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26M 2008 Space Security 2007 Spacesecurity.Org.Pdf SPACE SECURITY 2007 SPACESECURITY.ORG SPACE SECURITY 2007 SPACESECURITY.ORG Library and Archives Canada Cataloguing in Publications Data Space Security 2007 ISBN: 978-1-895722-58-1 © 2007 SPACESECURITY.ORG Design and layout by Graphics, University of Waterloo, Waterloo, Ontario, Canada Cover image: Orbital Sciences Corporation. Artists’ illustration of six microsatellites launched 14 April 2006 to form COSMIC, the Constellation Observing System for Meteorology, Ionosphere, and Climate, a joint project between the United States and Taiwan. Printed in Canada First published August 2007 Please direct inquiries to: Project Ploughshares 57 Erb Street West Waterlo, Ontario Canada N2L 6C2 Telephone: 519-888-6541 Fax: 519-888-0018 Email: [email protected] Governance Group Jessica West Managing Editor, Project Ploughshares Cynda Collins Arsenault Secure World Foundation Amb. Thomas Graham Jr. Cypress Fund for Peace and Security Dr. Wade Huntley Simons Centre for Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Research University of British Columbia Dr. Ram Jakhu Institute of Air and Space Law McGill University Dr. William Marshall Space Policy Institute George Washington University and NASA-Ames Research Centre Andrew Shore Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada John Siebert Project Ploughshares Advisory Board Amb. Thomas Graham Jr. (Chairman of the Board), Cypress Fund for Peace and Security Philip Coyle III Center for Defense Information Richard DalBello Intelsat-General Corporation Air Marshall Lord Garden House of Lords, UK Theresa Hitchens Center for Defense Information Dr. John Logsdon Space Policy Institute, George Washington University Dr. M. Lucy Stojak Consultant/International Space University Faculty Member Dr. S. Pete Worden Brigadier General USAF (ret.) TABLE OF CONTENTS PAGE 1 Acronyms PAGE 5 Introduction PAGE 7 Acknowledgements PAGE 9 Executive Summary PAGE 21 Chapter 1 – The Space Environment: this indicator examines the security and sustainability of the space environment with an emphasis on space debris, space situational awareness, and space resource issues. TREND 1.1: Growing debris threats to spacecraft TREND 1.2: Increasing awareness of space debris threats and continued efforts to develop guidelines for debris mitigation efforts TREND 1.3: Space surveillance capabilities to support collision avoidance slowly improving TREND 1.4: Growing demand for radio frequencies TREND 1.5: Growing demand for orbital slots PAGE 39 Chapter 2 – Space Laws, Policies, and Doctrines: this indicator examines national and international laws, multilateral institutions, and military policies and doctrines relevant to space security. TREND 2.1: Development of legal framework for outer space activities TREND 2.2: COPUOS remains active but the Conference on Disarmament has been unable to agree on an agenda since 1998 TREND 2.3: Space faring states’ national space policies consistently emphasize international cooperation and the peaceful uses of outer space TREND 2.4: Growing focus within national military doctrine on the security uses of outer space PAGE 57 Chapter 3 – Civil Space Programs and Global Utilities: this indicator examines the civil space sector comprised of organizations engaged in the exploration of space or scientific research related to space, for non-commercial and non-military purposes as well as space-based global utilities provided by civil, military, or commercial actors. TREND 3.1: Growth in the number of actors gaining access to space TREND 3.2: Changing priorities and funding levels within civil space programs TREND 3.3: Steady growth in international cooperation in civil space programs TREND 3.4: Continued growth in global utilities as states seek to expand applications and accessibility PAGE 74 Chapter 4 – Commercial Space: this indicator examines the commercial space sector, including the builders and users of space hardware and space information technologies. It also examines the sector’s relationship with governments and militaries. TREND 4.1: Continued overall growth in the global commercial space industry TREND 4.2: Declining commercial launch costs support increased access to space TREND 4.3: Government subsidies and national security concerns continue to play important roles in the commercial space sector PAGE 90 Chapter 5 – Space Support for Terrestrial Military Operations: this indicator examines the research, development, testing and deployment of space systems that aim to advance terrestrial based military operations, including warning, communications, intelligence, surveillance, reconaissance, meteorology, navigation, and weapons guidance applications. TREND 5.1: US and USSR/Russia continue to lead in developing militar space systems TREND 5.2: More states developing military space