The Social Impact of the Irish Border

The Emerald Curtain The Social Impact of the Irish Border

By Brian Harvey Assumpta Kelly Sean Mc Gearty Sonya Murray THE EMERALD CURTAIN

Published by Triskele Community Training & Development Carrickmacross Workhouse Shercock Road Carrickmacross Co. Monaghan Ireland

2005

ISBN: 0-9550088-0-8 The border was never intended, on our part, as a major international frontier, an emerald curtain. It was others who piled brick upon brick along that wall so we could scarcely see or comprehend one another. - James Chichester Clark, Prime Minister of Northern Ireland, 1969-71, attrib.

THE EMERALD CURTAIN Theimpactsoftheconflict 4 3 Theborderregion 2 Introduction:the‘EmeraldCurtain’ 1 Acknowledgements Methodology Definitions Terms ofreference Impacts onspecific groups 5 contents . Conclusions Reconstruction:reassessingtheimpact 4.5 Thefracturingofsocialconnections 4.4 4.3 Financialandeconomiccostson Humancostsofviolence 4.2 4.1 Conclusions 3.10 3.9 3.8 3.7 3.6 3.5 Impactoncommerce 3.4 Impactontrade 3.3 Anticipatingtheborder 3.2 3.1 Peacetime impacts Conclusions Thefutureofthe bordercounties 2.6 Theborderasa distinct region 2.5 Changesinpatterns 2.4 Distinctionswithin theborderareas 2.3 Characterization of thesouthernbordercounties 2.2 2.1 Whatif? The BoundaryCommission 1.2 Unintended,unforeseen and 1.1 . Displaced persons Ex-prisoners 5.2 5.1 border communities Impact onmobilityandthelabourforce Impact ontheenvironment Impact onsocialpolicy Impact oncivilsocietyandpolitics Impact onregionaldevelopment Impact ofregulation undocumented consequences

5.3 Women 5.4 The protestant minority community 5.5 Clones - Erne east 5.6 Conclusions

6 Specific groups - the lived experience 6.1 Ex-prisoners 6.2 Displaced persons 6.3 Women 6.4 The protestant minority community 6.5 Clones - Erne east 6.6 Specific conclusions 6.7 Common themes and issues 6.8 Conclusions and implications for community development

7 The Irish border in a European context 7.1 Impact of all borders 7.2 Models of cross-border cooperation 7.3 European policies for cross-border development 7.4 Conclusions

8 Evolution of cross border cooperation in Ireland 8.1 Historical evolution 8.2 Evolution of INTERREG programme in Ireland 8.3 INTERREG III 8.4 Civil society in INTERREG III 8.5 Cross-border cooperation in the Peace programme 8.6 Wider cross-border cooperation in Ireland 8.7 Conclusions

9 Ways forward in cross-border cooperation 9.1 Cross-border cooperation 2007-2013: the new proposals 9.2 A framework for cross-border cooperation 9.3 Community development and cross-border strategies 9.4 Civil society and cross-border strategies 9.5 Conclusions

10 Conclusions 10.1 A model of the border 10.2 Conclusions 10.3 Key messages 10.3 Specific recommendations

5 Tables

1 Level of voluntary and community organization in the southern border counties 2 Basic data about the southern border counties 3 Fatality rates in northern border counties 4 Women’s representation on public bodies in the southern border counties 5 Changes in protestant population, 1991-2002, southern border counties 6 Priorities and measures in INTERREG III 7 Cross-border work in the Peace programme URTAIN C MERALD E HE T references & bibliography

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Terms of reference

The purpose of this research is to carry out action research on the specific social, cultural and economic impact of the border on the infrastructure and sustainability of communities, geographic and issue based, in the southern border counties. In conjunction with these communities, the research attempts to identify innovative and distinctive strategies to strengthen community infrastructure and build sustainable communities that are capable of taking opportunities arising from peace.

The action research assesses the impact of the border on the geographical communities adjacent to or straddling the border and the participation of members of the target group in these communities. The border and the legacy of the conflict are believed to have had a negative impact on the infrastructure and sustainability of these communities. The project aims to identify this impact and work with the communities to develop strategies in both practical and policy terms to address this impact. The research is especially designed to build on the work originally carried out by Triskele in Along the Borderline (1999).

Definitions

The border is defined as those local authority areas sharing a land border: in the Republic, these are the counties of Donegal, Leitrim, Cavan, Monaghan and Louth. In Northern Ireland, these are the district council areas of Derry, Strabane, Omagh, Fermanagh, Dungannon, Armagh and Newry & Mourne. We are conscious that Sligo is defined as a border county for purposes of the Peace programme, although it does not have such a land border: the county will be referred to from time to time where appropriate. This research concentrates most on those southern counties in which Triskele traditionally operated: Louth, Cavan and Monaghan, Triskele being located in the last (Carrickmacross).

The term ‘Ireland’ will be used as a geographical term to apply to the island of Ireland. Although the term ‘Republic of Ireland’ has no constitutional standing, it is widely used and understood and shall be applied to the southern 26 counties. The term ‘Free State’ is used in a historical context to refer to the southern 26 counties for the period 1921 to 1949. The European Union Special Support Programme for Peace and Reconciliation in Northern Ireland and in the border region of Ireland will be termed, for convenience, Peace I and its successor, Peace II. The political agreement signed in Belfast in April 1998 will be termed here the ‘Good Friday Agreement’, though it is recognized that some people use the term ‘Belfast Agreement’. The neutral term ‘the conflict’ will be

7 THE EMERALD CURTAIN the main term used to describe the disturbed events over 1969-94 (and around them), though the term ‘the troubles’ may also be used occasionally.

The title ‘The Emerald Curtain’ was taken from remarks made by former Northern Ireland Prime Minister James Chichester Clark (chapter 1).

Methodology

This report was completed using three methods. First, desk research was used to investigate the background and context to the study. Second, the experience of communities living along the border was gathered through the use of four thematic and one geographic focus groups. This was, we felt, the most useful to obtain indepth the experience of key groups affected by the social impact of the border. The thematic focus groups were concerned with women, ex- prisoners, the protestant community, displaced persons and the geographical group was focussed on a district significantly affected by the border: Clones and east Erne. Third, over thirty interviews were held with policy-makers, community leaders and key people associated with the economic and social development of the border region.

The outcomes of the research were presented to two seminars designed to outline the initial findings, test the recommendations of the research and invite comments. The first was held in Monaghan on 25th November 2004 and invited members of the focus groups and experts in cross-border studies. The second seminar, held in Carrickmacross on 8th February 2005, presented the research to policy makers invited from government departments and agencies, north and south, the local authorities, public representatives and other interested parties.

Although this is a research project about the border and the communities living alongside it, the externally set terms of funding for this project required that it function in one jurisdiction (the Republic). It is not, strictly speaking, a cross- border project. Nevertheless, the perspective and experience of the northern side of the border was actively incorporated in the literature, analysis, documentation, views sought, interviews, the focus groups, the advisory committee and the consultations.

Acknowledgements

The researchers wish to acknowledge and thank many people for their contribution to the research. We start by acknowledging the support of the Area Development Management and Combat Poverty Agency (ADM/CPA), whose financial assistance made this project possible.

8 We thank those who contributed to the work of the focus groups. Members gave generously of their time, energy and thinking. Several organizations assisted in drawing together the focus groups: Blayney Blades, Dochas for Women, Derry & Raphoe Action, Failte Cluain Eois, Failte Abhaile, EXPAC and Clones Community Forum and we are grateful to them for their assistance.

We thank those who contributed by interview, especially the following: Andy Pollak, Centre for Cross Border Studies, Armagh Patricia Clarke, Centre for Cross Border Studies, Armagh Eoin Magennis, Centre for Cross Border Studies, Armagh Donald McDonald, ADM/CPA, Monaghan Paddy Logue, ADM/CPA, Monaghan Ann McGeeney, Cross-Border Centre, Dundalk Institute of Technology Pat Treanor, Failte Clones Tommy McKearney, EXPAC, Monaghan Liam O’Dowd, Queen’s University, Belfast Allen McAdam, Cavan - Monaghan LEADER, Ballyhaise, Co Cavan Adge King, Monaghan County Development Board Colin Stutt, Colin Stutt Consulting Tony Kennedy, Cooperation Ireland Seymour Crawford TD Josephine Treanor, Clones Community Forum Angela Graham, Clones Community Forum Rosemary Kerrigan, Community Connections, Blacklion, Co Cavan Sandy Holland, Community Connections, Blacklion, Co Cavan Ursula McKenna, Dochas for Women, Monaghan Bernadette McAliskey, STEP, Dungannon, Co Tyrone Kevin Gartlan, Farney Resource & Information Centre, Carrickmacross Eamon Molloy, North West Region Cross Border Group, Derry Marie Crawley, Marie Crawley Associates, Belleek, Co Fermanagh Breedge Lenihan, Monaghan Community Network, Monaghan Francis McCarron, Monaghan Community Network, Monaghan Sr Celine McArdle, Blayney Blades, Carrickmacross Kate Burns, Irish Central Border Area Network Oliver Brady, Historical Society, Bawnboy, Co Cavan Ian McCracken, Derry and Raphoe Action, Raphoe, Co Donegal Jack O’Connor, Special European Union Programmes Body (SEUPB)

The researchers thank Christina Cassidy and her colleagues in Ballybay Development Association, especially Agnes McGuinness, Aine McGuirk, Joseph Crawford, Marian Gilmour and Eoin O’Mahony. The researchers would like to thank the Border Minority Group, especially Charley McAdam, Jim Gibson, Ian Jordan, Angela Graham, Evelyn Morton, Heather Hall and George McConkey.

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People were interviewed on a not-for-attribution basis. This means that their comments would inform the research but they would not be directly quoted, nor would their comments be used in such a way as to directly identify them. They are sometimes referred to in the text as ‘informants’.

We thank those who contributed by the provision of information, papers and documentation. In particular, we are grateful to:

Valerie Grieve, Coiste na nIarchimi, Dublin Gabriel O’Connell, Monaghan Partnership John Butler, Dundalk Partnership Department of Community, Rural & Gaeltacht Affairs, Dublin Anne Anderson Porter, Cooperation Ireland Dr Cathal McCall, Institute of Governance, Queen’s University, Belfast Grace Moloney, Clogher Historical Society, Monaghan Sliabh Beagh Partnership Elisabeth Hellander, European Commission, DG REGIO

Several people provided comments on the draft text: Dr Hastings Donnan (Queen’s University, Belfast), Dr Terence Dooley (National University of Ireland, Maynooth), Dr Kathy Walsh (KW Research) and Ian McCracken (Derry and Raphoe Action) and we are grateful to them for their time and trouble.

Thanks are owed to Brian Mac Aongusa, the author of The Harcourt Street Line - Back on Track, Currach Press, for permission to reproduce his map of the Irish railway system in the 1950s.

We especially thank the members of the advisory group. This met three times in the course of the project to oversee progress, suggest lines of exploration and review the draft of the report. Those who contributed to meetings of the advisory group were Charley McAdam (Border Minority Group), Tommy McKearney (EXPAC), Pat Treanor (Failte Clones), Josephine Treanor (Clones Community Forum), Ruth Taillon (ADM/CPA), Ian McCracken (Derry and Raphoe Action), Ann McGeeney (Cross Border Centre, Institute of Technology, Dundalk, Co Louth) and Adge King (Monaghan County Development Board).

We thank those who attended the two consultations carried out during the research for their contributions, views and interest.

Finally, thanks are due to the staff of Triskele and Director Berny McMahon for administrative and logistical support throughout the project.

10 Chapter 1 Introduction THE EMERALD CURTAIN

The border was never intended, on our part, as a major international frontier, an emerald curtain. It was others who piled brick upon brick along that wall so we could scarcely see or comprehend one another. - James Chichester Clark, Prime Minister of Northern Ireland, 1969-71, attrib.

1.1 Unintended, unforeseen and undocumented consequences

Much has been written about the political origins of the border in Ireland, the roots of partition, the discussion as to which counties would be in and which counties out (Gwyn, 1950; Laffan, 1983). Even when the border was set down in 1921, it was far from settled and its precise outline was referred to a Boundary Commission. This proposed reshaping the border to reflect the political and religious loyalties of those living along its edges, but the three governments concerned agreed in 1925 that the frontier set down four years earlier should remain intact. Few appear to have given much attention to what the border would look like, what form it would take, or its likely consequences. In most respects, the border in Ireland is a tale of unintended and unforeseen consequences

Yet despite its fundamental place at the heart of the politics of both parts of the island, remarkably little has been written about the impact of the 450km border in Ireland1. It is extraordinary too that in examining social and economic narratives of the border region, how little is said about the border itself, or its consequences. Although many studies of the deprivation of southern border counties have been undertaken, few make connections to the border. It is possible to read a large amount of literature about the development of the border region, individual counties and sub-units, without any reference to the border whatsoever. Many studies of cross-border links and activities do not refer to the underlying issues or the role that the border has historically played in hindering or developing such linkages, or that it still plays. Indeed, several people remarked on how, quite recently, Monaghan County Development Board broke a long-observed convention by having a chapter “Monaghan – a Border County” in its county development strategy. This described the economic and social effect of the border as ‘profound’ and ‘by far the biggest influence on the lives of the people of Monaghan over the last fifty years’. Despite its profundity, the border had been the subject of remarkably little analysis or discussion.

As far back as 1994, O’Dowd, Moore and Corrigan (1994) made the point that analysis of the border was hampered by the non-availability of statistics, lack of comparability and an absence of information. Likewise Stutt (1996) noted that 1 Mirroring many other things, there is no unanimity on the actual length of the border. Some studies quote a much shorter length (343km) and the actual length may depend on how exactly one measures its meandering course.

12 Irish cross-border cooperation was little documented. Hamilton (2001) observed that ‘hard economic examination of the current extent of north-south links, the degree of complementarity and divergence between the two economies and the actual opportunities and barriers that exist in realising greater north – south integration have been largely absent’. Few studies had looked in any depth at the actual socio-economic situation in the border region. Cooperation Ireland (2004) noted how little the precise effect of the border in hindering trade has been measured. Rourke and Shiels (1998) made the following point:

‘There has been relatively little research carried out on the effects of the conflict on people living in the southern border counties. The work that has taken place has tended to focus on the economic consequences of the conflict rather than on the social, psychological and emotional impact‘.

‘An outstanding exception to this is Logue’s captivating The border – personal reflections from Ireland, north and south (1999). Its personal, anecdotal nature means that its scientific value was limited, but it nevertheless forms an important landmark.’

The status of the border is interesting if we look at the Initiative ‘92 inquiry in Northern Ireland, probably the largest citizen-based consultative consultation during the conflict (Pollak, 1993), one which may have had an important effect in paving the way for the Belfast Agreement and the present but uncompleted settlement. It is intriguing in itself that the inquiry was a report on Northern Ireland and limited to Northern Ireland ‘and those beyond with a legitimate concern for the region’. This framework invited an understanding of the problem as a self-contained one, whose impact was confined to the six counties. In the event, no submissions were received from outside the six counties of Northern Ireland. Several towns on the northern side of the border did make submissions (Newtownbutler, Keady, Strabane, Castlederg, Ballymagarry) as well as the larger urban areas of Newry and Derry. Although the subsequent report gave due attention to issues of the north-south political relationship, ‘the border’ was not present as an issue during its deliberations. There were two exceptions. First, pressure was evident, coming from the business community in Northern Ireland for an opening up of north-south trade and for the development of the border economic corridor along the east coast, accompanied by first thoughts on an all-island economy. Second, a small number of submissions proposed a repartition of Northern Ireland, with Fermanagh, Tyrone, Derry, south Armagh and Newry (or variations thereon) returned to the Republic.

Positive views of the border are difficult to find and few presented themselves to this group of researchers, writers and contributors. Logue (1999) records, as

THE EMERALD CURTAIN might be expected in an eclectic collection, approving views from unionist political representatives, who see the border as offering political and security protection from those wishing to overthrow their political choices and way of life. In similar vein, Kennedy (1999) defends the border as natural, normal, reflecting the political wishes of the political majorities of the two parts of the island, while celebrating the Irish border as being the least visible and most permeable in Europe.

1.2 What if? The Boundary Commission

The border under discussion in this study could have been quite a different one. Here this study makes a brief digression, though one whose relevance to the topic will become more apparent as the study progresses.

The idea of partition in Ireland dates to June 1912, when Liberal MP Agar Robartes proposed an amendment to the third Home Rule Bill, to exclude Antrim, Derry, Down and Armagh from the operation of the Bill. Over the following eight years, the idea, nature and extent of partition were hotly contested. Partition was especially strongly opposed in what became the southern Ulster counties - in fact equally opposed by both unionists and nationalists, albeit for quite different reasons (Carville, 1991).

Even for those who advocated or accepted partition, the present border was never intended to be the definitive border. Article #12 of the 1921 treaty established a Boundary Commission to determine the boundary between the Free State and Northern Ireland. Its powers were to ‘determine, in accordance with the wishes of its inhabitants, as far as may be compatible with economic and geographic conditions, the boundaries between Northern Ireland and the rest of Ireland’. Other sections of the Treaty established a Council of Ireland where both governments would address a growing list of common concerns. A small number of governmental bodies remained all-Ireland and were not then partitioned (e.g. the lights service, mapping).

The sanguine view of most northern nationalists was that the border would be significantly re-drawn, with the new Northern Ireland approximating the original four-county partition proposed in 1912 (Murray, 2004). Assurances that the border would be substantially redrawn had been given at the time by the first two Presidents of the Free State, Arthur Griffith and Michael Collins. Collins, for example, was absolutely clear that most of Armagh, south and east Down and Newry would be in the Free State.

The Boundary Commission took its decision on the basis of census returns and the extensive representations made to it by the communities living alongside the border. The Commission did not use local plebiscites, although these were 14 commonly used at the time during the redrawing of the European borders after the end of the first world war. Instead, they used ‘markets’ and ‘satisfaction’ as guiding factors. Recognizing the already disruptive economic effects of the border, they resolved to reunite townlands with their natural local markets, but only in such a way as to produce a level of satisfaction between protestant and catholic communities. The commission took a minimalist approach and subconsciously took the decision to retain Northern Ireland as a political unit essentially based on six counties. Granted the patchwork of religious divisions along the border, its task was well-nigh impossible. Even still, its proposals were full of contradictions and inconsistencies (Martin, 1999).

The Boundary Commission proposed to shorten the border by 80km, from 450km to 368km. The principal changes proposed were: - South east Fermanagh transferred to the Free State (Crom, Newtownbutler, Magheraveely, Rosslea) - South west Fermanagh transferred to the Free State - South West Armagh to the Free State (to Monaghan) - South Armagh transferred to the Free State (to Louth) - Parts of east Donegal to Northern Ireland - Four district electoral divisions, with mainly protestant populations, of Monaghan to Northern Ireland (Drumully, Mullyash, Church Hill, Carrickaslane).

The territorial balance of the redivision overwhelmingly favoured the Free State by around 4:1. The Free State would have gained 31,319 people and 2,727km2, while 7,594 people would be transferred northward (Murray, 2004). Monaghan would have lost about a thousand people but gained 10,000 people.

The proposals were especially important for Clones, one of the subjects of this study (chapter 5). The economic hinterland of Clones in south east Fermanagh would have been transferred to the Free State. They were of considerable consequence for the protestant community, another focus of this report (also chapter 5).

