for 5 to 10 years, the possibility of NASA’s undertaking other, more desirable options or its effecting any fundamental changes either in its major program mix or in the way it acquires space technology. Yet, in OTA’S judgment, serious consideration must be given, now, to preserving these options and making these changes, if NASA is to maintain U.S. space leadership. For fundamental shifts in other national and international circumstances that will importantly affect the conduct of future space activities are already under way. Just as unfortunately, because the Shuttle development program is expected to be essentially complete within 2 years, any moves to effect large

Ch. 2—Issues and Findings ● 29 should not be surprised to see them have sig- important technology sharing, in U.S. program nificant, although presently unpredictable in risk sharing, or in large savings to the public detail, impacts on any “space station” program, purses The Department of Defense (DOD) often even in the next few years. The key institutional does so within NATO and elsewhere, as do ma- question is this: will U.S. leaders see to it that jor aerospace companies in order to reduce their NASA meets these transitions head-on and own financial, technological, and market risk ex- moves out smartly to “lead the parade” by or- posure in large complex programs. NASA officials chestrating the growing and increasingly varied are making overtures to other countries regard- foreign and domestic space interests? ing their participation in any “space station” program, but it remains to be seen whether these For nearly a quarter of a century, the United overtures will result in the kind of collaboration States and the Soviet Union were the only ma- 4 that would realize major cost savings to the jor players in the civilian space arena. Except for United States. satellite communications, all of the U.S. civilian space activities were formally conceived, funded, With a single recent exception,b there has been and managed by the Federal Government, pri- no important instance in which our private sec- marily NASA. tor has set out to develop major items of space- related technology of acknowledged central im- Similarly, during this interval, NASA, the Na- portance to NASA programs on its own, using its tional Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration own resources—including financing—to do so. (NOAA), and the National Weather Service de- All such critical elements are still procured by the cided, with regard to the weather and climate Government, with Government funds and some area, what space-related scientific, technology- considerable Government oversight in the process. development, and infrastructure-acquisition programs should be conducted; developed their However, over the past few years, international characteristics in some detail; mounted almost civilian space circumstances, the circumstances always successful campaigns with the President of our own space-related private sector, and the and Congress to receive direction, legal permis- attitude of our Government toward the civilian sion, and Federal funds for their conduct; and space area have begun to undergo fundamental then conducted them using large numbers of in- shifts-shifts that, in the next few years, cannot house scientists and engineers and contracting but have great impact on what our publicly with their counterparts in universities and the funded civilian space program does and how it space industry. does it. NASA has frequently been willing to consider As a result of the sustained and generous assist- international cooperation in science with other ance of the United States, and by working in close countries, and has reached cooperative agree- concert with NASA and the U.S. space industry ments with many countries—agreements that saw over the past few years, several other countries other countries spend significant amounts of have conceived of, developed, produced, in- money to support their space professionals and stalled, and used substantial space and space- to provide them with equipment in order to ef- related equipment. Such equipment, some of it fect such cooperation. But there has yet to be any designed primarily for scientific research, some major cooperative agreement reached that would see truly significant equipment jointly designed !$Spacelab is the exception that proves the rule. NOAA, on the and produced by the United States and one or other hand, is moving to obtain further contributions of space- related technology through the Economic Summit process, and is more other countries that would result either in pursuing the development of international polar-orbiting meteorological satellites; both of these initiatives could result in important 4Since the adoption of the 1958 National Aeronautics and Space cost savings to the U.S. public program. Act, the United States has maintained identifiably separate civilian 6The exception is the agreement, on an ‘upper stage, between and military space programs, though there has always been coop- NASA and the Orbital Science Corp. of Vienna, VA. McDonnell eration between the two. The extent to which one can make a simi- Douglas upgraded the Delta and developed the Payload Assist lar distinction with respect to Soviet space activities remains a vexing Module (PAM) using its own funds, and other private groups are question. now developing expendable boosters of various kinds. 30 ● Civilian Space Stations and the U.S. Future in Space

primarily for commercial applications, is of a so- finally begin to reap the large and direct eco- phistication that often matches that of U.S. equip- nomic benefits so long hoped for by civilian space ment, and of a sales magnitude that, in some in- leaders. stances, now clearly offers serious competition Finally, the great, persistent, and projected def- to the generally acknowledged preeminence of icits in our Federal budget now require Congress the United States (cf. Spacelab; Ariane; the Cana- to take an even more careful look at deferrable dian Remote Manipulator System; DBS space- expenditures, especially “new starts. ” Indeed, craft; etc.).7 These countries now have sufficient the central issue of the President’s request for confidence in their own skills and experience to congressional approval of the first phase of a encourage them to ask for a much closer kind “space station” program is that of its capital cost, of cooperation with the United States. It will not even though NASA now estimates the size of the be long before they can and probably will insist initial portion of the program (in constant 1984 on it, for they will have the ability and the motiva- dollars) to be less than one-half that of the Shut- tion to “go it alone” if they cannot see that their tle program, and not much more than 10 percent basic interests would be adequately served by the of the Apollo program, and its acquisition sched- kind of cooperation extended to them by the ule would seemingly not require NASA’s budget United States. g to be increased over today’s amount. Similarly, one of NASA’s outstanding successes These new national and international circum- (shared with DOD) has been that of shepherding stances have begun to command the attention the aircraft, electronics, chemical, and other high- of the executive branch, and important first technology areas of our private sector into the steps toward addressing them have been taken. civilian space business. This is now a very sophis- However, although many of the leaders of the ticated and confident part of our overall national U.S. publicly funded space program are con- commercial-industrial capability. But significant vinced of the importance of these circum- segments of the private space sector are increas- stances, few of them have the professional and ingly restless with the prospect of having to pro- business experience required to ensure an ef- duce high-technology space items under what fective response. Furthermore, it appears that they perceive to be the no-longer-necessary, and 8 most of those beneath the top management lev- wasteful, “close control” of NASA managers. els as yet have little enthusiasm for making in- Also, the past few years have seen a growing dicated changes. And, indeed, it is not clear that number of entrepreneurs beginning to enter the leaders of the executive branch have thought civilian space area. These “newcomers” are not out, clearly, just how far they are willing to see limited to those who would use the assets and innovative arrangements arrived at that would services that NASA expects to acquire; some carry NASA and NOAA into much closer col- would provide such assets and services to both laboration with other countries and with our the Government and others in the private sec- own private sector. tor on what they believe to be inviting financial terms. Both the President and Congress are clear- National Commission on Space ly determined to see that the private sector plays a much more prominent role in the civilian space In July 1984, Congress enacted, and the Presi- lo area generally, that it is encouraged to make ma- dent signed into Iaw, the National Aeronautics jor investments therein, and that the country and Space Act of 1985. Title II of this Act estab- gHowever, consider the following: “In recent decades the aver- 7 For a thorough discussion of this issue, see the OTA report /i- age overrun on major programs, in constant dollars and constant nternational Cooperation and Competition in Civilian Space Activi- quantities, has been slightly over 50 percent. The average schedule ties, in press, milestone has been missed by a third of the time initially projected. 6At least some in the private sector believe that they can do as The average time to develop new systems has, until recently, been good work on space hardware generally as they do on commer- increasing at the rate of 3 months per year . . . each year. ” Nor- cial air transportation and communications satellites, and they are man R. Augustine, “The Aerospace Professional . . . and High-Tech willing to assume the financial responsibility of doing so and to risk Management,” Aerospace America, March 1984, p. 5. grave financial penalties if they fail. lopublic Law 98-36I. Ch. 2—Issues and Findings Ž 31

Iished a National Commission on Space. The de- NASA now plans to spend the next 2 years liberations of the National Commission can be making studies of a fairly specific low-Earth-orbit expected to have a fundamental impact on the (LEO) infrastructure complex that it would ac- entire civilian space future, including the future quire, operate, and use in a manner similar to course of any civilian “space station” program. the Shuttle. This plan was set in motion some This conclusion is based on the assumption that years ago. Over the next year and a half, the the Commission will provide an appropriate mix deliberations and eventual findings of the Na- of prestige, broad concern for the national inter- tional Commission could offer NASA, and est, technical expertise, and diverse outlook. others seriously interested in the space future, the opportunity to develop new program op- There are great opportunities now perceptible tions, and to compare these new options, new in the civilian space area, but the rapidly chang- methods, and new attitudes with the civilian ing circumstances that make their achievement “space station” program as currently defined. possible have raised difficult issues and created institutional inconsistencies. If the new oppor- Afresh, basic and uninhibited review of policy tunities are to be realized, these issues must be issues might well result in a fundamental change faced and the inconsistencies resolved. OTA has of NASA views on the following matters: earlier expressed the view that many of these ● the appropriate character of the “space sta- issues and inconsistencies cannot now be dealt tion” program; with adequately by the annual authorization ● the character and mix of its various large, process and that, therefore, some more funda- long-range programs; mental mechanism, such as a Presidential Com- ● the ways in which it might orchestrate the ci- mission, should be created. The newly authorized vilian space interests of all friendly countries; Commission is the first opportunity in a genera- and tion for Congress—and the Nation—to set a truly ● the ways in which it could act to prompt fresh course in space. It is critically important to greatly increased private sector investment in the Nation generally, and to a successful U.S. space. future in civilian space activities specifically, that the Commission be successful.

CIVILIAN “SPACE STATIONS”

The Case for Infrastructure in tween LEO and geostationary orbit (GEO), the Low-Earth-Orbit Moon, and beyond; to commence certain important life science12 and materials science experi- on balance, a persuasive case can be made ments early in the next decade, the conduct of for acquiring some long-term infrastructure in which would otherwise border on the impossi- near-Earth space, some of which would allow ble; to warehouse space assets and consumables, a human work force to be retained there for ex- so as to improve the efficiency of very costly tended periods.11 This case rests primarily on surface-LEO transportation; to aspire to much tangible rather than intangible considerations. more ambitious and dependable servicing of ever The persuasive tangible reasons are that the larger and more sophisticated, and therefore United States would then be able to explore the more costly and complex, space assets, there- possibility of more efficient transport staging be- by containing their total life-cycle costs and increasing their effectiveness; and to undertake new I I [t is of course assumed that the character and location of the infrastructure elements would be chosen to meet the specific, im- 12Life ~ience r-arch could include studies of long-term response portant expressed needs of those expected to use the services that to in-space conditions (in preparation for possible staffed expedi- these elements would be expected to provide—i.e., not chosen by tions to the Moon, Mars, or the asteroids) as well as studies rele- the technologists who would design, produce, and install them. vant to the general human population on Earth. 32 ● Civilian Space Stations and the U.S. Future in Space and innovative space activities with confident undoubtedly, more will be articulated in the freedom. future. These reasons reflect not only the many years of conceptual studies of infrastructure arrays that The Concerns About Low-Earth-Orbit could support space activities but, as well, a gen- Infrastructure eral consensus as to the value of space infrastruc- But while the case to be made for acquiring ture elements gained with actual experience in some long-term, habitable, LEO infrastructure is Skylab, the Shuttle Orbiter, the Soviet Salyut, persuasive, there is no compelling, objective, ex- Soyuz, and Progress, the Tracking and Data Relay ternal case either for obtaining of the par- Satellite System (TDRSS), Spacelab, the Manned all ticular array of elements that NASA now de- Maneuvering Unit (MMU), the West German scribes under the rubric of “the space station,” SPAS platform, the Canadian Remote Manipu- or for obtaining this or any other array in the lator System (RMS), etc. general manner that NASA is now expected to Indeed, it seems likely that, in retrospect-some pursue, nor for paying the particular public cost two decades hence—at Ieast a large portion, per- that it now estimates is required to do so.13 (The haps all, of the space infrastructure capabilities important internal case for proceeding with a now advanced by NASA as necessary will be seen large, early “space station” program is discussed to have been so. But this eventuality gives no above.) As the infrastructure would be of a very guidance as to how and when the various ele- general-purpose nature, to be used to support ments should be acquired. myriads of conceptual uses, few of which have been sharply defined or have gained wide accept- Another reason advanced is that, eventually, ance as important objectives of our publicly there may be important economic payoffs from funded space program, there is no necessity for materials processing in space that would require obtaining all of it soon. And, under these circum- the use of space infrastructure. What is now re- stances its value to the space program is quite quired is a great deal of imaginative and sound difficult to estimate objectively. in-space basic and applied research in the materials science area. Three groups are particularly concerned about a nearly $10 billion (1984$) commitment to a The intangible reasons for acquiring such infra- “space station” program: structure—reasons of maintaining space leadership generally, of creating further heroic role ● those, particularly space scientists, who fear models, of exhibiting our capacity for high- that such a relatively large commitment technology development, of enhancing national would represent a hazard to their own space security, of maintaining a strong NASA, etc.— interests; are much less compelling. “Space buffs” and per- ● those space professionals who would prefer haps some in the private sector (those who have NASA to take a more measured, evolving, called for a long-term Government commitment learn-as-we-go approach; and to provide R&D facilities in space before they would consider investing there themselves) argue that general-purpose space infrastructure (i.e., a 13Some contend that the substantial and growing U.S.S.R. space infrastructure (including Salyut, Soyuz, Progress, and Cosmos 1443- “space station”) would address such great and class modules) constitutes a valid, and important, justification for intangible purposes. But there is no evidence that the United States to mount a comparable, if not more capable, pro- large segments of the general public agree with gram. This report does not address this contention. However, even if keeping up with the Soviets or beating them at their own game this assessment, and they have not been offered were to become the motivation for a major civilian space infrastruc- the opportunity to express their views on other ture acquisition program, it does not follow that such a program major space ventures that might more forcefully would resemble that which NASA has described. Indeed, it might be quite different. See the OTA Technical Memorandum, Sa/yut: address such intangibles. A number of alterna- Soviet Steps Toward Permanent Human Presence in Space, OTA- tive intangible goals have already been put forth; TM-STI-14, December 1983. .

Ch. 2—Issues and Findings ● 33

● those particularly concerned with the com- rect, and quite illuminating expression, space in- mencement of any new and costly Federal frastructure can be bought “by the yard.”15 initiative who are sensitive to its impact on One thing is clear: NASA, if it wished, or were the Federal budget even if it falls within persuaded, could opt for obtaining now a NASA’s present, and hoped-for, “budget “core” fraction of the total infrastructure ca- envelope” of some $7 billion per year. pability that it believes that the country will need Of course, if the projected capital cost were over the long term—a core fraction that would well less than the near $10 billion (1 984$) now allow many useful scientific studies to be made estimated for the initial operating capability (IOC) and infrastructure support operations to be ex- (i.e., the initial phase of the infrastructure acqui- plored and evaluated, at a net U.S. capital cost sition program that NASA has in mind; the full of one-quarter to one-third of the $8 billion that cost of the program would approximate $20 bil- it now seeks. To this core fraction other ele- lion [1984$] by the year 2000), the concerns of ments could be added incrementally as experi- these groups would be significantly lessened. ence is gained in its use and as requirements become sufficiently persuasive. The Cost of Low-Earth-Orbit The technological and programmatic options Infrastructure exist for doing so. There is clearly a great variety of U. S., other Government, and private in-space The eventual cost of any in-space infrastructure infrastructure (some already in hand, some in de- depends on the chosen size, capability, degree velopment, some that is receiving detailed study) of new technology involved, and method of ac- from which selections could be made to provide quisition. It is not now possible to make another various kinds and amounts of in-space assets and estimate of the IOC cost that is significantly dif- support services—assets and services that would ferent from that made by NASA for what it de- be expected to allow some new activities to be scribes as “the space station” in which one would undertaken, and to increase the efficiency and have greater confidence. There simply are too effectiveness of others. many large potential “cost drivers, ” the significance of which cannot be judged under today’s Properly encouraged by NASA, private sector rapidly changing circumstances. firms are almost certain to come forward in the next few years with proposals that would provide All of the experience with the acquisition, some of the desired infrastructure elements and/ over a relatively long time, of large amounts of or support services now thought to require Gov- space technology, much of it to be newly devel- ernment development and acquisition. Some oped, suggests that the $8 billion (1984$) fig- such developments are already under way.16 ure will eventually be seen to have been a floor, not a ceiling, on cost. In spite of, or rather because of, this experience, NASA is determined Alternatives 14 that it will not be repeated. Some large sophisticated civilian space ven- There are several options available relating to tures such as the Space Telescope are pushing acquisition practices, international collaboration, at the frontiers of technology. This is not (or, at and the more imaginative use of the U.S. private least, need not be) the case for in-space infrastruc- sector that, if effectively grasped, could reduce ture. Indeed, there is little doubt that, with appro- the cost impact on the Federal budget. Acquisi- tion of in-space infrastructure is inherently dif- ls’’Space stations are the kind of development that you can buy ferent from the acquisition of a Shuttle or a com- by the yard.” James Beggs, NASA Administrator; Committee Re- mitment to develop and deploy those resources port of Hearings before the Subcommittee on Science, Technol- required to send a person on a safe round-trip ogy, and Space (Senator Gorton, Chairman) of the Senate Com- mittee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, Mar. 8, 9, and to the Moon. To use NASA’s own earlier, cor- 15, 1983, p. 51. IGTheSe developments are discussed in some detail in ch. 3 of lasee Augustine, op. Cit. this report. 34 • Civilian Space Stations and the U.S. Future in Space

priate congressional approval and funding, the ● Providing safe, sanitary, and suitable in- Nation could see the capabilities described by frastructure elements ‘for long stays by NASA in place and operating satisfactorily well human crews will be costly. But however before the middle of the next decade. Because, much some may be interested in exploiting in OTA’S view, technology development for unattended sophisticated machinery in LEO, space infrastructure envisioned in the near-term the state of the art is not yet capable of pro- should present no significant problem, it has not viding the wide range of functions and con- been given central attention in this assessment. fidence that human workers can provide un- However, some general observations on technol- til well after the early 1990s. However, given ogy matters may be useful here. the substantial emphasis that, to date, NASA has placed on human work crews in space, • Three basic kinds of in-space infrastructure it would be the prudent course, now, to raise elements are worthy of separate, but related, the level of support for the development of attention: in-space automation and remote operation 1. one or more relatively large central com- from Earth. Emphasis on R&D for space- plexes, with work crews as required– related automation and remote operation complexes where the bulk of the relatively could also be expected to have a salutary in- innovative work could be carried on; fluence on automation R&D for applications 2. normally unattended “free-flying” plat- here on Earth, U.S. industrial competitive- forms, nearby or remote from such com- ness, and its introduction into commercial- plexes, where various equipment could industrial activities. carry on activities precluded by the orbi- ● There are two quite different reasons that can tal locations, micro-gravitational circum- be advanced for the development of new stances, or effluents associated with a cen- technology to be employed in space infra- tral complex; and structure. One reason is to provide capabil- 3 .transportation between the surface and ities there that present technology cannot; such a complex, and between the com- the other is to reduce the life-cycle costs of plex and the platforms, and between the its ownership—i.e., to reduce O&M costs complex and much higher orbits or even and extend its useful lifetime. Both are out to solar system distances. laudable objectives. But they must be ● OTA is not persuaded that all of the particu- balanced against the simple fact that “there lar capabilities now being emphasized by is no such thing as enough money,” and any NASA, when measured against alternatives, decision to provide anything more (or less) are the ones that have the greatest value to than the vitally needed capabilities, and to the Nation’s publicly funded civilian space do so at an earlier than necessary date, and program. NASA’s present selection of the ini- any decision to try to predict the far future tial set of infrastructure elements and their so as to provide for all possible uses of such location in space would provide many of the capabilities, will simply result in at least the desired support capabilities. But they would unwarranted, and perhaps wasteful, use of not serve the interests of those attempting funds. OTA is not convinced that a good to service remote-sensing platforms of impor- enough balance has been struck between tance to weather and climate from low, near- the competing demands for funds for infra- polar orbits, or from geostationary orbits, nor structure and funds for other space activities. the interests of those in the private sector ● Diligent and imaginative exploitation of the whose communications, and perhaps navi- Shuttle fleet, along with use of free-flying gation/position-fixing, satellites are located platforms and local in-space transportation in much higher, including geostationary, or- systems for individuals (all already under bits, nor the interests of those who would way), could provide much useful informa- like to see less costly transportation provided tion and experience that would be of great between the Earth and GEO, and the Moon, value in making later decisions about the Mars, and asteroids. characteristics and operational employment Ch. 2—issues and Findings • 35

of long-term in-space infrastructure. Over ● Space lab’s operational characteristics also time, this broadening experience will in- could be amplified at relatively modest cost, crease the confidence with which eventual with the same helpful consequences. infrastructure selection decisions are made. ● Private sector development of large in-space ● Significant extensions of the time that an Or- electrical power supplies, occasionally at- biter could remain usefully on-orbit (to, say, tended platforms, and other infrastructure double or triple today’s 7 to 10 days) would elements could be successfully completed provide many of the capabilities desired for before the end of the decade. If done with work crews in permanent infrastructure, and imagination and economy they could offer provide them sooner and at relatively mod- attractive alternatives to Government devel- est cost, thereby relaxing the cost and sched- opment and acquisition of these capabilities. ule requirements associated with the latter.

OUR FUTURE IN SPACE Long-Term Space Goals and velopment of the technology needed to conduct Objectives all three. The family was generated to encourage much greater and more direct involvement of in- The United States can now make major strides terested segments of the general public in civil- in the civilian space area, but it is not adequately ian space activities, and to strive for economic, prepared to do so. political, and cultural ends in addition to the sci- We need to “re-visit” the substance of the entific, exploration, and technology-development 1958 Space Act, reaffirm those of its policy prin- ends of today. And the family contains some ele- ciples that are judged to be still valid, add others ments that are simply “bold. ” as appropriate, and lay out a set of new goals The national goals OTA proposes for discussion that are responsive to contemporary and fore- are: seeable circumstances, interests and values. An initial family of end objectives also should be ● to increase the efficiency of space activities identified that would address those goals over and reduce their net cost to the general the next years and decades. public; ● to involve the general public directly in space U.S. civilian space activities should be designed activities, both on Earth and in space; to protect, ease, challenge, and improve the hu- ● to derive scientific, economic, social, and man condition, In addressing its long-term goals, political benefits; the Nation should strive to move its space inter- ● to increase international cooperation and ests and activities closer to the mainstream of collaboration in and for space; public interests and concerns, maintain space ● to study and explore the Earth, the solar sys- leadership, enhance national security, and posi- tem, and the greater physical universe; and tion its civilian space activities to respond to find- ● to spread life, in a responsible fashion, ing the unexpected in the cosmos. throughout the solar system. For the purpose of prompting public discussion, Brief descriptions of the national objectives sug- OTA has developed an initial set of such goals, gested to prompt public discussion follow; they and a family of initial objectives to address these are not rank-ordered. goals. Chapter 6 of the assessment treats these in some detail. The objectives are suggested for ● A space-related, global system/service could consideration as additions to, not substitutes for, be established to provide timely and useful the continuing “core” programs of space science information regarding all potentially haz- and exploration, space applications, and the de- ardous natural circumstances found in the 36 ● Civilian Space Stations and the U.S. Future in Space

Earth’s space and atmosphere, as well as at our private sector could be stimulated to in- and below its surface. crease at a rate comparable to that of other ● A transportation service could be established high-technology sectors, and our public ex- to and from the Earth’s Moon, and a mod- penditures on civilian space assets and activ- est human presence established there, for ities could reflect this revenue growth. scientific and other cultural and economic purposes. Under present circumstances, the infrastructure that NASA would acquire in its “space station” ● Space probes could be used to obtain the information and experience specifically re- program is best described as general-purpose, quired to plan for further exploration of the i.e., designed to support well over 100 in-space planet Mars and some asteroids. activities. As a consequence, it must contain a large number of sophisticated and costly ele- ● Medical studies of direct interest to the general public, including study of the human ments, and there is considerable difficulty in set- aging process, could be conducted through ting objective acquisition priorities among them scientific experiments that compare physio- and acquisition schedules for all of them. logical, emotional, and social experience in Were a specific family of space end objectives the absence of gravity with experience established, it would then be much less diffi- gained in the conduct of related surface cult to establish which are the more important studies. in-space support assets and services that are re- ● At least hundreds of members of the general quired, and the time by which they would need public per year, from the United States and to become available. abroad, could be selected on an equitable basis and brought into space for short visits A rough estimate of the cost of meeting this there. family of objectives over the next quarter of a cen- ● A direct audio broadcasting, common-user tury amounts to some $40 billion to $60 billion. system/service could be established that would be available to all of the countries of To put this cost into perspective, it should be the world on an economical and equitable noted that: basis. ● completion of the Shuttle development pro- ● In general, all of the nonclassified and non- gram would reduce NASA expenditures by private communications from, and nonpro- $2 billion per year, or $50 billion over this prietary data generated by, all Government- interval; supported spacecraft and satellites could be ● if the 1 percent per year “real-growth” prin- made widely available to the general pub- ciple is accepted and is extended indefinite- lic and our educational institutions in nearly, another $25 billion would thereby be real-time and at modest cost. provided; ● Radio and optical free-space electromagnetic ● collaboration with other countries could pro- propagation techniques could be exploited vide the equivalent of perhaps another $25 in an attempt to allow reliable and economic billion; and long-distance transmission of large amounts ● the private sector should be able to reduce of electrical energy, both into space for use costs and make direct space R&D invest- there, and from space, lunar and remote ments that, together, could amount to the Earth locations for distribution throughout equivalent of billions of dollars. the world. ● The unit cost of space transportation, for Clearly, under such circumstances, funding people and equipment, between the Earth’s limitations would not prevent the United States surface and low-, geosynchronous-, and from undertaking an ambitious publicly sup- lunar-Earth orbit could be sharply reduced. ported civilian space program throughout the ● Space-related commercial-industrial sales in next quarter of a century. Ch. 2—issues and Findings “ 37

Long-Term Space Strategies be separated, and the latter could be taken up by our political process in a more paced, thought- If Congress and the President together re- ful, and confident manner. establish a formal set of basic civilian space goals, they—and the general public—could turn It is helpful to remember that broad, public, their attention to identifying a family of specific national debates on other important and com- objectives to address them. Then, on a year-to- plex issues–on housing policy, for instance, and year basis, as these plans were completed to the defense policy–take place regularly. While it is satisfaction of both branches, Congress could true that, historically, there has been little or no decide which one(s), if any, to pursue as tech- national debate on civilian space issues, that is nological, financial, political, and other circum- because the Nation’s space capabilities are only stances suggest and allow. now coming of age—in the sense that after 25 years real options, worthy of discussion, finally In the case of each objective, detailed program exist. plans could be laid out for attaining it. Such plans could: Cost Reduction identify required technological developments and space infrastructure support ca- However else the publicly funded space activ- pabilities; ities of the United States might be described, identify operational and/or political con- they certainly would have to be characterized cerns; as being very, very costly. Today, the kind and reflect circumstances in the civilian space number of space activities is no longer hindered area generally, both here and abroad; by ignorance of the physical characteristics of estimate the schedules and costs to accom- the Earth’s space domain, by concern about the plish each; reliable in-space lifetime of well engineered and judge who would be expected to be the ma- tested equipment, or by fear that men and wom- jor participants in their conduct; en going into and remaining in space for as long judge what the most likely end results of their as weeks at a time would be harmed. The unit successful completion would be; cost of these activities is the greatest inhibition identify who would benefit from their suc- to our development and use of space. If these cessful completion, and what sources of costs were lowered by 10 to 100 times, many funds should be looked to to meet both ini- individuals and organizations would be at- tial capital costs and any ongoing O&M costs; tracted to doing things in and concerning space and that today are not seriously considered or even suggest who would have the responsibility thought of. for any long-term ownership, operation, Consequently, if space is ever to be widely maintenance, and use of assets produced in used, a fundamental thrust must be to reduce the program. these unit costs sharply and across the board— Every 5 years or so, a review of the progress and particularly the cost of space transportation. of programs addressing the initial list of objec- The Shuttle is an outstanding technological and tives could be conducted as at the outset, and operational success, but achieving the objective a new family established. In this fashion, Congress of a much lower dollar per pound cost for pas- would always have before it well-thought-out ci- senger and cargo transportation between the vilian space activity and investment options—op- Earth’s surface and LEO, GEO, and beyond still tions to which a great deal of professional study remains to be accomplished. and general discussion had already been given Some elements of space infrastructure now before any decisions to proceed were required. under consideration by NASA for the first (IOC) In this general fashion the two vital questions and second (full-capability) phases of its “space of “can we do it?” and “should we do it?” would station” program could improve the efficiency

38-798 0 - 84 - 4 : QL 3 38 Ž Civilian Space Stations and the U.S. Future in Space of Shuttle use and offer the promise of lowering position particularly, etc., and do express the gen- the unit cost of LEO/G EO/Lunar trips, and these eral sense that these are laudable national objec- elements should be singled out for early and spe- tives. Yet almost all are still more interested in cific attention. But cost reduction is such a fun- addressing their own internal science and engi- damental matter that it should receive major sup- neering agendas. port by NASA, and by the Department of There is another aspect of the successful inter- Transportation, and by our private sector gener- jection of large-scale private sector activity into ally, and this support should call out for techno- the civilian space area that is perhaps most im- logical, operational, and institutional innovation, portant to the long-term prospects of the publicly and the objective, tough-minded, pursuit of any funded portion of these activities: they could in- such innovations that show significant promise. crease the tax base and increase tax revenues. There are many opportunities open to NASA Today, U.S. private sector space sales amount for reducing unit costs in its own acquisition proc- to some $2 billion per year, are increasing at an esses, and these are spoken to in some detail in average annual rate of some 15 percent per year, appendix D. compounded, and are probably generating a total of some $½ billion in taxes of all kinds. It appears The Private Sector to be a reasonable conclusion that such an average annual rate of increase could well be main- Both the President and Congress have ex- tained for at least the next decade or two. pressed their determination to see the private sector play a much more prominent role in our Such a rate of commercial and industrial space- civilian space area, and NASA and NOAA must related sales- and tax-revenue increase could fig- pay this determination particular heed. But it ure most importantly in the future of the publicly is OTA’S view that, as yet, this serious matter funded civilian space program. Already, today, is not receiving all the attention within the ex- while the Federal outlays for this program cost ecutive branch that it warrants, except perhaps some $7 billion per year, private sector space at the highest levels. ” This lack of attention sales return some $1/2 billion annually in the form seems to result from the fact that most of the of taxes. Were the 15 percent per year, com- space engineers and scientists in the Government pounded, rate to continue throughout the end simply do not have the professional and business of this century (and setting aside consideration experience required to work closely and imagi- of any negative impact that this growth could natively with the private sector. Perhaps even have on other segments of our economy), the re- more important, their long-term experience with- sulting tax revenues could approach half of our in the Government “space club” has not pro- public cost for supporting a civilian space provided them with the perspective to appreciate gram of today’s magnitude. indeed, in 20 years how important it is to the future of the publicly these growing tax revenues could equal the cost funded space program that the private sector of such a public program. And, by then, private assume this more prominent role. sector space-related R&D activities also could be funded at a level of billions of dollars per year. In general, most NASA and NOAA scientists and engineers can appreciate that successful pri- The funds now being spent on NASA and NOAA vate sector investment in the civilian space area programs are “discretionary” not “entitlement” (as well as any other area, for that matter) will funds. At some time in the future, our national result in increased employment opportunities, the financial circumstances could prompt serious production of needed and desired capital goods questions to be raised about the continuance of and commercial services, the strengthening of our such large, deferrable, expenditures. Of course, economy generally and our international trade there are arguments that can be, have been, and would be advanced for not reducing the present ‘The July 20, 1984, issuance by the White House of a “National Policy on the Commercial Use of Space” fact sheet is an encourag- level of such public expenditures, but these levels ing development. have been sharply curtailed in the past. To the Ch. 2—issues and Findings “ 39

extent that objective evidence of the direct im- closely with the United States on a “space portance of the R&D and other activities of NASA station” program. Now may be the time to and NOAA to this kind of economic growth is inquire as to whether our best interests, and in hand, it is an argument for the continuation the interests of at least some of these coun- of these activities. tries, would be best served by moving beyond yesterday’s and today’s kind of OTA concludes that two important, perhaps cooperation, and to attempt more direct col- the most important, activities that NASA could laboration or even joint venturing with them undertake today, and for the indefinite future, on any such program. would be to reduce the unit cost to the private As yet, NASA appears to be giving insuffi- sector of their conducting activities in space, and cient thought to establishing the kind of mul- to be of assistance to them in their making pro- ti-national, interleaved, development and ductive investments in space. production program of the type often en- Developing methods of truly useful and accept- tered into by the Department of Defense in able assistance could well be a thorny matter, NATO and elsewhere, and by some of our inasmuch as in many commercial-industrial- large private sector organizations and their financial areas there is a somewhat adversarial analogs in other countries. relationship between the Government and the In the DOD case, considerations of mili- private sector. And for some time the Govern- tary security, the additional complexity of ment will continue to be the largest purchaser working on programs involving other coun- of any private sector space goods and services. tries, the hazards of undue technology trans- Consequently, just as in, say, the supercomputer fer, and eventual commercial “spinoffs,” and nuclear energy areas, the space area will have oftentimes been resolved, to mutual have to see the appropriate roles of the Govern- advantage, in favor of sharing costs and im- ment and the private sector sorted out to ensure portant professional skills. There may be, in- that the interests and responsibilities of each are deed, similar, legitimate concerns about clear, so as to best serve both—and the Nation. technology transfer arising in any future international civilian infrastructure develop- Finally, it can be anticipated that the private ment program. However, the technology de- sector’s particular concern for cost reduction will veloped in such a civilian program would, eventually result in lowered costs in public space in the main, be general-purpose, and the activities also. cost-sharing incentives would remain. The general economic circumstances of International Space Cooperation many of these countries are basically sound; they desire to work with us on civilian space For most of the space age, there has been con- matters in general, and any “space station” siderable cooperation in space activities be- program in particular; they have exhibited tween the United States (by NASA, NOAA and technological prowess in Spacelab, the Ca- DOD) and several other friendly countries—ef- nadian Remote Manipulator System, Ariane, fective and useful cooperation. The changing and various communications satellites pro- circumstances of the civilian space area call for vided to INTELSAT. They were willing to a reappraisal of the kind and magnitude of trust the good offices of the United States cooperation that now should be sought. and NASA in going ahead with the $1 billion European Spacelab program–a pro- The OTA report International/ Cooperation gram that could be rendered valueless at any and Competition in Civilian Space Activities, time that the United States were to withdraw studies this area in some considerable detail; the opportunity of their employing it with here we will confine our conclusions to two: the Shuttle. 1. The European Space Agency (ESA), several Given all of these circumstances, it is not of its major member countries, Japan, and beyond imagination that a major internation- Canada have evidenced interest in working al collaborative civilian “space station” pro- -.—.

40 ● Civilian Space Stations and the U.S. Future in Space

gram could be negotiated that, among its teristics are not usually in short supply in the other virtues, could lighten the total burden United States generally, and certainly not on our public purse perhaps by as much as among the professionals in NASA and the $2 billion to $3 billion. This is not the ap- Department of State. Indeed, it was the com- proach to dealing with other countries on bination of just these national characteris- any “space station” program that is now be- tics in the U.S. approach to working with a ing taken by NASA. The present approach few countries in the past that enabled them is one of asking other countries to add funds to begin to work in space. to the United States’ estimated and antici- Recall that INTELSAT now has over 100 pated $8 billion commitment. The alterna- member countries, joined in a common in- tive approach has not been debated in the terest to see space used to improve commu- United States outside of NASA. nications. The United States could now The alternative approach is being explored begin to use any in-space infrastructure pro- by NOAA: NOAA is soliciting important gram to start orchestrating the interests of all cost-sharing, perhaps as much as one-half, of the countries in the world that would be on the part of other countries who share the willing to work with us in reasonable ways U.S. interest in maintaining, and improving, to see space developed and used for any and weather-related space sensing systems. This all peacefu I purposes “for the benefit of all alternative approach to working on a “space man kind.” station” program with other countries is worthy of careful consideration by Congress. Space as an Arena of For no reasonable way of reducing the Fed- Peaceful Cooperation eral debt burden by billions of dollars should be passed by unless Congress convinces Even now, when discourse between the United itself that it is not in the Nation’s interest to States and the Soviet Union is modest in the ex- do SO. treme, and the practical possibilities of effecting 2. Except, perhaps, for the smallest and poorest cooperative space-related activities between the countries, all of the countries in the world superpowers are severely limited,18 many cannot must have at least some interest in space: but hope that the two countries will find ways the devices and people that orbit above to initiate important cooperative civilian space them, the activities that go on there, and endeavors in the future. how they all could affect their own interests. To date, most visions of such cooperation form But only about one-tenth of the world’s around scientific activities. They are important, countries play an active role in space today. and they should continue to be given serious and Here is an extraordinary opportunity for thoughtful attention. the United States! Our determination to exhibit “space lead- Together, the United States and the Soviet ership” need not and probably should not Union have some 600 million people and a gross be confined to dealing with the richest and/ national product of some $5 trillion between or most technologically advanced countries. them, and both have global interests and power. We could broaden our approach to “inter- Therefore, possible joint cooperative space national cooperation” by taking as an expli- activities need not be confined to science; in- cit goal the incorporation of the space inter- deed, a broad range of space-related activity ests and activities of any other country in the

world into our program, if that country IBU,S..U.S,S.R. Coowration in space-related activities has not en- would be at all inclined to participate in tirely vanished. The SARSAT search-and-rescue program, a joint space ventures along with us, Of course, U.S.-Canadian-French undertaking, continues to interoperate suc- such an initiative would require hard work, cessfully with the parallel Soviet COSPAS system. Both the United States and the Soviet Union are members of INMARSAT, the patience, imagination, and generosity on the maritime equivalent of INTELSAT, and both are cooperating, along part of the United States. But these charac- with Europe and Japan, in the International Halley Watch program.

Ch. 2—Issues and Findings . 41

Photo Aeronaut/es and Space Administration

NASA has had agreements with more than 100 countries for cooperation in space activities. The pinnacle of international cooperation in space to date was the Test Project in 1975 (shown here), in which a U.S. Apollo spacecraft docked with a Soviet Soyuz spacecraft for several days of joint manned operations. However, no international cooperative agreement (including has yet involved significant sharing of technology or saving of costs. areas might well be explored, imaginatively and to see that it, and its contractors, did essentially determinedly. all that was done in the civilian space area. OTA plans to report on some of the issues in Throughout most of this time, and probably this area in the fall of 1984. without conscious reflection on NASA’s part, or the part of anyone else, it has simply been assumed that once our country decided that some- NASA’S Changing Role thing was to be done in or for civilian space, NASA was to do it. That is, the responsibility for Until a few years ago, and except for the satel- seeing that something got done in the civilian lite communications area, NASA has, since its in- space area was equated with NASA’s doing it ception, organized, staffed, and managed itself itself. 42 . Civilian Space Stations and the U.S. Future in Space

But the changing circumstances of the past few Finally, NASA could see that its activities con- years now clearly suggest a fundamental reap- tinue to be conducted, and the results continue praisal of NASA’s responsibilities and role in the to be used, not only to increase knowledge and development and further study, exploration, and to address important social and political goals, use of space. but also to enable our private space sector to increase its non-Government sales—the sales that Although this study of civilian “space stations” generate the taxes that help to pay for NASA’s and the U.S. “future in space” has brought these activities. changing circumstances into clear, at times pain- fully clear, focus, it has not attempted to search out what NASA’s new role should be in detail. Non-Government Policy Studies It is to be noted, however, that the Nation’s interests now are becoming much broader than It is inherently difficult for the Government those of NASA and, indeed, in some instances, to make some kinds of policy studies and, in- may lead to conflicts with what NASA may per- deed, it is potentially hazardous to have all such ceive to be its own interests. studies made by the Government in areas of important national concern. NASA could and, in OTA’S view, might well now give increased attention to making some Particularly in areas where Federal programs fundamental shifts of attitude and operation. take a long time to develop and carry out (say, In the past, it has been NASA’S responsibility a decade: cf. Apollo, Shuttle, Landsat, “space to meet any given national space objective; in station”) vested interests are naturally created the future, it could be NASA’s responsibility to within the Government and closely related sec- see that the objective is met. That is, NASA could tions of the private aerospace industry. Later now aspire to the much broader role of encour- these interests can present serious problems aging others in the private sector and through- of resource re-allocation on the program’s ap- out the world to do much more of what it does proaching completion unless new avenues for today. their employment have been carefully explored and publicly agreed on beforehand. If NASA is to rise successfully to the challenges now emerging in the national and international Our free, and increasingly educated, mobile, space arena, it must place relatively less empha- diverse, rich society is bound to generate ideas, sis on accomplishing by itself those things that desires, value judgments, and activities about our private sector or other friendly nations can which the Government simply has difficulty in satisfactorily do, either alone or with NASA assist- keeping well informed, particularly if the ideas ance. it can succeed in this only by continuing are quite different from those with which the to cooperate with both, and by broadening this Government has been dealing for some time and cooperation so as to prompt and assist both to are generated and pursued by persons and orga- extend their space-related capacities, confidence, nizations that are “new to the scene. ” and commitment. And it could emphasize such Civilian space activities continue to be of im- cooperation in the acquisition of in-space infra- portance to the United States in many intangi- structure, i.e., a “space station. ” ble ways, and they are now beginning to be Released from its relatively near-term focus, appreciated as offering tangible and growing pri- NASA could concentrate more of its own profes- vate sector economic prospects as well. “Space sional activities on the most important and ex- commercialization” has become a popular topic. citing of questions regarding space, the things that But in the absence of a “bottom line” and com- no one else can or will do: the very best of space- petitive economic forces, the Government has related science; the cutting edge of space-related a more difficult time than does our private sec- technology development; the boldest of space- tor in sharply reducing unit costs. And Govern- related explorations and developments. ment offices only rarely, by themselves, originate Ch. 2—issues and Findings ● 43 large innovative and challenging programs and professional staff would not be required to re- carry them out to satisfactory completion. spond to the contemporary institutional concerns of the space community. Such centers In the area of the physical sciences, for in- would control their research agendas and stance, U.S. leaders can look to several policy allocate resources as they believed best, rather study centers for independent guidance on issues than simply responding to directives. An exam- of broad national concern, In the space area, ple of this type would be a university-based in- however, there are only a few dedicated individ- stitute with several funding sources. The con- uals who can provide similar guidance. tinuing study efforts of such centers could In view of the increasing importance of civil- provide the American public a better opportu- ian space activities to the American public gen- nity to consider, and to help initiate, space activ- erally, it might well be desirable to establish one ities that would address important cultural, eco- or more independent space policy centers whose nomic, social, and political ends.

POSSIBLE LEGISLATIVE INITIATIVES

In the context of the circumstances and issues a year or two hence the acquisition of the discussed in this assessment and the conclusions general kind of infrastructure elements that reached therein, Congress could now give con- NASA is now focusing on; or sideration to taking a number of initiatives. 3. specifically identify any major space services to be provided, ask NASA to present various Some of these suggested initiatives are directly estimates of costs, schedules, and procure- related to “the civilian space stations” area; ment strategies that would be involved in others are related to broader areas that are of gen- providing them and, subsequently, select eral importance to “our future in space. ” from these estimates the elements and strategies to be approved; or Strategies for Acquiring Any New In-Space Civilian Infrastructure The response of Congress to the President’s formal request for the commencement of a “space station” program should take account of the general circumstances discussed in this study and the existence of options beyond those proposed by NASA. Given these general circumstances and the variety of options, Congress could adopt one of four positions: 1. decide that it is premature and/or inadvisable to set out, soon, to obtain any large amount of new long-term in-space infrastructure, and refuse to accede to an executive branch request to do so a year or two hence; or 2. at least by implication simply agree, in principle, to provide the kind and number of in-

space assets and services that NASA judges Photo credit: National Aeronautics and Space Administration to be necessary and, accepting its $8 billion Free-flying platforms such as the one depicted in this cost and 7 to 8-year schedule estimate as artist’s concept offer one option for relatively low-cost working numbers, be prepared to approve space infrastructure elements. 44 ● Civilian Space Stations and the U.S. Future in Space

4. for the acquisition of any in-space infrastruc- ● The priorities it places on the various serv- ture, simply approve an average annual ex- ices and assets that it sees as generally de- penditure rate for its acquisition and allow sirable. That is, if Congress were to allocate NASA to select the elements, acquisition more or less than the $2 billion per year now schedules, and procurement strategies in the being discussed for the acquisition of IOC light of NASA’s judgment regarding their rel- elements of space infrastructure, what are ative cost and value. the most important services to be made available and elements to be selected? Congress need not imagine that it is required ● The ways that are available to keep the U.S. to commit itself to accepting any of these posi- public cost to a minimum, and the bases for tions at this time, inasmuch as the President’s the executive branch’s pursuit or rejection fiscal year 1985 request was restricted to the first of them. That is, there are two important op- year of a 2-year study activity that would cost a portunities for reducing the public cost of relatively modest amount (some 5 percent of the any space infrastructure, but it is not clear projected total acquisition cost) for such a ma- that NASA—with its institutional interest in jor implied space activity. But there is a suffi- retaining present personnel force and appro- ciently persuasive case for our obtaining some priation levels—has incentives to pursue additional space infrastructure so that thoughtful either with sufficient imagination and vigor. and comprehensive study of what it should be These opportunities are: and how it should be obtained is now warranted. 1, Other countries could collaborate closely Therefore (setting aside the very important mat- with the United States so as to produce ter of our Federal budget’s present and projected any agreed infrastructure in a fashion that circumstances and the implications thereof for would see their financial contributions re- any deferrable “new starts”) Congress could use duce the demands on our public purse to the next year and a half to become better in- well below the $8 billion figure, rather formed about the options available to it and the than simply producing additional, perhaps implications of selecting particular ones from essentially duplicative, infrastructure ele- among them. And it could task the executive ments at no savings to the United States. branch to make additional, broader, studies than 2. Our private sector could be encouraged it now has in mind—studies that could assist Con- to use its own resources to develop, progress in arriving at its crucial judgments a year duce, and install as much of any agreed or so hence. infrastructure as would meet the Govern- The House Committee on Science and Tech- ment’s performance specifications at a nology has taken an important step in the direc- cost lower than the Government’s present tion of raising such broader issues in requesting procurement practices allow, rather than a study by NASA that will look into “space sta- have Government funds used to purchase tion” program management and procurement all of it and Government personnel used matters. 19 A report of this study, to be provided to manage the process in detail. by NASA to the committee by December 15, ● Other important space initiatives that NASA 1984, is expected to speak to both “ . . . [the] could undertake. That is, if Congress were Space Station development management plan to decide that the acquisition of any in- and procurement strategies with a description of frastructure should proceed at an average the alternatives available and the basis for the annual public expenditure rate appreciably [NASA] choices taken.” less than $2 billion per year, what other important programs could be mounted with the Similarly, Congress could request the executive 20 remaining professional staff and the differ- branch to inform it regarding: ence in dollars?21 Igsee Committee report of Mar. 21, 1984. qt shou Id be noted that this assessment makes the assumption that NASA’s overall funding level will remain relatively constant as it has in recent years. *1 Ibid. Ch. 2—issues and Findings Ž 45

● Conceptual programs of cooperation with how they are to be acquired, owned, operated, the Soviet Union in civilian space activities. and paid for, have all been carefully considered That is, while a case can be made for mount- and conclusions reached that most would accept ing large and continuing, technologically as reflecting our broadest national interests—not challenging, U.S.-U.S.S.R. cooperative civil- primarily the interests of the space community. ian space programs, essentially nothing of Congress is now moving to effect some impor- this nature is now being seriously considered tant changes in space law and policy. Legislation because of the low state of political accom- has already been enacted in 1984 by Congress modation. In anticipation that today’s ten- and accepted by the President that makes an im- sions may abate someday, it is important that portant change in the Space Act.22 The act now conceptual programs now be identified and declares “ . . . that [NASA should] seek and en- described that would: 1 ) be of little inherent courage, to the maximum extent possible, the political sensitivity, 2) offer little prospect of fullest commercial use of space.” significant technology transfer, 3) allow for important involvement of other space-expe- Although a sufficient, and sufficiently broad, rienced countries as well, and 4) offer the base of thought, analysis, and discussion of fun- promise of important cost savings to any damental considerations is not yet in hand to country that, otherwise, would pursue any allow Congress to proceed to make other funda- of them alone. The conduct of some such mental changes in our national civilian space pos- programs could well require some related ture with great confidence, the National Com- elements of in-space infrastructure. mission on Space authorized for in Title I I of this These broader studies would be carried on year’s legislation,23 and its subsequent activities, at the same time, and for a small fraction of couId go far toward calling widespread attention the cost of, the “space-station” engineering to our civilian space problems and opportunities. studies that NASA is now beginning to con- The Commission is expected to give the first duct, and the conclusions of their satisfac- broad consideration to our national space inter- tory completion would clearly be of impor- ests in a generation—consideration that would tance to Congress 1 ½ years hence. encompass interests in addition to those of science and technology that receive by far most of Civilian Space Policies, Goals, the attention today. It is the kind of considera- Objectives, and Strategies tion that would guard against our continuing to be caught up in either fascination with or the de- Except for a few changes in the basic space law, tails of exotic space technology, and would focus Congress has been satisfied to deal with evolv- instead on sensible and generally acceptable ing circumstances through specific year-to-year methods whereby we can proceed with the de- changes in NASA’s authorization bills. But these velopment of space, meet human needs in so do- circumstances are now so greatly changed, and ing, and fashion new ways of paying for it as we our space assets and experience are now so great, go. And it could identify new policies, goals, ob- that it has become clear that Congress could re- jectives, and strategies, and structural changes assess our civilian space laws’ goals, objectives, that, put in place, would increase the likelihood institutions, policies, and plans with great profit. that the great promises of the next quarter-century of the space age would, in fact, be realized. For instance, Congress and the general public should not find themselves in the position of hav- All of those within and without the Govern- ing to decide on large, complex, and very costly ment who are truly and seriously interested in items of space infrastructure such as a “space sta- furthering our prospects in space should be pre- tion” without having a much clearer understand- pared to assist this Commission. ing of what these items will all be used for over the long term, and without being confident that zzpublic Law 98-361. their character, the uses to which they will be put, ZJlbid. 46 ● Civilian ssace Stationss snd the U.S. Future in Space

The Creation of Space Policy year the Committee intends to look in greater Study Centers depth at the elements and character of the current institutional apparatus for setting space pol- The number of professionals engaged in space icy [and] examining the process by which deci- policy analysis is extremely small. The President’s sions and policies are reached on civil space science advisor spoke to this lack of independ- issues. ” ent expertise in testifying before a House subcom- In these circumstances, Congress could con- mittee in February 1984. sider prompting the establishment of one or more And in March the House Committee on Sci- modestly sized, policy-related, study centers out- ence and Technology24 spoke to “ . . . the chang- side of the Government. Provided with sufficient- ing character of national and international space ly broad charters, and funded in such a fashion activity [that] translates into issues and policy con- as to assure both independence in, and long-term siderations of increasing breadth and complex- support of, truly challenging studies, professionals ity, ” and went on to say that “[d]uring the next would be attracted to conduct the kinds of broad inquiry and analysis that the civilian space area Wjee committee KpOrt Of Mar. 21 f 1984. now so badly needs. Chapter 3 SPACE INFRASTRUCTURE Contents

Page Summary ...... 49 Introduction...... 49 Considerations For Any Space Infrastructure ...... 50 Orbits ...... 50 Low-Earth-Orbit Environment ...... 51 Technical Considerations ...... 52 Space Transportation ...... 54 NASA’s Approach to Space Infrastructure ...... 58 “Mission Analysis Studies” Summary ...... 58 Infrastructure Functions...... 60 Reactions of National Research Council Boards ...... 61 Alternative Infrastructure ...... 62 Uninhabitable Platforms ...... 62 Habitable Infrastructure ...... 70 Extended Duration Orbiter (EDO) ...... 70 Spacelab ...... 72 Shuttle as Permanent Infrastructure ...... 77 Shuttle External Tank (ET) ...... 77

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure No. Page 1. Orbital Inclinations and Representative Uses ...... 50 2. Diagram of Shuttle Mission Profile ...... 55 3. A Possible Configuration for NASA’s Initial Operational Capability . . . ‘ . . Space Station Involving a Solar Power Array, Habitat Module, Logistics Module, Two Laboratory Modules, and Satellite Servicing Structure ...... 57 4. An Artist’s Conception of a LEASECRAFT Enroute to Orbital Altitude With Payload Attached ...... 63 5. A Free-Flying Permanent Industrial Space Facility...... 67 6. Major Spacelab Elements ...... 73 7, Shuttle-Spacelab Flight Profile...... 74 8. An Artist’s Conception of a Free-Flying Pressurized Module with...... an Attached Resource Module (second phase of Columbus concept) . . . . 76 9. External Tank Structure ...... 80 10. Possible Uses of External Tank ., ...... 81 11. Concept of Infrastructure Utilizing Four External Tanks ...... 82 Chapter 3 SPACE INFRASTRUCTURE

SUMMARY

Since 1957 various spacefaring nations have Space Applications Board to NASA’s “space sta- launched hundreds of spacecraft, many of which tion” aspirations are then discussed. The re- remain today in Earth orbit or on itineraries within mainder of chapter 3 lists and describes alterna- the solar system or beyond. Many of these space- tives to NASA’s aspirations for space infrastructure, craft, and some of those to be launched in the including a number of currently existing platforms future including any “space station” elements and other infrastructure elements, and some that and associated launch and transportation sys- are under development or in the planning stage. 1 tems, are elements of space infrastructure, enabl- A “USA Salyut” concept is presented as an oping humans at the surface and in space to carry tion that could provide in-space infrastructure out activities outside of Earth’s atmosphere. This that is roughly comparable to the Soviet Union’s chapter begins with a discussion of the space current Salyut 7. environment, orbits, and the technical aspects of space infrastructure. NASA’s specific aspirations ‘Among the sources for the material presented in this chapter for a “space station” and the functions that NASA are background repcrts prepared for OTA by Dr. Jerry Grey, expects it to provide are listed in detail. The pro- aerospace consultant (on space systems and transportation) and by Teledyne-Brown Engineering on alternatives to wholly new tech- jected uses of such a facility are summarized, nology in-space infrastructure. Additional material on existing or taken from the response of a number of major proposed space platforms and spacecraft was furnished by indi- aerospace contractors to NASA’s Mission Anal- vidual aerospace companies. Also available were results of an OTA workshop on lower cost alternatives to a space station; workshop ysis Studies. The reaction of the National Re- participants included aerospace industry and international repre- search Council’s Space Science Board and the sentatives.

INTRODUCTION

The United States is currently pursuing a wide such “space stations” in the early sixties.2 In the variety of civilian space activities. The argument early seventies, astronauts were successfully sup- is being forcefully advanced that additional in- ported for long durations aboard Skylab, the first space infrastructure would permit scientific, tech- U.S. space laboratory. Now, at the beginning of nology-development and commercial activities the second-quarter century of the space age, U.S. to be performed more easily or economically space infrastructure that would support long-du- than at present, and might allow new types of ration human activities in space is again under activities in space. Plans for a civilian “space sta- consideration. tion, ” i.e., space infrastructure, were included in the ambitious U.S. publicly supported space ‘The first realistic design initiative for a space station appears to effort which commenced immediately after the have been taken prior to the NASA efforts by the Lockheed Corp. Missiles and Space Division in the late 1950s (S. B. Kramer and R. launch of the first Sputnik over a quarter century A. Byers, “Assembly of a Multi-Manned Satellite, ” LMSD Report ago. NASA undertook preliminary designs for No. 48347, December 1958).

49 —

50 . Civilian Space Stations and the U.S. Future in Space

CONSIDERATIONS FOR ANY SPACE INFRASTRUCTURE

The space environment is quite different from Figure 1 that on and near the Earth’s surface. There are Representative Uses a number of orbital, environmental, and techni- ● Earth observation cal factors that must be considered to ensure safe (land, ocean, atmosphere) Near-polar and successful operations in space. orbit Orbits Infrastructure elements could be located in one, or several, of a wide range of orbits. Most communications satellites and some meteorological and Earth observation satellites utilize locations in geostationary orbits, 35,800 km above the Equator, as fixed vantage points from which to transmit and receive signals or to observe the Earth’s surface and its atmosphere. It has been frequently suggested that on-orbit servicing of geostationary satellites, their orbital transfer propulsion systems, and inter-orbit transportation vehicles, could be done more efficiently from infrastructure located in low-Earth-orbit (LEO) with a low inclination relative to the Equator. An or- I b Materials bital inclination of 28.5° (see fig. 1) would be rea- processing sonable for this infrastructure, because launches Life sciences over the Atlantic Ocean from Cape Canaveral Astrophysics/solar into orbits of this inclination consume the least energy. When repetitive but not full coverage of the These two functions–servicing geostationary Earth is essential, a lower inclination can be used; satellites and launching into the lowest energy an orbit inclination of 57o is favored because it orbit from Cape Canaveral—are reasonably com- is the maximum practical inclination obtainable patible, because the additional energy needed with a Cape Canaveral launch. It may be desir- per unit mass at great altitudes to transfer a able to use infrastructure elements in several or- payload into geostationary orbit from 28.5° is bital planes, or perhaps to develop and employ relatively small. a reusable orbital transfer vehicle (ROTV) for transportation between orbits having various in- However, full repetitive coverage of the Earth clinations, although this would be expensive. for low-altitude meteorological and other Earth- viewing satellites requires near-polar orbits (such Orbital altitudes are also related to several phys- as the near-900 inclination illustrated in fig. 1). ical characteristics of space. One of these is the Such satellites are therefore launched from the “solar wind,” a radiation flux of high-energy par- Vandenberg Air Force Base in California, which ticles from the Sun, that can present a threat to offers a safe launch trajectory to the south, over human beings and equipment. However, the re- the Pacific Ocean. A Sun-synchronous near-polar gion from 200 to 600 km in altitude (LEO) is orbit that follows the dawn-dusk line is possible; shielded by the Earth’s magnetosphere and the it avoids Earth shadowing of solar-powered or radiation there is almost negligible compared with solar-viewing instruments, but does not accom- the radiation in and beyond the Van Allen belts, modate Earth-viewing instruments that require il- which extend to 50,000 km in altitude. The mag- lumination of the Earth’s surface by the Sun. netic field is less effective in shielding against ra- Ch. 3—Space /infrastructure . 51

Photo credit: Nat/ona/ Aeronautics and Space Administration Diagram showing Earth’s magnetosphere and other near-Earth phenomena. diation approaching the Earth near its magnetic Another consideration is the energy that must poles, including that associated with solar flares. be expended to take material to a sufficient alti- Thus, high-altitude orbits and near-polar orbits tude to obtain a relatively low drag, long-life or- are much less hospitable than low-Earth-orbits of bit. To reach LEO requires more than half of the low inclination. energy required either to reach geostationary orbit or to escape the Earth’s gravitational field Orbit altitude also affects the amount of global altogether. This is the physical basis for some of Earth coverage available to viewing instruments. the projected cost savings of a permanently orbit- If a sensor is required to provide daily global cov- ing infrastructure base: large launch costs would erage, for example, the physical limitations on be paid only once when infrastructure compo- the angular swath width impose a minimum sat- nents are carried into orbit and left there, avoid- ellite altitude much higher than 500 km. ing additional, repetitive, launch costs for heavy Aerodynamic drag becomes an important con- equipment that would be frequently used in sideration for lower altitude orbits. Aerodynamic space. Of course, resupply launches would still drag decreases for higher orbits; at 400 km, the be needed and would offset some of this cost sav- drag is two orders of magnitude less than at 200 ing.3 km. The minimum economical, long-term altitude for large semipermanent infrastructure ele- Low-Earth-Orbit Environment ments that would be serviced using the Shuttle ordinarily would be above 300 km, and it will Four characteristics of the LEO physical envi- likely be below 600 km because of the rapid de- ronment are of particular interest: microgravity, crease in Shuttle payload capacity with greater high vacuum, periodic high-intensity sunlight, altitude. and the combination of solar exposure and shadowing that makes thermal control possible. For Since locations in LEO are above most of the any infrastructure elements located beyond the atmosphere, astronomical observations of all sorts Van Allen belts, a fifth environmental parameter are favored there. As well, one revolution around is high-energy radiation, the Earth in a typical circular LEO takes 90 minutes, allowing vast areas of Earth’s surface to be observed in continuous succession and on a frequently repeated basis. However, higher orbits 3 provide a broader field of view for remote sens- The number of resupply launches required would depend on the types and levels of activities carried out, the presence or absense ing of Earth. of people, etc. 52 Ž Civilian Space Stations and the U.S. Future in Space

Above the minimum practical orbital altitude Communications.—A number of communica- of a permanent space facility, the presence of tion links would be desirable using frequencies microgravity and vacuum are essentially inde- throughout the electromagnetic spectrum and en- pendent of orbital inclination and altitude. In par- compassing a wide variety of distances, informa- ticular, the exploitation of microgravity or near tion content, and line-of-sight propagation direc- “weightIessness, ” which occurs when gravita- tions. Space communications must be designed tional and orbital acceleration counteract one to avoid interference with established ground- another, shows promise for the processing of ma- based systems and to take privacy, cost, capac- terials under such unique conditions. Energy gen- ity, and reliability into account. Another consideration depends on radiation from the Sun, and eration is the location of communications and thermal control depends on radiating waste heat data processing nodes. The various space infra- out into deep space. For most orbits, the Sun is structure elements could require a large number eclipsed nearly half of the time by the Earth, but of antennas and lenses (the Shuttle has 23) that, this effect can be tolerated if energy storage sys- altogether, would cover a wide field of view. tems are used; batteries charged from solar pho- Phased-array antennas, whose radiation patterns tovoltaic arrays can be used to supply electric can be “pointed” electronically rather than me- power during times that sunlight is blocked by chanically, could be widely used. the Earth. Systems for locating and tracking natural and Of course, for many human beings, simply be- manmade debris, loose tools, and approaching ing in orbit, and being able to view the Earth and spacecraft is also necessary. System concepts for heavens from this perspective, are the outstand- this purpose include radar with beacons or pas- ing characteristics of space. sive reflectors, radio transponders, interferometry, the Global Positioning System, ground-based ra- Technical Considerations dar, or Iidar (laser radar), Although space communications can rely ini- The design of infrastructure components and tially on current technology, millimeter and op- systems will depend heavily on a number of tical wavelengths may be desirable for use in technical considerations. While a considerable space. The development of systems in these parts amount of workable “space station” technology of the spectrum would offer significant techno- exists, as demonstrated by the success of Skylab, logical challenge. SPAS, MESA, and the Shuttle itself, the development of new technology may be desirable to ob- Electromagnetic Interference (EMl).–This is tain a long, and particularly useful and efficient a significant problem that can occur in space, par- lifetime for space infrastructure. ticularly when high-power microwave sources and sensitive detectors are involved. It is difficult Data Management.– Space infrastructure ele- to protect some electronic circuits from this “pick- ments would use an extensive data handling net- up” problem. In some cases EM I could force the work both on-board and on the ground. The net- use of a constellation of individual platforms sep- work would serve orbiting elements including the arated rather widely from each other rather than Shuttle, communication, navigation and remote a single large structure. sensing satellites, orbital transfer vehicles, crew members on spacewalks, tended free flyers, and Attitude Control and Stabilization .–Although support staff and scientific researchers on Earth. space infrastructure elements do not have to con- Cost, program control, and reliability prompt contend with gravity, wind, earthquakes, precipita- sideration of a wide variety of hardware and soft- tion, and other problems encountered on Earth, ware technologies just now coming into being. they must deal with quite different problems such For example, faster processors, laser disk storage, as the absence of both a “firm footing” and the and flat display terminals will provide large in- ‘‘stiffening” influence of gravity. Of particular creases in capacity at lower unit cost and weight. concern is the control and stabilization of large, Ch. 3—Space Infrastructure • 53 flexible, evolving, structural assemblies and mod- However, such a system would require both a ules. Elaborate control systems for each module large, massive single radiator and considerable (sensors, actuators, computers, , . .) that are co- transfer of energy among the various modules via ordinated by a single “supervisory” controller a heat-transport medium. Therefore, the trade- may have to be employed. offs between centralized and modular thermal rejection systems need to be examined in detail. Power.–Solar photovoltaic power generators The centralized system might utilize a gimbaled with nickel-cadmium battery storage are com- radiator maintained in an edge-to-Sun orienta- monly used in space. Systems employing them tion, not only maximizing heat dissipation and today cost at least several thousands of dollars thereby requiring perhaps a 60-percent smaller per watt and have useful lifetimes of 10 years or area than a fixed radiator, but also minimizing less in orbit. One alternative is a nuclear power solar-wind degradation of its thermal coating. reactor, perhaps of the type now being explored in the Space Power Advanced Reactor program, A conventional separate-tube radiator, similar but development time and hazards to human be- to that used in the Shuttle, would be extremely ings (and perhaps cost) may well preclude the complex and massive because of the need for use of nuclear reactors for inhabited infrastruc- redundant piping, valving, and other plumbing ture in the near future. components. For a typical 100-kW heat rejection system, a Shuttle-type radiator would require Significant cost reduction in photovoltaic arrays almost 6,000 meters (almost 4 miles) of tubing has been achieved using optical focusing devices in over 1,500 individual pumped fluid tubes, that concentrate sunlight on the photocells, but more than 50 fluid manifolds, and more than 75 considerable effort would be needed to develop isolation valves, fluid swivels or flexible line and demonstrate practical arrays of this type for segments. Hence, a heat pipe radiator may be use in space. Coupled with this technique could a better choice. Heat pipes transfer heat by boil- be the use of more efficient solar cells, such as ing a fluid such as ammonia at one end of a gallium-arsenide, in place of silicon cells. Efforts sealed tube and condensing it at the other. The to increase the lifetime and reduce the mass of liquid is then returned to the hot end by capillary batteries could also lead to cost reduction. One (surface-tension) forces in a specially designed promising replacement for present nickel-cad- wick which forms part of the tube. The heat pipe mium devices is the nickel-hydrogen battery. has no moving parts, and each pipe is self-con- Another, at an earlier stage of development, is tained. Single pipes have demonstrated heat re- the regenerative fuel cell/electrolysis method, in jection rates up to 2 kW; hence, as few as 50 which a fuel cell produces electricity and water could handle 100 kW of power in space, While when in the Earth’s shadow and splits water into the technology is relatively well known, consid- hydrogen and oxygen when in sunlight. erable development is called for to evolve a practical, reliable, long-life, heat pipe radiator at this Thermal Energy Management.–For infrastruc- power level. ture composed of connected modules, it may not be practical to use individual thermal control sys- Another technological challenge would be an tems for each module. Although individual sys- inter-module system that transfers thermal energy tems would offer maximum flexibility, such an to a radiator. Shuttle-type pumped-loop systems approach would prevent heat thrown off from using Freon 21 would consume large amounts one module from being used by another, and of power (up to 5 kW for a 100-kW system), and each module’s radiator, which is by far the big- would also require the development of large, gest and most exposed component of the ther- costly, space-rated pumps and their attendant re- mal system, would impose its own orientation pair and maintenance. A two-phase heat trans- and location constraints on the overall structure. port system using the same principle as the heat Hence, a centralized, automated system may be pipe would consume only about one-tenth as needed both to minimize total mass and to op- much power. Hence, it may be worth the cost timize radiator orientation (i.e., edge to Sun). of its development.

