Taking Habermas to Task on Kosovo: A Critical Review of the Habermasian Cosmopolitan Interpretation

Thesis

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Master of Arts Degree in the Graduate School of the Ohio State University

By

Todd Wendell Rho’Dess, B.A.

Graduate Program in Political Science

The Ohio State University

2010

Thesis Committee:

Michael Neblo, Advisor

William Minozzi Copyright by

Todd Wendell Rho’Dess

2010 Abstract

In the spring of 1999, the same year as its 50th anniversary, NATO made history by conducting an 11 week bombing campaign with the declared goal of forcing Slobodon

Milosovic to stop the ethnic cleansing of ethnic Kosovar-Albanians. Harking back to the brutality of Auschwitz, Secretary of State Madeline Albright praised the intervention as a rare point in history where nations stand in defense against the ‘evil’ of criminal regimes.

Another notable figure in the praise for the intervention was Jurgen Habermas. The acclaimed philosopher endorsed the intervention as a step toward the Kantian

“cosmopolitan condition” whereby states lend world organizations their monopoly of force for a normative goal---in defense of populations held hostage by oppressive governments. The aim of the thesis is to take a critical look at Habermas’s optimistic assessment of the Kosovo intervention. It starts with a detailed appraisal of each of

Habermas’s key truth claims on Kosovo ---namely that (1) NATO acted in outrage over the mass crimes and imminent ethnic cleansing in the province, and (2) that Serbian rejectionism of the ‘liberal solution’ to the question of Kosovo (i.e. significant autonomy) robbed the Western alliance of a viable peace option. The approach taken is to look at

Western documentary records to gleam the NATO and international understanding of the pre-bombing situation in 1999. The thesis finds that on both counts the Habermasian interpretation falls woefully short of capturing the Western view --- international perception that the Albanian separatist movement purposely used urban terror to incite a ii brutal Serb response and NATO intervention. The second part of the thesis traces flaws in the Habermasian interpretation of reality on ground to its failure to anticipate realpolitik as a motivation for EU member state, and US intervention. It critiques Habermas’s belief in a US normative power politics, for instance, by showing US failure to reduce support for client states engaged in comparable ethnic cleansing in the same period of the Kosovo intervention. The thesis cautions future endorsement of independent military alliance actions without authorization, however flawed, by the United Nations Security Council.

iii Dedication

This thesis is dedicated to my wife, for her loving moral and emotional support through the dimmest darkest times and helping me to learn the value of family, love, and loyalty.

iv Acknowledgements

My sincere thanks and appreciation are extended to Professor Michael Neblo for his invaluable support and encouraging words throughout the course of my research whilst allowing me the room to work in my own way. I am forever indebted to his help in making my degree possible. I also offer my sincere gratitude to Professor William

Minozzi who worked diligently to make this study a reality. His valuable recommendations and ideas helped me a great deal.

v Vita

2009 to 2010………………………………………...... Graduate Research Associate, Ohio State University

2007 to 2008………………….. ……………………….. Interac Co. Ltd., English Language Instructor, Japan

2006 to 2007……………………………………………. Helena English School, English Language Instructor, Japan

2003 to 2004…………………...... AEON Co. Ltd., English Language Instructor, Japan

1997-2001………………………………………….…... United States Air Force, Transportation Officer

1992-1996…………………………………………….... B.A. Government, University of Notre Dame

Publications

Rho’Dess, Todd with Fatemeh Masouleh and Yuji Murayama. “The Application of GIS in Education Administration: Protecting Students from Hazardous Roads.” Transactions in GIS 13:1(2009): 105–123.

Fields of Study

Major Field: Political Science International Politics

vi Table of Contents

Abstract ...... ii

Dedication ...... iii

Acknowledgments...... iv

Vita...... v

Chapter 1: Introduction...... 1

Chapter 2: The Habermasian Truth Claims on Kosovo...... 5

Chapter 3: Empirical Objections to the Habermasian Truth Claims...... 12

Chapter 4: Anticipating Counter-Arguments from the Habermasian Perspective...... 26

Chapter 5: Assessing the Moral Credentials of the ‘First World’...... 38

Conclusion...... 51

References ...... 52

vii Chapter 1: Introduction

Prior to the Kosovo intervention, rapturous expressions about the good will surrounding military intervention was considered taboo -- a far-fetched proposition. Events in the spring of 1999 temporarily changed that. It was the year that NATO launched an unprecedented military campaign with the expressed aim of halting mass killings and the expulsion of ethnic Albanians from the province of Kosovo. The 11-week bombing campaign against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) was unique in several ways.

First, it marked a transformation of NATO from a largely political body into an action- oriented military alliance. Second, it was one of the first post-Cold War uses of armed force to halt human rights violations occurring within a repressive state’s own borders.

Third, the campaign represented a new ‘humanitarian impulse’ albeit one absent formal

Security Council authorization.

Optimism about the deeper import of the intervention was immediate. As the bombing operation commenced, leaders of the allied countries portrayed it as a revolutionary break from the past, heralding the start of a ‘humanitarian era’ in international relations. With historical memories of Auschwitz in mind, for instance,

Secretary of State Madeline Albright stated that democracies were finally “standing up against this kind of evil” (Gellman 1999). Clinton’s speech the night before US-led

NATO forces launched air strikes drove home a similar point. Armed intervention represented a “just and necessary war” given that failure to act would be tantamount to a 1 “moral and strategic disaster” for the region (Clinton 1999). Clinton’s European Union partners also concurred. German Foreign Minister Joshua Fischer, for instance, referring to the optimistic assessments of German intellectual Urlrich Beck, expressed that

NATO’s actions symbolized a ‘new military humanism.’

Another notable voice in the chorus of approbation was Jürgen Habermas.

Repulsed by the mass crimes perpetrated by Germany in his life time and hopeful about resuscitating the normative thrust of Kant’s cosmopolitan vision, the influential philosopher ardently cast the Kosovo intervention in a positive light. For Habermas,

NATO actions represented not only a step away from the classical power politics of states but also progress towards the moral politics of a cosmopolitan society. It signified “a leap from the classical international law of states to a cosmopolitan law of global civil society” (Habermas 1999, 264). He argued that even without Security Council authorization the allied countries (of which the US and EU were standouts) acquied sufficient legitimation by falling back on erga omnes principles of international law in the face of gross violations of human rights. In this view, the NATO war over Kosovo represented positive advances towards the ‘constitutionalization of international law.’

To be fair, the German philosopher’s support for the NATO campaign was not without qualifications. The author also couched his endorsement of the NATO intervention with caution. Human rights enforcement absent “compulsory legal action legitimated by a democratic civil society of global citizens” would result in the

“transitory paternalism” of states, he warned (Habermas 1999, 270). Despite this shortcoming, Habermas felt that legitimation problems were sufficiently overcome by the

“undisputed democratic and constitutional character” of coalition members like the US

2 and Western European member nations (Habermas 2006a, 29).

Taking the promise offered by a Habermasian cosmopolitan model seriously, this thesis questions the philosopher’s hopeful assessment of the 1999 Kosovo case. The main crux of the analysis is to take a closer look at Habermas’s optimism about the Kosovo intervention’s status as a symbol of an emerging cosmopolitan order. Toward this end, it poses several critical questions about the deliberation process leading up to the spring

1999 intervention, the outcome of the path chosen, and the overall legitimacy of the process. According to Habermas coalition powers sought intervention because of perceived ethnic cleansing and mass atrocities prior to bombing. Habermas also argues that for the United Stated and EU member states to take on such a costly humanitarian operations realpolitik could not have been at work. To assess this view the thesis will focus on two major questions: (1) did NATO perceptions of facts on the ground prior to the war match Habermas’s portrayal of the Western understanding of the situation? With the three-level cosmopolitan global societal model in mind, (2) was it possible for the intervening powers to act with sufficient legitimacy without Security Council authorization?

The thesis will conclude that contrary to the Habermasian generalization of events, the NATO understanding of atrocities and expulsions was much more nuanced. It will also argue that major flaws in the manner in which the 1999 Kosovo intervention was executed stem from two overriding factors: (a) power-politics by the United States and

(b) a general over-reliance on nation-states that failed to fulfill the Haebermasian requirement for independent deliberation and moral clout. It concludes by recommending against humanitarian interventions in which decision-making power is delegated to

3 regional-alliances rather than supranational structures within the United Nations.

Prior to proceeding, a final point of clarification is in order. In revisiting major flaws in the Habermasian portrayal of the Kosovo case the aim is not to abandon his innovative cosmopolitan project. The intention is not to reject the unique model tout court, throwing out the proverbial baby with the bath water. Revealing problem areas lurking behind presumed cases of progress can, however, reveal something about the true state of divergence between theory and practice in progress towards cosmopolitanism. In more concrete terms, it might also reveal the need for increased theoretical vigilance prior to offering endorsements on future cases of ‘military humanism.’ A final practical application of thesis is to draw attention to the pitfalls of excessive high-hopes in normative progress whenever self-interested states step to deal with global crisis in lieu of world organizations.

4 Chapter 2: The Habermasian Truth Claims on Kosovo

Prior to delving into possible flaws behind the Habermasian interpretation of Kosovo, the

remainder chapter will focus on the numerous truth-claims offered up in his writings on

the conflict. The claims elucidated in the chapter will then serve as the crucial source

material for critiques of the Habermasian portrayal of NATO perceptions of Kosovo in

later chapters. To avoid charges of ‘cherry picking’ from early writings which might

clash with later works, the brief review will also point to the consistent themes expressed

in each of the essays throughout the years.