The report of the Boundary Commission required approval and implementation by the British, Northern Ireland and Free State governments. The government of the Free State quickly came under pressure, not least in Monaghan, not to ‘hand over’ any of ‘our’ territory to Northern Ireland. A deal was quickly reached between the three governments whereby: - The Boundary Commission report was suppressed; - The existing border was reaffirmed; - The Free State was relieved of its share of the British war and postwar debt; - The Council of Ireland was scrapped, in favour of intergovernmental cooperation.

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The deal was a rushed one and it is probably not unfair to say that the three governments panicked when faced with the practical prospects and human consequences of moving boundaries.

Dooley (1994) described the outcome as a disaster for Monaghan. The Boundary Commission could have appeased the protestants of Monaghan and saved the local economy of Clones, he says. Instead, the border became the dividing line between the industrialized north and the under-developed south. Monaghan, a reasonably prosperous county at the time, became an economic cul de sac and was formally declared a disadvantaged area in 1952.

The suppression of the report of the Boundary Commission brings us back to the first theme of this short, introductory chapter. The issue was quickly buried and by the time the standard description of the Free State was written only a few years later, the Commission and the issues associated with partition had disappeared from the national public, academic and political discourse (Mansergh, 1934). Its consequences had by no means disappeared for the communities living along the borderline (chapter 3).

The story of the Boundary Commission had a couple of historical footnotes. First, in a supreme irony, the government deemed it safe to release the papers of the Boundary Commission in 1969, just in time for the renewal of the conflict around the unsettled border. Second, the idea of a further partition never vanished entirely from the minds of some policy-makers, as the subsequent release of the 1974 state papers showed. In 1974, the Irish government of Liam Cosgrave drew up plans on how it might govern nationalist parts of Northern Ireland in the event of repartition following a hasty British withdrawal. Cosgrave suspected that the British government was considering withdrawal and repartition, a suspicion that proved to be well-founded. The Irish government drew up four repartition scenarios, from minimalist to maximalist, with the nationalist enclave in west Belfast under a system of governance comparable to West Berlin (Collins, 2005).

But now, an examination of the context, the border region itself, chapter 2.

16 Chapter 2 Context - The Border Region

THE EMERALD CURTAIN

Monaghan - the remote north - Charles Stewart Parnell, 1883

In this chapter, the socio-economic backdrop context to this project is outlined. Chapter 2 provides basic data and examines the southern border counties as a distinct entity (2.1). Because the counties are not homogeneous, distinctions within them are explored (2.2). Some recent changes in patterns are noted (2.3) before examining how the border emerged as a distinct area within Irish administration (2.4). Chapter 2 then looks at projections for the area (2.5) before some conclusions are drawn (2.6).

2.1 Characterization of the southern border counties

The current population of the southern border counties is 432,500 (2002), 11% of the population of the Republic and 12,156km2. It was not until the 1980s that the border counties began to be seen as a distinct region within the southern state and within the island as a whole.

The earliest known attempt in recent years to characterize the border area as a distinct economic, social and developmental entity was undertaken by the Economic and Social Committee (ESC) of the European Community in its 1983 report Irish border areas (Laffan & Payne, 2001). This highlighted the border region as having serious economic problems, a dependence on agriculture, having poor soil, with patterns of farm size, marriage and inheritance inimical to development. Incomes were low, unemployment high and there was significant out-migration. These features reflected the depressed state of the economies of Northern Ireland and the Republic, both peripheral regions of the European Union facing a bleak future (Harrison 1990).

In retrospect, the ESC report did stir an interest in the region and a fresh attempt to characterize the area was made by O’Dowd (1994), who found that the border areas lacked access to markets, centres of innovation and centres of population. It had few large towns as a focus for development, had low incomes, high out-migration, poor land and infrastructure. Cook, Poole, Pringle and Moore (2000) made a systematic attempt to assess the socio- economic position of the border in the situation of the island as a whole and they added to our understanding of the region. Their findings are important, for they applied a range of social data to reach a multi-level empirical analysis. Their findings were that the border area, north and south, had: • 15% of the population of the island; • Above average rates of dependency, economic inactivity and unemployment; • Low rates of urbanization. It was the most rural part of the Republic. • Above average rates of overcrowded and poor quality housing. 18 In general, deprivation indicators were more severe on the southern side of the border than the north, though the writers relied on figures that may not have reflected the economic boom in the Republic in the late 1990s. Their conclusions were that, ‘the population living close to the border experiences a higher level of several forms of deprivation or potential deprivation than that in Ireland as a whole, manifested by higher unemployment levels, a more dependent age structure and a greater proportion of housing with poor amenities’ (51-2). In their conclusions, where they examine the island as a whole, the authors come to the conclusion that ‘the border region emerges as having a greater deprivation problem than the rest of the state’ (118). The border counties accounted for a disproportionate share of the island’s unemployment, 34% (Stutt, 1999).

Many researchers emphasize the importance of rurality. In Monaghan, for example, 77% of people live in settlements of 1,000 people or less. The SEUPB (2003) points out that not only is farming a predominant activity, but the landholdings are small and unproductive. Productivity rates are 90% of the national average in the eastern border counties and 57% the average in the western border counties. KPMG (1996) argued that employment figures concealed latent levels of unemployment and high levels of on-farm underemployment. It added that ‘many of the problems faced by the border appear therefore as more extreme forms of the problems which practically affect all parts of Ireland’.

Studies focussing on particular socio-economic groups confirm this picture in greater depth. Rourke and Shiels (1998) mapped out educational disadvantage in the border counties, finding it to be the most extensive concentration of its kind in the state, attributing it to a long history of early school leaving (historically, to jobs not requiring qualifications), longer travel-to-school times and to fewer informal and subsequent educational opportunities. The counterpart to a high level of rurality is a low level of urbanization, with only three towns having a population over 10,000 (Letterkenny, Drogheda and Dundalk) and only two over 5,000 (Cavan and Monaghan). This means that economies of scale cannot be achieved in the educational area. Low population density also had negative implications for the provision of childcare, youth clubs, out-of-school activities and sports.

Triskele (2000) has, in the course of its rural community development work, drawn attention to the combination of economic disadvantage (age distribution, underemployment, lack of economic opportunity, high percentage of small farms and high dependency rates) and peripherality (exclusion from natural hinterlands, lack of market access, lack of transport, inaccessibility of services like education and lack of joined up policies).

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The strategic plans of a number of community and voluntary organizations working in the border areas were studied. A theme of the commentaries from the voluntary and community perspective is that border disadvantage is not just geographical, but focusses on particular groups: on women, more so than men, on rural communities more than urban. Those vulnerable to poverty nationally are equally at risk in the border counties: lone parents, Travellers, early school leavers being typical examples. To these, one should add groups at risk in the context of the conflict: northern catholics who have been displaced from Northern Ireland; and southern protestants who may have a sense of political isolation.

Most industry in the border counties remains small in scale and low tech in nature (e.g. mushroom production). There emerged a tradition of self-reliance and the cooperative movement has been strong in Cavan and Monaghan. Dominant economic activities have tended to be farming, road haulage, furniture, mushrooms and poultry. During the 1980s, a range of diversification projects were tried (e.g. rabbits, deer, ostriches, snails). While some were successful, they were unlikely to build a strong agri-industrial base.

Border counties residents have pointed to the slow pace of development in the area. One informant pointed out, first, that people living in some border areas had to wait for a long time for electricity and telephone (on the northern side, nationalist townlands had to wait even longer). Second, the quality of education in the border counties varied in the past: although some teachers were good, inspectors were reluctant to go to the region and some less talented teachers might go unchallenged.

In the study of the economic, social and cultural position of Co Monaghan, the Office of the Director of Community and Enterprise (2001) concluded that whilst Monaghan had a number of potential advantages and attractions:

‘The biggest problem to be addressed is the county’s weak social structure: unemployment, deprivation, low disposable incomes, lack of facilities for childcare and the elderly and a high level of illiteracy, all contribute to poor infrastructure and high levels of social exclusion and need to be addressed. The lack of access to or uptake of third level education has serious ramifications for the county economically, socially and culturally’ (116).

Third level education is considered to be a double-edged benefit. Most parents in the southern border counties have the aspiration that their children go on to third level, be that in the region, in the north, or further afield. They also realize that there are few ways in which third level skills can be deployed once they return and that such children are likely to leave the area.

Stutt (1999) summarized the following economic and social weaknesses of the border regions: - Lack of identity, profile, image; - Deficient transport, economic and social infrastructure; - Poor transport links, especially public transport; - Above average levels of social deprivation; - High levels of general and youth unemployment; - By contrast, skills shortages in some areas; - Low value added indigenous industry; - Dependance on agriculture; - Low levels of public services in key areas e.g. hospitals; - Over-reliance on European funds, rather than national and private sector ones.

These are the main economic features. From the point of view of community development, it would be especially important to make an assessment of the level of social capital in the southern border counties. The level of social capital in the southern border counties has not been systematically studied.

The border counties participate in the national programmes that provide community infrastructure. In addition, the counties have benefited from the development of community infrastructure under the Peace programme. Recent community development can be traced to the LEADER programme for rural development, which was introduced during the first round of the reformed structural funds (1988-93). During the second round, 1994-9, partnerships were established in all the disadvantaged rural and urban counties of the country. The Community Development Programme, which traces its roots in the second European poverty programme (1984-9), was gradually extended nationally in the 1990s. A number of family resource centres have also been established. The two Peace programmes (1994-9, 2000-4) provided a significant boost for community development in the southern border counties. In Monaghan, Clones Community Forum, for example provides youth services; assistance to people affected by suicide, bereavement, crime and poverty; welfare and tax advice; and plans to operate a local cross-border bus service. Dochas for Women has undertaken substantial skills training for women. Farney Resource and Information Centre provides jobs counselling that is otherwise not available. The work of Blayney Blades has involved: - The significant provision of local factory employment and enterprise development; - Personal development, training and upskilling for mothers; - Programmes for young women at risk of disadvantage and early pregnancy; - The housing of homeless people;

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- Development of childcare services; - Assistance to dysfunctional high-risk families with unstable relationships.

Community Connections in Cavan has developed public transport services and programmes for older people and carers. In Monaghan, the Office of the Director of Community & Enterprise (2001) has recorded, operating in the county, 62 disability groups, 23 women’s groups, 23 youth groups, 39 local development groups; 15 members of the Monaghan against deprivation network; 113 community-based groups funded under the Peace I programme and 12 projects funded by the International Fund for Ireland. Some areas of work may be stronger than others. Valuable information on the infrastructural situation of Travellers was researched by Quinn. He found that there was no Traveller organization in Monaghan and Travellers there had no contact with any of the national Traveller organizations (e.g. Irish Traveller Movement, National Traveller Women’s Forum, Pavee Point).

Rural development organizations in the border counties were profiled by Venture (2002) which identified up to 160 bodies in the border counties concerned with rural development. The highest densities recorded were in Fermanagh, Tyrone (16 each), Donegal (13), Armagh (9) and Monaghan (8).

It is possible to make a calculation of the level of voluntary and community organization in the southern border counties, as follows. These figures are based on the number of organizations granted taxation relief by the Revenue Commissioners because they fall within the legal definition of operating for charitable purposes. The bulk of these organizations are, in the southern border counties, groups such as development associations, playgroups, water schemes, history societies, environmental protection groups, community childcare services, animal welfare organizations, housing associations, women’s groups, community and resource centres, associations for older people, hospices, local associations of the Legion of Mary and Society of St Vincent de Paul, women’s groups and youth groups. A number of religious and parish-based organizations are included, as are a small number of statutory bodies who have so registered (their numbers are too small to affect the overall validity of the exercise). These figures are now kept up to date by the Revenue Commissioners, who weed out organizations that no longer function.

22 Table 1: level of voluntary and community organization in the southern border counties

County No. of Orgs. Ratio Density Leitrim 60 1:430 0.00232 Monaghan 103 1:512 0.00195 Sligo 107 1:543 0.00183 Cavan 122 1:462 0.00216 Louth 125 1:814 0.00122 Donegal 212 1:648 0.00154 National 6,257 1:639 0.00156

Source: Derived from Revenue Commissioners (www. revenue.ie) data on organizations defined as pursuing charitable objectives. ‘Ratio’ is defined as the number of persons per organization, based on county population figures.

In the Republic as a whole, there is a voluntary organization for every 639 persons, or a national density of 0.00156 (incidentally, much lower than Northern Ireland). All the border counties have a density in excess of the national average. Although Leitrim has the smallest number of organizations of all the border counties and although the county has an exceptionally low population, its relative density is actually the highest. Louth and Donegal are the only border counties with a density level of voluntary organizations below the national average, Louth markedly so.

2.2 Distinctions within the border areas

Despite overall prevailing patterns of deprivation, the heterogeneity of the southern border areas became an emerging theme of the border areas discourse in the late 1990s (ADM/CPA, 1999). In recent times, researchers, analysts and commentators have attempted to characterize the sub- components of the border areas. Until that point, there was agreement that social disadvantage seemed to be more accentuated on the southern side of the border, but the different counties had not been scrutinized in more detail. First, basic demographic data make it clear that there are significant differences between the counties concerned.

23 THE EMERALD CURTAIN

Table 2: basic data about the southern border counties

County Area, Population Density Household hectares Persons/Km2 Disposable income (Ireland = 100) Cavan 193,177 54,416 29 89.4% Donegal 486,091 137,383 28 83.7% Leitrim 159,003 25,815 16 87.5% Louth 82,613 101,802 123 98.3% Monaghan 129,509 52,772 40 91.1% Sligo 183,752 58,178 31 98.4%

Central Statistics Office (2001): County incomes and regional gross domestic product, 2001. Author, Dublin and Cork; LEADER programme

From this it is evident that there are significant variations within the southern border counties. The largest county, Donegal, is several times the size of the smallest, Louth. The population of Donegal is five times that of the least populated, Leitrim. Population density varies from 16 per km2 in Leitrim to 123 per km2 in Louth.

KPMG (1996) was one of the first to make important distinctions and drew attention to the relatively urbanized nature of county Louth; the rurality of the central border counties; and the extreme rurality and disadvantage of Donegal. ADM/CPA (1999) found what it described as ‘narrow belts of affluence’ around the six towns of the southern border counties: Letterkenny, Dundalk, Drogheda, Sligo, Cavan and Monaghan. From the 1990s, there was significant industrial development along the east coast, what was called the Dublin to Belfast economic corridor. Extreme rural poverty was most evident along the west coast and in the mid-part of the southern border counties. ADM/CPA used an index of social deprivation for each county in the island (1 = no deprivation. 10 = highest possible level of deprivation), finding that Donegal was the most deprived border county (8.1), followed by Leitrim, Cavan and Monaghan (all 6.7) and then Louth (6.3) (Sligo was relatively prosperous at 4.9).

Even within counties, there were variations. South West Cavan Community Development Project (2002) charted twelve individual district electoral divisions in its area, finding that two scored 10 out of 10, the highest possible level of deprivation, seven scored 9 out of 10 and the rest 8 out of 10. A map charting the exact divisions by electoral ward was published by Fitzpatrick (1999). Here, the plight of Donegal, Leitrim, south west Cavan and south and east Monaghan is all too evident. Many of the western parts of the southern border

24 counties qualify for the CLAR programme of assistance to rural areas of disadvantage. Several parts outside CLAR areas also underwent severe population decline though evidently not enough for inclusion in the programme. Some upland areas were especially denuded of their populations.

Triskele (2002) found evidence that Monaghan had been especially disadvantaged within the southern border counties and was seen as especially on the periphery of policy-makers in Dublin. Because of its shape, the county had been more than usually cut off from its economic hinterland northward. A stoic individualism pre-disposed people against complaint, meaning that factory closures were not protested and communities were slow to collectivize. This was also noted by Dochas for Women (2001) which also sensed a feeling of isolation from Dublin, the seat of power. This had caused a feeling of apathy over policy issues and participation in local government reform. Another county study was undertaken by Drumlin Community Development Project (2000), which characterized south county Monaghan as suffering from poor transport, an isolated elderly population and educational disadvantage.

Stutt (1999) introduced the concept of the border corridor. This refined the border area down to those District Electoral Divisions (DEDs) actually running along the land border (69 such in the Republic). This he called the border corridor. Here he found that the border corridor DEDs all had deprivation indices (e.g. dependency, unemployment rate, educational qualifications) more unfavourable than the rest of the border counties. According to the SEUPB (2003), ‘peripherality and rurality that distinguish the border region from the rest of the state are further exaggerated in those areas directly along the border’. Using this argument, Monaghan is the most affected of all the southern counties, for it has the longest border, 174km, with only one parish being more than 16km from the border.

What is true of the southern part of the border corridor is also large truly in the northern part. The districts of the northern border corridor are characterized by lower levels of educational attainment, a lower density of public services, under- representation of service industries and an overrepresentation of declining sectors. One problem – itself a cross-border issue – is that only a few social statistical sets of deprivation between north and south are directly comparable, although overall patterns, comparisons and trends between them are clear enough (Pringle, Walsh & Hennessy, 1999). Rourke and Shiels (1998) make the point that violence had a differential impact on the border areas, creating high levels of tension in those areas adjacent to the border, but others living in more distant parts of border counties 45km away were comparatively unaffected.

KPMG (1996) has urged us to be alert to trends in settlement patterns within

25 THE EMERALD CURTAIN the border counties themselves. KPMG noted, in the 1980s and early 1990s, a movement by poorer people from countryside to town; and by the affluent from urban centre to urban periphery. This may be continuing. The mid-term evaluation of the present BMW operational programme gives us the most up- to-date picture of the status of the border region. It shows contrasting areas of population growth and decline. Growth is most evident in south Louth, south east Cavan, Cavan town, and north east Donegal near Letterkenny and Derry. Population decline continues to be evident in west Donegal and most of Leitrim (Kearney, McKeown & Walsh, 2003).

2.3 Changes in patterns

As we have noted, most analysis of the border counties dates to the early 1990s, when improved social data became available for the first time. Some studies have attempted to mark changes in the border counties in the most recent years, an important development in the light of the country’s recent economic growth.

There is evidence that the celtic tiger period of the Irish economy made only limited impact in the southern border counties. The SEUPB (2003) has noted how the border region [defined here to include Sligo] has grown more slowly in recent years than the national economy: 43% over 1993-7, compared to 51% in the national economy. The SEUPB attributes this to the border area’s dependence on agriculture (where the growth in incomes has been low) and its inability to attract in the same proportion of inward, high-tech investment as other areas. Nor has it shared in the growth of indigenous industry. The growth in employment, at 15%, lagged behind the national employment growth rate over 1993-7 which was 26%. The border region’s share of national unemployment rose from 11.5% to 13.3%. The SEUPB attributes this poorer performance to the peripheral location, the lack of physical infrastructure, poor skill levels in the workforce, difficulties of transport access and the continued political uncertainty in the north. The border region still attracts a disproportionately small share of domestic and overseas tourists and a disproportionately high share of low-spending tourists. Similarly, according to the Department of Finance, the situation of the border counties has begun to improve following the cease fires and the introduction of the first Peace programme, but with a reservation:

‘The economy has been growing at a level comparable to EU-wide trends. However, relative to the rest of Ireland, the border region is lagging behind in terms of socio-economic convergence’.