38-798 0 - 84 - 5 : QL 3 54 ● Civilian Space Stations and the U.S. Future in Space

The use of passive cryogenic coolers for electro- to be resupplied every 90 days and would have optical detectors will present a difficult techni- a 30-day contingency supply. Compared with the cal challenge. Active cryogenic systems are prob- Shuttle system, which does not use recovery, ably not satisfactory for long-term operation. Pas- almost 7,OOO kg per resupply launch could be sive coolers require exposure to dark space and saved. If reclaimed water were also used for an environment that is free from effluents that showers, and for washing utensils and clothes, would condense on the cooler’s cold patch. thereby replacing “wet wipes,” disposable clothes, and disposable food service utensils, another Propulsion.— Infrastructure elements require 5,000 kg could be saved for each launch. There- propulsion systems for attitude control, orbit fore, the development cost of such a system change, station-keeping, and acceleration con- could be offset by associated transportation sav- trol. Propulsion systems currently use storable liq- ings of over $100 million per year. uid mono- and bi-propellant pressure-fed thrusters. Near-future plans include cryogenic oxygen/ Food supply technology will also require some hydrogen propulsion systems. Longer term pros- development, including improvements in packag- pects are electromagnetic thrusters including ion ing, preservation, bulk storage, reconstitution, rocket (ions can be accelerated to much higher and on-board preparation. Proper sanitation to exhaust velocities than those provided by chem- reduce the incidence of debilitating illness in the ical rockets) and mass drivers (“buckets” of heavy completely closed environment of a “space sta- materials can be accelerated, very rapidly by election” will require waste disposal, contamination trical motors rather than by conventional chem- containment, disease-prevention measures, and ical combustion). heakh-maintenance facilities unique to microgravity environments to be developed and used. A principal challenge will be the creation of a Some of this technology has already been devel- storage and transfer system for handling liquid oped for the long-duration Skylab project, but im- fuels in space. Specific needs are leak-proof fluid provements are needed. Particular attention couplings and leak-detection techniques, fluid- should be given to the proper design of residen- quantity gauges that operate with acceptable ac- tial, exercise, and recreational facilities if people curacy in microgravity where conventional liquid- are to remain in orbit for periods of much longer Ievel sensors are not suitable, reusable, low-mass, than several weeks. nontoxic, long-life insulation for cryogenic storage and transport, and the liquefaction and refrig- eration systems needed for long-term cryogenic Space Transportation storage. Improvements in cryogenic refueling Vehicles will be needed for transportation be- procedures now used on the surface for Shuttle tween Earth and LEO, between various LEO or- operations would be necessary—preferably pro- bits, between LEO and higher, including geosta- cedures that would use automation—to obviate tionary, orbits, and beyond to the Moon and the need for a large technical staff that would be perhaps to other planets and some asteroids. In very expensive to accommodate in space. the near future, supply for a “space station” from Life Support Systems.–Some of the materials Earth would rely primarily on the present Shut- necessary for the support of humans in space tle and possibly its derivatives. Local checkout would be supplied from Earth, others would be and maintenance services requiring people work- recovered in orbit from metabolic byproducts. ing directly in space could be conducted by With the exception of food, recovery technology tethered or free-flying spacesuited astronauts, demonstrated since 1967 can provide for oxygen, sometimes augmented by the existing manned carbon dioxide scrubbing, and water for both maneuvering units (MMUs). Servicing of more drinking and washing. Such a “partially closed” distant spacecraft could be accomplished with a system accommodating an eight-person crew, planned orbital maneuvering vehicle (OMV), pos- each drinking about 3.5 kg of water and using sibly in combination with either the Shuttle or a about a liter of wash water per day, would have planned space-based ROTV, or by an ROTV (or Ch. 3—Space Infrastructure • 55 the Shuttle) carrying an astronaut equipped with Earth’s surface and LEO at any Inclination. The an MMU. Shuttle can deliver 30,000 kg to a 200-km (120- mile) orbit inclined at 28.5° to the Equator. Any Launching spacecraft into higher orbits or on increase in orbit altitude or change from this or- Earth-escape trajectories requires the use of an bit inclination reduces the payload capacity. upper stage rocket, which could be automatic, However, most payloads are volume-limited by teleoperated, or used with a crew, plus kick the cargo bay’s 18-meter length and 4.6-meter stages or planetary landing stages, depending on diameter rather than weight-limited. By the early the project. ROTVS, either teleoperated or em- 1990s, the earliest date considered practical for ploying crews, could be used to service satellites obtaining a “space station,” NASA projects a total in orbits of significantly different altitude and of some 24 to 30 Shuttle flights per year, and somewhat different inclination. some 50 per year by the year 2000. The Shut- Shuttle.-The Shuttle (fig. 2) meets most of the tle’s cargo bay could be used to carry infra- current needs for transportation between the structure- elements

Figure 2.—Diagram of Shuttle Mission Profile

SOLID ROCKET APPROACH AND BOOSTER RECOVERED LANDING 56l Civilian Space Statlons and the U.S. Future in Space

its crew of up to seven persons could be used “Long March” rocket, and the Soviet Union is to assist with any assembly and checkout. The offering to make its Proton launcher commercial- Shuttle could also resupply expendable, ferry ly available. In addition, several private corpora- personnel, and serve for emergency rescue. tions in the United States and Germany have announced plans to develop ELVS. Many of these Manned Maneuvering Unit (MMU).–The vehicles and possibly others may be available MMU is a backpack equipped with a computer- commercially throughout the next decade. How- operated propulsion system that permits an astro- ever, it is not likely that they will be suitable for naut to “free fly, ” thereby projecting his senses, launching spacecraft that carry people, although his strength and dexterity, and his judgment be- they could launch supply spacecraft as the Sovi- yond the confines of the Shuttle or other habit- et Proton boosts the Progress into orbit. able infrastructure out to a few hundred meters. It is a general-purpose device that can be used Expendable launch vehicles that can launch to for inspection, servicing and deployment or re- high orbits, or to Earth-escape trajectories, use trieval of equipment, for construction and assem- either their own upper stages or uniquely com- bly operations, for crew rescue, for emergency patible orbital transfer vehicles (OTVS). The pay- repairs, etc. A Shuttle-based MMU was success- load itself carries the “kick stage” or other pro- fully demonstrated on two flights in early 1984. pulsion needed to move from high, inclined, elliptical orbits to geostationary orbits. Orbital Maneuvering Vehicle (OMV).-Local transportation in LEO would be provided by the Reusable Orbital Transfer Vehicle (ROTV).-A OMV. It would be operated remotely from the reusable, high-performance, liquid propellant Shuttle, other space infrastructure, or possibly “space tug” could provide transportation be- from Earth. It would be designed to have a six- tween LEO and geostationary and lunar orbits, degree of freedom propulsion system that would or between Earth orbits of various inclination and allow satellite or platform servicing operations at altitude. Reusability and space-basing give prom- distances well beyond the MMU’S few-hundred- ise of economic benefit for the use of an ROTV meter limit. One version of the OMV would be in launching and servicing communications and able to make altitude changes of 1,000 km or other satellites that utilize the geostationary or- more above its initial LEO and orbit plane changes bit. An ROTV could be piloted by a crew or re- of up to 8°, depending on payload weight. motely operated. Basic OMV equipment includes propulsion Development of an “Advanced Space Engine” units and propellent tanks; television cameras and suitable to power an ROTV has yet to be started. lights for inspection and operator guidance; com- Space-basing implies reusability, of course, as munications; control systems for remote opera- well as flexibility of thrust and duration of rocket tions; electric power; thermal control; and various burn, and the ability to refuel and perform main- manipulators and docking attachments. Current tenance in space. Thus, space-basing requires NASA plans are to have such a new-technology some form of orbital logistics system, including vehicle developed and operating in time to be tanks, pumps, controls, and other equipment for useful in the deployment and assembly of a refueling, people or teleoperator devices to check “space station.” out the ROTV, refurbish it as needed, and reset its operating systems for each new trip, and per- Expendable Launch Vehicle (ELV)-Up to No- haps crew quarters. vember 1982, all payloads launched into space were carried there by ELVS. There are now three Space-basing also requires docking, servicing, basic U.S. families of ELVS: the Delta, Atlas-Cen- and storage facilities in space to make ROTV op- taur, and Titan III. The European Space Agency eration possible. Moreover, as fuel for the ROTV has its Ariane family of boosters, Japan has its must always be brought from the surface to LEO, N-2 (derived from the U.S. Delta) and is devel- alternative ways of transporting it are under con- oping others, the People’s Republic of China has sideration. More efficient delivery systems than launched a geostationary satellite using its FB-3 the Shuttle, such as a Shuttle-derived tanker vehi-

Ch. 3—Space Infrastructure • 57 58 Ž Civilian Space Stations and the U.S. Future in Space cle, are being looked at. Scavenging left-over fuel that intersects the top of the atmosphere. If the from the Shuttle external tank is being given con- ROTV could dissipate enough energy to decrease sideration. Considerable development time and its velocity by 2,400 meters per second, it would expense would be involved in any of these efforts. have just enough energy left to raise it to a “space station’s” (typical) 300-km orbit. There, it could A prospect which offers an opportunity for con- deliver its return payload (if any) and refuel for siderable propellant savings is to dissipate the its next trip. This aerobraking concept promises ROTV’S excess kinetic energy, on return from a saving of over half of the propellant needed high altitudes to LEO, by allowing it to dip into (compared to an all-propulsive ROTV) for a re- the upper reaches of the Earth’s atmosphere, a turn trip with payload from geostationary Earth maneuver called “aerobraking.” The return flight orbit. would consist of a brief de-orbit burn that would place the ROTV into an elliptical transfer orbit

NASA’S APPROACH TO SPACE INFRASTRUCTURE

“Mission Analysis Studies” Summary The contractors viewed activities such as equipment servicing, research (especially in the life In 1982, as part of NASA’s planning to acquire sciences and materials processing), and assembly long-term inhabited infrastructure, i.e., a civilian and modification of large space systems as areas “space station, ” the agency authorized “mission in which presence of a human crew would be analysis studies” in the United States, and reached particularly beneficial. They recommended archi- an agreement with foreign countries for parallel tectural concepts involving several types of mod- studies, of the desires or needs for, and charac- ules for the initial central complex: a command/ teristics of, such infrastructure. The results of habitability module with accommodations for a these studies appear in appendix A. crew of four; an electrical power system provid- The “mission analysis studies” started with the ing about 25 kW to the users; logistics modules supposition that the United States would build for periodic resupply; airlocks, docking ports, and a civilian “space station, ” and did not require the pallets to enable mounting of equipment and lab- potential user to address either justification of the oratory modules. Subsequent development and basic “space station” concept or its funding. The growth of the facility over a 10-year period and studies were simply to identify uses that either incorporation of an ROTV and several free-flying would require or would materially benefit from platforms were anticipated. the availability of a “space station” and to sug- Estimation of acquisition costs ranged from ap- gest some of its fundamental characteristics. proximately $4 billion to $5 billion (1984$) for Of the several hundred potential activities in the initial facility, to about $12 billion for an science, commercialization, and technology de- evolved complex envisioned as being completed velopment identified by the U.S. companies (pri- 6 to 8 years after the system first became opera- marily aerospace) conducting the studies, the tional. Other than the performance and social selection was narrowed by NASA to a set of about benefits of such a “space station,” they estimated 100 time-phased missions for the first 10 years that economic benefits from servicing satellites of “station” operation, 70 percent of which could in orbit, transfer of satellites to higher orbits by be accomplished from a central base facility lo- an ROTV, and human-tended long-term research cated in a 28,5° inclination in LEO. Free-flying activities would be considerable. The increased platforms, either co-orbiting or in polar orbit, ability to launch planetary probes, establish a could accommodate most of the others. lunar settlement, and undertake human explora- Ch. 3—Space /infrastructure • 59 tion of Mars was considered of great significance industrial service activities (e. g., satellite servic- in terms of long-range goals. ing). Of the total set, 48 were categorized under science and applications, 28 under commercial, The foreign mission analysis studies paralleled and 31 under technology-development. those of the U.S. contractors and defined a similar set of space activities appropriate for infrastruc- In parallel with the contractor studies, NASA ture use. All participating agencies from Europe, hired two consulting firms to communicate with Canada, and Japan expressed great interest in tak- a variety of non-aerospace companies to iden- ing part both in providing elements of space in- tify and encourage interest in the use of in-space frastructure and in actively participating as part- facilities for commercial purposes. The consult- ners in its use. Many of them look upon it as ants discussed prospects with approximately sO fundamental to their future role in space and companies, and more than 30 expressed active therefore want long-term understandings and interest in using a “space station” if it were avail- agreements with the United States on partici- able. Most of the companies moving toward pation. agreements with NASA to become active in space are well-known U.S. industrial firms (one with an NASA assembled the United States and foreign announced agreement is the 3M Co.), but sev- mission analysis reports and held a workshop in eral are from the small business sector or Europe. May 1983 to synthesize the results. The workshop Interest is concentrated on the possible produc- established a minimum time-phased “mission tion of particular chemicals, metals, glass, com- set” (for the initial decade of use) of 107 specific munications, and crystals. Among the half dozen space activities, plus four generic commercial- companies now actively investigating the possi-

80X D.-NASA's Current Aspirations

$ 8. ,, . . 60 ● Civilian Space Stations and the U.S. Future in Space

bility of sponsoring space experiments, most are and launch vehicles (e.g., those carrying more interested in crew-tended operations rather communications satellites) to geostationary than automated procedures. Further details of the or other high orbits, and as automated in- consulting firms’ studies are discussed in the final terplanetary probes (e.g., a Mars orbiter or section of appendix A. an asteroid rendezvous vehicle; 6. an assembly facility for large space structures Infrastructure Functions (e.g., antennas for advanced satellite communications systems); The NASA planning process has depended 7. a storage depot for spare parts, fuel, and sup- heavily on the “Mission Analysis Studies” of U.S. plies for use as needed by satellites, plat- and foreign aerospace contractors and foreign forms, vehicles, and people; and space agencies. From the views assembled there- 8. a staging base for more ambitious future in, functions were identified for any space in- projects-and travel (e.g., a lunar settlement frastructure (“space station”) that could provide or a human voyage to Mars). efficient and effective assets and services to support the projected space activities. Questions such as the following must be asked relative to the corresponding functions listed NASA’s aspirations for a “space station” were above: most recently presented to the Senate Commit- 1. tee on Appropriations in March 1984. The in- How much of an investment do these (and frastructure envisioned in their plans would pro- other) capabilities warrant? vide the following: 2. Is use of a “space station” the optimum way to accomplish these missions? 1. an on-orbit laboratory supporting research 3. When will the need for a microgravity pro- on a wide range of life, materials, and other duction facility be demonstrated, and how science topics, and the development of new much of its cost should its users pay for? technology (e.g., studies of biology, cosmic 4. What kinds of satellites will be repaired, rays, processing methods for pharmaceuti- why, and who will bear the cost? cals and semiconductors, testing of space 5. When will the transportation hub be ready materials, and advanced communications and why is it needed then? technology); 6. What is the purpose of the assembly facility 2. permanent observatories for astronomy and for the large space structures–and of the Earth remote sensing (e.g., a solar optical tel- large space structures themselves? escope to examine the surface of the Sun, 7. What is the justification for a storage depot a starlab to study the structure of galaxies, in space? and Iidar equipment to probe the at- 8. When will a staging base be required for a mosphere); lunar settlement or a manned Mars expe- 3. a facility for microgravity materials process- dition? ing and manufacture of products (e.g., pharmaceuticals, semiconductors, glasses, and And, underlying all of these specific questions metals); is the hazard that too great a commitment to the 4. servicing of satellites and platforms (e.g., the acquisition of in-space infrastructure, and the re- maintenance or replacement of compo- sulting long-term operations and management ex- nents, replenishment of consumables, and penditures, might preempt the adequate support exchange of equipment); of other important civilian space activities. 5. a transportation hub to assemble, check out, Ch. 3—Space Infrastructure ● 67

REACTIONS OF NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL BOARDS

Other science and engineering organizations mentation, especially for large antennas, was have participated in the study of space infrastruc- another likely use in their estimation. The pres- ture acquisition. NASA invited the National Re- ence of a human crew was deemed desirable, search Council (NRC) to review its possible utili- particularly for materials science experiments and zation for space science and applications. (The for modification and repair of instruments. The NRC is a private organization of distinguished SAB also concluded that a platform in near-polar scientists and engineers operating within the char- orbit would be an important infrastructure com- ter of the National Academy of Sciences to act ponent, to be used for Earth remote sensing of as an advisor to the U.S. Government (and others) resources, Earth environmental studies, and on science and technology issues. It works ocean observations. The capability of the plat- through its committees, boards, and institutes, form to merge and process a variety of data prior two of which, the Space Science Board (SSB) and to transmission to the ground would be an advan- the Space Applications Board (SAB), studied these tage compared to independent, unprocessed issues in workshops during the summer of 1982.) transmissions from individual satellites. The SAB cautioned that sufficient resources must be made The Space Science Board concluded that al- available to develop instruments and payloads for most all of the space science research projects use on any “space station. ” forecast for the next 20 years (a forecast made without giving great attention to the possible use Another body examining the role of expanded of sophisticated in-space infrastructure) could be space infrastructure was the NASA Solar System carried out without the use of a “space station” Exploration Committee (SSEC). The SSEC is a as then characterized by NASA. These projects group of the Nation’s outstanding planetary scien- could be carried out by using Shuttle/Spacelab, tists directly advising NASA on planetary research. satellites, interplanetary probes launched with ex- The SSEC, which spent 2 years defining a new pendable launch vehicles, or contemplated up- U.S. planetary space strategy, looked at the per stages compatible with the Shuttle. The SSB usefulness of any new infrastructure for planetary stated it was not opposed to a “space station, ” exploration. It concluded that, in the near term, that a decision on it should be made for reasons the facility could be used beneficially as an beyond science uses, and that some science in- assembly and launch base for deep space probes terests would make use of it if it were available. with potentially important advantages for plane- But the SSB expressed concern that any delays tary spacecraft requiring large internal propulsion in launching science payloads that might be im- systems. In the longer term, this could greatly fa- posed as a consequence of waiting for comple- cilitate the return of samples from Mars by pro- tion of any “space station” could harm science viding a fully loaded booster such as a Centaur programs unnecessarily, as the SSB believes hap- rocket. A “space station” could also serve as a pened during the development of the Shuttle holding facility for returned samples to alleviate (when several programs used up funds for em- concerns of their possible contamination of the ployee salaries and other program costs during Earth. such delays), In January 1984, NASA created a 15-member The Space Applications Board expressed guarded advisory panel of academic space scientists that, support for use of a “space station .“ It indicated over a 2-year interval, is expected to give NASA interest in applications made possible, or made advice on suitable research projects for long-term, more efficient, through use of appropriate infra- habitable, space infrastructure. structure, such as servicing of free-flying platforms, launching of geostationary satellites, repair- Of related interest to NASA programs, the NRC’s ing LEO satellites, and serving as a materials Aeronautics and Space Engineering Board (ASEB) processing laboratory. Communications experi- conducted a workshop during 1983 on NASA’s 62 • Civilian Space Stations and the U.S. Future in Space

Space Research and Technology Program. While The ASEB urged NASA to provide access to not directly addressing “space station” issues, space for experimental purposes as a natural ex- their report noted the high payoff uses of space tension of national aerospace facilities on the in the communications and meteorology fields, Earth’s surface. Overall, the report recommended the present speculative nature of manufacturing that NASA devote a significant portion of its ef- in space, the high cost of space transportation forts to develop technology that would reduce and systems as an inhibiting factor in the com- the cost of spacecraft subsystems, payloads, trans- mercial use of space, and that, in the face of portation, and operations. foreign competition, the United States should continue to explore and stimulate potential uses of space.

ALTERNATIVE INFRASTRUCTURE

Because of the large public costs associated Shuttle or expendable vehicles for launch and with the NASA plans for acquiring in-space in- service. frastructure, and considering the view of the Space Science Board (and others) regarding the The Shuttle can be used to launch to, and re- NASA plans, it is important to explore alterna- turn equipment or other materials from, LEO. This tive approaches for providing the desired capa- ability allows for the use of space platforms of- bilities of such infrastructure. OTA has identified fering electric power, heat rejection, communi- several alternatives that could provide various ca- cations, attitude control, and other services to a pabilities, at various times, and at various initial number of users. Some time after insertion into costs to the Government. These alternatives in- orbit (typically several months to a year), the Shut- clude system components that currently exist or tle or an ROTV would rendezvous with such a are currently under development. OTA has also platform, and servicing intervals for platform- considered a gradual approach to infrastructure mounted instruments would be coordinated with acquisition with various average annual funding the rendezvous schedule, keeping costs in mind. rates; lower cost alternatives could be used as Payloads could be exchanged, attitude control, early steps in an evolutionary development lead- fuel and other expendable replenished, batteries ing to increasingly sophisticated and capable ar- charged, or the platforms could be returned to rays of infrastructure. Each of these approaches an LEO base or to Earth. Platforms could avoid has different implications for initial Government contamination and stability problems associated cost, life-cycle costs, pace of commercial devel- with inhabited infrastructure. The cost of the opment, and the pace for carrying out human common platform facilities could be amortized activities in space. over a long lifetime and a large number of activities. Uninhabitable Platforms Fairchild LEASECRAFT.-The Fairchild LEASE- Regardless of the outcome of the debate over CRAFT (fig. 4) is designed to support equipment the need for infrastructure that includes and/or that can be exchanged on orbit. This design ap- supports a long-term human presence in space, proach anticipates that the costs (special equip- there is a significant community of users who ment, crew training, etc.) and risks associated would benefit from having uninhabited space fa- with performing maintenance and payload modi- cilities and services available to them. A number fications and substitutions on orbit are outweighed of so-called free-flying automated platform alter- by the saving in transportation cost and improve- natives now exist, are in development, or have ment in spacecraft utilization, which avoids fre- been conceived, that could take advantage of the quent launch and return of the platform.

Ch. 3—Space Infrastructure ● 63

Figure 4.—An Artist’s Conception of a LEASECRAFT Enroute to Orbital Altitude With Payload Attached

LEASECRAFT was inspired by the Multimission altitude of 480 km. Later it can be returned to Modular Spacecraft (MMS) system on which the the Shuttle orbit for rendezvous. The total weight Landsat D and Solar Maximum Mission spacecraft of the LEASECRAFT bus is expected to be 6,400 are based. It can provide up to 6 kW of power kg (including the initial charge of propellant). and other services to user payloads, and is in- The power and other services provided by the tended to serve LEO space projects that include LEASECRAFT are dependent on the number and data acquisition/transmission and materials proc- type of its modules. Details of how module and essing. payload changes will be handled will depend on Data acquisition activities generally require fine lessons learned from the Solar Max repair. Pos- pointing and high data rates but relatively mod- sibilities include the manipulation of tools by the est power levels. Materials processing projects, Remote Manipulator System (RMS), spacewalk- on the other hand, require high power but low ing outside the Shuttle cargo bay by payload data rates and relatively coarse pointing. The specialists, and retrieval of the LEASECRAFT by LEASECRAFT could be converted from one con- the RMS to a position in the cargo bay where figuration to the other on orbit from the Shuttle payload specialists would perform the work or from other inhabited infrastructure. needed. The LEASECRAFT design includes a centrally An automated electrophoresis payload being mounted propulsion module that contains 2,700 developed by McDonnell Douglas is frequently kg of hydrazine for transfer from the standard mentioned in conjunction with the LEASECRAFT. Shuttle orbit of about 300 km to an operating It will consist of an electrophoretic processing fa- . —

64 • Civilian Space Stations and the U.S. Future in Space

cility and a separate supply module having a com- Ariane structural interface on its top side, which bined weight of some 10,000 kg. The process- enables it to share a launch by fitting between ing unit will use 3.5 kW of power and will require the Ariane and the primary payload. This use of an acceleration environment of less than 0.1 per- residual launch capacity can reduce the cost of cent of gravity on Earth. transportation to orbit. Another prospective payload for the LEASE- The total mass of the MESA/Viking platform is CRAFT system is NASA’s Advanced X-Ray Astron- some 500 kg. The design of the platform provides omy Facility (AXAF). AXAF is a 9,000-kg telescope for attitude control and propulsion. Once the Vik- that will operate in a 500-km orbit, require 1.2 ing separates from the main satellite after launch, kW of power, and periodic change of imaging the propulsion unit can boost the Viking into its and spectrographic instruments. operational orbit. The spacecraft is spin stabilized at 3 rpm, and Earth/Sun sensors and magnetic The LEASECRAFT’s ability to accommodate torquers are elements of the attitude control sys- specific payloads is very similar to that of the high tem. A combination of solar arrays and a battery power version of EURECA (see below), with one provide 60 W of average power with a peak pow- important exception: the higher data handling er of 120 W. ability of LEASECRAFT would allow it to accommodate most science and applications instru- Limited changes can be made in solar array size ments. It would not accommodate some instru- and power output. The overall diameter of the ment projects that are very large, or those that MESA with payload cannot exceed the 2.95-me- require human involvement. ter internal diameter of the Ariane’s payload compartment. The central core of the platform is de- The initial LEASECRAFT reportedly will cost at signed to accommodate both platform (420 kg) least $150 million (1984$) apiece to purchase. and payload weights (0o kg for the design refer- Users may also purchase partial services of ence) and up to nearly 2,OOO kg of host satellite LEASECRAFT or lease an entire platform from weight during Ariane launch. The available vol- Fairchild for $20 million to $40 million (1984$) ume for the payload is 1.6 cubic meters (m J). per year. Transportation costs will include initial Should the solid-propellant rocket motor not be launch of the LEASECRAFT and its payload and required, an additional internal volume of ap- other payloads that, subsequently, are taken to 3 proximately 0.6 m would be available for pay- it for exchange. load use. Boeing MESA.–The Modular Experimental MESA is limited in its applicability because of for Science and Applications (MESA) is Platform its small size, limited resources, the use of spin a low-cost satellite system designed by Boeing for stabilization, and the intention to have the pay- launch on the Ariane. The MESA design follows load integrated within the structure. This makes from Boeing small spacecraft designs and produc- it best suited to small, scanning or nonviewing, tion of the last decade. This includes three space- dedicated activities. While suited for some space craft known as S-3 for the Department of De- plasma physics or cosmic ray investigations, the fense, two Applications Explorer Modules (AEMs) spin stabilization is not appropriate for micrograv- for NASA, and the Viking Spacecraft being pro- ity activities. MESA will accommodate only a duced today for the Swedish Space Corp. small fraction of the science and applications The MESA program utilizes existing hardware projects identified in NASA’s Mission Analysis and previous experience to achieve a low-cost Studies. platform for modest payloads that do not require MESA is reported to cost $10 million (1984$). recovery, and for special cases that do require Transportation charges on the Ariane are uncer- recovery. tain since it can share a launch with another pay- An interesting feature of the MESA system in load. If it is carried in the Shuttle, it should qualify its Viking configuration is that it duplicates the for the minimum charge of $12.5 million (1984$).

Ch. 3—Space Infrastructure ● 65

Photo ” Boeing Aerospace

The Boeing MESA spacecraft undergoing ground processing. 66 Ž Civilian Space Stations and the U.S. Future in Space

Shuttle Payload Support Structure (SPSS).– try sources estimate that it would cost some hun- An example of a structure supporting payloads dreds of millions of dollars to develop and con- that remain attached within the Shuttle cargo bay struct. is the SPSS that has been developed for NASA. MBB SPAS.–The concept of a Shuttle-tended Teledyne Brown expects to commercialize SPSS platform was tested, to a limited degree, with the during 1985. It will provide a mount, electrical Space Pallet Satellite (SPAS) payloads during two power, data handling, and environmental con- Shuttle flights. SPAS was developed at the initia- trol for payloads weighing up to 1,400 kg. tive of the German company Messerschmitt-Bol- Long Duration Exposure Facility (LDEF).–A kow-Blohm (MBB). Its structure is constructed out platform housing 57 experiments, many of them of graphite epoxy tubes to form a modular truss seeking to record how manmade materials hold bridge that spans the Shuttle cargo bay in width up in the LEO environment, was released from and fits that length dimension for which a mini- the Shuttle in April 1984. The 10,000 kg-satellite, mum launch charge is made by NASA. The struc- called the Long Duration Exposure Facility (LDEF), ture provides mounting points for subsystem and will be retrieved by the Shuttle in 1985. The LDEF, experiment hardware and includes a grapple fix- basically a free-flying support structure for scien- ture for handling by the Remote Manipulator Sys- tific experiments, cost $14 million (1 984$), not tem, i.e., the Shuttle arm. The SPAS is designed including launch and retrieval. to operate in either a Shuttle-attached mode or as a free-flying platform, and it was released dur- Pleiades Concept.–A concept to expand the ing the seventh Shuttle flight to operate in the lat- use of platforms for space science research has ter mode for about 10 hours before retrieval. In been proposed by students in a 1983 systems en- that operation it provided the first opportunity gineering course at Stanford University. In this to demonstrate the Shuttle’s ability both to de- concept (called “pleiades”), a platform located ploy and retrieve a satellite. The SPAS payload in the Shuttle cargo bay would provide data proc- remained in the cargo bay during the 10th Shut- essing and other support for several co-orbiting tle flight, where it successfully handled equip- free flyers equipped for long-term astrophysics ment for several commercial users. research. Periodic servicing would be feasible from the Shuttle. If developed, it might become Having only battery power and compressed gas a permanent space infrastructure element. thrusters, the initial SPAS is designed for short- Iifetime projects (7 to 15 days), but subsequent Space Industries’ Platform.-A free-flying per- versions could undoubtedly extend the lifetime manent industrial space facility (lSF), designed pri- by incorporating solar photovoltaic arrays and marily for materials processing, has been pro- propellant-type thrusters, and maybe even a kick posed by a new commercial space company, motor to achieve a wider range of orbits and/or Space Industries, Inc. (fig. 5). An automated plat- to be able to return to a Shuttle-compatible or- form suited for production purposes, it could be bit for rendezvous. In its present form, SPAS will placed in LEO by the Shuttle and serviced sev- only accommodate relatively small, low-power eral times a year by it and/or any eventual long- instruments used for short periods of time. term space infrastructure. The ISF would include a pressurized volume where equipment could be The basic SPAS platforms costs less than $1 mil- serviced by a crew during resupply periods; the lion (1984$); subsystem equipment required by facility, however, would provide no life support specific payloads is not included. SPAS is de- functions when occupied other than a suitable signed to qualify for the minimum Shuttle launch atmosphere compatible with the Shuttle or ROTV, charge of $12.5 million (1984$) but, with a large to which it is expected to be attached during payload, it may exceed this qualification. these periods. EURECA.–The European Space Agency (ESA) Assuming successful financing, the facility could is developing a small unmanned platform carrier be placed in operation in the late 1980s. No cost that would be released from the Shuttle and re- figures have been made public, but some indus- trieved after free flights in space of 6 to 9 months. .— — —

Ch. 3—Space Infrastructure ● 67

Figure 5.—A Free-Flying Permanent Industrial Space Facility

. .

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Initial Operating Configuration Two ISF Module Configuration

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Four ISF Module Configuration ISF Docked to NASA’’ Space Station’

Ch. 3—Space /infrastructure Ž 69

Shuttle. The ability to fly from the Shuttle to a The cost of EURECA has not been clearly stated, useful orbit and back for rendezvous with the although ESA has referred to a program cost of Shuttle is typical of most space platform concepts. $170 million (1984$) that appears to include some payload costs. The EURECA will have a payload capacity of about 1,100 kg with the combined carrier and Plans are also being developed for EURECA 11, payload weighing approximately 3,500 kg. The an advanced version having increased power and total length of the carrier/platform, plus its payload capacity. The new design will allow payloads, in the Shuttle’s cargo bay will be 2.3 space-basing and equipment exchange on-orbit, meters, with an option for a shorter length of 1.6 using the Shuttle or a yet-to-be-developed Ariane meters if desired. automatic docking system. Energy for EURECA will be provided by deploy- SOLARIS.-This French concept includes pre- able and retractable solar arrays that will initially liminary designs for an automated platform. It deliver 5.4 kW of power at 28 volts. Of this out- would be unmanned, located in LEO, and would put, 1 kW will be available to the payload on a use furnaces, a robot manipulator arm, solar continuous basis, while much of the balance will power, and other subsystems. Ariane 4 would be required to charge the batteries that supply launch a transfer and supply stage, and a ballistic power when sunlight is not available.4 The power reentry capsule will bring processed materials supply for EURECA and its payload will be cooled back to Earth. using a fluid loop connected to a radiator. The first generation facility would have the fol- EURECA payload and housekeeping data will lowing major elements: be relayed to Europe via circuits employing the ● The Orbital Service Module (OSM), which L-Sat communications satellite as a test. The is a user-shared platform with docking ports telemetry system will normally use ground sta- for payloads and transport vehicles. tions in Europe, but it will also be compatible with ● An in-orbit Transport Modular Vehicle (TMV) the Shuttle. The maximum data rate that can be for resupply, transport, and servicing of processed on the ground by the proposed sys- space payloads. tem is 2.5 kbps, although the on board system will ● A Data Relay Satellite Communications be capable of transmitting up to 1 Mbps. System for control and high data rate trans- Size, mass, capacity, and data handling ability missions. are the most stringent EURECA design constraints. . The Ariane 4 launcher. If the data rate is restricted to 2.5 kbps, only film The intent is to fly the OSM in a circular “Sun- cameras can be accommodated. But if the full synchronous” orbit following a path over the twi- 1 Mbps data rate can be utilized, many science light line, thus avoiding the Earth’s shadow and and applications instruments can be accommo- thereby achieving a relatively high 10 kW of con- dated. However, large, high power, or high data tinuous power output for its users. Activities such rate payloads, such as telescopes, radars, Iidars, as materials processing, microwave Earth obser- multispectral scanners, or a combination of these vation, and assembly and check-out of large ve- or other instrument payloads cannot be accom- hicles in orbit are envisioned. The orbit altitude modated. Increasing the available power level could be adjusted from 600 to 1,000 km. Two alone does not significantly improve the ability docking ports would be available for TMV berth- to accommodate such payloads, since science ing, with five ports for payloads. Data transmis- and applications instruments that require high sion rates would not exceed 400 Mbps. The en- power (e.g., remote sensing radars) also tend to tire OSM weight would be 4,500 kg (excluding have high data rate requirements (tens to hun- propellant). dreds of Mbps). The function of the TMV is to provide transpor- 4More power would be available for payload use if it proves possible to operate the platform in a Sun-synchronous dawn-dusk or- tation service between the Ariane delivery orbit bit where it does not enter the Earth’s shadow. and the OSM, and to permit the return of a lim-

38-798 0 - 84 - 6 : QL 3 70 ● Civilian Space Stations and the U.S. Future in Space ited amount of equipment and products to Earth. “space station”; SOLARIS would be able to ac- The TMV will consist of an expendable module commodate only a small fraction of this market. with propulsion, attitude and trajectory control, Costs of the evolutionary SOLARIS program and the ability to rendezvous and dock. have not been defined, but they likely would be The TMV can be used in either one-way or several billions of dollars (1984$) if the entire con- round-trip service. For one-way service the pay- cept is developed. load would be attached directly to the TMV module, and both would be placed inside the fairing of the Ariane 4 for launch. A 5,000-kg payload could be accommodated in this manner. Habitable Infrastructure Round-trip service requires the use of a reen- Although uninhabited platforms can be used try vehicle similar to the Apollo reentry module. to support many experiments and commercial The TMV module is attached to the reentry body processes that do not require human presence, for launch in a manner similar to the arrangement and some activities require a stability that would for a one-way payload, and the two are separated be difficult to achieve if humans were present, during reentry. About 2,500 kg and 15 m3 of pay- other activities require or can be greatly aided load could be accommodated within the reen- by human presence. These include life science try vehicle; it could touch down on either land studies of humans in space, which are necessary or water and is designed for reuse. to prepare for long duration human travel in space, and interactive experimentation in mate- The first generation SOLARIS concept is func- rials processing (e.g., pharmaceuticals, semicon- tionally similar to the science and applications ductors, crystals), which is required in order to space platform studied by NASA, except that explore the commercial potential of materials SOLARIS specifies a dawn-dusk Sun-synchronous processing. orbit. This orbit restricts its usefulness for many Earth-viewing projects that require lighting from A number of infrastructure elements other than the Sun. However, radars, Iidars, and some mi- the proposed NASA “space station” are available crowave instruments can “see” in the dark and that can support humans in space. would not be affected, while solar-viewing in- Extended Duration Orbiter (EDO).–A major struments wouId gain the advantage of continu- constraint on the duration of the on-orbit time ous visibility of the Sun. The ability of SOLARIS for the Shuttle is the availability of electrical to support large, multiple instrument facilities power. The current Shuttle power system uses should allow for accommodation of most of the three fuel cell powerplants fed by cryogenically solar physics payloads. However, a continuous stored hydrogen and oxygen, and delivers 21 kW full Sun orbit would be a problem for many celes- on a continuous basis, of which 14 kW is allo- tial-viewing instruments that depend on Earth cated to the Shuttle itself and 7 kW is available shadow to eliminate scattered light from the Sun. for payloads. The fuel cells are fed from tank sets All automated life science activities and all (one hydrogen and one oxygen tank in each set) materials processing, except for those requiring located under the floor lining in the Shuttle cargo human presence, could be accommodated. bay. Three tank sets are considered standard The orbit of SOLARIS is not suited to launch, equipment. Two additional sets (for a total of five) retrieval, or servicing of low inclination satellites can be installed with no volume penalty to pay- (including geostationary satellites), since a large loads, but with a combined weight penalty (fully orbit plane change is required. And, since most fueled) of 1,500 kg. The full complement of five Sun-synchronous satellites are not in dawn-dusk tanks will provide a stay time of 8 days if the full orbits, a “latitude drift” would be required to 7-kW payload allocation is drawn upon continu- service them. Some studies consider satellite ously. Where little payload power is drawn, as assembly and service to be a major role for a might be the case for satellite repair or remote Ch. 3—Space Infrastructure ● 71 sensing activities, the stay time could be as much be required to provide power to recharge the bat- as 12 days. teries in sunlight; this power would be in addition to the basic 21 kW needed for Shuttle and pay- One obvious approach to extending the stay load power. The weight penalty for such a power time is to add more tank sets. One such concept subsystem is estimated to be about 3,200 kg. results in a stay time of 15 to 22 days, again depending on power consumption, by loading Modifications are required in other areas as a four-tank-set carrier into the cargo bay. Such well. Flash evaporators that are currently used a carrier would shorten the usable length of the to supplement radiator heat rejection require cargo bay by some 2 meters out of 18, and re- large amounts of water in some attitudes, and to sult in a 3,700-kg decrease in payload capacity. minimize reliance on them it would be neces- Extension of this approach to even longer dura- sary to increase the capacity of the radiators. With tions has a practical limit because of the volume regard to habitability, water tanks must be added and weight capacity lost, and the limited storage to compensate for water that is no longer gener- lifetime of cryogens. ated by fuel cells and a regenerative CO2 system would be required. Furthermore, for 15- to 30- A 20-day stay time with 7 kW of power con- day durations, the Shuttle habitable volume is sumed by the payload, or up to 26 days if less only adequate to marginal for a crew of four. A power is consumed, can be achieved by using reconfiguration of the mid-deck, recommended a solar array in conjunction with the five stand- for 30- to 60-day durations on orbit, includes ard cryogenic tank sets. In one concept, the solar moving the airlock to the cargo bay. A Spacelab array would deliver 18 kW in sunlight, and the module would also be added to provide such fuel cells would deliver 3 kW makeup power for crew amenities as a shower and an exercise and a total 21 kW. During orbital eclipse of the solar off-duty area as well as increased work area. array, the fuel cells would supply the full 21 kw. The RMS could deploy the array underneath the Among the activities which an EDO would be Shuttle, to avoid interference with the power sys- expected to support is satellite servicing. The tem heat radiator and the field of view from the Shuttle can reach a wide range of orbit inclina- cargo bay. A previously proposed Power Exten- tions and LEO altitudes, and the cargo bay, with sion Package (PEP) was identical in concept but its RMS and space for supplies and other support was sized to provide 15 kw, instead of the nor- equipment, seems well suited for this type of ac- mal 7 kw to payloads. The payload weight pen- tivity. The technical feasibility of repairing satel- alty for these concepts, including tank sets, is esti- lites from the Shuttle was demonstrated on the mated at 2,300 to 2,700 kg. The cost to modify Solar Maximum Mission Satellite in April 1984. one Shuttle was estimated to be $100 million to With the Shuttle launch charges alone projected $200 million (1984$). Spacelab would have been to be as much as $100 million for a dedicated the principal beneficiary of the PEP, but the flight before the end of the decade, the prospect planned flights of Spacelab were judged to be not of sharing a launch for this purpose along with frequent enough to justify the expenditure. other payloads and/or activities is a significant factor in the economic viability of such an operation. To achieve stay times well beyond 20 days requires some radical changes in the power system, In theory, with on-orbit infrastructure serving but the Shuttle could be designed for essentially as an operations and distribution center, a Shut- limitless duration as far as power is concerned. tle destined for it could carry not only supplies Batteries would be used for power during Shut- and equipment for the operation at hand but tle eclipse, and operation of the existing fuel cells could be loaded with payloads and supplies to would be limited to launch, reentry, or emergen- be left in space. Subsequent transfers to free- cies. The fuel cell reactants would be stored at flyers, for instance, could then be accomplished ambient temperature and high pressure, thereby with a lighter, more energy-efficient proximity- eliminating the storage lifetime constraint asso- operations vehicle in contrast to the relatively ciated with cryogens. A 48-kW solar array would massive Shuttle. The premise is that the saving 72 . Civilian Space Stations and the U.S. Future in Space to be realized by utilizing the launch capacity of trolling experiment hardware and for data handl- the Shuttle more effectively would, over time, ing and transmission to Earth. more than offset the cost of the on-orbit infra- Spaceiab is composed of two primary building structure specifically designed to handle equip- blocks: modules and pallets. The module is a can- ment and supplies. It is not clear to what extent Iike pressure vessel approximately 4 meters in the on-orbit infrastructure operations costs (both diameter that provides a shirt-sleeve working on-orbit and ground-support) are included in environment for the crew and rack accommoda- analyses of such operations. It is also not clear tions for experiment hardware. The module con- how total costs (facilities and operations) would sists of two end cones and one or two center sec- be allocated among all users of a shared “space tions (each 2.7 meters long). It may be used in station” to establish the economic viability of any either its long form (7.0 meters) or short form (4.3 particular activity such as satellite repair and meters) and may be flown alone or in combina- servicing. tion with one or more pallets. The pallets are U- shaped structures 3 meters long that span the car- Finally, an EDO could function as an observa- go bay and provide mounting for instruments that tory and a laboratory. There are adequate accom- are to be exposed to the space environment. pal- modations in the aft flight deck to control and lets may be flown individually or tied together monitor an observing payload such as one con- in trains. For pallet-only projects, the computers taining a large telescope. The Shuttle has no pro- and other subsystem elements normally carried vision for laboratory operations beyond the ac- in the module are housed in an “igloo” that can commodations available in the mid-deck lockers be attached to the forward pallet, The Spacelab and, on some early flights, the main galley area. hardware set also includes an Instrument Point- However, a Spacelab module, discussed in the ing Subsystem (IPS) capable of high-accuracy following section, could be added to provide a pointing for clusters of small instruments or a shirt-sleeve working environment in the cargo large telescope. bay. One drawback is that Spacelab consumes nearly half of the available 7 kW of payload pow- While both pallets and modules can be consider. Thus, electrical power for experiments would ered for use as independent space infrastructure, require careful management, and a more capa- in its present form Spacelab is totally dependent ble power system would be desirable for an EDO. on the Shuttle for its resources. Specifically, the Shuttle provides 7 to 12 kW of electrical power, An EDO is estimated to cost about $2 billion 8 to 12 kW of cooling, data handling and data (1984$) for the basic Shuttle, $300 million (1984$) communication at rates of up to 50 megabits per for an upgraded habitation module similar to second. Further, the Shuttle provides oxygen re- Spacelab, and $200 million (1984$) for the PEP. plenishment, and serves as both a crew residence The full Shuttle launch cost would be incurred and a safe haven under emergency conditions. for each flight. Spacelab depends on these resources to provide a safe, stable laboratory environment. Several stages in the evolution of the Space- Spacelab.–The Shuttle carried Spacelab into Iab module beyond the current generation have orbit for its maiden flight in November 1983. been studied, moving from complete depend- Spacelab is a set of hardware that converts the ence on, and attachment to, outside support ele- cargo bay into a general-purpose laboratory for ments, to relatively independent operation as a conducting science, applications, and technol- free-flyer that is resupplied every 6 months or so ogy investigations. It was financed and built by the Shuttle or an OMV. jointly by ESA in close cooperation with NASA, providing a convenient means for working with Spacelab With an EDO.–One version of the a collection of experiments in a shirt-sleeve LEO Spacelab that would be carried by an EDO uti- laboratory environment. It augments the Shuttle lizing a PEP, was studied by ESA in collaboration services for powering, pointing, cooling, and con- with NASA, The electrical and heat rejection sys- Ch. 3—Space Infrastructure ● 73

Figure 6.— Major Spacelab Elements MODULE

terns would be modified to handle increased For attitude control, there are a number of pos- power, and the command and data management sible candidate systems which could be adopted. system wouId be modernized. Since two Space- In Europe, for example, there is the ESA Modular Iab modules are now owned by NASA, additional Attitude Control (MAC) system, which is designed costs would involve only the modifications and for general satellite application. This subsystem launch costs. is in prototype form, and hardware tests are u rider way at present. Electrical power and cooling pro- Spacelab as an Attached Module.–Another visions would be required, as part of the dedi- version would see the Spacelab used as a labora- cated services module, in the form of solar ar- tory component of a “space station.” The module rays, batteries, and a heat radiator with a cooling would be lengthened to provide a greater shirt- fluid loop. It is possible that the increased-capac- sleeve volume for more experiments and people, ity (12 kW) solar arrays under development by but in this case other connected infrastructure ESA, together with the ESA radiator, would be elements would replace the Shuttle as a support suitable. Command and data handling could be system. Either an existing NASA Spacelab module satisfied by commercial computer technology. could be used for this purpose, or an additional Oxygen supply for the free-flying Spacelab could module could be provided at a cost of $300 mil- be handled by using the nitrogen tanks that are lion (1984$). already available in Spacelab. However, for long Spacelab as a Free-Flyer.–A third version is durations on orbit, additional provision for ox- that of Spacelab as an inhabited free-flyer. This ygen supply would be necessary, which might would require the development of a dedicated possibly take the form of a water electrolysis sys- service module that would provide the types of tem (as yet undeveloped). For crew habitation, resources currently provided by the Shuttle. the developed Spacelab free-flying module would 74 ● Civilian Space Stations and the U.S. Future in Space

Figure 7.–Shuttle-Spacelab Flight Profile

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need to be based on a two-segment-long module module, could provide long-duration infrastruc- as a minimum (7.0 meters), or preferably a three- ture for human and automatic operations in segment-long module (1 O meters), in order to space. An intermediate step in this direction provide the necessary volume for sleeping, food would be the development of a two-segment preparation and consumption, waste disposal, ex- Spacelab-derived module, coupled with a dedi- ercise and recreational equipment, and commod- cated service module. The cost of such a devel- ity stowage. Crew-supported experiment and lab- opment (designed for Shuttle resupply every 90 oratory activities could be accommodated in a days) could be some $400 million (1984$). The Spacelab-derived two-segment module, con- two-module development costs would be consid- nected to the habitation moduIe by an airlock; erably greater than for a one-moduIe configura- it would contain the necessary laboratory equip- tion, perhaps approaching $800 million (1984$). ment and Spacelab-derived racks. The use of two To put the size of a Spacelab-derived free-flyer modules connected via an airlock would provide into perspective, it is interesting to compare the the basis for a necessary safe haven in the event facilities described above to the Skylab facility of a major failure in, or of, either module. which was orbited 10 years ago. A three-segment The use of two Spacelab-derived modules, Spacelab module has roughly the same external combined with the associated dedicated service dimensions as the Apollo Command and Serv- Ch. 3—Space Infrastructure ● 75

ice Module’s propulsion/resource system plus and the problems associated with, exchanging reentry vehicle, that part of the Apollo transpor- equipment in the Spacelab module indicate that tation system that rendezvoused with Skylab. The its best use might be as a dedicated life and/or Skylab Orbital Workshop (OWS) provided pri- materials science laboratory, or as an in-space mary habitation and work space 6.7 meters in di- control center. ameter by 8.2 meters long or about 280 m3 of The idea of developing and using. existing volume. Thus, the volumes enclosed by the two- Spacelab hardware for long duration human and three-segment-long modules contain 25 and activities in space remains attractive in view of 40 percent, respectively, of the habitable volume the maturity of the system building blocks. Limita- of the OWS, and together would total just 70 per- tions of the free-flying Spacelab concept, how- cent of the OWS volume. In addition to the OWS, ever, may be significant. As an example, it would some Skylab control and utility functions were be difficult to develop an efficient closed-loop life housed in the airlock module and the Multiple support system. Docking Adapter. Because of the dimensions of the Shuttle cargo bay, a number of Shuttle Spacelab as free-flyer, including a utilities Launches would be required to build up a Space- module based on EURECA, has been estimated Iab-based infrastructure on a scale equal to to cost $1 billion (1984$). Transportation costs Skylab. would include an initial full Shuttle launch and subsequent supply and transport services via the The free-flying Spacelab could accommodate Shuttle. An automatic docking service could be any payload currently envisaged for the Space lab developed for resupply by expendable launch module on the Shuttle. Some life science facility vehicles, but the cost of such a development is concepts now being studied use a dedicated uncertain. Spacelab module as their basic structure. All life sciences studies could probably be performed; Columbus.–The Germans and Italians have high-temperature furnaces for material process- proposed to ESA that the Columbus project, using ing may require higher power and cooling that Spacelab modules as components of a more ex- could, if necessary, be provided by additional tensive infrastructure, should become the ESA power modules. Commercial production facilities contribution to the U.S. “space station” program. are not yet clearly defined, but if such produc- The plan, including three steps or phases, be- tion proves to be desirable, additional power and gins with a Spacelab module attached to a U.S. Spacelab modules could be added, if necessary, “space station, ” providing laboratory workspace to accommodate it. A small fraction of the Earth and deriving life support, power, attitude con- or celestial-viewing instruments could utilize the trol, and other services from the parent “station. ” scientific airlock or window of Spacelab, but this A second step (fig. 8) is an independent free-flying is a cumbersome way to handle such instruments. Spacelab with power, attitude control, and mod- The only advantage of the Spacelab window or est life support supplied by a service module fash- scientific airlock over a permanent external mount- ioned after the EURECA platform. It would re- ing position is easier access to the instrument, quire direct resupply by the Shuttle or an OMV, while the disadvantages include limited space, provide laboratory workspace, and allow tending restricted field of view, and the necessity to han- by a crew for up to 8 hours at a time. A third step dle the instrument whenever it is installed. How- would add another Spacelab one-segment mod- ever, viewing instruments could be installed and uIe, with propulsion, to be used as a crew trans- operated on one or more co-orbiting platforms. port and servicing vehicle which might also be Spacelab could serve as an operations control able to accommodate a small crew for short peri- center for other space activities. Properly equipped, ods at the laboratory. By servicing the free-flyer, it could accommodate 100 percent of this func- it would enable the Columbus module to oper- tion, although, depending on the number of ate autonomously for a few months at a time. This activities conducted, more than one Spacelab last phase is projected in Columbus program liter- module might be needed. The characteristics of, ature for possible implementation near the end

76 ● Civilian Space Stations and the U.S. Future in Space

Figure 8.—An Artist’s Conception of a Free-Flying Pressurized Module With an Attached Resource Module (second phase of Columbus concept) Ch. 3—Space Infrastructure ● 77 of this century. Cost estimates for a Columbus The Shuttle and its external tank also would use project are not yet available. the Shuttle solid rocket boosters for launching as is the case for the conventional Shuttle. Upon its NASA Minimum Cost “Space Station. ”-A reaching orbit, the solar arrays would be de- study regarding a “space station” that would min- ployed, the cargo bay doors would be opened, imize costs by using Spacelab modules was per- and the command module would be rotated into formed at the NASA Marshall Space Center and an upright position, thereby freeing the cargo bay was reported in 1982. It would provide sound for use in servicing and staging operations. A and useful infrastructure, but would be of rela- subsequent Shuttle launch could deliver a habit- tively modest dimensions in comparison with ability module, logistics module, and crew. NASA’s present aspirations. It would include a habitat module, a separate safe haven for emer- The use of a basic Shuttle in this fashion would gencies, and a support systems module. It would allow the very rapid acquisition of infrastructure be launched by the Shuttle and would have 1 kw able to serve as a habitable “space station” for of power and a scientific workspace. Later, a relatively low development cost. another support system module and a docking Shuttle External Tank (ET) .-Application of the adaptor would be attached, providing for the ET as an infrastructure element is intriguing be- long-term support of three persons, an experi- cause of its large size, because it achieves a near- ment module, pressurized and unpressurized ex- orbital velocity during normal Shuttle launch periment ports, gyroscopic attitude control, com- operations, and because it “comes free of extra munications and data handling, and 6 kw of cost” to orbit. As a result, several aerospace com- nominal user power. According to the NASA panies have studied the ET for possible use on study, the cost of this facility would be $2 billion orbit. to $2.5 billion (1984$), assuming the use of an existing Spacelab module already in the in- The ET has an interior pressurized volume of 3 ventory. some 2,OOO m in the form of two separate tanks—one for hydrogen, the other for oxygen. Shuttle as permanent Infrastructure. -In the In present Shuttle launch operations, the ET discussion of the EDO, it was shown how rela- separates from the Shuttle and reenters the atmos- tively modest changes to the existing Shuttle vehi- phere after main engine cutoff. On average, at cle could result in 20- to 25-day on-orbit stay separation from the Shuttle, the ET still contains times while more extensive modifications could about 4,500 kg of liquid O and H . The chal- make 30- to 60-day stay times attainable. A con- 2 2 lenge is to identify practical methods of salvag- cept has been proposed by one Mission Analy- ing the tank and scavenging these residual pro- sis Study contractor group that would have ma- pellants. jor Shuttle and its external tank assemblies carried into orbit together to form permanent infrastruc- The ET in orbit, initially viewed as a construc- ture. The basic Shuttle would be stretched to add tion shed and distribution center, might serve as 30 feet to the cargo bay and would be utilized a mounting structure for telescopes, large anten- without the wings, tail, and thermal protection nas, large solar power collectors, and experiment subsystem. The main engines and the OMS engines pallets, or it could be used as a component of would remain in place. The crew compartment inhabited infrastructure, in which case it would would be stripped to make room for a control need windows and entry hatches. The most ob- module. A command module would be located vious use for the ET is for on-orbit fuel storage. in the cargo bay. Major external tank modifica- This requires the least on-orbit modification, tions would include a power module with solar but assumes that the techniques and equipment arrays which would mount on the nose, and a needed to scavenge leftover fuel from the Shut- wraparound radiator for thermal control. tle and to store it for long periods in space are .

Ch. 3—Space Infrastructure ● 79

The addition of a free-flyi~g’SPAS platform, at a ctwt of $(h~ b@i~n {1,~$) would increase the science/applications uses by three. Other platforms suc!h a~ k4ESAj lXA3ECRAFf or EURECA could also be added. For example, the use of three EURECAS, wh[dhcould be purchased at a cost of $0.6 billion (1984$) or leased annually at a fraction of this cost, would increase science/applications uses by lo. (In addition, while the system as described here would rtot serve as an assembly/launch platform, 9 out of 10 projected solar system probes could be designed ~ be launched with upper stages from the “,, Shuttle.) ., , ,

in summav, a “USA Salyut” that approximates the, S@i~ SaIyut 7 could be assembled using e=n- tially existing or currently underdevelopment technol~g Iie;;,Spacelab modths and a service module composed of EURECA or LEASECRAFT-type power ad at!t\t@&”ccmttol% With the added cost of several free-flying platforms, it could support most of the ‘Wiend@~~d applications experiments and about one-third of the commercial and technology developwnt-adities’ now described by NASA as requiring long-term space infrastructure. Anwhg the sciene~ a@@@ it cdt)ld not support are what NASA describes as the Latge Deployable Reflector, Mars %~@h:@!tum, I!atth Wiences Research Platform, and Experimental Geosynchronous Communications l%t@i!ti. Operationally, the size, power, and port capabilities of the infrastructure would mean the pace@ rg#@%h And ckwelopment work would necessarily be less than half as rapid as with the NASA”pro#m@~@ swce infr=tructure. [f sta~ed in 1985, it could be operational by about 1990 # a -t of rw~ly, $2 biilion (1984$). . . Of course, any design aimed speclft~liy t@yard CjJr#@-~&@I e@ivalence with the Salyut 7 may miss the mark by the time it becomes op@fitiondlfi wati~ %wiet space infrastr~cture could be quite different by 1990. However, the general”-c~mparkon of Capability and cost is illuminating. .4 . ., . . ,

‘Described in detail in the OTA Technical Mernorarrdum Sa/yut-Sot4tH StepS 7%ard Awrwnmt Human Presence in Space, December 1993.

developed. Use as an uninhabited warehouse or carriers, would be available for habitation and unpressurized, sheltered workshop in space only pressurized workspace. Rotation of the wheel requires that the tank be purged of residual fuel, would provide artificial gravity in the spinning since several access openings (larger than 1 me- part of the facility and gyroscopic action for atter diameter) already exist. titude control. A concept to use ETs as components of habita- This innovative concept has several obvious ad- ble infrastructure has been developed by the vantages. There is no doubt that many human Hughes Aircraft Co. In this concept, four ETs activities, such as eating, drinking, food prepara- would be taken separately into orbit and then tion, showering, and dealing with human waste, joined to form the spokes of a large wheel-like would be much easier to carry on in the artifi- structure. Solar panels would be mounted on a cial gravity environment provided by this system. rim connected to the outer ends of the ET spokes, And possible health problems associated with providing 150 kW of power. The wheel would long-term living in microgravity, such as decalci- rotate, and a “despun“ module at the hub of the fication of bones and atrophy of muscle and con- wheel would provide zero gravity workspace. nective tissue, could be avoided. In general, the The basic feasibility of this “dual-spin” system has presence of spin and a choice of gravity regimes, been demonstrated on a much smaller scale in ranging from microgravity to artificial gravity over 100 successful communications satellites simulating what we are used to on Earth, shouId built by Hughes. Modules attached to the outer prove to be useful in solving a number of human, ends of the ETs, carried into space as aft cargo scientific, and engineering problems. 80 • Civilian Space Stations and the U.S. Future in Space

Figure 9.— External Tank Structure

INTE

LH2 Ch. 3—Space Infrastructure ● 81

Figure IO.— Possible Uses of External Tank

PROPELLANT SCAVENGING ET AS A HANGAR

’ \’

ET AS A STRONG BACK ET WITH ACC HABITAT 82 ● Civilian Space Stations and the U.S. Future in Space

Figure 11 .—Concept of Infrastructure Utilizing Four External Tanks Chapter 4 A BUYER’S GUIDE TO SPACE INFRASTRUCTURE Contents

Page Summary ...... 85 Procurement Options ...... 85 A Catalog of Space Infrastructure ...... 87 Cost Drivers ...... 91 People and Automation in Space ...... 92 Alternative Funding Rates ...... 94 Conclusions ...... $ ...... 97

LIST OF TABLES

Table No. Page 6. Comparison of Some Options for Low-Earth-Orbit Independently Operating Infrastructure ...... 88 7. Space Infrastructure Platforms That Could Be Serviced by Shuttle or an Orbital Maneuvering Vehicle ...... 89 8. Some Illustrative Space Infrastructure Acquisitions Possible at Various Annual Average Federal Funding Rates...... 97 Chapter 4 A BUYER’S GUIDE TO SPACE INFRASTRUCTURE

SUMMARY

If the United States decides to acquire a sub- may reasonably decide to acquire space infra- stantial amount of long-term space infrastructure, structure using an average annual funding rate there are various ways to proceed that should be rather than a “lump sum” approach. Possible in- carefully considered, including the degree to frastructure that could be obtained using aver- which new technology would be used, whether age annual funding rates of $0.1, $0.3, $1, and NASA should set design or performance speci- $3 billion (1 984$) are presented. The functions fications, and the roles of the private sector and that NASA intends to provide in a “space station” international partners. The costs and capabilities are listed, and alternative infrastructures that of a number of possible infrastructure options are could provide those functions are indicated. ’ compared in a table format. The cost drivers associated with the listed options and OTA’s approach to cost estimation are discussed. The next section examines a number of tradeoffs that 1 In addition to the two OTA workshops mentioned specifically in the following text, sources of information for ch. 4 include the should be considered regarding the use of auto- same references noted in ch. 3 for possible infrastructure elements mation and people in a “space station. ” Buyers and their estimated acquisition costs.

PROCUREMENT OPTIONS

If there is an affirmative answer to the ques- what the United States might desire. Other coun- tions of whether to acquire long-term in-space tries’ evident success with Spacelab, with Ariane infrastructure (and, if so, how much, of what and its launch complex, and in the field of satel- kind, and when), there yet remains the decision lite communications has given them great con- of how it is to be acquired. In many respects, this fidence in their abilities to work in full collabora- second decision is just as important as the first. tion with the United States on major space programs The mode of acquiring new, long-term, in-space and, before long, to undertake such programs assets and services should be influenced by a without the United States, should they then deem clear understanding of the contemporary context that to be appropriate. in which space activities are carried on. And the decision as to how to acquire these assets and The U.S. private space industry is also fully ca- services will have a significant impact on the pable of developing all or most of the ensemble future of space activities. of low-Earth-orbit (LEO) infrastructure elements needed to provide a more-than-adequate initial The pioneering, generous, and effective efforts operating capability (IOC) of the type now be- of the U.S. Government, and of NASA in particu- ing studied by NASA. With the important excep- lar, have resulted in the spread of civilian space tion of satellite communications, our industry in capabilities and expertise throughout much of the the past has undertaken work exclusively under world, to the point where they are now essen- contract to the Government. However, the past tially beyond the power of the United States to several years has seen the beginning of impor- control even if it is of a mind to do so. Many of tant space activities undertaken wholly on pri- the nations of Europe, and Japan, Canada, India, vate initiative. BraziI, and the People’s Republic of China as well, are increasingly positioning themselves to pur- Some of these private sector activities and some sue their own interests in space, independent of of those undertaken by other countries will be

85 38-798 0 - 84 - 7 : QL 3 86 ● Civilian Space Stations and the U.S. Future in Space

in direct competition with what many in NASA taken only where demonstrably required to now perceive to be their own important institu- lower overall cost of ownership. tional interests. ● NASA would prompt our private commercial-industrial-financial sectors to develop With the completion of the Shuttle develop- and produce, with their own resources and ment program now in sight, the United States on a genuinely competitive basis, as many faces a major decision as to whether–and, if so, of the Government-required civilian “space how–to redeploy a large fraction of NASA’s station’ assets and services as they can; resources. Under present circumstances, NASA, NASA would facilitate their efforts to do so; as in the past, would prefer to undertake another and they could be offered to NASA on a sale, large technological program, similar to the Shut- lease, or payment-for-service-provided basis. tle, to serve as the major agency focus, rather ● NASA, in obtaining the elements not pro- than to spread its efforts over a number of activ- vided by the private sector, would empha- ities that could be more demanding and more size management methods specifically de- useful. Of the various candidate activities, NASA signed to take the best advantage of the now has chosen to concentrate on the acquisition of quite sophisticated U.S. space industry (see a great deal of long-term, habitable LEO infra- app. D, “Synopsis of the OTA Workshop on structure. Cost Containment of Civilian Space infra- Congress and the President have approved structure [Civilian “Space Station”] Elements). NASA’s request to initiate a “space station” pro- ● NASA would negotiate collaborative agree- gram, and NASA appears to be moving to acquire ments with other cooperating countries that such infrastructure in much the same fashion that would see all partners share in the benefits it acquired the Shuttle: of such an IOC at a reduced acquisition cost to the U.S. Government for its share. ● A great deal of new technology would be developed, acquired, and used, essentially all This second approach would imply that NASA of which would be publicly funded. would hand off much (perhaps most) of the more ● NASA would arrive at and issue detailed mundane “space station” work by paying the pri- engineering specifications for, and exercise vate sector to do it, thereby conserving its skills close management control over, the technol- and resources so that they could be focused on ogy to be acquired. more challenging space goals and objectives, in- ● This infrastructure would be procured by cluding the development of the very advanced NASA with Federal funds. The U.S. private technology (e.g., bipropellant engines, a reusable sector would not be prompted to use its own orbital transfer vehicle, . . .) required, an activ- resources to provide a substantial portion of ity which, for the most part, the private sector the infrastructure. cannot justify. ● The international role would be limited. These two options are at opposite ends of a NASA would not seek the kind of close col- spectrum of approaches to the acquisition of laboration that would result in shared author- long-term space infrastructure. in determining ity, even if it might provide substantial capi- which approaches from this spectrum are most tal cost reduction for the United States. likely to influence the evolution of space activi- A significantly different acquisition approach ties in a desirable direction, Congress may wish would- have the following elements: to consider the following questions:

● As far as is reasonably possible, already de- ● Should the Government be allocating its pro- veloped, tested, and paid-for technology fessional skills and experience to the devel- would be used to achieve an adequate IOC, opment of: 1 ) incremental or 2) fundamen- with development of new technology under- tal advances in technology?

Ch. 4—A Buyer’s Guide to Space infrastructure ● 87

● Which approach is most likely to stimulate • What other large and important space ends the “commercialization of space”? should be addressed in the next decade or ● What level of international collaboration is two in addition to the acquisition of in-space really desirable? infrastructure methods and means?

A CATALOG OF SPACE INFRASTRUCTURE The fact that the United States has already developed a wide variety of space capabilities means that it has genuine choices—both of what infrastructure elements it places in orbit and of how these elements are to be acquired and used. It is around these choices that the difficult issues lie; by and large, the technology is either in hand or can be readily developed. It must be emphasized that the particular constellation of space infrastructure elements which NASA currently aspires to develop, construct, deploy, and operate is only one alternative in a wide range of options. Simply put, there is no such thing as “the space station. ” What is under discussion is a variety of sets of infrastructure elements, ranging from modest extensions of current capabilities to vastly more sophisticated, capable, and costly ensembles than NASA is now suggesting. As one way of presenting the variety of technology options available, OTA has prepared Photo credit: Natlonal Aeronautics and Space Administration tables 6 and 7.2 One option for modestly increased length of stay in space is a Shuttle Orbiter modified for extended tables were prepared in response to the congressional flight—the Extended Duration Orbiter, or EDO. Such committees which requested this assessment, 3 discusses in- a configuration might involve large solar panels for frastructure options in detail. extended electrical power, as shown here. 88 • Civilian Space Stations and the U.S. Future in Space

Table 6.—Comparison of Some Optionsa for "Low Earth” Orbit Independently Operating Infrastructure

Free-flying NASA infrastructure Extended Extended spacelab aspirations Duration Duration (developed Initial Mature, Shuttle Orbiter: Orbiter: as permanent operational fully Orbiter Phase I Phase II infrastructure) capability developed Date available (assuming start in 1985) Now 1988 1990 1990 1992 1996-2000

Costb (billions of fiscal year 1984 dollars) None 0.2 0.5 2-3 8 20

Characteristics Power to users (kW) 7 20 6 60 200 Pressurized volume (m3) 60 100 200 300 (with spacelab habitat) Nominal crew size 6 5 5 3 8 20 Miscellaneous Can accept No new New technology Modest crew Orbital Reusable Spacelab technology required; accommodations maneuvering orbital modest vehicle plus transfer laboratory two free-flying vehicle plus space unpressurized several more platforms platforms Capabilities c Time on Orbit 10 days 20 days 50 days Unlimited Unlimited Unlimited (60-90 day (90 day (90 day resupply) resupply) resupply) Laboratories for: Life sciences Moderate Moderate Considerable Extensive Extensive Extensive Space science/applications Modest Modest Modest Modest Extensive Extensive Materials science Some Some Moderate Moderate Extensive Extensive Technology development Modest Modest Some Moderate Extensive Extensive Observatories No Modest Modest Modest Extensive Extensive Data/communication node No No No No Considerable Extensive Servicing of satellites Modest Modest Modest Modest Considerable Extensive Manufacturing facility (materials No No Modest Modest Considerable Extensive processing) Large structure assembly No No No Modest Moderate Extensive Transportation node No No No No Moderate Extensive Fuel and supply depot No No No No No Considerable

Response to reasons advanced for space infrastructure Maintain U.S. space leadership and No Modest Modest Modest Considerable Extensive technology capability Respond to U.S.S.R. space activities No Modest Modest Modest Considerable Extensive Enable long-term human presence No Modest Modest Considerable Extensive Extensive in space Attention-getting heroic public No Modest Modest Modest Modest Modest spectacle Extended international cooperation Modest Modest Moderate Moderate Moderate Moderate Promote U.S. commercialization of Modest Modest Modest Considerable Considerable Considerable space Maintain vigorous NASA No No No Modest Extensive Extensive engineering capability Enhance national security, broadly No No No Modest Unclear Unclear defined Space travel for non-technicians Modest Modest Modest Modest Considerable Considerable aLiated options are illustrative examples; the list la not exhaustive. bco~ts include de@~n, development, and pr~uct’on; launch and operational costs are not included. Some costs are estimated by the Office of Technology Assess- ment; others were provided to OTA. cClearly judgmental. dlncluding launch to the Moon, Mars, and aome esteroids.

Examples of habitable infrastructure are shown listed, followed by one version of Space lab de- in table 1. First, the present Shuttle Orbiter and veloped into a free-flying inhabited facility. its possible modifications for somewhat extended Finally, the present NASA-envisioned space sta- (but not permanent) stays on orbit (i.e., a so- tion” concept is given, including both the IOC called Extended Duration Orbiter—EDO) are version with an estimated completion in 1992, Ch. 4—A Buyer’s Guide to Space Infrastructure ● 89

Table 7.—Space Infrastructure Platformsa That Could Be Semiced by Shuttle or an Orbital Maneuvering Vehicle

Unpressurized coorbiting platforms Pressurized platforms (serviced by means of extravehicular activity) (serviced internally while docked) Space European Industries’ Modified SPAS MESA LEASECRAFT EURECA Platform Spacelab Date available (now, or approximate, assuming Now Now 1986 1987 Late 1980’s 1989 start in 1985)

cod’ (billions of fiscal year 1984 dollars) 0.005 0.01 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.6

Characteristics Power to users (kW) 0.6 0.1 6 2 20 6 Pressurized volume (ft3) None None None None 2,500 3,000 Nominal crew size None None None None 1-3 only 3 when docked Miscellaneous 3,000 lb 200 lb 20,000 lb 2,000 lb 25,000 lb 20,000 lb Payload Payload Payload Payload Payload Payload Capabilities c Time on orbit 10 days 8 months Unlimited 6 months 3-6 months Unlimited Laboratories for: Life sciences No No Modest Modest Modest Moderate Space science/applications Modest Modest Modest Modest No Moderate Materials science Modest No Modest Modest Moderate Moderate Technology development No No Modest Modest Moderate Modest Observatories No No Modest Modest Modest Moderate Data/communication node No No No No No No Servicing of satellites No No No No No No Manufacturing facility (materials No No Considerable Modest Extensive Considerable processing) Large structure assembly No No No No No No Transportation node (assembly, No No No No No No checkout, and launch) Fuel and supply depot No No No No No No

Response to reasons advanced for space infrastructure Maintain U.S. space leadership No No Modest No Modest No and technology capability Respond to U.S.S.R. space activities No No Modest No Modest Modest Enable long-term human presence No No No No No No in space Attention-getting heroic public No No No No No No spectacle Extended international cooperation Yes No No Yes No Unclear Promote U.S. commercialization of Unclear Modest Considerable No Considerable No space Maintain vigorous NASA No No No No No No engineering capability Enhance national security, broadly No No No No No No defined Space travel for non-technicians No No No No No No aLi~t~ ~latformg are illustrative examples; the list Is not ‘Xhaustlve. btists include ~esian, ~evelopment, and ~r~uction; launch a~ o~ratl~nal costs are not included. Some costs are estimated by the office of Technology As~ss- ment; others were ~rovlded to OTA. cClearly judgmental.

and a mature, fully developed facility (1996- ● Cost (in fiscal year 1984 dollars)–to produce 2000). the capabilities shown. The estimates are based on sources such as industry reviews, The parameters for each option that may be company publications and meeting presen- used for rough comparative purposes are: tations, aerospace periodicals, and NASA information releases. Inasmuch as some op- . Approximate date of availability—assuming tions utilize existing hardware, the costs do that an acquisition (in contrast to a study) not reflect similar proportions of develop- “go-ahead” were included in the fiscal year ment and production efforts for the various 1987 budget. options. 90 ● Civilian Space Stations and the U.S. Future in Space

● Characteristics–several design parameters serviced by, any of the options listed in table 1. and sizing factors that provide the bases for In this way, additional capabilities could be added infrastructure capabilities. to the infrastructures given in table 1, SPAS and ● Capabilities—the types of functional activi- MESA are currently existing commercial platforms ties that the listed infrastructure could sup- that were financecj and developed by the private port, and the degree to which these activi- sector. LEAS ECRAFT is also a private venture now ties might be accomplished. under development. ● Responsiveness of a given infrastructure-to the various reasons put forward for having Some cautions should be noted in the interpre- a civi I ian n “space station, ” including any tation of this information. General descriptions long-term presence of human beings in of the various options are given, an estimates space . of their capabilities. These capabilities can be expected to change in some cases. Most of the ca- If great and long-range space activities (for in- pabilities have been described by qualitative ad- stance, the establishment of a lunar human settle- jectives. Quantitative estimates are rounded off ment or the return of materials from the asteroids to one figure. In the fifth section of the tables, or Mars) come under consideration, they wouId “Response to the Reasons Advanced for Space appear to be achievable using a sophisticated Infrastructure, ” the comparisons clearly must be reusable orbit transfer vehicle (ROTV) coupled qualitative and judgmental in nature and are pre- with on-orbit assembly, check-out, launch, and sented simply to bring these factors to the atten- recovery. The one option listed in table I that tion of the reader. For instance, as a particular could provide these capabilities is the NASA fully item the Spacelab option of table 2 is only one developed infrastructure. of several that have been put forward; one by Examples of uninhabitable “free-flying’ space European Space Agency (ESA) countries could platforms are shown in table 2. These platforms, definitely augment international cooperation if or others, could be used in conjunction with, and it were implemented. Ch. 4—A Buyer’s Guide to Space Infrastructure ● 91

COST DRIVERS

Beyond the observation that, in some general ment, test, and evaluation (RDT&E) activi- fashion, the cost will increase with the capabil- ties increases costs in the civilian space ity and sophistication of the infrastructure ac- sector also;3 quired, it is difficult to estimate the eventual cost 8. the extent to which any “Christmas-tree ef- of this capability to the Government. At least all fect” takes place within NASA, whereby the of the following factors could have an important infrastructure acquisition management is influence on this cost: persuaded by the NASA Centers to allow the cost of desirable but nonessential RDT&E 1. the total capability acquired–which, as sug- activities to be included in the acquisition; gested by the examples listed in the tables and of infrastructure options, can encompass a 9. the effectiveness of NASA’s efforts to arrive considerable range; at large-scale collaboration and related cost- 2. the extent to which already developed, sharing arrangements with other countries. tested, and paid-for technology is used, v. a focus on new technology with its higher These points address only the initial capital cost development cost and greater risk of cost of this infrastructure—to this cost must be added overruns; its ongoing operation and maintenance costs; the 3. the substitution, where feasible, of auto- cost of instruments, furnaces, etc., needed for mated systems for the accomplishment of scientific experimentation in association with its tasks previously undertaken only by human use; and the interest cost of any money borrowed beings; to fund the acquisition program. And it must be 4. the manner by which the infrastructure is ac- remembered, too, that the infrastructure will quired, i.e., the extent to which NASA puts eventually become obsolete or wear out. the engineering challenge on the space in- It is clear that there are many opportunities to dustry by issuing performance specifications, reduce infrastructure net cost that could be rather than continuing to issue detailed engi- grasped by a vigorous, imaginative, and deter- neering specifications and managing the ac- 4 mined NASA management. quisition process in detail; 5. the effectiveness of NASA’s efforts to per- These considerations suggest that, over the next suade our private sector to develop infra- year or two, at least as much attention should be structure assets and services “on their own, ” given to identifying the best ways by which the and to provide them to the Government at country should set about the permanent devel- purchase, lease, or service-payment prices opment of space as there is given to any techno- lower than those achievable by the Gov- logical advances and operational capabilities that ernment; are to be obtained. 6. the effectiveness of NASA’s efforts to effect eventual private sector operation of the infrastructure and its related activities;

7. the extent to which large and rapid expan- 3Classified material was not used in preparing this report. sion of military space research, develop- 4Cost reduction measures are discussed i n app, D of this report. structure issues is that of the proper mix of so- 1. If specifically designed to do so, any civil- phisticated people and sophisticated machines ian “space station” program could effec- (automation) to be employed in work activities tively serve as a high-visibility focus for pro- in spaces moting research and development in all Sln arriving at judgments on various “man/machine” issues OTA, disciplines in the field of automation. im- in close concert with senior congressional staff members, designed portant advances in terrestrial applications and convened a workshop which brought together many of the of automation could be expected to follow Nation’s experts in “smart machine” development from the Gov- ernment, industry, and academic communities with OTA and con- from a vigorous space automation program. gressional staff professionals. 2. However, there is a firm consensus among Ch. 4—A Buyer’s Guide to Space /infrastructure . 93

scientists and engineers in the various auto- For the foreseeable future, therefore, mation disciplines that current automated only a general continuum of conclusions equipment could not accomplish many of can be outlined: the functions envisioned by NASA for an machines generally will be unable to an- early 1990s “space station. ” This situation ticipate and deal with genuinely unknown results, in part, because NASA has invested circumstances and surprises; relatively few resources to develop auto- people will need the assistance of ma- mated capabilities specifically for general- chines to gain speed, strength, and mem- purpose infrastructure-support (in contrast ory; to improve their sensory capabilities with special-purpose scientific) space activ- and their mobility; and to provide them ities. In addition, the academic and indus- with artificial senses via radar, Iidar, radi- trial advanced automation research commu- ation detection, etc.; nity numbers only a few hundred. machines employed for ongoing R&D and 3. Therefore, if the kind of overall operational commercial-industrial operations will re- “space station” now envisioned by NASA quire human oversight and assistance; and is to be functioning by the early 1990s, it machines, maintained by people or not, will have to include people. Conversely, if as circumstances suggest,” should do all it is to be wholly or mostly automated, it hazardous and very-long-term repetitive could not become operational until 5 to 10 work. years thereafter, even with a major automa- 5. In the matter of relative cost of automated tion R&D effort. However, if any of the and space facilities including people, the aspirations of those now conducting re- expense of developing and providing safe, search and development in the space materi- sanitary, and suitable living and working fa- als processing area are realized, and one or cilities for human beings has to be weighed more processes are found suitable for long- against the costs of providing analogous term production, then elements of the infra- automated capabilities. The former will cer- structure that would be devoted to such pro- tainly be relatively expensive; the latter may duction, such as platforms co-orbiting near well cost more than some advocates im- any central complex, could be singled out agine, especially if as much capability is ex- for early, specific, sophisticated-machine pected of the machines as of a professional R&D focus. human work crew. With respect to doing 4. Conceptually, space infrastructure could be useful work in space, human beings rep- designed either to include a human work resent in-hand technology. Cost alone does crew or to depend on unattended sophis- not provide sufficient ground for choosing ticated machines. Despite the fact that the between automated and manned facilities. relative efficiency and/or effectiveness of 6. However, there are three reasons advanced these two quite different approaches have for having men and women in space, only been extensively debated for years, no con- one of which is to do useful work. The sensus has emerged. This absence of con- other reasons are: to serve as subjects for sensus results from a number of factors: the scientific study and to engage in any other state-of-the-art for sophisticated machines; kind of human activity. With respect to the the amount of experience we have had to second and third reasons, the question of date in the actual conduct of space support humans or machines does not even arise. operations is quite small; and, in such oper- Only the purpose of doing useful work has ations, NASA has placed more emphasis on been extensively studied and, as indicated human beings than on machines; in the preceding points, no clear and gen- , “, 94 ● Civilian Space Stations and the U.S. Future in Space

eral present advantage for having people or physiology, psychology, and social behav- sophisticated machines there has emerged. ior, must be acquired. If, similarly, the Na- If the Nation decides, as a matter of policy, tion decides, as a matter of policy, to enable to have some of its people remain away from people to pursue in space a variety of cul- Earth for long periods, then staffed space fa- tural activities other than work then, again, cilities, allowing for the study of human only their presence there will suffice.