Habermas provides detailed discussions on Kosovo in four pivotal writings (1) the

essay written during the spring 1999 NATO action entitled “The War in Kosovo:

Bestiality and Humanity: A War on the Border between Legality and Morality,” (2)

reference again to Kosovo in the 2003 Iraq War essay entitled “Interpreting the Fall of a

Monument,” (3) transcripts from an interview on the Kosovo intervention entitled

“Fundamentalism and Terror,” reprinted in the 2006 work The Divided West, and (4) a

full chapter on Kosovo (entitled “From Power Politics to a Cosmopolitan Society”) in the

2006 book Time of Transitions --- which expands on his first essay. Given the time lapse of several years between the initial essay and later writings, the collection provides a representative snapshot of the author’s thinking on the Kosovo crisis over time. In reviewing all four it soon becomes apparent how stable Habermas’s thinking on the crisis

5 has remained. As mentioned, his final full essay on the topic in 2006 harks back to ideas

of his original essay. The composition is also significant given retrospective commentary

confirming earlier conclusions and findings (i.e. those composed during and immediately

after the 1999 NATO bombing). A brief forward to entry (4), for instance, states that

“…nevertheless, I still defend the Kantian perspective of a transition from international to

cosmopolitan law from which I sought to justify the intervention in principle at the

time”(Habermas 2006b, 16). This shows that despite information released since the 1999

intervention, the author remains steadfast in his endorsement. With this in mind, the

remainder of the chapter will delve into the specific claims Habermas presents on the

Western understanding of the pre-bombing situation.

Sharply cognizant of the lack of supranational legitimacy for NATO military

actions in Kosovo, the issue that Habermas tackles in all four of these writing is the

necessity of intervention even without Security Council authorization. The first truth

claim is a clear illustration of this point. According to Habermas, Kosovo represented an

emergency situation warranting an immediate military response. In his 2003 essay, for

example, he claims that the intervention was legitimated “after the fact” given the aim of

“preventing ethnic cleansing…known at the time to be taking place” (Habermas 2006a,

29). To flesh-out the point, Habermas reiterates the timing and scale of mass crimes

occurring prior to the NATO decision to bomb. He states that “murder, terror, and

expulsion struck about 300,000 people in Kosovo even during the months prior to the start of the air attacks.” (Habermas 1999, 265) Action by the North Atlantic alliance without a Security Council mandate was thus justified in this view to provide “emergency aid for a persecuted ethnic minority” (Habermas 2006b, 21).

6 Habermas’s reference to ethnic cleansing and mass atrocities in Kosovo prior to bombing is also consistent with the standard version of events provided by US government officials and Western scholarly descriptions of the crisis. A typical academic account offered is that in the spring of 1999 armed Serbs, under the direction of Yugoslav

President Slobodan Milosevic, “appeared to be conducting an ethnic cleansing campaign against the province’s predominantly Albanian population.” The result was that Kosovar

Albanians fled the assault “recounting stories of…forced expulsions” and that the atrocities and expulsions “elicited the NATO bombing campaign” (Paris 2002, 424).

According to Ash (2000), the decision to wield force absent Security Council authorization was justified on grounds that we passed “the very high threshold” for humanitarian intervention;” namely “something approaching genocide” in Kosovo prior to the NATO bombing campaign. Other scholarly accounts begin the chronology six months to a year prior the March 24 bombardment while integrating ongoing clashes between the Yugoslav army (VJ) and the armed Albanian separatist group, the Kosovo

Liberation Army (KLA). A typical version is provided by Williams (1999). He states that: “Serbia assaulted Kosovo to squash a separatist Albanian guerilla movement, but killed 10,000 civilians and drove 70,000 people into refuge in Macedonia and Albania (in the process). NATO attacked Serbia from the air in the name of protecting the Albanians from ethnic cleansing.” In making this claim William’s reinforces the conventional theme of Western perceptions of ethnic cleansing prior to the bombing.

Though Weller (1999b) provides a similar picture to the one above, his account also fills in details on the exact nature of the civil strife between the KLA and Serb security forces. According to the author, in the fall of 1998 the VJ forced tens of

7 thousands “alleged” members of the KLA into the remote mountains in the dead of

winter. Though Serbian leaders drew down its forces following a December ceasefire

brokered by the United States and other members of the NATO alliance in March of 1999,

they later launched an offensive military campaign in defiance of international warnings.

Details on the Kosovar reaction is provided by Paris’s (2002) account; “once again,

Albanian Kosovars fled the assault, this time in even greater numbers” (p. 424). Political

leaders offered similar chronologies of events. One example is Clinton’s description of

Kosovo as genocide in-the-making in interviews immediately after the bombing

commenced. In on interview Clinton suggested that actions by Serb forces within Kosovo

had given ample notice of malevolent intentions prior to the resort to force. He also added

that “we act to protect thousands of innocent people in Kosovo from a mounting military

offensive” (Schmemann 1999).

To recap, the main point of accounts by Habermas accounts and other scholarly

sources is that killings and mass expulsions in the province had surpassed the critical

‘threshold’ for ethnic cleansing prior to the March 1999. In response, NATO initiated its powerful eleven week bombing campaign to thwart further Yugoslav violence. Though

Habermas does not specifically refer to the KLA, it is worth noting that he offers brief mention of the civil war aspect of the conflict. In line with other scholarly accounts, for instance, Habermas posits that Serbs had transformed a civil war into something resembling ethnic cleansing. Thus he states “the (Yugoslav) terrorist misappropriation of state power transformed classical civil war into mass murder –emphasis added”

(Habermas 1999, 271). In this view the violence was the result of a “murderous” Serbian

“ethno-nationalism” which sought to expel ethnic Albanians from the province

8 (Habermas 1999, 265).

A second truth claim that Habermas presents in writings (1) through (4) above is the fact that armed intervention by coalition forces occurred only after Serb rejection of a viable diplomatic solution to the conflict. A comment in his 1999 essay serves to illustrate the point. Habremas (1999) mentions that NATO was carrying out the threatened punishment of air strikes after “failed” negotiations at Rambouillet. In saying this he makes reference to the Rambouillet conference convened by delegations from

France, Russia, the US, and Britain (otherwise known as the “Contact Group”) between

February and March of 1999 set up as the diplomatic track to the crisis. The result of this conference was a draft agreement which was considered by many as “the only peaceful solution to the Kosovo problem” –emphasis added (Weller 1999a:236). The aim of

Western powers at the negotiations, according to Habermas, was put to a stop to raging

Serbian ethno-nationalism. Following the failure of the conference, the Northern Alliance then provided “emergency aid” by force (Habermas 1999, 271). Habermas adds that coalition forces turned to the air strike option with the announced intention of “enforcing liberal conditions” for the autonomy of Kosovo (Habermas 1999). In taking this stance, he stakes a claim striking similar to President Clinton’s expressed views. In his televised speech the day of the NATO air strikes, for instance, Clinton reiterated that while the

Kosovars “were saying yes to peace” the Serbs flatly “refused even to discuss key elements of the peace agreement” (Clinton 1999).

The information on Habermas reviewed thus far can be compressed into two key truth claims:

9 Truth Claim (1): Perceptions of Yugoslav “terrorist” state violence in the

months prior to the March 24 bombing precipitated military sanctions by

NATO. Armed intervention was undertaken with an understanding prior to

the air strikes of a general ‘emergency situation’ in which 300,000 people

were victims of ‘murder, terror, and expulsion.’

Truth Claim (2): Following the failed Rambouillet negotiations, the United

States and member-states of the European Union followed through on “threat

of military punishment” to “enforce liberal conditions for the autonomy of

Kosovo” (Habermas 1999: 264).

The first claim is essentially that a NATO air campaign against the FRY was seen as emergency aid given widespread Western perceptions of ethnic cleansing “even during the months prior to the start of the air attacks;” namely the expulsion and murder of some

300,000 people” (Habermas 2006a, 86). As reviewed, the position is identical to standard academic accounts that Milosevic appeared to be conducting an ethnic cleansing campaign from the spring of 1999 or earlier. Academic sources which incorporate details of the civil conflict follow a similar path, attributing hostilities to perceptions of repeated

Serb offensive operations at a genocidal pace.

On the Ramboillet Conference (the second truth claim), Habermas implies that the aim of all nations involved was to subdue murderous Serbian ethno-nationalism with a workable peace option. Serbian rejection of the agreement forced the North Atlantic military alliance to spring into action. In conformity with emerging international norms of humanitarian intervention, NATO was fulfilling its responsibility to protect cosmopolitan citizens from “large-scale killings, ethnic cleansing, and serious violations

10 of international humanitarian law” for which sovereign governments “prove unwilling to prevent” (Habermas 2008a, 338). Given that Habermas consistently upholds the validity of claims (1) and (2), throughout writings on Kosovo, subsequent chapters will investigate whether or not they are consistent with the documentary record of NATO’s perceptions.

11 Chapter 3: Empirical Objections to the Habermasian Truth Claims

In Habermas’s (2008) he outlines the implications of moves toward the

“constitutionalization” of international law. One sign of progress along this normative path is the strengthened legal position of individual subjects who acquire additional status not only as citizens of nation-states but also as cosmopolitan citizens of a world society.