Figures for labour force participation, unemployment and agricultural employment still lag behind the rest of the state. Sectoral analysis shows that 26 the border counties still have a disproportionate share of older, declining industries and activities compared to the rest of the state. This is true in the border areas of Northern Ireland as well. Economic indicators for Derry, Newry & Mourne, Strabane, Fermanagh and Omagh district councils lag behind the rest of Northern Ireland for employment, unemployment and earnings. According to the INTERREG III mid-term evaluation:

‘In terms of unemployment, the border region remains relatively disadvantaged and specifically there tends to be relatively higher unemployment in some of the district councils. An examination of labour force participation rates indicates that the regions underperform relative to Ireland and Northern Ireland. The border regions remains amongst the most disadvantaged of the regions. Data on mean earnings in the district councils also confirm that incomes in the border areas tend to be lower and that some of the most disadvantaged areas are located along the border corridor....the region remains relatively disadvantaged.’ (text summarized from Price Waterhouse Coopers, 2003).

Is this still the case in every respect? Just published 2001 statistics show a distinct improvement in the situation of the border region (O’Brien, 2004; MacConnell, 2004). Louth is now close to average national income (100%) at 98.3% (Sligo is also close at 98.4%). Monaghan is at 91.1% of national income, Cavan 89.4%, Leitrim 87.5% and Donegal 83.7% (see table 2, above). The poor counties in Ireland are now to be found in the south-east, where Laois is now the country’s poorest county (82.4% of national average), closely followed by the two contiguous counties of Carlow and Wexford (84% and 85%). The focus of geographic poverty in Ireland continues to shift toward the midlands and south east. The statement in the INTERREG II baseline report that the border region is by far the most disadvantaged region in Ireland (KPMG, 1996) can no longer be true.

2.4 The border as a distinct region

The border counties were recognized as a region for the first time within the Irish planning system in January 1994. The Local Government Act, 1991, made possible the establishment of eight regional bodies in Ireland, to coincide with the 1994-9 programming period of the structural funds. The ‘border’ was a defined region, covering Donegal, Leitrim, Cavan, Monaghan, Louth and Sligo, governed by an assembly of councillors nominated by the respective local authorities and run by a small secretariat. Their primary role was to monitor, at regional level, the operation of the structural funds.

THE EMERALD CURTAIN

The advent of regionalism in Ireland derived less from a national commitment to regional development but more from European requirements for the monitoring of its programmes. The border region emerged from seven sub- regional review bodies established under the previous programming period, 1988-93. This period had seven, not eight regional bodies and most of the border counties found themselves in the ‘north-west’ region. The titles and boundaries were redrawn in 1994 to make way for an eighth, border region. From the point of view of this study, the notable aspect is that ‘the border’ was not seen as a distinct region in 1988, but was in 1993, with a new region created for this purpose.

In 2000, the eight regions were simplified as two: the Border, Midland and Western (BMW); and the Southern and Eastern (S&E), to reflect the division of the state into, for purposes of European Union funding, objective 1 and objective 1 in transition areas. The Border, Midland and Western region was headquartered in Ballaghadereen and the Southern and Eastern region in Waterford. The BMW authority has 38 members, drawn from the respective county councils and it continues to meet to review the development of the region. Despite the regrouping into two larger units, the eight regions remained in existence and today, the Border regional office is based in Cavan.

For the next structural fund programming period, 2007-2013, these two large regions are expected to continue operation. A disadvantage to researchers of the regrouping in 2000 is that the border region is now planned in conjunction with the midlands and western. The statistics of the 2000-6 development strategy are aggregated for all the BMW counties (Fitzpatrick, 1999) and the distinctiveness of the border counties is less evident.

2.5 The future of the border counties

Having examined historical developments and recent trends, what future can we project for the southern border counties?

The Irish government’s national spatial strategy “People, Places, Potential” (2003) gave attention to the development of the eight regions of the country as defined in the 1994-9 European structural funds programming period. The spatial strategy provided a mixed characterization of the border counties - some parts being ‘strong’ (Letterkenny, east Monaghan); ‘remote’ (the rest of Donegal, Sligo, Leitrim), ‘weak’ (middle Donegal, Cavan, south Monaghan). The national spatial strategy had a detailed analysis of the border region (pages 76-8), one which subdivided the region into three zones: the northwest (Donegal), the west (Sligo and Leitrim) and the east and centre (Cavan, Monaghan and Louth). The map of the area was colour coded into three different zones: 28 - ‘Rural areas with a strong potential for diversification’ (Inishowen, Finn Valley, SE Donegal, Sligo, NW Cavan, NW Monaghan) - ‘Diversifying areas with emergent management issues’ (central and west Donegal) - ‘Village strengthening and rural area opportunities’ (central, southern and eastern Monaghan, central Cavan, southern Leitrim, southern Sligo).

The precise reasons for these new forms of classification are not immediately obvious, but in the event the national spatial strategy proposed the establishment of gateways in Letterkenny, Sligo and Dundalk; and hubs in Monaghan and Cavan. Strategic transport linking corridors are proposed for Sligo - Letterkenny - Derry; Sligo - Enniskillen; and Dundalk - Cavan; while strategic radial corridors are proposed for Dundalk - Monaghan - Derry and Dublin to Cavan. By way of historic comparison, the previous national spatial strategy, the Buchanan report (1966) proposed Drogheda, Dundalk and Sligo as ‘regional growth centres’ and Cavan and Letterkenny as ‘local growth centres’.

A criticism of the national spatial strategy is that it was done up to, but not across the border, nor was the equivalent strategy in Northern Ireland (the Regional Development Strategy). Although the National Development Plan introduced the concept of a common chapter with Northern Ireland as far back as 1994, there was no such common chapter in the national spatial strategy. Governments still have much difficulty in working across the border even in those areas that lend themselves most naturally to regional, cross-border planning such as roads, tourism and waste.

Bradley (1996) has warned of an excessive preoccupation with the Dublin – Belfast economic corridor. It could become, he warns, an isolated growth pole, with only weak spillover effects into the adjoining border regions. In fairness, the proponents of the corridor made it plain that its success should not be at the expense of other regions. Still, the east-west axis of development of the border counties remains under-explored. O’Dowd warned us that ‘developing all- Ireland economic links is not synonymous with transforming the border region’. North-south improvements may not necessarily benefit the border regions. George Quigley pointed to the success of the corridor and the economic prosperity of Drogheda, Dundalk and Newry - and now argues the need for a series of growth corridors along a number of cross-border axes (Quigley, 2004; Poole, 2004). Other students of cross-border development suggest that twin cities of broadly similar size on either side of a border can also be a strong basis for economic development (Leontidou, Afouxenidis, Donnan et al, 2004). The prognosis for the border areas is:

29 THE EMERALD CURTAIN

- A continued improvement of the Dublin - Belfast corridor, with the prospect of Newry - Dundalk becoming a conurbation; - A much less rapid development of the central border region; and -The prospect of urban people moving into the area for rurality. With improved communications, many eastern and central parts of the border counties may become homes to commuters.

2.6 Conclusions

The first characterization of the Irish border region dates to the Economic and Social Committee in the 1980s. The border region of the Republic did not emerge as a distinctive unit within Irish economics, social policy, programming or public administration until the 1990s. Its distinctive features of economic and social disadvantage, peripheralization and under-investment then became plainly evident and were analyzed in more detail as the decade progressed. The corridor along the border was found to be additionally disadvantaged. Even with their many common features, the border counties may be divided into three distinct groups: Louth, the most prosperous; the central counties, with a broad swathe of disadvantage; and Donegal, the most disadvantaged county. Even within this grouping, there are considerable variations within counties. The context has begun to change in recent years, with the country’s economic growth and the development of the Dublin to Belfast economic corridor. The overall picture is of a region that has lagged behind national benchmarks for growth, employment and development.

30 Chapter 3 Peacetime Impacts THE EMERALD CURTAIN

Temporary borders soon harden into permanence - Winston Churchill

The Irish border is newer than most western European borders. KPMG (1996) makes the point that the Irish border should have been less problematical than other parts of Europe, given the lack of a linguistic divide and the shared administrative and legal traditions of the British Isles. It always was more likely to be an ‘emerald’ curtain than an ‘iron’ curtain.

But as Churchill once warned, temporary borders can quickly harden into permanence. This it did remarkably quickly after the collapse of the Boundary Commission in 1925. The hardened, frozen nature of the new border was reflected in the almost complete absence of intergovernmental contact from the moment of partition until the rapprochement between Lemass and O’Neill in 1965. Relationships were so poor that the sending of fire brigades across the border in 1941 to help the people of Belfast to extinguish the fires of German air raids was considered a major breakthrough in relationships. Officials met from time to time to administer the railway system, or in the case of the Foyle Fisheries Commission (1952), a shared river boundary.

Here, chapter 3 examines the peacetime impacts of the border, from partition to the present. The effects of the conflict will be addressed in the following chapter. First, we look at predictions of the impact of the border, made during the 1920-5 period of the temporary border (3.1). The peacetime impacts of the border are examined under a number of headings: trade, commerce, regulation, civil society and politics, social policy, regional development, the environment and mobility and the labour force (3.2 to 3.9). Conclusions are drawn (3.10).

3.1 Anticipating the border

Although the Irish border was described earlier as a story of unintended and unanticipated consequences, some people attempted to predict its consequences both before it happened and especially during the twilight period of 1920-5 when a temporary border was in place. Even before 1920, the unionists of Monaghan, Donegal and Cavan drew attention, in “No Partition of Ulster!” to the pernicious effects of a division within their economic hinterland. The case was made that these counties were part of the Ulster, Belfast-based economy, retailing goods that came by rail from Belfast. “These markets should not be separated from their suppliers” (Dooley, 1994).

The Boundary Commission provides useful documentation on the perceptions of the border communities as to the effects the border had already had on them - and the further impacts that were expected. Southern border traders 32

complained that they had already been obliged to shift their markets southward and export through Dundalk rather than the more convenient Belfast. Flax had always gone north for sale and this was now more difficult. Southern protestants quickly perceived a wealth gap opening up across the border and drew attention to the higher prices for agricultural goods in Northern Ireland, the lower cost of living there and the higher rate of pension compared to the Free State.

The Boundary Commission had much to say about the negative effects of the border to date: delays, interruption of trade, detours to reach approved roads. Trading patterns had already been interrupted and Armagh people had stopped coming to Castleblayney fair. Clones, described by the commission as the most prosperous market town of the region, was identified as being at particular risk should the present border be kept. Clones fair had already suffered and the business had moved to Lisnaskea and Newtownbutler. Traders in Clones complained that business was down 50% over 1923-4. Protestant traders were recognized to be more affected, relying as they did on protestant patronage from south east Fermanagh. Clones had already lost some professional business. The Northern Ireland courts of Fermanagh had continued, for convenience, to meet in Clones, but they were transferred back into Northern Ireland. The legal companies that serviced them, mainly protestant, left Clones to follow them. The citizens of Rosslea told the Boundary Commission that trade was now paralyzed, markets and fairs had almost disappeared and the cost of living had already risen.

Smuggling was not something that grew up gradually around the border. Smuggling appears to have developed immediately, for by 1925 the Boundary Commission described it as being a recognized way of life, citing a trade in smuggled cigarettes, tobacco, sugar and shoes. The first charges of smuggling came before the circuit court in Monaghan in 1924.

3.2 Impact on trade

Custom posts were set up on the border by the Free State government on 1st April 1923. Local newspapers first treated this unheralded development as an April fool’s joke. On that day too, passengers travelling through Clones were required to leave trains arriving in Clones to be searched on a windswept platform. Local Republicans treated this development more seriously, for the first attack on a custom post took place only four days later, 4th April 1923 and was successful in burning the temporary shed.

The custom posts had a temporary look at first (Logue, 1999). In the course of time, the customs were the most visible of a series of barriers, regulations and differentials that impacted on trade and social relationships. On some parts of 33 THE EMERALD CURTAIN the border, for example in Donegal, customs were fortified by an army presence, accentuating their profile (Bowden, Carton & Ni Dhuibhne, 2001). To what degree the Free State government was aware of the consequences of its actions on the border communities is not known, nor are we aware of whether serious consideration was given to maintaining a free trade market within the British Isles. In sharp contrast, the decision was quickly taken, though, to maintain a free labour and travel market within the British Isles, a decision which remains to the present.

The Free State was quick to impose duties on certain goods, a 15% import duty off footwear being imposed from the very start, so the customs were not an academic matter. The Great Northern Line crossed the border six times between Clones and Redhills, each crossing point requiring a custom post. The Castleblayney-Keady rail line was not amenable to custom searches, so it was closed. Other railway connections were immediately affected by the border. Donegal’s railway system radiated from hubs outside the county: the Londonderry & Lough Swilly Railway operated from Derry while the south Donegal system was based in Strabane, Co Tyrone (Murray, 2004). Their operations were immediately affected. By February 1924, the Northern Standard had reported on how the posts had not only become an inconvenience, but that they hampered trade. A decline in fair attendance was soon reported (Dooley, 1994). The border had an immediate effect in disrupting trading and shopping patterns. Traditionally, people in east Donegal did their shopping in Derry, but this diminished after 1920, though Letterkenny may have benefited instead. Monaghan’s trade with Armagh and Newry declined. There was a ‘Monaghan street’ in Newry, so called because goods from Monaghan were traded there.

The first and most significant impact of the border appears to have been on internal trade, which diminished quickly. It is estimated that customs reduced cross border trade immediately by between 20% and 40%. Sources of supply adjusted. Cross-border and north-south economic interactions eventually declined to the insignificant (Bradley 1996). The cutting off of hinterlands and market access quickly affected the milk industry. Southern milk suppliers found the practical and paperwork aspects of cross-border trade to be a considerable disincentive. As a result, milk markets adjacent to the border ended. Large creamery co-ops in the southern border counties market began to look southward and lost their northern customers, despite their proximity.

As intimated by the Boundary Commission, smuggling was the first and most evident distortion of trade introduced by the border. When the Folklore Commission began archiving national culture and traditions in the 1930s, border smuggling was well established. Jewellery, watches, cigarettes, razor blades, perfume and whiskey were already being smuggled by fishermen

34 across Lough Melvin. The term ‘smuggling’ took several forms and it is important to distinguish between them: - The illegal bringing in of goods, legal in the originating state but illegal in the importing state. - The transport of undocumented animals across the border in order to get a better price on the other side. - The importation of goods into one state without going through the appropriate licensing procedure. - Cross-border personal shopping, in which goods are brought across the border without their being declared for purposes of duty. This could be because they were cheaper, better branded or unavailable on the other side. - The bringing in of goods in commercial quantities without the payment of duties. Some of these goods may have been smuggled into either Britain or Ireland in the first place.

Even within this categorization, there are grey areas. Some provision was made for the crossing of the border with items purchased on the other side for immediate personal use and this was interpreted with different levels of severity. The opprobrium attached to different types of smuggling varied. Day-shopper smuggling was considered one of the least serious offences. Custom officers generally displayed little enthusiasm for hunting down individuals bringing back a box of biscuits, both because calculating duty owed was tedious and the manner in which such purchases distorted trade was limited. Transporting small household items such as tea, soap, bread, meat and butter under one’s overcoat was viewed as ‘harmless barter’ by most (McGuinness, 1999). Smuggling across the Irish border may have been seen as more ‘legitimate’ than in most other peripheral European regions. It was not seen as especially criminal and smugglers were neither isolated nor ostracized. Despite otherwise deep historical divisions, it was even a cross-community activity (Leontidou, Afouxenidis, Donnan et al, 2004). Examples of ‘smuggled’ goods were pigs, sheep, cattle, fuel, butter, sugar, sweets, eggs, biscuits, household fittings, cigarettes, alcohol, electrical goods, tea and bicycle tyres. The types of smuggling have gone up and down.

Observers of smuggling believe that small-scale, small-margin agricultural product smuggling is now small in scale and that most smuggling nowadays is carried out by gangs transporting fuel, alcohol and cigarettes (e.g. from eastern Europe), making substantial margins, causing substantial loss to state revenues on both sides of the border. Following the ceasefires, there have been accusations that paramilitary organizations have diversified into smuggling as a means of raising money for their organizations (O’Kelly, 2005).

As legitimate trade declined, the level of informal or illegitimate trade rose.

35 THE EMERALD CURTAIN

Clarke (2002) describes cross-border smuggling as being ’a long tradition’, a view formally supported by the Minister for Agriculture Joe Walsh. Early smuggling was in pigs and cigarettes and became quickly embedded in the folklore, to the extent that children would play ‘customs and smugglers’ rather than ‘cowboys and indians’ (O’Connor, 2004). The European Union brought fresh impetus to smuggling, for it was relatively easy to fake movements for purposes of ‘exporting’ and re-exporting goods from one jurisdiction to another, such as livestock, grain and tomatoes. Animal smuggling has, with improved policing arising from the foot-and-mouth epidemic, declined sharply in recent years.

In the Oireachtas, Senator Terry Leyden (FF) claimed that illegal organizations were washing diesel and supplying it to cowboy operators at a cost to the exchequer of €20m a year in foregone revenue. According to him, ‘instead of dipping the fuel tanks of small farmers at marts in Roscommon, the Revenue Commissioners would be better off investigating operations in the border counties’.2 The senator was, when asked, unable to explain how he calculated the figure of €20m.

At the heart of the matter, people in the border counties were slow to condemn their fellow citizens for taking advantage of local differentials arising from a border that they had never asked for. Ineffective policing of animal movements became evident in 2001 when foot and mouth spread into the Republic. The level, quantification and measurement of smuggling remains poor. While smuggling by nature evades detection, this does not account for the low level of effort to assess the problem. Part of the problem is that no one body appears to have an overall responsibility in the area. Despite having the will to impose custom barriers, the Free State devoted much less effort to control illegal trade. McGeeney (1999) recalls the smuggling of pigs along small border lanes not only as regular, but being done with impunity by double-trailered tiered transports.

In 1932, Fianna Fail came to power, pledged to develop domestic industry through the imposition of tariffs on imported goods. Protectionist policies were widespread throughout the developed world in the 1930s, but their vigourous adoption by the Free State from 1932 required reinforced policing by custom posts established all along the border. The opposition Cumann na nGaedheal party charged Fianna Fail with imposing the very partition that it claimed to oppose. In a further irony, several of the new protected industries were located close to the border (e.g. in Dundalk, Co Louth). The economic war of the 1930s seems to have had important effects in isolating the Free State’s economy not just from Great Britain but from Northern Ireland as well. Former Taoiseach

2 Seanad Eireann, Debates, 3rd June 2004, 1556

36 John Bruton has drawn attention to the effect of the economic war on the border and in deepening partition (McGarry, 2004). To give one specific example, the economic war brought to an abrupt end the export of sheep from north-east Donegal to Derry and on to England and badly affected trade in other areas, such as meat and fish (Bowden, Carton & Ni Dhuibhne, 2001).

Protectionism was reduced following the Anglo-Irish agreement of 1938, though the second world war introduced a fresh set of distortionary impacts, as goods in short supply in the wartime north (e.g. butter, sugar) were brought in, legally and illegally, from the agriculturally better endowed south. Smuggling intensified during the second world war (Bowden, Carton & Ni Dhuibhne, 2001). Butter and eggs went north; tea, cigarettes and flour went south. So did machinery, tractors and fertilizer to avoid duties.