ALTERNATIVE FUNDING RATES

Chapters 5 and 6 discuss a space infrastructure Table 8 lists the following (among other) ele- acquisition program that would involve an ini- ments of space infrastructure that could be ac- tial decision on the purposes of, and the objec- quired over various acquisition intervals: tives to be achieved in, the civilian space area, ● For $0.1 billion per year: probably no “per- followed by the design of that infrastructure with manently manned” facility could be ob- appropriate functional capabilities to support the tained even by the year 2000. Further exten- attainment of these objectives. An estimate of the sion of capabilities of the Shuttle system and cost and schedule associated with the attainment unpressurized platform developments could of these objectives, along with the acquisition of be obtained. The acquisitions could be: a de- such infrastructure, is also presented. velopment of the EDO Phase 1, for 20-day An alternative approach could simply establish orbit stays, over a 5-year period; or EDO annual expenditure levels for in-space infrastruc- Phase 11, for 50-day orbit stays, over 10 years ture acquisition. Thus, to provide an independ- or longer, plus two or three free-flying un- ent basis of comparison with the civilian “space pressurized platforms such as EURECA, station” program now favored by NASA, OTA has LEASECRAFT, and/or the Space Industries’ estimated what new space capabilities could be platform (assuming that the Government acquired, by when, if various annual average would make an outright purchase of such Government funding rates were established to do platforms). so. No changes to present NASA acquisition pro- ● At $0.3 billion per year: within 5 years, the cedures or NASA anticipated acquisition costs are acquisitions could be an EDO I I plus several assumed. Arbitrary annual average funding levels (perhaps pressurized) platforms. Over 10 of $0,1, $0.3, $1, and $3 billion per year (1984$) years, there could be acquired: 1) the first were chosen to illustrate the number and kind permanently orbiting, Spacelab-derived hab- of space infrastructure elements that could be ac- itable modules in 28.5° orbit that could sup- quired over periods of 5, 10, or 15 years. port three people, 2) an OMV (enabling servicing of nearby satellites), and 3) a few free- The results of these 12 funding scenarios are flying platforms. In 15 years, there could be given in table 8, which shows the funding rate, obtained either: 1 ) two free-flying Spacelabs, number of years, total expenditure, and kinds of one in polar orbit, one at 28.5°, or 2) much infrastructure elements acquired. The elements more capable permanent infrastructure at are divided into those that can operate independ- 28.5° than that which could be acquired in ently (e. g., the Shuttle Orbiter and a “space sta- 10 years. tion” central base) and those that depend on be- ● For $1 billion per year: within 5 years, there ing serviced or maintained from one of the could be acquired: 1) a permanent LEO independent elements (i.e., by an orbital maneu- facility operating as a transportation node vering vehicle (OMV), a local in-space transpor- (obtained as a new design by NASA), 2) an tation system operated from a “space station” OMV, 3) an ROTV capable of transporting control element, or directly by the Shuttle). spacecraft to and from geostationary and —

Ch. 4—A Buyer’s Guide to Space Infrastructure ● 95

e-Earth that are the

chemical 96 ● Civilian Space Stations and the U.S. Future in Space

Table 8.—Some Illustrative Space Infrastructure Acquisitions Possible at Various Annual Average Federal Funding Rates (all amounts in billions of 1984 dollars)

Space acquisitions a Dependent elements Number Unpres- Pressur- Space-based Beyond geostationary Funding of Total Independent infrastructure surized ized plat- transport orbit spacecraft rate years expenditures elements b platforms form# vehicles elements e O.1 5 0.5 EDO If (20 days, 5 crew) 2 — — — 10 1 EDO II (50 days, 6 crew) 3 — — — 15 1.5 EDO II (50 days, 6 crew) 3 1 — — 0.3 5 1.5 EDO II (50 days, 6 crew) 3 1 — — 10 3 Free-flying Spacelab modules’ 1 1 OMV — (permanent, 3 crew) 15 4.5 2 free-flying Spacelab modules in both 2 1 OMV 28 degree and polar orbits (3 crew each 5 5 Space transportation center (4 crew) — — OMV; ROTV — 10 10 NASA initial operating capability 2 1 OMV; ROTV — “space station”g (8 crew) 15 15 NASA growth “space station”g (12 crew) 3 1 OMV;ROTV — 5 15 NASA growth “space station”g (12 crew) 3 1 OMV; ROTV — 10 30 NASA mature “space station”g (16 crew) 3 2 OMV:ROTV Lunar capable ROTV; Shuttle-Derived Cargo Vehicle (SDV) staffed Lunar facility 15 45 NASA mature “space station”g 5 3 OMV: ROTV Lunar capable ROTV; (18 crew, SDV) staffed Lunar facility; Mars voyageh aTables 1 and 2 p~e~erlt characteristics and capabilities of infrastructure elements In detail. b=tended D“ratlon Orbitem (EDO) are IImited In their stays on orbit; other independent elements are lonO-term. cplatforms of the LEASECRAFT /EURECA tYPe dplatfoma of t~ m~ifi~ free.flylng spa~elab~pa~e lndu~trles type with their Own electrical power and pressurization SyStemS. eAt $fJ 1 billion&r, no long.te~, staffed infrastructure ebments are Wssible. f Em i (~tend~ Duration o~lter, phaae 1) and the spacelab modules have limited eleCtriCa~ pOWer (about 7 kw). gThe NASA “’space station” elements are expected to operate as transpodatlon and servicing centers as well as laboratories. They would have sufficient power for hextensive materials procesalng. A slgnlflcant part of the cost of a human visit to Mars could be provided in this case.

other higher orbits, and 4) the capability to travel to the vicinity of Mars and back could support the kind of vehicles that could be be well advanced. developed later to travel to and from the These projections are for infrastructure acqui- Moon. In 10 years, the IOC infrastructure now favored by NASA could be acquired. sition only; operational costs are not included. In general, more extensive infrastructure would In 15 years, nearly all of the infrastructure require larger operational costs. Also, there is a now seriously considered by NASA could be basic difference between the costs associated acquired. with using Shuttle-type vehicles and permanently At $3 billion per year (assuming that only orbiting facilities. The use of an EDO to conduct funds, not technology or other factors, would extended science or development activities with be the pacing program factor): NASA’s fully a crew would involve launch costs each time it developed “space station” could become went into orbit; use of a permanent facility would available in somewhat more than 5 years. In require resupply loads several times per year, but 10 years, this infrastructure plus a geosta- the cost of each flight could be shared with other tionary platform, plus a Shuttle-derived cargo payloads. For example, if 12 dedicated 30-day vehicle (SDV) for lower cost transfer of fuel EDO flights were conducted per year about $1 and cargo to LEO, plus a lunar facility ready billion (1984$) in annual transportation costs for occupancy and continuing operation would be involved; in comparison, cost of four would become possible. In 15 years, NASA’s partial-load Shuttle launches per year to resup- complete infrastructure aspirations and a ply a permanent facility would total $100 million lunar settlement could be in hand and, per- to $400 million (1984$), depending on the weight haps also, plans for seeing a human crew of supplies carried in each flight. Ch. 4—A Buyer’s Guide to Space /infrastructure . 97

CONCLUSIONS

The general conclusion of a great deal of study countries in order either to relieve the burden by the civilian space community (Government, on the Government’s budget generally, or to in- industry, and university) is that some additional crease the amount, or hasten the time, by which long-term in-space LEO infrastructure could be space infrastructure would be acquired and/or used to improve the efficiency and effectiveness other space activities were conducted.6 of a number of present and anticipated space Using the first approach, Congress initially activities. However, our space experience to might select functions similar to those provided date, and science, engineering, and space oper- by the Soviet Salyut 7 (operational since 1982). ations considerations alone, are not now suffi- Such a semi-permanent LEO laboratory could be cient, by themselves, to determine the charac- developed using Spacelab-like modules con- ter and amount of the in-space infrastructure nected to a power and support module patterned to be acquired soon. And in the absence of any after current platform designs. It would support objective external demand for its prompt acqui- several crewmembers and one-third of the science, sition, these considerations cannot determine commercial, and technology development activ- the rate at which it should be acquired. ities that NASA now suggests would be handled There are a wide variety of infrastructure op- by their IOC. NASA’s estimate is some $2 billion tions that could be chosen from to provide vari- (1984$) for such a development. ous kinds and amounts of in-space support assets Or, in another example, the conduct of ROTV and services. Some infrastructure options cur- operations might be selected as one of the main rently exist, others could be developed using cur- support functions to be supplied by space infra- rent technology, and some would require new structure. This would allow servicing and other technology. The cost to the Government of ac- activities in virtually all orbits, including polar, quiring this infrastructure could be reduced, sub- geostationary, and even lunar. In addition, such stantially, if our private sector were to offer to pro- infrastructure would support the continued ex- vide lower unit cost portions thereof, and other ploration of the solar system, which is one of portions were provided by other countries in col- NASA’s most important “char ters.” The cost for laborative programs within the United States. an ROTV and its associated LEO infrastructure has it is clear that a number of important support been estimated at $3 billion to $4 billion (1984$). assets and services could be provided with in- Of course, another example of the first ap- frastructure other than that defined as “The NASA proach would have Congress simply select the Space Station.” Therefore, in considering how IOC assets and services identified by NASA and much of what kind of in-space infrastructure the aerospace industry that are estimated to cost should be provided by when, reasonable ways $8 billion (1984$) (plus the cost of NASA staff); for Congress to proceed might be: or even to spur the infrastructure acquisition ● to select those specific support assets and process beyond NASA’s present aspirations, and services that they judge to be important, ask begin to move people beyond LEO. NASA to price them, and specify a date by Congress could consider alternative ways of which they should become available; or providing those assets and services in varying ● to set an annual average funding rate for the degrees. For instance: acquisition of in-space infrastructure, and allow NASA to select the assets and services ● an on-orbit laboratory supporting research to be provided and the dates of their acqui- on a wide range of life, materials, and other sition. science topics, and new technology devel- And Congress could decide to what extent ‘A conceptual possibility would be for NASA to provide a core NASA should emphasize the acquisition of any facility to which private industry could attach docking and fuel stor- infrastructure by our private sector and by other age equipment for commercial ROTV operations. ——

98 • Civilian Space Stations and the U.S. Future in Space

opments (Shuttle, EDO, Spacelab, Colum- ● a storage depot for spare parts, fuel, and sup- bus, NASA minimum cost “space station,” plies for use as needed by satellites, plat- Space Industries platform); forms, vehicles, and people (ETs, Columbus, ● permanent observatories for astronomy, and LEASECRAFT, the Space Industries platform, Earth remote sensing (Shuttle, EDO, Space- NASA minimum-cost “space station”); and Iab, Space Industries, SPAS, MESA, EURECA, ● a staging base for later, more ambitious Landsat, LEASECRAFT, Space Telescope, exploration and travel (Columbus, NASA IRAS, 0S0 satellites, Solar Max, and other minimum-cost “space station”). existing or planned observatories); If Congress were to select an average annual ● a facility for microgravity materials process- funding rate, some examples of the approximate ing including the manufacturing of such kind and amount of infrastructure that could be products as pharmaceuticals, semiconduc- obtained over a period of some 10 years (in 1984 tors, glasses, and metals (Shuttle, EDO, dollars) are, for instance: Spacelab, LEASECRAFT, the Space Industries platform, SPAS, Columbus, EURECA, MESA); $0.1 billion per year: an EDO (20-day stay ● servicing of satellites and platforms, includ- on-orbit) plus some free-flying platforms; or ing the maintenance or replacement of com- $0.3 billion per year: an EDO (50-day stay ponents, replenishment of consumables, and on-orbit), plus free-flying, pressurized infra- exchange of equipment (Shuttle, EDO, ELVs, structure supporting several crewmembers, as well as OMVs and ROTVs operated from plus some free-flying platforms; or the Shuttle); $1 billion per year: most of the NASA IOC ● a transportation node to assemble, check plus an ROTV; or out, and launch vehicles to geosynchronous $3 billion per year: all of the NASA IOC, plus and other high orbits, and on interplanetary its extensions, plus an ROTV, plus a Shuttle- trips {Shuttle, EDO, Columbus, NASA mini- derived cargo vehicle, plus a “geostationary mum-cost “space station”); platform, plus an operating lunar settlement ● an assembly facility for large space structures program. such as antennas for advanced satellite communications systems (Shuttle, EDO, Colum- bus, NASA minimum-cost “space station”);

Ch. 4—A Buyer’s Guide to Space Infrastructure ● 99

B Photo credit Natlonal Aeronautics and Space Administration

One alternative to the development of new technology is to use the Space Shuttle for many advanced operations in low-Earth-orbit. Shown here are: (A) satellite servicing satellite in April 1984; (B) assembly of a large structure in orbit— here simulated in water; and (C) a deployable antenna. Chapter 5 BROADENING THE DEBATE Contents

Page Space Infrastructure as Methods and Means ...... 103 Need for Goals and Objectives ...... 105 The Policy Background ...... 106 Today’s Too Narrow Debate ...... 108 Recent Proposals ...... 108 President Reagan’s Call for a “Space Station” ...... 109 Steps Toward Broader Participation ...... 110 Chapter 5 BROADENING THE DEBATE

SPACE INFRASTRUCTURE AS METHODS AND MEANS

Even the most informed ardent supporters of structure, electrical power, thermal control, ware- a U.S. civilian “space station” program agree that housing, stability (as to location, attitude, and any such facility would be a means to various temperature), communications, fuel, associated ends, rather than an end in itself. The ends pro- docking and air lock capabilities, local transpor- posed may be grouped into four categories: in- tation, LEO-GEO transportation, and, if staffed by dustrial (e.g., manufacturing materials); commer- men and women, life support and residential and cial (e.g., servicing satellites); scientific (e. g., working space, Because it is expected to be so- conducting experiments in the life sciences); and phisticated, and useful for periods of several dec- national security (e. g., maintaining a permanent ades, this space infrastructure could provide a U.S. manned presence). These ends, despite their new and qualitatively different regime of space diversity, have in common a presumption that assets, allow the provision of new space services, space activities will in future become more rou- and support the conduct of space activities in a tine and more clearly operational, less experi- new and presumably more efficient and effective mental, and less tentative. This presumption in manner. turn derives from an important change in the way that we are now beginning to view space. Four major decisions have marked the U.S. civilian space program: the establishment of NASA Twenty-five years into the Space Age, we are in the National Aeronautics and Space Act of in a position to view near-Earth space much as 1958, the initiation of the Apollo program in we would a vast tract of undeveloped raw land 1961, the establishment of COMSAT in the Com- on the Earth’s surface: sat Act of 1962, and the initiation of the Shuttle ● We have identified at least some of the de- program in 1972. But, despite the growing im- sirable locations (particular orbits). portance of the Nation’s publicly supported space . We have established an initial legal frame- activities, the pattern of decision making over the work for their beneficial occupancy (the Out- past 20 years has seldom proceeded in the light er Space Treaty). of broad public discussion. Until very recently, ● We have reliable transportation for people the discussion of whether to undertake a “space and machinery to and from these remote station” program and, if so, what elements it areas, from selected locations on the Earth’s should contain, had also been confined princi- surface (via the Shuttle). pally to engineers and scientists within NASA, and Ž We can maintain reliable communications within NASA-supported university programs and with these remote areas (via NASA’s satel- aerospace contracting firms. Consideration of the lite communications system). views and interests of these communities has, to a very great extent, determined the kind of “space These capabilities are prompting us to undertake station” program now suggested by NASA. the considered development of near-Earth space— with, therefore, the long-term implications for use As NASA’s Shuttle development program comes and support of any assets and people placed to a close, thousands of its in-house engineers there. and technical support staff and, in principle, as indeed, the terms “space station” or “space much as $2 billion per year in contract funds, transportation node” are most accurately under- u rider its present “budget envelope, ” would be stood as identifying elements of long-term, per- freed up to be applied to one or more new pro- haps permanent, space infrastructure, concen- grams. Given the agency’s natural desire not only trated initially, for the most part, in low-Earth to maintain its current size (a size NASA leaders orbits. These elements would provide in-space judge to have the support of the general public),

103 104 ● Civilian Space Stations and the U.S. Future in Space

but to grow at 1 percent per year1–a desire sup- ensure that the actual infrastructure, when built, ported by the Reagan Administration–this com- served as many constituencies as possible, and bination of people and funds that could soon be- also might moderate potential opposition from come available suggests, strongly, that any new groups who might view any large project as a programs must include the development and ac- threat to the budgets of their relatively smaller quisition of a great deal of new technology, activities. preferably related to having people in space; large The groups canvassed included the various numbers of technologists would be gainfully NASA Centers, the National Research Council employed both in NASA and in the space indus- (the Space Science Board and the Space Applica- try under contract to NASA. NASA’s plans could tions Board), the space industry, various poten- well have been further influenced by the fun- tial foreign providers and users of space technol- damental political belief that the agency might ogy (the European Space Agency, Canada, and not long survive in its present form without a Japan), and, in general, any groups that had single, large, “people-in-space” program upon worked on previous “space station” studies. The which a majority of its energies are focused. If essential form of NASA’s questions to these vari- a number of smaller programs were initiated in- ous groups was: if there were a permanent and stead, each of them, it is thought, could be ter- permanently staffed “space station, ” what activ- minated without widespread objections arising ities might it reasonably support, how would in the political process. Finally, NASA may have these activities influence its design, and of what thought it prudent to propose a “space station” value would those support activities be? Eight aer- program rather than some other large endeavor(s) ospace groups, placed under contract to NASA (e.g., a return of Americans to the Moon, send- in the fall of 1982, undertook parallel “mission ing people on an expedition to Mars, etc.) both 2 analysis studies” in order to determine a set of because the former had been carefully studied activities for the first 10 years of the “space sta- over the years, representing, in NASA’s view, a tion’s” operation, the fundamental characteris- natural complement to the Shuttle, and because tics suitable for accomplishing these activities, alternative large programs seemed too grandiose, and the presumed value to be associated with have not recently been discussed with the gen- obtaining and using them. These contractor groups eral public, and, therefore, were less likely to soon formed similar judgments regarding the enlist the required support, both within and with- amount of money that (NASA hoped) would be out the administration. made available, a desirable acquisition schedule, Once the decision had been made to begin de- and NASA’s preferences on such matters as the fining a “space station” program to be proposed employment of people in space and the use of for congressional approval, NASA began canvass- new v. already space-qualified technology. Also, ing possible user communities to learn what char- using standard industry cost estimating practices, acteristics they would like it to incorporate in they suggested the likely acquisition costs of the order to meet their needs. This process would infrastructure elements to the Government, The process by which users were canvassed

I NASA management has a strong commitment to its own institu- was essentially open-ended: no potential use that tional future. NASA Headquarters material, NASA HQ MF 83- either required or would materially benefit from 2275(1 ), prepared for a presentation to its internal Policy Review a “permanently manned space station” was re- Committee in mid-1983, and subsequently presented to a Board of the National Research Council, lists eight “Agency Goals. ” The jected out of hand. Given NASA’s internal cir- first goal is: “Provide for our people a creative environment and cumstances, this open-ended character was cer- the best of facilities, support services, and management support tainly unexceptionable: the more—and the more so they can perform with excellence NASA research, development, mission, and operational responsibilities. ” varied—the identified uses, the more capable, so- The second goal speaks to the space transportation system (the phisticated, and large the supporting infrastruc- Shuttle), and the third to the establishment of a permanent manned presence in space. App. B shows that, in previous years, this commitment has also been strong. 2The resu Its of these studies are summarized in app. A. Ch. 5—Broadening the Debate ● 105 ture would have to be. The greater the resulting tential users, with little attempt either to weigh capability and sophistication, the more engineers the seriousness of their intentions to use the fa- would be required to design, develop, and pro- cility, or to gauge their willingness to see funds duce it–and the greater its cost. Increased costs, that they would employ otherwise used instead in turn, wouId imply more Government contract- to develop it. A different, and perhaps more ing—and understandably generate greater inter- appropriate question, wouId have been: in view est in and support for the program by the space of the maturing capabilities and increasing num- industry. bers of the spacefaring nations of the world,3 what elements of long-term, in-orbit infrastructure In general, the greater the number of poten- would be appropriate to facilitate the considered tial users and potential suppliers, the greater the development of near-Earth space? This question influence that could be brought to bear on Gov- would not have required initial assumptions that ernment decision makers to approve any “space the facilities would be permanent and perma- station” program. In any event, essentially all im- nently manned, that the size of the eventual pro- portant space industry groups were represented gram would have to be geared to maintaining in the eight aerospace groups of companies, and NASA’s size and form, and that all possible users the number of potential uses recommended for should be accommodated. inclusion totaled well over 100. But even with the large number of uses that If there were any important potential uses left were identified, little doubt remains that the out of account, either because the supporting kind of “space station” which NASA prefers technology would be too costly or could not be cannot now be fully justified on scientific, eco- obtained in time, or because NASA judged their 4 nomic, or military grounds, or combinations discussion to be inappropriate for the time be- thereof. Rather, a decision to approve it will ing, they could still be provided for later, not in rest, finally, on a political judgment that will re- the initial operational capability (IOC) “station,” flect many intangible factors as well. but in the subsequent full capability “space station” program, which could continue to the end 31deally, one should add: “ and in wew of the goals and ob- of this century. jectives of our civilian space program. ” However, as argued throughout thts report, there is no publicly accepted agenda of such it is important to appreciate that the form in goals and objectives, which NASA put its original questions to the eight ‘It must also be noted that, since the cancellation of the Manned Orbiting Laboratory Program in 1968, the U.S. military has been aerospace groups largely determined the approach consistent in its public position that there is no military require- taken to potential acquisition of a civilian “space ment for a “manned space station. ” This position IS still publicly station.” And this approach, in turn, largely deter- malntal ned and remains i n force, even in the context of the Presi- dent’s call, in March 1983, for development of advanced ballistic mined the result—a “Christmas-tree” proposal in missile defense systems that could see large amounts of very sophis- which there was something for all identifiable po- ticated and costly military technology deployed in space.

NEED FOR GOALS AND OBJECTIVES

This entire panoply of relatively narrowly mination of the basic characteristics of the infra- focused and nearer term ends provide, in OTA’s structure elements actually needed, of their judgment, insufficient justification for a major, acquisition schedule and cost, or of the means new U.S. civilian space effort. Moreover, there whereby they should be acquired. is general agreement neither on a set of long- range goals which the U.S. civilian space program If future U.S. space-related goals and objectives now is expected to achieve nor on a set of spe- are to be effective in providing direction to future cific objectives which, as they are addressed, U.S. space efforts, they should be such as to com- would serve as milestones of progress toward mand widespread attention; have great inherent those goals. And without such a set of goals and humanitarian and scientific interest; foster the de- objectives the Nation cannot make a clear deter- velopment of new technology; have relevance 106 ● Civilian Space Stations and the U.S. Future in Space to global issues; prompt international coopera- vate sector so as to advance our economic tion; and involve major participation of our pri- prospects.

THE POLICY BACKGROUND

The overall end of U.S. space activities was first Over the years, a number of specific goals and stated as a preamble to the National Aeronautics objectives have been proposed. Significantly, and Space (NAS) Act of 1958, as amended (sec. however, none of them has arisen as a result of 102 (a)): “The congress hereby declares that it widespread public discussion. With the maturity is the policy of the United States that activities of U.S. space capabilities (and the capabilities of in space should be devoted to peaceful purposes several other countries and our own private sec- for the benefit of all mankind.” Six policy prin- tor as well) on the one hand and the straitened ciples, forming the core of the NAS Act, give sub- financial circumstances of the Government on stance to that overall end. These six have pro- the other, this situation is in need of fundamen- vided the framework in accordance with which tal change. That is, if the United States is to main- the civilian space program has evolved to the tain a strong commitment to a continuing civil- present day. These principles may be stated as ian space program, then an informed national follows: agreement on the goals and objectives of such a program is most important. ● that U.S. preeminence in space science, exploration and applications be maintained; At the beginning of the Nixon Administration, ● that economic, political, and social benefits the Apollo program was rapidly coming to a suc- be derived; cessful close, but no clear definition of a post- ● that knowledge be increased; Apollo space program had emerged. Early plan- ● that civilian and military activities be sepa- ning efforts had failed to yield a consensus, and rated (though they are to be coordinated and space program budgets had decreased dramati- are not to duplicate one another unneces- cally, presenting the new administration with sarily); growing unemployment in the aerospace indus- ● that NASA, the civilian agency, be limited try as well as a major technological agency that largely to research; and did not have clear signals regarding its future. In ● that international cooperation be fostered. order to address these problems, the Presiden- tial Space Task Group (STG) was established Thus, the NAS Act articulated the policy prin- under the chairmanship of the Vice President. ciples for overall guidance of the U.S. civilian The STG review was the first comprehensive in- space program, but the act alone has not pro- teragency planning effort that was carried out vided (and cannot be expected to provide) the with respect to the civilian space program. particular goals for civilian space activities. Lack- ing such guidance, the space program has instead In its final report,6 the STG recommended com- been directed by political and budgetary pres- mitment to a balanced publicly funded program sures not always relevant to a logically ordered that included science, applications, and technol- exploration, development, and use of space. At ogy-development objectives, but no immediate the same time, none of the policymaking bodies commitment to expeditions to the planets. They successively established in the executive branch suggested no change in the institutional structure nor any of the committees of Congress have been nor an operations role for NASA, but did empha- able to ensure that a long-range plan of particu- size the desirability of expanding international lar policies and programs would be pursued. s cooperation. The major technological development that the STG suggested was the reusable 5For a fu II discussion of these policy principles and their implications, see Civilian Space Policy and Applications, OTA-STI-177 —-..— b (Washington, DC: U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, The Post-Apo/lo Space Program: Directions for the Future, Space June 1982). Task Group Report to the President, September 1969. Ch. 5—Broadening the Debate ● 107 space Shuttle system that couId support an even- sequence, commitments to specific multiyear tual “space station. ” The clear priority was for Government programs would be made only with Shuttle development first, with a “space station” great care. This announcement was received with as a potential future development. Support for some dismay by the congressional leaders in- exploratory expeditions to the planets was re- volved with the space program and by the aero- tained as a long-range option for the Govern- space community. This concern spawned a num- ment’s civilian space program, with a “manned ber of hearings and proposed legislative approaches Mars mission before the end of this century as to a more vigorous space policy for the United a first target. ” States, and led to the request for the OTA assessment of Civilian Space Policy and Applications. In 1976, almost two decades after the adoption of the NAS Act, NASA issued its own “Out- Then on July 4, 1982, President Reagan an- look for Space” report. This document addressed nounced the issuance of his National Space Pol- the cultural goal of better scientific understand- icy Statement “. . . to provide a general direction ing of the physical universe and the social/eco- for our future [space] efforts . . .,” asserting that // nomic goal of further exploration and exploita- . . . our goals for space are ambitious, yet tion of the solar system, The report suggests four achievable. ” This statement “. . . establishes the goals reflective of basic human physical needs: basic goals of United States policy which are to: 1. improving food production and distribution; 1. strengthen the security of the United States; 2. developing new energy sources; 2. maintain U.S. space leadership; 3. meeting new challenges to the environment; 3. obtain economic and scientific benefits and through the exploitation of space; 4. predicting and dealing with natural and man- 4. expand U.S. private sector investment and made disasters. involvement in civil space and space-related activities; In October 1978, President Carter released a 5. promote international cooperative activities space policy statement that summarized the im- in the national interest; and portant aspects of an administration review of 6. cooperate with other nations in maintaining space policy and provided guidance regarding the freedom of space for activities which en: the President’s view of national objectives in the hance the security and welfare of man kind.” publicly supported civilian space program over the next several years. This statement reaffirmed On June 27, 1983, the Science Advisor to the endorsement of a balanced space program and President “. . . challenged] the aerospace com- committed the administration to the continued munity to do some bold thinking about the future development of the space Shuttle system and its [concerning space],” and went on to observe that // use during the coming decade. However, the . . . the real issue is how we can fashion a space statement made no new program commitments program that addresses today’s national aspira- and specifically rejected any major new techno- tions and needs . . . and . . . re-ignite[s] the spirit logical development. No goals were set to proof adventure that captured America in the past vide a focus for the program and the general phi- . . . . “ He questioned “. . . why don’t we let the losophy was best characterized by the statement American people share the grand vision of the that “activities will be pursued in space when it future of space?” appears that national objectives can most effi- But the articulated goals, particularly in the ab- ciently be met through space activities. ” Over- sence of specific objectives designed to address all, the policy statement left many questions un- them, fall well short of what the United States, answered. It made several statements about what today, might expect of its publicly supported ci- the United States would not do in space, but re- vilian space activities. mained very general regarding the nature of what it would do. In addition, it became clear that fiscal They do not speak at all of such fundamental constraints were likely to continue, and, as a con- matters as having human beings in space; of hav- 108 “ Civilian Space Stations and the U.S. Future in Space

ing the general public directly involved in space- pendence of the Western European countries and related matters; or of ameliorating the great in- Canada, Japan, Brazil, the People’s Republic of hibition that the present cost of space assets and China, india, and others, as well as the large and activities has on the development and use of constantly expanding U.S.S.R, space program space. And there is little in these words to sug- that, in its nonmilitary aspects, commands the at- gest the imaginative, the exciting, the challenging tention and respect of our civilian space Ieaders.7 or the adventurous or, to use the Science Advi-

sor’s word: the “bold. ” 7See Salyut—Soviet Steps Toward Permanent Human Presence in Space—A Technical Memorandum, OTA-TM-STI-14 (Washing- Finally, behind all of this there are the grow- ton, DC: U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Decem- ing accomplishments, competence, and inde- ber 1983).

TODAY’S TOO NARROW DEBATE

As the important matter of defining and artic- much weight on the process by which a national ulating such national goals and objectives is ad- decision is reached as on the substance of this dressed, it should not be taken as implied here decision; therefore, the better course for the Gov- that such definition and articulation are not now ernment in the longer run is to encourage as going on. What should be understood is that, for many of our citizens who are interested in space all practical purposes (including that of obtain- to participate in the pre-decision debate. ing any civilian “space station”), this activity is It was quite appropriate that, for most of the being conducted by space-related scientists, engi- past quarter of a century, our national space goals neers, and program managers—almost all within and objectives primarily reflected those of the sci- the Government, within university offices sup- ence and technology communities alone. These ported by the Government, or within the Gov- communities have done their work well. Conse- ernment-supported aerospace industry, At best, quently, our space activities now can, and should, then, the goals and objectives that would be ex- be broadened to reflect both the maturity of our pected to result from this kind of consideration space knowledge and skills, and the general pub- might, understandably, represent viewpoints that lic’s broader interests and concerns. are narrow relative to the wide spectrum of our national interests and opportunities in the civil- The matter of describing a new and clarified ian space area today. It is likely that an expres- set of long-term civilian space goals, and laying sion of goals, and especially specific objectives, out specific civilian space activity objectives, is arrived at in this fashion will reflect, perhaps un- made more urgent by the recent increase of mil- duly, the interests of their originators. And finally, itary interest in space—an increase that may well the U.S. political system oftentimes places as soon accelerate.

RECENT PROPOSALS

Recently, there have been a number of calls that the government and the private sector have to formulate a set of broadly based, contempo- not yet worked out their best permanent roles. rary national goals and objectives in the civilian Less forgivable is something else. With space so space area. clearly an arena of powerful economic and [national] security interest for the nation, we have For instance, Simon Ramo observes in his new been approaching plans and policies about book What’s Wrong With Our Technological So- space for well over a decade on an intermittent, ciety and How to Fix /t (pp. 175-1 76): t-top-and-jump short-range political basis. NASA has many hopes and plans, of course, but the After twenty-five years it is still true of the en- nation does not have a plan for the next two dec- tire commercial use of space in the united States ades. A real plan would describe both goals and Ch. 5—Broadening the Debate • 109

anticipated budgets. It would have recognition, stantial return on past and current investments acceptance, and stature with all the power cen- in space through clear . . . benefits to the society ters influencing advances and applications in on earth in the form of greatly expanded serv- space, namely, the government’s Executive ices and direct contributions to solution of earth- Branch, Congress, industry, and the scientific bound problems. ”9 and technological fraternity. A real plan would be one to which all these forces were committed The “NASA Advisory Council Study of the Mis- long-term, in the same way that at the start of sion of NASA” (released on Oct. 12, 1983) sug- the 1960s we were committed to landing a man gests activities that, in some cases, could be con- on the moon before the end of the decade. . . . sidered goals or objectives: explore the solar [And while] the possibilities of space warfare system, pursue scientific research in space, ex- [and] economic constraints [must be considered] ploit space for public and commercial purposes, none of these factors should prevent the United and expand human presence in space. And States from having sound long-range space goals as a guide to the government’s budgeting proc- NASA awarded a near $1 million contract to a ess. . . . Less-than-adequate attention has been private organization (Ecosystems) to provide it given to setting priorities and long-range goals with suggestions on “. . . long-term research and allocating missions to each sector. goals and the technology it should work on to meet those goals. ” in a recent report prepared by the Subcommit- tee on Space Science and Applications and trans- The President’s Private-Sector Survey on Cost mitted to the Committee on Science and Tech- Control, in commenting on the “. . . Federal nology of the U.S. House of Representatives, expenditure on R&D [of] about $48 billion a year Representative Ronnie Flippo, then Chairman of . . . faults the major science agencies for failing the Subcommittee, stated that: “. . . there is a to have clearly defined goals and plans for meet- lack of long-range goals for our space program.”8 ing them. ”10 And an editorial in the Christian The report noted that 7 years earlier it had also Science Monitor pointedly observes that “. . . it addressed “Future Space Programs” and then is most important that the U.S. develop a con- emphasized that NASA should “. . . focus on an sensus on manned-space-flight goals. None now over-arching concept [that] should represent one exists . . . Until consensus exists no specific space or more mind-expanding endeavors which chal- station concept can be usefully approved.’” 11 lenge the imagination and capability of the country [the] key element of [which] should be sub-

~Future Space Programs: 1981, Subcommittee on Space Science 91 bid., p. 3. and Applications, Committee on Science and Technology, U.S. l~sclence, No. 222, NOV. 25, 1983, p. 903. House of Representatives, May 1982, p. 1. I I The Chrjgjan Science Monitor, Dec. 12, 1983, p. 23.

PRESIDENT REAGAN’S CALL FOR A “SPACE STATION”

In 1984, the future of the Nation’s activities in priate Federal funds to begin studies of this pro- space was placed squarely on the congressional posed infrastructure. agenda. In his State of the Union Address, Presi- dent Reagan spoke at considerable length about the space area and what he judges should be the Of particular relevance here is the president’s Nation’s aspirations in regard to it. And he de- assertion that: “[one of] our great goal[s] is to build voted his radio address during the same week to on America’s pioneer spirit and develop our next space. He directed NASA to commence the de- frontier . . . : space.”; “America has always been velopment of permanent, low-Earth-orbit infra- greatest when we dared to be great. . . . We can structure that would support human beings in follow our dreams to distant stars.” And in devel- space, and to obtain it within the next decade. oping the infrastructure (i. e., a civilian “space sta- And he asked Congress to authorize and appro- tion”) he called for international participation so 110 ● Civilian Space Stations and the U.S. Future in Space

as to: “. . . expand freedom for all who share our In effect, the President’s speeches have now goals. ” prompted, and indeed his specific request for Fed- eral law and funds for a major new initiative in the In his radio talk, he spoke to the: “. . . challenge publicly funded civilian space program essentially [of] reaching for exciting goals in space , . . ,“ while requires, the conduct of a national debate over the explaining that, as well, “Our space goals will chart next year or two regarding our national interests, a path of progress toward creating a better life for goals and objectives in the civilian space area. all people” [and he emphasized that]: “a , . . space station [should be seen as] a stepping stone for [addressing] further goals.” Emphasis added.

STEPS TOWARD BROADER PARTICIPATION

Interestingly enough, the circumstances dis- of a “National Commission on Space” that will cussed above have resulted in only one impor- assist the United States “ . . . to define the long- tant change to the basic 1958 Act—the explicit range needs of the Nation that may be fulfilled emphasis on space commercialization that was through the peaceful uses of outer space “12 added this summer. Indeed, it was only in the With the President’s signature to Public Law 98- fall of 1983 that Congress began to hold hearings 361, there has been put into motion the first for- that might lay a basis for such changes. Scores mal and fundamental reexamination of the Na- of billions of public dollars have been appropri- tion’s civilian space aspirations, objectives and ated to pay for our public civilian space program institutions since the passage of the NAS Act in since we reached the Moon, and almost surely 1958. scores of billions more will be appropriated during the next few decades, but, to date, without From the outset of this assessment, the need the kind of thoughtful and fundamental reap- for identifying a far-sighted set of generally accept- praisal of our contemporary national interests and able civilian space goals and objectives that re- activities in space that many are coming to believe flect today’s circumstances has been apparent. the issues now demand. Our publicly supported Most notably, the assessment’s Advisory Panel civiIian space area has seemed to suffer from a has strongly urged that an initial set of such goals form of benign neglect. and objectives be identified and proposed for broad study and discussion so as to lay a more However, the debate is quickening. Congress rational basis for the consideration of any large has taken an extraordinary step regarding the ar- and costly space civilian “space station. ” ticulation of national goals and objectives in the civilian space area. In passing the National Aero- In response to that call, and with the intention nautics and Space Act of 1985, Congress, among of providing a sound and useful starting point for other things, found and declared that “. . . the a national debate on the scope and direction of identification of long-range goals and policy op- the Nation’s space activities, the next chapter of tions for the United States civilian space program this report provides an ensemble of interrelated through a high-level, representational public goals and objectives for consideration by Con- forum will assist the President and the Congress gress and the American public. in formulating future policies for the . . . program . . . “; and they called for the establishment IZpubllc Law 98-36I, Title Ii. Chapter 6 TOWARD A GOAL-ORIENTED CIVILIAN SPACE PROGRAM Contents

Page Possible Civilian Space Goals...... 113 Possible Civilian Space Objectives ...... 113 Indicated infrastructure ...... 122 Cost and Schedule ...... 124 Conclusions ...... 126 Final Observations ...... 128

LIST OF TABLES

Table No. Page 9. Possible Goals and Objectives ...... 115 10. Cost and Schedule to satisfy Objectives Suggested for Discussion ...... 125 Chapter 6 TOWARD A GOAL-ORIENTED CIVILIAN SPACE PROGRAM

POSSIBLE CIVILIAN SPACE GOALS

If the civilian space activities of the United significant—can be stated only in a more general States are to maintain widespread and enthusi- and open-ended way: astic public support, they should aspire to pro- ● to increase the efficiency of space activities tect, ease, challenge, and/or improve the human and reduce their net cost to the general condition. Such aspirations can and should be public; articulated in the form of long-range goals that ● to involve the general public directly in space would guide the conduct of the Nation’s space activities, both on Earth and in space; activities in general and a decision regarding pos- ● to derive scientific, economic, social, and sible acquisition of any “space station” in par- political benefits; ticular. ● to increase international cooperation and In order to prompt the formulation and subse- collaboration in and re space; quent discussion of future space goals and ob- Ž to study and to explore the Earth, the solar jectives, OTA has prepared a list of possible long- system, and the greater physical universe; range goals and a set of nearer term objectives and designed to address those goals. Although OTA ● to spread life, in a responsible fashion, does not recommend either this particular set of throughout the solar system. ’ goals or its supporting family of objectives, they These goals (some new, some already well- are intended to exemplify the kind of goals and accepted) have been chosen so as to move U.S. objectives around which consensus might well space interests and activities closer to the main- be formed so as to provide sensible guidance for stream of public interest and concern, while at the Nation’s future space activities. The Advisory the same time maintaining space leadership, Panel for this assessment has taken an unusually enhancing national security, and developing new active role in helping to formulate these goals and capabilities to respond to finding the unexpected objectives. It is the Panel’s judgment that the in the cosmos. goals and objectives proposed for discussion are reasonable and important.

The set of possible goals follows. (They should I Undertaking this goal responsibly would entail preserving the be read with reference to the six basic principles pristine environments of other worlds for future study and apprecia- spoken to in the 1958 Space Act and discussed tion. For example, there are bodies such as Europa and Titan, which have not yet been explored, where life may already exist. And there in the previous chapter. ) Some of these can be remains some residual controversy even about the possibility of defined in fairly specific terms, but others–no less microbes on Mars.

POSSIBLE CIVILIAN SPACE OBJECTIVES

In order to illustrate how the six basic civilian eration with other countries, in most cases) could space goals suggested in the previous section attain within the second quarter-century of the could be addressed, this section identifies 10 spe- space age. The particular objectives suggested cific objectives that the United States (in coop- here for further study and discussion are chosen

113 114 . Civilian Space Stations and the U.S. Future in Space to have a great impact and, taken as a group, to The results of these basic research activities, of respond to a broad spectrum of public, private, course, will be many and varied. In both the professional, and international interests. shorter and longer term they can have important public policy implications and, in general, they Of course, discussion of any of these concep- can eventually influence the cultural, economic, tual objectives should actually be undertaken and national security interests of the country in only with surface-based alternative and comple- many, and oftentimes unexpected, ways. As the mentary activities clearly in mind. Some elements roles and capabilities expected of our in-space of a few are already under way in a modest fash- infrastructure for the next two or three decades ion, but not in the sharply focused fashion sug- are considered, basic research activities should gested here. Some may turn out not to be feasi- 2 receive a high priority. Continuing success in ble for technological, economic, or other reasons, fundamental space research may be expected to Some could be attained in a very short time, but facilitate the accomplishment of the objectives others will take many years. Some respond to ob- proposed here. jective needs, some respond to conceptual opportunities. Broad consensus on some should be The titles of the 10 civilian space objectives fol- rather easily reached, but others can be expected low. They are not rank-ordered: to provoke serious argument and perhaps even 1. Global Disaster Avoidance and Minimi- disagreement. They range in cost from near-zero zation. to tens of billions of dollars. Some are chosen par- 2. Human Presence and Activities on the ticularly because, in addition to the importance Moon. of their being achieved, they also invite the ac- 3. Exploration of Mars and Some Asteroids. tive and important partnership of other countries 4. Medical Research of Direct Interest to the and the U.S. private sector. General Public. These objectives are proposed under the as- 5. People, Drawn From the General Public, sumption that the U.S. Government would still be in Space. expected to carry on, as today, a “core” space- 6. Modernizing and Expanding International related basic research program at the level of at Short-Wave Broadcasting. least $1 billion annually (in constant dollars). Pure 7. Providing Space Data Directly to the Gen- scientific research should continue to encompass eral Public. such diverse space-related areas as astronomy, 8. Using Space and Space Technology for the cosmology, life sciences, materials sciences, ge- Transmission of Electrical Energy. odesy, magnetism, relativity, plasma physics, me- 90 Reducing the Cost of Space Operations, Es- teorology, atmospheric composition and dynam- pecially Transportation. ics, and programs of preparing for human Iunar, 10. lncreasing Commercial-Industrial Space asteroid, and planetary exploration and settle- Sales. ment. The basic research program would be ex- The eventual acceptance of any or all of these pected to continue solar system exploration gen- objectives (along with their related costs) as ac- erally, including the planets, their moons, the tual national objectives would leave the priority Sun, comets and asteroids, and to improve the among them, and the rate of public expenditure methods and means of transporting equipment in addressing them, completely open. Each and and people in space. And it would be expected all would be undertaken, if at all, only as the to develop, deploy, and use those “cutting edge” funds become available to do so. space technologies—large and sophisticated telescopes and interferometers that span the elec- Table 9 relates these 10 specific objectives to tromagnetic spectrum, microgravity furnaces, so- the broader goals. phisticated and powerful Earth-oriented remote A brief elaboration of each of the 10 follows. sensors, sophisticated space probes, etc.—that are required to make early and fundamental advances ‘See the National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958 (Public Law in these fields in a highly productive fashion. 98-361 ). Ch. 6—Toward a Goal-Oriented Civilian Space Program ● 115

Table 9.—Possible Goals and Objectives

Goals Increase Derive space activities’ Involve the scientific, Increase Study and Bring life efficiency; general Derive political, inter- explore the to the reduce their public economic and social national physical physical net cost directly benefits benefits cooperation universe universe Objectives: - 1. Establish a global information system/ N N P Y Y N N service re natural hazards 2. Establish lower cost reusable Y P P Y Y Y Y transportation service to the Moon and establish human presence there 3. Use space probes to obtain information N N N Y Y Y N re Mars and some asteroids prior to early human exploration 4. Conduct medical research of direct N N P Y P N N interest to the general public 5. Bring at least hundreds of the general N Y Y Y Y N Y public per year into space for short visits 6. Establish a global, direct, audio broad- N P P Y Y N N casting, common-user system/service 7. Make essentially all data generated by N Y P Y Y N N civilian satellites and spacecraft directly available to the general public 8. Exploit radio/optical free space N N Y P Y N N electromagnetic propagation for long- distance energy distribution 9. Reduce the unit cost of space transpor- Y N Y Y N N N tation and space activitiesa 10. Increase space-related private sector Y N Y N N N N sale# aThls ~~u~d advance the proSpeC& of successfully addressing all other ‘Qoals.”

Y: Yes; N: No; P: Perhaps; depends on how carded out.

1. Global Disaster Avoidance and Minimiza- the Earth’s space and atmosphere, and surface tion.—ln cooperation with the other countries of and subsurface, for characteristics and changes the world, our Government and our scientific and relevant to such problems, and supplying both enginering communities could be set to the task immediate and longer term “warning” infor- of beginning to provide a global, space-related, mation promptly, directly, and in a form useful Earth-monitoring system/service which would to nontechnicians. provide fundamental information to the world’s political leaders, organizations, and institutions These are problems that have inherent multina- to assist them in dealing, satisfactorily, with tional elements of potentially grave hazard. And macroscopic “life-and-death” problems in such this type of space-related system/service could be areas as weather, climate, air and water purity, developed, installed, and used in such a fashion food production, seismology, and resource con- as to obviate the serious concerns raised by some servation. It would be designed to complement countries over what they consider to be undue related surface-based system/services, taking spe- surveillance of a military-political nature, or the cific advantage of the in-situ measurement and kind of monitoring that could provide an undue monitoring perspectives that only appropriate economic advantage to some countries. The sensors located in space could offer. Attention original elements of this system/service could be could be concentrated on earthquakes, tsunamis, continually improved on as new scientific knowl- ozonosphere perturbations, severe storms, envi- edge is obtained, new space-related measure- ronmental pollution, the carbon dioxide “green- ment techniques are perfected, and experience house” effect, volcanic effluvia, etc. Well before is gained in the reliability, utility, and cost of the year 2000 this operational global system/serv- space-related services in comparison with analo- ice could be in place, monitoring and studying gous services that could be provided at the sur-

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Ch. 6—Toward a Goal-Oriented Civilian Space Program ● 117 face. It could, of course, draw heavily on any low-Earth-orbit and lunar residential and work “global habitability” scientific studies. And it places could all keep analogous Mars objectives could provide information that would be usefuI specifically in mind. Over the next 10 to 20 years, in furthering study of “nuclear winter. ” crewless space probes, with characteristics specifically reflective of our intention to have some 2. Human Presence and Activities on the Moon. of our men and women visit the surface of Mars –Our Government and our scientific and engi- early in the next century, could be sent there. neering communities in government, universities, Specific plans could see a human exploration pro- and the private sector, could be given the task gram commence on the satisfactory completion of establishing a modest, permanent, habitable of our initial settlement on the Moon, provided facility on our Earth’s Moon. Such a facility would the cost of doing so is then seen to be acceptable. allow physical, chemical, geological, and cosmo- logical studies to begin there in earnest–with the Of course, the space probes could, as well, entire activity involving as many countries as pos- search for information of importance to a better sible. The U.S. private sector in concert with the understanding of our own terrestrial circum- Government could also be challenged to provide stances and processes. And consideration could facilities and services there that would open up be given to exploring a few of the asteroids as the Moon to travel, recreation, sports and other wel I. cultural, commercial, and industrial pursuits. 4. Medical Research of Direct Interest to the Three important elements of this program could General Public.– For over 20 years, the space probe: 1 ) the development of a relatively low-cost, grams of both the United States and the Soviet human transportation system/service between Union have been concerned with the ability of low-Earth-orbit and the Moon [see objective (9)]; men and women to survive and function well in 2) consideration of producing oxygen on the space. Space provides a special environment, Moon from lunar materials as a source of rocket marked particularly by the near absence of grav- oxidant for return trips and for life support (i. e., ity, within which several diseases and related using solar energy to release oxygen from Moon human physiological processes might now begin rocks); and 3) a search for abundant supplies of to be profitably investigated. Important topics water/ice in the cold-traps at the lunar poles. relevant not only to future space dwellers, but A primary cost-driver for human settlement on also to the Earth population as well, could include the Moon, and other celestial objects, will be the research on hypertension, osteoporosis (a disor- reliability and efficiency of the technology which der involving loss of bone mass highly prevalent would enable such settlements to provide livable in older women), osteoarthritis (which affects atmospheres, grow their own food, and build ef- over 16 million Americans), weight control, en- fective and durable habitats using local materials. ergy metabolism, digestive function, and body fluid balance. 3. Obtaining Information Required for Eventual Human Exploration of Mars and Some Asteroids. To elaborate on one such opportunity: exper- —The Soviet Union has stated that it expects to imental evidence, gathered from both animals explore, and have some of its people establish and humans in space and in certain Earth-based a presence on, the planet Mars. The United States simulations of some of the conditions of space could also aspire to do so when the technology flight, suggests that there may bean analogy be- is in hand to allow it to be done at relatively low tween some of the physiological changes that oc- cost, when adequate Mars-related data and in- cur in the absence of gravity and those changes formation are also in hand, and when our experi- which take place during the normal aging proc- ence in settling on the Moon gives us the con- ess. For example, as cosmonauts and astronauts fidence that we can do so successfully and effi- adapt to longer duration living in essentiaJJy ciently [see objective (2)]. Early programs to de- weightless conditions in space, they experience velop and use lower cost transportation, hous- atrophied muscles, brittle bones, and decreased ing, and people-related services in establishing cardiovascular and respiratory capacity, i.e.,

38-798 0 - 84 - 9 : QL. 3 118 . Civilian Space Stations and the U.S. Future in Space physiological conditions similar to those which begin to experience the “space adventure” di- accompany senescence. Further experimental rectly, will the space domain and space activi- studies in research programs carried on at the ties gradually begin to move into the mainstream Earth’s surface and on the Shuttle-Spacelab may of our national interests and concerns. confirm that, inasmuch as the human aging process evolved under conditions of constant grav- ~his objective and objective (7) have in com- ity here on Earth, removal of this force over long mon the aim of making the space domain, and periods of time in space results in changes in the space science and technology, much more acces- aging process and its rate—changes that could be sible to the general public.] studied in weightlessness with an explicit inten- 6. Modernizing and Expanding International tion of relating any findings to the general popula- Short-Wave Broadcasting.–Hundreds of millions tion. Given the importance of scientific studies of people, world-wide, regularly listen to speech of aging to all of the world’s people as individuals, and music programs broadcast via shortwave by and the effects of an aging population on many more than 100 countries. Because of the inherent economic, social, and political institutions, if sur- characteristics of the ionosphere which influence face and Shuttle-Spacelab “space station” studies the way by which the broadcast signals are pro- are encouraging, the United States could in- pagated, this service is limited at best and often- augurate a major international research program times is of poor quality, reliability, and coverage. in the fields of gerontology and geriatrics that Also, shortwave broadcasting has become a mat- would encompass related experimentation both ter of growing international political contention in space and on the Earth’s surface. because of its dominance by the major countries 5. People, Drawn From the General public, in and the growing interference to reception caused Space.—The Government is now moving to ex- by increasing use of the sharply limited useful pand human use of the Shuttle to include a very radio-wave spectrum by very powerful surface few nontechnician “communicators” per year on transmitters. A cooperative U.S. Government- Earth-space flights. Within the next decade, we private sector initiative could lead an international could have space “Lodge/Habitats” established effort to establish a global system, employing so- in low-Earth-orbit, with the Shuttle being used to phisticated and powerful direct broadcast satel- see hundreds of persons per year, the great ma- lites, that could replace most of today’s individ- jority of whom would be representative of various ual country shortwave stations well within a professional and cultural sectors and the general decade. Developed as an international common- public (i.e., nonastronauts and nonspace techni- user system, use of its services could allow broad- cian workers) drawn from the United States and casters throughout the world, regardless of their rest of the entire world’s population, being trans- size, location, or political persuasion, to reach ported there to spend a short time in space. The audiences in other countries clearly and reliably, entire activity could be operated as a sound, and at relatively modest cost. Such a service albeit innovative, commercial enterprise carried could go far toward meeting a standard of nation- on in cooperation with the U.S. Government; to-nation broadcasting equitability simply not there should be little or no net out-of-pocket cost physically possible under today’s surface-based to the Government as a consequence of this co- shortwave broadcasting circumstances. Briefly, operation. The enterprise could be conducted so it would be a more efficient, effective, and fair as not to favor the rich—all of our citizens should way of accomplishing the kind of shortwave have some opportunity to visit there. And such broadcasting now done from the Earth’s surface. “Lodge/Habitats,” and the activities that they, And, as well, the prospect of wholly new kinds and the Shuttle, could allow to commence in of international programming and international space, could be used to help the world celebrate marketing services could be opened. the next “Millennium” in an extraordinary fashion. 7. Providing Space Data Directly to the General Only when a large number of our citizens, rep- Public.—’’The wholesale introduction of com- resentative of a broad cross-section of our society, puters into [the home and especially] into class- Ch. 6—Toward a Goal-Oriented Civilian Space Program ● 119 rooms since 1980 amounts to a quiet revolution ganizations that could prepare various education- that will help meet the demands of scientific and al packages with a wide variety of users in mind: technological change as well as economic com- students of various ages and interests and many putation in world markets.”3 Nearly 80 percent of the general public with home TV receivers, of our junior and senior high schools now have video recorders, and computers. computers and it is expected that the number in 8. Using Space and Space Technology for the our public schools will reach 600,000 by next Transmission of Electrical Energy. -In effect, any year. A computer network now interconnects 200 radio communication involves the transmission university sites, and the number of terminals is of energy through the Earth’s atmosphere and/or expected to reach 150,000 soon. space—albeit at miniscule power levels. A few A high school teacher in the United Kingdom years ago, tens of thousands of watts of continu- has attained international attention by having his ous microwave power were transmitted in free students ‘‘tune in” to signals from Soviet space- space with very high efficiency and reliability, and craft and deduce information about the crafts’ multi hundred million dollars per year Defense characteristics and activities. The cultural, social, programs are now anticipated that would see at and economic implications of having a large and least 10 megawatts transmitted through the at- growing segment of our population using increas- mosphere and/or space via collimated and directed ingly sophisticated computers in their homes, microwave and optical electromagnetic beams. businesses, grade and high schools, universities, Use of such methods and means might allow etc., promise to be enormous. Many of these in- electricity to be distributed usefully across space. dividuals and organizations could now be sup- Energy sources could be located in geostationary plied, in near-real-time and at modest cost, with orbit and/or on the lunar surface and the energy the nonclassified and nonproprietary data gen- transmitted to the Earth’s surface. Or energy erated by payloads of public satellites and space- could be supplied from the Earth’s surface, as craft generally, by designing them to allow direct needed, to geosynchronous orbit and to a mil- readout of the space signals transmitted from lion miles or more beyond, at any desired power them and/or by providing the data promptly and level. Given that the cost of electricity is very generally from central collection points. For in- much higher in orbit (where it is provided by solar stance, a recent Shuttle/Spacelab flight resulted cell/battery combinations) than at the Earth’s sur- in the generation of 20 million video frames, 900 face, the latter might be able to be done com- frames of film, and 2 trillion bits of data. Hun- petitively at an earlier date. dreds of thousands of people have already taken the opportunity simply to listen in, passively, to The ready availability of such electrical energy surface-space voice communications—and made in space could allow a complete rethinking of the modest payments to do so. Making data available design and use of space assets and activities in on the atmosphere, surface and subsurface char- such space-related areas as communications, nav- acteristics of the bodies in our solar system, in- igation, position-fixing, remote sensing, and even cluding the planet Earth, and spacecraft operat- transportation. This is because systems designers ing data as well—all directly, while they were could anticipate having tens of megawatts (or being generated–could allow and prompt a more) of electrical power available in space, much greater direct public involvement, both whereas they now have only kilowatts and still here and abroad, in the publicly supported U.S. only tens of kilowatts by the middle of the next civilian space program. As well, it could increase, decade, and system operators would have to pay by orders of magnitude, today’s study and ap- only for the amounts of power that the systems preciation of these space data, spacecraft tech- would actually consume, just as at the surface. nology, and space activities generally, especially In addition, many areas of the world have enor- by our younger people. In time, the market could mous renewable energy potentials (especially well prompt the creation of “service-added” or- hydro, but solar as well when the conversion process becomes economically attractive), but ‘Christian Science Monitor, Jan. 6, 1984. they are located too far from other areas which 120 . Civilian Space Stations and the U.S. Future in Space

need such energy. A reliable, cost-competitive 10. Increasing Commercial-industrial Space and efficient solution to the very long-distance Sales.–The United States has spent well over (several thousands of miles, and intercontinental) $200 billion (1984$-adjusted) to learn how to en- transmission problem could allow surface-gen- ter space, to survive and function in it, and to erated (N. B., in this case not in-space generated, use it. In doing so, the Nation has accrued an as in the Solar Power Satellite concept) electri- enormous reserve of space knowledge, assets, city to be distributed via space. Most importantly, and experience, and created a sophisticated electricity generated by renewable sources could high-technology space industry administered and be treated as an exportable commodity, and in- managed by Government and non-Government ternational and intercontinental distribution and professionals in essential harmony with many load-shedding could become a global possibil- other professionals in our university community. ity—to great economic, social, and political ad- With one important exception, the entire civil- vantage. ian space effort has continued to be supported from the public purse. The time has now been And, of course, when such technology is reli- reached when our private sector—commercial- ably and economically in hand, it could be used industrial-financial—could begin to assume an in- to supply electrical “fuel” to spacecraft on voy- creasing responsibility for the conduct of our ci- ages to and from the Moon, and farther. vilian space activities. The one exception, the pri- 9. Reducing the Cost of Space Transportation. vate satellite communications business, has already —Whatever other measures are used to charac- reached sales of some $2 billion per year and terize civilian space activities, that of the enor- continues to grow at an average 15 percent per mous cost of in-orbit assets and activities is cer- year rate, compounded. Government organiza- tain to be listed. The primary “cost-driver” is that tions, policies, activities, and leadership could of space transportation for people and physical now be structured not only to see that the growth assets. For the predictable future, it will cost well in this one economically successful space field over $1 ,000/lb (1984$) to place human and equip- is maintained, but that other space fields (naviga- ment payloads into 200-mile high-Earth orbit, in tion, position-fixing, tourism, remote sensing, and an era when, near the Earth’s surface, they can materials processing) are likewise explicitly en- be transported by aircraft over 10 times the discouraged to grow and prosper. The President has tance at one-thousandth of this cost. Such a great announced a space strategy “to encourage Amer- cost differential continues to be one of the great- ican industry to move quickly and decisively intc est inhibitions, perhaps the greatest inhibition, to space. Obstacles to private sector space activi- our investment in, and use of, our Earth’s space. ties will be removed, and we’ll take appropriate We could now begin to look well beyond the steps to spur private enterprise in space, ” And Shuttle, and the specific technologies, fuels, the Space Act has now been changed so as to payloads, and operations basic to its design and require NASA to “seek and encourage . . . the use. We could mount large-scale, advanced tech- fullest commercial use of space.” New busi- nology development programs that would ad- nesses, increased employment, increased sales dress promising methods and means of provid- here and abroad, the introduction of new and ing reliable space transportation at much lower useful public and private services, and larger Fed- unit cost, giving full consideration to the future eral, State, and local tax revenues all lie in pros- circumstance of the much greater space traffic pect, once the present private sector learns how volumes that such lower costs could engender. to moderate its dependence on the Govern- An initial objective could be to reduce the cost ment’s largess and its slow-paced, structured way per pound for transport between the Earth’s sur- of doing business, and new private, competitive, face and low-Earth-orbit by an order of mag- entrepreneurial activities are formed and grow. nitude. One of the most important civilian space objec- Ch. 6—Toward a Goal-Oriented Civilian Space Program ● 121 tives now could be that of seeing that procure- core solar system exploration program mentioned ment of more and more of our space assets, and earlier; a global person-to-person satellite com- the conduct of more and more of our space activ- munications system/service; an in-space “sophis- ities, become commercialized, so that: 1 ) the net ticated-machine” experimental and demonstra- burden of space activities on the public purse is tion program; etc. It is clear that when truly sharply reduced, and 2) the Government can apply imaginative minds become impressed with the its resources to the achievement of objectives that broad dimensions of the space domain–not only either are not appropriate to the private sector its physical magnitude and character but the op- or lie beyond its capabilities. portunity for innovative uses–there is little apparent limit to the number and kinds of concepts As these economic benefits grow, they could for exploring and using it for earthly benefit. be looked at as offsetting, at least to some extent, the cost of our publicly supported space program. Underlying a decision to pursue any or all of Social benefits also must be kept in mind, since these objectives would be a concern for the basic a fundamental purpose of government is that of welfare of our own and indeed all of the world’s meeting important public needs that the private people; a challenge to international cooperation sector inherently cannot. in large, exciting, and peaceful activities; a challenge to the basic innovativeness and cost con- Of course, a number of other objectives could sciousness of our private sector; a commitment also be entertained. These could include: in- to the permanent human investiture and consid- creased emphasis on a solar system exploration ered development of both our Earth’s space and program, augmenting the expected wide-ranging our Moon; and a general sense of “spirit-lifting.”

122 ● Civilian Space Stations and the U.S. Future in Space

After careful study, and the weighing of costs and reflective of enlightened U.S. leadership in the alternatives, it seems reasonable to observe that thoughtful, bold, imaginative, and purposeful de- any decision to pursue them could be taken as velopment and use of space.

INDICATED INFRASTRUCTURE

Some of these objectives, if they are to be fore . . . and use much common or hand-me- achieved, would require certain elements of in- down technology, as much as possible rather space infrastructure; others, depending on how than build custom hardware. . . .“4 they would be carried out, may or may not re- If the Government’s large capital costs for de- quire such elements; still others would require velopment and production are to be minimized none. The manner in which the United States ob- and the private sector strengthened, then serious tains any of this infrastructure should reflect, to consideration should be given to encouraging the the maximum, our already great investment in private sector to provide infrastructure elements, space technology and operations; whenever rea- through sales, long-term leases, or on the basis sonably possible, it should be obtained at the of charges for actual service use, that meet Gov- lowest capital, and operations and maintenance, ernment performance specifications. cost to the public purse. It would embrace the views of NASA’s chief scientist: “[n assembling the necessary hardware, the watchword is ‘in- heritance’ . . . projects and spacecraft are to 4Dr. Frank McDonald, quoted in Christian Monitor, make maximum use of what has been done be- Dec. 28, 1983, p. 14. Ch. 6—Toward a Goal-Oriented Civilian Space Program ● 123

Obtaining space infrastructure in this fashion ● an LEO human residential and working is not only a reasonable and effective use of U.S. space to be used for medical research [ob- space assets, but it could reduce the difficulty of jective (4)]; obtaining public funds for the scientists, engi- ● a transport staging facility to support efficient neers, managers, and equipment needed to pur- travel to geostationary orbit, the Moon, and sue more, and more important, space ends. beyond, using reusable orbital transfer vehicles or other vehicles. This would address The main elements of longer term space infra- objectives (1), (2), (3), (6), (9), and possibly structure called for in pursuing the 10 objectives 5 (8); and are: ● a storage facility in LEO would allow use of ● an LEO capability to assemble and check out full Shuttle loads, helping objective (9), and the large and sophisticated satellites and staffed LEO laboratory facilities could pro- space structures needed to provide both the mote objective (1 O). hazard-prevention and the direct audio Of course, if such infrastructure elements were broadcast global system/service [objectives available for the specific purposes that justify their (1) and (6)]; acquisition, they could be used for additional purposes also.