In this view, human rights achieve a “positive validity (once) within a system of compulsory law” (Habermas 1999, 270). The overarching goal is an organization which fulfills the chief function of securing human rights and international security (Habermas

2008a). In Kantian fashion, the global implementation of human rights is thus causally linked with the objective of securing the global peace.

According to classical international law, NATO’s intervention would have counted as interference in the internal affairs of another sovereign state. As the philosopher astutely notes, however, “the cosmopolitan condition” effectively places the core norms of traditional liberal nationalism into question. Within this cosmopolitan framework, states automatically become subjects of international law and a

“cosmopolitan human rights regime capable of protecting citizens worldwide” (Habermas

2008a, 323). Under such ideal conditions, violations of human rights would be persecuted as “criminal acts within a state-ordained legal order” within an established set of procedures for resolving conflicts, rather than by “moral discrimination” (Habermas 1999,

268). The innovative thrust of the Habermasian project is that this condition can be 12 fulfilled without a Kantian world government to subordinate states to its centralized will.

At a minimum, the requirements of a Haberamsian model would be a “functioning”

Security Council borrowing from the monopoly of force lent it by states and a “second chamber” of representation of global cosmopolitan citizens to supplement the General

Assembly.

Would the 1999 Kosovo intervention by NATO count as legitimate prior to achieving this model? Other cosmopolitan scholars can offer definitive answers on the question in same vein as Habermas. Fine (2006) provides some insight. Making reference to Habermas’s rigorous requirements, the author notes that intervention requires authorization from a world organization at the supranational level. Citing Wheeler (2000,

34), he notes that most cosmopolitan’s writers would agree that only in the context of some “supreme humanitarian emergency” would military action become permissible.

According to this logic, the allied intervention in Kosovo can be viewed in the same light.

In this view, the 1999 NATO military campaign symbolizes action by a moral international community to protect populations from criminal governments, in accord with its sovereign duty. An additional requirement for intervention noted by Fine (2006) involves the distinction between “ordinary routine abuses of human rights” and “those extraordinary acts of killing and brutality that belong to the category of “crimes against humanity” (Wheeler 2000, 34). Fine (2006) reinforces this point by stating that military intervention is justified only when the intervening parties are convinced that killings are imminent. In such cases “it makes no sense to wait for mass killings to start” (Wheeler

2000, 34-5).

13 Habermas makes the parallel arguments for Kosovo throughout his writings. In later essays on the topic, for example, he posits that the “facts of the Kosovo case” should be “covered under the rubric of crimes against humanity” (Habermas 2006b, 27). He adds that the West cannot simply “stand by while Milosevic conducted yet another ethnic cleansing campaign” in the face of an “impending genocide” (Habermas 2006a, 86). The same position is drawn into sharper focus by Habermas’s two central truth claims noted above (i.e. that NATO perceived state terror and ethnic cleansing prior to bombing and the FRY refused peaceful settlement). Habermas states that:

“The terrorist misappropriations of state power (in the Kosovo case)

transform(ed) classical civil war into mass murder. When nothing else is

possible, neighboring democratic states should be allowed to rush to

provide emergency help as legitimated by international law…victims are

not to be left at the mercy of thugs” (Habermas 1999, 271).

Absent a mandate from the Security Council in an emergency situation, Habermas deduces, action is thus warranted under erga omnes binding principles of international law.

Following the brief review of the Habermasian theoretical framework above, the remainders of the chapter critically reviews the claim that Western coalition forces perceived eminent ethnic cleansing operations months prior to the intervention. To return to the central question above (1) do perceptions of events on the ground prior to NATO’s resort to force match the portrayals put forward by Habermas? Put simply, is his first truth claims accurate? To evaluate the claims, the remainder of the chapter reviews them in the light of the documentary record available at the time of the bombing campaign of

14 1999 or shortly after.

A word about pitfalls is perhaps necessary before proceeding. One danger in using documents to match NATO perceptions with Habermas’s truth claims is falling into the ‘Monday morning quarterbacking’ trap ---making superfluous critiques from information only knowable in hindsight. To avoid the snare, the analysis will use

Wheeler’s (2000) conception of an ‘intervention threshold.’ As reviewed, this view holds that military intervention is a valid option only when intervening parties are convinced that mass killings are either ongoing or imminent. Put in terms of the Kosovo case, the focus should be on what was understood prior to the spring 1999 air strikes. In other words, the central question pursued will be whether or not NATO powers truly saw

Kosovo as a case of ethnic cleansing prior to initiating bombing. To address the question the focus will be on Western documentation which conveys NATO’s perception of what was happening on the ground during the key year before the March 24 bombing. To narrow the focus, the main period of concern will be on perceptions of the situation between December 1998 and March of 1999, when Western involvement in the crisis was at its peak. The conclusion reached by the end is that, contrary to Habermas’s generalizations about ethnic cleansing, NATO’s perception of events on the ground was more complex and much less clear cut.

A review of Habermas portrayal of events is a useful starting point. According to the philosopher, “murder, terrorizing and expulsion struck some 300,000 ethnic Kosovo

Albanians” in the months leading up to the NATO air war (Habermas 1999, 271). In citing this figure, Habermas appears to be referring to the number of internally displaced in Kosovo in 1998. That was also the year international attention turned to Kosovo after

15 clashes between the separatist guerillas, the KLA, and the Yugoslav security forces reached serious proportions. By the end of the same year, NATO officials noted expanded involvement by the Yugoslav army.

According to NATO sources (Wheeler 2000) in the year before the bombing approximately 2000 were killed on all sides of the conflict along with perhaps 2-300,000 internal ethnic Albanian refugees within Kosovo. By October 1998 US envoy Richard

Holbrooke and an international delegation reached a cease-fired agreement making it possible to deploy 2,000 OSCE monitors as part of a Kosovo Verification Mission

(KVM) (Mandelbaum 1999). Following the end of the NATO bombing a peace accord was reached on June 3, 1999. By that time refugees flows had reached a crisis point with

671,500 refugees beyond FRY borders according to the UN High Commission for

Refugees (UNHCR) (Yemma 1999) Habermas makes reference to such mass expulsions in both his 1999 and 2006 essays. To keep the focal point on NATO perceptions prior to the bombing, as mentioned the chapter will keep to the months in between the breakdown of the ceasefire which lead up to the spring 1999 aerial campaign (December 1998 to mid-March 1999).

Was there evidence for Habermas’s contention that Western coalition nations felt ethnic cleansing was eminent, necessitating military action? Or was the assessment more mixed and closer to a classical civil war view? As touched on above of particular interest is the manner in which NATO viewed the role of the KLA, a factor which Habermas seems to miss in formulating his truth claims on the topic. In answer to the question above the US, Germany, and other NATO members understood the KLA not as a neutral force in the conflict but as a group provoking a fight in order to elicit a brutal Serb

16 response and accompanying Western bombing. KLA openness about aggravating the VJ for its separatist aspirations reached such a feverish pitch that it even reached the ears

Holbrooke himself. Thus, he later announced KLA was “taking very provocative steps in an effort to draw the West into the crisis” (Judah 2000, 178). US intelligence echoed this sentiment warning that “the Kosovo rebels intended to draw NATO into its fight for independence by provoking Serbian forces into further atrocities” (Judah 2000, 178).

Such notions were also publicized by direct statements of the KLA to the Western media.

In an interview with BBC, for instance KLA leader Hashim Thaci informed investigators that “we knew full well that any armed action we undertook would trigger a ruthless retaliation against our people” (Gowan 1999). Thus, the KLA leadership was quite forthright about their goal of inciting a brutal Serb response to prompt a NATO intervention; it broadcast its message to anyone who cares to listen.

The background facts of the internal conflict fit logically within the context of

KLA-initiated aggression. The civil war aspect of the struggle began in February 1998 after KLA guerillas based in Albanian, announced their intent to forcefully cede from greater Serbia, attacking Serb police and civilians within Kosovo in the process. By the summer of 1998, the KLA had also taken had taken over perhaps 40% of the province, setting off a fierce reaction by Serb security forces and paramilitaries targeting civilians alleged connected with the guerillas. It is interesting to note that in tandem with Yugoslav authorities the US denounced KLA tactics as terrorist. One example is Clinton’s special envoy Robert Gelbard categorization of the armed faction as “without any questions, a terrorist group” (Craig 1999). The KLA campaign against Serb security forces precipitated a brutal military crackdown which lasted for months prior to the NATO

17 military engagement. As fighting escalated through the end of 1998 media reports emerged that as many as 10,000 Serb Interior troops fought rebels and “harassed and sometimes massacred civilians in rural rebel strongholds” (Weller 1999b).

KLA responsibility for terrorist violence in the year prior to bombing is also reflected in the distribution of the death toll cited above. Wheeler (2000) estimates that

Serbs had killed 500, implying that the KLA was responsible for 1,500 deaths.

Documentary evidence shows that the import of such numbers was not lost on more hawkish elements of the alliance. The statements of the British defense minister as the

NATO air strikes commenced on March 24 is a case in point. Defense Minister Lord

George Robertson, later NATO Secretary General, informed the House of Commons that prior to bombing “the KLA were responsible for more deaths in Kosovo than the

Yugoslav authorities had been” (Chomsky 2000, 106). His testimony is buttressed by a subsequent British Parliamentary Inquiry. The report reveals that as early as January 18

Foreign Secretary Robin Cook told the House that the KLA had “committed more breaches of the ceasefire” (Chomsky 2000, 106). Thus, contrary to Habermas’s view of

Western perceptions, international understanding of the pre-bombing situation was primarily that of murder and terror on the part of the Albanian guerillas.