In Donegal, people crossed the border to shop for cheaper shoes and clothes. Many wore newly-bought clothes under their old clothes on their way back, not just for themselves but other members of the family and could be quite heavily dressed in summertime. Donegal people smuggled items to Derry and posted them there to relatives in Great Britain, sending goods unobtainable there, especially butter, nylons, cigarette lighters and watches. There is some suggestion that smugglers made the task of the male customs officers harder by having women and children do most of the smuggling. Getting through the customs created a folklore of daring, fear and adventure (Bowden, Carton & Ni Dhuibhne, 2001).

In the 1960s, pigs went north for better prices. Under Britain’s system of food subsidies, butter was much cheaper in the north, so it was smuggled south. Tariffs substantially reduced following the Anglo-Irish trade agreement of 1965. Most inter-country trade barriers were removed in 1973 when both Britain and Ireland simultaneously entered the European Communities. Despite this, it was still required that all trade movements between Ireland and the United Kingdom be declared, monitored, documented, filed, recorded, inspected and policed. From 1986 to 1992, the European Union issued 300 directives to eliminate transnational barriers in advance of the single market. The scope for national variations still remained, though, for responsibility for implementing the directives rested with national administrations, giving scope for variations and even ineffective transposition of the new laws. The custom posts were removed on 1st January 1993, four months shy of 70 years of their introduction. By this stage, the full impact of more than sixty years of customs and associated regulations was now evident. By the time of the single market, the proportion of the Republic’s exports going north had fallen to 2% of total exports; while only 15% of Northern Ireland exports went south. The customs almost severed the trade between both parts of the island. Donnan (1999)

THE EMERALD CURTAIN noted how the two economies of north and south became so separated from one another that southern businesses traded into the north through Great Britain and northern businesses did the same, despite the absurdity of such long lines of supply.

3.3 Impact on commerce

The distortion of trade resulting from custom barriers is often difficult to separate from other differences that arise across borders. European cross- border studies suggest that border regions display complex interactions of customs, regulatory régimes, prices, development and practices in trade and commerce. These interrelationships should be borne in mind in what follows.

Custom barriers were quickly exacerbated by price differentials and these were evident to the Boundary Commission before 1925. The price of goods in southern border counties rose, attracting shoppers and traders away from retailers there and toward northern shopping destinations. Shoppers and traders were, for the first fifty years of the border, able to compare prices objectively because of the common currency.

Britain and Ireland operated a common currency, sterling, from 1823 to 13th March 1979. On that date Ireland joined the European system for the maintenance of the different European currencies within a common band, the European Monetary System, ‘the snake’. Britain did not join, meaning that the Irish pound was unlinked from sterling. Subsequent currency variations could be volatile and most cross-border traders were not in a position to hedge against currency changes. Although the Irish pound tended to stabilize around 80% of the value of sterling, it occasionally sank lower (77%) and twice soared briefly far above parity (110%). In 1996, Ireland took the decision to enter the Eurozone even if Britain did not and in 2002, the sterling/Irish pound barrier was replaced by one of sterling and the euro (during the brief transition period, three currencies were in circulation in the border counties: euro, Irish pound, sterling pound). Since then, the different exchange rates have been generally quite stable.

Current price differentials are most obvious in the case of furniture, clothes, magazines and milk. Some of the differentials can be quite subtle. For example petrol is cheaper in the south, but home heating oil is cheaper in the north. Some commentators point out that the perception of goods being cheaper in the other jurisdiction can often be stronger than the reality and that price gains from cross-border shopping are, once time and travel costs are taken into account, quite marginal. There is a consciousness that the maximum VAT rate in Northern Ireland is 17%, compared to 21% in the Republic and for some significant purchases, 4% can make a worthwhile difference. 38 A snapshot of the level of cross-border shopping is available in the late 1980s (Harrison, 1990), using research by FitzGerald, 1988). At that time, almost all the cross-border shopping trade was northward. Cross-border shopping in Northern Ireland was estimated then to account for 2% of all consumer spending by the citizens of the Republic and 6% of all consumer spending within Northern Ireland. Southerners spent IR£200m a year in the north, a significant amount for a depressed economy. This compared to northerners spending IR£7m in the south, mainly on clothing, the only item then cheaper in the south. These figures excluded a substantial portion of smuggled goods going southward (televisions and spirits being the smuggled goods of choice at the time). At that time, it was estimated that residents of the southern border counties bought two-thirds of their petrol, two-thirds of their consumer durables and all alcohol in Northern Ireland. Newry probably benefited more than any other single town. Cross-border shopping represented 10% of all household spending in the southern border counties. The loss to the exchequer of documented cross-border shopping alone was in the order of £100m. The level of southern shopping - not just from these counties, but from much further south - reached such levels that the government intervened, prohibiting southerners from bringing goods back in unless they spent 48hr or more outside the jurisdiction or face penal taxation. This brought coach trips for shopping to an immediate end, halted southern shopping for electrical appliances and turned thousands of otherwise law-abiding citizens into petty smugglers (Donnan, 1999). The restrictions were later removed by the European Union.

The break with sterling presented a number of knock-on banking problems. The Central Bank required residents of the Republic to close bank accounts outside the jurisdiction. These became ‘off-shore’ accounts. This hit traders and shoppers who had, for convenience, held accounts in both jurisdictions as well as some small savers who had traditionally used banking services on both sides of the border. Some Donegal people expressed puzzlement as to how Strabane post office could be regarded as ‘offshore’ when the state still claimed jurisdiction over it. The break with sterling had the effect of increasing banking costs and introduced an additional inconvenience level associated with moving money. Many years later, small savers were pursued by the Revenue Commissioners for tax, interest and penalties on their cross-border accounts.

The Revenue Commissioners in the Republic do now track price differentials between north and south. In 2004, the Minister for Finance published details of price differences in the areas of drink, tobacco and oil. At the prevailing rate of exchange at the time, this found relatively small differences in drink, larger differences with cigarettes (dearer in the north), petrol (much more expensive in the north) and home heating oil (considerably more expensive in the Republic)3.

3 Dail Eireann, Debates, 28th October 2004, 585-6

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3.4 Impact of regulation

The customs were the first of a series of regulatory barriers that distorted cross- border trade. From early on until the late 1960s, crossing the border by car was a slow and expensive process. Regular travellers could get a yearly pass book, but had to pay a bond for the privilege. The custom post closed at midnight, though it was possible to arrange to cross the border at a specified prearranged time later in the night (this cost extra). Forms had to be filled, with entry and exit properly stamped, a process that could lead to long queues. To import and export goods legally required the presentation of triplicate forms on both sides of the border (different ones on each), forms obtainable at various offices but not at the border itself. The process was quite bureaucratic and goods could be refused if not very precisely described (McCracken, 1999). Sometimes the same goods had to be described differently to suit the idiosyncrasies of the two different systems of customs categorization. As late as 1967, motorists crossing the border must present a triplicate form for stamping (McCracken, 2004). Hauliers who reached the border too late had to sleep in their trucks overnight or abandon their vehicles and return later (McGinn, 1999). With such disincentives to legal trading, it is little wonder that there was so much smuggling.

The border cut 1,400 agricultural holdings (O’Dowd). Neither administration recognized the concept of the cross-border farmer, who were and are faced with the bureaucratic burden of dealing with two different jurisdictions. Neither, later, did the European Union which insists that cross-border farms must be farmed as more than one unit. The border inevitably forced a consolidation of farms on one side or the other. Many, though, persisted in holding and buying land on both sides. The regulatory régimes governing the movement of livestock meant that moving animals within the same farm but across the border was illegal. For a southern farmer to exhibit an animal in an agricultural show in the north, the exhibitor must have the animal tested and quarantined both for entry and return if unsold. Although it is possible to sell animals on the other side of the border legally, there remains a formidable level of paperwork.

Because of differences in the tax régime between Ireland and Britain, cars are much cheaper in Northern Ireland. In the Republic, the bringing in of cars from outside the jurisdiction is strenuously regulated, so that it is difficult for southerners to take advantage of the tax difference illegally and unprofitable to do so legally. The Republic has successfully held out for its vehicle registration tax, despite ongoing legal disputes over the issue with the European Commission.

Cars are not the only area where regulation remains a dominant issue. In the case of some areas of economic activity, the importation of particular products 40 may not be illegal per se, but there are licensing procedures. Here, the licensing procedure may be slow or may lead to a refusal, so some traders may take a chance and bring the goods in regardless (e.g. ammonia, nitrates).

The imposition of customs across the border gave the impression of a Free State that was highly assertive and independent-minded in its economic policies. This was not universally the case, for the Free State and the Republic shadowed British economic policies quite closely. Until 1976, Irish budgets were timed to follow close on the British budgets, so that systems of direct and indirect taxation could be closely aligned (this sometimes slavish imitation extended even to the regulation of time, for Ireland matched the short-lived British experiment with daylight savings time in the 1960s). From the 1970s, both direct and indirect taxation rates diverged between Britain and Ireland. Although divergence in direct taxation appeared to have little effect on trade or labour market movements, this was not true of indirect taxation. Here, differences are quite evident, for Value Added Tax is 17% in the UK, 21% in the Republic, enough to affect trade in particular commodities.

Price distortions resulting from a combination of currency levels and taxation have been most obvious in such areas as food products, drink, cigarettes and petrol. The last is the one that has seen the longest seesaw of variation over the years. Depending on the relative prices, petrol stations have flourished on one side of the border, only to close as stations have flourished on the other. At present, the consumer’s advantage lies in the south, where petrol is over 20% cheaper. This arises not from currency fluctuations, but taxation. The British government imposes a high duty on petrol in preference to a higher level of car tax. Intriguingly, harmonization of VAT and excise rates was an integral part of the Commission’s single market agenda. The Commission proposed that VAT operate within defined bands and proposed fixing single excise rates for alcohol, cigarettes, petrol, diesel and home heating oil (Harrison, 1989).

Even after the completion of the single market, regulation continues to the patterns of cross-border trade and commerce. InterTrade Ireland, for example, has noted the continuing effects of differences in employment law; the lack of commonality in patents and their registration; and the subcontracting complexities for northern contractors working in the southern market. These are just a few. Even where regulation has gone, some parts of the private sector are still remarkably slow to adjust to the single market. For example, some northern furniture traders will not accept purchases from or deliver in the south.

Some of the costs of regulation were eliminated when the single market was introduced and customs personnel were redeployed. The cost of cross-border policing can still be expensive.

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It is estimated that the cost of policing the border against mad cow disease in 1996 was IR£16m. The cost of deploying an extra 800 gardai was £2m a month (Anderson & Bort, 1999). The cost of policing associated with foot-and-mouth in 2001 was, presumably, higher still. Clarke (2001) notes that the numbers of police and soldiers deployed to guard the border ran into thousands.

Divergent regulatory régimes have the potential to create new forms of partition - or to avoid them. New global technologies should provide an opportunity for innovation to cross frontiers seamlessly. This did not happen in Ireland, as was evident in the study of telecom technologies by Murtagh, Keating, Bergin, Harper, McParland & Farid (2001). They illustrated how border communities faced practical problems in making mobile phone calls across borders. An enormously complex, untransparent and costly matrix of cross-border charges emerged. A joint report by Ofreg and ComReg found in 2005 that the incompatibility of mobile phone systems imposed significant problems and high roaming costs on users (although some companies can now offer all island arrangements for some customers). The Federation of Small Business described the cost of cross-border mobile calls as a financial headache and appealed for a a system of all-island tariffs to be introduced (Coyle, 2005). Similarly, in broadband, the two jurisdictions followed different philosophies and approaches in delivering this technology to the region.

3.5 Impact on regional development

As we have noted, the border cut towns and markets off from their natural hinterlands, a problem which the Boundary Commission anticipated and which, for all its faults, it did try to address. This process of economic amputation led to a long-term decline of the region, on both sides of the border. European studies suggest that fresh borders can have a double effect: first, uneven development compared on one side compared to the other; and second, a neglect of a peripheral border region by its central government.

The Irish border was no exception. Such a differential became quite evident in the course of the 1960s. As one southern informant put it:

The difference between the two sides was very visible You could see the difference in the land: northern farmers had subsidies, southern farmers did not. Northern roads were better, the economy was better.

Indeed, northern unionists were quick to point the backwardness of the Free State and then the Republic. This was visibly evident the moment one crossed the frontier.

42 Transport was the first casualty of the peripheralization of the border counties, on both sides. The border cut no less than 1,280 roads and lanes (O’Dowd). From their introduction in 1834, railways had been constructed with a view to serving the entire island (indeed, the Irish gauge remains unique in the northern hemisphere). No less than twenty railway lines crossed the border in 1922. From partition, railways were gradually pruned back and were cut back in reference not to the island pattern but their two sub-national hubs, Dublin and Belfast. As late as 1957, there were still four cross border railway routes: - Dublin to Derry, via Dundalk, Clones, Enniskillen and Omagh; - Enniskillen and Omagh to Ballyshannon and Bundoran; - Enniskillen to Sligo; - Clones and Monaghan to Armagh and Portadown.

Source: Mac Aongusa (‘The Harcourt Street Line’ - Back on Track)

Light railways also ran from Strabane to Letterkenny, Stranorlar, Ballyshannon, Donegal and Killybegs. The Belturbet to Ballinamore and Arigna line also

43 THE EMERALD CURTAIN intersected the border. All but one of the cross-border railways were closed in the 1950s, only the Dublin - Belfast corridor route surviving. Had the border not existed, it is possible that more cross-border routes might have remained open (e.g. Cavan – Enniskillen - Donegal, Dublin – Monaghan – Derry).

Even those towns on the periphery of the border were poorly served. The quality of the Belfast to Derry rail line deteriorated to the point that it became an object of ridicule. The withdrawal of rail services was not matched by an equivalent investment in their much touted replacement, bus services. Ballybay, for example, has no public bus service and only one private service a day.

There is general agreement that without the border, the pattern of road development would have been quite different. Matching the investment in motorways during the MacMillan, Douglas Home and Wilson governments in Britain, Northern Ireland governments spent considerable sums on road and motorway development in the 1960s. The resulting roads spread out from Belfast without recognition for island connections as a whole. The M1 motorway was routed west to Dungannon, rather than south, toward Dublin, a point which did not go unnoticed by northern nationalists. Until direct rule in 1972, few road signposts in the north even gave southern destinations, on the political assumption that no one would wish to go there.

Railways and roads were not the only example of an increasing peripheralization of the border counties. In the south, observers have been critical of the manner in which the governments of the Republic, in their view, failed to invest in the area. They cite: - The lack of foreign direct investment; - Health services, Monaghan Hospital being the prime example; - Tourism, where Donegal and Sligo are promoted but not Louth, Monaghan, Cavan or Leitrim, despite their many natural attributes; - Education, with the dearth of third level facilities in Monaghan, Cavan and Leitrim.

The level of foreign direct investment in the region appears to be low. There is a perception that it is acceptable to let the counties rely on their own small and medium-size industries. The proportion of Industrial Development Authority (IDA) - supported jobs in its border region accounts for between 7.2% and 10.3% of all jobs backed nationally 1997-2003, slightly less than the share of population for the area (11%). Within the border counties, though, some appear to fare badly. For the years 2000, 2002 and 2003, the IDA was unable to award any grant aid at all to companies in Monaghan, the only county in the country to find itself in such a situation.4

44 Border counties feel that they have not been good at attracting state facilities. In the region, only limited numbers of civil service staff have been devolved to Monaghan (e.g. a hundred Department of Agriculture staff to Ballybay, Co Monaghan). These assignments were not popular: civil servants appeared to be reluctant to come there and tried to minimize their time there. Two small state agencies were designated for Monaghan in the 2003 decentralization, Comhairle and the Combat Poverty Agency. Officials were reluctant to move there, only four being prepared to go to Monaghan and 16 to Carrickmacross.5

There is criticism of the failure to promote tourism in the central border counties. Critics feel that only Donegal and some limited projects, such as the North West Passage are promoted, despite the fact that the whole area has many attributes. The central border counties are grouped with North West Tourism and the view is taken that Donegal and Sligo are promoted at their expense. The border counties have many attractions to offer by way of tourism, culture, archaeology and language. People in the area have prospective projects, such as ecosystems, fishing, boating, outdoor pursuits, historic buildings, interpretative centres, the plantation forts, or the border gatherings that have proved so successful on the Scotland-England border. They welcome projects to improve the waterways, but regard them as of limited value if the waterborne visitors cannot be persuaded to stay in the area. Local people feel that have much to offer but that they are not consulted. Governments tend to think too big - tax breaks for the big houses - when smaller, local projects have much to offer. Such criticisms are far from anecdotal. That this is a policy problem became evident during the 2000-6 programming period of the structural funds, when Bord Failte offered grants for tourism projects able to attract 100,000 visitors or more. The deputy for Cavan Monaghan, Paudge Connolly, pointed out that Cavan and Monaghan had many worthy tourism projects, but none capable of attracting such large numbers. As a result, the two counties were effectively ruled out of the programme.6

In education, the extremes of the southern border counties were provided with institutes of technology (Letterkenny, Sligo and Dundalk), but not the large central area. There was little educational stimulus for the people of Cavan, Leitrim or Monaghan. Matching the investment in roads, Northern Ireland benefited from the educational reforms and expansion introduced in third level in Britain following the Robbins report (1963). But here, peripheralization once again influenced decisions and instead of siting the second university in Northern Ireland in Derry, close to the border, the decision was taken to build it in Coleraine instead.

4 Dail Eireann, Debates, 19th October 2004, 1093-4 5 Dail Eireann, Debates, 24th February 2004, 1537-8 6 Dail Eireann, Debates, 26th February 2004, 106-9

45 THE EMERALD CURTAIN

Another aspect of peripheralization is the failure to invest in public services. Not only has there been underinvestment in health services, but the services remaining have been reduced. This is especially evident in the case of Monaghan Hospital in the Republic, matched by a comparable situation in Omagh, Co Tyrone in the north. In the area of local government, there is a perception that the counties have not received their fair level of investment. The recent INTERREG and PEACE programmes are believed to have substituted for resources that would otherwise have been provided through normal local government channels in such areas as minor roads, leisure facilities, sewerage and landscaping. Here, mainstream funds were proportionately reduced, leaving the southern border counties in a neutral situation, even though their needs were greater.

The SEUPB (2003) provides an up to date assessment of the peripheralization of the region. This is worth noting, for such assessments are rarely to be found at government level. The border has, it says: • Constrained economic activity. ‘It remains a social and psychological barrier which is an impediment to the exchange of ideas and information and a barrier to effective cooperation and the development of effective local policies and strategies’; • Exacerbated fundamental problems of economic disadvantage and rurality; • Distorted and disrupted transport networks, adversely affecting the area’s competitiveness as a business location; • Held back the growth of new firms; • Made the region peripheral to the national education and training system, leaving it with a lack of high level skills.

The SEUPB built on earlier analyses of peripheralization. Dowd, Corrigan and Moore (1994) said this: ‘[The border region] lacks good access to markets, centres of innovation and large centres of population, unlike central border regions of the European Union. It has few large towns which might provide a focus for development’. Stutt (1996) makes the case that the Irish border regions remain, even after the introduction of the single market, ‘an area of especial difficulty’. Hamilton (2001), in his economic analysis, came to the conclusion that the border had had a ‘significant and damaging’ impact on the island’s economy. It had inhibited a coherent spatial development strategy, left the border region underdeveloped and led to a level of north-south trade that was well below what might be expected from two contiguous economies.