JNo additional space infrastructure elements are needed to Note that, in essence, provision of the infra- achieve objective (7). structure needed to pursue two of the larger scale —

124 . Civilian Space Stations and the U.S. Future in Space

objectives [(2) and (4)] could accommodate most ments, where they could be used for the conduct of the needs of all of the other eight. In what fol- of scientific research or the production of various lows, therefore, the cost of this infrastructure is materials under microgravity conditions. included under these two objectives. Finally, note that large amounts of very costly And note that no Government development of electrical power (with initial capital costs as high free-flying platform infrastructure elements is as $10,000 per watt) are not called for in LEO; called for; they (e.g., MESA, SPAS, LEASECRAFT, some 20 kilowatts would appear to be sufficient. EURECA, and the Space Industries platform) Larger amounts appear to be needed only for any could and probably would be designed, devel- eventual commercial-industrial materials process- oped and installed by our private sector, and/or ing, and could then be provided and financed other countries, and offered to the civilian space by the private sector in anticipation that such community—both Government and private inter- processing will prove to be profitable. ests—under appropriate sale or lease arrange-

COST AND SCHEDULE

Attaining all of these 10 suggested conceptual confidence in their detailed accuracy. But such objectives would cost money—overall, a great accuracy is not needed for the illustrative pur- deal of money. In table 10, rough estimates are poses for which they were developed. made for the cost of each of them, and the length if work were to commence on all of them now, of time over which each would be pursued. in the bulk of the cost would occur over the next all cases the cost estimates are rounded off to one 15 years. figure. And, again, the maximum use of: 1) already developed and paid-for space technology, Space transportation costs are not included in 2) the most truly competitive procurement meth- these estimates, except for an additional $0.1 bil- ods, and 3) the most modern and least burden- lion (1984$) or so for each LEO-lunar orbit flight. some acquisition strategies and procedures, are Rather, it is assumed that some 10 Shuttle surface- all fundamental assumptions. LEO flights per year, at an average cost of about $0.1 billion (1984$) each, would be budgeted for OTA’s first rough estimate of the total cost of all Government-sponsored civilian research and attaining all 10 of the objectives is some $40 bil- development purposes, including those consid- lion (1 984$) over the next 25 years. But, seem- ered here. ingly in the nature of things, long-term high technology development programs such as these Clearly, these costs are great in total sum, espe- invariably encounter unforeseen difficulties and cially in the face of other important calls upon experience the pressure of unexpected external Federal tax revenues during an area of multi hun- events. Indeed, the total cost should be under- dred billion dollar annual deficits in the Federal stood to be no less than $40 billion (1 984$), and budget. perhaps considerably more–as much as, say, $60 While the total cost of our publicly funded ci- billion (1984$ ).6 Given the early period at which vilian space program will reflect the magnitude these estimates are made, there cannot be great and character of the objectives addressed in the b“ln recent decades the average overrun on major programs, in program, and these will, in turn, reflect political constant dollars and constant quantities, has been slightly over 50 decisions, the unit costs to acquire and operate percent. The average schedule milestone has been missed by a third the technology will reflect engineering and man- of the time initially projected. The average time to develop new systems has, until recently been increasing at the rate of three agement decisions. months per year . , each year. ” Norman R. Augustine, “The Aerospace Professional . . . and High-Tech Management, ” Aero- Beyond the observation that, in some general space America, March 1984, p. 5. fashion, the cost will increase with the magnitude, ——

Ch. 6—Toward a Goal-Oriented Civilian Space Program ● 125

Table 10.—Cost and Schedule to Satisfy Objectives Suggested for Discussion

Total costa Duration Objectives (billions, 1984 dollars) (years) 1. Establish a global information system/service 2 10 re natural hazards 2. Establish lower cost reusable transportation 20 15, 25 service to the Moon and establish human presence thereb 3. Use space probes to obtain information re 2 15 Mars and some asteroids prior to early human exploration 4. Conduct medical research of direct interest to 6 5, 25 the general publicd 5. Bring at least hundreds of the general 0.5 5, 25 public per year into space for short visitse 6. Establish a global, direct, audio broadcasting, 2 10 common-user system/service 7. Make essentially all data generated by 0 25 civilian satellites and spacecraft directly available to the general public 8. Exploit radio/optical free-space electro- 0.5 10 magnetic propagation for Iong-distance energy distribution+ 9. Reduce the unit cost of space transportation 5 15 and space activitiesh 10. Increase space-related private sector salesh 0.5 25 - $40i

ab~t~ are for deve[~pment and acqu~sltlon, o~ratfons and maintenance costs are not Included, excePt for some launch and operations costs noted for objectives 2, 3, and 4.

b15 years t. establish the settlement, and 3 vlsits&ear at $0.1 billlon each (PIUS basic Shuttle launch costs) over the following

c&{~~r&erage, one pro~ evev 3 years and S0.4 billion each. d$2 billion over 5 years t. establish a life sciences laboratory in LEO, and $0.2 billionlyear thereafter to oPerate it. This laborato~ could also be used for materials science and other research.

e5 years t. establish a LEO “lodge-habitat, ” and its continuing use thereafter. f w ~ bllllon~ear In addition to DOD expenditures. 9w:3 bllllon/year for a 15.year technology development effort to reduce space transportation Urlit COSk3. %hls would also help efforts directed toward the other objectives. i The actual cost could ~ as high as ~ billion (1984 dollars), if costs exceed Mtial Predictions @ ~0/0 generality, and sophistication of the space capa- infrastructure also); the cost of instruments, fur- bility acquired, it is difficult–indeed, it is impos- naces, etc., needed for scientific experimentation sible, at this time—to estimate the eventual cost in association with its use; and the interest cost to the Government of addressing these objectives of any money borrowed to fund the acquisition and obtaining the required infrastructure. A num- program.7 We must remember, too, that infra- ber of the significant infrastructure “cost-drivers” structure eventually becomes obsolete or wears are presented in chapter 4. Suffice it to say here out, and, since its support services will come to that there are a number of factors that could in- be depended on, this implies that some form of fluence the net cost to the taxpayer for acquir- amortization and replacement will be called for. ing space infrastructure, and many opportunities A consequence of the successful attainment of to minimize this net cost that could be grasped any or all of these unit cost reduction objec- by vigorous and imaginative NASA management. tives—and reduction in the unit cost of space Appendix D speaks to the matter of cost containment. 7Any such cost is not allocated (if indeed it were possible to allo- To this point, only the initial capital cost of LEO cate it) on a program-by-program basis. But, in the overall, the more infrastructure has been considered. To this cost than $100 billion per year now required to be paid on the Federal debt is a cost of Government that must be considered by Congress, must be added its ongoing operation and main- at least implicitly, in all of its authorization and appropriation tenance (O&M) costs (and the O&M costs of lunar actions—in the space area as for all others. —

126 ● Civilian Space Stations and the U.S. Future in Space

transportation generally—would be to attract and more of its research, development, test, and more private interest to space activities. NASA, evaluation funds, to the development of truly in turn, would then be able to apply more scien - “cutting edge” technology in support of its tific, engineering, and management attention, science, exploration, and other activities.

CONCLUSIONS

To create a truly modern civilian space pro- rapidly increasing tax revenues, these important gram, the United States now might well move to “offsetting” incomes could be taken into consid- adopt up-to-date, long-term goals in the civilian eration by Congress when passing on NASA ap- space area, and to initiate work on a first family propriations. of specific space objectives to address over the next 20 to 25 years, If such goals and objectives Indeed, a reasonable extrapolation from pres- were set, the Nation would have a clearer pic- ent funding circumstances would suggest that, by ture of the kind of space infrastructure required the end of this century, our publicly supported to meet the objectives, as well as the cost and space program could be much larger than it is schedule under which this infrastructure could today. be obtained. It must be emphasized that whether or not, as The United States would also be able to treat a matter of public policy, our tax-supported ci- its publicly supported civilian space program vilian space program should be allowed to grow more explicitly as a direct investment of great po- to the magnitudes discussed here as possible is tential economic importance, in addition to the not an issue addressed in this report. Rather, it other benefits that it provides. This might in turn is important to appreciate that, under certain con- ensure that the program’s public costs would be ditions, expenditures for this program could be prudently contained, that its economic benefits considered to be offset to a large extent by reve- would be substantially and objectively enlarged, nues, thus giving Congress more flexibility in set- and that it would serve the broadest public in- ting expenditure levels than it has today. An im- terest. portant element of public debate about our space future, therefore, should be about the allocation Finally, if an early, paced transfer of manage- of public, economically related investments ment attention, commitment, and resources takes therein—for we need no longer consider our pub- place away from further major development and/ lic space expenditures as consumption expend- or production of Shuttle capability, and if there itures that underwrite the salaries of astronomers, is a vigorous and innovative pursuit of Govern- the technologies required for exploring the solar ment cost sharing with other countries and our system, and the intangibles of “space leader- own private sector, then the 10 objectives out- ship. ” lined here–or others analogous to them–could be aggressively pursued, and probably attained The promising prospects now in view indicate relatively soon, within the appropriations now ex- what agenda items should be emphasized in pub- pected to be received by NASA. And the attain- lic policy considerations of our long-term civil- ment of these objectives would entail the acqui- ian space interests. For if, over the next quarter- sition of much of the in-space infrastructure that century, we modernize our civilian space goals NASA now aspires to acquire. Also, if there is a and lay out a family of objectives for our civilian continuing increase in extra-NASA payments for space activities much broader than those usually use of Shuttle services, and if the private space- discussed; if we determine to focus our Govern- related sector succeeds in continuing to grow at ment and private sector skills on building, togeth- anything like its present rate, thereby generating er, a great commercial-i ndustrial-financial private

Ch. 6— Toward a Goal-Oriented Civilian Space Program ● 127 .———— .——— - sector space business in the face of growing in- we can move civiIian space activities into the ternational competition; if we administer and mainstream of America ’s- indeed, the world's— manage our space activities with vigor, imagina- interests, reap great political, sociaI, and economic tion, and statesmanship; and if we take the lead benefits, and very soon begin to have our men in orchestrating the space interests and activities and women strike out across the solar system. of all of the friendly countries of the world; then

Phofo credif /Vaflona/ Aeronauf/cs and Space Adm/n/straf/on

Space technology has opened up the entire to observation and scientific research. Satellite (I a joint project of the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Netherlands, produced dramatic revelations about the characteristics of other stars in our galaxy. 128 . Civilian Space Stations and the U.S. Future in Space

FINAL OBSERVATIONS

Congress and the United States will soon have what’s all this good for?’ “ (Emphasis in the an unprecedented opportunity to rethink its basic original .)8 views and interests in the civilian space area In response to this question, many might be through the creation, and subsequent endeavors, willing, in principle, to give the Government the of a “National Commission on Space. ” Public “benefit of the doubt” when its leaders point out Law 98-361 mandates that such an extraordinary (as they have nearly every year for the past dozen, Commission be formed. at least), that eventually such R&D expenditures In preparation for doing so, a few observations will return economic benefits many times over. should be made about a truly fundamental con- While there is a general consensus that, in macro- cern held by many regarding our publicly sup- economic terms, economic “spinoff” to the pri- ported civilian space program–a concern that, vate sector has been significant, outside of the for the most part, goes unvoiced by professionals satellite communications area it has not been pos- associated with this program, but which should sible to identify with objective confidence, to be dealt with in any fundamental reexamination date, that such great economic returns have been of it. In so doing, we should keep in mind that obtained (though there are grounds for hope that the essential magnitude and character of this pro- eventually satellite navigation and materials proc- gram was set a generation ago in response to the essing in space may also provide significant eco- major national security concern raised by the nomic benefits).9 And, of course, the same pros- launch of Sputnik by the U. S. S. R., and subse- pect for economic return could be advanced also quent international events and our perceptions about many other economically related R&D thereof. Thus, the basic nature was set in another areas, high technology and not, in which Gov- era to serve the needs of that era and, fundamen- ernment expenditures are either essentially zero tally, has changed little, even though those needs or only a very small fraction of today’s annual have long since been met. $7 billion public civilian space expenditures. So there is understandable reserve and questioning This concern may perhaps best be expressed about such a response. For most of us, $7 billion in question form: How can the U.S. people and per year is a great deal of money. Government justify, today, continuing to make such truly great and continuing public expendi- Well beyond these kinds of considerations is tures on space related matters perceived by most the ethical concern of whether or not scientists, of our general public as (however at times inter- engineers, and managers should be paid so very esting, and even exciting) lying well outside of well by the public to spend additional large sums the mainstream of their personal interests and of public funds each year to do such things as concerns, particularly now that our military space take photographs of distant planets. Many take program serves to offset most perceived U.S.S.R. the view that, with the immediate, continuing, space-related military “threats,” and during an and enormous problems faced by hundreds of extended period of unusual national financial millions of people throughout the world, with stringency? millions of U.S. (tax-paying) families having to live on a truly modest income or, indeed, having to As Congress begins to ponder this question, it deal with the lack of employment, with interest might start by reflecting on an observation made recently by Freeman Dyson: “ . . . if I look at, say, Senate hearings and Congressional Committees, eThe Washington Post, Apr. 9, 1984, P. B-1 1. they tend to pay too much attention to scientists. 9However difficult it may be to quantify the benefits of space R&D, They’re always talking very much in quantitative one can say with confidence that the use of weather satellites has saved thousands of lives. In addition, the use of surveillance satel- terms and technical details when the problems lites has resulted in savings to the Government that are on the or- really aren’t there. They very seldom ask, ‘Well, der of tens to hundreds of billions of dollars. Ch. 6—Toward a Goal-Oriented Civilian Space Program ● 129 payments on our Federal debt now costing us that its leaders now could be charged, explicitly, over $100 billion per year, supporting space re- with overseeing all of our public space activities search and exploration of this great magnitude with a fundamental view in mind: that these activ- just doesn’t seem to be a sensitive and equitable ities lead, in both the shorter and longer run, to use of public funds or even, to some, a particu- the creation of wholly new commercial-industrial- larly decent human avocation. financial ventures, and to truly large-scale, rapid, objectively measurable, national economic growth The more general pro forma response to this —with all that this implies for the delivery of new, concern, at least in part, is that: “ . . . life is un- useful, public and private goods and services, in- fair. ” Life is unfair. But most of us would proba- creased employment, increased deficit-offsetting bly agree that we all do have some obligation, tax revenues, and a more competitive interna- when reasonably possible, to attempt to redress tional trading position. some of these sobering societal imbalances and that, at the very least, those who are generously And another basic theme is that the U.S. Gov- supported by the public to engage in civilian ernment could now endeavor to orchestrate the space activities should share widely in the dis- interests and capabilities, however diverse and/or charge of this obligation. small, of all of the friendly peoples of the world in cooperative civilian space activities. Another general pro forma response is that most grave and widespread human problems If the United States does all of these things, and seemingly cannot be addressed by space-related does them in a truly efficient and productive man- activities, any more than they can be by a ballet ner, then we would see space being used, where production or a walk in a park. space can sensibly be used, both to protect and to ease the human condition. In this assessment the more direct and useful response is that some of our civilian space pro- With the creation of such major space-related gram objectives can be purposely selected to see programs to address such basic human concerns, that space is used, specifically, to make progress and appreciating that most of us the world over, toward important agreed-on societal ends. The much of the time, “do not live by bread alone,” suggested family of 10 conceptual objectives has we can in more reasonable conscience also con- been crafted so as to see that some of them speak tinue to undertake—and even perhaps enlarge directly to a few of the most fundamental human upon—space-related activities that, as well, chal- concerns that space and space technology can lenge the human condition: we can strike out indeed be used to “get at”: better protection from from the Earth for the Moon, 10 for the planets and natural disasters, better communications among asteroids, and indeed fix our eyes on ‘‘distant the world’s governments and peoples in our nu- stars. clear weapons age, and greater understanding of But only if we pay our ethical dues to our fellow physical conditions that affect all of us as we grow countrymen and women and to “all mankind”- older. They are of such a basic nature as to be and only if we meet our financial obligations as of potential value to “all mankind. ” we go. And, as well, a basic theme suggested here is that the publicly supported civilian space pro- 10An OTA W king paper giving the thoughts of six philosophers gram now could be organized and conducted to or on “The Philosophical Implications of Establishing Permanent a considerable extent as a public investment pro- Human Presence in Space” is available from the OTA Science, gram in basic science and high technology, and Transportation, and Innovation Program office. POSTSCRIPT

This postscript gives the sense of a meeting of members of the Advisory Panel held in November 1983 at the Aspen Institute’s Wye Plantation. The document was prepared by E. B. Skolinoff, and carefully reviewed by the participants. Certain exceptions expressed by participants are noted within the text.

The preparation of such a document by an OTA Advisory Panel iS an unusual act ion; Advisory Pane Is are seIected to represent a wide cross cross-section of informed opinion, and serve only to give guidance and review to an OTA assessment. In this case, however, the people I i steal below chose to go beyond the traditional role, and express their own views directly. Panel members have also been given the opportunity to fulIy review and comment on the fulItext of the report itself. REPORT OF THE SECOND ADVISORY PANEL MEETING Held at Aspen-Wye Plantation in November 1983

by Professor E.B. Skolnikoff Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Participating Panel Members* tional pride that captured our imagination, and that of others, in its first two decades. Those char- Robert A. Charpie, Chairman acteristics can be achieved in different ways, not Harvey Brooks necessarily correlated to the magnitude of the Peter O. Crisp space budget. We also believe there should be Freeman Dyson ways that the program can be used more effec- James B. Farley tively as an instrument for peace and cooperation Charles E. Fraser in a world in which the environment of space is Andrew j. Goodpaster threatening to become one more arena for mili- Charles Hitch tary competition. Bernard M. W. Knox Our conclusions are as follows. George E. Mueller, Jr. Carl Sagan Current Space Station Proposal* Eugene Skolnikoff I. James Spilker The panel has major reservations about the current NASA concept for a permanent manned The panel was asked to consider the proposal space station and recommends against commit- for a manned civilian space station in the light ment to such a project at this time. We are quite of the development of the Nation’s space activi- certain that a space station of some kind will ties generally, and of possible future civilian activ- eventually be needed. However, the objectives ities and goals in space. The panel approached underlying the current concept seem diffuse and this task first as a broad enquiry into future ob- imprecise. Approval of the proposal now would jectives in space and how the proposed space tend to lock the Nation’s civilian space efforts into station relates to those objectives. The results of a large, expensive program that would likely pre- that enquiry made it inappropriate for us to er-t- empt alternative possibilities and programs. gage in a more detailed evaluation of the current The panel was most concerned about the ab- space station proposal. sence of studies that evidence a larger vision of As background for our conclusions, we need space objectives and opportunities, against which to note that the panel believes U.S. civilian space this, or any future space station proposal, could activities are and should be of high value to the be evaluated (see 11). A space station should not Nation domestically and internationally. The bean end in itself, but rather a step toward other country has a variety of motivations behind its goals. Those other goals, which need to be care- space commitments—-political, psychological, fully developed and publicly debated, should scientific, technological, economic—all of which provide a necessary framework for evaluating the have validity and importance. In particular, in role and usefulness of any proposed design for looking to the future, the panel believes it essen- a space station. tial that the program should come to represent The panel recognizes that not all possible activ- again the sense of exploration and adventure, the ities and payoffs can be anticipated, and that energizer of both technological and institutional innovation, the source of outward-looking na- *George E, Mueller dlsa~rees w Ith thl~ conclusion, which he regards a$ not ~ onstru[ t iie with resi)ect to direct Ion tor NASA, and *The participants are [n general agreement with this summ~rv Su[)ptjn i~ [’ of unnecessary study. t+ e does a~ree w Ith the need to ot cone [us ions, although some members may not necessarl Iy cn - make the i[)acc itatlon a step to a lon~-ra n~e goa 1, and would sup dorw all the details or the phrasing of certain statements. [mrt ,i\kl n~ NASA to de~lgn a t,Ic I lit} to ~upport such a program

133 134 . Civilian Space Stations and the U.S. Future in Space

unexpected opportunities emerge in the course ward thinking, presumably to discourage the of developing a new capability. And the panel emergence of costly ideas or prevent the appear- accepts the validity of the desire to take advan- ance of lobbying. One result is that apparently tage of the capabilities offered by the Shuttle. But little capability exists within NASA, and essentially some of the immediate functions envisioned for none outside, able to carry out on a continuing the proposed space station (exploring near-Earth basis the kind of informed, analytical, critical applications, for example) can be evaluated with- studies that any major program area ought to out much, or any new infrastructure in space, in have. The need is acute. fact, by imaginative uses of the Shuttle; and a We have considered various options for cre- more fully thought-out station keyed to longer- ating such a locus for the professional study of range objectives would be more likely to stimu- public policy questions relating to the civilian late innovation and imagination. space program and wouId make several observa- Moreover, the station as envisioned would ap- tions. Clearly, NASA should have a larger inter- pear to have little payoff either for development nal capability for long-term analysis, but that of new technology (see III), or for the political- alone would not be adequate for obtaining ob- psychological benefits at home and abroad we jective outside views or for establishing public have already indicated should be given substan- credibility. The Administrator of NASA could, and tial weight (see also Xl). we believe should, serve as a sponsor of such studies, perhaps working through a broadly based The development of a habitable space station advisory committee to enhance objectivity and to gain expertise of people in space is an impor- credibility. We recommend that early consider- tant argument, but also one with little present ation be given to a long-term program of support basis for evaluation. We have seen no analysis of studies in the private sector (analytical orga- of the differential costs of a manned v. an un- nizations, commerce, industry and universities) manned facility, nor an analysis of the oppor- that would build a community of knowledgeable tunity costs of that differential. It is important that analysts of the Nation’s space activities, analo- it be understood that the panel does not argue gous to that which has been developed in other against man-in-space per se (the Shuttle may pro- areas such as energy and the environment. vide a good portion of that experience), but rather that a better rationale than has been provided us Such a program of studies also implies a more is required for a goal worthy of attainment. open planning process and the concomitant continuous rethinking of NASA objectives that go Il. Analysis Capability with that openness. This process can provide an opportunity for more extensive engagement of The lack of studies analyzing long-term space the private sector (see Vi), an objective we goals and opportunities was striking to the panel. believe should be high on NASA’s agenda, and There were not even studies available that laid can engage the interest of constituencies not out possible alternatives to the current proposal. already deeply involved in the space area. Without these, the panel felt it was not possible to sensibly evaluate the scale, nature, cost or purpose of a manned civilian space station. An ini- Ill. R&D tial “goals” paper prepared by OTA staff repre- A major factor in evaluating a proposal for the sented a start toward the kind of studies that are next step in the space program should be the con- needed. tribution that objective will make to the devel- The panel believes this situation is deeper in opment of new technology. The panel does not its significance than simply whether adequate believe the civilian space station as proposed is studies had been conducted before the space sta- likely to have as significant a technology-forcing tion proposal was put forward. NASA has been effect as should be required from a program that positively discouraged by successive administra- would be the centerpiece of the space agency’s tions from engaging in or sponsoring much for- activities for close to a decade. Postscript: Report of the Second Advisory Panel Meeting ● 135 ———

In fact, the situation is more serious, for ad- to an expensive large-scale facility if already ex- vanced technological development has been isting capabilities remain underexploited because severely cut back in the space program since the of shortage of funds, early days of the Shuttle program. Key technol- I n any programs undertaken in the near term, ogies that wouId be necessary for later missions, however, it is important that they not be allowed such as advanced space propuIsion systems or to develop a Iife of their own that prevents more machine intelligence and robotics, have not been desirable aIternatives, or interteres with other adequately (or at all) supported because of fund- ongoing programs of great importance, such as ding limitations. Even technologies to fully exploit those i n space science. current space applications have been relatively neglected. The current proposaI for a civiIian space station would generate little such technol- V. Long-Term Mission Possibilities ogy development and, more than likely, would The p,inei di~c us~ed w)m~~ ~x)s>i ble Iong-term prevent funds being available for such programs. a c- t i v i t i es t h (~ t < (~t i \ti (c( ! s o m e ot t h [’ ( r i t ~~ r i a Ji { I Yet, those technologies represent what should be believed to 1)~’ im~mrt,lnt: lik.~1) to L t)mrm,]n({ major payoffs of space activities and the central ~vi(iwpr(~ad altent i( )n, i n ho r(’ r) t S( i (’ n t i ti( I n t e r c’~t, features of future space activities technolc)g~ t’(lr( I ng r[> I LIL d n( (‘ to XI o I ){1 I i $~ L] t’~, Accordingly, we recommend that NASA en- \u b~td nt i,i I sixn Iti( .l n[{~ to h t] r II.~ n ~)! ( }t>l[’m 5, $11 lt- gage in the conscious development of seminal.11 a hi I it y for i rlt~’ rn ,lt i u n d I C-[XJI N I r ,tt i f) n ( >~’<’ V I I i ,1 nd technologies that are Iikely to form the bui!ding ~)rikate-$c~( t~jr [J,irt i{ i~~/ ,] r{) \Ll ~}qt~~t I () 11 \ 01” 1 I) L’ than wholly in-house, with the Government stim- kind~ ()( ~\MC [’ ;(~’i li L$ t> l~t~li(i (.) ~h(~u I(I l~t$ ,] n,i - uIating private-sector ventures and financing ly7ed dnd stu(ji[(l il} (J(~tc]il. where possible. The model of the highly success- (In<’ c-{]tegor) (Jt ~x~ssii)l~~ gtMl\ L\oLl I{i ini (Jl\ (J ful relations between the National Advisory Com - programs (let i~n(~d spvc iticci I 1)’ to cc)rlt ri but(’ mittee for Aeronautics (NACA) and industry for knowledge ~]bout ~jres(nt or futur<) pl,~nc’t,ir> ,{nd aeronautical technology could well be followed human issuc~s. For cx,~m}]l(~, ~)rogram< [{e>ign~[l by NASA for space technology development. to Iearfl mor[) dbout the global ‘‘~rw>r~hou:)~)’ effect that cou Id resu It from dcc u m u I.]se \(LJ Iner,]bi I ity, among others—make a major to carry out those functions on a continuing basis. ciedicatecl program of global monitoring poten- It makes little sense to make major commitments tially of crucial importance for the future. 136 ● Civilian Space Stations and the U.S. Future in Space

A different kind of goal in space would be to ogy industry, but also to attempt to bring down contribute directly to more generaI research ob- unit costs of space assets and activities over time, jectives in the life, material, or other sciences. For and to involve consumer-oriented industries in example, some of the effects of zero gravity on space applications that may be marketable. the body appear to be similar to the effects of To engage the private sector effectively to aging. Are there important contributions that can achieve these objectives poses several require- be made through space research programs on ments. Consultation with industry should start aging, an increasingly important social goal for with a broad dialogue on a wide range of possi- an expanding global population? Many other ble space goals and mission opportunities, not such complementary research targets could un- with the detailed design of an already-determined doubtedly be developed and evaluated. space station. And, of course, there is a long list of possible A second requirement is to develop a clarity scientific goals in space that can be considered: of commitment to activities that signals long-term 1. unmanned rendezvous missions to an aster- interest. Such commitment is necessary to en- oid or comet to provide early solar system courage industry to invest its resources of man- history; power and money in the development of tech- 2. Mars exploration, with unmanned roving nology potentially useful for those activities. Such vehicles; a clarity of commitment should be the outcome 3. landing on the Saturn moon Titan, which has of the joint studies and consultation referred to a nitrogen atmosphere, complex organic mat- above, ter and strong evidence of a liquid ethane/ methane ocean; A third, with regard to space applications, is 4. solar spacecraft able to penetrate some dis- to use either public corporations (perhaps of the tance into the Sun while sending back infor- Comsat type) or other institutional innovations mation; and to take over commercial development and ex- 5. Venus probes. ploitation of space technology. NASA is not well Longer-term: suited to the design and marketing of commer- 6. landing on asteroids, planets or comets with cial/industrial systems or services—that is not its return of sample material; purpose—and simply attempting to hand over an 7. probes beyond solar system; existing developmental system, such as Landsat, 8. manned lunar station; to the private sector for operation is unlikely to 9. manned asteroid station; and be viable. 10. manned missions to Mars. It is also possible that the present structure of Note, incidentally, that the current space sta- NASA is not well suited to prompt a major in- tion proposal would not necessarily be the pre- crease in private-sector space activities because ferred next step for most of these goals. of the present large commitment to in-house laboratories (see IX) and present technology procure- V1. Private-Sector Involvement ment practices. We cannot make a definitive judgment on that, but recommend an objective The panel is strongly of the belief that the pri- evaluation by NASA and by Congress. vate sector can be more effectively and extensively engaged in the Nation’s space activities VIl. International Cooperation than it has been to date. For the most part, current involvement has been restricted to a select International cooperation has been a goal of group of NASA contractors or subcontractors. the U.S. space program from the beginning, but There is need for involvement of a much broader the panel believes much more could be done. industrial constituency to elicit new ideas for Cooperation is particularly attractive for future space applications and techniques. Not only is activities for several reasons: technical compe- it desirable to engage the innovative and entre- tence is more widely distributed throughout the preneurial character of American high-technol- world than in the past, resource limitations are Postscript: Report of the Second Advisory Panel Meeting ● 137 more of a constraint on all countries, and many study of alternatives before selection is made. We space activities are relevant to all people, not just recommend a more open set of discussions that Americans. ask what we and other interested countries should be doing together. It is possible that the costs of space activities could be reduced by genuine joint programs that Any military overtones to NASA projects (see enlisted not only the funds, but also the talents Vlll) will likely have a negative effect on possi- of other nations. Examples, such as Spacelab, bilities for international cooperation. Though it already exist. But for more extensive cooperation, may be possible in practice to separate the mili- there must be a commitment for joint planning tary from the civilian interests in specific missions, at a very early stage, and reasonable guarantees it is a problem that we cannot afford to ignore. of program continuation once a commitment has There are also potential political benefits to be been made. Past history of American project can- gained over time through intimate and extensive cellations in midstream do not contribute to con- cooperation with others. Cooperation with East- fidence in the United States as a reliable partner. ern bloc countries, and especially the Soviet Near-Earth space applications are of obvious Union, will not remove the sources of conflict, interest to other countries from a commercial but may be used as an instrument to ameliorate perspective, but programs for monitoring the those conflicts and offer alternatives. changes in habitability of our planet would provide other common motivations. And, planetary Vlll. Effect of Military Programs probes that would potentially provide informa- and Interests’ tion relevant to this planet’s concerns—for example, those goals mentioned earlier of improving The panel is very concerned about the effects understanding of the CO2 greenhouse effect by on the civilian space program of a major new and studies of Venus, or gaining knowledge of the ef- enlarged focus on military uses of space. Though fects of fire, volcanoes and dust from study of the there might be some budgetary competition, the Martian environment—would also provide com- primary problem would be the competition for mon foci of interest with other countries. scarce technical manpower and industrial resources. The most qualified personnel would In fact, the potential benefits for all from space likely be attracted to the rapidly expanding and activities should provide a high incentive target technologically exciting defense sector, and for cooperation even if the other possible benefits NASA itself might see some of its best people of resource and talent sharing are less clearly rele- leaving. vant. There are also, of course, difficulties inherent in international cooperation, difficulties that In addition, such a large-scale military commit- stem primarily from problems of meshing of ment would likely serve to give a military image disparate bureaucracies and political systems. to our space activities abroad, where the distinc- There is also the problem that the structure and tion between civilian and military interests may incentives in NASA, and more broadly in the not be clear. budgetary and decision process in the U.S. Gov- International cooperation in the civilian pro- ernment, do not lead naturally to seeking inter- gram may also be harder to achieve because of national cooperation. This, too, is an issue we increased concern in the United States over ap- believe deserves separate attention by NASA and parent loss of technology assumed to be critical by Congress. for national security. Controls over information It should be noted that there seems to be con- could well be sufficiently onerous as to rule out siderable interest within Western industrial coun- some forms of otherwise desirable cooperation. tries in cooperating on the proposed civilian space station; European countries, Canada, and Japan are waiting for the United States to decide *To avoid the appearance of possible conflict of interest, members of the panel with past and present involvement in military space what it intends to do. Cooperation, to be really activities did not participate in the formulation of this section of meaningful, must involve joint planning and the report. 138 . Civilian Space Stations and the U.S. Future in Space

IX. NASA Operations and Organization such as launch services, or have not been adequately consumer-oriented in systems design and The panel did not make any formal evaluation development (for example Landsat). However, of NASA’s structure and performance, but a few competition is inevitable, quite apart from U.S. observations based on the experience of panel policies, for advanced industrial nations with members and the issues at stake are in order, high-quality technological capabilities are likely some already mentioned. to enter any market with economic potential. As has been noted, NASA is not well positioned Men and women in orbit, utilizing sophisticated for much more extensive cooperation with the and costly space assets, may be an important ca- private sector, or with other countries. The spe- pability for U.S. commercial exploitation of the cific reasons are different in each case, but the economic potential for near-Earth orbits, but we underlying factors in NASA appear to be: the consider that case as not having been demon- pride in past successes achieved by “going it strated as yet. In fact, commitment to such a ca- alone”; the perception of private-sector activities pability could delay exploitation, by preempting as competitive with, not complementary to, its funding and personnel that might better explore interests; the lack of desire among most scien- possibilities with industry through use of the pres- tists and engineers to devote themselves to the ent Shuttle capability or its modest extensions. administrative orchestration of multicultural, It could, in fact, be a massive commitment to the multi-political projects; and the large fixed facil- wrong kind of station, even for economic purposes. ities of NASA that inhibit flexibility. All of these discourage assignment of major responsibilities There is another aspect of the economic value outside the organization. of space activities—the spinoff of new technology to the commercial sector. In this respect, as This structure also serves to maintain high fixed we noted before, the proposed space station overhead costs in NASA, again discouraging ex- would likely hold relatively little interest as a ploration with industry of ways of bringing unit means of developing new technology—especially costs down. It is not clear what cost reductions in comparison with other feasible goals. would be possible, but it would be difficult to evaluate the possibilities given the present structure. Xl. Geopolitical Competition To some extent, the existing structure may also The Soviet Union has been conducting a vig- discourage the development of alternative goal orous manned space station program which, not- concepts, and generally inhibit imagination, since withstanding some serious mishaps, is apparently changes in programs may have negative effects on track. Beyond the continuing exhibition of on the present organization. space prowess, presumably of important political value to them, the uses to which their capa- These observations may be exaggerated, or bilities are intended to be put are not clear– should perhaps be balanced by other important perhaps this is similar to the American situation— attributes. We urge attention to the issue, though Soviet Union scientists have often indi- however. cated that the long-range goals for their space program include manned bases on the Moon or X. International Economic Mars. Regardless of later goals, they have cer- Competition tainly been gaining useful information about people in a space environment (which they share International competition in provision of civil- quite extensively with the United States). ian space services has already emerged, primarily with European countries, and is likely to grow There is a natural reaction in such circum- in the future as Japan becomes more heavily stances that leads to programs undertaken to engaged. To some extent, that competition has “match” the achievements of the Russians, or to been encouraged by U.S. policies that have not be concerned about the information or experi- provided adequate guarantees for the future, ence they have obtained that is not immediately —

Postscript: Report of the Second Advisory Panel Meeting ● 139

available to us. But, for the United States to possibility of some cooperation as well, even with undertake a large-scale program not necessary, our primary competitor. The more important the or ill-suited, to our needs is more likely to hand- subject, the greater would be the political signifi- icap us in the future in geopolitical competition cance of cooperation. with the Soviet Union. Especially is this so in this We close with reiteration of the panel’s con- case in which the civilian space station goal is viction of the importance of the civilian an space not likely to command dramatic attention or to program to the country, and the significance of lead to important new technology. the next major steps in space that the Nation Civilian space activities are, in fact, an impor- undertakes, Our ideas, our imagination, and our tant arena for international political competition. critical analytical abiIities need to be engaged i n The panel’s plea is for the United States to aim laying out the alternatives before us just as our for a goal worthy of attainment from this perspec- institutions, public and private, need to be appro- tive, as well as from others. The international po- priately engaged in implementing the decisions litical effects of visible, dramatic nonmilitary ac- finally made. In the long run, a sustained and ef- complishments are important in presenting an fective civilian space program wilt depend on image of a dynamic Nation able to preserve its building a lasting political consensus,a consen- vitality in an open, democratic form of govern- sus based on informed public debate and under- ment. Many throughout the world find hope and standing of the significant objectives that can be encouragement in that demonstration; it is im- served by civiIian space activities. portant to us as well as to them. We note again that competition in civilian space accomplishments need not rule out the APPENDIXES Appendix A RESULTS OF PRINCIPAL NASA STUDIES ON SPACE STATION USES AND FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS

Early in 1982, NASA established working groups to ian “space station “ complex in low-Earth-orbit (LEO) prepare for and coordinate a planning program to ac- in the 1990’s, who could use it, how could they use quire a long-term in-space inhabited infrastructure, it, what attributes, capabilities, and types of compo- i.e,, a civilian “space station. ” A Space Station Steer- nents should it therefore have, what would it cost, ing Committee at NASA headquarters led a two- when could it become available, and what benefits pronged effort. A Technology Steering Committee had could its use provide?” the task of assessing the current state of technology The contractor groups (in each case a prime con- and planning any needed development activities for tractor, usually with several subcontractors) commu- the program. At the same time, a Space Station Task nicated with the individuals, organizations, and insti - Force became the principal planning group to con- tutions that might be expected to make use of such sider types of activities (user needs/desires) to be car- in-space infrastructure to ascertain the important pres- ried out with any new long-term infrastructure, sys- ent and potential desires and/or needs for it, with em- tem physical characteristics, concept development, phasis on those uses that would require or materially and management organization. benefit from it. They then analyzed these various uses To support the Task Force as well as help clarify as a sequenced set of activities, so as to identify and various issues involved, NASA authorized a series of characterize infrastructure attributes and capabilities parallel investigations of the potential desires for, and that would be necessary in order to meet them. Suffi- characteristics of, such infrastructure. These studies cient study of major components and architectural op- (costing more than $6 million altogether) were made tions was made to provide reasonable indications of by eight U.S. aerospace companies (with their asso- how adequate infrastructure could be provided. ciated subcontractors). In addition, the European They next provided programmatic and scheduling Space Agency, Canada, and Japan funded essentially plans in order to predict when various portions of the parallel user studies of their own. Related investiga- program could become operational. Finally, costs of tions of possible nonaerospace industry interest in establishing the overall space infrastructure were esti- space use were made by two consulting firms. mated and the economic benefits projected that they foresaw through its use. The companies drew conclu- Major Findings of the U.S. Aerospace sions and made recommendations regarding further Industry “Mission Analysis Studies” developments. The eight prime contractors performing these studies In anticipation that the United States could decide were Boeing Aerospace Co., General Dynamics Corp. to build a publicly funded, habitable, permanent ci- (Convair Division), Grumman Aerospace Corp., Lock- vilian “space station”, NASA asked eight aerospace heed Missiles and Space Co., Martin Marietta Corp., industry contractor groups to perform independent McDonnell Douglas Astronautics Co., Rockwell Inter- “mission analysis” studies to indicate what it could national, and TRW. About 20 other high-technology be used for (the desires and/or needs), what capabil- companies were involved as subcontractors. The final ities it should have to meet them (its attributes), what reports were submitted on April 22, 1983. Their results its fundamental characteristics and components might have been published in a series of volumes entitled be like (its architecture), and what costs and benefits “Space Station Needs, Attributes, and Architectural to the Nation might be expected of such a space pro- Options.” gram conducted over the remainder of the 20th cen- The major findings of these contractor studies are tury. Emphasis was to be on the user communities, outlined below. national conceptual uses, and general architectures, not specific configurations. Users and Uses in essence, they were asked to answer the questions (Mission Requirements) “If the United States were to acquire an initial civil- The aerospace contractors actively sought out the I The Department of Defense also participated with NASA in these studies, interests of potential users of LEO infrastructure in or- and paid 5 percent of their cost. For the most part, the studies related to national security are classified, and no further reference will be made to them der to project what kind and extent of activities its sup- here. port assets and services should provide. Users were

141 142 ● Civilian Space Stations and the U.S. Future in Space

categorized under the three broad areas of science potential to grow to the multibillion-dollar-per-year and applications, commercialization, and technology level by the year 2000 if they could be made avail- development. able at acceptable prices). The fields of astrophysics and solar physics, life McDonnell Douglas Corp. has already pioneered sciences, environmental sciences and Earth observa- in exploring the use of the electrophoresis process to tion, materials processing, and communications sci- produce pharmaceutical materials aboard the Shut- ences all offered examples of possible uses of an ini- tle. Electrophoresis is a separation process in which tial complex. Over the longer term, it could be used electrically charged particles suspended in a solution as a base for launching lunar, asteroid and interplane- migrate through the fluid in the presence of an ap- tary research spacecraft. Advantages of having a plied electrical field. If the particles are of microscopic human crew were seen in instrument and equipment or larger size, a common process limitation is a sedi- servicing (predominantly for Earth observation, plasma mentation of the particles under gravitational condi- physics and astrophysics) and human involvement in tions. The effective absence of gravitational attraction research (predominantly in materials processing, life when conducted in orbit around the Earth permits the sciences and solar physics). Research in most life process of separation and purification of such ma- sciences, and some materials and astro/solar physics terials as proteins and pharmaceuticals to proceed at was deemed impractical without direct human par- rates 500 to 1,000 times faster than on the surface of ticipation; one contractor concluded that 41 of 75 the Earth. science activities would benefit from a human pres- Several other companies are giving serious consid- ence. The servicing of equipment would produce the eration to studying and manufacturing materials in side benefit of seeing instrument assets in space accu- space. However, the contractor groups agreed that the mulated. Long-term operations would be especially concept-to-market process generally takes many years, important to some research. that a space research laboratory is required, that for The permanent infrastructure would include “free- at least some of the studies professionals in situ and flying” tended platforms to ensure isolation (where continuous operations are very important desiderata, needed) from the possible dynamic disturbance or and that for most production processes, very large contamination of various kinds that might be present amounts of electrical power (in present space terms) in an inhabited location. would be essential. Commercial possibilities were suggested for remote Satellite communications is already a 20-year-old, Earth sensing in the fields of petroleum and mineral highly successful, world-wide commercial space enter- prospecting, and agricultural forecasts; for materials prise. It is seen as a business that should continue to processing; for on-orbit satellite launching of meteoro- expand rapidly. The required technology should move logical, navigation, and communications satellites to in the direction of large, dynamically controlled, multi- higher, even to geostationary Earth orbit (GEO), and antenna subsystems, on-board switching, and high r.f. for satellite servicing (although CEO servicing would power, for which a “space station” may well be seen not be possible using the initial infrastructure now en- by some as essential (or at least desirable) for efficient visioned by NASA). structural assembly and deployment, testing and Almost all Earth resources observation from space check-out, lower-cost transportation to geostationary currently employs satellites without a crew and their orbit—and eventually, perhaps, the servicing of GEO use will continue; however, the contractors found ad- satellites. vantages in using people to select surface locations Satellite servicing is seen as enabling resupply and to be studied, instruments, and observational param- repair of co-orbiting space vehicles, and those in other eters. Having space infrastructure also would enable orbits, such as polar or geostationary. In the latter case, concurrent multidisciplinary observations, and the a Reusable Orbital Transfer Vehicle (ROTV) would be crew would add the flexibility to modify the instru- needed to deploy or retrieve the spacecraft, as (ac- ments during long-term observation periods. cording to several contractors) extensive servicing The economical processing of some materials under would usually by done in, or in the vicinity of, a cen- conditions of near-zero gravity is one of the more in- tral “space station” complex. triguing possibilities for eventual commercial exploita- LEO infrastructure is seen by the contractor groups tion, with such materials as pharmaceuticals, alloys, as enabling space technology development on all semiconductors, and optical fibers as products. (Mar- fronts–developments of interest to materials process- ket demand for each of these products is seen by some ing, communications, flight controls, fluidics, large of the more optimistic contractor groups as having the space structures, on-orbit assembly and test, robotics, App. A—Results of Principal NASA Studies on Space Station Uses and Functional Requirements ● 143

etc. All of these would benefit because of the sophis- activities in this baseline set are noted as being best tication of the support equipment that could be pro- accommodated either by attaching them to a central, vided them, the longer time available for work in or- inhabited infrastructure complex, or locating them on bit than is provided by the Shuttle, and the extensive free-flying platforms that would be tended only inter- crew involvement needed, at least for the foreseeable mittently by crew members. future, for construction, calibration, and test. Inasmuch as some 70 percent or more of the potential needs/desires could be accomplished in the Phased Activities (Mission Sets) 28.5° orbit, it was the unanimous recommendation of all the contractor groups that any initial inhabited The contractor groups assembled sets of activities infrastructure be located in this orbital plane. Free- and operations responding to needs and desires ex- flying platforms, either co-orbiting or in polar orbit, pressed by potential users in order to estimate the could accommodate most of the remaining missions. assets and services required to support them for vary- One example of the number of inhabited infra- ing stay times in space. The preferred orbits were seen structure-attached payload elements at any time (so- to be a low-Earth-orbit whose plane would be at 28.50 called station occupancy) is shown in figure A-1, in inclination to the Equator (typical of launches from which the initial operational capability was assumed Kennedy Space Center, FL), a 57° inclination (possi- to occur during 1990. The projected activities are seen ble from KSC with a more northerly insertion direc- to reach a high number quite early in the develop- tion) and a polar orbit (available with launch from ment cycle. Vandenberg AFB, CA). In some cases, staging to geostationary orbit or to escape velocity (for lunar, Functional Capabilities asteroid and/or planetary flights) would be necessary. Most of the studies identified several hundred pos- NASA has recently indicated that it expects pro- sible uses and desires, a number well in excess of what posed new space infrastructure to provide the set of might be accommodated during the 1990s. When ex- functions described in chapter 2. One contractor’s amined in the context of realistic technical progress, visualization of these functions is given in figure A-2, the likelihood that such uses/desires would actually while table A-2 illustrates the corresponding attributes develop, and the benefits made available through such required for space infrastructure designed to accom- use, etc., the vast majority of those potential uses plish the functions. Translated into physical quantities, could be supported with infrastructure located in the the requirements for power, pressurized volume, crew low inclination orbit of 28.5°. This is exemplified by size and Shuttle launches are typified by figure A-3. a typical distribution of activities shown in table A-1 The initial power needs for the central space complex as recommended by one of the contractor groups. The of the infrastructure are modest, about 25 kW, but as

Table A-1 .—One Contractor Group’s Mission Set

Attached to central infrastructure complex in LEO Free-f I yers Inclination plane Inclination plane (LEO) 28.5” Polar 28.5° 57” Polar GEO Escape Science and applicatlons: Astrophysics ...... 7 6 3 1 1 Earth and planetary ...... 5 3 1 7 12 Environmental observations ...... 7 4 1 7 4 3 Life sciences ...... 7 Materials processes ...... 2 Commercial: Earth and ocean ...... 1 2 1 Communications ...... 6 5 Materials processes ...... 14 1 Industrial services ...... 5 1 Technology development: ...... 33 Operations: ...... 2 86 7 9 12 14 12 12 Total mission set ...... 152

SOURCE: Based on information contained in the study led by the General Dynamics Corp

144 ● Civilian Space Stations and the U.S. Future in Space

Figure A-l .—One Contractor’s Time-Phased Set of the experiment load increases so does the power re- Activities Involving Work Crews quirement. If materials processing in space takes place on a commercial scale now visualized by some, the 30 power demands could then become quite large. It is likely that, eventually, much of the materials process-

20 ing production would be carried out on platforms with their own solar array power supplies; they would co- orbit with the central complex. 10 In the view of most contractor groups, an initial operational crew would consist of some three persons, 0 with the crew size growing to as many as 8 to 10 in 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 the mid 1990s. Corresponding pressurized volume for Year the crew and some operations might grow from about Conclusion: 28.5-deg station captures approximately 92°/0 of 200 m3 to 600 m3. activities involving crews. Five or six Shuttle flights would be required to estab- SOURCE Based on Informatlon contained in the study led by General Dynamics Corp lish the IOC infrastructure suggested in the studies.

Figure A-2. —A Representative Set of Functional Capabilities

SOURCE Based on in the study led by Grumman Aerospace App. A—Results of Principal NASA Studies on Space Station Uses and Functional Requirements ● 145

Table A.2.—One Contractor’s Estimate of Required The components suggested by one of the contrac- Infrastructure Attributes tor groups for the first central complex are indicated in figure A-5. A central command/habitability module Accommodates activities with work crews: . Micro-gravity provides overall infrastructure command and control, — Life sciences data handling, communications, and accommoda- — Materials processing tions for a crew of four. (Several of the contractor — Technology development groups’ studies suggest three crew members at the ● Outward looking outset.) Directly attached is the energy module where — Astrophysics solar cell arrays and batteries provide electrical power ● Earth pointing — Earth exploration and its conditioning and storage. (In this illustration, — Environmental observation the energy module is pressurized; some studies sug- Supports free-flyer activities: gest that it be mounted externally.) The third, logistics, ● LEO/H EO satellites/platforms module stores and makes available consumables and — Emplacement — Service equipment delivered by the Shuttle. With only these — Retrieval three infrastructure elements, a crew could live in or- ● GEO satellites/platforms bit satisfactorily for extended periods but would be — Emplacement able to accomplish relatively little scientific or other — Service activity beyond those experiments that could be ac- ● Planetary satellites — Boost commodated in the available internal space. Provides resources: Additional elements shown in figure A-5 are the ● Work crew time airlocks to permit people to move in and out of the ● Power habitability module and to conduct activities in space ● Data processing ● Command and control (so-called extravehicular activity (EVA)), an astronomy ● Thermal control service pallet to enable mounting of scientific obser- ● Stable platform vatory equipment, and a payload service pallet to per- ● Pressurized volume mit servicing of satellites and such auxiliary vehicles ● Exterior mounting Provides functions: as an orbital maneuvering vehicle. The final unit sug- ● Assembly and construction gested for the IOC is a materials processing laboratory. ● Checkout The continuous power suggested would approach ● Service 25 kW (roughly corresponding with the initial level ● Reconfiguration shown in figure A-3). Inasmuch as the crew accom- ● Maintenance and repair modations might require about half of this amount, ● Transportation ● Storage the power available to users would allow for materials SOURCE: Based on Information contained In the study led by the General processing experiments but not for some kinds of Dynamics Corp ongoing production. Other contractor groups would arrange the infra- Contractors estimated that civilian projects would re- structure elements differently, with a possible com- quire six or seven flights per year (fig. A-3). While three mand module separate from an habitability module, or four supply visits per year by the Shuttle would be or an operations module combining energy genera- needed for ongoing operations and maintenance tion and conditioning with a command and control (O&M), these could be partial-load deliveries com- center and EVA facilities. Some designs would incor- bined with other loads. porate tunnels or passageways to connect different modules. Infrastructure Elements Ten or more subsystems have been suggested to (Architecture) enable the infrastructure elements to remain in orbit and function satisfactorily. These are itemized in the It is at the implementation stage that the contractor organizational diagram shown in figure A-6. groups’ reports suggest quite different approaches to In accordance with the NASA study directions to providing those in-space infrastructure elements the contractor groups to envision the use of new tech- needed to meet the user needs/desires. One concep- nology where it would be beneficial, various new tual array of components is illustrated in figure A-4. materials and theoretical designs for the subsystems The central complex would be in communication with have been suggested. An example of one contractor other elements including free flyers, free-flying plat- group’s technology recommendations is given in table forms, a reusable orbital transfer vehicle, the Shuttle A-3; while most items are considered to be currently Orbiter, and ground stations via the Tracking and Data available in a useful form, advanced technology would Relay Satellite communications system. be required to achieve the improved capability and/or 146 ● Civilian Space Stations and the U.S. Future in Space

Figure A-3.— One Contractor’s Estimate of Resources and Services

4 I J

o I I I 1 1 I I I I I 90 95 00 95 00 Year Year

Shuttle flights

8 I 6 200 4

n 1 1 1 I 1 i I I I “ 1990 1995 2000 Year

SOURCE Based on !nformatlon contained In the study led by the General Dynamics Corp

reduced weight and Iifecycle costs that it recom- ple in size. A similar evolutionary plan including mends. Some contractors identified standardization tended co-orbiting and polar platforms and an ROTV as contributing to cost containment; where no ad- is shown in figure A-9. A possible co-orbiting indus- vance in technology appeared necessary, they sug- trial platform is illustrated in figure A-1 O, and an ini- gested use of standard available equipment if prac- tial tended polar platform could appear as shown in tical, with space qualification as necessary. figure A-1 1. Core module commonality was suggested by essentially all contractor groups in order to pro- Evolution of the Initial Capability mote production cost economy. All of the contractor groups provided plans for evo- Role of a Human Crew lution from the initial operational capability (IOC) to expanded infrastructure expected to become available All contractor groups emphasize the importance of by the end of the century. One example of infrastruc- having a human crew. All consider that “sophisticated ture located in the 28.50 orbit is shown in figures A-7 machines” (robotics, artificial intelligence, etc. ) will (IOC) and A-8 (Evolved). The crew would increase not be able to provide the desired capabilities that from three to nine, the power would triple, the num- could be provided by a human crew through the early ber of pressurized core modules would increase from 1990s. The benefits of having a human crew are sum- one to five, and the servicing facility would quadru- marized by one contractor group in table A-4.

App. A —Results of Principal NASA Studies on Space Station Uses and Functional Requirements ● 147

Figure A-4. —infrastructure/’’Space Station”

Costs and Benefits ment, and servicing capability, the cost would be $4.5 billion to $6 billion. With a crew of eight or nine, 60 The cost estimates of design, development, test and kW of power to users, two or three laboratory modules evaluation, and production, of a “space station” com- and expanded servicing facilities, plus two tended plex have been made by each contractor group ac- platforms–one co-orbiting and one in polar orbit– cording to parametric models following a “Work the estimated acquisition cost would be $7.5 billion Breakdown Structure” developed by the joint Indus- to $9 billion. This latter infrastructure array corre- try Government Space System Cost Analysis Group. sponds to the IOC suggested by the NASA Space Sta- Since detailed designs were not part of the study, tion Task Force (SSTF) in June 1983. predominantly weight-based parameter estimates The above figures include those Shuttle launches re- were used to arrive at a rough order-of-magnitude esti- quired to place the elements in orbit, but generally mate for the costs of designing, building and deploy- do not include NASA support and program manage- ing a complex. ment expenses; OTA estimates that these latter costs Inasmuch as individual contractor groups proposed would be another $1 billion to $2 billion if acquired different combinations of modules and systems, con- by NASA in its usual fashion. siderable care is necessary in making comparisons of An additional ROTV capability cost has been esti- costs among them. It will suffice here to note that a mated at $2 billion to $3 billion, including both the “core” IOC space station in a 28.50 inclination orbit LEO basing facility and the operating vehicle. If a new (i.e., command/habitation capability for a crew of fuel tanker vehicle were to be developed, it could cost three or four, power unit, and resupply logistics approximately $1 billion. modules) was estimated to cost $3.3 billion to $4 bil- The programmatic approach assumed by a number lion (1 984 dollars). With appropriate attached pallets of contractor groups is that of the use of “protoflight” and modules to provide further observation, experi - construction. One group compared the new method

38-798 - 84 - 11 : 3

148 ● Civilian Space Stations and the U.S. Future in Space

Figure A-5.—One Contractor’s Suggested IOC Central Complex Architecture

SOURCE: Based on information contained in the study led by Rockwell International.

Figure A-6.—A Suggested Central Complex Subsystem Organization

● Power ● Radiator ● Storage ● Engines ● Data bus ● Transmitter ● Attitude gen reference ● Transport ● Handling ● Processors ● Antenna determination ● Power ● Water ● Interfaces ● Detection/ reclamation ● Momentum dist ranging ● Controls/ storage ● Waste mgmt displays ● Navgation ● Clothing ● Storage ● Orbit ● EVA ● FLT maintenance ● IVA software

● Structures ● Health maintenance ● Mechanisms ● Habitability & crew support ● Materials

SOURCE Based on information contained in the study led by Rockwell International

App. A—Results of Principal NASA Studies on Space Station Uses and Functional Requirements ● 149

Table A-3.—One Contractor’s Suggested List of Subsystem Enabling Technology — Subsystem characteristics Enabling technology

● EPS ...... ● Solar array Thin cell and higher efficiency ● NiH, batteries ● Cell manufacturing processes ● 180V dist. ● Battery development ● High voltage component development a DMS ...... • Ada computer language ● Meeting existing Ada schedule a ● Fibre optics ● Low loss couplers ● Advanced main memory with b/u ● Develop higher densities battery ● Bubble auxiliary memory ● Space qualifications and higher densities a ● COMM & TRKNG • S, Ku band subsystems Modulations/cod ing/bandw idth ● Dish, omni-antennas ● Design/develop for application a ● TDRS ● Acquisition/tracking/data rate ● Simultaneous operation ● Radio frequency interference protection EC/LSS ...... ● closed loop ● Existing hardware with modifications ● GN&C ...... ● Attitude control Existing hardware with modifications ● Velocity control ● Existing hardware with modifications ● Stabilization ● Existing hardware with modifications ● Sensors ● Existing hardware with modifications a technology and techniques adequate required for technology Key Power Subsystem Management Subsystem —Communication TRKNG—Tracking EC/LSS—Environmental Control and Life Support Subsystem GN&C–Guidance, Navigation, and Control TDRS—Tracking and Data Relay Satellite SOURCE Based on contained the study led by the Grumann Aerospace Corp

Figure A-7.—One Contractor’s Suggested IOC Central Complex

SOURCE Based on Information contained the study led by Grumman Aerospace Corp

150 . Civilian Space Stations and the U.S. Future in Space

Figure A-8. —The Same Contractor’s Suggested Evolved Central Complex

Added facilities

. Typical missions — Astronomy — Life science — R&D ● Solar array — Satellite & industrial platform service — Payload assembly — Earth observation

— Assembly/storage

NADIR

SOURCE Based on contained the study led by Grumman Aerospace

Figure A“9.—One Contractor’s Suggested Evolution Plan; LEO, 28.5°

Key

TMS—Teleoperataor maneuvering system ISTO—lnitial solar terrestrial observatory MMU—Manned maneuvering unit ASTO—Advanced solar terrestrial observatory RMS– Remote manipulator system ASO—Advanced solar observatory OTV—Orbital transfer vehicle LSS — Large space structure

SOURCE Based on contained in the study led by Marietta

App. A—Results of Principal NASA Studies on Space Station Uses and Functional Requirements • 151

Figure A-10. —One Contractor’s Suggested Free-Flying Industrial Platform

SOURCE Based on contained the study led by Grumman Aerospace

Figure A-11 .–One Contractor’s Suggested Tended Polar Platform (IOC)

SOURCE Based on contained the study led by Grumman Aerospace Corp 152 . Civilian Space Stations and the U.S. Future in Space

Table A4.—One Contractor’s Summary of Benefits of infrastructure Work Crew Presence

Function Benefit Related issues

● Maintenance and repair...... ● Reduced equipment cost Realizing cost savings potentials ● Enhanced availability and life Real-time mission involvement...... ● Reacting to unexpected or transient “ Designing activity and events instruments to take advantage ● Discovery, insight, and understanding a Lab operations ...... ● Difficult or impossible to automate • Lab equipment at “space ● Research progress not paced by station” Shuttle reflight schedule ● Crew skills Construction, assembly, test checkout, a modification of large systems ...... ● Difficult or impossible to automate ● Role of EVA ● Simplify designs compared to ● Design to realize benefits complex deployment ● Low-thrust transfer to final ● Stiffen structures destination ● Final test and correction in space

%VIthin the predictable future. SOURCE: Based on information contained in the study lad by the Boeing Aerospace Co. with that used in the Skylab project. In contrast to the Some of the technology advances would be expected multiple qualification test, backup, and flight articles to “spin off” to other areas. used then, they assume that the first production unit Further, they expect that the performance benefits will be a flight article. Furthermore, they judge that would accrue from an improved ability to perform in- the large size of modules permitted by the space trans- space tasks, resulting in both an increase of quantity portation system (STS) would promote economy of and improved quality of output. A number of these scale. Finally, they judge that autonomous operation are listed in table A-5. In the research and technol- of the infrastructure would allow significant reduction ogy areas, the cost of development programs could in ground support compared to that of Skylab. These be reduced by large factors–some project it to be as factors lead them to conclude that a “space station” much as 50 percent. Free-flying platforms could en- could be acquired for significantly less cost per pound able and promote many commercial projects. A base than was Skylab. Although it is unclear which precise for maintenance and repair of in-space equipment on spacecraft elements are included, their estimate was $77,000/kg ($35,000/lb) for Skylab (1984), while they Table A.5.—One Contractor’s Summary projected $44,()()0/kg ($20,000/lb) for a “space sta- of Performance Benefits tion.” Their estimate of the cost of the Spacelab is $220,000/kg ($100,0O0/lb), although this is higher than All mission operatlons: that of European sources. (Of course, a “space sta- ● Decoupled from Shuttle launch schedule, payload tion” could be many times larger and heavier than priorities, and ground delays either Skylab or Spacelab.) They estimate that it re- Space based ROTV: • 10,000 kg + useful payload into GEO quired 10 percent of the acquisition costs per year for ● On-demand capability Skylab O&M, and estimate that a life-cycle-cost de- On-orblt assembly: signed “space station” would require about 3 percent Ž Work crew can inspect, work around, and per year to operate. complement robotics and automation Estimates for operation and maintenance costs of ● Shuttle size limits surmounted all the aerospace contractor groups fall within the On-orbit technology and R&D: range from $150 million to $600 million per year ● Work crew can calibrate, operate, and modify (1984); about $400 million per year represents a mean ● True space environment ● Interaction of multiple disciplines and capabilities in value of these costs for a “space station” accom- a novel environment will produce synergistic modating 8 to 10 crew members. advances All contractor groups foresee that in-space infra- ● Shorter development programs structure could provide operational performance, Sclentific observations: sociopolitical, and economic benefits. The first two ● Short lived experiments extended are essentially qualitative in nature: appropriate activ- ● Work crew can monitor, intervene, replenish, and update ities would enable scientific and commercial commu- SOURCE: Based on information contained in the study led by the Grumman nities to expand and improve their activities in space. Aerospace Corp. App. A—Results of Principal NASA Studies on Space Station Uses and Functional Requirements ● 153

an as-needed basis, and scheduled activities such as pared with an estimated $0.6 million per experiment resupply and/or removal of manufactured products, if done in a long-term laboratory there. One estimate would be provided. The useful life of observation of the cost of pharmaceutical production, where a modules would similarly be enhanced by replenish- large portion of the expense is in the materials, is that ment of consumables, change of experimental equip- of some $33 million/kg ($15 million/lb) if done in an ment items and their unscheduled repair. EDO, compared to $18 million/kg ($8 million/lb) if As scientific knowledge is gained there is greater po- done at a “space station.” These kinds of cost benefits tential to enhance the quality of life. Basic research could be expected to continue throughout the com- results provide some of the background to applied re- plete “space station” life of some two decades and, search, where economic and social benefits prospects if realized, could be a significant factor in encourag- become more visible. Improved space-based ocean, ing the commercialization of space. weather, and atmospheric research eventually could Were a Shuttle used to service an LEO satellite, the assist in our ability to locate and manage Earth re- price per flight would approach some $20 million, sources, and monitor and control the physical envi- which is comparable to the value of the servicing for ronment. New pharmaceuticals as well as semicon- many such satellites. Using permanent space infras- ductors and metal products could become available tructure services offers the possibility, in principle, of through space research and processing. Other social reducing this operational cost by perhaps one half. benefits envisioned by one of the contractors are in- Benefits expected of an ROTV are related primarily dicated in table A-6. to its being based in space and its reusability. One of “Space station’ ’-related economic benefits are the study contractor groups estimated that a fully hoped for in at least three ways: research, develop- amortized ROTV service could be provided at a total ment, and production activities generally; satellite cost of about $60 million for a 4,500 kg (10,000-lb) servicing; and orbital transfer vehicle operations. The payload delivered from LEO to GEO. In contrast, a contractor groups judge that the greatest benefits large expendable upper stage costs some $100 mil- should flow from the latter. lion or more, delivered with its payload to LEO. Thus, Research and development cost reduction through net economic benefit for the ROTV would be some use of infrastructure support is the most difficult to esti- $4o million to $5o million per flight, and 20 launches mate, but most of the contractor groups concluded per year could provide a total savings of $1 billion/year. it could amount to hundreds of millions of dollars per Figure A-1 2 illustrates the judgment of one contrac- year. One example is that of a lengthy science re- tor group regarding the various kinds of benefits ex- search project such as that involving the Shuttle In- pected of the use of a “space station.” frared Celestial Telescope Facility that anticipates Regardless of when a positive economic payoff some 250 days of use in space. If done in a series of might commence—always assuming that it does—a 30-day extended-duration orbiter (EDO) trips, the “space station” could be a powerful capability multi- associated operating expense is estimated to be about plier. Of course, one of the most important benefits $3.6 million/day, while if accomplished in a continu- would arise from the conduct of activities which ous interval in a laboratory there, the cost is expected would be impossible to conduct without it, and activ- to decrease sharply, to $0.4 million/day. Materials ities that we cannot conceive of now. science experiments done in space using a 30-day EDO might cost $2.9 million per experiment, com- Conclusions The aerospace contractor groups that studied po- Table A-6.—Some Social Benefits Suggested tential needs and desires for new infrastructure iden- by One Contractor tified hundreds of activities in the areas of space science and applications, commercialization, and . High-technology—a national goal technology development that could be carried out uti- ● Focus for engineering/science education lizing long lifetime infrastructure with accommodation ● Lunar and beyond exploration • International cooperation for a crew to live and work in space. The vast majority ● Unique, sophisticated development facility are activities that are possible only with a crew sup- • New communication services ported by the infrastructure, or ones that would be ● New commercial products and industries — medical, enhanced by their presence: they would maximize semiconductor R&D performance, especially in the life and materials ● New therapeutic, diagnostic techniques sciences, and contribute to economic benefits. No ● Enhanced national security SOURCE: Based on information contained in the study led by the Grumman single activity, or even a few, would be sufficient to Aerosp~e Corp. justify its establishment, but the large total number

154 . Civilian Space Stations and the U.S. Future in Space

Figure A-12.–One Contractor’s Summary of Infrastructure (“Space Station”) Payoffs

Provides significant economic benefit as launch and utilities facility Equivalent to two additional Orbiters 7 6 5 B$ 4 . + 3 2 1 Extended time on orbit

STS sortie

Free-flyer spacecraft Spa stati

o 5 10 20 Time, years

Projected benefits exceed cost

Cumulative Provides long-term capability for cost

$ Cumulative

benefits

years SOURCE Based on Information contained the study led by Martin Marietta Corp contributing in all functional areas, in the judgment imum experimental and research facilities would con- of the contractor groups, provide reasons to acquire sist of a command/habitat module connected to a an extensive permanently inhabited space infrastructure. solar-array energy module, plus two logistics modules All study participants see significant benefits—in- (for resupply by Shuttle flight). They estimated such cluding such intangibles as national prestige, leader- an initial unit’s acquisition cost to be from $3.3 bil- ship in space, and economic, performance, and social lion to $4 billion (1984). A later complex accom- benefits connected with scientific research, commer- modating eight crew members, 60 kW of power to cialization, and new technology. Reflecting the broad users, two laboratory modules, several external pay- range of advantages projected, contractors differed as load attachment points and satellite service pallets, to which aspect would be most significant. Planetary and two tended platforms (co-orbiting and polar) were probes, a Lunar settlement, and human exploration estimated to cost $7.5 billion to $9 billion. An ROTV of Mars are considered of great significance in terms capability could cost as much as $3 billion more. And of longer range goals. further expansion of “space station” components and It was the unanimous recommendation that the first capabilities were contemplated into the 21st century. infrastructure units should be placed in a 28.50 inclina- These contractor costs accumulate to $10 billion to tion low-Earth-orbit. All were envisioned as new tech- $12 billion for the development of the contractor- nology designs and were projected as allowing evolu- suggested evolved complex over an approximately 9- tionary growth with increased size and capability year period to the mid-1990s; NASA support and pro- phased in over an initial assembly period of about 5 gram integration expense could be another $2 billion years. The smallest unit with adequate volume to to $3 billion. The contractor “evolved” system is house a crew of three for extended stays and with min- roughly comparable to the summer 1983 NASA IOC App. A—Results of Principal NASA Studies on Space Station Uses and Functional Requirements ● 155

but with the addition of full ROTV capability. (Further many, Aerospatiale of France, Spar Aerospace of Can- additions that enter, generally, in NASA’s future plans ada, and a group of European companies consisting to the year 2000 would add another $6 billion.) of AEG, British Aerospace, Fokker, and CIR. The contractors point out that, although quite large, these expenditures may be compared with the approximately $60 billion (1 984) invested in the Apollo pro- European Space Agency gram and the estimated equivalent $56 billion spent The member nations of the European Space Agency for the Salyut-Soyuz project (reported by Interavia for (ESA) authorized a study team which was directed by February 1982), each over a somewhat comparable MBB/ERNO and included Aeritalia, Matra, British period of time. While the study contractor groups con- Aerospace, Dornier System, SABCA, BTM, and KAMP- cluded that these estimated costs could be contained SAX. It examined European interest in providing ele- within a NASA budget projection that maintained ments and the likely consequences of utilizing a today’s level of appropriation over a 10-year period, “space station” having crew capabilities. they recognize that some cost-offsetting economic re- Especially emphasized was ESA’s desire to partici- turn on this public investment is necessary. pate actively in the program, both in the design and While the prospects for cost containment and other construction of components (e.g., logistics modules, intangible benefits are considered to be promising, free-flying platforms, laboratory modules, and equip- two operational factors are pointed out as the main ment and servicing pallets) and in the later operations sources of large, quantifiable economic benefits. One (e.g., access on a continuing basis for experiments, is the use of an LEO-based ROTV system to transport identification of payloads and operational require- equipments between LEO and higher orbits, including ments, and provision of crew members). GEO. The other relates to the fact that appropriate in- The study assessed participation as offering poten- frastructure would result in maximizing the STS load tial benefits to European nations in scientific, techno- factor for each flight. The contractors project a reduc- logical, industrial, economic, operational, and politi- tion in costs for these activities of up to $10 billion cal areas. European contributions were seen as based over the system lifetime. Income could result from in- upon their own set of potential user interests, on sys- creased commercial space development fostered by tems with clean interfaces with other infrastructure the lower cost of space activities and faster conduct components, and on the utilization of developed Euro- of research activities generally. pean technologies (specifically Spacelab). Perhaps ESA A final comparison may be made regarding other could provide “dedicated modules” with preferential long-duration “space stations” of the past and present: conditions for European users to compensate for Euro- Skylab and Salyut. As orbiting spacecraft accommo- pean investment. Participation would be particularly dating crews, at first glance they appear to be fun- cost effective to ESA if all of the infrastructure were damentally similar. But, while all three could function available to it without a major program on their part as space test and laboratory facilities, the contractors to obtain it, so that it would be complementary with note that the proposed “space station” is the only one rather than competitive with European unmanned providing for satellite servicing. And neither Skylab nor systems. Salyut offered the assembly and transport harbor en- The study team identified about 130 activities that, visioned for a new “space station. ” conceptually, European countries desire to carry out in space. Similar to the projections of the U.S. con- Major Findings of “Mission Analysis tractor groups, they included materials processing, life Studies” of Other Countries sciences and bioprocessing studies, space science and applications, and technology development. An inno- Related studies were also requested of potential vative use was that of entertainment, such as filming foreign participants in any “space station” program. of space movies and creation of new artistic forms in In terms similar to the eight U.S. aerospace contrac- space. tor group studies, the European Space Agency (ESA), ESA recognized the possibility of free-flyers as a sup- the National Research Council of Canada, and a Jap- plement to a “space station” for Earth observation and anese Space Station Task Team (representing numer- space science, but noted the advantages (over an ex- ous organizations in Japan interested in aerospace pendable booster) of the Shuttle and additional in- activities) prepared studies. In addition, individual orbit infrastructure; this combination would involve companies or groups of companies from these regions less costly hardware, provide return transportation as presented reports of elements or subsystems of special needed, and obviate the necessity of bringing a com- interest to them. Among these were Dornier of Ger- plete spacecraft back to the surface for servicing. 156 . Civilian Space Stations and the U.S. Future in Space