capabilities PAGE 108 Chapter 6 – Space Systems Protection: this indicator examines the research, development, testing and deployment of capabilities to protect space systems from potential negation efforts, particularly detecting, withstanding and recovering from an attack. TREND 6.1: US and USSR/Russia lead in general capabilities to detect rocket launches, while US leads in the development of advanced technologies to detect direct attacks on satellites TREND 6.2: Protection of satellite ground stations is a concern, while the protection of satellite communications links is poor but improving TREND 6.3: Protection of satellites against some direct threats is improving, largely through radiation hardening, system redundancy, and greater use of higher orbits TREND 6.4: US and USSR/Russia lead in developing capabilities to rapidly rebuild space systems following a direct attack on satellites PAGE 124 Chapter 7 – Space Systems Negation: this indicator examines the research, development, testing and deployment of capabilities designed to negate the capabilities of space systems including deception, disruption, denial, degradation and destruction. TREND 7.1: Proliferation of capabilities to attack ground stations and communications links TREND 7.2: US leads in the development of space situational awareness capabilities to support space negation TREND 7.3: Ongoing proliferation of ground-based capabilities to attack satellites TREND 7.4: Increasing access to space-based negation enabling capabilities PAGE 138 Chapter 8 – Space-Based Strike Systems: this indicator examines the research, development, testing, and deployment of space-based strike systems, which operate from Earth orbit with the capability to damage or destroy either terrestrial targets or terrestrially launched objects passing through space. TREND 8.1: While no space-based strike system has yet been tested or deployed, the US is continuing the development of a space-based interceptor for its missile defense system TREND 8.2: A growing number of countries are developing an increasing number of advanced space-based strike enabling technologies through other civil, commercial, and military programs PAGE 149 Annex One: Space Security Working Group Meeting Participants PAGE 152 Annex Two: Active Dedicated Military Satellites PAGE 161 Endnotes Acronyms ABM Anti-Ballistic Missile ACRONYMS ANGELS Autonomous Nanosatellite Guardian for Evaluating Local Space ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations ASAT Anti-Satellite Weapon ASLV Augmented Satellite Launch Vehicle ATV Automated Transfer Vehicle AWS Advanced Wideband System BMD Ballistic Missile Defense CBM Confidence-Building Measures CD Conference on Disarmament CEV Crew Exploration Vehicle CNES Centre National d’Études Spatiales CNSA Chinese National Space Administration CONUS Continental United States COPUOS United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space COSPAR-SARSAT Committee On Space Research – Search and Rescue Satellite-Aided Tracking CSA Canadian Space Agency CX-OLEV ConeXpress Orbital Life Extension Vehicle DARPA Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency DART Demonstration of Autonomous Rendezvous Technology DBS Direct Broadcasting by Satellite DGA Délégation Générale pour l’Armement DOD United States Department of Defense DSCS Defense Satellite Communications System DSP Defense Support Program DTRA Defense Threat Reduction Agency EADS European Aeronautics Defence and Space Company EC European Commission EELV Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle EHF Advanced Extremely High Frequency EKV Exoatmospheric Kill Vehicle ELINT Electronic Intelligence ESA European Space Agency EU European Union FALCON Force Application and Launch from the Continental United States FAA Federal Aviation Administration (US) FCC Federal Communications Commission (US) FMCT Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty FOBS Fractional Orbital Bombardment System 1 Space Security 2007 GAGAN GPS and GEO Augmented Navigation GEO Geostationary Orbit GEOSS Global Earth Observation System of Systems GLONASS Global Navigation Satellite System GMES Global Monitoring for Environment and Security GNSS Global Navigator Satellite System GPS Global Positioning System HAND High Altitude Nuclear Detonation HEL High Energy Laser HELSTF High Energy Laser Systems Test Facility HEO Highly Elliptical Orbit IADC Inter-Agency Debris Coordinating Committee ICBM Intercontinental Ballistic Missile ILS International Launch Services INMARSAT International Maritime Satellite Organization INTELSAT International Telecommunications Satellite Consortium ISO International Organization for Standardization ISRO Indian Space Research Organization ISS International Space Station ITAR International Traffic in Arms Regulation ITU International Telecommunications
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