In their study of the river Blackwater catchment area, Brady, Shipman, Martin; Kirk, McClure, Morton & Minnock Barron (1997) developed the theory of peripheralization at a more local level. They observed how the border created

46 ‘a sense of isolation, truncating natural economic markets. They noted that the three counties of the catchment area (Armagh, Tyrone and Monaghan, 72% in the north) had similar economic characteristics, the dominant one being small farm size, with a declining elderly population. This created a rural poverty that was demoralizing, economically draining, leaving the community with low or declining expectations, few role models to encourage participation in third level education, a reduced ability to attract new economic activity or to diversity production. They observed that although the Blackwater area lies almost equidistantly to the two seats of political power in Ireland and not far from either, its people have been disempowered by their economic circumstances.

3.6 Impact on civil society and politics

The border was an immediate shock to civil society in the border counties. Nationalists of course strongly resented the border for political reasons, as did southern Unionists. But for most people living in the border counties, regardless of politics, the arrival of the border, fortified by custom barriers, was met with disbelief. Older people had a sense of not just inconvenience, but the loss of a more coherent borderless world. Attitudes to the border came to define one’s politics, one’s world. There was a sense of amputation, truncation, one subsequently reflected in the literature of the area (e.g. Kiely).

Yet, despite the rupture which the border brought to cross-border and north- south trade and personal relationships, some north - south relationships survived remarkably intact. Although religion had a close relationship to the political division of the island, none of the churches divided in 1921. Not only the catholic church, but the protestant churches, continued to operate and meet on an all-island basis, their organizational structures taking little or no account of the border. Even though the majority of the Church of Ireland’s members were in the north, its diocesan boundaries weaved in and out of the border and its clergymen and later women continued to train in Dublin. The Rev Ian Paisley’s Free Presbyterian Church, founded by one of the most long-standing leaders of unionism, functioned across the border and has three churches in the Republic.

Sporting associations continued to function on an all-Ireland basis - not just the nationalist sports, such as the Gaelic Athletic Association - but also rugby football and others more associated with a unionist tradition. Most national youth organizations remained all-Ireland bodies. All-Ireland operation remained a feature in several specific areas (e.g. Royal National Lifeboats of Ireland). Some UK-wide associations continued almost unaffected by the border, especially in the area of trade unionism (e.g. ATGWU, NUJ) and some charitable organizations (e.g. Barnardos). Many professional associations

THE EMERALD CURTAIN retained an all-Ireland character. The Royal Irish Academy, founded in the 18th century, remained the primary association for academics, embracing all the universities in the island. The banking system survived partition largely intact, the Bank of Ireland, Allied Irish Banks (First Trust) and Ulster Bank remaining dominant banks in both parts of the island.

There is a belief that social and political capital in all the border counties have been weakened as a result of the peripheralization of the region. Potential leaders of the community have tended to leave, rather than act as spokesperson and the voice of their counties and the region. The lack of ministerial appointments is believed to be a reason for the neglect of the region, but there is little evidence to support the widely-held belief that Cavan- Monaghan has always been overlooked for ministerial appointments. To the contrary, there are very few periods when the constituency has not been represented in government and many leading government ministers (not to mention the Tanaiste and President) were drawn from the constituency (e.g. Ernest Blythe, Patrick Smith, James Dillon, Erskine Childers, Tom Fitzpatrick, John Wilson, Rory O’Hanlon). Whatever the merits of this argument, the deputies and senators from the region do not act as a visible, identifiable block, although they do cooperate for the good of all their constituencies behind the scenes.

Many informants characterized the political system of the region as too static and very dynastic. There is little room for new entrants in the two main political parties. Women are put off by the largely male nature of local councils. Younger informants consider politics as unattractive because of the perceived level of corruption. In recent years, spokespersons have emerged to challenge the peripheralization of the region. Independent hospital candidates have been elected in both northern and southern elections. There is a widespread popular belief that this preparedness to vote for representatives outside the political mainstream has contributed to the region’s economic and social neglect. There is a popular belief in north Monaghan that it is being ‘punished’ (a term frequently used) for having elected a Sinn Fein deputy and then an independent hospital candidate.

3.7 Impact on social policy

Although the economic effect of the border was evident immediately, the effects on social policy became evident more slowly.

It was in education where they became most apparent first. It was inevitable that the different regulatory and administrative régimes would accentuate whatever differences existed between north and south and these would be most closely felt the nearer to the border. Education systems drifted quickly 48 apart as the Free State and Republic introduced a different system of educational qualifications (intermediate and leaving certificate) and compulsory Irish. Patterns of access to education likewise differed, the north following British educational reform (albeit selectively), the south matching these developments some time later. In the border counties, these divisions became acutely apparent for the Presbyterian Church, which ran its primary schools on both sides of the border. One unfortunate early teacher had to run different curricula and exams for two jurisdictions simultaneously (although, in an additional twist, was denied payment for his teaching in the south because of his lack of knowledge of Irish) (Rodgers, 1999). Also in education, an early difference arose in the case of residential institutions for young people. In the 1920s, Northern Ireland followed the practice in Great Britain of closing these institutions, while the numbers placed in them were still rising in the Free State.

The social policies of both jurisdictions in the 1920s and the 1930s were broadly similar. The social development paths of Northern Ireland and the Republic diverged after the second world war. The government of the Republic did not follow the path of the welfare state set down by the post-war British Labour government. The Irish Labour Party made a valiant effort to ensure that it would, the inter-party government adopting a white paper to this effect in 1949. This project was abandoned: the Republic never established a national health service and its welfare provision was a pale and less generous imitation of services developed in Britain. As a result, social policy and administration in both parts of the island diverged. By the 1960s, a gap between the two welfare systems was very visible, the northern system being more comprehensive in nature and more generous in payment. Informants considered northern childcare to be superior in quality and availability.

Because of the common labour market, some areas of Irish and British welfare systems had a high level of interchangeability. Pension entitlements earned in Britain could be transferred to Ireland should the insured person move. The introduction of portability of welfare entitlements for insured workers by the European Union (directive 1408/71) thus had limited impact in Ireland, where such a system was already in place with Britain. The arrangement was by no means comprehensive. To give two examples, low-income parents resident in the north who placed their children in childcare in the south were likely to lose their childcare income support, while childcare training qualifications obtained in one jurisdiction were not necessarily recognized in the other.

The community and voluntary sectors in both parts of the island increasingly reflected these differences. Although some pre-1920 voluntary organizations in the social field continued to operate on an all-island basis (e.g. Society of St Vincent de Paul), they were a small minority. Most present voluntary organizations began to develop from the 1960s onward, by which time

49 THE EMERALD CURTAIN administrative differences between the two jurisdictions had become well entrenched. New voluntary organizations in Northern Ireland saw no purpose in belonging to all-island voluntary organizations relating largely to the particular administrative and political systems in operation in the Republic and vice versa. New voluntary organizations in Northern Ireland were either specific to Northern Ireland or else, quite likely, a local branch of a UK-wide body. New voluntary organizations in the Republic liked to see themselves as home-grown and not beholden to their former colonial masters, though there were some exceptions (e.g. Simon Community).

By the end of the 20th century, the two voluntary sectors had gone largely down two separate paths, reflecting the divergences in social policy of the two states. The differences were amplified in some sectors: even sign language was different between north and south. Until the development of structured programmes of cross-border cooperation, there was little cooperation between the two voluntary and community sectors, either on a north-south basis or across the border. The cultural impact of the border was evident in the study of local history societies undertaken by Prunty, Gillespie and Mulryan-Moloney (2001). They found that although there were many flourishing local history societies along the border and in both jurisdictions, there was a lack of good communication across the border or between them.

The border had both a general and specific impact on health services. From 1948, with the introduction of the National Health Service in Britain, the people of Northern Ireland benefited from a universal health service. The Republic did not follow this route and today, the ‘universal’ part of its health service is limited to only 25% of the population, making a full system of interchangeability of entitlement impossible. Jamison, Butler, Clarke, McKee & O’Neill (2001) found that the border had damaging consequences for the development of health services in an already socially disadvantaged area. Had the border not existed, then health services might have developed in a more natural way around larger population centres. They cited as an example the manner in which neither north Donegal nor the northern part of the Western Health and Social Services area were able to form the critical mass necessary for a quality level of local health service: but that together, they might be able to attract combined resources much greater than the sum of their two parts. Lengthy ambulance journeys along the border put at risk patients who could be brought, more swiftly, across the border to a nearer hospital in the other jurisdiction. The southern border counties suffered a double disadvantage. Not only did they not benefit from economies of scale that might be possible in a cross- border service, but, being disadvantaged by the border and with higher levels of social deprivation, they required a higher level of accompanying health investment, something they did not receive in any case.

50 The level of mobility in health services has been limited to defined areas and was largely dependant on inter-governmental cooperation. Following the Anglo- Irish agreement in 1985, arrangements were made for patients in the North Western Health Board area to attend services in Derry and Belfast and these were followed by other purchasing arrangements for hospitals in Newry and elsewhere. Almost all the traffic has been northward (Birrell, 1998). Between 1,300 and 1,400 southern patients go north each year while about 900 northerners are treated in the Republic. Southerners travel north for private dental care, both because of the virtual absence of a public service in the Republic and because it was cheaper in the north. The levels of patient flow between the Republic and Northern Ireland approximate to the European norm (0.2%), which is quite low.

Staying with social policy, people living close to the border took advantage of changes in regulatory régimes and provision in the area of leisure. Northerners travelled south for later pub opening hours, Sunday opening, recreational facilities open on a Sunday and leisure facilities less developed in the north (e.g. night clubs). In the other direction, southerners travelled north to use leisure centres (e.g. Monaghan to Armagh). From 2004, northerners travelled south for smoke-free pubs while southerners travelled north for pubs where smoking was still permitted.

3.8 Impact on the environment

The impact of the border on the environment has become apparent only in recent years. The primary focus is waste and this emerged as a significant problem in 2004. The illegal waste traffic appeared to take two forms: the sending of the Republic’s waste to Northern Ireland for landfill dumping there and the dumping of waste in the border counties where surveillance levels were considered low. The amount of waste produced in the Republic grew significantly in the course of the sustained celtic tiger boom. As the state’s landfill sites filled and the price of legal dumping grew, it became more attractive to dump illegally or to export waste. The amount of illegally disposed waste was estimated to be between 500,000 and 750,000 tonnes a year. In an investigation, the Irish Times recorded the illegal dumping of southern border waste in the southern border counties, normally by the use of excavators on poor quality farm land late at night. Up to a dozen such sites were being investigated. Southern waste was also being legally exported as ‘recyclable’ waste, but then relabelled and disposed of as landfill, which is illegal but still far cheaper than disposal in the Republic (Reid, 2004). Several trucks were confiscated in Cootehill, Co Cavan and north of the border and some of the

7 Dail Eireann, Debates, 4th March 2004, 905 - 908

51 THE EMERALD CURTAIN trade had sinister overtones with gunmen involved (Reid, 2004; Murray, 2004).

In 2004, a task force was established, comprising the Environment Protection Agency, the Gardai, local authorities, the Environment and Heritage Service NI and the Police Service of Northern Ireland to address the problem of cross- border waste smuggling. The Minister for the Environment, Heritage and Local Government told the Dail that the government was taking an all-island approach to resolving some waste management issues.7 The Environmental Protection Agency was charged with assessing the scale of the problem, probably the first time that any official study had been made of illegal cross-border trading.

3.9 Impact on mobility and the labour force

The border had an immediate effect on trade, commerce and shopping patterns, as we have noted. The common labour market and the free movement of people were relatively unaffected by partition. The common labour market was strained during the Second World War, when controls and restrictions were imposed on Irish labour moving into Great Britain, but it was relaxed after the war. The Free State and subsequently the Republic’s government went to some effort to maintain the free movement of labour, people and passport-free travel. The maintenance of the common labour market and free travel area was an enduring principle of Anglo-Irish relations, a point stressed by many successive ministers for external affairs. Such access proved to be economically of great value during periods of emigration, principally the 1950s and 1980s. Although Ireland joined most intergovernmental systems within the European Union, Ireland maintained a steadfast line with Britain against the Schengen system of cross-border checks, refusing to join the Schengen system and other European measures in the area of justice and home affairs. Having said that, the maintenance of a common labour market had little to do with people crossing the border to work within the island of Ireland: rather, it had to do with Irish labour emigrating to Great Britain.

What about workers crossing the border within Ireland? Here, we make a decision between workers moving across the border to live and work on the other side (migrant workers, in European Union parlance) and those who commute daily from one side of the border to the other (‘frontier workers’ in European parlance).

Information on workers crossing the border is limited. The level of mobility was probably low at the time of the border and remained low until recent times. The issue was not studied systematically until the North-South Ministerial Council commissioned a Study on obstacles to mobility (Indecon & Price Waterhouse Coopers, 2002). The numbers of people crossing the jurisdiction to work on the other side in Ireland is considered low by European standards. 60% of the 52

people of Clones, Co Monaghan are believed to cross to Northern Ireland to work, but that is considered quite exceptional. The Northern Ireland government from time to time fretted about the problems of southern workers coming north to take ‘northern workers’ jobs’ and it is true that a number of skilled southern workers went to the shipyards and engineering industries when they were at their peak.

The level of migration across the Irish border is in the region of 2,000 to 3,000 persons a year each way. Until 1996, more people moved from the south to the north, but the pattern is now in the other direction. For both jurisdictions, cross- border inflows and outflows to the other are a small proportion of their overall flows (for most years, less than 10%).

Estimates on frontier workers suggest that the number of northern workers commuting to the south has risen from around 2,250 in the late 1990s to over 9,000 presently. Obstacles to mobility suggests that commuting is highest on the Letterkenny-Derry and Dundalk-Newry axes and weak in between. The number of southern workers commuting north is estimated at a steady 9,000, so the two flows are now roughly in balance. Study on obstacles to mobility found that there were still significant obstacles to cross-border mobility, perceived and real; low income groups were disproportionately hampered but that the obstacles on the Irish border were not unique in a European context. Cross-border movement had been impeded, over the years, by such factors as different levels of vehicle registration tax; differences in direct and indirect tax rates; eligibility for tax credits; differences in tax years; and much higher housing costs in the Republic. Survey work indicated that north-south movement is sensitive to such issues as taxation (direct and indirect), pensions, education and the availability of housing.

Student movement has generally been higher, facilitated by the long history of mutual recognition of university qualifications within the British Isles (this has been less true of vocational qualifications, where northern NVQ qualifications and southern NCEA qualifications were and are not mutually recognized). There was a long tradition of southern attendance in northern secondary schools in Derry, especially by east Donegal protestants. Some Monaghan protestants also went for secondary schooling in Armagh. This movement diminished following the introduction of ‘free’ education in the Republic in the late 1960s. There was a long tradition of northern students, not least those of the unionist persuasion, attending college in Dublin University (Trinity College) (indeed, James Craig represented the university in Dail Eireann for many years).

Attendance by third level students in institutions in the other part of the island has fluctuated in recent years. Northern attendance in the south fell following the outbreak of the conflict. When the European Union struck down the

53 THE EMERALD CURTAIN practice of charging differential fees to students from other member states, there was an upsurge in southern traffic northward. The number of southern students studying in the north rose from 1,700 to over 3,000, but this was later abruptly curtailed by the introduction of student fees in the north (Birrell, 1998). McGill & Morgan (2001) found prohibitive disincentives against southerners crossing the border to attend adult education courses in Northern Ireland. They cited as examples the Lottery, the Northern Ireland Arts Council and Proteus, who had to guarantee to the Department of Finance and Personnel that only people from within Northern Ireland would benefit from their training programmes. The number of northern students in southern educational institutions has fallen from 1,700 a year in the mid-1990s to about 1,000 at present, though the reasons for this are unclear.

3.10 Conclusions

This chapter has attempted to assess the peacetime impact of the border under a number of headings: trade, commerce, social policy, the environment, mobility, civil society.

The first peacetime effect of the border was to reduce trade between north and south to the point that it was eventually almost eliminated. A smuggling industry developed within months, ranging from personal smuggling to the large - scale movement of industrial goods without documentation. Trade and commerce were quickly affected by price and later currency differentials, sharply distorting patterns of shopping and retailing. Cross-border movements became subject to an ever more elaborate regulatory régime. Although the extent and focus of regulation has shifted over the years, the overall impact has, at least in some areas, tended to grow as the two states have developed along their separate paths. It is instructive to note, though, that most of these impacts followed decisions by the southern, rather than the northern government. Cross-border movement continues to be heavily regulated in certain areas, such as farming, car sales and chemicals.

Some impacts have diminished. Trade barriers were taken down when both states joined the European Communities in 1973 and when the single market was introduced twenty years later. Restrictions on personal travel were relaxed. Even still, different taxes and regulations continue to distort trade, commercial and personal relations. Mobile communications, designed to reduce barriers between people, created new forms of electronic partition in compatibility between systems, roaming arrangements and pricing.

The border had a medium and long term impact on the development of the region. This was evident in differential development along the border, the reorganization of transport networks around the two capitals of Dublin and 54 Belfast and the peripheralization of the southern border counties. Investment was made outside the area or on the edge of the area and this became most visible in foreign direct investment, health services and third level education. Peripheralization created a vicious cycle of economic and social decline.

The border eventually had a profound effect on social policy and this became enduring after the introduction of the welfare state in Britain. Those areas most affected were education, health policy, social security and the trajectories of voluntary sector development. New impacts of the border are evident in the area of the environment, where waste traffic has emerged as a significant issue.

In some areas of life, the effects of the border have been much less marked. In many ways, civil society was remarkably unaffected by the border. The common labour market remained in place. There continued to be a modest level of educational interchange.

The impacts of the border today reveal some contradictory outcomes. In some respects, integration is evident whilst in others continued partition is in evidence. Most informants believe that the border in Ireland has become much weaker in recent years. They cite the single European market, the associated removal of the customs barriers and the much reduced security presence (see next chapter). In chapters 7 and 8, we will look at theoretical paradigms for European border development and see how the Irish border fits in to these models.

The European Union integration is considered to be the factor that had made the biggest change. From 1973, agricultural subsidies improved the situation of southern farmers and from the 1980s infrastructural improvements followed. The single market removed the custom barriers. Indeed, some people suggest that the pattern of differential development is now flowing the other way. On the Dublin - Belfast motor route, the longest stretches of motorway are now in the south. Many northern agricultural businesses have been bought up and are managed by southern entrepreneurs. One of the purposes of the single European market was to promote economic integration across borders. Anderson & Goodman (1998) suggest that in the first five years since the introduction of the single market, there has been a spectacular level of private sector economic integration and rationalization in the island of Ireland, especially in agribusiness. They are critical that political integration has followed far behind economic integration. The value of north-south trade over 1993- 2000 rose from £1.118bn to £2.236bn. This process is not limited to the economy but extends to civil society. In their study of the voluntary and community sector in both parts of the island, Acheson, Harvey, Kearney and Williamson (2004) suggest that the European Union has prompted a certain convergence between them in their goals and methods.