Continuing with the documentary review of international perceptions, another element of the data to analyze is the pattern of increased KLA maneuvers against the VJ following the December ceasefire. Given the information cited thus far, the Western understanding of the conflict falls into a fairly stable pattern, with reports reaching the same conclusions. Detailed reports from the EU are a case in point. On December 8, 1998, for instance, the Foreign Ministers of the European Union, for example, expressed

18 concern for the intensification of military action in Kosovo, noting that increased activity by the KLA prompted an increased presence of Serbian security forces in the region.

They noted further that “the KLA are the main initiators of violence in a deliberate campaign of provocation” (Chomsky 2000, 105).

A change in the pre-bombing situation begins in December, with the break-down in the ceasefire that had permitted large numbers of internally displaced people to return to their homes. The general picture understood at the supranational level can be gleamed by the UN Secretary General reports. Reaching the parallel conclusion to the EU, its

December 7 report states that Kosovo Albanian paramilitary units were exploiting the lull in fighting associated following the ceasefire to reestablish their control of the province.

Reports from credible Western sources immediately prior to the March bombing

(January-February 1999), record a similar pattern. From January of 1999 the cycle of confrontation was generally depicted by OSCE as KLA attacks on Serb police and civilians with a “disproportionate response by the FRY authorities” along with “renewed

KLA activity elsewhere” (Chomsky 2000, 108-109). An interesting feature of such reports is that prior March 24 perceptions were that the main Yugoslav security and military response to KLA attacks was a reduced ---to levels lower than the previous year.

The OSCE monthly report of February 20 provides some evidence (Chomsky 2000, 109).

It describes a “volatile” situation in which Serb-KLA “direct military engagement…dropped significantly,” but significantly one in which KLA attacks on police continued inciting “sporadic exchanges of gunfire with the VJ” (Chomsky 2000,

109).The UN Secretary-General monthly report confirms this picture reporting that violence and clashes “continued at a relatively lower level” relative to previous months

19 (Chomsky 2000, 108).

Another significant attribute of the OSCE February account is an increase in KLA

“terrorism” just prior to the bombing. Thus, the “main feature of the last part of the reporting period has been an alarming increase in urban terrorism with a series of indiscriminate attacks against civilians in public places and towns throughout Kosovo.”

Examples given include the KLA abduction of five elderly Serb civilians and three deaths after a bomb attack outside an Albanian grocery store (Chomsky 2000, 109). The UN-

Inter Agency January 11 report provides a similar picture citing an example of fewer retaliatory attacks by Yugoslav government security forces and increased randomized violence on the KLA side. One example cited is a bomb outside a café in Pristina which injured three Serbian youths and “triggered retaliatory attacks on Albanians.” Other instances of retaliatory attack include the VJ shelling of civilian and KLA facilities with

“at least 15 Kosovo civilians killed” (Chomsky 2000, 108).

NATO member perceptions of the relative restraint by Serbs in the months prior to intervention is particularly noteworthy given indiscriminate ‘urban terrorist attacks’ reportedly conducted by the KLA. One example is an OSCE monthly report on Feb 20 that the “main feature of the last part of the reporting period has been an alarming increase in urban terrorism with a series of indiscriminate bombing or raking gunfire attacks against civilians in public spaces in towns throughout Kosovo” by the KLA

(Chomsky 2000, 103). The same OSCE report records an increasing in the ‘policing’ of

Albanian communities by the KLA and punishment against those deemed to be ‘Serbian collaborators’ (Chomsky 2000, 102). The report adds that “unprovoked attacks by the

KLA also” resulted in increasing casualties among Serb security forces with occasional

20 “military operations affecting the civilian population” (Chomsky 2000, 110).

A final salient fact to explore is how NATO viewed retaliatory attacks by

Milosevic forces in the face of urban KLA terrorism. As cited, Habermas takes for granted that the international military alliance acted to secure emergency aid “for a persecuted ethnic (and religious) minority” (Habermas 1999, 265). The Western view, in other words, held that irrespective of KLA advances, Serb military operations charged with ethno-nationalistic aims were carrying out naked aggression. If the US and EU member-state interpretation matches this view then a critical pillar of his truth claim holds. A look at the Western documentary record in the period in question, however, reflects the opposite. The last NATO (January 16-March 22) report prior to the bombing presents a clear-cut example. Its report fails to support the contentions reviewed above ---

Western belief that Serbs were appearing to conduct an ethnic cleansing campaign in the spring of 1999. The NATO view of Yugoslav operations is much more nuanced; with descriptions of a circumscribed military campaign by the VJ and selective force.

Evidence of this fact is the pre-bombing governmental reports stating that Serb military efforts were focused on the KLA rather than the population at large. According to its final report (January 16-March 22), NATO notes that “aggressive Serb attacks on villages suspected of harboring UCK forces or command centers,” adding that causalities reported were mostly military at levels akin to preceding months (Chomsky 2000, 110).

Evidence from within the German government in the beginning of 1999 confirms this picture. On January 12, 1999, the Foreign Office Intelligence, for instance, found that charges “of explicit political persecution” of the Albanian ethnicity were not verifiable, adding that public life in the capital and other major cities had in the entire conflict

21 period,” continued on a relatively normal basis” adding that “actions of the security forces were not directed against the Kosovo-Albanians as an ethnically defined group, but against the military opponent and its actual or alleged supporters” (Chomsky 2000,

109). A final piece of confirmatory evidence of such impressions is the testimony of a

French representative to the KVM cited in OSCE records. KVM member Jacques

Prod’homme reported that in the month leading up to war “neither he nor his colleagues observed anything that could be described as systematic persecution, either collective or individual murders, burning of houses or deportation” (OSCE 1999).

Up to this point, the review of US and EU member state documentation has focused primarily on what was recognized about the period prior to the air strikes. As reviewed, the situation while understood as ‘volatile’ was not perceived as a Serbian wholesale ethnically cleansing of the entire region. Despite some atrocities and harassment, the overall pattern of assessment at national, inter-governmental, and supranational levels was that the situation was stabilizing, perhaps reflecting the effectiveness of the OSCE-KVM monitors already in place. It was also understood that for months the KLA guerillas were responsible for a majority of the killings designed to incite a harsh Serbian response in order to draw NATO into the fray.

To recap, according to Habermas clear signs of ethnic cleansing were evident prior to the bombing. According to the author, in the months leading up to the air war hundreds of thousands had been subject to purposeful ‘expulsion, murder and terror.’ The

Kosovo intervention, in this view, was aimed at preventing massive violations of human rights already in progress –“ethnic cleansing known at the time” (Habermas 2006a, 29).

In conformity with academic accounts events: the Habermasian view is that it would have

22 passed the critical ‘threshold’ for a humanitarian emergency, warranting military sanctions to enforce equal rights.

To subject this view to further scrutiny a second empirical objection can be raised.

Another flaw in Habermas’s portrayal is that it works to invert the chronology of events presented in the Western documentary evidence. As the remainder of the chapter will show, official high-level governmental and NATO member state accounts reveal that the bombing acted as a trigger inciting a sharp escalation of mass expulsions and brutal atrocities. Contrary to the conventional story then available evidence illustrates that ethnic cleansing preceded the bombing. To begin, the sharp rise in the refugee numbers recorded by the United Nations is illustrative. The report demonstrates that the vast majority of the expulsions began immediately after the bombing campaign of March 24.

Other reports weave an analogous story. Three days after the bombing had begun, for example, the UNHCR reported that 4,000 had fled Kosovo. On April 1 refugee flows reached sufficiently high levels for the UNHRC to begin providing daily figures.

Initiation of the Humanitarian Evacuation Program was also initiated within days of the

UNHCR figures. According to Weller (1999a) “within a few days the number of displaced had again risen to over 200,000-emphasis added” (p. 85). OSCE also added to the total picture reporting that, by the end of June, the cumulative total of those internally displace was at staggering levels. Not counting the several hundred thousands internally displaced, forces of the FRY had “forcibly expelled some 863,000 Kosovar Albanian from Kosovo” (Gall 1999).

Returning to the documentary record the evidence also reveals that, in tandem with refugee flows, atrocities sharply escalated immediately after the NATO bombing.

23 Perhaps the most solid support of this trend is allied reports detailing Milosevic’s worst crimes. Since the motivation in constructing them was to build the strongest possible cases and serve as criminal indictments against Milosevic they represent the best possible source of the Western understanding of Serbian crimes. A brief look at the report data reveals that, almost without exception, allegations of ethnic cleansing are restricted to points in time immediately after the NATO bombing. The first major sources are two

State Department cases against Milosevic completed on May and December of 1999. The most remarkable feature of the report is that like previous estimates, the chronology is restricted almost completely to the period following the bombing campaign. Apart from a single exception (the massacre of 45 people at Racak on January 15, 1999) no crimes were recorded prior to the NATO bombing. The second major documentary sources of evidence are the OSCE reports on the crisis. Confirming the State Department story,

OSCE reports record that “a pattern of the expulsions and vast increase in looting, killings, rape, kidnappings and pillage once the NATO air war began on March 24th” so that the airstrikes produced “the most visible change” (Erlanger 1999). They added that the situation “seemed to have slipped out of control of any authorities, as lawlessness reigned in the form of killings and the looting of houses” in the “massive expulsion of thousands of residents from the city” mostly took place in the last week of March and in early April” (Chomsky 2000, 108).

