Islamist and Secular Forces in Morocco WP Not a Zero-Sum Game
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Introduction Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik German Institute for International and Security Affairs Comments Islamist and Secular Forces in Morocco WP Not a Zero-Sum Game Mohammed Masbah S In Morocco, unlike in other Arab countries, Islamists and seculars tend to cooperate in formal as well as informal politics. Political opportunities and pragmatic interests trump ideology most of the time, providing a suitable environment for a broadly in- clusive political order. However, two factors stand in the way of sustained cooperation between Islamist and secular currents: on the one hand, sporadic upsurges of identity politics, and on the other, the strategies of divide and rule traditionally pursued by the “Makhzen” and its close allies. Rather than focusing on a set of partners who appear at first to be compatible with their values, Europeans should promote an inclusive politi- cal process that integrates all actors with significant popular outreach, such as the social movement Jama’at Al-Adl wa-l-Ihsan (Justice and Charity Association, AWI). Political divisions in Morocco are typically the PJD – three other secular parties: (1) the driven by tactical choices and specific issues, Party of Progress and Socialism (PPS), which and much less by ideology. To give but one originated in the communist party and had example: In late October 2014, a coalition a long history of ideological animosity with of labor unions, secular opposition parties, the PJD; (2) the Popular Movement (MP), a and the Islamist social movement AWI non-ideological pro-palace party; and (3) the joined ranks in calling for a general strike secular pro-palace party National Rally of In- against austerity measures adopted by dependents (Rassemblement National des the government, which likewise comprises Indépendants, RNI). secular and Islamist parties. For his part, Prime Minister Abdelilah Benkirane of the governing moderate Islamist Justice and Islamists and Seculars – Development Party (Parti de la justice et Who Are They? du développement, PJD) rejected attempts In Morocco, as in the rest of the Arab world, to single out his party as the target of the the terms “Islamists” and “seculars” may strike. Rather, he emphasized the cohesive- refer to a wide range of actors. So-called ness and harmony of the governing coa- Islamists are typically actors whose political lition across ideological differences, a and social platforms are based on specific coalition that comprises – in addition to readings of Islamic principles. This category Mohammed Masbah is a Ph.D. fellow in the project “Elite change and new social mobilization in the Arab world” realized by the SWP Comments 51 Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP). The project is funded by the German Foreign Office in the framework of the transformation November 2014 partnerships with the Arab World and the Robert Bosch Stiftung. It cooperates with the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung and the PhD grant programs of the Heinrich Böll Stiftung and the Hanns-Seidel-Stiftung. 1 encompasses moderate Islamic parties this goal, it focuses on gradualism and co- striving to participate in democratic pro- operation with all relevant political actors. cesses – such as the Justice and Develop- Thus, the main political difference between ment Party in Turkey, Ennahda in Tunisia, the PJD and AWI is the former’s pragma- or the PJD in Morocco – and reaches to tism. radical and militant formations, such as Seculars, on the other hand, are general- Salafi-Jihadis and al-Qaida affiliates, who ly defined in opposition to Islamists, as Islam reject democracy as such on ideological is not the main ideological driving force grounds. behind their political activities. They are In Morocco, the largest organizations not opposed to local Islamic culture and with Islamist orientation are the moderate values – for this reason, we call them secu- – but not legalized – social movement AWI lars and not secularists – and may, at the and the moderate Islamist party PJD, along- same time, have their own interpretations side a range of Salafi groups of different of Islam, which they conceive of as being orientations. distinct from the approaches of trans- AWI is a social movement with a rigid national political Islam advocated by organi- hierarchical structure. Since its founding in zations such as the Muslim Brotherhood. 