55 THE EMERALD CURTAIN

56 Chapter 4 Impacts of the Conflict

THE EMERALD CURTAIN

The dreary spires and steeples of Fermanagh and Tyrone receded in the distance, the integrity of their ancient quarrel undiminished, as a greater conflagration now engulfed the continent of Europe. - Winston Churchill, 1914

In some popular minds, the border was a zone of conflict only for the period 1968-9 onward. In reality, its conflicted nature has been more long-lasting than contemporary impressions suggest. There was rising tension in the border counties from the moment partition was proposed and indeed police reports from 1914 suggest that border communities were close to civil war. Unrest was a feature of Northern Ireland throughout the 1920s and 1930s, while the IRA waged a border campaign in the 1950s and early 1960s. Even with the end of the conflict in the 1990s, the impact of the conflict will be felt for many years. In this chapter, we examine the social consequences of the conflict on the border communities, starting with the human costs (4.1), the financial and economic costs (4.2) and the fracturing of social connections (4.3). Note that specific impacts related to the focus groups that are the subject of this study will be left to the next chapters, chapters 5 and 6. The impact of the conflict is assessed in the light of reconstruction (4.4) before conclusions are drawn (4.5).

4.1 Human costs of violence

The recent troubles imposed a huge cost: in human lives (over 3,000 persons), injuries (between 30,000 and 50,000 persons) and financially (once estimated at €34.5bn). These costs were differential, falling heavily on particular parts of Northern Ireland, including the border regions. Studies have been carried out of the incidence of fatalities within Northern Ireland (Smyth & Fay, 1999). Belfast is, unsurprisingly, the part of Northern Ireland with the highest incidence of fatalities. District councils in northern border areas come a close second, as table 3 illustrates. Of the eight district councils with the highest levels of fatal violence above (1.5 deaths/1000), five are border districts:

Table 3: fatality rates in the northern border counties

Fatal incidents per 1,000

Belfast 4.94 Newry & Mourne 3.93 Dungannon 2.56 Derry 2.50 Armagh 2.50 Cookstown 2.11 Fermanagh 1.74 Strabane 1.64 58 Source: Adapted from: Fay, Marie-Therese; Morrissey, Mike & Smyth, Marie (1999): Northern Ireland’s troubles - the human costs. London, Pluto Press.

Violence affected not only Northern Ireland, but the Republic and Great Britain. In the Republic, the unresolved Monaghan bombing (1974) was part of the most violent day of the conflict. Several other southern border towns were also bombed (e.g. Belturbet, Co Cavan, December 1972; Dundalk, Co Louth, December 1975; Castleblayney, Co Monaghan, March 1976) and killings took place on the southern side of the border (e.g. Burnfoot, Co Donegal, January 1973; Sen Billy Fox, Monaghan, March 1974). These are only some of the incidents: violent events on the southern side of the border do not appear to have been as systematically documented as those within Northern Ireland itself.

Statistics on the impact of the conflict on the border counties do not tell the human side of the story. Here, the conflict had a profound impact. Many people knew someone who had been shot, or injured. Several informants told of incidents in which teachers had been shot in schools, or taken away from them and subsequently killed. One informant knew of a woman going out with an RUC man who was shot dead, ‘creating a climate in which people did not socialize with anyone’.

The violence led to withdrawal and isolation. A climate of fear enveloped the area. Some protestants had relatives in the British Army and people became reluctant to mix with them socially if that created problems. Many were afraid to travel, especially by night, ‘in case you met the wrong people’. The outbreak of the conflict had an immediate effect in the border counties. ‘There was some fear, especially at the time of the Arms Trial, of destablization and conflict, especially among the protestant people’. People wanted to distance themselves from the conflict. ‘Protestants would not express a political opinion’. Catholics took down old pictures of Pearse, in case they were represented as extreme Republicans. Some people were reluctant to express themselves in Irish and played down their activities in the GAA, in case this be taken as a political statement. One informant told the research:

‘Before the conflict, people travelled across the border a lot and people took holidays on either side of the border. After 1969, all that stopped. There was a sense of decline in the county. Young people left and the county became ever more elderly. Shops closed. People didn’t want to come here any more’.

This withdrawal was evident at a more collective level. A case in point was the fatal bombing in Belturbet, Co Cavan documented recently by Shannonside FM in its documentary ‘The Forgotten Bomb’. No one was arrested or convicted for

59 THE EMERALD CURTAIN this bombing, nor any of the other bombings in the Republic, so the details of the crime never reached court. What was the most harrowing part of the documentary was to listen to the fate of the families of those who had been killed by the bombs. The gardai never reported to them a conclusion about their investigation. Social or health services were not extended to help them. While neighbours sympathized, they were invited to move on and best let the events be wiped from the community’s collective memory. By contrast, the period after the ceasefires saw the introduction of services for victims of the conflict and trauma in Northern Ireland, but there was no equivalent response in the Republic.

During the conflict, relationships between protestants and their catholic neighbours ranged from polite to good. Neighbourly help was always provided from one to the other and in return. But there was always a standing convention of ‘don’t talk about the war’, even when terrible events took place.

Connections to the protestant community in the north presented particular problems. Many would know people in the security forces in the north, but they could never refer to this publicly. Members of the forces in the north could never visit their relatives south of the border, for fear of ambush. Many knew people who died in the conflict, mainly Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC). The recent troubles were much more severe than the border campaign for the protestant community. Quite a number of protestants joined the B specials during the 1956-62 border campaign and would cycle over for duty on Saturdays. During the present troubles, this was not the case, for the specials and subsequent security forces which southerners might join became a priority IRA target.

For most of the conflict, the Irish border was the most militarized area of the European Union and the most militarized part of Europe west of the Berlin wall and the iron curtain. In the early 1970s, the British Army began to install watch- towers, bases and fortified checkpoints all along the northern side of the border (O’Dowd). These were visible and intrusive, although some military experts questioned the military value of this ‘crusader castle’ approach.

The watch towers on the northern side of the border and the seemingly constant buzzing around of military helicopters made many people feel uneasy. Most local residents found the checkpoints intimidating, with guns pointed right into people’s cars, with the danger that they could easily go off. In some places, the British Army made repeated incursions over the border either on foot or by helicopter and there were reports of a snatch squad at work. Cattle were shot at from the air and sometimes even people. Another informant living on the border: Remarked,

60 ‘There was lots of undercover stuff around here. Soldiers would appear out of nowhere, with no markings or unit identification. You could be stopped anywhere all of a sudden, out on the roads or farming. They would know who you were and all about you and would quiz you about your neighbours. The whole experience was very unnerving. The Ulster Defence Regiment was especially problematical. You could identify them in advance by their uniforms and their hairstyles. They always gave local people a hard time, with niggling or even insulting remarks. And if you didn’t ignore it, you could spend an overnight in the nearest barracks’.

The climate was fearful and even ugly. Several people recalled the worst periods of the conflict. Events that should have been limited to mourning turned into intimidation when men in black outfits ordered businesses to close for funerals or commemorations, especially at the time of the hunger strikes. One informant: ‘People were too scared to stand up to this’. They later regretted not having stood against intimidation.

The cratering of roads seem to have had a punitive effect on the border communities. The only people on whom it seems to have had little effect were the very people it was designed to impede - the paramilitary organizations. Both the IRA and loyalist military groups continued to operate across the border with impunity.

4.2 Financial and economic costs of the conflict on the border communities

Some estimates have now been made of the financial costs of the conflict. Considerable financial costs were imposed on the British and Irish exchequers. Tomlinson (2004) estimates the direct costs over the 1968-93 period as being in the order of UK£23.5bn (€34.5bn), of which 80.5% fell in Northern Ireland itself, 12% in the Republic and 7.5% in Great Britain. For the Republic, 12% is UK£2.82bn or €4bn. The European Commission (1994), quoting DKM (1994) estimated costs in the order of £350m each year to the UK government and £120m a year to the Irish government. The Commission took the view that the indirect costs in depressing economic development could not be calculated, but Bradley (1996) quotes a figure for the indirect costs (e.g. foreign investment and tourism foregone) as £365 per person a year in the north and £225 per person a year in the south.

Both jurisdictions experienced a loss of investment due to image of Ireland as a violent place. Northern Ireland suffered much more so. In the area of foreign direct investment, Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland attracted similar levels of investment from 1960 to 1970, the north being slightly more

THE EMERALD CURTAIN successful. From 1971, the pattern diverged to the extent that by 1990, the Republic was attracting four times more. Whilst economic factors and the skills of the respective promotion agencies played their part, the conflict made it very difficult for Northern Ireland to attract any investment (Anderson & Goodman, 1997). Tomlinson (2004) estimates that up to 45,000 manufacturing jobs were lost in the north. He points out that many of the social and economic costs arose less from direct destruction than a failure to develop.

The failure to develop was a feature of southern border counties: with their border with Northern Ireland, they may have been seen as ‘too close to the conflict’. Such proximity may have been, in the eyes of those responsible for promoting foreign direct investment, a disincentive. The SEUPB (2003), in its assessment of the impact of the border, attributes to the conflict a continuing shadow of influence. ‘Economic renewal’, it says, ‘requires the emergence of new economic activity through new starts, expansions or inward investment. The conflict has made the border corridor in particular an area of perceived instability and this will not have encouraged inward investment’. Even in 2004, InterTrade Ireland noted that the conflict still exerted a small, residual influence, making southern traders reluctant to do business in Northern Ireland.

The outbreak of the conflict led to a general downturn. Although border towns were most affected, towns further south also suffered. The main economic effects that people noticed were: - Closure of traditional industries and plants; - Decline in economic activity, with the closure of shops and small businesses (e.g. drapery); - A decline in social life; - Long-term outmigration; - People taking week jobs in Dublin, as evidenced by weekend bus traffic.

Even Ballybay, for example, some distance from the border, saw the number of pubs halve during the conflict from 27 to 13. Land fell into disuse. Farmhouses were abandoned and cattle no longer grazed there. The border became a dead, depopulated, stagnant zone. New houses were not built there, nor new industries located there.

During the conflict, there were regular interruptions to public transport services. The IRA repeatedly attacked the Dublin - Belfast rail service, although the strategic merits of doing so were difficult to determine. Birnie (2001) noted the electricity interconnector brought a benefit to both sides of the border of about £10m annually until it was destroyed at an early stage. Restoring the connector cost £1.2m in 1995, bringing an initial savings of £500,000 a year.

These events created a problematic image for the region. This had many indirect effects. Many people felt that it was impossible to market counties such as Louth, Monaghan and Cavan, with their reputation as ‘bandit country’. People would not travel to the area even for school reunions. Some people in Dublin and points further south even thought that these counties were, in reality, part of Northern Ireland in any case. One resident moving into the area from Kilkenny referred, ironically, to ‘crossing the border’ into Monaghan. Border regions created an impression with government that they were trouble, a nuisance, a drain on resources. People talking about the neglect of the border region were possibly ‘Republican’ and therefore suspect.

4.3 The fracturing of social connections

The conflict had a deep impact on social connections among the border communities. Such impacts were immediately visible whenever there was a high-profile act of violence near to the border: cross-border visiting, shopping and travel was extremely sensitive to the violence, dropping sharply after such incidents, gradually rebuilding thereafter (Robb, 1995).

The main cause of the fracturing of the social relationships was the road closures. There was nothing new about restricting cross-border travel, for such roads had been ‘spiked’ in the 1956-62 border campaign (impassable barriers were erected across roads). The new closures went much further. Not only were roads spiked, as before, but many were cratered and even bridges were blown, sending a signal that such measures were intended to be permanent. All roads between Leitrim and Fermanagh were severed, for example. The number of cratered roads was estimated at 102 (Cooperation Ireland, 2004). Despite the harshness of these measures, whose military effectiveness was questionable in any case, many unionist politicians pressed for the border to be completely sealed and land-mined. These sentiments echoed the comments of JR Fisher, the unionist representative on the Boundary Commission, who labelled Donegal as ‘Afghanistan’ and wanted the border redrawn as a ‘solid ethnographic and strategic frontier’ (Murray 2004). Not all did, for some unionist politicians along the border had reservations and were well aware of the negative economic impact.

Road closures had an immediate effect on the border. Many parishes crossed the border and parish life - both protestant and catholic - was severely disrupted. Attending a church down the road, but on the wrong side, could now involve a 20km round trip. ‘As children, you stopped playing with people on the other side - crossing all the craters was too much trouble’ . The impact of these events on children’s minds would always remain. It is doubtful if the effect of the road closures was appreciated outside the areas directly concerned. Border people would be asked ‘Well, why don’t you just go round by the main road?’. 63

THE EMERALD CURTAIN

The road closures, the violence and militarization had a deeply disincentivizing effect on cross-border contact. Associations of the elderly for example, who might routinely make trips over the border, ceased doing so. Following the ceasefire, organized outings to Northern Ireland resumed, but for some southerners, it was their first visit since the late 1960s.

For unionists close to the border on the northern side, the conflict put them in an impossible position. ‘Their own community expected them to hold the frontier - yet they could not really be trusted to keep the enemy out. They were badly exposed. They didn’t like the road closures, but could never admit that to the rest of the community. Publicly they said that they favoured the closures, while at the same time they privately resenting the inconvenience. Many went to ground, many left’.

4.4 Reconstruction: reassessing the impact

The border roads were gradually reopened after 1994 and by 2002, almost all had been reopened. In many ways, border communities proved to be remarkably resilient despite the conflict. Some survived through the underground economy. Despite the many disruptions in supplies, many creameries continued to retain a cross-border membership. Agricultural organizations continued to work together. There were divided views among informants as to whether the social connections fractured during the conflict have now been rebuilt. Some notice that neighbours, friends and groups began to visit one another quite quickly. One community quickly installed a footbridge across a border river and it has been busy ever since. Some are more doubtful. An entire generation of contact and social intercourse was broken which can never now be fully restored.

Even with the ceasefires, it took some time for transport links to return to normal. Many years later, cross-border train services continued to be interrupted by security alerts which led to the cancellation of trains and passengers being bussed between the affected points, resulting in frustrating delays (NSMC, 2002). Even though the roads have been reopened, local people point out that there are limits to normalization: there is still no systematic arrangement to grit roads across the border in cold weather.

Brady, Shipman, Martin; Kirk, McClure, Morton & Minnock Barron (1997) in their analysis of the river Blackwater catchment area noted how the border first and then the cutting of roads and bridges impeded its economic development. The ceasefire was followed by an unprecedented increase in visitor numbers, ‘demonstrating how the political situation had been a major limiting factor in the development of the area’. The closures, which lasted 25 years, nevertheless 64 inflicted long-term damage, breaking traditional natural, traditional and social linkages.

The Peace programmes provided an opportunity for the two governments to reflect on the cost of the conflict to the border communities. In presenting the case to the European Commission for a second Peace programme, the Department of Finance & Personnel & Department of Finance itemized the main impacts of the conflict as being the negative effects on business, commercial development and employment and the exacerbation of rural decline by the closure of cross-border roads:

‘If normal circumstances had prevailed, we would expect commercial and social interaction between communities on both sides of the border to have flourished, but this has not been the case’ (33).

Despite the ceasefires and the subsequent but incomplete political settlement, the impact of the conflict will be felt for many years. The conflict continue to leave behind a legacy of issues around truth, justice and reconciliation. Many argue that the Good Friday Agreement failed to deal sufficiently with truth, justice and reconciliation issues and was less attentive to these issues than post-conflict settlements in other countries, for example South Africa, Sierra Leone, Argentina and Guatemala. In the Republic, the unresolved Monaghan bombing (1974) and other violent events (see 4.1) have not been brought to closure. A significant part of the conflict took place in the districts along the border. In Northern Ireland, there remains a strong sense of injury about the killing of border protestants in the Ulster Defence Regiment (UDR), which, many feel, was done either by neighbours or with the use of the intimate knowledge of neighbours (Crawley, 2003).

Thankfully, some experts have pointed a number of ways forward. The Eolas Project issued, in Consultation paper on truth and justice (2003), a number of options as to how these issues should best be addressed. Several models were examined (investigative, story-telling, independent panel etc), designed to lead to a satisfactory closure. The Healing through remembering project (McClelland, 2002) has also explored a series of ways in which these issues can be addressed, such as a permanent living memorial and a truth recovery process. Thirty years after the events took place and following a campaign by the Justice for the Forgotten Group, killings in Dublin, Cavan, Monaghan and Donegal were eventually investigated by the Barron inquiry.

4.5 Conclusions

This chapter has attempted to identify the impact of the conflict on the border

65 THE EMERALD CURTAIN communities. These impacts were, in the first instance, human fatalities and injuries (4.1). A climate of tension and fear enveloped the area. There were significant economic impacts, compounding economic disadvantage and exacerbated by investment foregone (4.2). The impact of social connections was sharp and deep, though there are mixed opinions as to whether this will be enduring (4.3).Even now, with an end to the violence and with economic improvement, there is still a shadow. The violence itself has left some unfinished business. The protestant minority community on the southern side of the border still feels sore and vulnerable while there are equally unresolved issues among the nationalist communities. The programme ‘The Forgotten Bomb’ showed that community healing is not well served by collective amnesia. Other recent studies have also identified truth, resolution and closure as significant issues in the southern border counties. Paralleling the way in which Northern Ireland had problems recognizing the effects of the conflict outside the six counties, so too the Republic has tended to underestimate the severity of the conflict within the southern border counties.

66 Chapter 5 Impacts on Specific Groups THE EMERALD CURTAIN

The effects of the border were by no means confined to the immediate land border, like Clones. The effects reached far inland, with towns and communities citing impacts and effects essentially similar, if not identical, to the immediate border areas.

The core of this research was an examination, through focus groups, of the impact of the border in 2004-5. This was done through four thematic and one geographical group. An underlying assumption of this research was that not all people, all groups and all communities were equally affected by the border or the conflict. Some were more affected than others. The groups selected to test the social impact of the border were four thematic groups: Ex-prisoners Displaced persons Women The protestant minority community and then one geographical focus group: Clones Erne East.

The backdrop to the focus groups is provided here in chapter 5 under these five headings (5.1 to 5.5) and some comments are given (5.6) before the outcome of the discussions and analysis of the focus groups is detailed in the following chapter, 6.

5.1 Ex-prisoners

It is estimated that up to 15,000 people were imprisoned in the course of the troubles arising from their connection with the conflict. Most were imprisoned in Northern Ireland but significant numbers also in the Republic and in Great Britain. Most were men, although there was a small number of women prisoners. Note that this research addressed and was in contact with a distinct group of ex-prisoners, namely those imprisoned as a direct result of the conflict. While many of the issues raised are likely to be shared with other ex-prisoner groups, we are primarily concerned here with this distinct group.

Of those imprisoned, about 3,500 ex-prisoners had a southern background. Up to 2,000 may be still resident in the southern border counties, some settling in particular towns (e.g. Dundalk, Monaghan, Ballinamore, Sligo, Donegal and Lifford). Many of the southern ex-prisoners still live in low-demand local authority housing (Dundalk Partnership, 2004).

About 2,000 northern ex-prisoners came to live in the south (total: 6,000,

including their families). Some would be northern-born, with southern partners. They came to the south to avoid loyalist death squads, to avoid police and army harassment, or, in some cases, because they continued to operate. The majority did not, though they remained sympathetic to Republicanism and kept up contacts with their ex-comrades.

Ex-prisoners have the following profile. By origin, most come from backgrounds of small farming, tradesmen, craftsmen, with few professional people. Ex- prisoners in Monaghan came from a variety of backgrounds: people who had been in jail for various lengths of sentences, short and long, people who had been jailed in the north, the south and Britain, escapees, people from Belfast, Derry and Tyrone and the south.