The aim of the analysis in making the above points was not to exonerate

Milosevic’s forces from military excesses taken in the course of his pre-NATO bombing operations. Nor is it to suggest that ethnic cleansing simply did not take place at any point in the crisis. Rather the goal was to critically asses Habermas’s truth claims in light of

24 Western knowledge in published accounts before the bombing. The empirical evidence presented in this chapter partially refutes Habermas’s claim that NATO understood itself as acting in response to ethnic cleansing occurring prior to the bombing.

25 Chapter 4: Anticipating Counter-Arguments from the Habermasian Perspective

In two pivotal essays (the 2008 “Between Naturalism and Religion” and the 2008

“Constitutionalization of International Law and the Legitimization Problems of a

Constitution of World Society”) Habermas lays out the detailed structural components necessary for a humane global order. He begins by building the ‘cosmopolitan condition’ out of the institutional architecture of the United Nations. Toward this end, he proposes a

‘legally constituted international community’ with responsibility on a global scale for protecting the human rights of ‘cosmopolitan citizens.’ The aim of this chapter is to offer a critique of Habermas’s endorsement of the NATO bombing from the perspective of this innovative cosmopolitan model. In the context of the Kosovo intervention, the focus will be on elucidating the mechanisms he presents for safeguarding human rights. The chapter will posit a critical question ---does the 1999 Kosovo case meet the demanding standards

Habermas sets forth in his model? In the context of Security Council objections, did the

North Atlantic alliance possess sufficient deliberative power and legitimation to intervene military?

It is perhaps useful to start with a review of the overarching framework Habermas meticulously constructs. Habermas’s goal is to revive Kant’s cosmopolitan project and secure global peace without the conceptual weight of a Kantian world republic.

Achieving the transition to a “cosmopolitan condition,” he argues, must take the form of the juridification of international law (Habermas 2008a). This unique vision of a 26 cosmopolitan political order is also strongly linked to the global promotion of human rights. Sensitive to the gap between theory and reality, Habermas grapples with movement toward a cosmopolitanism order under conditions less than ideal. Mindful of the need to keep the vision firmly planted in the realities of present-day conditions,

Habermas constructs a model centered on the institutions and procedural resources of the

United Nations. On the model he proposes, the UN is uniquely positioned to maintain the normative thrust of Kant’s original project. Habermas’s view of morality provides insight as to why this is the case. He suggests that since human rights “exhibit the structural features of individual rights” only an established legal order can secure their “positive validity” (Hobby 2006b, 28). A positive development in the United Nations Habermas lauds along these lines are accelerated efforts to strengthen the legal position of the individual legal subject who in turn “gradually acquires the status of a cosmopolitan citizen” (Hobby 2008, 335). Such developments are significant, he holds, as they represent steps toward the contitutionalization of law and the international moralization of politics.

The philosopher is also encouraged by reform proposals put forth by the 2004

High-Level Panel; organized to bring the UN more in line with the principle of its charter.

A second challenge mentioned is the dilemma of how to infuse political institutions with sufficient enforcement power without reverting to world governments. To achieve this end, another component of the author’s vision worth discussing is a re-vamped role for nation-states. He observes that “the classical function of the state as the guarantor of security, law, and freedom, would be transferred to a supranational world organization specializing in securing peace and implementing human rights worldwide” (Habermas

27 2008b, 445). To achieve this goal, the author suggests augmenting national parliamentary delegates in the General Assembly with something completely novel: representation by a chamber of ‘cosmopolitan citizens.’ These internationally-oriented citizens would in turn be responsive to wider peace and human rights policy concerns. Habermas also makes clear that as a kind of “world parliament,” the United Nations would primarily play the role of lawmaker within a multi-level system. Will-formation within this context would be restricted to the realm of interpreting and expanding the parameters United Nations

Charter (Habermas 2008a).

Within this model, the innovation of a “second chamber” of cosmopolitan citizens also serves to bolster the legitimation of the current General Assembly and Security

Council. A quote from Habremas’s essays illustrates this position. He states that

“embedding a reformed world organization in a global public sphere would be sufficient to confer the requisite legitimacy on decisions taken by its two central non-majoritarian institutions” (Habermas 2008a, 342). A third challenge is enforcement once legitimacy is properly achieved. The Habermasian ‘elegant solution’ to Kant’s a world republic in this case is to borrow the monopoly of force possessed by states. Actual enforcement of

‘high-minded’ principles delineated at the supranational level in this view would fall towards the lower rung of the multi-system ---namely, nation-states. Given its hierarchical position vis-à-vis member-states, the international organization could then draw upon the force “lent to it by other willing members” (Habermas 2008b, 450). With world organizations confined to legal rather than political realms, Habermas continues by clarifying the obligations foisted on individual states. Within this system member-states are charged with collectively enforcement of the “cosmopolitan human rights regime”

28 enshrined in the cosmopolitan constitution.

The above framework raises technical questions as well. For example: who authorizes the use of force to protect human rights? Put differently, when cosmopolitan citizens have their rights trampled on which body deliberates on whether military sanctions are appropriate? The answers to such questions are important if the concern is addressing mass crimes in the here and now, rather than some point in the distant future.

Within the structure that Habermas lays out, the author endorses assigning the Security

Council the task of authorizing military force to protect cosmopolitan citizens. In a general way it would also function to equip the principles of a cosmopolitan constitution

(i.e. the UN Charter) with sufficient political power. To this end, he makes explicit its role in issuing military sanctions to thwart ethnic cleansing and other mass crimes explicit. In a statement on the Security Council Habermas observes that cosmopolitan citizens confer on world organizations “a kind of indemnity that authorizes the Security

Council to act on their behalf as a stand in when their own governments prove unwilling to protect their rights” (Habermas 2008a, 340). To add further support of this notion,

Habermas ties in the recommendations of the 2004 UN High-Level Panel, reaffirming the

Security Council’s exclusive right to authorize sanctions against states. To emphasize this point he refers to ”the emerging norm of collective international responsibility to protect in the event of genocide, ethnic cleansing, or other serious violations of international law which sovereign governments are…unwilling to prevent” (Habermas 2008a, 339).

Given the institutional framework provided in earlier writings a number of questions arise: Do the member states within a regional alliance have sufficient normative power and legitimacy to act without Security Council? Writing on the cusp of the crisis

29 1999 Habermas attempts to provide an answer; he states that dismissing the procedural legitimacy supplied by the Security Council is justified in times when it is “blocked from acting effectively” (Habermas 1999, 269). In the case of Kosovo, “as long as,” the UN failed to approve appropriate military sanctions for Yugoslavia, NATO’s appeal to the

“moral (as opposed to legal) validity of international law was a necessity” (Habermas

1999, 269).

Though Habermas can be excused for inaccurate perceptions of the Western view on Kosovo, his assertions contain interesting contradictions which should be highlighted.

One criticism that can be made of his logic is that it flies in the face of principles of deliberation outlined by the philosopher in other writings. The problem with Habermas’s dismissal of the Security Council, for example, lies in the effect on the cosmopolitan deliberative process he outlines in other writings. Reviewing the Habermasian communicative ethics model, Head (2008) points out, for instance, that procedural guidance for democratic decision-making processes entail submitting proposals for collective scrutiny without predetermined outcomes. It would therefore not allow for what Habermas is suggesting: disproving of deliberation at the supranational level until such time that one’s preferred option (i.e. military intervention) is chosen. Predetermined outcomes would not only rob the Security Council of an open deliberation function, but would also muddy the process; putting in question the very normative legitimacy which

Habermas claims NATO possesses. As Head (2008) concludes, another general consequence is emerging patterns of exclusion, coercion and illegitimacy. Thus, the normative costs of a coercive and non-deliberative process are simply too high to circumvent the Security Council. In terms of a quick cost-benefits analysis, adhering to

30 Habermas’s model (i.e. leaving authorization of force to the Security Council) may be the only option.

In response to the point just raised, Habermas’s might have a number of rejoinders. The first response would be to concede that the Security Council ought to be the ideal institution for authorizing the use of force. His most clear statement on this point can be found in his post-911 endorsement of the Kosovo intervention in remarks in interviews. Habermas acknowledged, for instance, that empowering NATO to act unilaterally every time is risky venture. Casting doubts of his position aside he added that

“they (NATO) are no substitute for the consent of the Security Council which is mandated by the UN Charter” (Habermas 2006a, 86). Habermas might also emphasize that it was never his intention to elevate the interpretive powers of regional alliancse over the decision-making power of independent institutions. The philosopher’s first essay is a good source for this view. Habermas (1999) observes that because the alliance countries are exercising their own powers of decision-making and interpretation they cannot avoid acting ‘paternalistically.’ Along similar lines, he also would concede the point that

NATO’s appeal to moral validity under international law, while practical under the circumstances, still lacks the character of a juridical force legitimated by a democratic cosmopolitan order.

To counter the point that NATO still needed Security Council approval,

Habermas could attack the argument from a completely different angle. He might criticize, for instance the very premises on which the argument rests; the premise that the

Security Council is a workable institution for deliberation in the present. It is true, he would contend, that the world organization is expected to monitor the worldwide

31 compliance of human rights standards. It is also true; he would add that per his multi- level global system, the classical function of states as guarantors of freedom would be transferred to supranational bodies like the Security Council which subordinate international relations to compulsory legal regulations (Habermas 2008a, 338).