The need or benefit from human involvement in been discussed in the section on Canada; others are about 70 percent of the proposed activities was presented here. stressed. Among these were life sciences experiments and the servicing of satellites such as the EURECA DORNIER vehicles that are under design in Europe. Power needs Dornier of Germany investigated several concep- identified for users were in the range of 20 to 30 kW. tual infrastructure elements for ESA which have an obvious relation to a potential later participation of Eur- Canada ope in a U.S. program. The conceptual elements The National Research Council of Canada expressed analyses included: 1. a high degree of interest. The Canadian report iden- ‘requirements and technology aspects for space tified about 37 potential uses and desires, largely in pointing systems; 2. the areas of remote sensing and technology develop- designs and capabilities of heat pipe radiators; ment. Most could be carried out at an orbit inclina- and life sciences experiments and development of life tion of 28.5° with 5 kW of power. Many uses would 3. benefit from having a human crew, and a Canadian support systems. astronaut as a payload specialist was proposed. AEROSPATIALE Continued development of the SPAR Remote Ma- nipulator System is anticipated along with new work Aerospatiale of France studied the following areas: on associated construction and servicing subsystems. 1. General infrastructure concepts, along with their Also, Canada would develop a space vision system evaluation of the eight U.S. contractor group ar- to facilitate ranging and docking, and consideration chitectural designs. The contractor group studies is being given to advanced remote sensing subsystems. were noted as having numerous advantageous In a separate report, Spar Aerospace Limited out- design features, but in each case several dif- lined its capabilities in high-power solar arrays and in- ficulties are foreseen. dicated interest in building one of a modular type; 2. Concepts for a Reusable Orbital Transfer Vehi- various concepts were given but no cost estimates. cle were studied with special consideration of its fuel storage arrangements. Japan 3. Designs of a Teleoperator Maneuvering System were-studied. It would incorporate solar arrays The Japanese Space Station Task Team reported to provide electrical power. long-term, across-the-board interest. While few spe- cifics regarding individual experiments were given, AEG, BRITISH AEROSPACE, FOKKER, CIR they anticipated uses for astronomy, life sciences, This group of European companies analyzed power materials processing, technology development, Earth observation, space energy research, and large com- sources employing solar energy arrays, comparing munications satellite assembly. The majority of these planar and concentrator designs and various support- would require or benefit from human presence, with ing structure arrangements. A flexible-blanket, retract- long time on orbit and human judgment and/or oper- able, fold-out array was favored for further study. This ating capability as important factors. They anticipate approach also lends itself to stepwise growth to power levels as great as 250 kW. that space activities would involve two general phases— one up to the middle 1990s to develop methods to MBB/ERNO, AERITALIA, BRITISH AEROSPACE, be capitalized on thereafter. DORNIER SYSTEM, SABCA, BTM, KAMPSAX The Japanese would be interested in developing almost any or all elements of the space infrastructure, MBB/ERNO, the leader of this group of companies, from attached modules to the ROTV. They suggest was also the principal contractor for the general ESA starting with simple standard modules and enlarging “space station” study. Thus, much duplication occurs the capabilities for various additional needs. in this report of the summary appearing earlier in this chapter. Individual Foreign Company Interests Considerable emphasis was put upon the possibility of the Spacelab and EURECA spacecraft being used Extensive studies were made by several European as infrastructure elements. companies or industrial groups to augment the reports Modifications of Spacelab could provide combined discussed in the previous sections of this chapter. A habitation/laboratory functions in conjunction with an submission of Spar Aerospace Limited has already EDO vehicle. A crew of three could be accommo- App. A—Results of Principal NASA Studies on Space Station Uses and Functional Requirements ● 157

dated, but this would result in a decrease in labora- ate their facilities, but also enable them to be offered tory space compared to the present Spacelab design. to the United States, thus allowing a sharing of re- EURECA would first be used as a Shuttle-tended un- sources and reducing the financial involvement of par- pressurized free-flying platform. Later development of ticipating nations, a resource/service module incorporating solar electrical power, environmental control, and life support Summary systems would enable an increased capability in association with the developed Spacelab and the EURECA The universal attitude of all non-United States orga- platform. Ultimately these elements could, with others, nizations is one of enthusiasm to participate in a space become components of a larger, more permanent infrastructure program, not just to develop and build space infrastructure. elements of it, but to be active as partners in the oper- Also, a Spacelab with its own solar array could be ation and use of its facilities, especially the elements a free-flying experiment module which could be that they would produce. Many of them look upon tended by a crew that would visit for a few hours at it as fundamental to their future role in space and a time. therefore want long-term understandings or agree- They also indicated a European consortium was pre- ments with the United States. The characteristic note pared to develop and produce an ROTV and its is one of desired international cooperation in which hangar facility, a Teleoperator Maneuvering System there is true participation throughout rather than (labeled by Matra as a Teleoperated Service Vehicle), simply shared eventual utilization. and the satellite service and assembly infrastructure segments. NASA Synthesis of the “Mission No specific estimated costs were given. However, Analysis Studies” six items (a free-flying, tended, experiment module, a logistics module, a free-flying platform, an unpres- NASA assembled the United States and foreign mis- surized logistics resupply carrier, a teleoperator ma- sion analysis reports relating to a civilian “space sta- neuvering system, and a thermal control technology tion” and held a workshop during May 1983, to syn- development program) could be achieved over a 1s thesize the results. Of the hundreds of projects and year period at funding levels aggregating about $1.6 experiments proposed by potential users, the work- billion (1984). While direct comparison with estimates shop of the Requirements Working Group and the made by U.S. aerospace companies is difficult be- SSTF Concept Development Group established a min- cause of numerous design and capability differences, imum time-phased “mission set” (for the decade from this cost could be lower than, but of the same order 1991 to 2000) of 107 specific space activities, plus four of magnitude as, the estimate for a corresponding set generic industrial service activities (e.g., satellite of modules by the American contractors. servicing). The study observed that pressurized modules would Of the 107, 48 were categorized under science and sometimes be needed for experimental reasons even applications, 28 under commercial, and 31 under if human habitation were not a consideration, and this technology development. The four additional com- would affect not only the design but also the opera- mercial opportunity activities would be continuously tion of such modules. available as needed for industrial servicing. The study team recommended that development The NASA working groups judged the list of activi- should proceed in phases with the initial phase using ties to be realistic in terms of maturity of experimental proven existing elements. Automated processes should and program planning, scientific need, and progress be preferred for routine work, but cost effectiveness of technology development. The programs identified must always be considered, inasmuch as automation for the first 3 years were particularly well validated can be costly. in their view. At the end of the workshop, their rec- This study, representing companies from many ommendations of the minimum capabilities required European countries, was oriented to identifying po- at IOC were as follows: tentially produceable infrastructure elements, not 1. Space station central complex at 28.50: overall concepts. This emphasized Europe’s intention ● 55 kW of average electrical power to users; 3 to play an active role in development and operation, ● Two 60 m laboratory modules (for materials not simply provide hardware. The candidate elements processing in space and life sciences); would satisfy their user needs and have clean inter- ● 5 person crew (4 for payload operations); faces with the other elements of space infrastructure. ● 300 MBPS data rate; and This would not only put Europe in a position to oper- • 4 to 6 payload attachment mounts, 158 ● Civilian Space Stations and the U.S. Future in Space

2. Polar platform (unpressurized): and on thin films. An executive with one company ● 12.5 kW of average power; with experience in aerospace has indicated that the ● 300 MBPS data rate; and Government’s funding toward eventual acquisition of • 4 payload attachment mounts. permanently inhabited space infrastructure is a necessary (but not sufficient) condition to convince industries that the United States is serious about space Nonaerospace Industry Interest commercialization. He considers that, in addition, a in Space Use long-term commitment to supporting the commercialization effort is what will suffice to bring the private NASA contracted with the Booz-Allen & Hamilton sector into full participation. and Coopers and Lybrand consultant firms to com- Some industry observers point out that the often- municate with a variety of nonaerospace companies mentioned example of how communications satellites to ascertain (and at the same time stimulate) interest became a commercial success is not necessarily rele- in the use of space facilities for commercial purposes. vant to today’s efforts at space commercialization in Up to March 1984, they discussed prospects with up- other areas. First, there was already a clear market for wards of so companies of which more than 30 ex- the improved communications services which a pri- pressed active interest. To most of these firms the con- vate organization was created to provide, something cept of doing business in space is utterly foreign; a which is not clearly evident today is such areas as great deal of exploring with them is necessary to sur- materials processing in space or remote sensing. Sec- face possibilities of products or services that might be ond, the enabling legislation to move it forward to compatible with their commercial activities and offer reality was motivated by the need to create an inter- promising opportunity of eventual financial success. national system, while today’s commercialization Booz-Allen & Hamilton reported to a conference in issues concern primarily U.S. domestic businesses. mid-1 983 that most of the companies moving toward The barriers that Booz-Allen & Hamilton found to negotiation of Joint Endeavor Agreements with NASA wider interest in commercial space enterprises were are well-known U.S. industrial firms (one with an an- technical, economic, and government-related. First, nounced agreement is the 3M Corp.) but several are technical knowledge of the space environment by from the small business sector or Europe. Interest is many industries is very scanty, while in general there concentrated in such fields as chemicals, metals, are too few answers as yet to the behavior of many glasses, communications, and crystals. Another type kinds of materials in space. Second, economic risks of enterprise being actively pursued is a fee-for-service associated with timing and cost of space experiments laboratory in space. Among the half-dozen companies are looked at by private enterprise from the standpoint actively investigating space experiments, most are in- of the expected long payback period (1 O or more terested in crew-tended operations rather than remote years). Third, the maze of government bureaucracy or automated procedures. to be faced to obtain approval on such things as Joint Since the administration’s authorization of a “space Endeavor Agreements is deterring some, especially station” program, interest among several companies small companies, from entering into space business. has become more firm, according to those involved Booz-Allen & Hamilton is recommending establish- in the study; the 3M Corp. has recently announced ment of some form of permanent intermediary to assist a Memorandum of Understanding with NASA to begin nonaerospace companies in contacts with NASA and space experiments on inorganic chemical materials other Government agencies. Appendix B THE EVOLUTION OF CIVILIAN IN-SPACE INFRASTRUCTURE, I. E., “SPACE STATION,” CONCEPTS IN THE UNITED STATES*

Introduction the tone by picturing “space stations” as stepping stones for trips by people to the planets, especially Almost from the first time humans thought about Mars. Like these earliest contributions, succeeding leaving the surface of this planet, one theme has been proposals included fiction and nonfiction, humanism the creation of some form of human outpost in space. and science, practicality and fancy. They were sparked In fiction, and during this century in increasingly spe- by an unbridled enthusiasm for spaceflight and a firm cific engineering detail, the “space station” concept belief that exploration of the planets was human des- has been extensively discussed. In one of the two ma- tiny. Most were informed enough to realize that di- jor space-faring nations, the Soviet Union, a fairly rect ascent from Earth to interplanetary space was not rudimentary but still very capable “space station” pro- technical y attractive. “Space stations” were way sta- gram, centered on the Salyut spacecraft, has been on- tions, logistics depots on the way to the planets. going since 1971. In the other space power, the Tsiolkovsky in 1923 wrote of a station placed “at United States, the development of some kind of per- a distance of 2,000 to 3,000 versts (a Russian unit of manent presence i n space to support space activities distance equal to 0.6629 mile) from the Earth, as (an i n an efficient and effective manner, is now u rider artificial) Moon. Little by little appear colonies with way. supplements, materials, machines, and structures This appendix reviews those past occasions, with brought from Earth.” In his 1923 book, The Rocket particular attention to the rationales offered at various Into Interplanetary Space, space pioneer Herman times for space infrastructure development and to the Oberth first described an orbiting manned satellite as differing concepts which have been proposed. His- a “space station, ” and proposed that it could be used tory can cast a useful perspective on current policy as an Earth observation site, world communications alternatives, which, after all, reflect the continuation link, weather satellite, or orbital refueling station for of a long-running debate over the justification for in- outward-bound space vehicles. frastructure of various characteristics, size, and cost. The early proposals resulted in more words than By sketching the earlier points in the history of the U.S. hardware. The only group of “space station” advo- space program at which a “space station” has come cates to make progress toward realizing their dreams under serious consideration as a major project, only were the members of the German Rocket Society, to be rejected in favor of some other alternative, it may among whom the “space station” concept became be possible to identify what is now different, and what common currency.2 But even they could only mud- is not, that might now lead to a more favorable evalua- dle along on rocket research with the limited private tion of various proposals. funds at their disposal until military support prompted by the approach of World War II brought on the fi- Earliest Space Infrastructure nancing necessary for research and development that . (i e.,. “Space Station” Concepts)t would lead to spaceflight. Wernher von Braun and his associates built the v-2 rocket for the Wehrmacht The first proposals for “space stations” conceptually in order, they said later, to achieve their real goal— akin to modern schemes appeared in the late nine- the development of spaceflight. Whatever their mo- teenth century. Konstantin E. Tsiolkovsky’s Dreams of tives, after the war they brought to the United States Earth and Sky and the Effects of Universal Gravity the most advanced rocket technology in the world and (1895) and Kurd Lasswitz’s On Two Planets (1897) set schemes for “space station” and interplanetary flight that had been sparked and nurtured by the romantic enthusiasm of the first half of the 20th century. *This paper was prepared for OTA by John Logsdon, based In part on orlglnal material by Alex Roland, I Much of this section IS based on papers by Frederick 1. Ordway, I I 1, ‘‘The History, Evolutlon, and Benefits of the Space StatIon Concept, ” presented ‘Barton C. Hacker, “And Rest As On a Natural Station: From Space Sta- to the XIII International Congress of the History of Sctence, August 1971; tton to Orbital Operations In Space-Travel Thought, 1985-1951 ,“ unpublished and Leonard David, “Space StatIons of the Imaglnatlon, ” A/AA Studenf)our- paper, NASA History C)tlce ArchIves (hereafter NHOA), Washington, DC, na/ VOI 20, No, 4, winter 1982/1 983. p 9.

159 160 ● Civilian Space Stations and the U.S. Future in Space

In the United States in the years immediately fol- ● “a watchdog of the peace”; lowing World War II, both scientists and military lead- ● a meteorological observation post; ers recognized that the ability to launch payloads into ● a navigation aid for ships and airplanes; and orbit would have important implications for their par- ● “a terribly effective atomic bomb carrier. ” ticular fields of activity. In considering the various uses This detailed description was only one of the many to which space might be put, several lines of devel- concepts developed in the years after World War II opment emerged. First, to the concept of “space sta- but prior to the 1957 launch of Sputnik and the for- tions” with human crews as stepping stones to the mal beginning of the Space Age.6 Even before the planets was added the less dramatic but more reali- United States had an official civilian space program, zable concept of relatively small Earth satellites, not most of the possible uses of a “space station” had to send men to other celestial bodies but to perform been identified by visionaries who dreamed of space practical, Earth-oriented tasks in orbit: communica- travel,7 tion, scientific research, reconnaissance, etc. j Second, further consideration led some to conclude The Response to Sputnik, 1957-618 that bases in orbit were “not necessary for most activities envisioned there: rendezvous of the rockets and Sputnik changed the context for U.S. space activi- satellites themselves is sufficient to most purposes. ”4 ties. In spite of President Eisenhower’s attempts to But this perspective and its appearance in the literature avoid it, a space race with the Russians was on. All did nothing to deter a third line of development: the kinds of proposals that would have been laughed from elaboration of earlier concepts of “space stations, ” the stage in earlier years were put forward in deadly perpetuated in this era most spectacularly by Wernher earnest. Many at home and abroad perceived the von Braun’s concept of a toroidal “space station. ” United States as having fallen behind the Soviet Union Von Braun’s ideas received wide publicity in a Col- at least in this sophisticated technology, and nothing lier’s magazine special titled “Man Will Conquer but a crash program would do. Space Soon.” Von Braun claimed that “scientists and Having people in space is the most complicated and engineers now know how to build a station in space the most dramatic of space activities, and it quickly that would circle the Earth, 1,075 miles up . . . .If we became the focus of the competition. News that the do it, we can not only preserve the peace but we can Soviets were considering a “space station” of the von take a long step toward uniting mankind.” Braun variety fanned the enthusiasm in the United Von Braun’s plan called for a triple-decked, 25-ft- States for a like undertaking and underlined the mili- wide, wheel-shaped station in polar orbit which would tary overtones of the space race.9 As one observer put be a “superb observation post” and from which “a it, “the rapid and timely completion of the Military trip to the Moon itself will be just a step.” The main Space Station will do much to bring about space element of space infrastructure would be accompa- supremacy (italics added) for America and lay the nied by another: a free-flying observatory that would scientific foundation for the aerospace power of the be tended by a crew. future.” 10 Von Braun noted that the station would not be alone But this was not to be. In spite of all that the mili- in space; “there will nearly always be one or two tary had done to pioneer research in spaceflight, Presi- rocket ships unloading supplies near to the station. ” dent Eisenhower opted for a civilian space agency, the “Space taxis” or “shuttle-craft,” as von Braun described them, would ferry both people and materials from the rocket ships to the station itself. Von Braun noted a number of uses for a “space bThe detailed description in the von Braun article should not be confused with a detailed design. For two early detailed designs, see: 1 ) “Assembly of stat ion”: a Multl-Manned Satellite, ” Lockheed Missile and Space Division, LMSD ● “a springboard for exploration of the solar 48347, Dec. 18, 1958 (available in the archives of the National Air and Space system”; Museum of the Smithsonian Institution); and 2) “A Modular Concept for a Multi-Manned Space Station, “ in the IAS Proceedings of the Manned Space Stat/on Symposium, Apr. 20-22, 1960, pp. 37-72. 7See, for example, the IAS report, op. cit. ‘R. Carglll Hall, “Early US. Satellite Proposals,” Tec/rno/ogy and Cu/fure, 8Thls history is recounted in John M. Logsdon, The Decision to Go to the vol. 4, 1963, pp. 41 O-434; and Arthur Clarke, “Extraterrestrial Relays: Can Moon Project Apollo and the Nat/onal Interest (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, Rocket Stations Give Worldwide Coverage?” W/re/ess Wodd, October 1945, 197o), ch, 2; and W. David Compton and Charles D. Benson, Living and pp 305-308. Working in Space: The History o{ Skylab (Washington, DC: National Aero- 4Harry E. Ross, “Orbital Bases, ” )ourna/ of fhe British /rrferp/anetary Society, nautics and Space Administration, 1983), SP-4208, ch. 1. vol. 9, 1949, pp. 1 -19; Kenneth W. Gatland, “Rockets in Circular Orbit, ” 9“Soviet Scientist Sees Need for Manned Station in Space, ” AerO/spdCe )ourna/ of the British Interplanetary Society, vol. 9, 1949, pp. 52-59. Engineering, vol. 17, September 1958, p, 27. iOLowell B. Smith, “The Military Test Space Stat Ion,” ‘Wernher von Braun, “Crossing the Last Frontier, ” Co//ier’s, Mar, 22, 1952, Aero/Spdce EfWKW- pp. 25-29, 72-74. /ng, vol. 19, May 1960, p. 19. App. B—The Evolution of Civilian In-Space Infrastructure, I. E., “Space Station, ” Concepts in the United States . 161

National Aeronautics and Space Administration as long-range goals of the NASA program; Low told (NASA), and entrusted it with a manned mission. And the conference that “in this decade, therefore, our that mission would be a modest one, at least at the present planning calls for the development and dem- start. Project Mercury would demonstrate that a per- onstration of an advanced manned spacecraft with suf- son could fly in space; until then there would be no ficient flexibility to be capable of both circumlunar talk of “space stations” and manned flight to the flight and useful Earth orbital missions. In the long Moon and planets.11 range, this spacecraft should lead toward a permanent However, as the new space agency began opera- manned “space station. ”13 Low also announced the tions, NASA leadership set the development of a long- name of the advanced spacecraft program, then aimed range plan for the agency’s first decade as a high-pri- both at the Moon and at “space stations”; it was to ority task. A “space station” was a leading candidate be called “Project Apollo.” for a post-Mercury goal. The House Space Commit- tee in early 1959 concluded that stations were the log- The Apollo Anomaly ical follow-on to Mercury, and von Braun (then still working for the Army) presented a similar view i n his Once again, however, external events intervened briefings to NASA, At this time, the German rocket to upset the orderly course of events envisioned by team had developed an elaborate scheme, called Proj- those planning the country’s future in space. President ect Horizon, for Army utilization of space, including Kennedy came into office in 1961 committed to reas- miIitary outposts on the Iunar surface. sert America’s vitality and resolve in the war of nerves In the first half of 1959, NASA created a Research with the Soviet Union. When, in April 1961, the Rus- Steering Committee on Manned Space Flight, chaired sians tested the United States once again by launch- by Harry Goett. At the first meeting of this committee ing the first man into space, Kennedy ended his early members placed a “space station” ahead of a lunar indecisiveness on the space program and in 1961 expedition in a list of logical post-Mercury steps. In committed the country to the race to the Moon. This subsequent meetings, the debate centered on the decision, the most momentous in the history of the question of whether a “space station’s” value for American space program, was made for reasons of scientific research, especially in the biomedical area, prestige and politics.14 It determined the future of outweighed the excitement of a lunar landing goal. NASA and its programs more thoroughly than any While some members of the committee argued that other decision before or since. That influence oper- “the ultimate objective of space exploration is ated on two levels. manned travel to and from other planets, ” the repre- First, and perhaps most importantly in the long run, sentative of one center argued for an interim step, the style and public perception of the Apollo commit- since “in true spaceflight man and the vehicle are go- ment made it something of a model for all future space ing to be subjected to the space environment for ex- proposals. President Kennedy made the decision tended periods of time and there will undoubtedly be quickly but not precipitously. He consulted his staff space rendezvous requirements. All of these aspects and NASA and chose the Moon landing as the most need extensive study . . . the best means would be dramatic and most feasible of the suggestions for with a true orbiting space laboratory that is manned demonstrating U.S. ability to best the Soviet Union in and that can have a crew and equipment change. ” 12 high-technology competition. He presented the idea Ultimately, the Goett committee recommended that in a speech before an unusual joint session of Con- a lunar landing be established as NASA’s long-range gress, in which the new President outlined his plans goal, on the grounds that it was a true “end-objective” for fulfilling his campaign promises of getting the requiring no justification in terms of some larger goals United States moving again. to which it contributed. “Now is the time,” said Kennedy, “to take longer These recommendations were not immediately ac- strides—time for a great new American enterprise— cepted. For example, at an August 1960 industry brief- time for this nation to take a clearly leading role in ing on NASA’s future plans, George Low presented space achievement, which in many ways may hold a scheme in which a manned lunar landing and crea- the key to our future on Earth. ”15 In a moving and un- tion of a “space station” were given equal treatment compromising challenge, the President called on Con-

I I Loyal s Swenson, jr., james M, G rlmwood, and Charles C. Alexander, 1‘George Low, “Manned Space Fllght, ” an NASA, NASA -lrrdustry Program This I\’eM Ocean A H/sfory of’ Prqect Mercury, NASA SP-420T (Washing- P/.]ns Conference, July 1960, p. 80, (NHOA). ton, DC National Aeronautics and Space Admlnlstratlon, 1966). ‘“ Logsdon, op. cit., chs. 3-5, recounts the history of the declslon to begin I ~Bruce Lofi I n, as quoted I n the MI n utes of the Research steering Commit- the Apollo program and analyzes the motives which led to that declslon tee on Manned Fllght, meeting of May 25-26, 1959 (NHOA) “lbld , p. 128 162 . Civilian Space Stations and the U.S. Future in Space

gress and the public to commit itself to a $25-billion16 1960s, studies of “space station” concepts proceeded undertaking in space for largely intangible goals of throughout the decade. prestige and competition. Congress and the public agreed, launching NASA on its most famous and for- “Space Station” Plans During mative enterprise and creating an indelible image of the 1960s how to launch a major project in space. Only slowly, if at all, would NASA administrators and other space During the 1960s, “space station” studies were con- advocates come to realize that the Apollo commit- ducted both within NASA and by the various aero- ment was a political anomaly defying duplication. space contractors (particularly those without a major The Apollo decision also ensured that in accom- role in Apollo). They resulted in examination of a wide plishing the lunar landing objective the United States variety of concepts, ranging from inflatable balloon- would develop a large, but specialized, space capa- Iike structures, through the use of refurbished rocket bility, and that manned spaceflight would come to stages, to very large stations requiring the use of Saturn dominate all other kinds for at least a decade. And V boosters to put them in orbit. Three NASA field cen- it ensured, especially after it was complemented by ters—the Manned Spacecraft Center in Texas, the Mar- the lunar-orbital rendezvous decision, that the “space shall Space Flight Center in Alabama, and the Langley station” concept would recede into the background Research Center in Virginia—managed these in-house for the duration of the race to the Moon. The Moon and contractor studies, and they were coordinated by mission would proceed on its journey directly from the Advanced Missions Office of the Office of Manned Earth orbit–simply because that was the quickest way Space Flight at NASA headquarters in Washington.18 to go (though not necessarily the best for long-term While the manned flight centers at Houston and development) and the Saturn V launch vehicle (origi- Huntsville were focusing almost their total energies nally designed for other purposes) would permit it. on getting Apollo started in the early 1960s,’9 the In this hothouse atmosphere, Project Mercury and Langley Research Center was giving substantial atten- Project Gemini became demonstration programs for tion to the theoretical and engineering aspects of Apollo. Many of the tasks that had to be accomplished “space station” design. These efforts dated from at in order for Apollo to succeed were also on the agenda least mid-1959, and by 1962 enough work had been for “space station” research. Mercury, for example, done to form the basis for a “space station” symposi- demonstrated that a person could survive the weight- um.20 Langley researchers noted that “a large manned lessness and radiation of space. Gemini demonstrated orbiting ‘space station’ may have many uses or ob- that rendezvous, docking, and extravehicular activ- jectives.” Among these objectives they listed: ity were feasible. The last of these was always more 1. learning to live in space; important to “space station” plans than to Apollo. ● artificial-gravity experiments, Both projects demonstrated, at least to some, that a . zero-gravity experiments, and human being was a crucial component of the space- • systems research and development, craft’s capability, performing such functions as 2. applications research; piloting, observing, and photographing; and piloting ● communications experiments, especially was contrasted with the comparatively ● earth observations, primitive, ground-controlled capsules of the Russians 3. launch platform experiments; and in which the cosmonaut was simply a passenger. ’ 4. scientific research. Notwithstanding these positive steps on the road to With respect to launch platform experiments, Langley a total manned spaceflight capability, Apollo was to suggested that: prove a programmatic deadend for NASA. Many in . . . the “space station” with its crew of trained astro- NASA understood all along that the lunar rendezvous nauts and technicians should be a suitable facility for approach to accomplishing the objective was a technical anomaly and they never gave up their notion Iestudles durln~ the 1960s at the Langley Research Center, the Manned of a more logical approach to human exploitation of Spacecraft Center, and the Marshall Space Flight Center are summarized In space, i.e., a “space station. ” For this reason, while Langley Research Center, Compilation of Papers Presented at the Space Sta- tion Technology Symposium, Feb. 11-13, 1969 (N HOA). Apollo was at the center of public attention during the !sEven So, both Houston and Huntsville had “space station’ study effofls under way; in particular, Houston was studying a large (24- person) “space station” to be launched by a Saturn V. The studies directed by Langley have been chosen for review because they were more fully de- lbThen_some $6CI bi I I ton today. veloped than those directed by the two other centers. I TSwenson, et al., Op. cit.; Baflon C. Hacker and James M. Grimwood, on ~t}The early Langley studies are summarized in Langley Research Center, the Shoulders of Titans: A History of Project Gemini, NASA SP-4203 (Wash- A Reporl on the Research and Technological Problems of Manned Rotating I ngton, DC: National Aeronautics and Space Administration, 1977). Spacecraft, NASA Technical Note D-1 504, August 1962 (NHOA). App. B—The Evolution of Civilian /n-Space Infrastructure, I. E., “Space Station, ” Concepts in the United States • 163

learning some of the fundamental operations neces- ical condition, and physical therapy if zero-gravity sary for launching space missions from orbit. The new conditions were debilitating for the crew.23 technologies required for rendezvous, assembly or- By early 1963, NASA Associate Administrator and bital countdown, replacement of defective parts, and 21 General Manager Robert Sea mans called for study of orbital launch can be determined. Among various “space station” studies carried out an Earth Orbiting Laboratory (EOL) from “an overall by Langley contractors during the first half of the NASA point of view.” Such study was needed, said 1960s, perhaps the most detailed was that of a Seamans, since an EOL had been studied and discussed “by several government agencies and con- Manned Orbital Research Laboratory (MORL) con- 24 ducted by Douglas Aircraft from 1963 to 1966. Doug- tractors” and because NASA and DOD “are now las had had some prior interest in “space stations”; supporting a number of additional advanced studies. ” in 1960 it had built a full-scale mockup of a four- Seamans’ reference to DOD was significant: NASA person astronomical space observatory as the central and DOD were locked in a controversy over control theme of an “ideal home exhibition” held in London. of post-ApoIlo manned flight efforts. NASA’s management, anticipated Seamans, would “be faced with the This station was to be constructed inside the fuel tank of a second-stage booster, a Douglas idea which ulti- decision to initiate hardware development” in 1964. mately found use in the Skylab program over a dec- Seamans ordered an agency-wide, 4 to 6 week high- ade later.22 priority study which would examine EOL proposals In this study, a baseline technical concept for an in terms of, among other factors: MORL was established first, then the “utilization po- 1. Defense Department interest, 2. international factors, and tential” of such a station was examined—i,e., design 25 preceded requirements. When the original design was 3. other government agency interest. compared to various requirements, it was inadequate, Throughout this study and other attempts to define and a larger station in a different orbit evolved as the a “space station” program in the 1963-66 period, final result of the study effort. The study found that there was a continuing tension between those designing the station itself (primarily associated with the Of- the highest utilization potential came from “key engi- fice of Manned Space Flight (OMSF), its field centers neering and scientific research studies augmented by and associate contractors) and those interested in the specific experiments directed toward potential Earth- experiments and other uses of such a faciIity (primar- centered applications. ” As the study proceeded, the MORL got steadily more sophisticated and bigger, as ily the Office of Space Science and Applications and there were no criteria established to limit the addition the Office of Advanced Research and Technology of new experimental requirements. (OART)). For example, one OART staffer complained The MORL requirements study examined: in 1963 that “the fact that OMSF is supplying funds for MORL , . . does not change the fact that in doing ● Earth-centered applications; so they are in a supporting role to the experimental ● national defense; purpose of the MORL. That experimental purpose ● support of future space flights; and, should carry a heavy stick in the determination of how ● the space sciences. 26 From this analysis, the study predicted the need for the research program will be accomplished. ” “hundreds of thousands of man-hours” in orbit to Later in 1963, the Director of OART asked field center assistance in defining “more clearly the potential carry out all useful applications; this implied a long- usefulness of such a laboratory as a platform for scien- range requirement for “near-permanent operations tific and technological research in space. ” He noted and support of probably several space stations. ” The study also noted, foreshadowing a future issue, that

“the limiting factor on the number of such stations, ~JDouglas MISS I Ie and Space Systems Diwslon, Douglas Aircraft CO., ‘‘ Re- and the crew size of each station, appears to be the port on the Development of the Manned Orbkal Research Laboratory (MORL) System Utilization Potential, ” Repon SM-48822, January 1966. cost of logistic support. ” The final MORL concept, al- ZdThough It IS not discussed in detal I In this report, durl ng this period the though basically a zero-gravity station, had an on- Department of Defense was exploring the potential of manned flight for na- board centrifuge for reentry simulation, testing of phys- tional security missions. Some of this study effort was conducted jointly with NASA, but most was not; one focus of the effort was the military potential of a “space station. ” In 1963, the Air Force’s Manned Orbiting Laboratory (MOL) program was approved as an initial step in examining the ways In wh Ich human crews cou [d be used to enhance national security operations In orbit The MOL wa5 canceled In 1969 . J~Memoran~u m from NASA Associate Adml nlstrator, “Space Task Team “ I hld for ,Manned Earth Orbltlng Laboratory Study,” Mar. 28, 1963 (NHOA). )iGeorg(, v But Ier, ‘‘space sti3t10n5, 1959 To?” in B. J, Bluth and S R. “Memorandum from Chtet, Manned Systems Integration, to Director, Ot- \Ic \eal L,Iprf~te on SpJCe, vol 1 (Granada Hills, CA National Behavior Sys- tlce of Ad\anced Research and Technology, “ SEB for the Manned Orbttal [t’m\, 1981 J, p 8 Research Laboratory, May 16, 1963 (N HOA).

38-798 0 - 84 - 12 : QL 3 164 . Civilian Space Stations and the U.S. Future in Space

that “a view has prevailed to date, based primarily on Secretary of State, Webb combined an ebullient and intuitive judgment [emphasis added here], that this re- dynamic personality with a keen political sense and search function (exclusive of biotechnology and hu- long familiarity with the ways of Washington. He man factors research) constitutes one of the more im- believed in long-range planning, but he eschewed portant long-range justifications” for a “space station.” long-range plans, which he felt excessively tied the It was essential, he argued, to make “a correct deci- hands of the Administrator. He wanted to be prepared sion as to whether and why a MORL project should for the future, but he did not want to commit himself be undertaken.”27 or NASA prematurely to another project as large as By 1964, the definition of uses for a “space station” Apollo. had broadened enough to lead the Director of the Webb adopted two approaches to post-Apollo plan- OMSF Advanced Manned Mission Office to suggest ning. First he characterized and rationalized Apollo that it was “both timely and necessary to pursue as the development of a capability in space, not an . . . broadly beneficial uses of “space stations” with end in itself. Once the Moon landing was accom- the departments and agencies that will capitalize and plished, NASA would be able to convert the resources exploit these broader uses” and that an interagency and experience of the Apollo program to other pur- “applications working group” be established for this poses through a program called Apollo Applications. purpose. Such interagency involvement, he noted, Second, he used his fine political sense to ensure that “can result in a higher level of knowledgeable sup- NASA adjusted its ambitions in space to suit the cli- port to NASA for implementation of a national multi- mate of opinion in Washington and throughout the purpose ‘space station’ program.”28 Nation. As the war in Vietnam and the domestic unrest of the late 1960s compounded NASA’s problems in Beginnings of Post-Apollo Planning2g getting congressional attention and appropriations, NASA gradually modified its internal plans and pro- Under pressure from the White House and Con- posals. The agency took more clearly the line that gress, NASA began looking beyond the Apollo proj- Webb stressed throughout his tenure: NASA must ect in 1964 and 1965. In 1964, an in-house examina- have a balanced program in which manned space- tion of NASA’s future options had recommended that flight played a role along with space science, applica- NASA defer “large new missions for further study and tions, and aeronautical research. analysis. “3° However, there was concern within NASA NASA spoke more often in the mid-to-late 1960s of about maintaining an adequate workload for both practical, Earth-oriented space activities, which would NASA centers and NASA contractors, as the develop- exploit the gains already made and provide taxpayers ment phase of Apollo neared completion, and an evo- with tangible returns on their investment in space, lutionary approach from Apollo to more advanced ac- And, increasingly, NASA came to look on the “space tivities appeared more likely to meet this need, given station” as the logical next step that would at once the low probability of a major new start on post-Apollo exploit the Apollo team and its achievements and still programs. respond to political pressure for a measured and prag- The nature of NASA’s long-range planning during matic space program .31 this period turned on the style and personality of the The public debate in the late 1960s on the future Administrator, James E. Webb. A lawyer and business- of the space program introduced many of the con- man who had served President Harry Truman as Di- cepts about the “space station” that still surround this rector of the Bureau of the Budget (BOB) and as Under proposal–some inherited from the Apollo experience, others developed to address the criticisms of that program. First, NASA sought, in conjunction with its plans ~’Memorandum from Director, Office of Advanced Research and Tech- nology, “Request for Assistance in Defining the Scientific and Technological for a “space station,” to define an undertaking large Research Potential of a Manned Orbital Laboratory, ” Oct. 31, 1963, NHOA, enough to focus the agency’s future activities, as Apol- This IS not a reference to the Air Force’s MOL Program. 10 had focused them in the 1960s. Occasionally, it was ZaMemorandum from Director, Advanced Manned Missions Program, ‘‘1 n- creased Participation of Potential User Agencies in Development of Broadly suggested that a manned Mars mission would provide 32 Beneficial Utiiizatlons of Manned Orbiting Space Station, ” July 15, 1964 the ideal focus, but the “space station” could per- (N HOA), ~gSee Arnold Levine, Managing NASA In the Apo1/o Era, NASA Sp-4012 (Washington, DC: National Aeronautics and Space Administration, 1983), ~1 see, for example, Webb’s testimony i n U.S. Congress, Senate Commit- chapters 2 and 9 and James Webb’s foreword, for a full account of post- tee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences, National Space Goals for the Post- Apollo planning. Apol/o Period, Hearings, 89th Cong,, 1st sess., Aug. 23-25, 1965. ~OThe rep~ was called “Summary Report, Future Programs Task Group, ” JzWebb for example, stressed the importantance of focus in a letter to and was printed in U ,S, Senate, Committee on Aeronautical and Space President Johnson, Feb. 16, 1965, published in U.S. Congress, Senate Com- Sciences, Hearings, NASA Authorization for Fiscal Year 1966, 89th Congress, mittee on Aeronautics and Space Sciences, NASA Authorization for Fiscal 1st sess,, 1965, pt. 3, pp. 1027-1102. Year )966, op. cit., p, 1028, App. B—The Evolution of Civilian In-Space Infrastructure, I. E., “Space Station, ” Concepts in the United States Ž 165

form the same function, even while providing a logical be more specialized and there would be more of step toward Mars. The “space station” had the added them. advantage of seeming more practical and Earth- This envisaged a time well into the future where oriented. Second, NASA stressed the flexibility of the man is really operating on a continuing basis in “space station” concept and a station’s ability to per- space . . . . Mueller also proposed that: form a variety of functions ranging from Earth-oriented we can go in the direction of exploiting our applications and scientific research to staging plat- Iunar capability as it developed in the basic Apollo forms for manned missions to the planets. George E. program and will be developed further if the Apollo Applications Program is carried out. Or we can go in Mueller, NASA’s Associate Administrator for Manned the direction of increased emphasis on Earth orbit ap- Flight, emphasized the economic benefits of “space plications . . . . We can go from Apollo applications stations” i n such areas as applications, weather, com- through the development of an orbital “space sta- 33 munications, research, and national security. tion, ” and then on to the near planet flyby systems NASA advocacy of “space stations” also argued that and follow a logical path which then goes to planetary the country should see that the Apollo team and hard- exploration. ware were held together and exploited, should main- For all the purposes a “space station” might serve, tain manned spaceflight in addition to unmanned mis- from the purely practical to the widely visionary, it sions, and should sustain the Nation’s preeminence was always cast in this period as the logical next step in space in flight operations, science, and technology in developing space capability. NASA instituted an lest the Soviets win the long-term space race by de- Apollo Applications Program, but this was an interim fault.34 Occasionally, NASA invoked national security move towards what the agency really sought: a ma- as a rationale for the “space station, ” but in the 1960s, jor political commitment to make the next step an- at least, this brought the agency into apparent con- other large one. flict with the Air Force’s Manned Orbiting Laboratory, In 1967 and 1968 this campaign suffered major re- a conflict Webb tried to avoid, at least in public. 35 versals which had permanent impact on the course The theme that NASA employed most relentlessly of events. The Apollo 204 fire in January 1967, which was that the “space station” was the logical next step killed three astronauts during preflight testing at Cape in the development of America’s capability in space. Kennedy, set the Apollo landing back a number of George Mueller was especially emphatic. Speaking of months, and cast the first serious doubt on NASA’s practical applications, he testified: ability to meet its Apollo goal. The accident also The major steps that are involved . . . are, first of focused congressional attention on NASA and con- all, the development of an orbital “space station, ” and sumed some of the agency’s political credit on the along with that is a need for a logistics system to pro- Hill. Perhaps more damaging in the long run was the vide support for an orbital “space station. ” That com- resignation of James Webb in the closing weeks of the bination then leads to the development of what might 1968 presidential election campaign. Leaving the be called an application center, and if you will, that agency without the major commitment to a post-Apol- is probably going to turn out to be a relatively large 10 program he had sought, Webb took with him an orbital station which will have in it the sensors that irreplaceable sense of political pragmatism that the are required .36 Continuing this hypothetical progression of Earth- agency would sorely miss. oriented, practical “space stations, ” Mueller added As the first successful lunar landing mission ap- that, proached, in the fall of 1968 NASA requested $60 mil- . . . having utilized this orbital station for a number lion to initiate a “space station” effort. This request of years, there is another major step forward in going was denied. NASA approached the beginning of 1969 to a research complex which might be the large or- in some disarray: biting research laboratory and coming from that re- • James Webb had resigned in the Fall of 1968, and search complex, then, would come the second gen- the Acting Administrator, Thomas Paine, was new eration of application centers, and here they would to the agency. ● Richard Nixon had been elected President, and JJM~eller’s testimony IS in U.S Congress, Senate COminlttee on Aeronau- his position on space policy was far from clear. tical and Space Sciences, National Space Goals for the Post-Apollo Per/od, ● NASA had settled on the “space station” as its Op Clt , p. 103 MU s congress, senate Corn mlttee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences, post-Apollo program objective, but to date had Ndtlonil Spdcc God/s for the Post-Apollo Pe[@d, op. Cit., p, 338, had no success in getting Presidential or congres- )~webb told congress the h40L ‘‘represents an added nationa I space ca - sional support for such an initiative. pa bill(y rather than a competitive one. ” Ibid , p, 341. See also the testimony ot Harold Brown, Director of Defense Research and Englneerlng, esp p. 336 NASA took bold action in the early months of 1969 l~Th IS and the foIIoWI ng two q uotatlons are from Ibid , pp. 49, 62, and 64 to attempt to change this situation. 166 ● Civilian Space Stations and the U.S. Future in Space

Post-Apollo Planning Under tions in space which cannot be effectively carried out on Earth. Thomas Paine Paine told the President that he had “a unique opportunity for leadership that will clearly identify your A research engineer before joining NASA as Dep- administration with the establishment of the Nation’s uty Administrator in January 1968, Thomas O. Paine major goals in space flight for the next decade” and became Acting Administrator following Webb’s resig- that “the case that a ‘space station’ should be a ma- nation in October. Nominated NASA Administrator jor future U.S. goal is now strong enough to justify at by President Nixon in March 1969, Paine was con- least a general statement on your part that this will firmed by the Senate the same month, beginning the be one of our goals.”39 shortest term—less than 20 months—of any NASA Paine asked for a March 31 presidential decision on head. 37 future manned space flight issues. He did this even Paine was a swashbuckler, an out-and-out space though he knew that, on February 13, the President enthusiast, critical of the caution and circumspection had established an ad hoc blue-ribbon Space Task of his predecessor and determined to inaugurate the Group (STG) and had asked that group for “definitive second decade of space with a major, national, Apol- recommendations on the direction which the U.S. lo-like commitment. As he wrote to the President’s space program should take in the post-Apollo period,” science advisor after being confirmed as NASA Ad- 40 with a September 1 reporting date. By asking the ministrator: President to decide on the future of manned space We have been frustrated too long by a negativism that says hold back, be cautious, take no risks, do less flight in advance of the planning process which was than you are capable of doing. I submit that no per- being established for precisely that purpose, Paine was ceptive student of the history of social progress doubts trying to use the success of the Apollo 8 circumlunar that we will establish a large laboratory in Earth or- mission and the desire on the part of any new admin- bit, that we will provide a practical system for the fre- istration to take some early and popular initiatives as quent transfer of men and supplies to and from such counters to a process which he was not sure would a laboratory, that we will continue to send men to be favorable to NASA. the Moon, and that eventually we will send men to In preparing for Space Task Group consideration of the planets. If this is true, now is the time to say the Paine initiative, the positions of the various par- so . . . .We in NASA are fully conscious of practical ticipants on a large “space station, ” and the factors limitations . . . .In the light of these considerations, influencing their positions, became evident. we can be sensible and moderate about our requests for resources—but we must know where we are The BOB objective was to “head off any play by going. 38 NASA to get a budget amendment now” since “this is bad budget strategy, probably unworkable as far as Initial Proposals Congress was concerned, and impossible to obtain without committing the President to support the long- This philosophy led Paine, at the start of the Nixon range objectives. ”41 administration, to take steps unusually bold for an act- The President’s Science Adviser, Lee DuBridge, ing agency head. In February 1969, Paine appealed asked the Space Science and Technology Panel42 to directly to the President in support of the manned assist him in evaluating the Paine initiative. The Panel space flight program. He argued that “positive and met with NASA officials, and advised Dr. DuBridge timely action must be taken by your Administration that there was “no great urgency” related to the issues now to prevent the Nation’s programs in manned Paine had raised and, “from a programmatic stand- space flight from slowing to a halt in 1972” and sug- point, the arguments in favor of early action appear gested that: very weak. ”43 the nation should . . . focus our manned space flight” program for the next decade on the development and operation of a permanent “space station”-a National Research Center in Earth orbit— JgMemorandum from Thomas Paine to the President, ‘‘Problems and Op- accessible at reasonable cost to experts in many dis- portunities in Manned Space Flight,” Feb. 26, 1969. ciplines who can conduct investigations and opera @The STG was chaired by Vice-President Spiro T. Agnew and had as members NASA, the president’s Science Adviser, and the Department of Defense, The Bureau of the Budget, Department of State, and Atomic Energy Com- mission had observer status.

41 Brlefi ng Memorandum prepared by the Bureau of the Budget, Econom - J7Homer Newe[ [, Beyond the Atmosphere: Early Years Of space science ICS, Science, and Technology Division, “President’s Task Group on NASA SP-421 1 (Washington, DC: National Aeronautics and Space Adminls- Space Meeting No, 1,“ Mar. 6, 1969. tratlon, 1980), p. 288. 41A subgroup of the president’s Science Advisory Committee (F’’MC). ‘Quoted {n Levine, op. cit., pp. 258-259. 4Jlbld App. B—The Evolution of Civilian In-Space Infrastructure, I. E., “Space Station, ” Concepts in the United States ● 167

The “space station” did gain some support from the station’s logistic vehicle, should be the Agency’s top- Department of State, which saw: priority program, In the summer of 1969, NASA let . . . a close relationship between our space program two Phase B study contracts for “space station” de- and foreign policy objectives. Thus, an ongoing, chal- sign, and in its 1970 congressional testimony the sta- lenging and successful space program is important tion was presented as the centerpiece of the agency’s from the viewpoint of these objectives–particularly programs, one designed and funded to afford increasing oppor- Throughout 1970, NASA continued technical stud- tunities for international cooperation. ies and user-oriented activities to promote the station The State Department believed that there were “great- concept. However, by the middle of that year, it was er international values i n a “space station” and reusa- clear that in the eyes of the space subgovernment out- ble logistics vehicle than in . . . lunar exploration, ” side of NASA, the shuttle program was a more attrac- and that: tive investment than was the station, and by the end our choices should not be unduly influenced by our estimate of Soviet choices, nor do we need of the year, the station had been dropped back to con- to prejudice deliberate consideration of our space ceptual study status. NASA had built up a great deal goals in order to preempt Soviet activities. Our capa- of momentum behind the “space station” concept bility is now well understood both by the Soviets and through the 1960s, but when it came time for the by most other countries. Foreign countries will focus country to decide, through the policymaking process, less on the competition between ourselves and the whether the station was a “good buy, ” the response Soviets than on the relevance of space activities to was negative. The reasons for this negative assessment .44 their own interests and needs were already clear for NASA to see by March 1969, The Department of Defense (DOD) position was but it took over a year for NASA’s leadership to rec- that DOD “does not have or anticipate projects which ognize the situation and to steer the Agency away require a “space station” as defined by NASA. DOD from the station and behind the shuttle. has great interest in the development of a lower cost transportation system suitable for their uses as well as Detailed Station Planning 45 for NASA’ S.” The report of the STG staff directors was a rejection After conducting preliminary Phase A studies, pri- of that part of the Paine initiative which asked for early marily in-house, during 1967 and 1968, NASA was “space station” commitment: prepared in early 1969 to involve the aerospace in- The majority of the Committee members . . . did dustry in defining the program through two Phase B not support the request for additional FY70 funding studies. NASA’s hopes were that these program defi- to enable more rapid progress toward the launch of nition studies would provide the technical basis for a “space station” in the mid-1970s. This view does a start on “space station” development within a year not represent an unfavorable judgment on the ques- or two. These studies were initiated in September tion of adopting the “space station” as a major new 1969, and extended over most of the next 2 years. But goal of our space program, but rather results from a events at the policy level made it increasingly unlikely desire not to imply prejudgment of the eventual re- that the “space station” program would ever proceed suIt of the STG review. The case for urgency was un- beyond the Phase B stage, at least in the 1970s. convincing, and it appears that no important options would be foreclosed by deferring action .46 The handwriting was already on the wall by the time This attempt by NASA to get early commitment to the “Paine initiative” was rejected in March 1969, but a “space station” has been reviewed in some detail during the rest of 1969 and 1970 it became much because its resolution foreshadowed much of what clearer. Finally, NASA could no longer avoid reality, happened in the following 1 ½ years as NASA strug- and by late 1970 the space Shuttle, not the station, gled to gain support for a “space station” develop- was identified as the agency’s top priority. Just as the ment as its major post-Apollo program objective, Apollo Applications Program had been a “better buy” Throughout the STG review and the White House for the country in the mid-1960s, so the Shuttle was consideration of the STG report, NASA argued that perceived by policy makers in the early 1970s, But the the “space station, ” and not the space shuttle con- failure of the “space station” program to gain approval cept, which was evolving from its origin solely as the was not because of a lack of effort; the Phase B study process was the focus for that effort.

“R F Packard, “Department of State observations, ” draft, Mar. 13, 1969, 45MI Iton Rosen (NASA staffer for STG), ‘‘Memorandum for the Record, ” DEFINING THE PREFERRED CONCEPT Mar 13, 1969 (N HOA). AND ITS RATIONALE 46, Report O( the space Task Group Staff DI rector’s Committee on NASA’S Request for Amendments to the NASA fiscal year 1970 Budget,” Mar. 14, One problem, perhaps the key one, was that NASA 1969, p 4 found it quite difficult to tell both prospective contrac- 168 . Civilian Space Stations and the U.S. Future in Space

tors and the political leadership what kind of station, NASA issued a Statement of Work for the Phase B for what purposes, it wanted to develop. This was so Space Station Program Definition on April 19. Prospec- even though NASA had been studying “space station” tive contractors were ready; they had been following concepts throughout the 1960s. The basic require- the rapidly expanding character of the program closely ments which had emerged from the study effort were: and were “already forming teams in anticipation” of 1. qualification of people and systems for long-dur- the Phase B competition. so ation Earth orbit flight; The Work Statement described the “space station” 2. demonstration of man’s ability and functional as “a centralized and general purpose laboratory in usefulness in performing engineering and scien- Earth orbit for the conduct and support of scientific tific experiments; and, and technological experiments, for beneficial applica- 3. periodic rotation of the crews and resupply of the tions, and for the further development of space ex- “space station. ” ploration capability” and noted that the work re- The average crew size for this station was planned to quested would include “the Space Base but will focus be six to nine persons, with a 2-year orbital lifetime on the mid-l970s Space Station as the initial but evolu- design goal.47 An Apollo command and service mod- tionary step toward the Space Base. ” The objectives ule launched by a Saturn 1B booster was to be the lo- of the “space station” program were stated as: gistics vehicle for the station; the station itself was to ● Conduct beneficial space applications programs, be launched on a Saturn V booster. scientific investigation and technological engi- When Thomas Paine was exposed in January 1969 neering experiments. to this staff thinking, he found it too modest. His cen- ● Demonstrate the practicality of establishing, oper- ter directors agreed. For example, Wernher von Braun ating, and maintaining long-duration manned or- told Paine that: bital stations. NASA should now tell the contractors what we want ● Utilize Earth-orbital manned flights for test and in the long run, what we foresee as the ultimate—the development of equipment and operational tech- long range–the dream–station program. NASA niques applicable to lunar and planetary ex- should spell out the sciences, technology, applica- ploration. tions, missions and research desired. Then NASA ● Extend technology and develop space systems should define a 1975 station as a core facility in orbit and subsystems required to increase useful life by from which the ultimate “space campus” or “space at least several orders of magnitude. base” can grow in an efficient orderly evolution ● Develop new operational techniques and equip- through 1985. MSC Director Robert Gilruth told Paine: ment which can demonstrate substantial reduc- We should now be looking at a step more compara- tions in unit operating costs. ● ble in challenge to that of Apollo after Mercury. The Extend the present knowledge of the long-term “space station” size should be modular and based biomedical and behavioral characteristics of man on our Saturn V lift capability into 200-mile orbit. in space. Three launches would give us one million pounds in The initial “space station” was to have a crew of orbit, including spent stages. That is the number we 12, and would normally operate in a zero gravity 48 should be planning for the core size. mode, but during the early weeks of its operation there Out of this lack of consensus within NASA came a would be an assessment of the effects of artificial grav- rapid change from the January concept of a “space ity; a counterweight would be tethered to the station station.” In February, Aviation Week reported that “all and the configuration spun to provide the gravitational previous concepts have been retired from active com- effect, The station was to be 33 ft in diameter and was petition in favor of a large station,” with the focus on normally to operate in a 270-nautical mile, 55° orbit, “a 100-man Earth-orbiting station with a multiplicity but also be capable of operating in polar and slightly of capabilities” and the “launch of the first module retrograde orbits, 51 of the large “space station, ” with perhaps as many Shortly after the original proposals in response to as 12 men, by 1975. ” Top NASA officials were re- the statement of work were received by NASA, a new ported to have rejected earlier “space station” plans 49 requirement was added to the Phase B effort. Not only as “too conservative. ” was the “space station” to be designed so that it could be the core around which a space base could be de- 4%Vllllam Normyle, “Alternatives Open on Post-Apollo, ” Awatiorr Week and Space Techncdogy, Jan, 13, 1969, p. 16. ‘+BThomas palne’s notes from meeting on space stations, jan. 27, 1969 50Wllllam Normyle, “Large StatIon May Emerge as ‘Unwritten’ U.S. Goal,” (N HOA). Aviat/on Week and Space Technology, Mar, 10, 1969, p. 104. ~yWI Illam Normyle, “NASA Alms at 100-Man Station, ” Aviation Week and 51 NASA , ,Statement of Work, Space station Program Definition (Phase B), ” Spdce Technology, Feb. 24, 1969, p, 16. Apr. 14, 1969, App. B—The Evolution of Civilian In-Space Infrastructure, I. E., “Space Station, ” Concepts in the United States . 169

veloped; the station module would also be the core station. However, beneath this growing momentum of a spacecraft designed for a manned trip to Mars. was an uncertain base of political support. This requirement came out of the policy debates de- On July 29, 1970, Charles Mathews, NASA’s Dep- scribed in the section in this report, “NASA’s Post- uty Associate Administrator of Manned Space Flight, Apollo Ambitions Dashed,” and was a reflection of ordered MSC and MSFC to terminate the continuing the high hopes for all of NASA’s future manned pro- Phase B activity and to redefine the effort in a funda- grams which were pervasive in the immediate after- mental way. On the basis of congressional action, math of the first lunar landing. NASA leadership had become convinced that the Sat- urn V program, which had been in terminal condi- PHASE B STUDIES tion for almost 2 years, was finally dead, i.e., there Three aerospace firms, North American Rockwell, would be no booster capable of launching a 33-ft sta- McDonnell Douglas, and Grumman Aircraft, sub- tion. The only launch vehicle available for use in put- mitted proposals to NASA in response to the Phase ting the “space station “ into orbit would now be the B Statement of Work, and on July 22, 1969, NASA space Shuttle, with its planned 15-ft by 60-ft payload awarded Phase B contracts of $2.9 million each to bay. What had started out as the supply vehicle for North American Rockwell and McDonnell Douglas. the station was to be its key to survival. The studies were to run for 11 months beginning in It took some doing to skew the study effort toward September; MSC would manage the North American components with diameters able to fit into the Shut- Rockwell effort, and MSFC, the McDonnell Douglas tle payload bay; one study contractor commented that study. “people who were eager to fly in a 33-ft station found A continuing problem during the course of the the prospect of long stays in the 14-ft station not very Phase B studies was the difficulty of integrating sta- attractive. ” But NASA did issue Phase B extension tion design and the candidate experiments for the sta- contracts for a modular “space station” study effort tion. These studies were compiled into a thick docu- to extend through most of 1971, and North Ameri- ment known universally as the “Blue Book. ” One can Rockwell and McDonnell Douglas went to work participant in the study later noted that “the candi- on the new concept. date experiments compiled in the NASA Blue Book By the time the studies were begun, however, the are too costly to be considered as a whole, are some- likelihood that they would lead to an early commit- what duplicated . . . , have not been verified as the ment to station development was already vanishingly true experiment goals . . , .“52 small. NASA had suffered a number of defeats in late The Phase B studies were extended for 6 months 1969 and through 1970 in its attempts to get an am- on June 30, 1970; by this time, the planning date for bitious post-Apollo program approved, and by the the first station launch had slipped to 1977. The cost summer of 1970 it was becoming quite clear to NASA leaders that only one big program had any chance of of the program was now estimated at $8 billion to $15 billion, including both development costs and 10 years presidential and congressional approval, and that it was not the “space station” program. From its start of on-orbit operations; this estimate did not include the cost of a space Shuttle program. It was reported as the “advanced logistics system” for the station and that “an overriding desire on the part of the United space base, the space Shuttle had garnered the inter- States to internationalize the 12-man “space station” est of the Air Force and many within NASA, and in . . . has eliminated any possibility of Department of the summer of 1970 the agency leadership grudgingly Defense participation in the program.”53 decided to make the Shuttle its top-priority program. In addition to the technical design activities, NASA Thomas Paine had announced his resignation in mid- was undertaking a Phase B effort to define experiment 1970, and the station thus lost a supporter at the top; modules to be added to the core station and planning this may have made the shift to the Shuttle easier. a year-long study to involve potential users, both do- Station studies continued through 1970, 1971, and mestic and international, in the program as it was de- 1972, with the final in-house studies focused on a single research applications module (RAM) to be car- veloping. A user’s symposium to kick off this effort was 54 scheduled for September 1970, and both study con- ried into orbit by a Shuttle. This was all that remained tractors were building full-scale mockups of the 33-ft of what, only a few years earlier, had been plans for truly large facilities in Earth orbit. As a final indication of this reality, on November 29, 1972, the Space Sta-

“Jack C. Heberllg, “The Management Approach to the NASA Space Sta- tion Deflnltlon Studies of the Manned Spacecraft Center, ” NASA Technical Memorandum X-58090, June 1972, p. 30, ~qThls u Itlmately became the basis for the Spacelab developed by the Euro- $~space Business Dady, July 27, 1970. pean Space Agency, 170 ● Civilian Space Stations and the U.S. Future in Space tion Task Force was abolished, then immediately rein- sion; it had been planned in advance. It reflected carnated as the Sortie Lab Task Force. NASA was able Agnew’s willingness to lend support to an ambitious to gain approval for Shuttle development in early and bold space program, if only NASA would propose 1972, and that task occupied the agency’s energies it. This willingness matched the predispositions of throughout the decade. Until the Shuttle was ready, NASA administrator, Paine, himself disappointed at the the dream of permanent human facilities in space lack of excitement and purpose he was getting from the would have to wait. However, preserving a large pay- organization’s planning machinery. Spurred on by load bay as an essential element of the Shuttle, NASA Agnew’s private and public support, Paine decided was able to maintain the possibility of returning to the that NASA should also “bite the bullet” and move ag- station concept, thereby keeping its dream alive. gressively to identify an early manned Mars mission as the central focus for its future plans. In order to do NASA’s Post-Apollo Ambitions this, he ordered NASA planners explicitly to incor- 55 porate a manned Mars mission during the 1980s into Dashed NASA’s overall plans. This was the source of the early While the “space station” Phase B effort was pro- modification to the Phase B study requirements de- ceeding apace at the technical planning level, at the scribed previously. policy level NASA from 1969 through the end of 1971 There were several reasons for switching to the Mars was trying to get White House (particularly) and con- emphasis as a central theme in NASA planning. Per- gressional support for an increasingly less ambitious haps most influential was the early STG rejection of post-Apollo program. The initial forum for this attempt a “space station” commitment based on the “logical was the Space Task Group. After its early rejection of next step rationale. ” By justifying a “space station” NASA’s “space station “ initiative, the STG turned to as a necessary precursor to manned Mars missions i n the task of preparing recommendations on future the 1980s, NASA hoped to provide a convincing ra- space policy and programs for President Nixon. tionale for the station’s urgency. Not only “space sta- The image of the Apollo commitment as a model tions” but the newly proposed space Shuttle, the de- for future space goals colored STG discussions from velopment of nuclear rocket engines, and the the start. At an early STG meeting, NASA’s Adminis- retention of the large Saturn V as a booster were re- trator, Thomas Paine, argued the need for a “new ban- quired if an early manned Mars landing were to be ner to be hoisted” around which competent and mot- approved as a national goal. ivated engineers, scientists, and managers could rally, Between March and August 1969, as the Apollo pro- as they had around the Apollo goal. Vice President gram and other ongoing NASA missions achieved Agnew, reacting to Paine’s point, raised for the first spectacular successes and public interest in space was time in the STG context the question which would in- at a peak, as the Vice President continued to ask for fluence much of the group’s debates: Where was the an “Apollo for the seventies, ” as NASA’s manned Apollo of the 1970s? Could it be, asked Agnew, that flight organization coalesced behind an aggressive the United States should undertake a manned mission plan of new activities for the next decade, Paine to Mars? became more and more bullish about the need for When Agnew first read the staff proposals for STG bold new initiatives as a way of keeping the Nation’s consideration, he reportedly was disappointed be- civilian space program vigorous and his agency’s cause none contained the strong and dramatic theme momentum large. As Apollo came to an end, NASA he thought was required for the national space effort. plans had gotten increasingly ambitious. On July 16, 1969, as he joined thousands at Kennedy Now, by asking for “commitment in principle” to Space Center to watch the liftoff of the Apollo 11 mis- the most ambitious plan his advisers had conceived, sion, Agnew “went public. ” In interviews at the Paine presented a challenge to the other STG mem- launch site Agnew said that it was his “individual feel- bers and to others interested in the future of the space ing that we should articulate a simple, ambitious, op- program. He told the Nation that NASA was ready to timistic goal of a manned flight to Mars by the end begin a program that would send people to Mars at of this century. ” After liftoff, Agnew told the launch the earliest feasible time, and he asked the Nation’s team that he “bit the bullet . . . today as far as Mars leadership whether they were willing to support such is concerned. ” a bold enterprise. The answer was not long in com- Agnew’s statement at Cape Kennedy was not a ing, and it was a resounding “No.” spontaneous reaction to the excitement of the occa- The results of NASA’s attempt to mobilize support behind the Mars objective, were, from the agency’s perspective, little short of disastrous. What NASA dis- 55Th is account is acJapted from John M. Logsdon, ‘‘The Policy Process and Large-Scale Space Efforts,” Space Humanization Series, vol. 1, 1979, pp. covered was just how limited the support for major 65-80. new space initiatives was. The final STG report, sub- App. B—The Evolution of Civilian In-Space Infrastructure, I. E., “Space Station, ” Concepts in the United States ● 171

mitted to the President i n mid-September, did suggest station” approval were possible. However, NASA’s that “the United States accept the long range option policy leadership grudgingly read the handwriting or goal of manned planetary exploration with a (which was in capital letters) on the wall, and in put- manned Mars mission before the end of this century ting together the next agency budget request in Sep- as the first target. ” This goal, said the report, would tember 1970 decided to make the Shuttle the top-pri- act as “a shaping function for the post-Apollo pro- ority NASA program for the 1970s and to give up gram. ” Beyond its general statements, the report rec- attempts to gain approval to develop a “space station” ommended no commitment to any particuIar program until after the Shuttle program was well under way. option or even any specific project on a particular It took another 1 ½ years of conflict-filled negotiations timetable. with the White House and Congress before NASA was Even this “muted Martian manifesto” had no stand- able to gain their endorsements of the space Shuttle ing with the White House. Although the STG finished in 1972. its work with its submission to the President, more Using the budget process, the political leadership then 6 months passed before Nixon made any formal of the country had applied its concept of national in- reaction to the Group’s recommendation, and that re- terest and national priorities to the space program; action was noncommittal. In the interim the processes through that process, the technological aspirations of of public policymaking operated on the space pro- NASA were put under firm though perhaps too short- gram to shape it to the short- and longer-term require- term political control. What happened to NASA’s ments of what the White House perceived as the “space station” plans is best viewed, not in terms of budgetary and political interests of the Nation. When NASA “winning” or “losing,” but in terms of what NASA tried to use the STG report as the basis for justi- happens when an agency’s aspirations are significantly fying its 1971 budget request, it found that the report’s at variance with what political leaders judge to be both recommendations carried little weight either in the Bu- in the long-term interests of the Nation and politically reau of the Budget or, particularly, the White House. feasible. This experience might be quite relevant to While the President personally apparently remained current attempts by NASA to gain support for the kind a space buff, his advisers were quite skeptical of the of “space station” program that it desires. political payoffs from major new activities in space; their reading of public opinion was that American Skylab: An Interim “Space Station”56 society had little interest in future space spectaculars. The only remainder of the Apollo Applications Pro- This skepticism, combined with stringent budgetary gram, begun with high hopes in 1966, Skylab was a constraints, resulted in a budget for NASA in fiscal S-IVB third stage of the Saturn V launch vehicle, out- 1971 that was far below NASA’s most pessimistic ex- fitted as a workshop to be visited by three successive pectations. NASA, still not reconciled to the notion crews after being launched into low Earth orbit. The that space had little political support, “fought a retreat- mission could hardly have gotten off to a worse start. ing action through the entire budget process, ” being During launch of the Skylab workshop in May 1973, “beaten back but fighting lustily at every turn of the the meteor/thermal control shade tore loose from the road, ” according to Administrator Paine. spacecraft and seriously damaged a solar cell panel It was in this context that, during the first half of needed to produce power on the vehicle. The first 1970, it became clear to NASA leadership that NASA crew to visit Skylab managed to jury-rig a parasol to would not get approval to develop simultaneously replace the shade and to salvage the one solar panel both a “space station” and the space Shuttle. In a that was not lost in launch. This proved enough to save March 1970 statement, President Nixon provided only the mission and to allow virtually the full run of ex- a very guarded endorsement of future space activi- periments that had been planned for the three crews ties, and what priority was granted he gave to the that visited the laboratory in 1973 and 1974, turning space Shuttle. During the 1970 debate over NASA’s potential disaster into another virtuoso display of budget, Congress expressed a high degree of skepti- NASA resourcefulness and skill. cism about ambitious new goals in space. The linkages Skylab provided grist for everyone’s mill. “Space sta- among the Shuttle program, development of a “space tion” advocates praised the demonstration of man’s stat ion,” and a manned Mars expedition came under long-term survivability in space–84 days for the third particular attack, and threatening but unsuccessful attempts to delete funds for station and Shuttle studies were made in both the House and the Senate. ~~F~r a tull account of the Skylab project, see W. David Compton and Charles D Benson, LI\ Ing and Work/rig In Space. the H/story of Space/ab As the preceding section described, at the techni- NASA SP-4208 (Washington, DC National Aeronautics and Space Admlnls- cal level NASA was still acting in mid-1970 as if “space tratlon, 1983). 172 . Civilian Space Stations and the U.S. Future in Space

crew—and the rich variety of scientific and applica- activities, and its significant capability for lifting large tions tasks of which he had proved himself capable– and/or heavy cargoes to low Earth orbit (LEO). Studies ranging from Earth observation and photography to which established requirements for large structures in manning the solar telescope, conducting physiological both LEO and geosynchronous orbit–structures experiments, and even carrying on space processing. which could only be constructed in space—seemed Especially did they fasten on the role of human be- to provide the needed rationale, and space construc- ings as the flexible, opportunistic component in the tion became a major theme in space infrastructure “space station” that had saved the mission with emer- studies during the 1975-80 period. gency repairs no machine could have made. Without The first NASA foray into a new station study effort people, claimed the advocates, Skylab would have was a 1975 study of a “Manned orbital Systems Con- failed. 57 cept” (MOSC) carried out by McDonnell Douglas As- Without people, claimed the critics, Skylab would tronautics under the technical direction of the Mar- not have been necessary. Many who questioned the shall Space Flight Center. This study “examined the wisdom of manned space flight, especially scientists, requirements for . . . a cost-effective orbital facility even while they conceded the impressiveness of the concept capable of supporting extended manned Apollo achievement and appreciated how their own operations in Earth orbit beyond those visualized for programs had ridden on its coattails, came to won- the 7-to 30-day Shuttle/Spacelab system.” Study guide- der if the whole undertaking involving people was lines included use of available hardware developed worth the candle. With money drying up and many for the Skylab, Spacelab, and Shuttle programs, “in- scientific missions promised for the final flights of sofar as practical, ” and an initial operational capabil- Apollo being canceled with those flights, the relative ity (IOC) in late 1984. economy and efficiency of unmanned, automated The context for the MOSC study included a grow- missions looked more attractive in contrast. 58 ing concern about the Earth’s resource limitations, Whatever the eventual evaluation of Skylab, it was population growth, and environmental stresses, driven interpreted by NASA’s manned space flight managers by the widely publicized “limits to growth” debate as legitimizing renewed study of the “space station” of the early 1970s. The study noted that “the plan- concept. Those studies, carried out during the 1974- ning and development of future space programs can- 80 period, have laid the base for current discussions not be done in isolation from the many critical prob- of whether it is finally time to move ahead with the lems facing the peoples of the world during the acquisition of in-space infrastructure, of what charac- coming decades” and that “there will continue to be ter and magnitude, to be obtained by when, and to many conflicting and competing demands for re- be operated, used, and paid for by whom. sources in the years ahead.” This context skewed the emphasis in establishing activities to be conducted Recent In-Space Infrastructure with the support of in-space infrastructure to “the research and applications areas that are directly related (i.e. “Space Station”) Studies to current world needs. ” In addition to the impetus to reexamine the “space Though oriented more directly than past station con- station” concept which came from the success of the cepts to high-priority global problems, the MOSC Skylab project, other influences in the same direction study still emphasized the “science and applications included the need to begin to identify potential “post- research facility” rationale; although such activities as Shuttle” programs and new requirements for using assembly of large structures and operating space man- men and women in space operations emerging from ufacturing facilities were examined during the study, a number of study efforts being carried out by NASA the emphasis was on a facility which would “enable in the 1974-75 time frame. the scientific community to pursue programs directly In order to build a plausible rationale for once again related to the improvement of life on Earth.” The final proposing a “space station” as an element of NASA’s MOSC configuration called for a four-man modular- program, it would be necessary to identify some high- ized facility; the manned module would be based on priority activities which could not be accomplished the Spacelab design, and Spacelab pallets would also using the space Shuttle, with its 7 to 20 day orbital be used to support unpressurized payloads. Total pro- staytime, its Spacelab facility for manned experimental gram costs for development and operation of the initial MOSC facility were estimated to be $1.2 billion.59

Szsee, for example, John H. Disher, “Next Steps in Space Transportation, Astronaut/es and Aeronautics, January 1978, p. 26, SgMcDonnell Douglas Astronautics, Manned Orbita/ ~YskmJ ConcePts JBNewell, op. cit., pp. 290-295. Study, Book l-Executive Summary, Sept. 30, 1975, pp. iii, 1-2, 30, 36. App. B—The Evolution of Civilian In-Space Infrastructure, I. E., “Space Station, ” Concepts in the United States ● 173