Prisoners were released in the course of the conflict as their sentences concluded and were released in groups following the Good Friday Agreement in 1998. Although groups existed to assist prisoners in the course of the conflict, such work was not put on a systematic basis until after the ceasefires. The largest group working with ex-prisoners is Coiste na Iarchimi, which is associated with Republican prisoners and which has centres in Clones, Dundalk, Ballinamore and Letterkenny (referred to hereafter as Coiste). Services are provided for ex-prisoners by other organizations in Strabane (IRSP/INLA), Belfast (Officials) and Monaghan (EXPAC). Several projects are now run for ex-prisoners. An early task for prisoner support groups was to re- skill and upskill former prisoners. Former prisoners had lost their confidence and some of their skills were quite outdated (for example, skills for a motor mechanic in the 1970s were now well out of date). They must also be re-skilled for jobs where they had a reasonable chance of work and where they would not be discriminated against. As a result, many were interested in work that could lead to self-employment. All faced the traditional problems of readjustment faced by long-term prisoners: a changed outside world, low incomes, rebuilding relationships with partners and families.

The situation of ex-prisoners coming to live in the southern border counties has often been difficult. Many people moving from the north to the south recorded hostility by southerners, an attitude that they were ‘subversives’, resentment that they were taking ‘their’ local authority homes and attracting special branch surveillance.

The impact of the conflict on people related to ex-prisoners has also been documented. The primary group affected has been their families - partners and children. Farset (2000) recorded the psychological and emotional effects of imprisonment on the children of prisoners and how they affected their upbringing. Prisoners and their families had an ongoing need for counselling and personal support (Coiste, 1999). The situation of wives or partners of

69 THE EMERALD CURTAIN prisoners and combatants was, during the conflict, especially difficult. They were able to receive support in Republican communities, but this was not the case if they moved away to more rural communities in Northern Ireland or across the border into the Republic. Here, there was often anti-Republican antagonism. Children were criticized. There was little money. Women were reluctant to bring problems to their men during prison visits. The women were stigmatized for being married to Republicans, regardless of their own political views. She was automatically assumed to share her husband’s politics (which she might, but that is not the point). Despite their endurance, there has been criticism of the lack of visibility of the wives of prisoners in the post-war settlement: ‘It was a man’s war. Now it’s a man’s peace. Men got all the jobs in the ex-prisoner organizations’.

A number of specific issues affect the ex-prisoner community. Even some time after the ceasefires, Coiste (2003) noted that the situation of prisoners and their families had by no means normalized. The organization recorded the following: - Rejection of applications for Public Service Vehicle licences, requiring applicants to go to court to have refusal overturned; - Refusal of taxi licences (in Northern Ireland, there is a three - year bar); - Refusal of mortgages by building societies; and invalidation of insurance if convictions were not disclosed.

In some parts of the south, a taxi licence would be approved by the gardai following an interview. In others, it would frequently be refused. Appeals to the Department of Justice, Equality & Law Reform were always unsuccessful, even though there is no formal stated policy against ex-prisoners holding licences.

Many recorded considerable levels of discrimination in private sector employment. Many employers were reluctant to hire ex-prisoners, or dismissed them the moment they were aware of their record. This was not just a Northern Ireland or border county issue, but applied to Dublin as well, where a distinguished teacher was dismissed from his post (EXPAC, 2004). Many would get work in temporary, low-paid employment where the level of checking of employee backgrounds would be low. O hAdhmaill (2001) analysed in some detail the employment history of ex-prisoners, finding that the normal experience was one of unemployment, discrimination and having to face security concerns. Many ex-prisoners had been in jail for a long period and few had recent, relevant job skills or qualifications. Positively, FAS is prepared to fund training and jobs initiative schemes for ex-prisoners, providing training in a range of skills, while other services are supported by the Department of Social and Family Affairs. Other services for ex-prisoners are funded by the health services and partnership companies.

70 A detailed account of the experience of Republican ex-prisoners has been provided by Jamieson & Grounds (2002). They found that ex-prisoners experienced high rates of unemployment. They estimated that about 26 types of jobs were effectively closed off to ex-prisoners. Almost all faced the dilemma of how to fill in the section of a job application asking applicants whether they had a criminal conviction: saying yes meant certain refusal while denial meant a future of concealment and the risk of dismissal if found out. Even when employers did knowingly take on ex-prisoners, they later perceived that they exposed other staff to risk, should the person concerned be singled out for an attack. Instances were recorded of the police visiting employers of ex-prisoners to alert them to the background of their employees, or visiting the employee directly in the workplace, arousing suspicion. Either way, dismissal was likely. Most were forced into no-questions-asked casual employment (e.g. labouring, construction industry), the informal economy, or a limited range of jobs, for example as door security for night clubs. Until the late 1990s, work was universally difficult to get. Labouring work with the county council was the most coveted, because it was steady and paid a set wage - but some local authorities would not take on ex-prisoners.

Coiste na n-Iarchimi has documented many important ongoing issues arising from the reintegration of ex-prisoners within society. Coiste (2003) recorded the following: - Ex-prisoners continue to experience high levels of unemployment, as high as 82% in Monaghan; -They may, quite legally, be turned down for employment by either private or public employers. Employers may, quite legally, require job applicants to disclose a conviction and reject an application on that basis. - Ex-prisoners cannot adopt children; are barred from access to criminal injuries compensation for subsequent wrongs; and may be denied visas for entry to other countries (they are routinely refused entry to the United States, Canada, New Zealand and Australia, though not South Africa nor other EU states).

Coiste noted that denying ex-prisoners the opportunities to engage in legal activities may have the effect of forcing them to hide their past when applying for work or even pushing them into illegal and criminal activities. There is no system whereby convictions may, either on completion of sentence or subsequently, be expunged. By contrast, expunging is available to the security services in Northern Ireland. The Equality Authority has recommended that discrimination on the basis of criminal conviction be added to the existing nine grounds whereby discrimination is unlawful in the Republic.

It is unclear whether the refusal of entry is because of intelligence collected by

THE EMERALD CURTAIN the countries concerned; names supplied by the Irish or British governments; or information entered on passport barcodes without the knowledge of the passport holder (the formal position is that barcodes do not include any information not already printed in the passport). It is probable that the countries listed above would remove travel restrictions on ex-prisoners if asked to do so by the Irish and British governments.

Rourke (2003) examined the situation of all ex-prisoners in the Republic and came to a number of conclusions which resonate with the foregoing. He identified as key issues the vulnerability of ex-prisoners to social exclusion, hostile and negative attitudes to ex-prisoners and the need for lobbying and support groups for ex-prisoners. The National Economic and Social Forum (NESF) (2002) noted the difficulty which Republican ex-prisoners experienced in obtaining public service vehicle licences, foreign travel and accessing credit. NESF noted that Ireland was the only European Union country which did not remove the obligation to declare short-term prison sentences after a defined period. The council argued that barriers to the employment of prisoners should be lifted on grounds of human rights, efficiency and consistency. NESF took the view that it was wasteful to assist prisoners in training for employment, but then prevent them obtaining employment; and inconsistent for the government to expect private sector employers to take on ex-prisoners while refusing to do so itself. NESF recommended that criminal records be expunged after a defined period of time (barring exceptions where public safety was at risk such as sex offenders or embezzlers); that the Employment Equality Act be amended to include protection against discrimination on grounds of a criminal record; and that the bar on employment in the civil and public service for people with a criminal record be lifted (barring specific exceptions).

5.2 Displaced persons

Displaced persons are people who left their homes involuntarily during the conflict, though, as we shall see, the nature and circumstances of its involuntary nature varied. Most but not all displacement discussed here was cross-border, from north to south and principally affected the nationalist community. Ralaheen (2005) estimates that there are about 22,390 Northern Ireland born people living in the southern border counties, concentrated in Louth, Monaghan and Donegal. Examination of the census data shows an upward trends from 1971, with periodic surges of Northern Ireland arrivals. Not all were refugees - some moved for happier reasons such as work or marriage - but Ralaheen estimates that about half were displaced.

Displacement was not a single, simple move of one group of people to another district. The first displacement took place when refugees first fled from Northern

72 Ireland to the Republic on 9th July 1969. Many more followed and the Irish army set up refugee centres in August 1969, both along the border and further south and these became home to about 4,500 people at their peak. Following the introduction of internment, there was a second wave in August 1971, with up to 6,000 people fleeing southward to the army camps and facilities opened by the church. A total of 9,800 refugees were received the following year, 1972, the most violent year of the conflict. For some, their stay in the south was short and they were soon able to return north, though not necessarily to their former home.

These figures do not include loyalist refugees, most of whom fled to Great Britain. It should also be noted that many nationalists also fled to Great Britain, where centres for Irish emigrants were inundated with refugees. Total figures for the level of displacement as a result of the troubles range from 28,000 at the lower end to between 54,000 and 60,000 at the higher, giving some idea of the scale of this upheaval (Tomlinson, 2004).

Returning to the exodus from north to south, this was a substantial movement of people by any standards. What is remarkable is that from 1972 displacement disappears from the public record in the Republic, being rarely mentioned thereafter. Ralaheen (2005) termed this a problem of ‘structural forgetfulness’. A culture of silence, it says, is not unusual around displacement, for example, France taking many years to recognise the displaced Algerians within its midst. It appears that displacement took place in two phases: the three big waves of 1969, 1971 and 1972 constituted the first phase, when refugees were received in many parts of the Republic by the army and later the civil authorities; and a second, long, less documented phase over 1972-94 in which there was a fluctuating flow of individuals and families, concentrating their settlement in three border counties. Unlike the earlier period, few of these displaced people returned north. This second phase was not attributable to any one single event, unlike the earlier upheavals. Instead, it was prompted by local crises, typically when individual families were forced out of their homes in the middle of the night. Young males, in particular, found themselves continually picked up by the army or a likely target for sectarian assassination. At the other end of the spectrum, people might decide that they had simply ‘had enough’ of the conflict and left in a more planned way. No single event was responsible, but the accumulated tension of years.

In addition to refugee movements to the Republic and Great Britain, there was a significant level of internal displacement within Northern Ireland itself. Housing estates in Belfast and other parts of Northern Ireland were reconstituted around the two separate communities, with peace walls or lines built between them. 28,000 are estimated to have moved jobs as a result of

73 THE EMERALD CURTAIN intimidation and many subsequently moved home as a result (Tomlinson, 2004). A less violent and more subtle form of displacement was also widespread, in which families move from areas in which they were a religious minority into housing estates or rural communities in which they were a majority. Such a redrawing of the religious composition of communities has been noted in Armagh, for example, where protestants moved north and catholics south (Murtagh, 1997). Although the primary reason was sectarian intimidation, others were forced out by paramilitaries. Individuals considered to be antisocial were ‘exiled’ and told to leave, either to other parts of Northern Ireland, the Republic or Great Britain.

Although the nationalist community was most affected by displacement, the unionist community also suffered. There was a decline of protestant populations in Newry, on the west side of the Foyle in Derry and in parts of Fermanagh. Some experts refer to this as ‘the greening of the border’ or the establishment of a secondary border running from Armagh through Dungannon to Derry.

How were the southern border counties affected? Dochas for Women, Monaghan (2001) noted that Monaghan suffered directly from the violence of the conflict and that it had one of the highest populations of displaced people. Ait na nDaoine, Dundalk (2001) identified a high level of displacement in its project area. Here, of those coming from outside co Louth, the highest numbers, 21% came from northern counties, principally Antrim (presumably meaning Belfast) and Down, 9% and 8% of residents respectively. Certain towns were aware of significant number of displaced persons moving there. Some displaced persons, either voluntarily or involuntarily, relocated as far from the border as possible and didn’t ask for help, so as not to draw attention to themselves. They tried to make themselves anonymous. This has also made their story almost invisible in the historical or contemporary record. They did not form themselves into organizations. Whatever the circumstances, the process of displacement was a traumatic one. Children, especially, suffered from the effects of displacement, ranging from nightmares to the loss of school friends. Displaced persons were often assumed to be Republicans and were stigmatized accordingly, even though, as Ralaheen (2005) confirmed, many did not have political affiliations or strong political views. When they settled in groups, they were often blamed for any trouble that took place in the town.

The number of displaced persons moving from the Republic to the north in the course of the conflict is not known. The protestant focus group (see chapter 6) later made the point that southern protestants ‘did not all leave on a bus one night but over time a lot have gone’. One correspondent for this research drew attention to the exodus of protestant people from Monaghan northwards after

74 1922. ‘Although they lived in the south, given the catholic ethos of the new state, they naturally regarded the northern state as home and actually referred to it as such. Until recent times, little was done to encourage young protestants in the south to regard themselves as anything but outsiders and the existence of latent sectarianism remains a problem in counties along the border’. This might be considered a harsh judgement in the light of some efforts by the Free State to welcome the minority community, but possibly that the situation on the ground in the southern border counties was more difficult than has been appreciated. Ralaheen (2005) recorded many anecdotal claims and reports that southern protestants were displaced north during the conflict, but was unable to find independent or statistical confirmation of such movements.

5.3 Women

Of our five focus groups, the situation of women presents the biggest challenge to research and documentation. Voluntary and community organizations in the region have noted two distinctive features of the situation of women in the region: a distance from the political system and a lack of economic opportunity.

A comprehensive study of the situation of women in the southern border counties remains to be done, but reports to date tend to bear out these contentions. Preliminary work was undertaken by McMinn & O’Meara (2000), who reported on the manner in which women in the southern border areas were economically, socially, culturally and politically disadvantaged. They found that the proportion of women in employment in all the southern border counties was below the national average and that the proportion leaving school without educational qualifications was, in all these counties, above the national average.

The view among activists is that the representation of women in public life in the southern border counties is low. Political parties do not give particular attention to gender issues and only one party has a women’s forum active in the area (Sinn Fein). In reality, the picture is a more complex one. Gender representation in the Oireachtas for the area is uneven. None of the parliamentary representatives for Louth or Cavan-Monaghan constituencies are women. On the other hand, this is compensated for by above average representation in the other constituencies. The following table gives details of women’s representation on public bodies in the southern border counties in more detail:

75 THE EMERALD CURTAIN

Table 4: Women’s representation in public bodies in the southern border counties National Southern Border Counties Proportion Dail Eireann 13% 16% County Councils 15% Cavan 12% Donegal 10% Leitrim 14% Louth 11% Monaghan 20% Sligo 12% County Borough Councils Drogheda 8% Sligo 17% Town Councils Buncrana 11% Bundoran 33% Carrickmacross 33% Castleblayney 22% Clones 22% Vocational Education Committees 22% Cavan 44% Donegal 19% Leitrim 14% Louth 11% Monaghan 23% Sligo 12% City & County Development Boards 19% Cavan 11% Donegal 14% Leitrim 14% Louth 39% Monaghan 23% Sligo 15% City & County Enterprise Boards 25% Cavan 14% Donegal 19% Leitrim 33% Louth 21% Monaghan 17% Sligo 21% Regional Assemblies 14% BMW region 10% Regional Authorities 11% Border 8% Regional Tourism 21% Nort West 16% Midlands East 9% Health Boards 22% North Eastern 10% North Western 15% Source: Based on Gilligan (2004). Figures rounded.

76 A number of interesting features emerge. First, there are considerable variations across counties. The widest is the vocational sector, where women’s representation ranges from 11% in Louth to 44% in Cavan, against a national average of 22%. Taking each in turn:

• Women’s representation is above the national average for Dail Eireann (16% to 13%) • In the county councils, women’s representation is below the national average of 15% in five of the six counties, only Monaghan being above at 20% • In the town councils, women’s representation is above the national average of 15% in all but one, Buncrana (11%). It is more than double the national average in Bundoran and Carrickmacross (33% each) • On the vocational education committees, women’s representation is below the national average of 22% in four counties but above in two (Cavan and Monaghan) • On the city and county development boards, women’s representation is similar: below in four and above in two (Monaghan, 23% and Louth, 39%). • On the city and county enterprise boards, women’s representation is above the national average of 25% in only one county, Leitrim, 33% • Women are underrepresented on the regional assembly: 10% compared to the national average of 14% • Women are underrepresented on the regional authorities: 8% on the border regional authority, compared to 11% nationally. The level of women’s representation is extremely low in any case. • Women are underrepresented on both regional tourism authorities: 16% on the north-western, which serves five of our six counties and 9% on midlands east (covering Louth). • Women are notably underrepresented on health boards: 10% on the north- eastern and 15% on the north-western, compared to 22% nationally (these boards have since been abolished).

Overall, there is a pattern of women’s under-representation in public life. Such under-representation is most evident on the health boards, tourism authorities, regional authorities and regional assemblies. Women’s representation is below the national average in a majority of counties for the city and county enterprise boards, city and county development boards, and vocational education committees. Women have been more successful in achieving election to Dail Eireann and the town councils. Their representation is below average in the county councils. These outcomes show how much scope there is to improve women’s representation, especially on bodies which have more flexibility in how they select their members.

In the local authority in Monaghan, although the Strategic Policy Committees

77 THE EMERALD CURTAIN

(SPCs) of the local authorities opened new opportunities for women as voluntary and community sector representatives, in the event no priority was given to the selection of women representatives, nor was there discussion on improved gender balance. Few women are represented on the strategic policy committees either through voluntary and community sector representation or through the other social partners. When the SPCs in Monaghan County Council were reconstituted in autumn 2004, voluntary and community organizations had only one representative on each. No guidelines were issued recommending that representation strive to reach a gender balance. A comparable pattern is believed to exist in the other counties.

Most voluntary and community organizations in the region still have a male leadership. Although the Irish Countrywomen’s Association is well established in the area, the number of dedicated organizations concerned with women’s issues is still small. For example, there appear to be only four such groups in the Monaghan Community Network. There appear to be few women business leaders in the southern border counties.

Turning to the labour force, the proportion of women working in the home in the southern border counties is believed to be higher than the national average. Many women in the rural areas help their husbands in farm work, a role which has come to be acknowledged in recent times. There was and remains a tradition of women’s involvement in home-based Small and Medium sized Enterprises (SMEs). The border economy has, as already been noted, been a self-reliant one and women took on a number of backyard, farmhouse projects, eggs, poultry, sewing and mushrooms being the best examples. Women were affected by the border and by the border closures during the conflict. For women involved in SMEs in peacetime, the border imposed considerable paperwork and transaction costs, even to ship goods in transit to Donegal. With the road closures, women suffered badly from the closing off of social contacts. Women feel that they suffered these burdens disproportionately to men.

During the 1980s, women moved into off-farm work in such areas as cleaning, shops and supermarkets. Generally, the additional incomes derived were quite small. Women have since moved into childcare, administration and retailing and up the skills chain. McArdle (1996) traced significant changes in the economic situation of women in the mid-1990s. While her study was focussed on Castleblayney, Co Monaghan, her observations are likely to be applicable to other parts of the region. She noted: - Significant numbers of married women and young girls entering the workforce; - Women employed in part-time, low-paid work in such areas as mushrooms, cleaning and home helps; - Young girls, including school girls, working in shops and catering.

78 Some did several part-time jobs; - An increase in women-owned businesses (as distinct from farms worked by both partners); - Evidence of some women entering more skilled occupations e.g. finance, clerical; - Much of women’s work was in the informal economy. She counted a female workforce in the town at 776 at a time when official statistics showed only 254 women workers in the town.

The level of provision of childcare facilities is low. There is an inadequate supply of crèches, both community and commercial, but especially affordable community-based provision. There is reckoned to be a significant level of provision in the informal economy. The level of reporting of domestic violence is considered to be low in Monaghan, believed to be a reflection of the low awareness of the issue among women and a distrust of authority. This is broadly confirmed by the official figures for the level of domestic violence incidents in Monaghan and Cavan. Incidents are, in absolute terms, well below the national average, fitting into a pattern with some other midland counties (Garda Siochana, 2004).