To retort, Habermas might counter that though we can look forward to the day when a sufficiently reformed world organization functions would function as his model posits we are simply not there yet. The same theme runs through his various writings on Kosovo.

Habermas’s statements on the progress of the United Nations towards reforms suggest a continual “work in progress.” In other readings he stresses that while the institutions of the UN “are on course to close the circle between theory and reality” we remain “a long way off” (Habermas 2006b, 26). A variant of this argument made by Habermas is to point out that the institutional architecture has yet to be fully realized. One example is his comment that the “second chamber” of world representatives at the General Assembly lacks the necessary piece of the cosmopolitan puzzle ---a “functioning Security Council

(Habermas 2006b).” The implication of making these observations becomes clear. If a perfectly reformed Security Council remains out of reach then it must be possible for regional alliances at the transnational level to act on behalf of the inchoate cosmopolitan community. In the Kosovo case, this is precisely the path which Habermas takes; pointing out the flaws in the decision-making powers of the Security Council while continually emphasizing the need for decisive action when it ‘fails’ to act. Thus

Habermas observes that:

“Where this has not been achieved, norms remain forcibly imposed

constraints, however moral their content. Certainly, the intervening powers

32 are trying to enforce the claims of all those in Kosovo whose human rights

are being trampled upon by their own government.” (Habermas 2006b, 28)

Though institutional independence of the Security Council approval would be the preferred route, the current under-institutionalization of cosmopolitan law demands action other actions.

To build his case for the flawed nature of the Security Council in the Kosovo case, the philosopher would most likely point to the fact that China and Russia succeeded in blocking resolutions authorizing the use of force with veto threats. Habermas might also gives detailed reasons for why these nations frustrate the possibility of Security Council authorization for humanitarian intervention. The first problem he might elucidate is the structural problem. Unlike the League of Nations, which consisted of what Habermas terms “avant-garde” liberal-democratic nations, the UN with its 192 member states includes is all inclusive (Habermas 2008, 340). Although loose membership requirements meet the necessary condition for ‘the universal validity of cosmopolitan law’ it creates problems as well. One flaw Habermas fleshes out is the inclusion of authoritarian regimes with belief systems and practices which ultimately challenge UN Charter. Unlike states with liberal constitutions, he points out; these nations are heirs to ‘European nationalism’ and are likely to cling tightly to traditional ideas of sovereignty and the principle of non- intervention regardless of the situation (Habermas 2008). In this view, the intransigence of Russia or China would take center stage as states. In the Kosovo case he could refer to their view of the conflict as a purely internal matter and as a consequence strategically playing the veto card whenever Western-led intervention proposals rose to the surface.

Whereas liberal nations adhere to their obligation to protect human rights worldwide,

33 Habermas would contend, authoritarian societies prefer to “free ride” from Security

Council membership. To flesh out this point further, Habermas could easily point to theoretical explanations of China’s abstention and threatened veto actions during the

1999 Kosovo crisis. Voeten (2001), for example, found that China’s stated reason for its abstention was precisely as Habermas’s predicts; the Asian powerhouse stated that the

Kosovo crisis was an internal matter of the Yugoslav government. Along these lines,

China’s voting behavior during the crisis also fit into what the author termed a “maxi- mini” foreign policy strategy wherein security and economic benefits are maximized with the least amount of material commitments (Thalakada 1997). Similar conclusions were drawn about alleged Russia obstructionism on the question of force. For example, the same author found that the Soviet goverment sought to influence the course of armed intervention in UN Security Council resolutions to maintain its post-cold war influence and preserve the status quo (Voeten 2001).

To further illustrate his argument about the under-institutionalization of international law and a problematic Security Council, Habermas might also emphasize distinctions between liberal and non-liberal states. Habermas’s discussion of repressive versus democratic states serves to illustrate the point. The main dilemma he finds is that, unlike wealthier Western nations, authoritarian states lack the normative qualifications needed to enforce the global implementation of human rights. His writings in Habermas

(2006a) provide a good source of information. To differentiate the two regime-types, he cites the distinction shown used by political scientists between “first” and “second” worlds. In this framework, “first” world nations have the prosperity to bring their interests in line with the “half-way expectations” of an unrealized cosmopolitan order

34 while the austere (and often oppressive) “second” world countries are characterized by the opposite ---an expansionist foreign policy and “a neurotic defense of sovereignty”

(Habermas 2008a, 339). Habermas expands on this point by citing the UN High-Level

Panel’s observation that “standard-setting to reinforce human rights cannot be performed by states that lack a demonstrated commitment to their promotion and protection”

(Habermas 2008a, 340). The resulting double standard by such nations is severe damage to the credibility of foundational UN institutions like the Security Council. An extension of this logic in closing would be to point out Russia’s horrendous past human rights record in Chechnya or China’s historical abuses of Tibetan autonomy. Such actions demonstrate that they cannot be relied on to safeguard the equal rights of ethnic minorities in the Serbian province even if willing to do so.

As alluded to above, another technique Habermas might use to build counter- arguments to critiques of NATO actions would be to appeal to the unique normative foundations of member states. The final part of the chapter will be devoted to laying out this position. The crux of the chapter will be that though Habermas makes a strong case in his critique of non-OECD nations, he falters in his attempt to establish the human rights credentials of liberal nation-states. Given its disproportionate military power and importance on the global scene, the focus will be on his discussion of the global superpower, the United States. Throughout Habermas’s descriptions of US actions in

Kosovo, one point to observe is the careful effort to establish the US within the framework of a moral actor. His description of the US view of human rights politics supplies ample evidence. In contrast to the obstructionism of non-liberal regimes, he emphasizes that the United States pursues “the global implementation of human rights as

35 the national mission of a superpower that pursues this goal under the premises of power politics” (Habermas 2006b, 27). The unique mix of power and moral politics is a theme which Habermas takes up in other essay writings as well. Hence, Habermas adds that the struggle against mass crimes rests on the “very American” national perspective of a

“normative power politics” (Habermas 2006b:27-28). The US follows this course in accord with its ‘political traditions.’ Habermas is also cautious not to overstate the case.

Careful not to insinuate that moral concerns are pursued by the US at the expense of all else, he also stresses that like other nations it assigns first priority to its interests which at times is in disharmony with its declared normative aims. Examples include the Vietnam

War or cases of dealing with threats “in its own backyard” (Habermas 2006b, 27).

In keeping with the theme of a power politics and morality he also places the US in a unique category concluding that its imperial policies represent a “new hybrid of humanitarian selflessness” (Habermas 2006b, 27). This normative thrust to foreing policy may also provide some of the legitimacy lost with the “deadlocked’ Security Council --- an additional benefit. Within this framework, the liberal constitutions of broadminded states naturally conform to the UN charter constitute providing an additional layer of necessary legitimation to state actions. Another source of legitimacy the author points to is the “proven historical record” of democratic states writ large. To illustrate Habermas asks readers to contrast NATO with George W. Bush’s ‘Coalition of the Willing’ an alliance which included states which “systematically violate human rights, such as

Uzbekistan and…Liberia” (Habermas 2006a, 86). In sharp contrast “exemplary histories of the “proven democracies” of nation-states like the United States within NATO presumably do not suffer from this problem. The general conclusion to be reached is that:

36 “Only the peaceful and prosperous OECD societies can afford the luxury of bringing their national interests more or less in line with the half-way cosmopolitan expectations of the United Nations.” (Habermas 2006a, 29) For further support on this position

Habermas could have also added a quote from Clinton expressing the basic logic the

‘Clinton Doctrine.’ In the President’s own words: “If somebody comes after innocent civilians and tries to kill them en masse because of their race, their ethnic background and their religion, and it’s within our power to stop it, we will stop it (Clinton 1999).”

37 Chapter 5: Assessing the Moral Credentials of the ‘First World’

Is the Habermasian portrayal of a US normative power politics an accurate one? Put differently, does the historical record reflect a genuine US concern for the implementation of human rights? The answer to these questions is crucial if credence can be lent to Habermas’s portrayal of the humanitarian intentions of the mightiest member of the NATO alliance. As reviewed above, Habermas implies that the normative qualifications of the United States include its liberal constitution and a ‘proven track record’ of selflessness. For empirical support of this contention Habermas often refers back to Woodrow Wilson’s normative and pragmatist motives for entering World War I.

Such reference to Wilson certainly fits given the statemen’s status within the foreign policy community (including Clinton and Bush administrations) as the prototypical symbol of American utopianism.