Rather than attempt to gain approval to take the cher set as a primary NASA goal, “accelerating the MOSC effort to a Phase B stage, in the Fall of 1975 development of economic and efficient space serv- NASA decided to conduct further studies in which the ices for society, ” such as “resources management, emphasis was shifted from research in orbit to space environmental understanding, and commercial re- construction. In explaining its study plans, NASA turns from the unique contributions of space. ”61 noted: The Outlook for Space report was not directly or Earlier “space station” studies emphasized the strongly supportive of the need for a “space station. ” “Laboratory in Orbit” concept. Emphasis is now be- It did conclude, however, that: ing placed on a Space Station as an “Operational Most of these activities might well be supported by Base” which not only involves a laboratory but also the Shuttle system, together with associate space lab- such uses as: (a) an assembly, maintenance, and lo- oratories and free-flyers, There are more far-reaching gistics base for conducting manned operations involv- objectives, however, which will require human activ- ing antennas, mirrors, solar collectors, transmitters; ities in space transcending those supportable by cur- (b) for conducting launch and retrieval operations for rent Shuttle flight plans, such as the construction of orbit-to-orbit and Earth-departure vehicles which may satellite power stations or the establishment of a per- require assembly or propellant transfer in orbit; (c) manent lunar base. It is difficult at this time to assert for conducting retrieval, maintenance and redeploy- that either of these activities, or others like them— ment operations for automated satellites; (d) for man- space manufacturing, space colonies—will be under- aging clusters of spacecraft and space systems as a taken within the next 25 years. Nevertheless, as we central base for support for common services . . . . looked at the future of space, particularly at those Orbital location studies will emphasize the possi- more creative programs directed toward major exploi- ble exploitation of geosynchronous orbit, as well as tation of the opportunities which space provides, we low inclination and polar low Earth orbit . . . . Cur- inevitably found man to be an integral part of the sys- rent planning is directed toward a “space station” tem. If the United States is to be in a position to take new start in fiscal year 1979.60 advantage of these potential benefits then it would There were a number of reasons for NASA’s switch seem necessary that we develop the capability to i n emphasis in “space station” justification. There was operate for extended periods of time. The space fa- no evidence that the scientific community was any cility would be constantly available, although crews more supportive of a manned orbital laboratory con- would, of course, be periodically exchanged. cept in 1975 than it had been in 1970; prior attempts The creation of such a permanent space facility to justify a “space station” by its use as a space-based seemed to us to be the most useful way to continue R&D facility had not been successful. More positively, the advancement of manned-flight technology. With the mid-70s saw a number of studies of the potentials the Shuttle system giving us comparatively low-cost access to space on the one hand, and the economies of space operations for addressing problems on Earth. which could be realized from the use of the perma- The most broadly conceived of these studies was nent space facility on the other hand, the construc- undertaken by a NASA study group which was asked tion of a permanent “space station” appears to be in 1974 by NASA Administrator James Fletcher (who the next logical step for the manned flight program— had become Administrator in April 1971) to provide not as an objective in itself, but rather for its techno- an Outlook for Space—”to identify and examine the logical support of a number of other objectives which various possibilities for the civiI space program over can benefit from our growing knowledge of how hu- the next twenty-five years. ” The study group con- mans can work in space and to provide a foundation 62 cluded that: for the future. Once again, NASA saw the justification for a “space . . . the great challenges facing the physical needs of humanity are principally the results of the continu- station” primarily as “the next logical step” in ex- ing struggle to improve the quality of life. Particularly ploiting people’s ability to work in space. critical is the need to improve food production and In addition to the Outlook for Space study, in the distribution, to develop new energy sources, to meet mid-1970s a number of even more visionary efforts new challenges to the environment, and to predict were identifying challenging future space goals. One and deal with natural and manmade disasters. In each notion which received wide public attention, but had of these areas, we found that significant contributions a relatively modest influence on NASA’s internal plan- can be made by a carefully developed space program. ning activities, was the proposal by Princeton Professor The NASA report recognized that “future space pro- Gerard O’Neill that, primarily in response to the grams must provide a service to the public.” In re- Earth’s resource limitations, work begin on develop- sponding to the Outlook for Space report, James Flet-

~1 outlook {of sPaCe. A synopsIs (Wash I ngton, DC: National Aeronautics ‘>W S Senate, Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences, NASA and Space Adm I n Istratton, January 1976), pp. iv, v, 5-7 4u(horIzatIon /or FY 1977, Hearings, p. 1046 ~~lbld,, pp 55-56 174 . Civilian Space Stations and the U.S. Future in Space

ing very large human habitats in space—space col- the basis for a Phase B “space station” “new start” onies. 63 in fiscal 1979—i.e., sometime after October 1978. A concept which was quite attractive to NASA’s However, NASA was unable to get the approval of engineers was developed by Peter Glaser of Arthur the Office of Management and Budget to proceed on D. Little, Inc.; this was the proposal that large solar a schedule which would have made such a new start arrays in geosynchronous orbit could provide a large possible. Recognizing that NASA was not going to be source of continuous energy on Earth. The solar power able to start on a major “space station” effort anytime satellite (SPS) idea was given a great deal of technical soon, by the spring of 1977 NASA officials were sug- attention by NASA during 1975 and 1976, until NASA gesting that “the (Shuttle) orbiter is a significant ‘space was forced by the Office of Management and Budget station’ in itself, ” and were looking toward ways to to turn over lead responsibility for SPS to the Energy enhance Shuttle capability to perform many of the Research and Development Administration (soon to missions that the SSSAS studies had assigned to a become part of the Department of Energy). “space station. ”66 Developing an SPS would require extensive use of Rather than being the year in which significant moon-orbit work crews in order to assemble and test very mentum behind a “space station” program was de- large structures in space. Similar construction require- veloped, 1978 turned out to be a year in which there ments were derived from less grand schemes involv- was essentially no “space station” activity per se. The ing large antennas in space for communications use system analysis studies had identified, as important and scientific investigations. steps in extending the capabilities of the space Shut- By the end of 1975, NASA had developed an argu- tle, the development of an in-orbit power supply and ment that space construction might be a major re- of Shuttle-tended unmanned orbital platforms for var- quirement of its programs during the 1980s, and ious science and applications payloads. Both Johnson wanted to explore the role of in-space infrastructure Space Center (JSC) and Marshall Space Flight Center utilizing work crews in carrying out these construc- (MSFC) were studying orbital power supplies during tion efforts. In December 1975, the agency issued a 1978; the Johnson Space Center concept was called request for proposals for a “Space Station Systems a power extension platform, while Marshall Space Analysis Study” (SSSAS); the study effort was to be Flight Center was examining a 25-kW power platform. focused around the use of a “space station” to “serve Marshall also initiated studies of an unmanned a wide range of operational base and space labora- Science and Applications Space Platform (SASP), and tory activities, ” such as using the station “as a test fa- most of the MSFC study activities during the 1978-80 cility and construction base to support manufactur- period were devoted to these two program concepts. ing, fabrication and assembly of various sizes of space (During 1980 and 1981, MSFC contracted with structures, ”64 McDonnell Douglas to study an evolutionary program One finding of the system analysis studies was that through which an unmanned platform such as the one scientific efforts could “go along for the ride” on defined in the SASP study could grow into a manned ‘‘space stations” capable of supporting construction, platform, i.e., a “space station, ” perhaps along the materials processing, and power generation objec- lines that McDonnell Douglas had earlier defined in tives. An aerospace publication reported that: the 1975 Manned Orbital Systems Concept study.) The space base concept is one whose time seems While Marshall’s emphasis was on an evolutionary to be coming rather quickly. Until recently, “space approach to space platforms, by early 1979 the leader- stations” have been thought of mainly as . . . ‘the ship of JSC had decided that the Center’s efforts should traditional laboratory in the sky. ’ Some observers were refocus on a major “space station” effort. Aviation surprised when construction, materials processing and Week reported JSC was “concerned about this lack power were given roughly equal status with sci- of continuing assessment for permanently manned ence . . . . Now, the balance has shifted further U.S. facilities” and was “mindful of the growing So- to . . . space construction work as the ‘prime focus’ 67 of the studies.65 viet capability in this area. ’ Another factor influenc- When NASA began this study effort in late 1975, ing JSC thinking was “a need for a real goal to main- its hope had been to use the Phase A study results as tain the dedication of present participants in the space program and the interest and enthusiasm of young people in space technology in order to motivate their 6JGerard K. 0’ Nelll, ‘‘The Colonization of SpaCe, ’ phY51c5 Today, Sep- pursuing engineering and science careers.”68 tember 1974, b4NASA Press Release, “NASA Seeks Proposals for Space Station Studies, ” 6bAvja(jon week and Space Technology, Mar. 16, 1979, P. 49. Dec. 11, 1975. b71bld. ‘>’’ Operational Base Concepts Gain In Space Station Studies, ” Aerospace MNASA, Lyndon B. Johnson Space Center, Space @erations Center: A Dally, Sept. 13, 1976, p. 54. Concept Analysis, Nov. 29, 1979, pp. 1-1, 1-2. App. B—The Evolution of Civilian In-Space Infrastructure, I. E., “Space Station, ” Concepts in the United States • 175

Based on these considerations, during 1979 JSC con- Conclusions ducted an in-house study of a concept identified as a Space Operations Center (SOC). This study was It should be evident that there is no obvious cutoff based on two assumptions: “that the next 10 to 20 point for an account of the development of the “space years will include requirements for large, complex station” concept. Today’s planning and proposals are space systems” and “that geosynchronous orbit is a continuation of an evolution which has roots in the clearly a primary operational area in space in the com- earliest years of this century and which has proceeded ing decades. ” If these assumptions were valid, JSC i n sporadic bursts of intensity over the past quarter- argued, then “the space construction and servicing century. It is possible, however, to reflect on past ex- of these future systems wiI I be more effective with a perience in the context of the current situation. Such permanent, manned operations center in space. ” reflection reveals two levels of concrete justification The primary objectives of the SOC were identified which have been offered i n support of in-space infra- as: structure—i. e., “space station, ” acquisition. ● construction, checkout, and transfer to operation- One set of justifications ties the need for a perma- al orbit of large, complex space systems; nent human presence in orbit to a particular image ● on-orbit assembly, launch, recovery, and servic- of the future objectives of the civiIian space program. ing of manned and unmanned spacecraft; and, According to this line of reasoning, a “space station” ● further development of the capability for perma- can be seen as: nent manned operations in space wiith reduced 1. a necessary way station in preparing for people dependence on Earth for control and resupply. exploring the solar system; or The SOC study noted that this list of objectives: 2. an extremely valuable “national laboratory in or- . . . noticeably does not include onboard science and bit” for carrying out many of the research and applications objectives, although the free-flying sat- development activities related to a balanced and ellites which would be serviced would include mostly diverse civilian space program with both scien- those of this genre. The primary implication of this tific and application objectives; or mission is that experiment and applications require- 3. a centralized operations base from which the ments will not be design drivers; the SOC will be “op- routine exploitation of, particularly the commer- timized” to support the operational functions of these cial exploitation of, both LEO and geosynchro- objectives. However, experiments or applications nous orbits can most effectively proceed. which can tolerate the operational parameters of the SOC can be operated onboard, or an entire dedicated In all of these justifications, in-space infrastructure module could be attached to an available berthing is explicitly a means to achieving or faciIitating a par- port. ticular set of space policy objectives, and a decision The study developed a concept of a self-contained, to develop it would be tied to the more fundamental continuously occupied orbital facility built from sev- decision that those objectives were of sufficient eral Shuttle-launched modules. The initial SOC crew priority to justify the investments required to achieve would be 4 to 8 people. In addition to a core facility, them, including the necessary infrastructure itself. His- the full-capability SOC would require a construction torically, what has happened at past occasions for facility and flight support facility. The costs of this fully decision on the course of the American space program capable SOC were estimated at $2,7 billion, with the is that other goals than those which would have re- total facility in place 9 to 10 years after program ini- quired a “space station” were given preference: tiation. b9 1. In 1961, President Kennedy sought a dramatic The Johnson Space Center briefed interested par- space achievement in which the United States ties on SOC at the end of November 1979, in anticipa- could best the Soviet Union. The choice of a lution of initiating a contractor study of the concept dur- nar-landing objective and of the lunar-orbital ren- ing 1980. One account of this briefing suggested that dezvous approach to achieving it as the response “the ‘space station’ may be ready for a comeback.”7° to Kennedy’s need meant bypassing the devel- The following year would see a new administration opment of Earth-orbital capabilities including take office and a new NASA Administrator appointed. “space stations. ” The concept of in-space infrastructure would be 2. In 1969-71, President Nixon sought to reduce the looked at afresh. priority and budget allocation of the space program after Apollo while still developing some

● new technology, maintaining a manned space W hj., pp 1.8, 1-13, 1- 1‘3, 1 ’24 flight element, and creating more balance among 7“Da\ Id Doollng, “Space StatIon May Be Ready for a Comeback, ” HurIf~- various program objectives. Within the scope of ~ i//c TIrrw$, Dec 9, 1979, p 4 what he was wiIling to approve, there was insuf- 176 • Civilian Space Stations and the U.S. Future in Space

ficient activity to justify developing a major or- Current NASA Administrator James Beggs has made bital laboratory, and the space Shuttle was se- much the same point, saying that “a ‘space station’ lected as an alternative (and in NASA’s mind, an is the logical next step in the history of our manned interim) step until the level of space activity space systems. It will build on the achievements of would become high enough to require such a fa- the Mercury, Gemini, Apollo, and Shuttle pro- cility. grams. ”72 From the perspective of overall policy objectives, This argument decouples station justification from then, the fact that a “space station” has been rejected any particular set of missions and suggests that a as a part of the space program in the past can be in- “space station “ is a valuable, logical, and/or neces- terpreted primarily as a function of the particular stage sary step in developing the capability to pursue any i n the program’s evolution at the time that its acquisi- future objectives in space. The underlying assumption tion was proposed. Such rejections are best under- is that the United States will want to pursue an active stood as national leaders saying “not yet” or “not space program and that a “space station” is required under the current conditions, ” rather than an outright to do so. This line of argument is frequently combined “no.” The issue then becomes whether the overall with assertions of the need for leadership or preemi- character and desired objectives of the Nation’s space nence in space as a source of national pride and pres- program for the rest of this century are now of a scope tige and as a counter to the military and/or economic to justify acquiring in-space infrastructure as a means threats coming from other spacefaring nations. to achieve them. This theme has consistently been put forth over the Related to this point is an observation which springs past two decades by advocates of a “space station.” clearly from this historical record: that the concept In the past, it seems as if they were “ahead of the “space station” can be used to describe very different curve’ ’—i.e.,., that in objective terms the U.S. space hardware configurations and technical capabilities, program had not yet developed to a point where the ranging from the von Braun toroidal concept of the argument that a permanent manned outpost was in- 1950s, through the 50 to 100 person space base pro- deed the logical next step in an aggressive space enter- posed by NASA in 1969 and the “construction shack” prise was plausible to those outside the space com- concept of the mid-197os, to recent proposals for a munity. small and evolutionary station based on an unmanned The same argument is being put forth today; the platform. Historically, then, the term “space station” question is whether it is any more plausible in 1984, is extremely elastic, and an informed evaluation of a as the U.S. space programs enters its second quarter- particular proposal must ask “what kind of ‘space sta- century, than it has been previously. Given the capa- tion, ’ for what purposes, at what cost?” In this sense, bility for easy access to orbit provided by the space the past history of the proposal is not particularly rele- Shuttle, it may be that having the ability to stay in or- vant to the current situation. bit for extended periods for experiments or operations At another level of justification, the need for a per- is now in fact a “next logical step.” Or it may be that manent human outpost in orbit has been consistently the program has not yet evolved, and is not evolving seen by those with a broad perspective on future toward the kind of active future, in which the crea- space activities as a necessary step in development tion of permanent human presence in orbit is justified. of a capability to explore and exploit outer space, if This historical review suggests that space advocates that exploration and exploitation is to be pursued ag- will continue to press their vision of the way to go gressively. Thomas Paine made this argument to about opening the space frontier and that a “space Richard Nixon in 1969: station” will continue to be an integral part of that vi- We believe strongly that the justification for pro- sion. It is up to others in leadership positions to decide ceeding now with this major project as a national goal whether the vision of space held by those who are does not, and should not be made to depend on the the heirs of Tsiolkovsky, Oberth, von Braun, and many specific contributions that can be foreseen today in others who have worked on the space program in this particular scientific fields like astronomy or high en- country is one which the United States will now ergy physics, in particular economic applications, embrace. such as Earth resource surveys, or in specific defense needs. Rather, the justification for the “space station” is that it is clearly the next major evolutionary step in man’s experimentation, conquest, and use of space.71

72 James M. Beggs, “Securing Our Leadership in Space,” Astronautics and T\ Memorandum from Thomas Paine to the President, Feb. 24, 1969. Aeronautics, September 1982, Appendix C INTERNATIONAL INVOLVEMENT IN A CIVILIAN “SPACE STATION” PROGRAM*

Introduction There are both symbolic and utilitarian payoffs which lead a country to engage in international in- The National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958, volvement in its technical activities through formal co- as amended, includes the following passage: “The aer- operative agreements. Among the national objectives onautical and space activities of the United States shall served by such involvement are:2 be conducted so as to contribute to . . . the follow- 1. Symbolic Objectives ing [objective]: . . . Cooperation by the United States a. political and policy influence–a country may with other nations and groups of nations in work done engage in international cooperation in order pursuant to this Act and in the peaceful application to influence political attitudes and policy out- 1 of the results thereof . . . .’ As a result of this provi- comes in cooperating countries, in particular sion, NASA has a long tradition of cooperation with so that those attitudes and outcomes are com- other countries in space activities. patible with its own national objectives. In accordance with this tradition, there have been b. policy legitimization–a country may invite extensive discussions over the past 2 years between others to cooperate with it in order to enlist NASA and other friendly countries regarding a possi- their support for a particular course of action ble international in-space infrastructure acquisition that the country intends to pursue; broaden- program. Then, in January of 1984, President Reagan ing the base of involvement in a particular in his State of the Union Address called for a U.S. undertaking may increase its legitimacy both “space station” with international participation. These at home and abroad. circumstances indicate the importance of a full con- c. policy commitment–a country may allow sideration of various international options for devel- others to participate in one of its undertak- opment, acquisition, operation, and use of future long- ings as a means of gaining their commitment term, in-orbit infrastructure. The aim of this appen- to support some of its other policies. dix is to contribute to this consideration. d. leadership–a country may invite others to join it in a common undertaking because it Why International Involvement? believes that such an intimate partnership will allow it to demonstrate clearly to others a THE MOTIVES FOR COOPERATION leadership position. Countries engage in international cooperation in sci- e. cooperation to encourage cooperation—a entific and technical undertakings for a variety of country may initiate or enter into a specific reasons. In order to assess the potential advantages cooperative undertaking in order to demon- and disadvantages of international involvement by strate its commitment to the general princi- another country in a U.S. “space station” program (or ple of international cooperation as a desirable even the advantages of fully internationalizing the pro- course of action. gram) it is first of all necessary to understand the 2. Utilitarian Objectives reasons which lead nations to engage in international a. division of labor and sharing of costs–a coun- technical cooperation in general. These motivations try may invite others to join in an undertak- can then be discussed as they apply to the specific ing it wishes to pursue in order to achieve a situation of space infrastructure development, opera- necessary or desirable sharing of the burdens, tion, and/or use in order to provide a framework for particularly the cost, of that undertaking. examining various degrees and forms of potential in- b. access to foreign resources—a country may ternational involvement, from no involvement at all open one of its undertakings to foreign partic- up to and including a space infrastructure enterprise ipation in order to engage or have access to which is fully multinational from the start.

● Paper prepared for OTA by Hubert Bortzmeyer, with revision by John ‘This statement of objectwes IS adapted from Stephen M. Shaffer and Lisa Logsdon. Robock Shaffer, The Politics of International Cooperation: A Comparison of I National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958, As Amended, Section U.S. Experience in Space and in Security (Graduate School of International 102(b)(7). Relations, University of Denver, 1980).

177 178 ● Civilian Space Stations and the U.S. Future in Space

unique or superior resources, both physical In space, perhaps more than in most areas of inter- and human, available only in other countries. national science, it has been the policies and initia- c. economic influences-a country may invite tives of the Government, rather than those of the sci- others to participate in an undertaking in or- entific and technical community, which have der to increase the likelihood that they will established the U.S. attitude toward cooperative then purchase the products or services of that undertakings. 4 Although NASA’s international pro- undertaking, rather than those of potential grams have involved the Soviet Union, Canada, Ja- competitors. pan, and various developing countries, NASA’s pri- This breakdown of the objectives of cooperation ba- mary cooperative partner to date has been Europe— sically reflects the perspective of a country seeking to both individual European countries and the various involve others in its activities; however, it also can be European space organizations which have existed used to identify the reasons why others would agree over the past two decades. to cooperate with that country. In general, one would International cooperation in civilian space activity expect those responding to a cooperative initiative to is thus a longstanding tradition, especially in the field give highest priority to utilitarian benefits, but the sym- of space science, but also to some extent in space ap- bolic payoffs from international cooperation can ac- plications and space technology programs. As the gen- crue, though not evenly, to all partners. eral space policies of potential international partners The United States has made international coopera- in a space infrastructure acquisition program are re- tion in science and technology—in space as in numer- viewed, many examples of cooperative ventures can ous other sectors-a major element of its foreign pol- be brought to light. These range in scope from mod- icy; most observers agree that the overall benefits of est participation in minor projects to intense involve- such cooperation in both symbolic and utilitarian ment in major undertakings on the basis of full part- terms have been substantial, and that the negative im- nership, An extreme example of the latter is the setting pacts have been comparatively insignificant.3 Unless up of an intergovernmental consortium to carry out it begins a technical undertaking for motivations which comprehensive programs in a particular technical are overwhelmingly nationalistic in character (e.g., field—telecommunications. Project Apollo or the Supersonic Transport) the United On the other hand, there are few examples of sub- States has welcomed the participation of its closest stantial involvement of foreign partners in programs allies. As international involvement in the “space sta- which could be characterized as the main thrust of tion” program is assessed, this “bias” toward coop- the national space policy of a given country, whether eration will be maintained. it be the United States, the U. S. S. R., or any other space-capable state. As a matter of fact, the only in- INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION IN SPACE: stance so far of such an arrangement is the involve- THE RECORD TO DATE ment, since the early 1970s, of Europe and Canada In the 25 years that the United States has had a Gov- in the development of the American Space Transpor- ernment-funded civilian space program, international tation System (STS). cooperation has been one of its major themes; as men- But even that example is not really valid, since the tioned above, it was an explicit objective of the NAS hardware developments assigned to Europe (Spacelab) Act. Armed with this legislative mandate, with Presi- and Canada (the Remote Manipulator System, RMS), dential and congressional support for a U.S. civilian although producing valuable complements, involve space program which emphasized openness and sci- a rather minor share of the total costs involved, on entific objectives, and with already existing patterns the order of 10 percent. Furthermore, what is really of cooperation in space science, NASA has since its central in the STS is the American-built Shuttle. The inception conducted an active program of interna- other two items are accessory to it: the RMS could tional partnership. easily have been replaced with some U.S.-designed equivalent, and, if Spacelab did not exist, the STS

JThe Nat tonal Academy of Sciences has recently undertaken a review of sclentlflc and technolog~al cooperation among the OECD countries which 4Another area where Government I nttlatlves were crucial I n establlshi ng reaches this conclusion. patterns of international cooperation was nuclear energy. App. C—International Involvement in a Civilian “Space Station” Program ● 179

would still be able to carry out 90 percent of its in- The essential features of NASA guidelines are: tended activities. s cooperation is to be on a project-by-project basis, An invitation for international participation in a U.S. not on a program or other open-ended ar- “space station” program might well have the result, rangement; as did the U.S. offer to participate in STS development, each project must be of mutual interest and have that foreign participation would be somewhat margin- clear scientific value; al in terms of both the scope and the nature of its share technical agreement is necessary before political in the workload. A different outcome, however, is also commitment; possible, resulting in what was described above as a each side bears full financial responsibility for its rather unusual circumstance: major foreign involve- share of the project; ment in what will be the brunt of the U.S. effort in each side must have the technical and managerial space over the next decade or more. Since the early capabilities to carry out its share of the project; seventies, space technology has been disseminating NASA does not provide substantial technical as- and/or maturing throughout the world, bringing cer- sistance to its partners, and little or no U.S. tech- tain countries almost to par with the United States in nology is transferred; and aspects of space technology relevant to a such an scientific results are made publicly available.8 undertaking, and thus broadening the technical base These guidelines have occasionally been bent, as for significant cooperation. in the case of the 1975 U.S.-U.S.S.R. Apollo-Soyuz In order to understand which of these outcomes is Program. In general, however, they have provided an likely and/or preferable, it is first necessary to detail effective framework within which NASA has pursued the objectives which would lead both the United a mixed set of objectives, including: States and other countries to collaborate on a space ● Scientific/Technical infrastructure undertaking. As NASA’s current Direc- Increasing the number of qualified people tor of International Affairs has observed: “International working on problems of space research and space cooperation is not a charitable enterprise; coun- space technology by broadening the base of tries cooperate because they judge it in their interest involvement in space activities; to do so. ”6 Shaping the development of the space programs in other countries by offering attractive U.S. OBJECTIVES AND INTERESTS RELATED opportunities to join with the United States i n TO INTERNATIONAL INVOLVEMENT IN A U.S. SPACE “doing things our way”; and INFRASTRUCTURE ACQUISITION PROGRAM Channeling the funds and technical capabil- In the first year of its existence, NASA formulated ities dedicated to space in other countries a set of policy guidelines for international coopera- away from activities which are competitive or tion in space. Those guidelines have survived periodic not compatible with U.S. interests, but involv- reexamination and remain in force today. They reflect ing them in a program dominated by and large- “conservative values7” with respect to the conditions ly defined by the United States. under which cooperation is desirable. ● Economic – NASA estimates that it has achieved over $2 billion in cost savings and effective contributions from its cooperative programs over the

sThe U.S. policy, as became clear I n 1972, was to ensure that foreign con- past 25 years; cost-sharing has been an influen- tributors to the STS should not have responsibility for any element which tial, though not top-priority, element of NASA’s was essential to the success of the system. The only civillan space programs cooperative programs. to which Europe has contributed or is contributing essential parts are the International Ultraviolet Explorer (IUVE) and the Spxe Telescope (ST). There – Involving other countries in expanded space IS a strong push within NASA to Iim it the foreign role in any ‘‘space station’ activities may create new markets for U.S. aer- program to non-essential elements, but this push is being countered by an ospace products. Increasingly strong insistence, from the major ESA contributors at least, that potential partners be allowed to develop some of the key infrastructure ele- ● Political ments, Of course, there is a natural resistance within U.S. industry to seeing — NASA’s international cooperative programs foreign organizations provide what it could produce: witness, for instance, the Industrial opposition to the Canadian development of the RMS. It should have been designed to present a positive im- be noted, however, that NATO partners are frequently gwen responsibility age of the United States to our cooperating for developing essential components of defense systems, with consequent partners; in particular, the contrast between strerigthenlng of the alliance. 6Kenneth S. Pedersen, “International Aspects of Commercial Space Activ- ities, ” speech to Princeton Conference on Space Manufacturing, May 1983. 7Arnold Frutkin, /nternationa/ Cooperation in Space (Prentice-Hall, 1965), p. 32. 8Shatier and Shaffer, op. CIt,, p. 18

38-798 0 - 84 - 13 , QL 3 180 ● Civilian Space Stations and the U.S. Future in Space

U.S. openness and Soviet secrecy with respect FOREIGN OBJECTIVES AND INTERESTS to space has been exploited by the United RELATED TO INVOLVEMENT IN A U.S. States. “SPACE STATION” PROGRAM — International cooperation in space has been Success in cooperative undertakings requires that undertaken by the United States in order to each side perceives the cooperation as being bene- advance other U.S. foreign policy objectives. ficial to itself; such undertakings are even more likely While the priority given to these various objectives to be successful if there is at least some commonality has varied over time and mission opportunity, at the of objectives. All partners must believe that coopera- core has been a policy that permitted this country’s tion is a useful means for advancing some of their na- closest allies to become involved in the U.S. space tional objectives without undue costs related to others. effort. Indeed, some have criticized NASA for mak- It is somewhat more difficult to generalize with respect ing possible such participation, at minimal cost, in an to the motivations which might lead specific countries effort paid for almost entirely by U.S. taxpayers; “ben- or groupings of countries to decide to join the United efit, know-how and opportunity were shared to an ex- States in development, operation, and/or use of space tent which was totally unprecedented where an ad- infrastructure, but the following seems most germane: 9 vanced technology was involved . . . .“ Since the ● Scientific/Technical start of its civilian space program, the United States In most areas of space technology, the United has used international cooperation in space as a States is still a leader. Other countries may means of creating a sense of togetherness and com- hope that close partnership with the United mon achievement among, particularly, the industrial States will give them increased access to these democracies which are this country’s most significant technologies and help upgrade their own tech- partners in maintaining world order. nical capabilities. The benefits to the United States of international The “space station” contains elements of space cooperation do not come without costs, of space infrastructure which, used in connection course. Among the potential negative impacts of in- with the space transportation system, will volving others in the U.S. space program are: “modernize” space operations; other coun- 1. increased technical risk and management com- tries may decide they must be part of the most plexity; advanced way of operating in space, .2. Significant OUt-flOWS of sensitive or valuable U.S. ● Economic technology, employment opportunities, and/or — If the commercial potential of many areas of hard currency, as the United States purchases space activity is as large as some forecast, use space-related goods or services from other of in-space infrastructure will be an essential countries; or at least extremely useful means for achiev- 3. in particular, the development, through their in- ing that potential. Other countries wanting to volvement in U.S. space activities, of effective participate in the commercial exploitation of competitors to U.S. firms in commercial space ef- space may view sharing the costs of a “space forts; and station” program as the best way to be major 4. possible disputes among the United States and partners in such commercial exploitation. its cooperating partners-which, if not resolved, — Cooperation with the United States may be the could lead to broader foreign policy conflicts. only way that other countries can afford to de- To date, NASA has managed its affairs so as to have velop capabilities in particular areas of space minimized these potential negative impacts. For in- technology. Division of labor and costs is a stance, many of the cooperative programs involved necessary approach for those without the re- NASA’s launching of foreign satellites, in which the sources to develop a total system of space in- technical risk to NASA was virtually non-existent and frastructure on their own. While the United which often led to foreign purchase of additional States could probably afford to develop it on launches. its own, as could the ESA countries in collaboration with Japan,10 probably no other coun-

IOAS noted later in this appemfix, there is a considerable difference between the amount of taxpayers’ money the United States on the one hand and Europe and Japan on the other are prepared to spend on space. But gArnold Frutkin, “U.S. Policy: a Drama in N Acts,” Spectrum, September there is little doubt that Europe alone cou/d make a comparable investment 1983, p. 74. if the political will existed. App. C—lnternational Involvement in a Civilian “Space Station” Program ● 181

try or region except the Soviet Union and its member countries in attendance: it resulted in a allies could make a comparable investment in Definitive Agreement which entered into force in 1973 space. and made INTELSAT a working international organiza- — Other countries may anticipate that such a pro- tion, with a present membership of more than 100 gram will provide marketing opportunities for countries. their industries and want to participate in the The U.S.S.R. and other socialist countries never program in order to maximize those opportu- joined INTELSAT, both because it was initiated by the nities. United States and actually run by Americans during . Political the first years of its existence and because they would — Participation in the “space station,” like par- have had very little influence on the organization ticipation in the space transportation system, under the weighted system of voting which was may provide other countries a way of sharing employed. in the political and prestige benefits of manned The International Maritime Satellite Organization space flight activities without bearing the total (lNMARSAT) has a number of features that are dis- cost of manned systems. tinctly different from those of INTELSAT. It provides — The United States is the military and economic global coverage, whereas INTELSAT does not. Another leader of the non-Communist world; cooper- difference is that among its member states, INMARSAT ation with the United States in such an effort counts the Soviet Union (with a 14 percent owner- may provide a way for other countries to main- ship share, second only to the United States’ 23 per- tain or increase their commitment to a political cent) and several other socialist countries. and military alliance with the United States. INMARSAT’S statute obliges it to provide free access to members and nonmembers. THE POTENTIAL FOR AN INTERNATIONAL INMARSAT was created pursuant to the initiative of “SPACE STATION” PROGRAM a United Nations agency, the Inter-governmental Some have suggested that any major new undertak- Maritime Consultative Organization, which, from ing in space be from the start “truly” international— 1973 to 1976, convened a series of international con- i.e., designed, funded, and managed by an interna- ferences to establish a global maritime satellite com- tional consortium or an equivalent organization .11 Al- munications system. In 1979, the INMARSAT Conven- though the current momentum behind “space station and Operating Agreement entered into force, and tion” plans is leading away from this option, it is worth operations started early in 1982. With the exception identifying it here and assessing it later as a possible of the above-mentioned differences, INTELSAT and way of approaching its development or operation. INMARSAT are similar in structure. Such an approach would, of course, be the ultimate Could a similar international organization be in the way of internationalizing a program; in this created, in order to develop, operate, and use in-space mode of cooperation, the United States would merely infrastructure? In principle there is no obstacle to this, be a shareholder among many others within a con- although the parallel with INTELSAT can be very mis- sortium of participants. There are precedents in this leading. In particular, it is not clear that the provision respect; an instance which comes readily to mind is of orbital infrastructure to accomplish a variety of ob- that of the International Telecommunications Satel- jectives could ever be the kind of profitable enterprise lite Organization (INTELSAT). that space-based communications has been. Commu- In 1962, the U.S. Congress passed the Communi- nications is a well-established business, yielding a re- cations Satellite Act, creating the Communications Sat- turn on investment of about 14 percent within ellite Corporation (COMSAT) and charging it with de- INTELSAT. Also, the capability upon which INTELSAT veloping a global system for international satellite was originally based (communications satellites and communications. The United States could not achieve launch capabilities) had been developed by the such an ambitious goal without the active participa- United States at its own expense. tion of other nations; therefore negotiations were There are no such credible economic prospects for started which led (after substantial conflict) in 1964 space infrastructure, which would have many different to an “interim agreement” under which a global net- uses, some for pure government-funded research, work was successfully established. In 1969, a Pleni- others in the nature of a public service, and still others potentiary Conference was convened, with 67 for commercial applications. Also, in a satellite communications system, there lies more cash-flow in the

1 I See, for example, RcJ&rt Salkeld, “Toward Men Permanently in Space, ’ procurement of the ground segment than in the Astronautics and Aeronautics, October 1979. building of the satellites. This has made it possible for 182 ● Civilian Space Stations and the U.S. Future in Space

American firms to be the exclusive manufacturers of 2. ESA’s overall activity is subdivided into two cat- INTELSAT satellites for years without stirring too much egories: resentment within the international consortium, mandatory activities, which include chiefly because other member countries have found ade- scientific programs and basic organizational quate compensation in the manufacturing of ground expenditures; mandatory contributions are stations for themselves and for sale abroad. based on each state’s GNP; Also, Europe, with its Ariane series of boosters, is optional activities, which are specific programs now competing for INTELSAT launch contracts. In ad- like Ariane, Spacelab, Marecs, and so on; condition, some form of international cooperation was ab- tributions to these programs are negotiated solutely essential, almost by definition, for an inter- between the participants at the inception of national communications network to be feasible. No the program. such cooperative imperative is attached to space in- This system provides ESA with a considerable flexi- frastructure. bility: although unanimous consent of all Member A more adequate precedent for an international States is needed formally to permit ESA to undertake “space station” enterprise might be that of an inter- an optional program, a vote in favor of the program national organization created to conduct a number does not carry any obligation to participate. Member of jointly coordinated space programs for the benefit States may decide, after a program has been of its member states. Such a “limited partnership” may authorized, whether—and, if so, to what extent—they be a realistic approach to space infrastructure devel- wiII participate. Thus, Member states can adjust their opment and/or operation. To a large extent, the Euro- financial effort to the degree of interest they see in a pean Space Agency (ESA) does provide such a paral- program and/or to the “return” their industry will ob- lel.12 Since its inception, ESA has performed very tain from it (one of the solutions to the irksome “fair successfully in spite of the difficulties associated with return” problem). Also, member states can support almost all international organizations.13 In ESA’s case, another partner’s favorite project by a token partici- the two major problem areas have been, and still are: pation which can be traded against others, resulting 1 ) the time and burdensome negotiations required to i n “package deals” which settle seemingly unrecon- settle differences about general policies to follow and cilable differences. what programs to support; 2) the framing of an “in- A further degree of flexibility is provided by the fact dustrial policy” designed to improve the worldwide that the agency is not obligated to manage all of its competitiveness of European industry while ensuring programs through its own staff. ESA can delegate to a “fair return” to individual members states (the “re- a national agency the responsibilities for a program’s turn” is the value of the contracts let by ESA to any management, if this appears to be preferable from a member state, and it is “fair” when proportionate to political, economic, or technical point of view (CNES, that member’s financial contribution to the agency’s the French space agency, is thus entrusted with tech- budget). nical management of the Ariane development The Convention governing ESA provides some clues program). as to how these difficulties are dealt with in the long 3. ESA early recognized that a multinational agency run: is better off letting contracts to multinational in- 1. The formal structure of ESA is designed to accom- dustrial firms rather than attempting to balance modate laborious negotiations and compromises. contracts among national companies according The legislative power, so to speak, rests with a to its “fair return” principle. This balancing act Council where all states are represented; the is often performed better and more quickly in- Council meets regularly, usually for 2-day ses- side multinational consortia of European aero- sions.14 There is also an Executive responsible for space and electronics firms, the creation of which day-to-day operations and long-range planning. ESA has encouraged. As a last parallel which might be drawn from ESA, it should be noted that this agency’s role is generally limited to development and demonstration of space I ZESA is described i n more detail below. IJI ndeed, if one takes a long view of past European coopf?ration, saY, over systems. Utilization, in the sense of operational or 100 years, ESA’S record is strikingly good. Although its operations have been commercial exploitation, is usually entrusted to other on a much smaller scale than have those of NASA, ESA’S record of technical successes is perhaps as good as that of any other organization. intergovernmental organization, like EUTELSAT for re- 141n general, exh Member State has one vote in the Council. However, gional European communications or EUMETSAT for a Member State does not have the right to vote on matters concerning an meteorological satellites. Commercial operation can optional program in which it does not take part. Except where the ESA Con- vention provides otherwise, decisions of the Council are taken by a simple even be entrusted to private multinational corpora- majority of Member States represented and voting. tions like ARIANESPACE, which has been established App. C—International Involvement in a Civilian “Space Station” Program ● 183

to produce, market, launch, and finance Ariane schemes, not only in the field of space science (re- launch vehicles. This arrangement could be paralleled putedly free of competition), but also in general public in an international “space station” program: different service types of applications (e.g., meteorology or international entities, with possibly different member- search-and-rescue), and even in commercial applica- ship and operating procedures, could take care of its tions (e.g., communication via INTELSAT, INMARSAT, development and operation. or INTERSPUTNIK). Cooperation, in other words, As far as development and operation are concerned, seems to be a widely recognized way of performing one might question whether the creation of interna- space activities, provided a certain amount of auton- tional entities in charge of these activities would en- omous assets have been secured to safeguard national tail creation of new technical agencies duplicating the independence and ability to compete, so that if this know-how and resources of existing space agencies, U.S. offer to cooperate is not taken up on a program most notably NASA. Clearly, this would not be an ad- as central even as the “space station, ” this situation visable course. However, the international body in is unlikely to be reversed, charge of the program could confine itself to overall That such duplication does not make optimal use management, and rely on existing agencies in the par- of the global resources of the international commu- ticipating countries for technical management, super- nity is obvious, but by no means new. If one accepts vision, and day-to-day activity, a procedure similar to it, the next question, from a U.S. perspective, is that sometimes followed by ESA. Given that the whether other spacefaring countries, not being in- United States would undoubtedly be the largest share- volved in the U.S. program, would thus be motivated holder in such a joint venture, it should be possible to challenge U.S. supremacy in space and to compete to have the leading role assigned to NASA and/or the commercially with it even more effectively and bet- U.S. private sector in this context. Other major agen- ter than they do now. In other words, what are the cies like ESA (Europe), NASDA (Japan), CNES (France), implications if other countries strive to acquire more or DFVLR (West Germany) would as a matter of or less the same capabilities as the United States is course have to be entrusted with tasks commensurate seeking by developing space infrastructure, but on with their country’s or region’s financial commitment. their own and not in partnership with the United States? THE POSSIBILITY OF A U.S. DECISION TO It should be noted first that acquisition of similar ca- “GO IT ALONE” WITH RESPECT TO THE pabilities does not necessarily require development 15 “SPACE STATION” of similar technology. The capability to launch satel- Of course, there is the possibility that no other coun- lites, for instance, can be provided by a very sophisti- try will reach agreement with the United States to co- cated reusable craft like the Shuttle, or by less inex- operate in the acquisition and use of in-space infra- pensive expendable rockets. Similarly, it could turn structure. In this unlikely situation, the United States out that most or all functions of space infrastructure would “go it alone. ” Would such a step deal a fatal that utilize a human crew could eventually be per- blow to all future prospects of international coopera- formed by one or several automated systems. This cer- tion in space? There seems to be no reason to fear tainly seems to be true whenever a single specific ac- such a drastic outcome: what would probably hap- tivity is under examination: materials processing in pen is merely an extension into the future of the pres- space, for instance, could perhaps be adequately per- ent situation, characterized by a large amount of du- formed in an operational production mode by an un- plication, with most countries striving to acquire more manned platform along the lines of the French or less the same capabilities so as to be able to com- SOLARIS concept. pete, especially where commercial applications are Therefore, when specific activities are considered concerned. in isolation, there appear to be ways for other coun- The same countries, however, are now willing to tries to remain competitive in space applications with- participate in quite a large number of cooperative out joining a U.S. “space station” program. However, when looked at from a global perspective, a comprehensive space program is more than the sum of a few specific application projects. U.S. development of . long-term space infrastructure would mark the incep- I SThe circumstances adduced at the beginning of this appendix provide tion of a new way of performing activities in space; reason to believe that a U .S, -only program is the least I ikely alternative, How- the hoped-for result would be enhanced flexibility and ever, since no final Congressional decision on international participation in economies of operation in many areas of space sci- any U.S. “space station” program has been made—and since the Congress may wish to reconsider this matter de rrovo-the U.S.-only option IS Included ence and applications, whether already recognized here or presently unforeseen. 184. Civilian Space Stations and the U.S. Future in Space

Any country wishing to gain access to this new way preliminary designs for such a vehicle have been pub- of doing business in space would have to acquire an licized. These designs are compatible with a winged extensive set of technologies and systems: reentry vehicle, looking somewhat like a down-scaled 1. Orbital communication relays. (The United States Shuttle, which under the name HERMES has also been is developing such relays in the form of the Track- through early design stages in France. Both craft could ing and Data Relay Satellites; similarly, ESA’s L- operate automatically but could also transport people. SAT will have orbital capabilities and will be used No cost estimates have been officially quoted yet, in this role for the control of EURECA). but independent experts, by extrapolating from other 2. In-orbit servicing (and probably retrieval) systems. European and U.S. program costs, predict $2 billion (The United States has flown a short-range system to $4 billion as the price for acquiring such a minimal of that kind, the manned maneuvering unit capability. This is much less than what it took to de- (MMU), which enables people to tend satellites velop the Shuttle, but 2 to 3 times what it cost to in the vicinity of the Shuttle, To go further along develop Ariane. Of course, in order to exploit such this line, NASA will have to develop the so-called a staffed flight capability properly, if it is not to remain Orbital Maneuvering Vehicle (OMV)). only a prestige enterprise, all space activities must be 3. The capability of returning space hardware from adapted to the “new way of doing business in space.” orbit to the surface of the Earth via unmanned Today’s European satellites, for instance, do not lend vehicles. (This is a capability which the United themselves to servicing in orbit; all sorts of new tech- States has bypassed through development of the niques would have to be adopted for that purpose, Shuttle) and/or; such as modules easy to plug out or in; built-in, readily 4. Ultimately, man-rated launch and reentry vehi- accessible and readable check-out circuits; safety de- cles (unless automated systems or systems re- vices destined to protect the astronauts’ lives, and so motely controlled from the ground suffice. to per- on. form all the space tasks for which the need for In turn, even if this proves to be economical in the human beings is currently foreseen–a possibil- long run, it would call for increased investment at the ity which is debatable at best). start. Added to the higher operating costs of manned Even if one takes into account that such capabilities space flight, the overall consequence of all these con- need not rest on facilities identical (in terms of size, siderations amounts to this: in order to acquire the sophistication, etc.) to those deployed by the United capabilities which go with the new way of conduc- States, the cost of their creation is nevertheless likely ting space activities, medium space powers like Eur- to be several times higher than the cost of creating ope or Japan would probably have to multiply their and maintaining independent “traditional” satellite space budgets by at least 2 to 3 times. However, the building and launching capabilities. ratio of civilian space expenditures to gross national Consider, for instance, the total development and product (GNP) in Europe and Japan is much smaller flight testing cost of Ariane 1: roughly $1 billion (1984). than the corresponding ratio in the United States— The corresponding cost for the Shuttle exceeds $10 i.e., roughly 4 times less. There is therefore room for billion. The Shuttle’s payload capability is much expansion, but such a major shifting of gears would greater than that of Ariane 1, especially in LEO. But require a reassessment of national priorities in all the the important point is that Ariane suffices to endow countries involved, and there is no sign that such a European countries with the capability to launch all reassessment is imminent. the applications satellites they need, and even further, A last question to address is whether another alter- to market launch services abroad, competing com- native is open to these countries: again assuming that mercially with NASA and the U.S. private sector in the United States goes ahead alone with the devel- that field. (One might state more accurately that the opment of a “space station” and all the attendant new real competition will come from the Ariane 2, 3 and technologies, must countries wishing to enter into or 4 versions, which together will cost about an addition- stay in the space business of necessity develop similar al $400 million beyond the initial development ex- capabilities? In other words, could “doing business penditures: the argument, however, still holds true.) in the old way” be competitive when faced with the Suppose now that Europe decides to acquire a “new way, ” just as expendable launch vehicles from manned flight capability of its own. A typical way to Europe, Japan, and the United States seem to be man- do that (as explored in ESA’s “long-term preparatory aging to stay in competition with a very new and dif- program”) would be to develop an even larger ver- ferent craft, the Shuttle? sion of Ariane, with a LEO capability around one-half Two factors will have a deciding influence on this that of the Shuttle: under the name Ariane S, various question: App. C—International /evolvement in a Civilian “Space Station” Program ● 185

1. Economics At the present stage, it would seem that neither eco- — The relative importance of captive markets; nomic factors nor political and technical trends yield — charges applied to users: the very sophistica- a clear answer to the question of whether there is an tion of new systems may, at least in the initial alternative way open to countries unable or unwill- phase, lead to high operational costs; this argu- ing to acquire in-space infrastructure. This is a major ment is further complicated by the fact that reason to believe that the U.S. offer to cooperate with user’s charges do not necessarily reflect actual other countries will be accepted by other spacefar- costs. If the United States decided to go ahead ing nations, at least to the minimum extent necessary for reasons of its own, not all of which were to see what happens. Whether such minimal partici- economic ones, it probably would not fully pation is in the U.S. interest will be discussed later in amortize costs through user’s charges; other this paper. But the conclusion of the reasoning and suppliers of space services might do the same, analysis just presented is inescapable—as the United to facilitate export sales, for instance; States begins a space infrastructure program, others will — the fact that the key area of commercial com- want to be part of it, provided the cost (in all senses petition in space utilizes the geostationary or- of the term) is not too great. bit, whereas the “space station” and its related new capabilities will at the start focus on LEO Possible Modes of International activities, and will extend their sphere of Involvement in a U.S. “Space operations to geostationary orbit much later; Station” Program meanwhile, business can go on as usual in that orbit. There is a wide variety of possible forms that inter- 2. Political and Technical Trends national cooperation in a space infrastructure program — One of the major impacts of “space station” might take. This section describes two general cate- technology will be in the field of construction gories of involvement, each with several variations: and assembly of large structures or platforms 1. international cooperation during “space station” in orbit. Presently, however, there seems to development, then separate deployment of be a trend in favor of small or medium-sized operational systems; and satellites which fit the needs of one given 2. international cooperation throughout the deploy- country or group of countries eager to possess ment, operation, and use of the “space station .“ its own independent system. Small to medium-sized satellites would probably also appeal JOINT DEVELOPMENT, SEPARATE DEPLOYMENT to commercial operators (in the United States If the United States and/or its potential international and elsewhere) who might find it of advantage partners believe that free and open competition in uti- to own a system built along their specifications lizing space is preferable (or unavoidable), and if these rather than to lease a segment of a larger countries nevertheless want to save on development system. costs and prevent all-out duplication of efforts, then — However, even small/medium satellites might this option will be attractive. joint development of a benefit from new methods of operating in total system or a piece of hardware, followed by sep- space. The capability to check a satellite in arate or independent deployment, operation, exploita- low orbit before transferring it to its final or- tion and/or sale is a commonplace arrangement in, bit to start operation there, or the capability among others, aerospace programs. Many military and to repair it when it fails, may be a significant civilian aircraft have been or are being born that way, commercial advantage which no prospective at least in Europe. The United States seems to favor customer is likely to overlook. However, the separate development followed by licensing economic attractiveness of satellite servicing agreements, but there are examples to the contrary is still a very controversial matter; lb anyway, from a strictly financial point of view, a cus- (e.g., the joint development of the CFM 56 jet engine by General Electric and the French SNECMA). tomer could be presented with the same ad- Among the reasons that other countries might want vantages by an adequate system of warranty. to commit only to joint development, reserving the But the psychological appeal would clearly be right of separate deployment of constituent elements, in favor of the servicing capability. are: 1. Going along to see what happens. This would lbThe reluctance of those concerned to meet the relatively low costs of retrieving and refurbishing WESTSTAR 6 and PALAPA B-2 indicate that in- typically be the attitude of countries or agencies orbit retrieval ad repair are not yet economically attractive. feeling rather skeptical about the benefits to be 186 . Civilian Space Stations and the U.S. Future in Space

derived from use of in-space infrastructure, but Such compromises are by no means impossible, but which deem it necessary to be at least symboli- must be evaluated on a case-by-case basis to make cally present in the game, just in case it turns out sure that the overall cost of the compromise design that their skepticism was ill-founded. Such part- and of its adaptations to specific needs does not ex- ners may not be of the most active sort, but they ceed the added costs of separate developments. Fur- also will not be troublesome, since the very thermore, such a compromise design is inevitably dif- reason of their being present is “to follow the ficult to agree on, for all parties tend to believe that leader.” Presumably they would not be interested it is to them that will fall the largest amount of modifi- enough in the joint undertaking to fund cost in- cations to be made later to adapt the common devel- creases if the program should meet with difficul- opment of their specific needs. These, however, are ties, and would therefore attempt to settle for a problems inherent in all cooperative development fixed amount rather than a fixed percentage type programs, and past experience, notably in the field of participation. of aeronautics and armaments, proves that they can 2. Going along to acquire some of the know-how be settled whenever a strong sense of common pur- and of the technologies to be derived from the pose prevails. program. This would be the attitude of countries While, for one or more of the reasons sketched or agencies with a positive attitude towards new above, joint development without a commitment to systems, but which are not in a hurry to deploy joint operation or utilization may be attractive to a po- and use them, so that they only want to acquire tential cooperating partner, it would appear that the knowledge to be implemented in a much later United States might prefer a more comprehensive perspective. Along with other, more “political” cooperative approach, as described below. However, motivations, this seems to be what prompted Eur- there may be reasons for the United States to avoid ope to join the post-Apollo program. There was commitment to international involvement beyond the also a more immediate industrial motivation; Eur- development stage. Among such possible motivations ope hoped to sell to NASA more units of the hard- are: ware developed by European firms, and NASA 1. A feeling that national security applications in has indeed purchased a second Spacelab flight space might evolve in such a way that the United unit in Europe. This type of motivation is apt to States would prefer to deploy its own infrastruc- create problems, insofar as it raises the issue of ture so that it could control access to it; this is technology transfer or dissemination. not necessarily a problem since provisions for 3. Going along in order to & able to deploy a sep- such restriction could be part of an international arate system at about the time that the primary agreement. partner deploys its own. This is a sign of real in- 2. A similar argument could be made if, particularly, terest to the program, insofar as it means that all materials processing activities appear quite prom- parties truly believe in it. However, it might well ising commercially and U.S. firms prefer a U. S.- generate more problems than would the preced- only “industrial park” in space. ing ones. It is indeed unlikely that all parties con- 3 The United States may prefer a safety valve free- cerned will aim, through their joint development ing it from the need to continue a joint effort if efforts, towards development of strictly identical there is a likelihood that the cooperative experi- infrastructure elements. As a consequence, a ence during the development phase is not satis- number of compromises would have to be ac- factory on technical, economic, and/or political cepted by all (or some of) the participants to rec- grounds. onciIe differing specifications. Any given partici- In addition to all of the above, dissatisfaction with pant will tend to specify the work assigned to it joint development programs sometimes crops up, not so that it serves directly (or with the smallest from problems directly related to the development possible amount of modification or adaptation) phase of the undertaking, but from an apparent or real its own national interests. However, the end lack of benefits deriving from the joint effort once it product of the same work, if the joint endeavor has carried through. This leads one to examine what is to make any sense, must also be readily adapt- benefits can be expected, and what sort of framework able to what other participants plan to construct. is needed to ensure that they can be reaped. In a rather grossly exaggerated way, this is a situa- 1. Each party deploys and uses for its own purposes tion akin to ESA and NASA trying to agree on a one or several units of the jointly developed hard- definition of Spacelab which would enable it to ware. (Construction would presumably be shared be launched either by the Shuttle or by Ariane. among industrial firms which built the proto- App. C—International Involvement in a Civilian “Space Station” Program . 187

types.) This approach is feasible if integrated JOINT DEVELOPMENT, OPERATION AND USE systems have in fact been jointly developed; how- The essential features of this option are: ever, as stated earlier, this may not necessarily — operation and maintenance costs of the infra- be the usual case, as agencies and administrations structure, as well as development costs, would involved wiII tend to prefer clear-cut interfaces be shared; rather than closely integrated systems. — ownership of most or all of its elements would 2. Assuming then that each participant has devel- stay most probably with the United States; how- oped a self-contained system (e.g., the United ever, all participants’ rights of access and use for States develops a core element and country X a common and/or national purposes, including teleoperator maneuvering system (TMS) compati- mutual commercial competition, would be guar- ble both with the U.S. element and country X’s anteed by an adequate legal framework. own spacecraft and launch vehicles), several op- Implementation of this approach is essentially a tions are possible: three-step process, where each step has to be con- — Participants in joint development efforts make sidered separately before an overall conclusion is no provisions for the post-development phase, made: and leave it to evolving circumstances and 1. Joint Development economics to ensure a successful career for the Most considerations just set forth in the section developed items. (For example, if the U.S. ele- above are applicable here. In a way, however, ments are sound ones, country X will purchase there are fewer problems; the ultimate purpose one or more, and vice versa, provided no legal of joint development being the deployment of obstacles or perceived national security con- elements to be used jointly, there is less need for cerns regarding these sales arise). involved legal rules concerning mutual purchas- — Make it an obligation for all par-ties to purchase ing obligation, second source development, and (and agree to sell) one or several units of the so on. Nor does one have to be concerned about 17 hardware developed by each. compatibility of certain sub-elements with indi- — And, of course, all possible intermediate ar- vidual countries’ nationally developed launch rangements between these two extremes. (To vehicles and the like. (Unless of course some par- use a simplified example: the United States ticipants wish to be able to break the partnership could be obligated to use country X’s teleoper- and go their own ways, but this would not be set ator maneuvering system, not by purchasing as a primary objective of the arrangement.) it but by offering as a compensation a given Needless to say, though, “rules of the game” amount of “utilization time” on elements of are still indispensable, especially in three areas: its infrastructure; reciprocally, country X’s obli- Settling the ownership of technology acquired gations would be to provide and maintain a while carrying out the joint development, and given number of these TMS vehicles.) transfer of technology, where required, for ac- A “closed-end” international partnership appears complishing the work; to make the most sense if the infrastructure is a“ nec- Assuming a dominant position of the United essary, but not sufficient, part of the capabilities re- States in the undertaking, how much poten- quired for effective and efficient operations in space. tial leverage will be left to its partners in order All partners will want to ensure that whatever is de- to give them a feeling of being able to protect veloped will be compatible with their longer range, their rights? but separate, plans for space. However, this kind of Conversely, one has to retain for the United limited international involvement is less likely in most States the possibility to work out substitute ar- situations to be attractive either to the United States rangements, in the event that one or another or to its potential partners than more substantial in- of the partners defaults, so as to ensure the volvement in the operation and utilization phases as ultimate integrity of the program, well as the development phase. The following section 2. Joint Operation examines such an approach. jointly developed infrastructure can be used jointly while being operated by a single country—presumably the United States. joint opera- I @ch an expl~it obligation WOUld circumvent the possible unwillingness tion would, however, lend a more international of one party to purchase elements from another. From the European point flavor and help international participants to feel of view, U.S. unwillingness to purchase additional Spacelab modules has been something of a problem. more secure by giving them added leverage— 188 ● Civilian Space Stations and the U.S. Future in Space

with, of course, potential problems for the United time, for the user’s own benefit, for whatever States. purposes, provided it complies with interna- International involvement in operating the in- tional law and a preset series of explicit rules? frastructure could range from very little (opening These rules must not be open to unilateral in- a few positions to foreign nationals on the ground terpretation. Sensitive aspects, such as safety control team and possibly in the orbital crew, as and national security requirements, must be a token gesture) to full-fledged internationaliza- exhaustively and accurately dealt with in ad- tion of both ground team and crew. The latter vance, so as not to allow, later on, the impres- would imply including citizens of other countries sion of arbitrarily imposed requirements. in various key positions in numbers proportionate This right-to-use may not necessarily be free with the overall level of participation of their of charge, but if a price has to be charged for country in the program. it, it must be equitable (no preference with re- The latter case, even if likely to create prob- spect to the U.S. Government or private users, lems for the United States by the leverage and no hidden overheads, etc.). As stated above, the visibility it gives to its partners, might, how- the ideal situation would probably be one ever, also pave the way towards solution of one where very little or no exchange of funds oc- issue raised by this approach—the question of curs. The setting of utilization priorities is “equitable costs.” Assuming that the United equally important in this connection; the pre- States develops, say, 95 percent of a “space sta- sent NASA-DOD arrangement for giving abso- tion” system, and that country X develops and lute priority to national security payloads in builds 5 percent of it, it seems fair to reserve 5 Shuttle manifesting would not be likely to gen- percent of the station’s effective working time for erate much international enthusiasm if it were country X’s purposes. If, however, the United paralleled. States is alone in bearing all the maintenance and Cancellation clauses must be very explicit and operating costs, X cannot enjoy its 5 percent provide for adequate prior warning and com- “space station time” free of charge. Some equi- pensation; unilateral recanting should not be table reimbursement scheme has to be devised allowed. Needless to say, the purpose of such for maintenance and operating costs incurred by clauses would not be limited to protection of the United States—a scheme that would resolve U.S. partners; the latter would have to consent attendant problems of fair and accurate account- as a counterpart to a perdurable involvement ing, opening U.S. accounts to X’s comptrollers, system, in order to allow not only for the in- devising rules for taking into account all the fringe frastructure’s initial deployment, but also for benefits built in the system (like the replenish- the continuous evolution and growth which ment of propellant tanks with unused fuel from is going to be one of its main features. the Shuttle, and so on). However, if country X There seems to be no reason why all the above- actually carries out 5 percent of the maintenance mentioned issues could not be settled in the terms of and operations in kind, it may be possible to end a cooperative agreement among the United States and up with an almost no-exchange-of-funds its partners. Legal terms, however, would probably not situation. be sufficient to enable all parties to the undertaking 3. Joint Utilization to feel safe and secure: safeguards embedded in the The problem here is that there will be not only very fabric of the joint effort, providing mutual le- utilization in common for common purposes, but verage and affording room for the inevitable compro- also an individual participant’s use of the infra- mises, may have to be accepted. structure for its own benefit, including commer- On the surface at least, such a situation might ap- cially competitive types of usages. pear unbalanced in the eyes of the U.S. public and International partners will want to be provided Government: the United States will probably be car- with adequate safeguards to protect their legiti- rying most of the burden of the joint undertaking, and mate rights. This, in turn, raises the question of would seem required to provide to others guarantees what are “legitimate rights.” An effort should be and safeguards and to accept dependence on them made to define this concept as precisely as possi- in excess of what would be commensurate with its ble. Listed below are what appear to be major partners’ share of the burden. To most of these part- issues involved: ners, however, being involved substantially in a U.S. — Is thereto be unrestricted use of a given frac- “space station” program would mean forfeiting their tion of the “space station’s” effective work ability to develop not only a similar, but even a re- App. C—International Involvement in a Civilian “Space Station” Program ● 189

duced, capacity of their own, at least in the near term. This description of potential international partners Therefore, they will be staking the whole of their ini- will focus first and foremost on those industrialized tial asset commitment in the joint venture, whereas countries which at present are displaying a certain the United States would always be in a position, with amount of interest, or at any rate curiosity, toward some added funds and efforts, to make up for the fail- “space stations.” This list includes Europe–as a whole ure of one of its partners to keep the deal—a recourse through the European Space Agency and as exempli- that, under the circumstances, would be more costly fied by countries like France, the Federal Republic of to the partners. Germany and Italy–and Japan and Canada. From the U.S. point of view, of course, accepting Among the industrialized countries, the Soviet international participants in its “space station” pro- Union also deserves some mention, though hardly as gram makes sense only if this apparent–and, to some a likely participant in a U.S.-sponsored program. Rath- extent, real—imbalance does not jeopardize funda- er, as a major space power already engaged in its own mental national interests. The more guarantees and program of developing, emplacing, and using in-space safeguards the United States can afford to offer to its infrastructure, the Soviet Union is a potential compet- potential partners, the more those countries are likely itor to the United States in offering opportunities for to participate substantially and to pay accordingly. international involvement in such activity. This working out of mutual stakes in a common under- Among the developing countries, some have ac- taking is likely to be a delicate and complicated quired enough space technology capability to design process, and build indigenous satellites and launch vehicles (China, India), and others have ambitious plans to do Potential International Partners so in the future (Brazil). These and others deserve some attention, especially as possible participants in Now that potential modes of cooperation have been a broad multilateral effort. discussed, the potential partners for the United States in a “space station” effort will be described in some EUROPEAN SPACE AGENCY detail. Advances in space technology over the last decade Although joint European endeavors in space date throughout the world provide many prospective can- back to the early 1960s, the present European Space didates for bilateral or multilateral cooperation on a Agency (ESA) was founded in May 1975. ESA was the space station project. One should, however, keep in successor to two earlier organizations, the European mind that taking a meaningful share in a program of Launcher Development Organization (ELDO) and the such scope, cost and technical sophistication, will be European Space Research Organization (ESRO). It is no trivial undertaking for most of these candidates. of interest to recall briefly the history of these organi- What is meant by “meaningful share” depends, of zations, insofar as it sheds some light on U. S.- course, very much upon the circumstances. In a bi- European relationships in space endeavors as well as lateral arrangement between the United States and on how international space organizations perform. another country, the latter’s supplying less than 1 per- In 1960-1961 a number of European countries (Bel- cent of the infrastructure’s value in hardware or com- gium, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and monplace electronic components can hardly be the United Kingdom) became aware of the political termed meaningful. On the other hand, in the case and scientific benefits to be drawn from space activi- of a broad multilateral organization comprising many ties (awareness of potential economic benefits countries, large and small, with shares ranging from emerged some years later). They understood also that a fraction of 1 percent to several 10s of percent, a par- a pooling of their resources and efforts was necessary ticipation similar in level and kind to what has just to compete with the United States and the U.S.S.R. been described might well be meaningful to the par- i n at least certain key areas—leaving out the develop- ticipating country. ment of staffed capabilities in which the superpowers Another factor to be taken into account when con- were competing strongly for what appeared to be es- sidering joint ventures in advanced technological de- sentially national prestige reasons. These countries velopments is, obviously, the relative level of indus- also recognized the importance of a comprehensive trial development of the participating countries. program including satellite as well as launch vehicle Countries with more or less comparable industrial development. backgrounds, similar technical outlook and mutually ESRO was created to deal with satellite develop- compatible management practices will find it easier ment, and it did so successfully. From 1967 to 1975, to pool their resources. ESRO launched (with U.S.-built rockets) nine satellites, 190 ● Civilian Space Stations and the U.S. Future in Space

conducted a large number of experiments in space, tary potential of the tug was too great to permit de- engaged in successful cooperative projects with pendence on outside sources.”18-19 NASA, and managed to have its mandate enlarged to Also, during the same period, France and the Fed- encompass applications satellites. The organization eral Republic of Germany (FRG) were negotiating with built up a competent and well-organized executive the United States for the launching of their jointly built and technical staff which ran three technical field Symphonic telecommunications satellite, which the centers and a network of tracking stations. cancellation of the Europa project left without a ELDO, meanwhile, kept running into trouble, al- launch vehicle. The United States agreed initially to though it had only one project to deal with, the de- launch Symphonic, but required that the satellite be velopment of Europa, a medium-size rocket, roughly declared experimental rather than operational. The equivalent to the U.S.-built Atlas-Agena. Poor man- United States thus complied with its policy of assisting agement structure was the main source of trouble; with launchings provided they were for peaceful pur- ELDO had almost no authority of its own, but acted poses and in compliance with “relevant international as a sort of coordinating agency for separate national arrangements.” This was a reference to the INTELSAT projects (a British first stage, a French second stage, Agreement which required signatories to avoid “sig- a German third stage, Italian payload fairings, etc.). nificant economic harm” to the organization caused Additional problems arose from the fact that system by regional competition, To France especially, and and subsystem development had to proceed in par- perhaps to a lesser degree to the FRG, these condi- allel. The first stage was virtually completely devel- tions were construed as an attempt by the United oped at the start of the program and suffered only one States (and other INTELSAT partners who shared in minor failure in nine flights. Each of the remaining this position) to keep them out of the expanding sat- stages experienced failures on its first operational flight ellite telecommunications business. as an element of the complete vehicle: as a result, These events acted as catalysts in the setting up (in there was a string of six failures in which, in turn, each 1973) of the principles which were to govern the fu- major element became successful. ture ESA as well as in the drafting of its program. Based The program was further marred by a formidable on unsatisfactory European experience in obtaining escalation of costs, and, when its eleventh test flight U.S. launch assurances, the French found excellent ended in failure at the end of 1971, it was finally can- grounds for advocating development of an autono- celed after $700 million had been spent. mous European launch capability, and succeeded in At about the same time, the United States had stim- obtaining from its partners a 40-percent participation ulated ELDO, ESRO, and their member states to con- in the previously French-only program to develop the sider whether Europe should build a major segment Ariane launcher. The FRG, though disappointed by of NASA’s proposed space transportation system (STS), the withdrawal of the tug proposal, nevertheless then referred to as the “post-Apollo program.” By sought out European participation in the U.S. space 1972, agreement seemed to be within reach; the task transportation system through development of a “sor- allocated to Europe was development of a “space tie laboratory,” later named Spacelab. tug,” an advanced rocket-stage to be used to transfer The United Kingdom agreed to go along with a payloads from the Shuttle’s low orbit to higher ones, “package deal” which was worked out in July 1973, including the commercially essential geostationary or- whereby France funded 60 percent of Ariane, the FRG bit, The tug appeared to be a good candidate for coop- about the same percentage of Spacelab, and the U.K. eration, insofar as it was indeed an important segment 56 percent of a European maritime communications of the STS—almost a key one—and because in devel- satellite, later called MARECS. Each of the three coun- oping it, Europe could draw from its unhappy but ex- tries also agreed to take a minor share of the two tensive experience in rocketry. Furthermore, it would others’ favorite projects. With this “package deal” ac- enable Europeans to keep working and making pro- cepted, the creation of ESA could proceed, and the gress in what they felt was an essential area–i.e., agency began operation in May 1975. The stated ob- launch vehicle development. jectives of the ESA include: In mid-1 972, however, the United States decided to withdraw the space tug proposal, “partly because the entire post-Apollo program was being scaled back, IKivilian Space Policy and Applications (Washington, DC: U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment OTA-STI-1 77, 1982), p. 363. because of doubts about European technical capabil- 19A more detailed discussion of European involvement in NASA’S pOst- ities, and also because the Air Force thought the mili- Apollo efforts is provided below. App. C—lnternational Involvement in a Civilian “Space Station” Program • 191

— developing and implementing a long-term space has under development an advanced coastal and policy; oceanic monitoring satellite (ERS-1) equipped — carrying out space activities; with a radar and other microwave instruments. — coordinating the European space program and Other remote-sensing activities are also underway the space programs of its member states; and (data reception and dissemination, Spacelab- — developing and implementing an industrial poli- borne high-resolution camera). cy appropriate for its programs. 3. Space Sciences-ESA has pursued ESRO’s tradi- The agency, in addition to carrying out major but tion of ambitious scientific satellite projects. Four optional projects such as Ariane and Spacelab, car- of these are presently operating successfully while ries out a space science program planned on a 5-year several more are in the development phase. Most basis. This science program and ESA’s operating budg- notable is GIOITO, a spacecraft to fly by Halley’s et call for mandatory financial contributions from its Comet in 1986. Science also is an area where member states. Table C-1 lists the current distribution cooperation with NASA has been and is exten- of such contributions for the ESA science program. I n sive; ESA is contributing several major subsystems constant-dollar terms, the ESA budget for mandatory on the Space Telescope. The two agencies also programs has remained virtually constant since the or- had a joint program called the International Solar ganization’s inception. Power Mission (ISPM). This was a rather sophis- ESA runs a comprehensive set of space programs. ticated plan to send two spacecraft (one U.S.-built 1. Communications Satellites-a broad and vigorous and the other European-built) over the two poles program, with several satellites in orbit (OTS, an of the Sun. In 1981, because of budget cutbacks, experimental spacecraft, and MARECS, leased to NASA chose to withdraw its spacecraft from this INMARSAT to provide operational maritime com- enterprise, creating frustrations and resentment munications); with more to be launched (ECS-1 not only within the scientific community but also and -2, for the purpose of setting up a regional within political circles in Europe. The ISPM has satcom system); and with a large communications gone ahead but now includes only a European satellite (L-SAT) under development. The first L- spacecraft launched by NASA. The impact of this SAT payload includes four different experiments, withdrawal is discussed later in this appendix. one of which is to test direct-to-the-home TV 4. Launch Vehicles–this is an area where the dual broadcasting. nature of ESA’s policy is best shown. On one 2. Remote Sensing–as a contribution to a global hand, the Agency actively pursues its Ariane program set up under the auspices of the World autonomous launcher program, aimed in part at Meteorological Organization, ESA launched two competing commercially with U.S. launch vehi- METEOSAT geostationary weather satellites sim- cles; on the other hand, it is locked in, through ilar to the U.S. GMS. The second of these satel- the Spacelab program, to the use of the U.S. Shut- lites was carried in orbit by ESA’s own launcher tle. Concerning Ariane, in spite of two setbacks (Ariane), and ESA’s member states have agreed (failure of one development flight out of four and to keep the METEOSAT system in operational of the first operational flight attempted late in condition for at least 10 years (by replacing the 1982), there were (as of July 1984) 7 successful satellites when they fail in orbit). The Agency also launches out of 9 attempts, and it is definitely a technical success. The more powerful Ariane 2, 3, and 4 versions have already been approved Table C-1 .—ESA Science Budget and funded by ESA. Commercial success also is expected during the next several years as a re- Percent contribution to ESA’s sult of several external factors: delays in the Shut- science program Member States tle development schedule, high cost of U.S. ex- Belgium...... 4.49 pendable vehicles such as Delta or Atlas-Centaur Denmark ...... 2.51 France ...... 21.40 (resulting, in turn, from low production volume), Federal Republic and an insufficient number of Shuttle flights. A of Germany...... 25.57 private corporation (Arianespace) has been estab- Ireland ...... 0.54 lished to finance and market Ariane through ac- Italy ...... 12.46 tive salesmanship and promotion. Netherlands ...... 6.00 Spain ...... 5.04 Spacelab was successfully launched aboard the Sweden ...... 4.25 Shuttle in November 1983. Slippages in the Switzerland ...... 3.99 launch schedule, cost overruns, and technical in- United Kingdom...... 13.75 terface problems—which each party tended to at- 192 ● Civilian Space Stations and the U.S. Future in Space

tribute to the other—have at times caused a cer- Past history, however, also points strongly toward a tain amount of strain between NASA and ESA, European tendency to balance its commitments care- but probably nothing more than is to be expected fully between the acquisition of autonomous capabil- in such an ambitious cooperative effort.zo The ities (as exemplified by Ariane) and the involvement question remains, however, of the scope which with U.S. projects (e.g., Spacelab). will be given to Spacelab’s utilization, and of who To sum up, it appears that, notwithstanding its pol- is willing to pay for the exploitation of its capa- icy of retaining capabilities of its own, especially in bilities. How this question is resolved will have those areas where commercial competition may take an influence on European attitudes toward par- place, ESA is a likely candidate for a substantial coop- ticipation in a U.S. “space station” program. erative effort with NASA because: 5. Future Plans–These are still in the process of be- a. ESA and its individual member-states have a ing drawn up, but it is worthwhile to point out longstanding tradition of cooperation with that ESA has allocated funds not only to evaluate NASA. those options which are natural follow-ons of pre- b. Although much smaller, total European space ex- sent programs (like an advanced heavy version penditures are commensurate with NASA’s of Ariane beyond the planned version 4) but also (about one fourth). Given that the consolidated to study explicitly the prospects of “transatlan- gross national product (GNP) of ESA’s member- tic” cooperation. Within the next 2 years, ESA states is somewhat larger than the GNP of the must decide which of the major options identified United States, there seems to be room for a sub- by its long-term space transportation plan to stantial increase in these expenditures. However, follow: cooperation with the United States in de- present trends do not seem to point in that veloping space infrastructure, and/or pursuing direction. European-only development of modern capabil- c. The ESA Executive (headquarters and technical ities for space operations. The timing of U.S. and centers) is driven by internal motivations which ESA decisions on future programs is now com- are somewhat similar to NASA’s, and ESA is striv- patible, but will not remain so indefinitely. ing to define and get authorization for an ambi- ESA also has an active program of basic research tious long-range program which would give size, in materials processing, one of the most promising focus and purpose to its activity. candidates for widescale applications aboard a “space d. Most member-states of ESA are at least willing station.” This research program is carried out at pres- to take a look at a possible U.S. offer to cooper- ent on a variety of vehicles, among which Spacelab ate on a “space station,” and generally believe is prominent. ESA’s Council has already approved and that the very scope of such a program makes it funded the development of another in-space infra- necessary to approach it jointly in order to structure element for this purpose; a space “platform,” achieve a meaningful level of participation. it is named EURECA (European Retrievable Carrier). In spite of what has just been said, some major EURECA is designed to carry experiments that remember-states of the European Space Agency do not quire longer times on orbit than are available on the want at the present juncture to preclude bilateral co- Shuttle. It will include materials processing facilities operation with the United States (if they deem it wor- (furnaces and the like), and will be launched and re- thwhile and no satisfactory joint European arrange- trieved by the Shuttle. Its design will provide enough ment with the United States can be devised.) These maneuvering and power supply capability to sustain countries appear at present to be France, the FRG, and a prolonged (i.e., 6 months) orbital life of its own. Italy, which together account for over so percent of These features give to EURECA all the appearances ESA’s resources. In any case, even though these coun- of a “free-flyer” which could be tended by other, tries would be likely to end up participating in a U.S. future infrastructure elements and actually make it space infrastructure program through ESA if such a look like a first step toward ESA participation in a program is instituted, they will assess their interests “space station.” and decide upon their course irrespective of the joint All of the above points clearly toward an ESA will- European assessment, and it is therefore worthwhile ingness to consider seriously the possibility of a Euro- to take a closer look at each one. pean participation in a space infrastructure program. FRANCE ZOMany modifications had to be made to Spacelab as a result of changes France has always aimed at being the “third space in the Shuttle interface. This situation was somewhat reminiscent of the opera- power” after the United States and the Soviet Union, tions of ELDO, for it arose, and inevitably so, from the parallel development of a system and one of its major subsystems. and has indeed managed to build up the largest and App. C—international lnvolvement in a Civilian “Space Station” Program ● 193

most comprehensive space program in Europe and the France and the FRG are now discussing plans for a third-largest in the world. Budgetary appropriations military reconnaissance satellite: this makes autonomy are an indication of this; in 1983 (approximate figures) all the more important to French decision makers. France’s space expenses will be $545 million (as com- Hence the staunch support (and high financial con- pared with the FRG’s $325 million, or Japan’s $450 tribution) given to the Ariane program, and the care- million). French ambitions date back to the de Gaulle fully balanced bilateral cooperation with many differ- era, and it was as early as 1966 that France orbited ent countries: the United States, the FRG, Sweden, its first satellite with a French-built rocket, a few days and the U.S.S.R. particularly. In ESA’s policymaking before its second satellite was launched by NASA. bodies, France has been and will probably remain in Since then, the French program has substantially the future one of the staunchest advocates of the dual shifted its emphasis away from national prestige to- approach of balancing cooperation with the United wards economic competitiveness, especially for ex- States with an equally strong commitment to autono- port purposes. mous capabilities. Therefore, while maintaining a fair-sized space sci- THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY ence program, CNES (the French space agency) has been active mostly in launch vehicle development Just like France and other members of ESA, the FRG (Ariane, under ESA’s supervision), communication sat- conducts the largest share of its space efforts through ellites construction (participation in joint European that agency’s joint programs. In particular, the FRG programs; national TELECOM 1 satellites to be laun- government strongly supported the Spacelab program ched in 1984; a bilateral program with the FRG to at its inception in the early 1970s, and since then has launch direct TV broadcasting satellites in 1985), land provided more than 50 percent of its funding. The FRG remote-sensing systems (the first satellite of which, also provides the largest single contribution to ESA’s named SPOT 1, is to be launched in 1986 and will remote-sensing programs (METEOSAT, ERS), and land incorporate two high-resolution instruments and communications programs (OTS, ETS). More recently, stereoscopic imaging capability), and a variety of other when trying to shape ESA’s future programs, the FRG programs. has acted as a promoter of the EURECA project de- French industry, meanwhile, does not content itself scribed earlier, while France was promoting Ariane 4. with implementing national programs and its share of The FRG, however, is also engaged in a number of European ones, but also strives very hard to compete bilateral cooperative undertakings. Along with France, for space-related export sales. Ariane launch services the FRG is developing TV-SAT, a direct television have been sold to several organizations or countries– broadcasting satellite: experience thus gained will including private firms in the United States—and com- enable its electronics and aerospace firms to compete munications satellites to ARABSAT (a consortium of for export sales in what is expected to become one Arab countries). of the fastest growing markets, that of DBS (direct CNES also runs a research program to evaluate ma- broadcasting satellites). Another important area of terials processing applications, and has laid out plans bilateral endeavor is space science, not only with the and preliminary designs for a specialized automated United States (several FRG scientific satellites have “manufacturing-in-space system” named SOLARIS. been launched by the United States), but also with This concept features a platform (without crew facil- France, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. ities) equipped with furnaces, adequate power supply, Strong emphasis on materials science and process- and other ancillary subsystems including a robot man- ing is a characteristic feature of the FRG’s space pro- ipulator arm; a transfer and raw material supply stage gram. This includes suborbital flights on sounding to be launched by Ariane 4; and a ballistic reentry cap- rockets, which provide a few minutes of “near zero sule to bring processed items back to Earth. An effort gravity”; small payload packages to be carried by the to promote interest in this concept among other ESA Shuttle (referred to by NASA as “Getaway Specials”) member-states has not met with success up to now, and of course utilization of Spacelab. The FRG has perhaps because it was felt to be premature. conducted major experiments on the first Spacelab In sum, France’s space policy places a strong em- mission in 1983 (which was a joint U.S.-European phasis on “autonomy” (on a European level at least, flight). It has also purchased and will manage a wholly if not in the strictly national sense). This is due in part FRG Spacelab mission called D-1, to be flown in Oc- to a frame of mind inherited from the de Gaulle era, tober 1985. but now even more so to economic considerations; The FRG materials processing program is not purely commercial competition requires that a country be scientific in orientation. It aims at involving the indus- able to play its own hand independently. Furthermore, trial sector early in exploring potential applications of 194 . Civilian Space Stations and the U.S. Future in Space

space-processed metals, composite metals, crystals, and has taken a leading position in advanced com- and chemicals. This close association of government munications technology (20-30 gigahertz) through the support with industry’s initiative seems to work well, SIRIO-2 meteorological data dissemination satellite, all the more so because the FRG’s major aerospace which was destroyed in 1982 when the first Ariane and electronics firms play a much larger role in initi- operational flight failed to achieve orbit. ating and funding research and development efforts Besides its marked interest in communications-re- than do their counterparts in other European lated space activities, Italy has undertaken several countries. bilateral cooperative ventures with NASA, particularly Generally speaking, this fits in well with what ap- in areas not covered by European programs. In the pears to be the overall goal of the FRG’s space poli- past, these have included an imaginative concept cy: to encourage its national aerospace industry, to called San Marco, involving several launchings of promote scientific and industrial/technological re- small scientific satellites by U.S.-made SCOUT rockets search, and to rely on ESA’S programs to stay in the from an off-shore platform located on the equator off applications business. The keyword seems to be the coast of Kenya. More recently, Italy started devel- “competition through technological capability” rather oping IRIS, a small booster stage for Shuttle payloads. than “competition through nationally proven sys- Remote sensing is another theme for U.S.-Italian coop- tems.” (This latter could well be the French motto.) eration, if only because Italy runs the main European All this supports the views expressed in many quar- Landsat data receiving station located at Fucino near ters that among ESA’s member-states the FRG is the Rome. most “transatlantic-rein ded,” and that its attitude The latest scheme considered for a joint U.S.-Italian towards cooperative ventures with the United States venture is worth mentioning because of its obvious is likely to be more positive than that of the French. relation to in-space activities. It is the so called There is no doubt that in ESA’s councils, and even “tethered satellite” concept, in which a scientific sat- more freely so when drafting its national program, the ellite is to be attached by a long umbilical cord to the FRG would consider very seriously a possible invita- Shuttle or another infrastructure element in orbit. Italy tion from the United States to participate in “space now has a Memorandum of Understanding with station” development. Also, the FRG has been less NASA regarding this matter, and joint studies are outspoken than France in its reactions to the frustra- under way to develop the concept, Perhaps because tions which have resulted from some of the past U. S.- of this, Italy up to now has been one of the most eager Europe joint ventures. But the frustrations were there of ESA’s member-states to participate in informal dis- all the same, and like most of its European partners, cussions on U.S.-European cooperation in a “space the FRG will weigh closely the pros and cons of the station” development program. possible modes of cooperation.