1987, it has chosen not to engage in formal Similar to other Arab countries, until politics. It is not opposed to formal political recently most Moroccan seculars would not participation per se, but its founder, Abdes- have described themselves as such, not least salam Yassine (who died in 2012), opted to avoid the negative connotation of the against participation due to his opposition term among the wider population, which to the monarchy in its actual form, which tends to conflate it with atheistic or anti- he described as a “compulsory authority.” religious tendencies. Recently, however, Yassine was inspired by both Sufi spiritual there has been a trend to adopt “secular” teachings and the Iranian revolution. This as a self-designation among intellectuals is why AWI has been moderate at the ideo- who wish to take a clear position against logical level but radical at the political level. the advances of Islamists in the political Sufi spirituality provides AWI’s followers mainstream. with qualities of discipline and patience. Historically, Moroccan seculars were At the same time, AWI has succeeded in identified with the political left, although building a strong apparatus aiming to be many veered toward liberalism after the the vanguard of the “critical masses” that collapse of state socialism in Eastern Europe would march peacefully to effect radical in the early 1990s. Liberals, on the other change. hand, had been sponsored by the monarchy Organizational strength and ideological since the 1960s to serve as a counterweight indoctrination have provided the move- to the left. However, they are firmly “liberal” ment with strength against the regime’s only on economic issues, such as protection sporadic “soft” repression. The latter has of property rights and private enterprise, aimed at weakening the organization by, whereas their commitments to civil liber- for example, shutting down its offices at ties and democracy find limits in their the local level, but has not attempted to deference to the palace. completely ban its activities and structures. In general, during the 2011 protest move- The PJD, by contrast, is a political party ment, the constitutional reform process, and that shares some ideological affinity with the workings of the current governmental the Muslim Brotherhood. The PJD stands coalition, Islamist-secular cooperation and for a genuine strategic alliance with the contention have been determined much monarchy, as it believes that reform is pos- less by ideology than by concrete interests. sible through formal political participation and non-contentious politics. To achieve SWP Comments 51 November 2014 2 The 2011 Protest Movement petition that, according to them, put a During the protests in 2011, Islamists were ceiling on the “aspirations of the people.” found on both sides. Ideology was of sec- For AWI, the M20F provided an oppor- ondary importance; what mattered instead tunity to acquire a greater presence in the was the position vis-à-vis the ruling regime public sphere after a period of hibernation – the monarchy and its entourage in the that started in 2007, in which the authori- state administration and the business com- ties suppressed most of its activities, and munity, locally referred to as the “Makhzen.” thus its visibility decreased. For this reason, The decisions about whether or not to sup- AWI joined the protest movement at an port the protest movement were based on early stage to advance its claims and griev- political calculations, and more specifically ances. Due to its long history and numeri- the balance between the moderates and cal strength, it provided the movement radicals in both camps. with an organizational backbone and social This became clear in the responses to the resonance. regime’s initiatives to absorb popular anger At the tactical level, AWI agreed to grant in 2011. Both AWI and the radical left, led a greater share of representation to com- by the An-Nahj ad-Dimuqrati (Democratic paratively small secular parties in the move- Path, Nahj) party, rejected the king’s speech ment’s organizational structure, meaning of March 9, 2011, describing his call for that AWI’s share of representatives in M20F’s “deep political reforms” as a “trick” to give national support bureau – and hence its the regime a new lease of life. Thus, the visibility in the media – remained far below palace’s top-down reform approach unified its share in the movement itself. Instead, the radical opposition and led to an im- young secular activists attracted much of plicit agreement between AWI and the the attention. These tactical moves were radical left to cooperate under the banner adopted to avoid regime repression and to of what was to become known as the Feb- build confidence with secular actors, there- ruary 20 Movement (Mouvement 20 Février, by allowing AWI to be perceived as coopera- M20F). Both AWI and Nahj are pursuing a tive rather than hegemonic. However, AWI maximalist approach and seeking radical had a strong presence at the local level, and reform that would give “people the right to its members were very active in the local choose” the political system of the country committees of the movement. through a constitutional assembly, includ- Although the M20F provided an oppor- ing the option to abolish the monarchy tunity for a rapprochement between Islam- through a democratic vote. They believe ist and secular forces, it also demonstrated that only radical regime change can im- the limits of alliances between ideological prove the current situation, be it through rivals. For AWI, participation in the M20F the voluntary abdication of the king and a did not come without concessions.