Yet, as Cox (2000) reviews, whereas contemporary thought holds a clear picture

of Wilson’s, roles historians are, in fact, deeply divided. To illustrate cracks in the

conventional image, for instance, Cox discusses the historical contradictions in Wilson’s

proclaimed support for self-determination and democracy; the two key components in

‘Wilsonian idealism.’ The president’s enthusiastic support for the long and brutal

occupations of the Philippines and Haiti are two commonly mentioned contradictions. As

Cox (2000) observes, such actions reveal not only a restricted conception of democracy

but also an implicit endorsement of a racial hierarchy. To lend empirical credence to such 38 arguments, the author cites Wilson’s comment in 1917 to Secretary of State Lansing that

the “white civilization and its dominion over the world rested largely on our ability to

keep this country intact” (Cox 2000, 222). Given that Wilson represents the strongest

case for the normative orientation of the American political tradition, it opens

Habermas’s generalizations to doubt and creates room for further scrutiny. The goal of

the remainder of the chapter is to critically assess Habermas’s claims that liberal nations

possess the requisite normative legitimacy. To assess the humanitarian intent of the

United States in the case of Kosovo, discussion will be kept to its human rights record for

cases of ethnic cleansing in roughly the same period of its contribution to the 1999

Kosovo intervention. The question considered will be that in major cases of ethnic

cleansing of the 1990s; did the Clinton administration act to mitigate mass crimes? Put

differently, did US foreign policy conform to the normative expectations Habermas sets

up? Or was realpolitik in fact at work? With the questions clearly outlined it is also worth briefly exploring two key protests which Habermas might have with the approach. One possible counter that the philosopher might raised is the issue of viability; even the most powerful nations with benign intentions cannot intervene everywhere “for example, on

behalf of the Kurds, or the Chechens, or the Tibetans” –emphasis added (Hobby 2006b,

27). In a similar vein, he might add that constraints on military humanism are particularly

acute when abuses happen in the same periods and conflicting demands for material

resources creates budgetary strains. In anticipation of these objections, the analysis will

develop a couple of controls for the test cases. The first will be keep the analysis cases of

humanitarian selflessness which would require the least amount of political and financial

resources. Toward this end, the focus of the analysis will be on cases of ethnic cleansing

39 by US clients where military intervention would not be required to lessen genocide –

simply a withdrawal of military aid and support. In addition, to ensuring that atrocities

and expulsions were sufficient to warrant international attention, the focal point will be

on cases at least on the same scale as Kosovo. Focus on the post-cold war period (i.e. the

mid-1990s) is also important. As Habermas astutely observed above, the humanitarian

impulse can also be trumped by strategic national interests. Considering that the Cold

War represents a period of quintessential power politics, cases will be chosen outsides

this period. Thus, keeping to the 1990s and immediately after the collapse of the Soviet

Union can serve as a useful indirect control for realpolitik.

Given its setting within NATO’s borders, Turkey’s repression and ethnic cleansing of the Kurd’s is an excellent starting point. Prior to delving in to the US role, some background data is first in order. From 1984 to 1999, the Turkish military was embroiled in a conflict with the separatist Kurdish Worker’s Movement (PKK) in

Southwest Turkey. The roots of the conflict can be traced back to government measures to suppress expressions of Kurdish cultural identity. Although Kurdish remains the mother tongue for roughly 20% of Turkey’s roughly 65 million inhabitants, the government continued to prohibit the teaching of Kurdish in schools or broadcasting

Kurdish radio and television programs (Ergil 2000). Restrictive measures also extend to barring parents from giving their children Kurdish names. As Ergil (2000) recaps, the government failure to grant cultural recognition to Kurds not only prevented a peaceful resolution of the conflict but also became the main obstacle to Turkey’s integration into the EU. Apart from the political consequences abroad, the policies also fomented widespread discontent among the Kurds eventually sparking an armed insurrection and

40 clashes between the PKK and Turkish security forces.

Another important element of the conflict is the scale and character of the atrocities and ethnic cleansing, overwhelmingly attributed to Turkish paramilitary forces.

In addition to methods of torture, assassination, reports by reputable human rights groups also reveal reports of people being thrown from helicopters or civilians being burned alive while bound to electric cables and chains (Human Rights Watch 1995). One index of the atrocities is the toll of internal refugees between 1993 and 1994 which sharply rose to a whopping 2.5 or 3 million in that period. The flight of millions of Kurds coincided with operations by the Turkish army to devastate the Southeast regions of Kurdish settlement. In the same year, mystery killings alone amounted to 3,200 with the victims mostly civilian (Human Rights Watch 1995). In addition to such crimes as torture and expulsions 3,500 villages were laid waste; roughly seven times the number destroyed in

Kosovo (Human Rights Watch 1995). As Turkish military forces devastated the region of

Tunceli, the northern Kurdish capital of Dyirbakir, the Turkish State Minister for Human

Rights reported that “the terror in Tunceli is state terror” (Chomsky 1999, 54).

Did Clinton abide by the humanitarian doctrine outlined in his speeches and predicted by Habermas? The historical record reveals this was, unfortunately, not the case.

Despite published reports by the likes of Human Rights Watch and the condemnation by the EU, the Clinton administration continued to make Turkey one of the leading recipients of US military aid as atrocities reached a their peak in the mid-1990s. This fact also captured focus of journalistic and academic accounts in the US. One test of the US humanitarian impulse is given by Michael Randal’s reporting and coverage. He notes that although 1994 was the year of the worst repression of Kurdish provinces, it was also the

41 year that Turkey became largest single importer of American military hardware (Randal

1999). The Turkish arsenal, 80% American, included everything from M-60 tanks to

Blackhawk helicopters and F-16 fighters. Human Rights Watch reported similar findings in 1995 observing that as “the US pours sophisticated weapons into Turkey’s arsenals” each year it was becoming “complicit in a scorched earth campaign that violates the fundamental tenets of international law” (Human Rights Watch 1995). Randal (1999) also notes the Clinton administration government attempts to continue aid by other means after its connection to Turkish atrocities took center stage following Congressional bans.

After human rights groups exposed Turkey’s use of US fighter jets to bomb Kurdish villages, for example, the Clinton administration found a variety of ways around laws requiring suspension of arms shipments. Further analysis reaffirms the predominance of power politics in the Turkish case. According to Judah’s (2000) account of the conflict, for instance, though Western countries “may sympathize with the plight of the Kurds or

Tibetans…realpolitik means that there is little they are willing, or able to do to help them.” Further confirmation of this logic was illustrated by Defense Secretary William

Cohen’s praise of Turkey’s for its humanitarian bombing of Kosovo as it launched new co-production agreements with the loyal client-state from April 2000.

Up to this point, several tentative conclusions can be drawn from US support of

Turkey during the peak years of its ethnic cleansing and NATO membership:

(1) That US interests (suspected in this case to be extensive co-production arrangements of military equipment and Turkey’s status as a US ally) ‘won out’ over human rights concerns, in contradiction to both the Clinton doctrine and Habermas’s predictions of selfless humanitarianism (Hartung 1999).

42 (2) The case is particularly damaging since it constituted an ‘easy’ case of ethnic cleansing (i.e. one in which ethnic cleansing and expulsions at levels far higher than

Kosovo could have easily been attenuated by simply reducing or cutting off aid).

(3) Possession of a liberal constitution or values did not lead to a change in state behavior despite highly publicized mass killings and atrocities by its client. As a second case will illustrate below, rather than being a lone outlier case, Turkey was part of a larger pattern.

One variant of the ethnic cleansing case cited above is the case Columbia in the

1990s. No two cases are exactly alike but the number of similarities is interesting. Similar to the Turkish case, ethnic cleansing in Columbia also involved a protracted civil war between guerillas on one hand (the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Columbia or FARC) and the Columbian Army on the other. Another similarity with the Turkish case is that the atrocities in Columbia far exceeded anything attributed to the Milosevic indictments.

Thus, Columbia is an important case because it had the worst human rights record in the

Western Hemisphere throughout the 1990s. This fact is also reflected in the number of displaced and killed; some 3,000 were victims of political murders. The refugee flow as estimated by the State Department, Church, human rights, and other sources was estimated to be at 300,000 a year (Pardo 2000). With a cumulative total approaching 2 million, it became the third largest population of displaced people in the World only after

Sudan and Angola. According to the Columbian government and leading human rights groups, the rate of killings intensified the year of the NATO bombing campaign. Political murder rates reportedly (Chomsky 2000, 18) increased by almost 20% with the proportion attributed to paramilitary groups rising to almost 80%.The overwhelming mass of atrocities was again attributed to the same group. Along with human rights

43 reports, the State Department confirmed the same general picture. In a report covering the same period, it found that “security forces actively collaborated with members of paramilitary groups” (Chomsky 2000:18). The pattern of US support during peak atrocity years for the Columbia case was another similarity. Thus, in spite of official reports of atrocities and expulsions, Columbia became the leading Western Hemisphere recipient of

US arms and training with a three fold increase in aid as violence reached its peak between 1998 and 1999 (Hartung 1999). Instead of condemnation for a far more excessive response to an armed insurrection to armed insurrection than in Kosovo,

Columbia was rewarded with copious US aid and maintained its status as Washington’s premier client state. Hence, with only slight changes in names and events, conclusion (1)-

(4) also held for this case. Though Columbia’s atrocities were fully within US power to stop, political considerations again seem to hold sway.

The conclusion that the US tolerated and even exacerbated the preventable ethnic cleansing of its clients has far reaching implications for Habermas’s normative justification of the NATO bombing. In his critique of Carl Schmidt’s pessimism about human nature, Habermas argues against the possibility that the human rights politics ‘is a mere ideological cloak’ for power interests in the Kosovo case (Habermas 2006a, 23). In a section entitled, “Contradictions of Realpolitik…” he argues further that the

“hermeneutics of suspicion makes rather poor case” against the Kosovo intervention.

Several reasons are offered in support of this position. The first is that though ‘muscle flexing’ is an attractive foreign policy option, Habermas does not believe that coalition states in the NATO alliance would take on the costs of intervention solely for that reason.