ITALY THE UNITED KINGDOM With a 1983 budget for space activities in the range Although the United Kingdom initially showed lit- of$150 million, of which slightly more than one-half tle inclination to share in NASA’s “space station” makes up its contribution to ESA programs, Italy is aspirations, this situation has changed over the past clearly demonstrating a willingness to implement a year, with U.K. interest coming to focus on platforms. space policy of its own. The framing of such a policy Great Britain is, after France and the FRG, the third seems to be hindered by lack of central coordination largest contributor to ESA’s budget, but the lion’s share among the several interested government agencies: of its attention over the past several years has been Defense, Communications, and the National Research given to satellite communications, within ESA as well Council (CNR). The last, however, seems to be in the as nationally. As it happens, a “space station” has process of taking the lead. been thought, until recently, to be of relatively little In 1979, CNR managed to secure government ap- value to satellite communications (except in the very proval for an overall plan calling for a sharp increase long term). Britain’s developing interest in long-term in funding; this has been partly implemented. Most in-orbit infrastructure, coupled with its intention of of the increase is to fund national programs, especially maintaining its vigorous space science program (pur- in the field of communications satellites: a system sued both through ESA and bilaterally with NASA) and named ITALSAT is being considered, as well as a di- its rapidly growing interest in remote sensing, may sig- rect broadcasting TV system. Meanwhile, Italy has nal a move toward a more comprehensive and diver- strongly supported ESA’s experimental L-SAT program sified space program. App. C—lnternational Involvement in a Civilian “Space Station” Program . 195

OTHER ESA MEMBER-STATES Space development in Japan is executed under the This paper has dwelt at some length on those mem- leadership of the Space Activities Commission (SAC), bers of ESA which deem it preferable to participate an advisory organ to the Prime Minister. The main ex- directly, as well as through ESA, in talks with NASA ecutive agency is the National Space Development Agency (NASDA), established in 1969 to undertake on “space station” matters, This does by no means imply a lack of interest on other member countries’ the development of applications satellites and related launch vehicles, and to conduct launching and track- parts. However, it does make it more difficult to assess ing operations. Another agency, the Institute of Space their positions with respect to possible U.S. overtures 21 and Astronautical Science (ISAS), is in charge of scien- since those positions are not debated publicly. One fact remains, however: all ESA’s members have entific space programs carried out on balloons, sounding rockets, and satellites. ISAS builds its own family of trusted to the Agency a long-term program planning mandate, and have provided funds therefore. And this launch vehicles and runs its own launch center at Kag- oshima, independently of NASDA’s launch facilities mandate explicitly encompasses consideration of which are located at Tanegashima. “transatlantic” cooperation on a space station. Japan is the only country where large-scale space CANADA science and space applications programs are carried out by two completely separate entities, reporting to There is a General Agreement on Cooperation bet- different departments of government; while ISAS is an ween Canada and ESA, which makes Canadian par- “independent national institute” under the Ministry ticipation in an ESA contribution to a space infrastruc- of Education, NASDA reports to the Prime Minister’s ture program at least a possibility. Its longstanding Office through the Science and Technology Agency. tradition of bilateral cooperation with the United But NASDA also carries out programs on behalf of, States, however, prompts Canada, through its National and draws funds from, other ministries: Transport Research Council, to evaluate its interest in a “space (meteorology), Posts and Telecommunications, station” independently. From 1970 to 1981, Japan successfully launched 21 Canada’s expenditures in space in 1983 were about satellites, developed two families of launch vehicles, $100 million. Apart from a pioneering effort to operate undertook the development of several more satellites domestic satellite communications systems (the ANIK and of a third type of launcher, and readied a number spacecraft family built by Hughes) and a number of of experiments to be carried by the Shuttle and joint scientific projects with the United States, Can- Spacelab. For the time being, this effort has been ada’s major bilateral program with NASA is the de- directed exclusively towards meeting domestic needs velopment of the remote manipulator arm for the (communications, remote sensing) and the acquisition Shuttle. In return for a NASA commitment to purchase of technology and expertise through a wide range of additional arms from Toronto-based Spar Aerospace scientific and experimental programs. Consequently, Ltd., Canada has funded the $100 million develop- there has been, to date, little effort by Japan to comment of the first flight unit, which has been success- pete with other space powers in offering commercial fully tested on Shuttle flights. Manipulator systems services abroad. (An exception is the sale of ground could be important features of space infrastructure and stations for setting up communications networks or thus are candidates for Canadian contribution. remote-sensing data reception; in these areas, Japa- nese industry has captured a good share of the world JAPAN market.) With the exception of bilateral cooperation with the Until very recently, Japan has cooperated closely United States, Japan has, to date, carried the burden with NASA as well as with U.S. industry. In the field of its space activities alone.22 Fairly constant in the last of space science, there have been a number of scien- few years, Japan’s space expenditures per annum tific exchanges, and this will continue as Japan plans amount to approximately $45O million, a budget near- to use flight opportunities on the Shuttle and Spacelab. ly one half the size of the European Space Agency’s. Many of Japan’s applications satellites, whether experimental or operational, have been developed within the framework of joint ventures among Japanese and U.S. companies. As far as launch vehicles are con-

ZIThe ~sitlon of the smaller states In ESA is somewhat simi far to that of cerned, the “Mu” series of small launchers has been those in the European Economic Community. At the Economic Summit, the an indigenous development from the start, but the big four European nations attend in their own right; the remaining six are larger “N” family to be used to launch applications represented by the President of the Commission. Zz)apan may nw be expanding its sphere of space cooperation. it has re- satellites has relied on technology transfers from the cently opened a liaison office in Paris, for example. United States.

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The first stage of the “N1” version is in effect a Thor- In May 1984, Japan announced a plan for its par- Delta first stage built under license, and the third stage ticipation in the U.S. “space station” program. The is a U.S. (Thiokol) production. The improved “N2” plan calls for Japan’s development of an experimental version goes even further in this direction, as it also module to carry out life science and materials science includes a U.S. (Aerojet) second stage. All told, Japa- experiments, to be performed by one Japanese work- nese industry builds barely more than half of the “N2” er. The module will be connected with the U.S. in- vehicle. It should be pointed out that the U. S.-Japa- frastructure. It will include a manipulator arm, exper- nese Agreement on Space Activities (signed in 1969) imental devices for studies related to pharmaceuticals, imposes restrictions on the use of these U.S. technol- crystals, compound materials, and a self-sufficiency ogies and hardware by curbing transfer to third parties. food system. The development expenses to be paid The new launcher design, named Hi-A (roughly by Japan are estimated to be 200-300 billion yen [$0.9- equivalent to ESA’s Ariane 1 ) will alter this situation 1.4 billion (1984)]. significantly, for the second stage (which will burn advanced liquid hydrogen/oxygen propellants) and the DEVELOPING COUNTRIES third stage, as well as the guidance system, will be of Some developing countries can operate in space on indigenous design and manufacture. When the H1 -A their own, as is exemplified by India and the People’s becomes operational, Japan will be only one step Republic of China. Both countries have launched sev- removed from an autonomous launch capability, eral satellites using indigenous launchers. Both coun- namely the development of a new first stage (for which tries are engaged in efforts to use existing systems to preliminary designs have already been proposed). acquire expertise in important applications areas like In addition to the obvious desire to increase Japa- meteorology, remote sensing, communications, and nese industry’s share of the construction of space educational broadcasting. Details of programs and hardware, this trend towards autonomy could be technology are not always very well known outside based on two grounds. First, there may be dissatisfac- of these countries; most Western observers who have tion with U.S.-supplied hardware; indeed, in 1979 and visited space facilities in India and China have been 1980 two costly launch failures were traced to prob- impressed by their potential, if not always by their able malfunction of U.S.-supplied subsystems, and in present condition. In both countries, an adequate sub- the aftermath of these events it was decided to accel- stratum of advanced industries is missing—especially 23 erate indigenous development. Second, an autono- in the areas of electronic components, high-grade ma- mous launch capability clearly would enable Japan terials, and chemicals—and strains are caused by con- to offer full-scale commercial services in space ap- flicting priorities and by lack of foreign exchange. 24 placations. Shortages of trained technicians add further difficul- Another aspect of Japan’s space policy is that little ties, but the foundation has been laid for further activ- has been done to diversify its sources for technology ities in space. procurement and partnerships beyond the United Other developing countries are striving to reach the States. Regular consultations are held, for instance, stage already attained by China and India. A few years with ESA, but amount to little beyond some coordi- ago, it seemed that Brazil was on the verge of getting nation or satellite tracking stations. France was ap- a comprehensive program started, including its own proached in the early 1970s and at several points later satellites and launchers, developed in part indige- on for possible cooperation on liquid hydrogen-fueled nously and in part with foreign help. (France and the rocket engines, but to no avail; the parties did not FRG had actually almost concluded agreements with reach even a conceptual definition of a cooperative Brazil to that effect.) Political developments, growing venture. economic difficulties, and diplomatic pressures from some countries that were, perhaps, wary of Brazil’s access to missile technology have lowered these prospects considerably. Although Brazil has not managed to become a builder of space systems, it is an active zqhe japane5e reaction to the recent failure of transponders on their di- user of existing systems (INTELSAT for communica- rect broadcast satdlite suggests that the drive toward self-sufficiency will prob tions, LANDSAT for remote sensing), and still plans ably be further intensified. q has ~n ~nt~ out that Japan’s launch capabilities are severely limited to operate a satellite communications system of its by agreements with the fishing industry, whereby the Tanegashima launch own, which would be procured abroad. center can be used only four months per year. But this restriction clearly Utilization of space technology, in contrast to its de- would not be sufficient to deter Japan frcwr its traditional policy of entering the world market after a technology has been mastered and tried out on do- velopment, is almost worldwide. In particular, more mestic markets. than 100 participating countries are members in App. C—International Involvement in a Civilian “Space Station” Program ● 197

INTELSAT, and each of them operates at least one the INTELSAT organization. These countries decided ground station. In addition, there are more than half instead to create their own international satellite com- a dozen LANDSAT and/or SPOT remote-sensing data munications system, named INTERSPUTNIK; since the reception stations i n existence or u rider construction two systems have to be linked somehow, there are throughout the so-called Third World .25 INTELSAT ground stations in the U. S. S. R., Cuba, and Are there potential partners in a joint “space sta- Romania, but these countries are users of and not par- tion” venture to be found among these countries, es- ties to INTELSAT. It is true that the Soviet Union is pecially among those which have some sort of aero- party to several international satellite systems, notably space industry of their own? There is no basic reason INMARSAT (which is, roughly speaking, to maritime why the answer should be no, but it must be pointed communications, what INTELSAT is to ground com- out that: munications) and SARSAT-CORPAS (an experimental — to some of these countries, cooperation with the satellite assisted search and rescue system). But these United States would pose a tricky, if not insur- were created in a context where the United States did mountable, political challenge, unless the mode not play a dominant role. of cooperation approached a “genuinely inter- However, it is not possible to discuss international national” one; prospects for international involvement in a “space — financial participation of these countries could station” without mentioning the Soviet Union, for that probably not exceed a very small percentage of country does operate its own in-space infrastructure: the total cost; and Sal yut-Soyuz-Progress .26 Furthermore, the Soviet — such a program exceeds by far the ambitions that Union has provided opportunities to several other these countries set at present for their endeavors countries to have one or more of their citizens visit in space, and going along with it in an interna- this infrastructure. tional context would not satisfy the fundamental The Soviets have never concealed their ultimate in- craving for autonomy and self-assertion which tention to have some of their people in space often, to some extent, underlies their space operating permanent facilities there, and Salyut is policies. clearly a major step towards that goal. The pace of Concerning the second point, it might be argued its future evolution is, however, open to conjecture. that a large number of small percentages can amount The Salyut-Soyuz-Progress infrastructure, as developed to a sizable sum. To give one example: 82 out of 102 to date, does not exhibit all the features to which signatures of INTELSAT own each less than 1 percent NASA aspires for U.S. in-space infrastructure. of the shares, but their combined participation For instance, the Salyut’s crew can perform work amounts to more than 20 percent. As to the third only inside the station, or, when spacewalking, only point, a genuinely international structure could be very close to it, by remaining tethered. The Soviets acceptable to countries who see space activities as a apparently have no such thing as manned maneuver- means of self-assertion; for, even if the system were ing units, teleoperated maneuvering systems, and the built and operated by industrialized countries, it like. As a result, the crew cannot tend other space- would at least be jointly owned/managed by all. These craft which might co-orbit or rendezvous with their considerations all point to the same conclusions: a sig- complex, in order to maintain, service, or repair them. nificant level of participation by developing countries This reflects adversely on all material processing re- is unlikely to occur, except possibly within some search: Salyut, because of perturbations caused by broad international framework and unless aggressively pursued by the United States.

THE SOVIET UNION NThe name SALYUT designates a series of manned Ohitd laboratories, launched and operated one at a time since 1971. The system presently ac- Under present and foreseeable political circum- tive, SALYU1 7, is likely to stay several years in orbit, as did its predecessor SALYUT 6, both because of design improvements and because a fair amount stances, the Soviet Union would be unlikely to par- of in-orbit maintenance can now be carried out by visiting crews. The space- ticipate in in a space venture initiated and led by the craft, weighing about 40,000 Ibs, is launched unmanned, and later on rendez- United States. Even the prospects of its participating vous with SOYUZ capsules carrying a crew of 2 or 3. SALYUT 6 and 7 have also been visited by larger (30,000 Ibs) unmanned craft. The usual pattern in a genuinely international system seem very remote. of activity is to send abroad first a “semi-permanent” crew of two for a dura- One need only remember that the Soviet Union, and tion now exceeding 6 months. While this crew stays on board, visiting crews of three join them (usually for a week). These visits alternate with unmanned the other Eastern-bloc countries, have never joined resupply trips by PROGRESS. To date, the station has been left unoccupied for some time after the semipermanent crew has accomplished its long-duration stay, after which the cycle starts again. For a more complete discussion, see the OTA Technical Memorandum Sa/yut: Soviet Steps Toward Per-

25Each of these stations usually serves several Countria. manent Human Presence in Space, December 1982. 198 . Civilian Space Stations and the U.S. Future in Space

crew members’ movements and the lack of a free-fly- The debate over European participation in NASA’s ing platform in its vicinity, does not provide the very post-Apollo program is by far the most important past low level of residual “gravity” necessary for the im- experience, since it was the only time that the United plementation of finely tuned experiments. States invited its major allies–Europe, Canada, Aus- In spite of this, and other present limitations, the Sal- tralia, and Japan—to participate in an effort which was yut has been used extensively for military and civil- at the core of NASA’s plans for the future. While there ian activities. In the latter case, where some results had been significant scientific cooperation prior to are known, cosmonauts have performed useful work 1969, particularly with Europe, there was a deliberate in life sciences, Earth observation, astronomy, mate- decision as NASA’s post-Apollo efforts were being rials processing, and technology development. Fur- planned in 1969 and 1970 to make international in- thermore, SaIyut has enabled the Soviet Union to gain volvement in those efforts, particularly of U.S. allies, the prestige associated with having some of its peo- a major theme. ple in orbit. Armed with what he thought was a mandate from Cooperation with the Soviet Union in space is a President Richard Nixon to seek such involvement, complex matter.27 Planning is difficult when future NASA Administrator Thomas Paine toured Europe and plans are, by definition, to be kept secret. Communi- the Far East inviting other countries to consider cation with authoritative Soviet representatives tends substantial involvement in the emerging U.S. post- to be scant, slow, and often “beside the point.” Stand- Apollo plans, which at the time included a “space sta- ards, methods and even terminology are very different tion,” Shuttle, reusable orbital transfer vehicle (“space from those in use outside the Soviet Union. Conse- tug”), and, ultimately, having people visit Mars. Euro- quently, project managers and teams from these coun- pean nations, through ELDO and ESRO, were particu- tries who have been involved in bilateral programs larly responsive to Paine’s initiative, and began to with the U.S.S.R. have usually experienced great dif- study in some detail various forms of participation; nei- ficulties in keeping cost and schedule under control. ther Japan nor Australia made an active response to However, Soviet teams have proven their ability to the U.S. initiative. be flexible and imaginative when they feel the need A primary NASA objective in initiating the for it. For example, West German scientists whose in- post-Apollo dialogue was “to stimulate Europeans to struments are to be flown on the upcoming Soviet rethink their present limited space objectives, to help VEGA mission to Halley’s Comet have found the co- them avoid wasting resources on obsolescent devel- operative arrangements quite satisfactory. opments, and eventually to establish more consider- Whatever the difficulties inherent in international able prospects for future international collaboration cooperation with the U.S.S.R. in space activities, there on major space projects. ”28 In particular, NASA was are countries which have no other choice, and there eager to steer Europe away from developing an auton- are countries which find advantage in balancing coop- omous launch capability. Plans for an expendable eration with the United States with joint ventures with European launcher were the “obsolescent develop- the Soviet Union. It seems unlikely, however, that ments” to which Paine was referring. these latter countries would go so far as to bypass co- At the time NASA was offering to involve other operation with the United States on a “space station” countries in an ambitious post-Apollo enterprise; it did by exclusive recourse to analogous Soviet flight op- not have White House or congressional approval for portunities. the programs it was promoting overseas. Indeed, one tactic NASA may have been using to gain program ap- Factors Influencing Assessment proval at home was to point out the problems involved of International Involvement in in withdrawing from incipient agreements with Eur- U.S. “Space Station” Program ope to cooperate in those programs. Potential U.S. partners were aware of the NASA approach; in Sep- PAST EXPERIENCE tember 1970, for example, “American space officials Both the United States and its potential partners will were asked for assurance that, if West European na- have a substantial historical record in mind when it tions scrapped their space programs in favor of a joint effort with the United States, the latter would not, in comes time to decide whether, and how, to proceed 29 in a cooperative “space station” endeavor. an economy move, back down. ”

ZBLetter from Thomas Paine, NASA Administrator, to the President, NOV. ZTU ,s, /u .s, s, R. Coowation in space will be examined by OTA in detail 7, 1969. in a technical memorandum to be published late In 1984. ZqNew York Times, Sept. 24, 1970, P. 64. App. C—International Involvement in a Civilian “Space Station” Program ● 199

By 1971, only the Shuttle and orbital transfer vehi- tug, with its planned cryogenic fuel, in the Shuttle cle remained as part of NASA’s post-Apollo plans; the payload bay. “space station” had been shelved for the indefinite In June 1972, the United States withdrew (without future. NASA was suggesting to Europe that its partic- warning) the option of Europe’s participation being ipation involve developing some portion of the air- development of the tug, and told Europe that the only frame of the Shuttle orbiter and total responsibility for choice left for substantial participation was develop- developing the space tug. However, others within the ment of the sortie laboratory. Europe was also ex- Executive Branch were skeptical that Europe had the cluded from direct involvement in developing any ele- technical capability to develop the tug on its own, and ment of the Shuttle orbiter itself. This decision came were concerned that the United States might, in the as a blow to Europe, which had already spent substan- process of assisting Europe in the tug development, tial sums both on tug development and, particularly transfer sensitive and/or economically valuable U.S. in the United Kingdom and Italy, on orbiter design technology. work in collaboration with U.S. industry. In terms of Throughout 1970 and 1971, negotiations on Euro- stimulus to European technical and industrial capa- pean involvement in post-Apollo development efforts bility and eventual sales potential, Europe viewed the were Iinked to a European request for U.S. assurance sortie laboratory as a distinctly less desirable option. that it would launch European communication satel- Nevertheless, Europe (and in particular the FRG) lites. The United States had for some time resisted pro- found the opportunity to become involved with the viding such assurances on terms acceptable to Eur- U.S. mainstream program for the 1970s attractive ope because of its own economic interests, both enough that it continued negotiations in a situation INTELSAT and in U.S. industry’s domination of the where the United States was clearly playing a domi- market for communications satellites, but i n Septem- nant role. After a further year of negotiations, in mid- ber 1971 a compromise on the issue acceptable to 1973 Europe agreed to proceed with development of both sides was reached and this obstacle to the post- the sortie laboratory (by now named Spacelab) as part Apollo negotiations was removed. of a “package deal” which also included development President Nixon approved development of the Shut- of a French launcher (which became the Ariane proj- tle on January 5, 1972. Shortly afterwards, a joint ect) and of an experimental maritime communications NASA/European “experts group” met and reported satellite and which called for the creation of a single that “NASA . . . continued to encourage European European Space Agency to carry out these projects. participation in development and use of the post- It was the difference in cost between the expensive Apollo program. . . . NASA’s expectation [was] that tug development program and the less expensive (at European participation in development of the Shut- the time) Spacelab program which freed up the fun- tle would be within the context of a broader program ding needed to initiate joint European support of which included multilateral European responsibility Ariane. for development of a major element such as reusable The Memorandum of Understanding which gov- space tugs . . , or Shuttle-borne orbital laborator- erned NASA/European cooperation on Spacelab was ies . . , .“3° signed in September 1973.31 At the time of the U. S.- The suggestion that there was an alternative to Euro- European agreement on Spacelab development, it was pean development of the space tug had emerged with- anticipated that the facility would be used extensively in the United States during 1971; the so-called “sor- in conjunction with the Shuttle and that the United tie can” laboratory (also called a research and States would buy several Spacelabs beyond the one applications module) was seen as clearly within Euro- engineering model and one flight model which Eur- pean capabilities, offering no risks of unwanted tech- ope agreed to develop and build at its own cost and nology transfer, having no military implications, and then to deliver to NASA. This has not yet happened. providing clean technical and managerial interfaces with development of the Shuttle orbiter itself. On the other hand, two factors militated against Europe’s de- 31 The Mou b~ween NASA and E’jA was a subo~l “ate document ~hlch veloping the tug: 1 ) recognition that the Shuttle and drew its authority from the Intergowxnmental Agreement between the United its associated orbital transfer vehicle would be used States on the one hand and each of the individual governments of the ESRO Member States on the other. This Agreement was thus binding on the whole by the United States for military, as well as civilian, of the U.S. Government not just on NASA. Although ratified by the parlia- purposes, and 2) NASA’s concern over housing the ments of several ESRO countries, it was not submitted to the U.S. Senate for ratification. As a consequence, its status was that of an “International Executive Agreement” and, as such, subordinate to U.S. domestic law. This point, which the ESRO states did not appreciate at the time, became important in 1979 in connection with a U.S. Air Force plan (later cancelled) to JONASA press Release, Feb. 11, 1972. develop a system similar to Spacelab. 200 ● Civilian Space Stations and the U.S. Future in Space

The costs of both Shuttle and Spacelab utilization have as a bargaining chip in U.S.-European negotiations on escalated to the point where extensive utilization of future collaboration. For a time, though, it seemed as the full Spacelab capabilities is questionable, and the if “aberrations such as the unilateral pullout by the United States has bought only the minimum single ad- United States” from the ISPM could “set back pro- ditional Spacelab to which it was committed. gress for years.”36 It is perhaps an indication of the The Europeans knew that, under the circumstances, basically favorable climate for U.S.-European collab- they would have to accept the status of a junior part- oration in space activities that the ISPM incident and ner. Now that they have demonstrated their compe- the Spacelab experience are viewed as lessons of what tence, they will look to agreements on a much more is to be avoided in future negotiations rather than equitable basis as Europe considers cooperation with reasons for not cooperating in the future. the United States in “space station” development. For example, the current head of CNES has questioned NATIONAL SECURITY INTERESTS whether Spacelab has “fulfilled German expectations” Military and national intelligence space activities (the FRG was the major European advocate of the pro- provide the United States and its allies with major na- gram) and has suggested that “there is some question tional security advantages, and all indications point as to whether Spacelab . . . is really appreciated by towards reliance on them in the future. A major pro- the U.S. . . . In any event, Europe does not really feel gram like the “space station” is therefore bound to at home in Spacelab, whose operation is now out of have national security implications. If a decision is 32 European hands.” made to develop a single set of infrastructure elements European acceptance of what some now perceive to satisfy all interests, civilian and military, then the to be unfavorable terms in the Spacelab agreement prospect of international involvement in such a pro- stemmed in large part from lack of confidence in Euro- gram raises critical questions. This is all the more true pean capabilities and from a belief that only through since new security implications may emerge as the cooperation with the United States could those capa- program matures. If the future unveils unforeseen po- bilities be improved. Now, having brought both tentialities, international participation in the program Spacelab and Ariane to success, Europe has much may inhibit, perhaps even prevent. the United States more confidence in its ability to chart its own future from taking full advantage of them. in space and it is likely to be a more demanding par- To an extent, major international involvement will ticipant in negotiations with the United States over obviously restrict U.S. freedom of choice in the future: cooperative ventures. it would be more difficult, for instance, for the United European confidence in the United States as a coop- States to preserve the option of integrating all its ef- erative partner was shaken in the spring of 1981 when forts in space (military as well as civilian) and having the United States announced, without prior consulta- a single Government agency responsible for them tion with its European partners, that it was canceling (though the U.S. Army and its Corps of Engineers may a U.S. spacecraft which was part of a two-spacecraft exemplify a possible approach). Such a drastic step 33 International Solar Polar Mission (ISPM). This with- has been debated and rejected in the past, but, in prin- drawal caused vigorous protests from not only Euro- ciple, it remains an option which international par- pean space officials but also representatives of foreign ticipation might foreclose. Conversely, any form of 34 ministries. There is general agreement that the ISPM U.S. military activity would raise major problems for 35 affair was not handled well by the United States. Al- ESA as a partner, since the ESA charter precludes any though both the United States and Europe have man- 37 involvement in military projectso aged to put ISPM in perspective, European officials A more likely future, however, is that any national are not beyond using U.S. remorse over the incident security uses would rely on elements operationally separate from the civilian one, but built with similar or identical technology and perhaps making joint use of basic utilities. Dependence of any military seg- ‘zHerbert Curien, “The Pride of France: a National Commitment, ” Spec- ment(s) on parts and/or subsystems procured from for- trum, September 1983, p. 75. JJlndeed, European confidence had been shaken earlier when the United eign sources could ensue, This is a situation which will States cancel led its share in the AEROSAT program, In this instance, the U.S. withdrawal was total, and the program was stopped.

3zFor a runni ng account of the International Solar Polar Mission COfItrOVerSy, see articles in Aviation Week and Space Technology, Mar, 2, Mar. 30, Aug. 36Noel Hinners, “Space Science and Humanistic Concerns,” in Jerry Grey 3, Sept. 28, and Dec. 28, 1981. and Lawrence Levy, eds., Global Implications of Space Activities (American JSlt is ~rhaps ~rth noting that the situation was aggravated because NASA Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics, 1982), p. 43. was not permitted to consult or even warn ESA of the impending cancella- ‘Three of ESA’S members (Sweden, Switzerland, and Ireland) are neutral tion until the President’s budget had been delivered to the Congress. countries. App. C—International Involvement in a Civilian “Space Station” Program ● 201

never please the military (which, like France, prefers tions, therefore, should not discourage the United “autonomy”), but which can probably be met with States from seeking foreign participation, if it so adequate licensing arrangements (e.g., those under desires. which the AV-8 Harrier aircraft was produced). For Perhaps more important to national security con- instance, if the U.S. military were to envision using siderations are the restrictions which might be im- elements of any civilian space infrastructure under posed on certain national security uses of internation- such circumstances, a foreign supplier could be really developed infrastructure. While some, perhaps quired to entrust a U.S. official agency with all draw- many, potential international partners might not op- ings and documents needed to transfer the manufac- pose so-called “peaceful” military applications (e.g., turing of the item under consideration to a U.S. military R&D, or activities in support areas such as supplier if such a course eventually proved to be nec- communications, navigation, surveillance), some of essary. An intergovernmental arrangement would spe- them are unlikely to agree to the installation of any cify those situations where the U.S. agency is author- “battle station” on an element derived from a devel- ized to implement the transfer to a national supplier, opment program to which they are party. There is so as to protect the foreign firm’s commercial inter- clearly no way to bypass such an issue: it would of ests in all other cases. necessity have to be settled beforehand, as explicitly Such a device works best when the back-up sup- as possible, in the agreement instituting the interna- plier in the U.S. is pre-identified, so that a minimum tional program. amount of transfer of know-how, consistent with the A last issue relating to national security considera- preservation of the foreign source’s interests, can be tions is that of the transfer of technology from the carried out in advance, thus shortening the inevita- United States to foreign participants, or vice versa. ble lead time inherent in a manufacturing restart. Of There are generally two ways in which such technol- course, there is always the possibility that the U.S. mil- ogy transfers occur: “ itary could procure systems directly from non-U. S. 1. In the course of an international development suppliers; this has happened for a few military systems program, a certain amount of know-how is inevi- in the past. tably transferred among the parties to the project. Another security-related consequence of interna- This is more in the nature of general knowledge tional participation could be that foreign participants (management, organizational methodology and would be exposed to the operating characteristics of procedures) than of specific technological skills. the technology used by U.S. national security agen- The character of technical interaction between cies. This could involve those parts or subsystems pro- NASA and ESA in conjunction with Spacelab, vided by foreign sources, and can be assessed only even though it includes some technical assistance on a case-by-case basis. But the matter could extend provided by NASA, is evidence of this. beyond foreign-supplied hardware, since foreign par- 2. If a foreign participant in charge of a given sub- ticipants will of necessity have access to a certain level system were to appear unable; at a late stage of of technological detail, especially those interfacing the program, to produce a product conforming with what they supply. This, however, is not neces- to required performance standards, it then would sarily critical: in a similar instance, the Shuttle, al- become necessary to assist the concerned party though it can be used to carry on U.S. national secu- in meeting the specifications, a process which rity activities, is itself not a classified item. However, might involve the transfer of valuable and sensi- many aspects of Shuttle operations, such as access to tive know-how. This can only be assessed on a the Orbiter itself, are carried out under strict security, case-by-case basis, but a number of safeguards and the military has developed separate control facil- can be built into the program at the start. These ities for its use of the Shuttle. would include careful selection of subsystems en- Similarly, as the presumed leader in a space infra- trusted to foreign participants and provision for structure program, the United States is bound to be midcourse assessment of performance. Of i n a dominant position regarding transfer of sensitive course, the reverse possibility now exists as well: technology and industrial information. As was the case that the United States could gain access to valu- with Spacelab, all data and drawings pertaining to any able technological know-how from other foreign contribution would have to be made available countries. to the United States in order to allow operation, main- POTENTIAL PRIVATE-SECTOR INVOLVEMENT tenance, and repairs to be carried out. The United States, on the other hand, would have to provide only In principle, private business and international essential interface data to its partners. Such considera- cooperation are perfectly compatible; successful 202 ● Civilian Space Stations and the U.S. Future in Space

“multinationals” are proof of this. It is true that until It appears likely that international involvement in recently there were no multinational firms involved space infrastructure development, operation, and in space developments (unless INTELSAT is seen as ownership would enhance the prospects for an eco- a business). Actually, space activities in practically all nomically efficient and broadly based utilization pro- countries constitute an area where governmental set- gram. Common interest in its future capabilities and ting of policy, financing, and implementation of pro- use will stimulate creativity and innovation among a grams are the rule, although the private sector can be much wider international community of potential us- expected to play an increasingly important role in fu- ers, including non-profit-seeking ones (governmental ture space activities. agencies, research institutions and the like). Also, any There is a clear trend towards increased private-sec- competition from the Soviet Union will be lessened tor involvement in those applications of space ex- if spacefaring countries feel secure in their participa- pected to generate profit, and the matter of “space tion in a U.S./international complex. commercialization” is now being actively debated in the United States. In Europe, precedents have been THE TECHNICAL ADEQUACY OF POTENTIAL set with firms like ARIANESPACE (for the sale of launch FOREIGN CONTRIBUTIONS services) and SPOT-IMAGE (for the commercial ex- What components of space infrastructure would ploitation of the French SPOT Earth-resources-sensing each of the potential partners reviewed earlier be most satellite). In Japan, space programs rely on close gov- likely to contribute by virtue of the current tenden- ernment-industry interaction. cies of its own programs, of the existence of techno- Hence, if it appears that activities conducted using logical domains where its industry is known to excel, space infrastructure can be economically profitable, or of other factors? Answers to this question are im- the fact that it was developed internationally should portant. For if any foreign partners enter such a coop- not present an insurmountable obstacle to private-sec- erative effort, the United States must ensure that their tor involvement in its use. However, all other things technical contributions are feasible, compatible, and being equal, it is likely that U.S. industry would pre- complementary. Or, from another perspective: to fer to deal with infrastructure owned and operated by what extent would the desired infrastructure have to U.S. interests, Government or private. be modified in order to accommodate contributions by a given set of participants? THE ECONOMICS OF COMMERCIAL APPLICATIONS It is impossible now to suggest more than a few gen- The greater the prospects of commercial use of eralities, inasmuch as NASA has not yet specified what space infrastructure, the better the prospects for re- the overall performance specifications are going to be. turns from investments made to develop it. The eco- Too, the level of technical sophistication for a given nomic prospects can only gain from its large and wide- subsystem cannot yet be articulated. As just one ex- encompassing utilization. Such utilization, including ample, consider electric power conditioning and dis- foreign users, may exist even if the United States de- tribution. On all spacecraft developed until now, elec- velops all or nearly all of the infrastructure. Many tric power is distributed at low voltage, and all foreign customers would be attracted to any oppor- spacefaring countries possess the relevant technology. tunities provided by its use. The extent of commer- Many experts, however, judge that, for long-term in- cialization would then depend mainly on the condi- space infrastructure, this technology should be sup- tions set by the owner(s) and operator(s): first and planted by an alternative, high-voltage technology. In foremost, pricing policy, but also any commercial re- anticipation of just such a development, ESA and strictions (e.g., will the infrastructure be made avail- NASA have been discussing for some time the gener- able to foreign firms competing directly with U.S. firms ation of a set of standards to be employed in space- in a given field of application?) and technical factors craft high-voltage power systems; but the matter is still (e.g., such stringent safety requirements that disclosure outstanding, of proprietary knowledge would have to be made by Lastly, potential participants may wish to make their the user). However, NASA’s experience with accom- contribution, not in the areas where their industry is modating commercial interests (including R&D efforts) best endowed with existing capabilities, but rather in on the Shuttle, through such mechanisms as Joint En- areas where they want it to acquire new capabilities. deavor Agreements and trips purchased in whole or Nothing should prevent them from doing so if they in part by commercial interests under proprietary con- are ready to commit themselves to meet the costs of ditions, provides precedents which suggest that even such new and (to them) risky developments. This mat- U.S.-only elements could accommodate non-U.S. ter could become “sticky,” however, if they were to commercial users successfully. wish to make a “key” contribution in such an area, App. C—International Involvement in a Civilian “Space Station” Program ● 203

Thus, no useful projection of task allocation can be other major partner, say Japan, joins the “space made now. Perhaps the division of work will have to station” program at a similar level, this still leaves be negotiated on a case-by-case basis, before the pro- the U.S. to bear 60 to 70 percent of the expense. gram actually starts, but after its shape and definition 3. International cooperative programs, especially have been outlined in more detail. Some countries are where advanced technology is concerned, have already suggesting ways in which they might prefer the reputation of being beleaguered by complex to contribute, and it would be wise for the United diplomatic and managerial interfaces, as well as States to give careful consideration to including pro- by difficult compromises needed to tailor the spective partners in the infrastructure design phase in overall undertaking to each participant’s particu- some sensible fashion. lar requirements. 4. Past experience points to the fact that the U.S. Assessment: Pros and Cons civilian space pro-gram is difficult enough to coor- of International Involvement dinate with the U.S. national security program on a purely national basis. This could be even more A “U.S. ONLY” PROGRAM difficult in the case of an international “space sta- At first glance, since almost certainly the United tion” program. States is likely to bear the largest part of the financial These considerations must however be carefully burden of a “space station” development program, weighed against a number of arguments in favor of and since international cooperation is fraught with international involvement: many well-known difficulties, it would seem that there As stated repeatedly, international cooperation would be much merit in the prospect of an independ- is a long-standing tradition in civilian space pro- ent, strictly U. S., undertaking. In addition, many of grams, and pursuing it has had a very positive po- the reasons which have led the United States to con- litical impact. Traditional partners of the United sider a “space station” program in the first place— States in the industrialized world consistently list national pride and a sense of accomplishment, nation- cooperation with this country among the objec- al prestige, national security, or supporting U.S. firms tives of their space policy statements; for exam- in commercial space activities—might best be served ple, the head of the French space program, who by a program carried out under exclusive U.S. control. also chairs the ESA Council and the European Sci- Similarly, it could be argued that potential interna- ence Foundation, has recently noted that “coop- tional partners might find it to their advantage to be eration with the United States is of fundamental 38 left to their own devices in planning and implement- importance. ” The United States has given a ing their respective space programs, rather than hav- strong impression already that it anticipates sig- ing to weigh the pros and cons of associating them- nificant international utilization of a “space sta- selves with what will in essence be an American tion” and that, in order to assure such utilization, program, unlikely to be perfectly suited to their goals it wilI be receptive to foreign participation i n the and/or technical and financial resources and likely to development phase of the program. A decision limit their ability to pursue independent actions. to forego such participation would certainly have The arguments in favor of a strictly national U.S. pro- major (though probably not yet very major) po- gram can be summarized as follows: litical costs. 1, There is no substantial reason why the United 2. As discussed earlier, if the United States chooses States would not be able to go it alone: the coun- to go ahead alone with its space infrastructure ac- try has all the technical and industrial resources quisition program, several countries or groups of necessary. countries among the industrialized Western-type 2. Generating and maintaining international inter- democracies are likely to follow suit, even if on est in a “space station” program and enlisting a smaller scale and after some time. Such duplica- participants is in itself a difficult process, leading tion of efforts might well result in a net loss to to many concessions on the part of the United the Western world. The very cost of these invest- States and other participating countries, the re- ments is bound to generate an extremely harsh turn from which could be rather disappointing. level of competition for their commercial utiliza- Participation of Europe in major U.S. space tion, to the point where it may not be economi- undertakings, such as the Space Transportation cally sound any more and the benefits of space System or the Space Telescope, seems always to stay in the 10 to 15 percent range, which is consistent with European space budgets. Even if one ~acurlen, op. Cit., P. 76

38 798 0 - 84 - ] 5 , QL 3 204 . Civilian Space Stations and the U.S. Future in Space

commercialization could be lost or significantly was the best available means of maximizing all of the delayed. national objectives which have led to beginning the 3. Even if the prospects that Europe and Japan may program in the first place. As mentioned earlier, the associate in a joint “space station” program with- INTELSAT and INMARSAT analogy is rather mislead- out the United States seem remote, there is no ing here. The objectives of those systems are inher- doubt that this possibility becomes more likely ently international in character and could not be suc- if the United States chooses to go it alone. As cessfully pursued without broad international argued earlier, there are virtually no cir- participation, while space infrastructure can be devel- cumstances in which Europe or Japan would oped and operated as a purely national enterprise. refuse a U.S. offer of involvement in the “space Even the parallel to ESA is somewhat artificial: Euro- station, ” and thus it is up to the United States to pean countries created ESA because such a joint en- decide whether to make that offer. deavor was the only way that they could marshal the As argued earlier and briefly again above, a likely resources required to carry out a comprehensive impact of U.S. decision to proceed alone would be space program, albeit on a regional rather than a na- the eventual development by other space-oriented tional basis. The United States, should it chose to do countries of capabilities which will be, at least in part, so, has the resources required for unilateral “space similar to those offered by a U.S. “space station.” This station” development. could result in increased downstream economic com- A decision to create an international acquisition ar- petition between the United States and other indus- rangement is highly unlikely, given the specific char- trial countries in commercial exploitation of space. By acter of the support mobilized behind the “space sta- involving potential competitors in the U.S. ‘program, tion” concept in the United States, Europe and Japan this situation might be avoided or minimized. There to date. One fundamental motivation which could is a certain parallel with the situation regarding Euro- lead to such a decision–that it was the only way to pean involvement in U.S. post-Apollo activities. By mobilize the needed financial or technical re- withdrawing the offer of European development of a sources—is missing, and there seems to be no other space tug (with an estimated cost to Europe of $500 compelling reason, from a U.S. perspective, to pur- million—$1 billion) and substituting the Spacelab (then sue this option. Only if it were seen by the United estimated to cost $100 million-$200 million), the States and, to a lesser degree, other spacefaring states United States made possible a European financial as a particularly attractive way of symbolizing their commitment to develop its own launcher, which is commitment to broadly based international cooper- now competing with the Shuttle for launch contracts. ation would a “fully international” option be pre- The United States needs to evaluate carefully whether ferred; no such vision has been persuasively ad- it wants to create a similar situation as its “space sta- vanced. tion” program begins. Making international operational arrangements As mentioned earlier in this paper, from the U.S. once the infrastructure is acquired appears a some- perspective international involvement is an option, not what more realistic prospect, though still unlikely to a requirement. However, not only are there strong be preferred by its developers. The United States (and reasons for the United States to pursue this option, its partners) could recoup at least some costs of the but, at least from NASA’s perspective, internationaliz- acquisition by selling shares in it, and this form of ing the “space station” program to some meaningful broadened international involvement may be an at- degree eventually may bean important means of ga- tractive way of giving newly industrializing and de- thering political support in this country for the size veloping countries a useful sense of involvement on and kind of program that it wishes to have. If the na- the space frontier. Broader international involvement tionalistic objectives which might be served by NASA’s could also be accomplished by internationalizing (to present “space station” program aspirations are not some extent) the operating crew—or by leasing facili- sufficient to gain White House and congressional sup- ties to the rest of the world. port of a “go it alone” approach, then an approach mixing nationalistic and cooperative elements seems A U.S. PROGRAM WITH INTERNATIONAL essential to mobilize political support for it. INVOLVEMENT Since the United States has given strong indication AN INTERNATIONAL PROGRAM that it will open its space infrastructure program to This approach to space infrastructure development, foreign participation, it is useful to estimate what form operation, and use would be preferred by the United of involvement is most likely to be successful, where States and/or other space-capable countries only if it success is defined as a mixture of costs and benefits App. C—International Involvement in a Civilian “Space Station” Program ● 205

which is acceptable to all involved. Reaching an agree- But it seems as if the objectives, primarily utilitarian, ment is likely to involve difficult bargaining and sig- which would motivate other countries to join in such nificant compromise at the political, managerial, and a U.S. program would be best served if they could do technical levels. This process is already beginning, and so with minimal loss of their future freedom of ac- both the United States and its potential partners (par- tion—i.e., participation in the acquisition, including ticularly Europe) are approaching the issue in a rather development, phase only, with no a priori commit- different manner than was the case during the 1969-73 ment to system utilization or to sharing in overall negotiations over post-Apollo participation. system management. Those objectives which are likely to be of most in- Potential U.S. partners are, of course, fully aware terest to the United States perhaps would be best that a U.S. offer to share in the acquisition of in-space served by a cooperative approach which would com- infrastructure is fundamentally political in character, mit the United States and its partners to share impor- and that decisions on issues such as cost-sharing and tant parts of the overall acquisition program, to remain division of labor are as much political as technical or involved beyond its acquisition (i. e., during its oper- economic. However, as the earlier review of the space ational phase as well), and to seek broadly based infra- programs of potential partners has suggested, Europe structure utilization once established: that is, overall (both ESA and individual countries) Canada and Ja- joint acquisition, operation, and use. Certainly the pan will bring some very real assets to the negotiat- United States would prefer to be the world leader in ing process. The outcome of that process is certainly space development and use over the next few dec- not going to reflect U.S. interests alone. Indeed, Eur- ades. A U.S.-led, freely arrived at, major in-space in- ope, Canada and Japan may consider their participa- frastructure collaboration program–one involving tion in the operation of the infrastructure and their many, perhaps all, countries, especially the major guaranteed access to it as preconditions to their con- spacefaring ones—would go a long way toward tributing to its development. achieving this goal. Appendix D SYNOPSIS OF THE OTA WORKSHOP ON COST CONTAINMENT OF CIVILIAN SPACE INFRASTRUCTURE (CIVILIAN “SPACE STATION”) ELEMENTS1

PREFACE and technical considerations. A synthesis of the discussions in these two areas is presented in the next two This appendix summarizes information presented at sections. The last section is a set of tentative an OTA workshop on cost containment and cost mini- conclusions for the consideration of NASA and mization in NASA’s projected civilian “space station” Congress. program. This program is expected to result in the Government’s acquisition of elements of an overall Summary in-space infrastructure support system. The 2-day workshop was held on October 18 and 19, 1983, and Recent history indicates that only about one-third was attended by more than a dozen senior profes- of the cost of acquiring a space system is directly sional representatives from (non-NASA) high-technol- related to hardware. Management, engineering, inte- ogy Government organizations, Government-related gration, test, software, documentation, and other ac- aerospace industry organizations, and non-space in- quisition support activities use up the remaining two- dustry organizations. Most of those attending were thirds. Although many ways that promise to cut costs either former senior NASA professionals or had in a civilian space infrastructure (“space station”) pro- worked often on large NASA contracts. The views of gram were discussed at the workshop, program phi- invitees unable to attend are also contained in this ap- losophy and management were emphasized. pendix. A Glossary of Terms appears at the end of the Some of the cost issues have already been recog- document. nized by NASA and may indeed be incorporated into The workshop discussions were limited to a NASA NASA’s current cost-control activities. These issues are program that would develop infrastructure elements nonetheless included here in order to bolster the argu- without significant participation by foreign government that NASA will have to change the way it ac- ments or the private sector in either funding or over- quires high-technology space assets if acquisition unit all management. Such involvement would bring with costs are to be sharply reduced. it additional considerations that would have to be ad- The major cost issues are summarized below: dressed early in the planning stages of the project in order to avoid serious, cost-increasing program COST-CONTAINMENT CONSIDERATIONS changes. New technology: In general, the cost of in-space Moreover, the workshop discussions assumed that infrastructure elements is directly related to the NASA staffing for the project would remain at the min- amount of new-technology research, develop- imum levels required to obtain the infrastructure at ment, test, and evaluation (RDT&E) invested in the earliest date and in the most cost-effective manner. the program. To minimize cost, NASA should Workshop participants did not attempt to quantify, adopt an approach that would minimize the in either absolute or percentage terms, the estimates amount of new technology necessary to meet of possible cost reductions expected to result from performance objectives. Because NASA Centers using the management and technical approaches sug- have their own continuing agendas and tend to gested here. incorporate their own RDT&E interests into large, The first section summarizes the results of the 2 days popular, long-term development programs, the of discussion; it is divided into the two areas on which extent of involvement of the Centers in the man- the discussion centered: management considerations agement of large space programs affects the cost of those programs. Sufficient management authority: NASA’s cur- 1 Workshop conducted for OTA by Computer Sciences Corp. rent plan to designate a separate Associate Ad-

206 App. D—Synopsis of the OTA Workshop on Cost Containment of Civilian Space Infrastructure Elements . 207

ministrator for the program is both necessary and station, ” extensive technological development appropriate. The structure, responsibilities, and does not appear to be necessary to obtain its nec- authorities of the management organization re- essary elements. Elements based on current tech- porting to this Associate Administrator are also nology would be less expensive to produce, with vital for controlling costs. some exceptions would appear to have reason- ● Careful definition: An extensive definition phase able long-term operation and maintenance costs, (e.g., the present NASA Phase A/B) could help would permit later improvements, would not re- minimize costs by determining precisely what ca- quire as extensive a management effort, and pabilities are required to meet specific objectives; would cost the taxpayer less, technology development should be limited to Performance objectives requirements: The those requirements. strong Phase A/B effort that NASA currently per- These issues, discussed in terms of management and forms is required. However, if NASA develops technical considerations, are summarized below. detailed design specifications and procures hardware on the basis of their use, contractors’ ini- MANAGEMENT CONSIDERATIONS tiatives to meet or better schedules and costs ● Centralized management: A centralized, high- would be inhibited. Performance objectives (with level NASA organization to manage development specified minimums) based wherever possible on and procurement could lower cost by reducing current technology would allow contractors to layers of management, minimizing the number meet the program requirements in the most cost- of organizational and design interfaces, and co- effective and timely manner. ordinating parallel development efforts. It could ● Contract incentives: By specifying performance also simplify coordination of technical and man- objectives that could be met with minimal ad- agement efforts. vances in technology, NASA would encourage System engineering and integration: Strong sys- contractors to propose the most efficient cost and tem engineering and system integration efforts schedule approaches. Incentive contracts that (see Glossary) both by contractors and by NASA both reward and penalize would help to ensure could reduce the number of technical interfaces, that these objectives are met. allow most design conflicts to be resolved in- ● Design issues: Adopting standards, defining and house, and help ensure that the overall system maintaining simple” interfaces, replicating ‘basic is engineered for optimal performance. elements, and specifying common hardware Bounded program: Defining a bound, or end would simplify design and development, reduce point, to the initial acquisition, including devel- change-migration across the interfaces, and re- opment, activities could contain costs by elimi- duce the impact of nonrecurring costs. nating the possibility of prolonged RDT&E so as to reach an early initial operational capability (lOC). Management Considerations Separation of NASA’s general RDT&E costs from Both the management philosophy and practice infrastructure acquisition costs: The initial de- under which any space program is conducted are usu- velopment should be based as much as possible ally dominant factors in determining the cost of the on available technology. And only those RDT&E various program elements. Sound management prac- costs that directly contribute to development tices must include cost avoidance, cost minimization, should be charged to this program. and cost containment. The following management Development of new cost models: Current cost practices should keep space system acquisition costs models will not provide accurate estimates of the low: funding needs of the future civilian “space sta- centralize the development program manage- tion” program. These models were developed for ment organization and have it report directly to efforts that had requirements fundamentally dif- the NASA Associate Administrator; ferent from the needs of the proposed “space sta- use proven industry contractors for acquiring the tion. ” major program elements; set specific endpoints for the initial development TECHNICAL AND PROCUREMENT phase; and CONSIDERATIONS develop and implement management practices Current technology: Based on the requirements that emphasize, and wherever possible reward, defined to date for an operational civilian “space cost reduction and cost containment. 208 Ž Civilian Space Stations and the U.S. Future in Space

CENTRALIZED MANAGEMENT systems so that the complete system—not just each A centralized organization to manage the acquisi- component of it—performs as well as the technologi- tion program could reduce costs by concentrating the cal state-of-the-art and the funds available for its ac- control and integration of all technical, cost, and quisition will allow. This activity is known as system scheduling activities. Clear lines of responsibility; cen- engineering. System integration is the term used to de- tralized direction; strong control over budgets, funds, scribe activities aimed at ensuring that the individual and technical decisions; and control over such fac- subsystems work together to create a well-functioning tors as interface and communality would be enhanced whole. Both of these concepts involve much more under such an approach. Splitting program manage- than just technical performance. In the case of NASA- ment among different NASA centers, as has sometimes procured systems, acquisition costs and operating and been the practice in the past, could make it difficult maintenance costs also should be important consid- to develop a fully integrated “space station.” How- erations. Usefulness to system users, such as simplicity ever, the centers should be used, as necessary, to proof access, is another, and long life and easy evolution vide specific expertise or technical support. to the next step may be others. More detailed factors The management organization, which would be re- might include ease of flight preparation, in-orbit main- sponsible for contracting for the various program ele- tenance, and updating, for example. ments, should be given a large measure of authority. Many past system engineering and integration ef- The organization could be located at a Center in or- forts at NASA have emphasized the technical or mis- der to have access to technical and administrative sup- sion performance. Certain changes that have occurred port. Such an organization must have an experienced during the past 25 years of space effort should now technical arm; to achieve that, expert personnel from allow NASA to broaden its view of system engineer- NASA Centers could be assigned to the program man- ing and integration. agement office. Until very recently, the civilian space program has This centralized approach would enable a program been (it had to be) characterized as a very high-tech- manager to more easily assess risks and make cost- nology program that has had to bootstrap itself: that reducing decisions, primarily because he or she would is, the technology often had to be developed during the same time interval that it would have to be incor- be freed from conflicting pressures from other parts of the organization. (This reasoning supports the argu- porated into the spaceflight hardware. Thus, NASA’s ment that individual NASA Centers should not be giv- responsibility was not only to manage the aerospace en management control over elements of the pro- contractors that build the mission hardware but also gram,) Under this approach the central program to establish both internal and external RDT&E capabil- management team would have the best chance to ities to carry out the necessary parallel technology de- evaluate costs, scheduling, and performance objec- velopment. In discharging these dual roles, NASA, of tively, and to produce balanced emphases and necessity, has been intimately involved in design and development of the systems it was procuring. Indeed, decisions. When a Center does manage the development of doing so was the only practical way by which NASA technology or hardware for the program, it should be could effectively communicate its requirements to its on a subcontract basis from the program management contractors. As a consequence of these circumstances, NASA has tended to concentrate on the hardware de- office. It should have a specific development time and cost. Inasmuch as current technology would be used sign and performance aspects of system engineering wherever feasible, long-term RDT&E programs at the and integration— sometimes at the expense of cost NASA Centers would not burden the acquisition pro- containment. gram with their associated costs and management de- Two factors present today should allow NASA to mands. While new-technology RDT&E is an important broaden its emphasis from hardware design consid- continuing function of the NASA Centers, it should erations of system engineering and integration to be funded separately unless it uniquely meets the per- other, equally important matters: 1 ) the relatively ad- formance or cost objectives of the space infrastruc- vanced state of the technology—especialIy that avail- ture program. able for this program—and 2) the evolving sophistication of U.S. industrial capability. After 25 years of space technology development and operational ex- SYSTEM ENGINEERING AND INTEGRATION perience in its use, essentially all of the technology In any complex system, each component or sub- is in hand to build a sophisticated, long-life, reason- system should be designed with the objective of ably priced civilian “space station” for operation in enhancing the performance of the entire system. Thus, LEO. Also, the aerospace industry has changed sig- compromises must be made among the various sub- nificantly. Part of NASA’s original charter was to fos- App. D—Synopsis of the OTA Workshop on Cost Containment of Civilian Space Infrastructure Elements . 209

ter and enhance the space technology know-how of performance problems in order to meet the IOC date. U.S. industry. To a considerable extent, NASA has This approach provides considerable flexibility should achieved this objective: many senior personnel in in- unforeseen program difficulties occur—as they almost dustry have devoted their entire careers to space-re- always do. lated activities, and many have come to the industry The program’s initial operational phase would be from NASA–in various fashions NASA gave many of initiated on the IOC date, but the operational plan- these and other individuals their professional “start.” ning would be begun earlier by a parallel program or- Because of these factors, several cost-reduction pos- ganization. A well-thought-out transition plan to move sibilities now exist. Inasmuch as space systems should from the acquisition to the operational phase should be built using current technology unless new technol- be developed as a part of Phase A/B and acted upon ogy would lower life-cycle costs, in many cases NASA throughout the acquisition phase so that effective and should be able to specify the use of already existing comprehensive operating procedures exist at the out- hardware. Using this technology, together with cur- set of operations. Thus, the program organization rent industry sophistication, should enable NASA to needed to conduct the operational phase should be transfer more of the system engineering and integra- established by NASA during Phase B. This organization associated with hardware design to industry, free- tion would work with the acquisition program office ing NASA system engineers to concentrate on cost and with other operations organizations within NASA. minimization and avoidance, operability, and other In particular, it would become familiar with the oper- important matters. Of course, NASA must continue ations of the Shuttle, Spacelab and other space infra- to ensure that all of the space infrastructure elements structure elements in order to gain experience in their work together efficiently; that the major interfaces are use. defined, controlled, and integrated; and that the end The two program organizations–acquisition and use objectives are met. A NASA centralized project operations—should work together to obtain low life- management organization would be responsible for cycle costs. Cost estimates should be keyed first to the these efforts. In particular, the organization could en- two program phases and then to schedules, in order sure that appropriate tradeoffs are made that result in to foster sound decisionmaking regarding the pro- reduced development and O&M costs. gram’s ongoing budget. During the operations phase, the overall concept of a civilian “space station” should BOUNDED ACQUISITION PROGRAM be reviewed periodically, in close concert with the pri- NASA’s present emphasis on the “evolutionary vate sector, to determine whether the Government character” of the “space station” program, while em- should continue, expand, or reduce operations based on considerations of life-cycle costs and national bodying many good programmatic features, gives rise to a very real concern —that is, the pace at which ini- benefits. tial elements of the integrated system become avail- COST AWARENESS AND CONTROL able for early operational use. Program delays often are associated with over-sophistication built in dur- Establishing and maintaining cost awareness among ing the definition phase or with unrealistically stringent aerospace engineering personnel in both Government specifications. In addition, many engineers and scien- and industry should be a major part of any program tists have a tendency to keep improving the design activity and should begin at the definition phase. At at all levels—improvements which also can result in that phase, it is important that the definition be com- delays in advancing to operational status. plete within the scope of the bounded program. This This concern could be allayed by the very practical activity should include an estimate of costs of all ele- approach of establishing a program consisting of a ments of the work to be done. System designers bounded acquisition phase, including development, should participate in this process and be responsible for the procurement, launch, in-orbit assembly, and for any budget alterations assigned to them. Contrac- acceptance of the infrastructure elements defined as tor costs and schedules must be realistic and contrac- providing initial IOC. The centralized program man- tors should be made aware of the need to estimate agement office would carry out this phase. All other them accurately. related or supporting activities would have separate Cost awareness can be promoted through motiva- budgets and would be subcontracted to other NASA tional programs. One useful approach involves con- offices after negotiation of performance specifications, tract incentive fees for cost, schedule, and perform- costs, and schedules. Even the bounded program ance. However, when this arrangement is used, the should have identified elements that could be elimi- contractor must not be overly constrained in his nated or moved off-line in event of cost, schedule, or problem-solving efforts. The incentive contract is a 210 ● Civilian Space Stations and the U.S. Future in Space

motivational technique that could be used effectively time schedules without the detailed NASA man- at all levels of the organization. It could be augmented agement oversight required in the past. at the lower levels by direct awards for cost-saving sug- Conflicts of interest often exist between RDT&E- gestions, underbudget performance, rapid problem- oriented NASA Centers and the system acquisi- solving, and similar efforts that reduce the costs of a tion management office responsible for overall ca- particular facet of the program. pability optimization, cost containment, and Key to any effective cost control activity are accurate meeting of schedules. cost estimates. Estimates that are too low break down the cost control process. Estimates that are too high USE OF CURRENT TECHNOLOGY create a “vacuum” that will surely be filled. Moreover, Together with various ground and space transpor- cost models based on previous programs will not give tation infrastructure, appropriate in-space infrastruc- satisfactory results for this program because those ture should provide NASA and other users with cost- models use weight, volume, safety, and complexity effective capabilities to pursue many important space- factors that are significantly different. A quantitative related objectives. It is quite appropriate that NASA analysis is needed to correct existing cost models. In consider the program in this larger context while mak- the meantime, bottom-to-top estimates may prove in- ing plans for its development. And, the character and structive, particularly when applied to already existing magnitude of the NASA Centers’ involvement in this technology or subsystems. planning activity must bean important part of this con- Life-cycle costing may dictate design decisions that sideration. are more costly initially but that provide savings over The various NASA Centers are developing prelimi- the long term. Program operating environments must nary concepts for individual infrastructure elements also be considered for their effects on costs: design- and associated subsystems. These design concepts are ing for a fail-operational, as compared to a fail-safe, technologically sophisticated and are being developed working environment is costly. The concept of accept- on an individual subsystem basis. It appears that these able risk, particularly human risk, as it affects costs subsystems are to be packaged in modules that are should be analyzed anew, because the in-orbit “space as independent as possible from each other, and that station” operating environment is inherently much the infrastructure central complex will bean aggregate more tolerant of operating difficulties than has been of these modules. the case in previous space programs. The ability to Proceeding with the acquisition of such individual repair equipment and rescue personnel also should subsystems in this fashion could be evidence of in- be taken into account. adequate system engineering capability, or inadequate Finally, to be effective, cost estimates, whether de- management strength, or both. Both are needed to rived from cost models or otherwise, must assume a enforce those top-down tradeoffs and compromises reasonably small development effort for solving unex- necessary to ensure that the overall system—and not pected problems. Additional funds should be set aside just the individual subsystems or modules—functions to handle such problems, but access to this money as well as possible, Experience has shown that early should be very carefully controlled. hesitation regarding system engineering can often result in increasing difficulty later in the enforcement Technical and Procurement of such compromises; measures taken to integrate sub- Considerations systems that, by then, do not inherently fit together can be a very costly experience. The kind of technology to be used, and the division It appears that NASA may now be planning to of tasks between private contractors and NASA Cen- employ a substantial amount of new and sophisticated ters during the acquisition process must be considered technology in the program, and to have a parallel pro- in order to achieve the lowest unit cost. The follow- gram for the development of this technology. it is very ing factors should also be kept clearly in mind: important that NASA first analyze, based on perform- ● The United States, the European Space Agency ance requirements and cost reduction/avoidance ob- countries, Canada and other countries have al- jectives alone, whether developing this new technol- ready invested enormous amounts of money and ogy is necessary. In particular, it should seek sound effort to develop, test, and use sophisticated professional advice from outside NASA in order to bal- space technology. ance any internal tendency to favor new technology . The aerospace industry has “come of age, ” and development. It must be repeated that, for the most now can be expected to exercise ingenuity in part, a functional “space station” could be built using containing costs and meeting performance and current technology. It could be cost effective in ad- App. D—Synopsis of the OTA Workshop on Cost Containment of Civilian Space Infrastructure Elements ● 211

dressing important, long-term, civilian space program from the aerospace industry, and has been highly suc- goals and objectives. And it should be designed so that cessful and cost effective. it could be modified during its operating life as new, more cost-effective, technologies are developed “off- DESIGN ISSUES line.” For-profit companies understand the importance of good design practices in minimizing the cost of man- INCENTIVE CONTRACTING VIA ufactured products. These practices include using PERFORMANCE SPECIFICATIONS standard components or subsystems when appropri- To date, most NASA spaceflight activities have in- ate, minimizing and simplifying interfaces, and volved planning for and procuring hardware that has replicating basic elements as often as possible. It is ex- been at the leading edge of the technology. Accord- pected that space hardware contractors will use such ingly, because it has had to issue detailed engineer- design practices if NASA encourages them to do so. ing specifications to contractors, NASA has been As noted earlier, however, NASA seemingly now heavily involved in the technical aspects of such pro- plans to procure the infrastructure elements by means curements. It is NASA’s present intention to issue engi- of detailed engineering specifications. Such a plan neering specifications for procurement after the could prevent contractors, when the seemingly inevi- detailed definition is determined in a combined Phase table design changes crop up, from calling on the most A/B study. This process would tend to over-constrain cost-effective design options to remedy the problem. potential private-sector contractors: the detailed de- Moreover, detailed design specifications are rarely sign, budget, schedule, and expected performance developed with overall cost effectiveness in mind. would be predetermined. However, design changes Reflecting their past experience, NASA Centers often are usually necessary to resolve unanticipated prob- emphasize technical excellence and complete elimi- lems that occur as the design is developed. The need nation of risks, even when the safety of people is not for such changes in turn may adversely affect the a concern, almost regardless of the costs. budget, schedule, and performance. Design changes But if performance specifications were written to re- have been the chief reason that spaceflight hardware quire minimal use of new technology, design prac- has been so costly. tices would not be an issue. Contractors could do However, if the overall infrastructure was engi- what they do best—design cost-effective equipment neered first as a whole, then NASA could procure it that meets the Government’s specified performance on the basis of performance specifications rather than needs. detailed engineering specifications. A detailed Phase Acceptable risks should be assessed during NASA’s A/B preparation would still be required, but its pur- Phase A/B definition to determine where performance pose should be to determine the performance objec- specifications and, ultimately, design specifications tives and minimum requirements of the overall in- could be relaxed to contain and minimize costs. frastructure, and then of the specific elements, ensuring that all specifications are necessary and Conclusions achievable. Such an approach provides contractors with incentives for achieving the performance objec- The primary conclusions of the OTA workshop tives within cost and on schedule. follow. Specifying the desired performance, and providing contract incentives for achieving performance and for CENTRALIZED MANAGEMENT OF INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT bettering costs and schedules, could minimize unit costs, Further, with negative incentives—i.e., penalties Effective and efficient management of the proposed for failure to meet the costs and schedules–agreed- program could be achieved by establishing an orga- to unit costs could also be minimized. NASA should nization with a single point of authority and control carefully define an acceptable incentive fee structure at a high level within NASA. To ensure complete in- that relates to a predetermined level of risk accept- tegration of all management interfaces, this organiza- ance for the program. Contractors would be respon- tion should control all prime contractors directly and sible for any trade-offs to meet the performance speci- involve only those Centers necessary for the techni- fied. NASA’s system engineering and integration role cal execution of the program. This central NASA man- would be to define the areas where the elements meet agement organization should be responsible for estab- and to ensure that the elements do in fact work to- lishing performance specifications and for defining and gether. This procedure is used by COMSAT to pro- managing interfaces between major elements. The cure hardware for satellite communication systems prime contractors for these major elements should be 212 ● Civilian Space Stations and the U.S. Future in Space

fully responsible for the system engineering and in- costs, including development costs, and to provide a tegration of their respective elements. fixed framework for operations planning,

MINIMIZATION OF THE USE OF RISK MANAGEMENT NEW TECHNOLOGY With the program based, insofar as possible, upon It is almost axiomatic that cost and risk will be min- proven current technology, operational risk could be imized if the IOC infrastructure is built using proven, examined rationally as a cost factor. Alternative ap- state-of-the-art technology to the extent feasible. Space proaches to quantifying risk acceptance should be ex- technology has now developed to the point that future plored; complete risk avoidance at any cost is not RDT&E and associated facilities should be funded always required and is very costly. separately from this program; they should not be dependent on justification by any one large space pro- Glossary of Terms gram for their inauguration or continuation. RDT&E performed at NASA Centers should be funded solely Available technology-space technology, including on the basis of need to support long-range space hardware, software, techniques, and capabilities science, applications, or technology development. that need no further development for inclusion as NASA should seek outside advice as to what new tech- part of the infrastructure (“space station”). nology is needed in order to offset any possible in- Bounded program–Predetermined end point of any house bias in favor of costly, and perhaps unneces- research, development, test and evaluation sary, development. (RDT&E) program, in terms of time and costs based on realistically achievable objectives. PERFORMANCE SPECIFICATIONS AND Cost models–Formal methodologies for estimating INCENTIVE CONTRACTS the cost of planned future spacecraft subsystems/systems based on extrapolations of the cost Significant cost savings could be realized if NASA were to procure major elements of the “space station” of previously developed similar subsystems/sys- based on performance specifications, rather than on tems, with appropriate weighting factors for differences in weight, volume, safety, complexity, past detailed design specifications, Contracting should include incentives and penalties based on performance and/or anticipated cost increases, etc. objectives so that the contractors would be prompted Components–The lowest level of decomposition of to apply initiative and ingenuity in minimizing costs the parts that comprise a subsystem. while meeting schedules and performance. Configuration control–Formally established project control procedures for proposing and approving CONTRACTOR SYSTEM ENGINEERING changes to a developing system by assessing the AND INTEGRATION effects of possible changes on the other components/subsystems within the system, on the system If infrastructure elements were procured on the basis performance, and on the interfaces with other of incentive contracts defined by performance speci-” systems. fications, design details would be the responsibility of Current technology-(See available technology.) the contractors, not NASA. By implication, contrac- Design specifications- Detailed engineering specifica- tors for major infrastructure elements would also per- tions for the procurement and manufacture of ele- form the system engineering and integration for their ments of the infrastructure, elements. The centralized NASA program office would Definition phase–The initial phase of any proposed be responsible for defining, controlling, and in- NASA high-technology development and/or acqui- tegrating the interfaces. sition program. (NASA proposes to spend more effort than usual on the definition phase of a space FINITE, BOUNDED ACQUISITION PROGRAM infrastructure—civilian “space station’ ’—program, Costs could be contained if the program were corresponding to its more conventional Phases A planned as a finite, bounded acquisition program spe- and B so as to permit better estimates of infrastruc- cifically designed to achieve an early IOC. The acquisi- ture use, technology, and costs to be made, thereby tion phase would include the procurement, launches, enabling NASA to go directly into Phase C contrac- on-orbit construction, and acceptance testing of the ting following procurement funding approval.) flight systems. The later, separately managed, opera- Elements–The highest level of decomposition of the tions phase would then be initiated and reviewed peri- modules, free flyers, platforms, and transportation odically. The effect would be to bound all acquisition vehicles that comprise any infrastructure. App. D—Synopsis of the OTA Workshop on Cost Containment of Civilian Space Infrastructure Elements ● 213

Engineering specifications–( See design speci- Phase A–Study of conceptual design options and fications.) alternatives for accomplishing the desired ob- Incentive contracts-Contracts that reward the con- jectives. tractor for meeting or bettering performance, Phase B—Trade-offs to select one or more gener- schedule and/or cost estimates while complying ally acceptable approaches as most cost effective. with all minimum specifications. Penalties are im- Usually provides first-order cost estimates based on posed for not meeting schedules, costs, or speci- past experience with analogous systems. fications. Phase C–Detailed design, which begins to provide Infrastructure-The totality of surface and in-space information for a more accurate bottom-to-top cost components, subsystems, modules, elements, and, estimate. perhaps, in-space human crew that are to be used Phase D–Actual system development. Usually to support various space activities efficiently and done on a cost basis, with an incentive fee; rarely effectively. (See “Space Station.”) procured at a fixed price. There is continuous man- Interfaces-The point or points at which adjacent sub- agement by NASA and, at times, negotiation re- systems, systems, modules, or elements of any in- garding performance, costs and/or schedules. frastructure come together in a structural, mechan- (In phases A and B, suggestions regarding appro- ical, electrical, or functional sense. priate technologies are usually heavily influenced Life cycle cost–Total cost from start of concept by NASA.) through development, production, deployment, RDT&E– Research, development, test, and evaluation and operation throughout the useful life of the in- (or engineering.) frastructure. Includes all maintenance, operational, Space Station–Infrastructure elements located in the and peripheral costs. Earth’s space, perhaps containing a human crew, New technology—Technology that either is nonexis- used to support space activities efficiently and ef- tent and must be developed or does not exist in fectively. (See “Infrastructure.”) fully usable form, and which must at least be System engineering-System design methodology that changed and perhaps be developed further before adjusts components and subsystems in order to it becomes “avail able.” This implies that additional achieve the best possible performance from the sys- costs must be incurred to bring the technology to tem as a whole in addressing specified objectives; a useful stage. system initial and life cycle cost is usually an im- Open-ended program–A program without a defined portant consideration; acquisition time can also be end point in time and/or cost and which, in many an important consideration. cases, tends to be self-perpetuating. System integration-The engineering necessary to en- Performance requirements-Quantitatively stated sure that all of the individual subsystems interface functional requirements; they must precede engi- properly so that the complete system performs as neering or design specifications. it should. Phases A, B, C, D–Fundamental elements of NASA’s Test bed (RDT&E)–A facility for simulating the envi- usual approach to the development and acquisi- ronment and/or external interfaces so that systems tion of large, high-technology systems: and subsystems can be tested realistically. Appendix E TITLE II—NATIONAL COMMISSION ON SPACE (PUBLIC LAW 98-361)

Purpose (6) the Nation is committed to a permanently manned space station in low Earth orbit, and future Sec. 201. It is the purpose of this title to establish national efforts in space will benefit from the presence a National Commission on Space that will assist the of such a station; United States– (7) the separation of the civilian and military space (1) to define the long-range needs of the Nation that programs is essential to ensure the continued health may be fulfilled through the peaceful uses of outer and vitality of both; and space; (8) the identification of long range goals and policy (2) to maintain the Nation’s preeminence in space options for the United States civilian space program science, technology, and applications; through a high level, representational public forum (3) to promote the peaceful exploration and utili- will assist the President and Congress in formulating zation of the space environment; and future policies for the United States civilian space (4) to articulate goals and develop options for the program. future direction of the Nation’s civilian space program.

Findings National Commission on Space

Sec. 202. The Congress finds and declares that– Sec. 203. (a)(l) The President shall within ninety (1) the National Aeronautics and Space Administra- days of the enactmert of this Act establish a National tion, the lead civilian space agency, as established in Commission on Space (hereinafter in this title referred the National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958, as to as the “Commission”), which shall be composed amended, has conducted a space program that has of 15 members appointed by the President. The mem- been an unparalleled success, providing significant bers appointed under this subsection shall be selected economic, social, scientific, and national security from among individuals from Federal, State, and local benefits, and helping to maintain international stability governments, industry, business, labor, academia, and and good will; the general population who, by reason of their back- (2) the National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958, ground, education, training, or experience, possess as amended (42 U.S.C. 2451 et seq.), has provided expertise in scientific and technological pursuits, as the policy framework for achieving this success, and well as the use and implications of the use of such continues to be a sound statutory basis for national pursuits. Of the fifteen members appointed, not more efforts in space; than three members may be employees of the Feder- (3) the United States is entering a new era of inter- al Government. The President shall designate one of national competition and cooperation in space, and the members of the Comission appointed under this therefore this Nation must strengthen the commitment subsection to serve as Chairman, and one of the mem- of its public and private technical, financial, and in- bers to serve as Vice Chairman. The Vice Chairman stitutional resources, so that the United States will not shall perform the functions of the Chairman in the lose its leadership position during this decade; Chairman’s absence. (4) while there continues to be a crucial Govern- (2) Members appointed by the President under par- ment role in space science, advanced research and agraph (1) of this subsection may be paid at a rate not development, provision of public goods and services to exceed the daily equivalent of the annual rate of and coordination of national and international efforts, basic pay in effect under section 5332 of title 5, United advances in applications of space technology have States Code, for grade GS-18 of the General Schedule raised many issues regarding public and private sec- for each day, including traveltime, during which such tor roles and relationships in technology development, members are engaged in the actual performance of applications, and marketing; the duties of the Commission. While away from their (s) the private sector will continue to evolve as a homes or regular places of business, such members major participant in the utilization of the space envi- may be allowed travel expenses, including per diem ronment; in lieu of subsistence, in the same manner as persons

214 App. E—Tit/e I/-National Commission on Space Public Law 96-361 • 215

employed intermittently in the Government service partment, agency, and instrumentality shall cooper- are allowed under section 5703 of title 5, United States ate with the Commission and, to the extent permitted Code. Individuals who are not officers or employees by law and upon request of the Chairman of the Com- of the United States and who are members of the mission, furnish such information to the Commission. Commission shall not be considered officers or (e) The Commission may hold hearings, receive employees of the United States by reason of receiv- public comment and testimony, initiate surveys, and ing payments under this paragraph. undertake other appropriate activities to gather the in- (b)(l) The President shall appoint one individual formation necessary to carry out its activities under from each of the following Federal departments and section 204 of this title. agencies to serve as ex officio, advisory, non-voting (f) The Commission shall cease to exist sixty days members of the Commission (if such department or after it has submitted the plan required by section agency does not already have a member appointed 204(c) of this title. to the Commission pursuant to subsection (a)(l): (A) National Aeronautics and Space Administration, (B) Department of State. Functions of the Commission (C) Department of Defense. (D) Department of Transportation. Sec. 204. (a) The Commission shall study existing (E) Department of Commerce. and proposed space activities and formulate an agen- (F) Department of Agriculture. da for the United States civilian space program. The (G) Department of the interior. Commission shall identify long range goals, oppor- (H) National Science Foundation. tunities, and policy options for United States civilian (1) Office of Science and Technology Policy. space activity for the next twenty years. In carrying (2) The President of the Senate shall appoint two ad- out this responsibility, the Commission shall take into visory members of the Commission from among the consideration— Members of the Senate and the Speaker of the House (1) the commitment by the Nation to a permanently of Representatives shall appoint two advisory mem- manned space station in low Earth orbit; bers of the Commission from among the Members of (2) present and future scientific, economic, social, the House of Representatives. Such members shall not environmental, and foreign policy needs of the United participate, except in an advisory capacity, in the for- States, and methods by which space science, technol- mulation of the findings and recommendations of the ogy, and applications initiatives might address those Commission. needs; (3) Members of the Commission appointed under (3) the adequacy of the Nation’s public and private this subsection shall not be entitled to receive com- capability in fulfilling the needs identified in paragraph pensation for service relating to the performance of (2); the duties of the Commission, but shall be entitled to (4) how a cooperative interchange between Federal reimbursement for travel expenses incurred while in agencies on research and technology development the actual performance of the duties of the Com- programs can benefit the civilian space program; mission. (5) opportunities for, and constraints on, the use of (c) The Commission shall appoint and fix the com- outer space toward the achievement of Federal pro- pensation of such personnel as it deems advisable. The gram objectives or national needs; Chairman of the Commission shall be responsible (6) current and emerging issues and concerns that for– may arise through the utilization of space research, (1) the assignment of duties and responsibilities technology development, and applications; among such personnel and their continuing supervi- (7) the Commission shall analyze the findings of the sion; and reviews specified in paragraphs (1) through (6) of this (2) the use and expenditures of funds available to subsection, and develop options and recommenda- the Commission. In carrying out the provisions of this tions for a long range national civilian space policy subsection, the Chairman shall act in accordance with plan. the general policies of the Commission. (b) Options and recommendations submitted in ac- (d) To the extent permitted by law, the Commission cordance with subsection (a)(7) of this section shall may secure directly from any executive department, include, to the extent appropriate, an estimate of costs agency, or independent instrumentality of the Federal and time schedules, institutional requirements, and Government any information it deems necessary to statutory modifications necessary for implementation carry out its functions under this Act. Each such de- of such options and recommendations. 216 . Civilian Space Stations and the U.S. Future in Space

(c) Within twelve months after the date of the estab- House of Representatives, a long range plan for United Iishment of the Commission, the Commission shall States civilian space activity incorporating the results submit to the President and to the Committee on Com- of the studies conducted under this section, together merce, Science and Transportation of the Senate and with recommendations for such legislation as the the Committee on Science and Technology of the Commission determines to be appropriate. Appendix F FINANCING CONSIDERATIONS AND FEDERAL BUDGET IMPACTS

With respect to the conceptual objectives proposed jectives (1), (2), (3), and (4). A further assumption is for discussion in chapter 6 of this report, it is impor- made: that the U.S. Government will view its civilian tant to ask not only the question of “what would their space leadership role as one of orchestrating the in- attainment cost?,” but the next most important ques- terests, abilities, and activities of any and all of those tions as well: “who would pay these costs?” and countries of the world who wish to participate in space “under what circumstances?” This appendix ad- research, exploration and development, and that it dresses these questions, and then turns to an exami- will play this role in the vigorous, sensitive and inno- nation of how novel answers thereto could affect the vative fashion that competitive space circumstances Federal space budget. and the high political and financial stakes require. Indeed, if the United States does not lead the world Financing Considerations in this fashion, there is growing indication that, perhaps sooner than we imagine (especially with the suc- International Considerations cessful Spacelab experience behind them), several European countries themselves would be prepared to Note that what is being discussed here are not “go it alone.” And the U. S. S. R., as well, may be be- 1 NASA goals and objectives, but national goals and ginning to exhibit an “outreach” toward cooperation objectives and, at least for the most part, goals and with countries outside of the Communist bloc. objectives for the benefit of all mankind. Therefore, The Solar System Exploration Committee of NASA’s for instance, when other countries can reasonably be senior Advisory Committee has taken specific and pos- expected to have an active interest in cooperating with itive recognition of this opportunity in its recent re- the United States as parties in multinational activities, port: Planetary Exploration through Year 2000.5 Under this also should be taken into explicit consideration the general heading of “International Cooperation, ” when considering their cost to us. the Committee observes that: “In the 1960s and John Logsdon has recently observed that: “There 1970s, planetary science was clearly dominated by the is now the possibility of a global division of labor and United States, with major contributions by the U.S.S.R. .2 cost in space science [and exploration] . . .“ Offi- The trend in recent years has been an increase, rela- cials of the European Space Agency (ESA), for instance, tive to the United States and the U. S. S. R,, in the ca- are reported to be of the view that ESA: “ . . . antici- pability and interest of other nations to participate in pates contributing . . . perhaps up to 30 percent of the planetary science and exploration missions. This in- 3 estimated cost [of any] space station . . .“. And OTA creasing interest has occurred against a backdrop of has been told, informally, by a well-informed foreign budgetary constraints in all nations, together with in- official that, if Japan and Canada also were to be increasing sophistication and cost of planetary missions. cluded in a full partnership arrangement, “in the limit” Combined, these factors suggest that more planetary this fraction could be appreciably larger. And recently science can be accomplished in a given period if in- fractions of 35 to 40 percent overall have been publi- terested nations coordinate their planning and, occa- cized.4 (This 35 to 40 percent, i.e., some $3 billion sionally, undertake joint missions.” [1984$] apparently is now seen by NASA as in addi- But no allowance is made in the NASA budget pro- tion to the $8 billion [1 984$] now estimated by NASA jections–projections that average some $400 million/ as the cost of the IOC infrastructure to the United year (1 983$) throughout the rest of this centuryG–for States.) the important financial contributions that other coun- Simply for purposes of illustration, an assumption tries could be expected to make to space science and of one-third foreign government cost-sharing is taken exploration programs. here as a reasonable expectation regarding at least ob- One very long-term, very successful example of multinational cooperation in the space field was developed under the enlightened leadership, and with the I Other Government agencies, primarily the National Oceanic and Atmos- important assistance of, the United States: the lnter- pheric Admtnlstration (NOAA), have Important space interests and respon- s} bllitles as well. ‘Science, Jan. 6, 1984, p. 11 et. seq.; see esp. p. 13. 3Science, Dec. 9, 1983, pp. 1099-1100. S1 983, see esp. pp. 25-26. 4Nature, Mar. 15, 1984, p. 216. %ee NASA’s report, p. 27.

217 218 . CiviIian Space Stations and the U.S. Future in Space

national Telecommunications Satellite Organization was quite specific in justifying his decision to start (I NTELSAT). Some 20 years ago, the only countries in- work on the development of space infrastructure in volved in civilian satellite communications were the terms of its eventually allowing for “ . . . living and United States, the United Kingdom, and France. working in space for . . . economic . . . gains. ” In his Today, INTELSAT counts 109 countries as members; later radio address he stated that he expects: “ . . . a the countries conduct a useful, profitable, and rapidly space station will open up new opportunities for ex- growing space-related business–long-haul trunk com- panding human commerce . . . .“ munications—which grossed some $400 million in The legislative branch too, perhaps smarting be- 1983, and in which the required U.S. investment share cause of the seemingly endless Landsat commerciali- is now down to less than 25 percent. (The business zation difficulties, and responding to the continuing is now so profitable that, last year, potential com- hesitancy within NASA concerning their space appli- petitors came forward.) And INTELSAT has been cations responsibilities, has moved to strengthen the joined by INMARSAT in the maritime communications law quite specifically regarding “space commercializa- area; INMARSAT counts even the U.S.S.R. among its tion.” NASA’S fiscal year 1985 authorization bill, members. ’ which became Public Law 98-361 with the President’s Finally, the President has taken steps to see that the signature on July 16, 1984, makes a basic change in matter of international cooperation—indeed, perhaps the “National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958.” international collaboration—in the civilian space area It amends section 102 of the act by including a new will receive direct and important attention by the ex- paragraph (c) as follows: “The Congress declares that ecutive branch. In his radio address during the week the general welfare of the United States requires that of his 1984 State of the Union message, the President [NASA] seek and encourage, to the maximum extent observed that: “international cooperation . . . has possible, the fullest commercial use of space.” This long been a guiding principle of the United States is strong, unambiguous and “revolutionary” language space program [and that] just as our friends were asked for our publicly funded civilian space program’s to join us in the Shuttle program, our friends and allies “char ter.” will be invited to join with us in the space station proj- It would seem reasonable, therefore, to imagine that ect.” In response to this Presidential directive, NASA’s the kind of private sector participation suggested here Administrator has recently visited several other coun- in addressing certain of the 10 conceptual objectives tries to explore the matter of their working on any will, in fact, be realized. “space station” program with the United States. International Plus Private-Sector Private-Sector Considerations Cost Sharing Considerations Also, when our private sector can reasonably be ex- Thus, when the financial support of both other pected to assume the cost (in anticipation of commer- countries and our own private sector are taken into cial-industrial sales and profits), or at least an impor- consideration, the net U.S. public cost of meeting tant fraction thereof, this should be taken into these 10 conceptual objectives is estimated to be some consideration. This should be the case for at least ob- $25 billion to $40 billion (1984$), i.e., some 70 per- jectives (2), (5), (6), (7), and (10) (see ch. 6). cent of their estimated $40 billion to $60 billion total For much of 1983, and still continuing, NASA has cost. 8 (See table F-l). The average net public cost for had a task force studying what it might do to speed the first 5 years considered here would be some $2.0 and enlarge the “commercialization” of space. And billion/year (1984$); during the last 5 of the 25 years the Department of Transportation (DOT) has recently the average net public cost could decrease to about been charged by the President with assisting an ex- one-half this rate. (See table F-2.) pendable launch services industry. These expenditure rates suggest that, with the com- Now the President has given a powerful general pletion of the initial modest Moon settlement, the pro- thrust to the matter of much greater economic partic- jected NASA budget could allow a major program of ipation by our private sector in space-related activi- human exploration of Mars (and of one or more as- ties, In his 1984 State of the Union address he ex- teroids) to begin in earnest. pressed himself of the judgment that: “ . . . space holds enormous promise for commerce today,” and

7For a thorough discussion of the satellite communications area, see the OTA report International Cooperation and Competition in Civilian Space Ac- ‘Norman R. Augustine, “The Aerospace Professional . . . and High-Tech tivities (now in press). Management,” Aerospace America, March 1984, App. F—Financing Considerations and Federal Budget Impacts ● 219

Table F-l .—USA Net Public Cost (billions of 1984 dollars)

Total Other Private USA net cost countries sector public cost 1. Establish a global information system/service regarding natural hazards ...... 2 0.7 0 1 2. Establish lower cost reusable transportation service with the Moon, and establish human presence there ...... 20 7 1 13 3. Use space probes to obtain information regarding Mars and some asteroids prior to early human exploration ...... 2 0.3 0 2 4. Conduct medical research of direct interest to the general public ...... 6 2 0 4 5. Bring at least hundreds of the general public into space for short visits ...... 0.5 0 0.4 0.1 6. Establish a global, direct, audio broadcasting, common-user system/service ...... 2 0 2 0.2 7. Make essentially all data generated by civilian satellites and spacecraft directly available to the general public ...... 0 0 0 0 8. Exploit radio/optical free-space electromagnetic propagation for long distance energy distribution ...... 0.5 0 0 0.5 9. Reduce the unit cost of space transportation and space activities ...... 5 0 0 5 10. Increase space-related private salesa ...... 0.5 0 0.5 0 Total ...... = 40b =10 =4 = 26C aThi~ would advance the pr~~pect~ of successfully a& JresSing all goals and all other objectives. bThe actual total cost including a ~percent incre=e could be $60 billion; the same inCreaSe could affect all other cost ‘Stimates’ cwith a 50.percent cost increase, this cost could be $40 billion NOTE: Some rows do not sum due to rounding.

Table F-2.—First Rough Estimate of the Total Cost/Year and the Net Public Cost/Year (in billions, 1984 dollars) for the First 5 Years, of Attaining the 10 Conceptual Objectives

Total cost (and the Total Net public cost Net public years) to attain each cost/year, (and the years) to attain cost/year, “objective first 5 years each objective first 5 years 1. 2 (lo) 0.20 1 (lo) 0.10 2. 20 (15) 1.33 13 (15) 0.87 3. 2 (15) 0.13 2 (15) 0.13 4. 6 ( 5) 0.40 4 ( 5) 0.28 0.5 ( 5) 0.10 0.1 ( 5) 0.02 6 2 (lo) 0.20 0.2 (lo) 0.02 7. 0 (25) 0.00 0.0 (25) 0.00 8. 0.5 (lo) 0.05 0.5 (lo) 0.05 9. 5 (15) 0.33 5 (15) 0.33 10. 0.5 (25) 0.02 0 (25) 0.00 =40 = 3 =26 ==2

Economic-Growth Considerations civilian space area to date, and considering only ex- PROJECTED GROWTH IN PRIVATE SECTOR penditures from now on. SALES AND RELATED TAX REVENUES To date, except for the satellite communications area, the United States’ publicly supported civilian Beyond the cost-offsetting financial participation of space program has been essentially one of basic re- other cooperating countries and our own private sec- search, exploration, and development of technology tor, it is important to obtain some useful sense of the required to support both. Economic returns have been present, and future, marginal net cost to the U.S. gen- expected to result from general “spin off” to the pri- eral public of its civilian space activities—i e., setting vate sector from these otherwise-directed R&D activ- aside further consideration of the over $200 billion ities. The general sense is that to some important ex- (1984 adjusted) “sunk cost” of our investments in the tent that has apparently happened, even though the

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evidence on the macroeconomic level is admittedly most recent projection, by Jerry Grey12 is that: “Sat- difficult to come by. ellite communications demand is still growing rapidly Let us start, therefore, probably conservatively but at between 20 and 30 percent per year and is pro- objectively and reasonably quantitatively, by noting jected to continue at this rate to the end of the cen- that the present (1 983 year-end) U.S. commercial-in- tury, despite potential inroads by optical fibre cables. dustrial space-related annual sales of capital equip- projections for turn-of-the-century annual volume ment (essentially all in the satellite communications (spacecraft, launch and integration services, and com- business, for satellites, their launching, and their asso- munications services themselves) range from $30 bil- ciated ground equipments) are some $1.6 billion/ lion to$100 billion.” A 15 percent/year, compounded, years If satellite insurance sales, operations and main- sales growth throughout 1984-2000 on a 1983 base tenance (O&M) charges related to surface equipments, of $2 billion would produce sales of some $20 billion end-to-end circuit lease charges and lease charges for in 2000; on a $3 billion base, some $3o billion. in-space microwave transponders (there are now Of course, the rate of 15 percent/year, com- some 400 in orbit which are owned by U.S. compa- pounded, may prove to be optimistic. If, instead, a nies) are added, total U.S. private-sector space-related 10 percent figure is used, the year 2000 sales projec- sales are now probably $2 billion to $3 billion per tion would exceed $10 billion on a present $2 billion year. base, and $15 billion on a present $3 billion base. This sales figure, at least in the satellite communi- Further, assume either that Government civilian cations long-haul circuit leasing area where records space-related expenditures remain at about $7.o bil- have been kept since the outset of private sector oper- lion (1983) per year or that they grow, in real terms, ations (see INTELSAT’s annual reports) is a conse- at 1 percent per year, compounded, as is NASA’s de- quence of an average annual growth rate of some 15 sire and this administration’s expressed intention. percent/year, compounded, for nearly the past 20 (No attention is given here as yet to the reimburse- years.10 ments made to the Government for the provision of If it is assumed that the total of all Federal, State, space-related Government services—now almost and local tax rates on these sales averages 20 to 30 wholly the reimbursement for the provision of Shut- percent, 11 then, roughly, $0. 5 billion/year in Govern- tle flights.) ment tax revenues are now being derived from these Under such circumstances and with such assump- sales. Thus, while the gross civilian space-related Gov- tions, over time, the effective net Government cost ernment expenditures are some $7 billion/year today, of supporting the civilian space program (in billions in fact the net Government expenditures could be of 1983 dollars) could be considered as decreasing ra- considered to be significantly Iess—i.e,, effectively pidly. (See tables F-3 and F-4.) some $6.5 billion/year (or some 7 percent) less. Under either assumption regarding future NASA ap- Now, assume for the purpose of illustration that the propriations, and a projected 15 percent/year tax rev- total sales generated in the satellite communications enue increase, the “break-even” point would be area, enlarged in time by space-related navigation, reached in some 20 years; i.e., in one generation the position fixing, remote sensing, materials processing, effective net public investment required to underwrite tourism, private launch and transportation services, our entire Government civilian space program—either space platform leasing, etc., continues to grow at the a program of today’s magnitude or, by then, some 20 current rate, i.e., some 15 percent/year, com- percent larger–would be reduced to zero. Even with pounded–a doubling about every 5 years. The pro- the lower 10 percent/year tax revenue growth projec- jection for this rate of growth has been made by NASA tion, the effective net public cost would then be a and others and may prove to be conservative. The great deal less than today’s. And, over the next 20 years, a total of tens of billions of dollars (1 984) in tax revenues would have been generated. This is such an important observation and prospect gThis figure was provided to OTA by Janet Martinusen ot the Aerospace Industries Association of America, Inc.) that it bears further elaboration. For the prospect that IOln what follows, note that no attention is given either to the influence such extraordinary private-sector space-related sales of inflation or to any decrease in nonspace-related sales as a consequence and tax revenue projections might well be attained of the growth of space-related sales; i.e., this discussion must be considered— particularly by economists–as illustrative and qualitative, not methodologi- suggests that the Government could commit itself to cally exhaustive and quantitative. promoting, vigorously and innovatively, the growth llfconomjc RepOr-f of the President, transmitted to the Congress, February 1984 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1984); Study of 1982 Effective Tax Rates of Selected Large U.S. Corporations, prepared by the staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation (Washington, DC: U.S. Govern- ment Printing Office, November 1983). !Z’’lnvesting In Space . . . ,“ Aerospace America, April 1984, p. 90. App. F—Financing Considerations and Federal Budget Impacts • 221

Table F-3.—Growth in Tax Revenues From Private Sector Space. Related Sales, and Their Influence on the Net Cost of the Federal Civilian Space Program (billions of 1983 dollars per year– assuming a 15°/0 sales growth rate)

Government space expenditure net cost Tax revenues A constant $7 billion/ $7 billion (1983) increasing Years growth @ 150A/year year (1983) at 1‘\Olyear O (1983) 0.5 6.5 6.5 5 (1988) 1,0 6.0 6.4 10 (1993) 2.0 5.0 5.7 15 (1998) 4.1 4.0 20 (2003) 8.2 (1.2) 0.3 25 (2008) 16.0 (9.5) (7.5)

Table F-4.—Growth in Tax Revenues From Private Sector Space-Related Sales, and Their Influence on the Net Cost of the Government Civilian Space Program (billions of 1983 dollars per year–assuming a 10% sales growth rate)

Government space expenditure net cost Tax revenues A constant $7 billion/ $7 billion (1983) increasing Years growth @ 10%/year year (1983) at 1‘/Olyear O (1983) 0.5 6.5 6.5 5 (1988) 0.8 6.2 6.5 10 (1993) 1.3 5.7 6.4 15(1 998) 2.1 4.9 6.0 20 (2003) 3.4 3.6 5.1 25 (2008) 5.4 1.6 3.6

of commercial and industrial space-related sales. That ensen recently observed that: “ . . . a successful high- is, the Federal Government, working in close concert technology company normally must spend 5 to 10 with the private sector, would work to see, over time, percent of its gross sales on R&D’’13) then, 20 years a great increase in such high-technology sales, thereby from now, a private-sector R&D investment rate of generating proportionally much greater tax revenues some $1 billion to $2 billion (1 984) per year would which could be looked upon as “offsets” to the pub- have been reached. lic R&D expenditures on space. Also, if successful, The total Government investment (again, assuming such an initiative would result in an effective transfer that NASA appropriations increase at 1 percent “real of much of the responsibility for the health and growth growth” per year, compounded) plus the commercial- of space-related economic activities from the public industrial investment in space-related R&D would be to the private sector. expected to increase substantially overtime. (See table The President has just taken particular note of this F-5, which assumes a 15 percent projected growth rate possibility: the July 20, 1984, White House “Fact for the private sector.) By the end of the next quarter Sheet” entitled “National Policy on the Commercial of a century, the country’s overall space-related R&D Use of Space” states that “In partnership with indus- activities could reach a level that would be nearly try and academia, Government will expand basic re- twice the size of today’s Government program and search and development which may have implications that, by then, would be increasing at some 5 per- for investors aiming to develop commercial space cent/year, compounded. products and services.” These are extraordinary projections, and they could Of course, private-sector gross revenues also can be well turn out to be conservative ones. expected to support space-related commercial-indus- To put such numbers into a space R&D and explora- trial R&D. Again, assuming that sales grow at the aver- tion perspective, note that a U.S. public expenditure age annual rate of 10 to 15 percent, compounded, and of an average of some $1 billion/year over, say, 15 assuming as well that about 5 percent of these sales is spent by the private sector on space-related R&D (probably a conservative assumption; C. Paul Christ- I Jsclence, Apr. 13, 1984, P. 117 222 ● Civilian Space Stations and the U.S. Future in Space

Table F-5.—Growth in Yeariy U.S. Space investment, that Department’s new responsibilities for the com- Federal (increasing at 1°/0 annually) Pius Private mercialization of expendable launch vehicles: “ . . . (increasing at 150/0 annually) this involves ‘a whole new industry’ with growth prospects estimated at up to $10 billion over the next dec- Investment (billions of 1983 dollars per Year) ade. ”15 Years Government Private Total A recently published OTA report, International O (1983) 7.0 0.1 7.1 Competition in Electronics, notes that: “Sales of the 5 (1988) 7.4 0.3 7.7 10 (1993) 7.7 0.5 8.2 more than 6,000 electronics manufacturers in the 15 (1998) 8.1 1.0 9.1 United States exceeded $125 billion in 1982 and are 20 (2003) 8.5 2.0 11.0 growing rapidly . . . the growth rate over the past dec- 25 i2008) 9.0 4.1 13.0 ade reached nearly 15 percent [per year, compounded].” 16-17 As one general example: Forbes magazine has to 20 years could allow us, along with other cooper- recently 18 surveyed the sales growth of 25 leading ating countries, to place a modest settlement on the companies in the electronics area, comparing the Moon. In similar fashion, an additional some $2 bil- average of such sales for the most recent 5 years with lion/year, over 20 to 30 years, could allow a first the average of the preceding 5 years. The annual human landing on the planet Mars. And each of these sales growth of the top one-half of the companies aver- sums would include paying for that kind and amount aged 23 percent, compounded. of LEO infrastructure specifically required to assure The early days of commercial radio provide another the efficient operational conduct of these ventures, example of how the growth rate of a newly introduced service supported by new technology can attain phe- HISTORICAL BASES FOR A PROJECTION OF nomenal values. “[In] the spring of 1922 . . . the sale SALES GROWTH IN THE PRIVATE SECTOR of radio sets, parts, and accessories amounted to more than $60 million annually. By the end of 1929, sales While, of course, no brief can be held with com- had climbed to a remarkable $843 million.”19 This is plete confidence, either for the absolute rates of in- an annual growth rate of greater than 40 percent/year, crease of space-related sales, or for such a long-term compounded. More recently, lasers and their applica- continuation thereof as is outlined here—and other tions have become at least as big a high-technology countries have also already clearly perceived the great business as has satellite communications, “In the past longer-term economic prospects in the space area14– 2 decades . . . the market for laser-related systems that it must be remembered that the U.S. investment in solve practical problems has grown to over $3 billion the publicly supported civilian space area has proper year , . . “2° vided an enormous base of assets, understanding and As an individual company example, over the past experience for so doing; that the active interest of our 7 years the International Business Machines Corp. private commercial-industrial sector in investing in (IBM) has seen its sales grow at an average annual rate space assets and activities, already non-trivial, is of 14 percent, compounded, and its top financial of- quickening; and that we have other high-technology ficer was quoted late last year as venturing the predic- growth “stories” as useful references: air transportation that “ . . . sales growth in the next several years tion, computers, radio, television, medical technol- will surpass the 14 percent rate . . . “;21 in fact, sales ogy, communications, etc. grew 17 percent in 1983.22 Seven years ago IBM’s sales For instance, President Karl G, Harr of the Aero- space Industries Association observed, in his report of December 1983, that “ . . . there has been a con- J~Aerospace Daily, Jan. 19, 1984, pp. 97-98. siderable acceleration in the building of commercial lcNovember 1983, p. 108. communications satellites . , . that’s just the beginning 17N4B. Neither this figure, nor any that follow which reference sales growth in either absolute numbers or annual rates, have been adjusted to reflect of an indicated boom; worldwide projections show the unusually high inflation rates that held during the late 1970s and early enormous increases in demand for satellite commu- 1980s. Consequently, they are inherently “optimistic” if taken as an augury nications services between now and the end of the of future sales growth. But, at the same time, this was an epoch during which business expansion was abnormally repressed by the same inflationa~ pres- century.” And Secretary of Transportation Elizabeth sures—pressures that, one hopes, will not soon be repeated. Dole is recently quoted as saying, with reference to Iajan. 2, 1984, p. 176. IsSteven L. ~1 Sesto, “Technology and Social Change, ” in Technological Forecasting and Social Change, vol. 24, pp. 183-196; see esp. p. 183. Zoscience, Apr. 13, 1984, P. 117. 14See th OTA rew~ on /nternatjona/ Cooperation and Competition in e I} Wa// Street Journal, Dec. 9, 1983, P. 5. Civilian Space Activities, 1984. llwall Street Journal, Dec. 19, 1984, p. 2. App. F—Financing Considerations and Federal Budget Impacts ● 223

were some $15 billion; today they are some $40 bil- domain such as space. The “Stevenson-Wydler Tech- lion, and 3 years from now could approximate $55 nology Innovation Act of 1980”27 states: “(a) Policy. billion. It is clear that the absolute size of sales is not It is the continuing responsibility of the Federal Gov- necessarily an impediment to further sales growth ernment to ensure the full use of the result of the Na- when desired new assets and services are being in- tion’s Federal investment in research and develop- troduced and adopted—not even at the $30 billion to ment. To this end, the Federal Government shall strive $50 billion/year level. . . . to transfer federally . . . originated technol- Other, more recent, high-technology commercial- ogy . . . to the private sector. ” Also, for instance, the industrial examples abound. Over approximately the Department of Defense (DOD), using the 1982 author- past decade (ending in 1982) the average annual com- ity incorporated into formal law by inclusion of appro- pound growth rate in sales (taken from Moody’s or priate language in Title 10 of the United States Code, individual company reports) for the Communications Section 22394, employs very long-term contracting for Satellite Cooperation was 15 percent; for INTELSAT utility services in its “Venture Capital Energy Procure- and Texas Instruments: 16 percent; for Hewlett-Pack- ment Program by the Military Services. ”28 DOD uses ard: 23 percent; and for MCI: 68 percent. this program to excite the private sector to develop Thus, it does seem reasonable to expect that, with and use new technology to provide DOD with energy energetic and innovative consideration explicitly given services at lower cost than otherwise; this approach to cooperative Government-private sector promotion is now being replicated by certain States and munici- of United States commercial-industrial space invest- palities. ments and initiatives—initiatives directed both to And the features of the “Small Business Innovation opening up new uses related to space and to reduc- Development Act of 1982,”29 which was enacted to ing the unit cost of producing space assets and con- (among other things) “ . . . utilize Federal research ducting space operations–the next quarter of a cen- and development as a base for technological innova- tury could see truly important, perhaps outstanding, tion [so as] to contribute to the growth and strength growth in our civilian space-related sales, with all that of the Nation’s economy, ” also could be utilized by this should imply for employment, tax revenues, in- NASA, NOAA, DOT and other space-related execu- ternational trade, etc. As the earlier referenced OTA tive branch offices. This act requires that as much as report succinctly states: “ . . . the United States needs 1 1/4 percent of the “annual extramural” R&D appro- to search for new engines of growth to drive the econ- priations of most major Federal agencies be spent with omy into the 21st century . . . “23 and “ . . . special smaller and, presumably, more aggressive, more en- stress should be laid on . . . R&D and technology plus trepreneurial, business organizations. measures aimed at stimulating investment in new and Perhaps, say, a small fraction of 1 percent of the total innovative firms . . . “24 And, as a recent Washington annual NASA and Commerce/NOAA/DOT appropria- Post article emphasized: “America’s strength in ex- tions could be spent directly and specifically to prompt porting is not in standardized, commodity products, activities that offer reasonable promise of furthering but in high-technology specialized products that draw the growth of space-related sales in our private sec- on the huge pool of American know-how and exper- tor. In close concert with our private space-related tise;] specialized, higher technology products . . . are business sector, the Government, in order to realize America’s bread and butter.”25-26 a more effective linkage of its R&D to the private marketplace, could use these funds to help “focus” the LEGAL AND EXPERIENTIAL BASES FOR scientific, exploration, and technological results of the FEDERAL/PRIVATE-SECTOR COOPERATION IN other 99.5 percent on the task of increasing business ECONOMICALLY DIRECTED R&D sales. Such a requirement would be somewhat analogous It is important to note that there is some precedent to that holding for the nine national laboratories that in Federal law for exploring Government-private sec- operate under the aegis of the Department of Energy. tor initiatives in stimulating sales in a high-technology Under the terms of the Stevenson-Wydler Act (sec. 11 (b)) these laboratories are obligated to spend not less than 1/2 percent of their funds on activities that 13/nternatjona/ com~titfon in Electronics, p. 466. Z41bld., p. 502. ~sjan, 8, 1984, P, G l/G8 ITpub[lc Law 96-480, Sec. 11. Utilization of Federal Technology, Oct. 21, 26 Notably, in the private commercial-industrial world, the sPace area is 1980. not yet even considered to be important in terms of “high technology”- Zasee an article by this title in the 10th Energy Technology Conference Re- see U.S. News and World Report, Jan. 16, 1984, p. 38 where, in de fintng port, p. 230 et seq. “High Technology: What Is It?,” space assets and activities go unmentioned. ‘qPublic Law 97-219. 224 ● Civilian Space Stations and the U.S. Future in Space

would see the technology that they develop, using ing if the private-sector [at the outset] is unwilling or Federal funds, “transferred” to our private sector. The unable to fund the R&D [and it] may be necessary to potential power of such an approach is a matter of increase support for initial R&D funded by the Gov- public record. One of these laboratories, Sandia, ernment if commercial activity is deemed important.” spends more than 1 percent of its budget in this fash- The report raises serious questions as to “. . . the ef- ion, and has had a long list of successful transfers. 30 fectiveness of [the] mechanisms [now used by NASA] In one area alone, that of clean-room technology used for promoting [space] commercialization,” But the by hospitals and electronics companies, Sandia esti- heretofore-mentioned example of Sandia and, for in- mates that sales have now reached $200-million/year stance, the pressure for AT&T’s Bell Labs, with its $2 by 70 companies. Much as in the case of satellite com- billion/year budget, to become consumer- and market- munications and NASA (but scaled down by just an oriented, 34 suggests that the executive branch, and order of magnitude), the total tax revenues provided especially NASA and Commerce/NOAA/DOT, if prop- by such sales, probably some $50 million, is some 8 erly prompted by the President and Congress and led percent of Sandia’s $7oO million annual budget. by imaginative, experienced, and tough-minded lead- In an article entitled “The Making of a Conserva- ers, could make the required transition. For instance, tive Science Policy,” Wil Lepkowski observes that: NASA’s recent request for proposals for a Shuttle mar- . . . from 1982 onward [the present] Administra- keting support contract is an important step in that tion . . . drew back from its original insistence that the direction.35 So is Executive Order #12465 (February government had no business developing new tech- 24, 1984), designating the Department of Transpor- nologies for the private sector. ” He suggests that: “In tation as the lead agency “for encouraging and facili- fact, there is nothing wrong with the government’s de- tating commercial ELV activities by the United States veloping ideas, concepts, and hardware for the pri- private sector.” vate sector to exploit for the good of the public.” And he concludes: “What the administration will notice in 1984, and try to stimulate, is evidence from research THE SPACE-RELATED PRIVATE SECTOR GROWS UP agencies that their programs are contributing to the Slowly, the private sector is learning more about economy, innovation, and productivity. We can ex- space, more about the prospects of doing business pect to see growing evidence of the major contribu- there, and more about how to deal with the Govern- tion of the conservative revolution: closer and closer ment in so doing. integration of economics with science and technolo- For instance, NASA and the 3M Co., St. Paul, MN, gy. After many decades, policymakers are doing a bet- signed a memorandum of understanding earlier this ter job of bringing the two together. That, by itself, year that will enable the company to fly aboard the 31 is an achievement.” The President’s 1984 State of Shuttle several experiments related to the growth of the Union address and his subsequent radio address organic crystals and the development of thin films. both bear out Lepkowski’s expectation in the civilian NASA has signed one major joint endeavor agreement space area, with McDonnell Douglas and Johnson & Johnson for The Congressional Research Service recently ob- the production of pharmaceuticals in space, and cur- served that: “ . . . many analysts believe that Federal rently is in discussions with approximately 20 com- policy to harmonize governmental and private sec- panies contemplating future space endeavors. tor support of private science and technology proba- Other firms have been involved in discussing a wide bly could be improved significantly without [an ex- range of experimental activities such as electroplating cessive] degree of government-private sector enhancement, improvement in catalytic materials, for- 32 collusion . . . “ And it prepared a report for the use mation of glass alloys, research in long-term blood of the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Trans- storage, development of remote-sensing techniques, 33 portation of the United States Senate that notes that: development of smaller space vehicles and compo- “With increasing [prospects] of space commercializa- nents of a “space station,” etc. The firms include: Fair- tion . . . the Government may have to provide fund- child, Micro-Gravity Research Associates, John Deere, Space Industries Inc., DuPont, Honeywell, A.D. Lit- tle, Orbital Sciences Corp., American Science and jOTechno/ogy Transfer at Sandia National Laboratories: First Annual Re- Technology Corp., Ball Aerospace, C2Spaceline, port, SAND83-0345, March 1983. 31 Technology Review, January 1984, p. 39 et SW. Sparx, Spaceco Ltd., and Astrotech. j?jee the CRS Review, January 1984, p. 14. 3Wongressional Research Service, “Policy and Legal Issues Involved in the Commercialization of Space” published as a Committee Print (No. 98-102), Jtsee /formation Technology Research and Development, OTA, in Press. Sept. 23, 1983, pp. 17-18. MNASA tndust~ Briefing for STS Marketing, May 1, 1%4. App. F—Financing Considerations and Federal Budget Impacts ● 225

Of greatest importance in considering the matter of As an initial reference point, the NASA fiscal year the Government’s working to promote growing pri- 1984 budget authorized by Congress is adopted. It is vate-sector sales i n the civilian space-related area are, usually presented in the general form of table F-6. (The of course, the views and policies of the leaders of both data source is the Congressional Record. In all that the legislative branch and the executive branch, par- follows, rounding can influence the last figure in sums. ticularly the President himself. President Reagan has All other Government civilian space expenditures are made his views and desires clearly known. In his radio small relative to NASA’s, and their inclusion would address of January 28, 1984, he stated: “We expect unnecessarily complicate this discussion.) Inasmuch space-related investments to grow quickly in future as only the space R&D elements of this budget are of years . . . .NASA, along with other departments and concern here, this table presents just these. agencies, will . . . promote private investment Table F-6 shows that $2 billion will be spent on Shut- . . . we’re going to bring into play . . . the vitality of tle production (Space Transportation Capabilities De- our free enterprise system. ” velopment) in fiscal year 1984. The Shuttle produc- So, whatever views the administration has in regard tion and development program is nearly complete; to close cooperation between the Government and when it ends, there will be about $2 billion that is the U.S. private sector in general, and however much unspoken for in the NASA budget, if current funding attention such cooperation receives in other areas, it levels continue. is now clearly, indeed forcefully, on record as sup- Two other financial matters must be taken into con- porting it between civilian space-related offices such sideration: the reimbursement to the Government for as NASA and the commercial-i ndustrial-financial in- Shuttle transportation services when the Shuttle is used stitutions that can be expected to profit from such co- by the private sector and other countries; and the 1 operation. To repeat: “ . . . NASA . . . will promote percent/year real growth in funds that would be made private investment , . . ,“ available to NASA if the present administration’s ex- And, of course, to the extent that the private sector pressed budget views in this regard for future fiscal provides space assets and operational services that years are accepted by Congress and continue indefi- technology, the marketplace, and its growing free- nitely. enterprise capabilities allow, and conducts RDT&E ac- That the payments for use of Shuttle launch serv- tivities at the multibillion-dollar/year level, NASA ices are already reimbursing the Government for 4 would be able to concentrate on the more basic re- percent of the publicly funded civilian space program, search, the more demanding space exploration, and and that these payments are now expected to grow the more exotic “cutting edge” technology required to truly important dimensions soon (perhaps 14 per- to support both.36 First hints of the potential of such cent by 1989), should be appreciated by all with a seri- a private sector move are beginning to appear: Rock- ous interest in the cost of this program. The NASA Ad- well International is studying the commercial construction, launch, and maintenance of a private-sector in-orbit “electric utility, ” costing more than a billion dollars, that would be prepared to offer electrical pow- Table F-6.—NASA Overall Authorization for er as a service to a host of space operations; J’ Space Fiscal Year 1984 (billions of dollars) Industries is readying itself to develop, produce, and A. R&D...... 5.88 deploy a sophisticated space platform by 1988; the B. Construction and facilities ...... 0.13 Astrotech Corp. is holding discussions about their pur- C. Program management ...... 1.24 chasing a Shuttle Orbiter at a price of some $2 billion D. Total ...... =$7.30 (1984); etc. The R&D element (A, above) consists of external contract funds for: Impacts on the Federal (NASA) 1. Space transportation capabilities development ...... 2.01 Space Budget 2. Space transportation operations ...... 1.55 3. Physics and astronomy ...... 0.56 What can be concluded from simply studying and 4. Planetary exploration ...... 0.22 projecting the Federal civilian space program budget 5. Life sciences...... 0.06 6. Space applications ...... 0.31 itself? 7. Technology utilization ...... 0.01 8. Aeronautical research and technology . . . 0.32 jbsee the article by George Mueller in Aerospace America, January 1984, 9. Space research and technology...... 0.14 p. 84 et seq. 10. Tracking and data acquisition ...... 0.70 ITsee the International Section of Renewable Energy News, December 1983. =$5.90 226 . Civilian Space Stations and the U.S. Future in Space

ministrator has reported at a press briefing36 that the 25 years could see a total of some $25 billion reimbursements—primarily for Shuttle flight serv- (1984$) added to the $50 billion made available ices—approached $300 million in fiscal year 1984, and through the Shuttle RDT&E completion—i.e., a that he expects that they will approximate some $7OO total of some $75 billion (1984$). Thus, just these million in fiscal year 1985. Further, he stated that: “1 two measures alone would suffice to see (from still anticipate reaching the break-even point in 1988 the financial viewpoint alone) that the ten con- or 1989. ” ceptual objectives could be satisfactorily ad- Thus (even without considering the cost-offsetting dressed within the next quarter of a century. importance of tax revenues generated by private-sec- 3. If the two preceding assumptions are retained, tor space business) the net cost to the public of our and if, in addition, the full cost were to be shared publicly funded civilian space program even now is by other countries and our private sector, in the significantly less than the gross cost because of this fashions and to the degrees outlined earlier, this Shuttle cost reimbursement: it is $6.6 billion net out measure (again, speaking just of financial, not po- of $6.9 billion gross. Next year the expected reim- litical or technological circumstances) would al- bursement income would more than offset a 4 per- low the ten conceptual objectives to be attained cent inflation rate. (Considering the tax revenues as in, say, 20 years since this would allow some $15 an additional effective “offset” would reduce the $6.6 billion (1984$) of public funds to be used to accel- billion to $6.1 billion. That is, the net cost could be erate the schedule. Alternatively, the 1 percent considered to be some 11 percent less than the gross per year “real growth” and/or the “base” figure cost, and falling.) of $2 billion could be reduced. And, finally, NASA now has some reason to expect 4. Whether or not such public and other funds are that funds for its program would increase by 1 per- indeed made available could be influenced, pos- cent/year plus any inflationary increase. If inflation itively and importantly, by two other circum- compensation plus 1 percent real growth becomes stances: emplaced in NASA’s annual appropriations, it would ● If the incorne from other countries and the pri- have important influence on the pace at which space- vate sector for the use of the Shuttle increases related objectives, such as those suggested here, could as is now hoped/expected, then, in a half-dozen be pursued. A 1 percent “real growth” on a base of years or so, this would amount to NASA appro- $7 billion/year would provide a total addition of some priations being, in effect, “offset” by as much $10 billion by the end of this century, and a total ap- as some $2 billion (1984$) per year; proaching $25 billion in the next 25 years—i.e., an . If our private space-related sector could be stim- average of some $1 billion per year (1984$) over this ulated to maintain its present rate of sales latter interval. growth, it could begin to make significant addi- Under the assumptions made here, three conclu- tional space R&D investments itself—invest- sions may be reached concerning cost and financing ments that could grow to billions of dollars/year considerations: in the next two decades or so; and 1. In the absence of any private-sector or other- . If the tax revenues “thrown off” by our private country financial participation-i .e., under cir- sector’s commercial-industrial sales continue to cumstances whereby the full cost of addressing increase in the future as they have in the past, the ten conceptual objectives would be defrayed i.e., if a 10 to 15 percent per year, compounded, by U.S. public funds, and assuming that the funds growth rate were to continue over the next quar- continuing to become available year-to-year ter of a century, they could, at least to some ex- would be in the same amount as those now avail- tent, be looked upon also as an important “off- able under NASA’s “budget envelope,” then, set” to the gross public cost of our publicly starting 2-3 years hence, the essential completion supported space program, inasmuch as they of Shuttle-related development could provide would amount to scores of billions of dollars some $2 billion (1984) /year—i,e., some $50 bil- (1984$). lion (1984$) over the next quarter of a century, Clearly, under such generaI circumstances as these, 2. If, to this RDT&E “wedge” is added the antici- funding limitations would not prevent the United pated 1 percent/year “real growth” in appropria- States from undertaking an ambitious publicly sup- tions, in addition to an indexing of appropriations ported civilian space program throughout the next to neutralize the influence of inflation, the next quarter century.

aaThe Washinflon Post, Feb. 6, 1984, page A-9. Appendix G GLOSSARY OF ACRONYMS, ABBREVIATIONS AND TERMS

Glossary of Acronyms and GEO – Geostationary Earth Orbit (some- Abbreviations times, less precisely, geosynchronous) ACC – Aft Cargo Carrier GN&C – Guidance, Navigation, and Control AEM – Applications Explorer Module GPS – Global Positioning [Space] System ASO – Advanced Solar Observatory (see NAVSTAR) ASTO – Advanced Solar Terrestrial Ob- HEO – High Earth Orbit servatory IMS – Information Management Subsystem ASEB – Aeronautics and Space Engineering INMARSAT – International! Maritime Satellite Cor- Board (of the NRC) poration AXAF – Advanced X-Ray Astrophysics Fa- INTELSAT — International Telecommunication cility Satellite Corporation B — Billion IOC — Initial Operational Capability BOB – Bureau of the Budget ISAS — Institute of Space and Astronautical CDG – Concept Development Group Science (Japan) CNES – Centre National D’Etudes Spatiales ISF — Industrial Space Facility (France) ISTO — Initial Solar Terrestrial Observatory CNR – National Research Council (Italy) IVA — Intravehicular Activity COM – Center of Mass JEA – Joint Endeavor Agreement COMM — Communications JSC – Johnson Space Center COMSAT – Communications Satellite Cor- Kbps — Kilobits per second (of data poration handling) DBS – Direct Broadcast Satellite KSC — Kennedy Space Center DDT&E – Design, Development, Test, and kg — kilogram (2.2 pounds) Evaluation kW – kilowatt DMS – Data Management Subsystem LDEF — Long Duration Exposure Facility DOC – Department of Commerce LDR — Large Deployable Reflector DOD – Department of Defense LEO — Low-Earth-Orbit (usually 200-600 DOT – Department of Transportation km) ECLSS – Environmental Control and Life Sup- LIDAR — Light Detection and Ranging port Subsystem LSS – Large Space System EDO – Extended Duration Orbiter M — Million ELV – Expendable Launch Vehicle — meter (3.3 feet) EOL – Earth-Orbiting Laboratory MAC — Modular Attitude Control EOS – Electrophoresis Operations in Space MAS — Mission Analysis Study EPS – Electrical Power Subsystem MBB — Messerschmitt-Boelkow-BIohm ESA – European Space Agency Mbps — Megabits per second (of data ET — External Tank handling) EUMETSAT – European Meteorological Satellite MDA — Multiple Docking Adaptor Organization MESA — Modular Experimental Platform for EURECA – European Retrievable Carrier Science and Applications EUTELSAT – European Telecommunications Sat- MMS — Multimission Modular Spacecraft ellite Organization MMU — Manned Maneuvering Unit EVA – Extravehicular Activity (“walking in MOL — Manned Orbiting Laboratory Space”) MORL — Manned Orbital Research Lab- FF — Free Flyer oratory — g – Gravity MOSC Manned Orbital Systems Concept

227 228 ● Civilian Space Stations and the U.S. Future in Space

MPS — Materials Processing in Space SSEC — Solar System Exploration Committee MSC — Manned Spacecraft Center SSSAS — Space Station Systems Analysis MSFC — Marshall Space Flight Center Study NAC — NASA Advisory Council SSTF — Space Station Task Force (within NAE — National Academy of Engineering NASA) NAS — National Academy of Sciences STG — Space Task Group (of the National NASA — National Aeronautics and Space Security Council) Administration STS – Space Transportation System NASDA — National Space Development TDRS – Tracking and Data Relay Satellite Agency (Japan) TDRSS – Tracking and Data Relay Satellite NAVSTAR — DOD Satellite Navigation System System (see GPS) TMS — Teleoperator Maneuvering System NOAA — National Oceanic and Atmospheric (former designation for OMV) Administration (within DOC) TMV — Transport Modular Vehicle NRC — National Research Council (of the TRKNG — Tracking NAS-NAE) TRS — Teleoperator Retrieval System O&M — Operations and Maintenance TSV — Teleoperator Service System OART — Office of Advanced Research and TUSK — Tethered Upper Stage Knob Technology (within NASA) VAFB — Vandenberg Air Force Base OAST — Office of Aeronautics and Space WBS — Work Breakdown Structure Technology (within NASA) OMB — Office of Management and Budget OMS — Orbital Maneuvering System Glossary of Terms OMSF — Office of Manned Space Flight (within NASA) Base–the central or core set of interrelated, and per- OMV — Orbital Maneuvering Vehicle (for- haps interconnected, 28.5° LEO infrastructure merly designated TMS) (“space station”) modules including facilities for OSM — Orbital Service Module power, docking, control, and human habitation. OTA — Office of Technology Assessment Cargo bay–the Space Shuttle’s central fuselage sec- OTV — orbital Transfer Vehicle tion (openable to space) in which cargo, equip- OWS — Orbital Workshop ment, and experiment modules are carried. PEP — Power Extension Package Core–(see base.) P/L — Payload Cosmos 1443-a Soviet resupply vehicle for Salyut or- POV — proximity Operation Vehicle biting spacecraft. R&D — Research and Development Element–any module, platform, free flyer, or vehi- RCS — Reaction Control System cle which is an integral part of the in-space infra- RD&P — Research, Development, and Pro- structure, and dependent on one or more other ele- duction ment(s) for its long-term operation. RDT&E — Research, Development, Test, and Free flyer–an unattached or free-flying uninhabitable Evaluation (or Engineering) satellite (usually dedicated to one purpose or activ- r.f. — Radio Frequency ity) which is serviced by or otherwise dependent RMS — Remote Manipulator System on other infrastructure elements. ROTV — Reusable Orbital Transfer Vehicle Geostationary satellite–a geosynchronous satellite RWG — Requirements Working Group whose circular orbit lies in the plane of the Earth’s SAB — Space Applications Board (of the equator and which thus remains fixed relative to NRC) the Earth; by extension, a satellite whose position SDV — Shuttle Developed Vehicle remains approximately fixed relative to the Earth; SOC – Space Operations Center its altitude is necessarily approximately 35,000 km SOLARIS – European Space Platform Concept above the Earth’s surface. SPAS – Space Pallet Satellite Geosynchronous satellite–an Earth satellite whose SPS – Solar Power Satellite period of revolution is equal to the period of rota- SPSS – Shuttle Payload Support Structure tion of the Earth about its axis. SS – Space Station Infrastructure-a generic term referring to all the ele- SSB – Space Science Board (of the NRC) ments constituting an interdependent space sup- Glossary of Acronyms, Abbreviations and Terms Ž 229

port system, consisting of surface and in-space Satellite–a body that revolves around another body elements. of preponderant mass and that has a motion pri- Leasecraft-proposed commercial, long-term, unpres- marily and permanently determined by the gravita- surized platform that could be used for Earth obser- tional forces of attraction between them; generally vation, materials processing in space, etc. applied here to an object revolving about the Earth. Low-Earth-Orbit (LEO)–an orbit around the Earth at Shuttle-the reusable passenger- and cargo-carrying altitudes usually ranging from 200 to 600 km and surface-LEO vehicle of the NASA Space Transpor- located at any of various inclinations to the Equator. tation System; sometimes referred to as the Space Megabit-a data communications rate of 1 million bits Shuttle Orbiter. (or units) per second. Skylab–an independent orbiting laboratory com- Module—an element of the infrastructure base or core posed principally of hardware remaining from the which provides a unique function for infrastructure Apollo program; inhabited by crews of astronauts operations. during 1973-1974. Orbiter–the Shuttle vehicle of the NASA Space Trans- Spacelab–a laboratory module, designed and pro- portation System. duced by ESA, carried into and out of orbit in the Orbit transfer–change of orbit, usually to one of sig- Shuttle cargo bay and supported by the Shuttle nificantly different altititude or inclination. power and life support systems. order of Magnitude–factor of 10. Space probe–a spacecraft designed to travel out of Pallet–an open structure attached to an element of the gravitational field of the Earth to explore other infrastructure that provides mounting for equip- parts of the solar system. ment, vehicles, or experiments. Space station–a totality of habitable and uninhabit- Platform–an orbiting multi-use structure capable of able Earth-orbiting interdependent infrastructure supplying limited utilities to changeable payloads elements constituting a long term in-space support and dependent on other infrastructure elements; system. usually uninhabitable except, perhaps for some, for Tracking and Data Relay Satellite System (TDRSS)–a servicing. communications system used to relay data directly Polar orbit–an orbit whose plane intersects the between orbiting vehicles and a single U.S. ground Earth’s axis of rotation. station at White Sands, NM. Salyut–a Soviet inhabited “space station” in LEO, the first model of which was launched in 1971. Index Index

broadening the debate, 103-110 civilian “space station s,” 31-35 need for goals and objectives, 105 alternatives, 33 policy background, 106 concerns about LEO infrastructure, 32 President Reagan’s call for a “space station, ” 109 cost of LEO infrastructure, 33 recent proposals, 108 infrastructure in LEO, 31 space infrastructure as methods and means, 103 general, 25-31 steps toward broader participation, 110 NASA’s circumstances, 25-28 buyer’s guide to space infrastructure, 85 transitions, 28 alternative funding rates, 94 possible legislative initiatives, 43-46 catalog of space infrastructure, 87 civilian space policies, goals, objectives, and cost drivers, 91 strategies, 45 people and automation in space, 92 creation of space policy study centers, 46 procurement options, 85 strategies for acquiring any new in-space civilian infrastructure, 43 Congress: U.S. future in space, 35-43 House: arena of peaceful cooperation, 40 Committee on the Budget, 4 cost reduction, 37 Committee on Science and Technology, 4, 44, 46, international space cooperation, 39 109 long-term space goals and objectives, 35 Senate: long-term space strategies, 37 Committee on Appropriations, 4, 60 NASA’s changing role, 41 Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transporta- non-Government policy studies tion, 4 private sector, 38

European Space Agency (ESA), 39, 56, 66, 155, 189 legislation: evolution of civilian in-space infrastructure, 159-176 Comsat Act of 1962, 103 Apollo anomaly, 161 National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958, 25, 35, beginnings of post-Apollo planning, 164 103, 106, 110 earliest space infrastructure, 159 National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1985, 30, 45 NASA’s post-Apollo ambitions dashed, 170 post-Apollo planning under Thomas Paine, 166 National Academy of Sciences, 61 recent in-space infrastructure, 172 National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), response to Sputnik, 1957-61 4, 6, 7, 10, 11, 12, 21, 25, 27, 28, 31, 32, 38, Skylab: an interim “Space Station, ” 171 39, 42, 43, 49, 58-60, 103-104 “Space Station” plans: during the 1960s, 162 Solar System Exploration Committee, 61 National Commission on Space, 16, 30, 31, 214 financing considerations and Federal budget impacts, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration 217-226 (NOAA), 29, 30, 38, 39, 40 National Research Council, 49, 61 infrastructure options, 7 NATO, 29, 39 funding rate options, 12 National Weather Service, 29 procurement options, 10 need for goals and objectives, 13 technology options, 7 Nixon administration, 106 comparison of options, 8 space infrastructure platforms, 9 OTA workshop on cost containment of civilian space infrastructure required, 17 infrastructure, synopsis of, 206-213 cost, 18 financing, 19 People’s Republic of China, 56, 85 technology, 17 possible goals and objectives, 15 INTELSAT, 39, 40 Presidential Space Task Group, 106 internationaI involvement i n a civiIian ‘‘space station’ program, 177-205 Ramo, Simon, 108 assessment: pros and cons, 203-205 rational for space infrastructure, 4-7 factors influencing assessment of international involve- Reagan, President Ronald, 107, 109 ment, 198-203 relation of a “space station” to the U.S. future in space, possible modes of international involvement, 185-189 3 potential international partners, 189 Report of the Second Advisory Panel Meeting, held at Why international involvement?, 177-185 Aspen-Wye Plantation, November 1983, 133-139 issues and findings, 25-46 analysis capability, 134

233 234 ● Civilian Space Stations and the U.S. Future in Space

current space station proposal, 133 shuttle as permanent infrastructure, 77 effect of military programs and interests, 137 considerations for any space infrastructure, 50-58 geopolitical competition, 138 LEO environment, 51 immediate alternatives to a space station, 135 orbits, 50 international cooperation, 136 space transportation, 54 international economic competition, 138 expendable launch vehicle (ELV), 56 long-term mission possibilities, 135 manned maneuvering unit (MMU), 56 NASA operations and organization, 138 orbital maneuvering vehicle (OMV), 56 private-sector involvement, 136 reusable orbital transfer vehicle (ROTV), 56 R&D, 134 shuttle, 55 results of principal NASA studies on space station uses technical considerations, 52 and functional requirements, 141-158 attitude control and stabilization, 52 major findings of the U.S. aerospace industry “Mis- data management, 52 sion Analysis Studies, ” 141 electromagnetic interference (EM I), 52 AEG, British Aerospace, Fokker, CIR, 156 life support systems, 54 Aerospatiale, 156 power, 53 Canada, 156 propulsion, 54 costs and benefits, 147 thermal energy management, 53 Dornier, 156 NASA’s approach to space infrastructure, 58-60 European Space Agency, 155 infrastructure functions, 60 evolution of the initial capability, 146 mission analysis studies, 58 functional capabilities, 143 National Research Council, 61 individual foreign company interests, 156 infrastructure elements, 145 Title n-National Commission on Space (P. L. 98-361), Japan, 156 214-216 phased activities (mission sets), 143 toward a goal-oriented civilian space program, 113 role of a human crew, 146 cost and schedule, 124 users and uses, 141 indicated infrastructure, 122 NASA synthesis of the “Mission Analysis Studies, ” 157 possible goals, 113 nonaerospace industry interest in Space use, 158 possible objectives, 113 global disaster avoidance, 115 shape of the space future, 19 human presence and activities on the Moon, 117 international, 20 increasing commercial-industrial space sales, 120 new role for NASA, 21 medical research of direct interest to the general private sector, 20 public, 117 space infrastructure, 49-82 modernizing and expanding international short-wave alternative infrastructure, 62-82 broadcasting, 118 habitable infrastructure, 70 obtaining information required for eventual human Columbus, 75 exploration of Mars and some asteroids, 117 Extended Duration Orbiter (EDO), 70 people drawn from the general public, in space, Spacelab, 72-75 118 uninhabitable platforms, 62 providing space data directly to the general public, Boeing MESA, 64 118 EURECA, 66 reducing the cost of space transportation, 120 Fairchild LEASECRAFT, 62 using space and space technology for the transmis- Long Duration Exposure Facility (LDEF), 66 sion of electrical energy, 119 MBB SPAS, 66 Pleiades Concept, 66 U.S. Department of Defense, 4, 29, 30, 39 Shuttle Payload Support Structure (SPSS), 66 U.S. Department of Transportation, 38 SOLARIS, 69 U. S. S. R., 5, 45 Space Industries Platform, 66

U.s . GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1984 0 - 38-798 : QL 3