Given this fact, neither the aim of “finding a new role ascribed to NATO,” nor the goal of

44 “the US expanding its spheres of influence” constitutes plausible motivations” (Hobby

2006a, 25). As previous chapters have hopefully demonstrated, both consciously “bad” options chosen by the US and other EU member states in the Kosovo case (i.e. to bomb and precipitate worst atrocities) and US support for clients carrying out even harsher terroristic state violence is possible precisely because ideological cloaks have been utilized. Evidence from internal memos and public revelations from top level US officials supports this view. Anecdotal evidence from US-NATO Commander Wesley Clark is a good example. A review of Clark’s memoirs Ignatieff (2001), for instance, concluded that according to the Commander the “really decisive impulse” of the NATO bombing campaign was “the need to impose NATO’s will on a leader whose defiance was undermining the credibility of American and European diplomacy” not to mention

“NATO’s willpower.” If we continue checking the historical record, Habermas’s consistent stance that pure power politics was not at work begins to crumble.

Throughout the crisis, NATO leaders emphasized that the decision to bomb on

March 24 was necessary for two main reasons (a) stopping ethnic cleansing and (b) establishing the ‘credibility of NATO’. As reviewed, reason (a) is questionable on grounds that it entails stopping atrocities that NATO itself precipitated as a consequence of its own bombing. In light of these facts, justification (b) becomes more tenable.

Statements by Clinton administration senior staff provide further support. National

Security Advisor Samuel Berger’s comments to the Washington Post, for instance, explained that the events which led to the confrontation in Kosovo were “the humiliation of NATO and the United States,” listing among the principal reasons for bombing the fact that it was necessary “to demonstrate that NATO was serious” (Gellman 1999). A

45 similar window into Clinton Administration perceptions was provided by Secretary of

Defense William Cohen. Outlining Clinton’s plan for air strikes prior to the March 24 bombing, Cohen mentioned that threats to bomb Milosevic “quickly became a test of

NATO’s credibility, with the added bonus of the alliance’s looming 50th anniversary”

(Gellman 1999). Of particular note is the fact that that Cohen’s comments followed a private meeting of NATO defense ministers in October 1998, at a time when NATO was producing mixed reports of responsibility and, as reviewed, was interpreting renewed

Serb atrocities as justified reactions to the takeover of 40% of the province by the KLA guerillas.

Tentative empirical support for non-normative (i.e. power political) justifications for bombing also makes it possible to question Habermas’s claims on the Rambouillet

Accords. According to Habermas, NATO conducted the punishment of airstrikes following the ‘failure’ of negotiations at Rambouillet. As reviewed above, he states further that the air strikes were conducted with ‘the declared goal of implementing a liberal solution to the Kosovo problem. The implication of his brief statement is that negotiations failed following Serb’s rejectionism of the ‘liberal solution’ thwarting the one peaceful settlement option. Given the possibility of realpolitik in the negotiation phase, Habermas’s truth claims on the diplomatic track also deserve a closer look. Since the US wielded a disproportionate amount of influence in the negotiation process as well, the focus will on assessing its role in the diplomatic process. One problem with the

Habermasian account that is readily apparent is the insistence on a normative motivation for US strategy. The philosophers’ reference to benign hegemony is one instance. The

“hegemonic unilateralism” pursued since Bush Sr. in 1991, he informs readers, draws its

46 inspiration from a long tradition of norms to which the United States has been firmly committed (Habermas 2006b, 31). Given this tradition, he surmises, the American delegation “had already conducted the negotiations at Rambouillet from this original point (2006a:83).” The line of argument does make intuitive sense when fit within framework of ‘hegemonic unilateralism.’ If the US entered the agreement with a uniquely strong moral orientation, after all, it would have had little patience for any Serbian refusal to recognize Kosovar-Albania claims to equal rights. This would lead to a dominant

“defect” strategy as soon as it perceived Yugoslavian duplicity and failure to recognize autonomy claims.

The first problem with this account Habermas presents is that it contradicts the empirics of the Serbian position throughout the February 1999 Rambouillet process.

Whereas the Habermasian portrait of events implies continued Serbian obstreperousness, one notable aspect of the Serbian delegation was it’s harmony and agreement with the most important political aspects of the so-called ‘liberal solution;” the substantial autonomy for the Kosovo province. This fact is further evidenced by the comments of the

Rambouillet co-chairmen that there was widespread ‘consensus’ on the question of substantial autonomy for Kosovo, including mechanisms for embedding of democratic institutions and reaffirming the importance of human rights protections (OSCE 1999).

Contrary to the Habermasian account there was no reports Serbian rejectionism on this important point.

Additional empirical support for Serbian openness to the liberal solution is evident from the actions of the Yugoslavian Parliament as it put forward a proposal strikingly similar to the February 1999 consensus at Rambouillet. Although Habermas

47 refers to the Rambouillet Accords as practically the only peace proposal on the table, a second one was proposed by the Serb National Assembly on March 23, on the eve of the

NATO bombing. The resolution condemned the withdrawal of the OSCE monitors in preparation for the NATO bombing and called on both the UN and OSCE to facilitate a diplomatic settlement with negotiations “toward reaching of a political agreement on a wide-ranging autonomy for Kosovo, with the securing of a full-equality of all citizens and ethnic communities with respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the

Republic of Serbia and the FRY” (Chomsky 2000, 122).

Another striking feature of the Rambouillet negotiations held February to March

1999 missed by the Habermasian account is the controversial military element forced through by the United States. Although the Serbian government ad been willing to sign the Accords, a “secret appendix” was handed them on the last day, demanding, in effect, the surrender of Yugoslavia to NATO military occupation. Dubbed ‘Appendix B,’ the contentious provision demanded that NATO enjoy “free and unrestricted passage and unimpeded access throughout the FRY (Federal Republic of Yugoslavia), including

‘associated airspace and territorial waters,’ a loss of sovereignty beyond anything acceptable” (Thussu 2000). The extreme nature of the US proposal was echoed by others in senior leadership. According to Lord Carrington, former NATO Secretary General, then Chair of the Hague Peace Conference in Yugoslavia, it constituted a” killer clause” which “allowed NATO to use Serbia as part of the NATO organization”(Chomsky 2000,

124). Another damaging aspect of the annex was that it included provisions for legal immunity for all NATO personnel from the laws of the country destroying any jurisdiction by Yugoslav authorities, required them to essentially follow NATO orders.

48 The annex containing the ‘killer’ provisions is also noteworthy for how furtively it was introduced. Tacked on late in the negotiations and were virtually hidden from public view. This includes journalists covering the Ramboiullet and Paris talks in March of 1999 (Posen 1999). Even more surprising was the fact that it was hidden from the UK, staunch US ally and the most hawkish of the NATO alliance. The annex was not made available, for instance, to the British House of Commons until April 1, the first day of the

Parliamentary recess and a week into the bombing (Fisk 1999). The Russians also complained about not being informed about them. According to Thussu (2000) the

Rambouillet process essentially became a US document, with “little input from international organizations such as the UN or European Union” and domestically was

“rarely mentioned in CNN reports,” or other mainstream media outlets (p. 348).

The US practice seems once again to directly contradict the Habermasian deliberative paradigm. As Habermas outlines, a genuine deliberation process requires not only “inclusion and equal opportunity for participation” but also “publicity and transparency” (Habermas: 2008b, 413). In the US case one can surmised that its stealthy actions at Ramboiullet only served to circumvent open critical evaluation of options on the table so critical for “rationally motivated yes or no reactions” by US allies and the public at large. In light of the US actions, Fisk speculates that Rambouillet “was set up to fail” (Fisk 1999). The strongest support for this sentiment comes from the comments of

Henry Kissinger; the elder statesmen of realpolitik. On the US role in Rambouillet the former Secretary of State writes that:

“The Rambouillet text, which called on Serbia to admit NATO troops

throughout Yugoslavia, was a provocation, an excuse to start bombing.

49 Rambouillet is not a document that an angelic Serb could have accepted. It

was a terrible diplomatic document that should never have been presented in

that form” (Kissinger 1999).

Although internal records are not available to confirm Kissinger suspicion, events on the ground after the cessation of the eleven week bombing campaign offers some evidence. The complete loss of sovereignty demanded by the US in the annex was recognized by NATO to be unnecessary for the goals of a political settlement and was quickly withdrawn soon after the bombing commenced.

50 Conclusion

The aim of the thesis was to take Habermas to task on his optimistic assessment of the

1999 Kosovo intervention. In line with conventional academic accounts of the conflict,

Habermas argues that because the Security Council was blocked from acting effectively something needed to be done in anticipation of the “cosmopolitan condition” to defend populations besieged by criminal regimes. This interpretation is premised on the belief that prosperous nations like the US are ideally situated for incorporating the ‘politics of human rights’ into their national trajectories. By looking at the historical reaction of the

US in the era of the Kosovo intervention, the analysis hopefully pointed out that a liberal constitution is not sufficient to equip nation-states with the requisite normative credentials. Additionally, moves toward enforcing military sanctions to strengthen

‘credibility’ throws into question the decision-making capacities of Western states charged with safeguarding human rights as in Kosovo. The conclusion reached is that, however well-intentioned individual states or military alliances may be the likely costs make it better to adhere to the rigorous criteria set forth in Habermas’s unique model of

supranational governance outlined in chapters above. In essence, the heuristics of

skepticism may well serve as the best possible guide for ensuring that the ‘high’ politics

of human rights remains out of reach of the Machiavellian power politics of nation-states.

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