5.4 The protestant minority community

Although much has been said of the minority religious community in the Free State and the Republic as a whole, less has been written of the impact of the border on the southern minority protestant community in these border counties. Most accounts of the experience have focussed on the adjustment of the protestant community to the new state; its role in the state’s economic, educational, political and professional life; and the politics of pluralism. Less attention has been paid to its social interaction with the new state, especially in the southern border counties.

5.4.1 Historical background

Historical background is helpful in understanding the background to the protestant community in the southern border counties and relevant elements are sketched here.

The protestant community in the southern border counties dates to the Ulster plantation of the early 17th century, the spread of the linen industry and the establishment of protestant colonies by local landlords. Some towns became known as ‘protestant towns’ e.g. Newtowngore, Co Leitrim. Within the protestant community, there were many subtleties in regional and denominational affiliation. The three main groups were the Church of Ireland,

79 THE EMERALD CURTAIN the Presbyterian Church in Ireland and the Methodists. Later, smaller groups came, such as baptists and the Free Presbyterian Church led by Rev Ian Paisley. The Society of Friends (quakers) also became established. Some were stronger in some parts than others. An example is given from Co Cavan, where Bawnboy is associated with the Church of Ireland, Ballyconnell with the Methodist Church and Killeshandra with the Presbyterian Church.

The situation of the protestant community in Monaghan has been especially well documented. When the third home rule crisis broke in 1912, Monaghan’s protestant community comprised 25.3% of the population (18.5% in neighbouring Cavan). The Orange Order became a mobilizing force within the protestant community and contemporary evidence supported by police reports from the Royal Irish Constabulary, suggest that it was strongest in Monaghan of all the subsequent 26 counties (McClelland, 1978; Carville, 1991; Fitzpatrick, 2002; Dooley, 1994, 1997, 1998, 2002). The Solemn League and Covenant received strong support in Cavan and Monaghan, with Edward Carson travelling to address a monster rally in Newbliss, Co Monaghan in August 1913. Unionists enlisted in the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF), which began drilling. By 1914, the UVF had 3,400 members in Cavan, probably more in Monaghan and 2,746 in Donegal. Training camps were running throughout 1914 and huge stores of weapons were built up, some from the Larne gun-running. The level of protestant mobilization sparked a counter-reaction, with the formation of the Irish National Volunteers in the county in 1914. The police reported a high level of tension in the county, with disturbances that summer in Clones and Castleblayney. It is not often realized how close the border counties came to civil war in 1914. The situation was reminiscent of the Balkans shortly before the civil war of the 1990s. The protestant community of Monaghan continued to argue for inclusion in Northern Ireland until early 1920, when the Ulster Unionist Council voted for a 6-county Ulster not including Monaghan on 10th March 1920. Monaghan unionists resigned from the council in disgust.

In the event, the war of independence in Monaghan had a strong sectarian element (Turner, 2002). This became evident in 1920, when Dail Eireann announced a boycott of Belfast - made goods. Traders who did not observe the boycott were ostracized. The only county where this boycott had practical effect was Monaghan, not least because it retailed Belfast-made goods (Dooley, 1994). Although catholic traders were equally liable for ostracization, in practice most catholic traders observed the boycott, but protestant traders were less inclined to do so. Protestant traders could be de-blacklisted if they paid fines to Sinn Fein, which many did (Dooley, 1994). The experience of the boycott may have persuaded at least some protestant traders to move north after it ended in 1922. Research by the Boundary Commission found that 2,117 southern protestants moved to Fermanagh alone between 1920 and 1925,

most being shopkeepers, police, railway workers and post office staff (Dooley, 1996).

Deserted by the unionists of Northern Ireland, in 1923, the Orange Order in the county pledged its support for the new Free State government and committed themselves to work for ‘liberty and equality’ in the new state. They came to accept prime minister James Craig’s reported advice to ‘knuckle down, live with it and make the best of it’. The Orange Order continued to back a protestant candidate in Monaghan constituency for many years, generally with success. Maintaining a public visibility was more difficult. The first march in the Free State took place on 12th July 1931 in Monaghan and Bailieborough, but militant Republicans prevented a march in Newtowngore, Co Leitrim. Marches eventually came to an end a month later in Cootehill on 12th August 1931 when one was planned by another loyal body, the Grand Black Chapter. The IRA appeared in strength for the occasion. The President of the Free State, William T Cosgrave, sent in a large force of gardai and army, but the march was called off. Cosgrave told the institution that he would not ban its march, he appreciated the loyalty of its members to the state but regretted he could do so little in the face of intimidation (McClelland, 1978). This was the last black or Orange march in that part of the region (Fitzpatrick, 2002) and some of their banners eventually found their way to museums. In Donegal, Twelfth marches continued in St Johnston, though marked by two evenings of disturbances there in 1973. They continued in Rossnowlagh to the present and are now better attended than ever, about 9,000 people regularly participating.

The numbers of protestants in southern border counties declined steadily in the period since partition. The protestant community’s numbers in the Free State area fell 32.5% between 1911 and 1925 alone. Some undoubtedly went to Northern Ireland, where the protestant community rose by 0.5%. The Northern Ireland census of 1926 indicated that 24,000 southerners had moved north since partition and estimated that a quarter were military, police and civil servants, whose transfer was facilitated. Most were probably protestant. One cross border community saw the protestant population drop from 800 in the 1920s to only 80 people at present.

The proportion of protestants in Monaghan declined from 26.6% in 1861 to 14.2% in 1961 to 11.1% in 1971. The protestant population fell from 9.6% of the 26-county area in 1911 to 3% by 1991. The decline in the border counties was in the order of 65%, with higher rates in some counties than others (e.g. Leitrim). The causes of the decline were attributed to a mixture of push factors (economic decline) and pull factors (a sense of greater comfort and security in the north). Violence and intimidation also played a part, with claims that it was widespread. Several people suggested that there was a pattern of differential

81 THE EMERALD CURTAIN emigration. Protestant traders, for example, read the economic trends more quickly and had family connections to re-establish businesses either in Northern Ireland or further afield, for example in Canada.

There appear to have been several high points of exodus: the economic war, the 1950s, the recent conflict. In Cavan, many protestants moved north in the 1950s. This appears to have been due to economic factors and a perception of improving economic conditions in the north, possibly reflecting Britain’s postwar recovery. ‘Pull’ factors appear to have been more influential than ‘push’ factors. Holland (2004) traced the evolution of co Monaghan surnames from 1963 to 2001. During this period, Monaghan gained 933 new surnames and lost 528. The author noted how since 1921 and especially since World War II, there had been an identifiable decline in the population bearing settler names from the time of the Ulster plantation.

The decline of the protestant population presents a political problem. Leontidou, Afouxenidis, Donnan et al (2004) point out that this demographic decline of the protestant population on both sides of the border has been interpreted in opposite ways on each side. ‘In the south, no one seems concerned about what is regarded as almost a natural event’ while in the north, more instrumental explanations are put forward.

Mixed marriages presented a particular difficulty for the protestant community. The application of the Ne Temere decree obliged the partners of a mixed marriage to bring up their children as catholic and, when enforced, this clearly diminished the protestant population. In recent years, mixed marriage families have tended to adhere to the protestant side, but such families have tended to be much less involved in church-based activities. From the 1980s onward, many young people, of all denominations, drifted away from their churches and were slow to identity themselves as committed members of any church. Within the protestant community, there was a certain tendency to patronize businesses on one own’s ‘side of the house’, as the local phrase went. The level of mixing could vary from one community to another. The protestant community kept together for its own social events and dances. In Leitrim and Cavan, the Newtowngore and Cootehill confrontations in the 1930s appear to have been a low point, for otherwise, relationships between the two communities ranged from the polite to the good, the two serving together in local development committees without difficulty.

Returning to population issues, the long decline of the protestant community in the Ulster counties halted in recent years. If we look at the community in the border counties, we note the following intercensal changes:

Table 5: Changes in protestant population, 1991-2002, southern border counties

1991 2002 Donegal 13,046 10% 14,058 10.2% Monaghan 4,416 8.6% 4,684 8.9% Cavan 4,586 8.6% 5,302 9.4% Sligo 2,940 5.1% 3,330 5.7% Leitrim 1,158 4.5% 1,359 5.3% Louth 2,970 2.9% 3,960 3.9%

Numbers and percentages, these expression as proportion of county populations

The protestant community has not only shared in the absolute population recovery during this period, but the proportion of the protestant community in the community as a whole has risen. One contribution to this rise and a part explanation has been immigrant communities from Africa, many of whom identify with protestant churches. Nationally, there was a rise of 0.7% between 1991 and 2002, lifting to 3.7% of the national population.

5.4.2 Impact of the border at community level

Now we explore the present context in more detail, but first, make a note of the situation of the protestant community on the northern side of the border. Crawley (2003), in her study for the Rural Community Network, found a community that was very conscious of its vulnerable, isolated position, despite being in a political majority in the state. The community had steered clear of the two Peace programmes, had reduced the profile of its distinctive activities (e.g. Twelfth parades), had lost confidence in its future, was poorly led, was now very much closed in on itself, minimized contacts with its catholic neighbours and eschewed cross-community work. Is this the case in the Republic?

There are several examples of recent mobilization of the protestant community. Before doing so, we should note that the term ‘Protestant Community’ should be used carefully. The diversity of the community should be recognized, for it includes a variety of communities in the different counties, with different voices, emphases and approaches. Experiences in Monaghan and to a lesser degree Donegal have been the best documented.

The Border Minority Group (2004) was formed in recent years to promote the needs of the protestant minority community along the border. It is probably one of the first groups of its kind to articulate such views from a community

THE EMERALD CURTAIN perspective. An early point made by the group is that the protestant community was reluctant to come forward to express its views, preferring to ‘keep its head down’ and not draw attention to itself. The group highlighted the sense of isolation after 1921, of being left ‘on the wrong side’ of the border. As a community it felt isolated and neglected. The group also noted intolerance. Orange halls in the southern border counties continued to be attacked, with arson attempts and even rifle fire. They must be strongly fortified with steel shutters. Elsewhere, there can be low-level intimidation, such as the painting of flags and graffiti. Although community relations were good at a personal and group level, the protestant community still perceived a level of distrust, intolerance and disregard for its cultural identity. Open displays of that identity (e.g. Twelfth commemorations, wearing a poppy) were received with hostility. Vandalism of protestant facilities was a particular cause of concern. There was a perception that the protestant community was less well treated by the public sector, especially when it came to grants for sports and community facilities. The situation of the protestant minority community appeared invisible to state agencies charged with the protection of minorities, such as the Equality Authority and the city and county development boards. The protestant community was not involved in existing community development activity. Despite the recovery in population, there was a lack of confidence in the future of the community over the next ten years.

In Donegal, Derry and Raphoe Action, based in Newtownstewart Co Tyrone and Raphoe Co Donegal has worked with the protestant community in Co Donegal for a number of years. Much of its work has focussed on improving the community infrastructure of the protestant community in the country, especially parish facilities and youth clubs. Derry and Raphoe Action has been successful in attracting funding from the Peace programme; the Department of Arts, Sport and Tourism; the Department of Social and Family Affairs; and the Vocational Education Committee. The success of this approach has not only led to practical improvements and the refurbishment of obsolescent facilities, but has led to improved confidence within the protestant community. The requirement to submit proposals and plans has helped the protestant community to reconsider its needs.

A profile of the protestant community in Donegal is now available (Derry & Raphoe Action, 2001). The picture that emerged was of a community with a strong sense of identity with the Irish state, active participation in civic and community life, good community relations, a continuing identification with church and religion and a level of commitment to both single identity and cross- community involvement at local level. The research did note some important issues affecting the community, such as a feeling of belonging to a minority community, discrimination in accessing some forms of employment, a sense of

84 political under-representation, with additional concerns around mixed marriages and population decline. There was a broadly held belief in the need for further work in reconciliation between the two main religious communities in Donegal. McCracken (2004) believes that the southern border protestant community is ‘no longer a passive remnant of pre-partition Ireland’ but now an active member of a forward-looking national community. This does not just apply to Donegal, for some of the distinctively protestant towns of Monaghan have begun, in recent years, to participate in the tidy town competitions.

PUL Networking (2003) noted how the protestant community was observed to ‘keep to itself’ and maintain a distance. Members were slow to come to social events in catholic parishes and slow to reciprocate their initiatives. In recent years, though, the protestant minority community in the southern border counties has been more willing to express its opinions and aspirations.

The Monaghan Community Network carried out diversity training work with participants from the protestant community and this identified the following (Crawley, 2003-4) : - A sense of being intimidated, with attacks on Orange halls continuing to the present day. Attacks varied from graffiti to the shooting at an Orange hall; - Still a lack of acceptance of the value of the protestant community. It is still not possible to hold a 12th July parade in Monaghan; - The continued operation, albeit much less vigourously than in the past, of the Ne Temere requirement that children of a mixed marriage be brought up as catholic. - Inability to access resources. Although in the past, protestant organizations tended not to apply for grants, those who have done so in recent years have generally been unsuccessful; - Women’s organizations tend to organize along denominational lines, protestant women tending to join the Women’s Institute (based in Northern Ireland), the Mothers’ Union, Presbyterian Women’s Association or Methodist Women’s Association in preference to the Irish Countrywomen’s Association.

Whereas the community as a whole has tried to involve the minority in community activities, these efforts have often failed to take account of protestant sensitivities. Community activities have not always recognized the importance of such issues as where events are advertized, the timing of events (e.g. Sundays) and the use of lotteries to raise money.

The lack of funding for community development in the protestant community presents a problem, especially for physical infrastructure. In rural areas, halls are divided between community halls, in practice associated with catholic

THE EMERALD CURTAIN parishes; and protestant halls, associated with local Church of Ireland, presbyterian or other communities. Many of the protestant halls are now in poor condition and are not up to modern standards. In recent times, several protestant communities have applied for grants both for halls and other community activity. Generally, such applications have been unsuccessful. In some cases, refusal has been justified on the basis that such a grant would breach the separation of church and state. Rejection of applications has caused some resentment and is contrasted negatively to grants for catholic- based community halls, grants for catholic-affiliated youth clubs and the unlimited funding available to the Gaelic Athletic Association. The Border Minority Group did receive funding from the Ulster-Scots Agency in Belfast.

A decision by statutory bodies in the Republic to provide on-going funding for community development and cultural diversity in the protestant community would be a huge confidence boost and a way of valuing equal citizenship. There is a feeling that it is not valued at a time when Ireland is learning to understand about its new minority communities. Even at a practical level, the protestant community is not on the civic list when visitors come from other countries. The protestant community finds a genuine difficulty in devising a way forward so that its voice - or multiple voices - may best be heard. It is not a community predisposed to being politically noisy, awkward, provocative or causing embarrassment.

Although not all members of the protestant community wish to associate with the loyal orders (many prefer not to), there are some for whom it is an important part of their heritage. In some rural areas of Monaghan, there is a long tradition of bands (pipe, flute, accordion), with practices being held during the spring, culminating in picnics and the big annual day out on the 12th July. North west Monaghan still has seven bands in an 8km radius. The music and songs are handed on from one generation to another and some bands have three generations of members. Whilst southern protestants are well aware of the dislike of the order by many in the nationalist community in the north, they take the view that the loyal orders should be viewed, in the south, as a legitimate, non-threatening form of cultural expression. Twelfth parades should be seen in the same light as the national St Patrick’s Day parades. This is not the situation: Orange events must still be held in isolated areas and an Orange parade is still not possible in the main Monaghan towns. Workers asking for the day off for the Twelfth risk being ridiculed. Critics tell some of their members that, by maintaining the Orange lodges, they are ‘living in the past’. Irish society still has a problem, they believe, in accepting this form of cultural diversity and people outside a narrow definition of ‘Irish’.

The idea of community development work with the protestant minority community may be a relatively new one. Work in this area has been developed

by the Monaghan Community Network in its ‘Celebrating Difference’ project. This project has been positively evaluated, the researcher indicating that it should be the basis for much further progress (Walsh, 2003). The Peace programmes seem to have provided some limited space whereby the issues arising from the conflict can be opened out, but more is still required. Within the protestant community, there is a greater preparedness to speak openly of these issues. There are still unresolved issues from the conflict: the lack of expressions of remorse by Republicans for what happened during the conflict is still a cause of pain and, while recognizing the imperatives of the peace, they find the integration of Sinn Fein into the political system hard to take. Continued pressure against Orange parades they see as an attempt to intimidate the protestant community out of the remaining border areas.

5.5 Clones - Erne east

Not all geographical parts of the region were equally affected by the border and the conflict. Many informants were of the view that some regions and some counties were much less affected. Regions, counties and districts whose economic links and hinterlands looked southward (or in the north, northward), tended to be less affected.

Monaghan is the county with the longest land border and Clones was arguably the southern border town most severely affected both by the border and by the conflict. Clones’ natural hinterland was and is Fermanagh, rather than Monaghan and three quarters of the parish of Clones is in the north. Clones was a busy market town. The border had an immediate effect on the trade in Clones. By October 1924, local people were travelling to Enniskillen for cheaper cigarettes, sugar, tobacco, butter, washing powder, flour and shoes and traders were complaining of a 50% loss in trade. On the northern side, an example of the effect of the border was in the law. In chapter 3, we noted how the legal districts of Fermanagh and Clones were transferred quickly by government order to Enniskillen.

Clones had been since 1858, the hub of the railway network in Ulster, ‘the Crewe of the north’, with over forty trains passing through, travelling in four directions. The line was closed in 1958, after a hundred years in operation and was a severe economic loss to the town (Kerr). Several hundred families, whose employment had been associated with the railway, left in the following years. Some people attribute the historic decline of Clones to this event (Clones is not the only example, for others pointed to the devastating effects of the closure of Belturbet station, Co Cavan).

Although the closure of the roads is associated with the recent troubles, roads were cut during earlier conflicts. The presbyterian Rev Dr Andrew Rogers 87 THE EMERALD CURTAIN

(1999) recalls the many detours imposed on him as he tried to minister to his cross-border congregation during the 1956-62 IRA border campaign. The break with sterling added to the town’s predicament: 75% of the town’s trade had been in sterling until 1979. The road closures in recent years were even more severe. All Monaghan was badly affected by road closures, with 41 crossing points blocked (O’Dowd) . On the northern side, eight cross-border roads near Rosslea, co Fermanagh, were closed and local trade quickly fell by 40%. Distances for some round trips quadrupled. Many farmers in the region had land straddling the border and they were especially hard hit, in one extreme case having to drive 19km to reach an adjoining field. Belturbet also suffered badly, for the bridge there was blown. Of the four roads leading out of Clones, three went into Northern Ireland and all were blown. Townspeople from Clones travelled into the north by roundabout routes and faced lengthy security delays. A correspondent to this research drew attention to these particular effects. - The Clones drapery business got 75% of its trade from Fermanagh before the closures but the trade eventually ended after the closures; - Other trades hard hit were electrical, shoes and bakeries; - The Clones creamery depended on milk from Fermanagh, but this source of supply was largely closed off. In terms of distribution, it could no longer supply into the north; - The Clones agricultural show, hitherto a cross-border event, lost this key aspect of its character.

Several informants used the expression that ‘Clones was destroyed by the conflict’. At one stage, when petrol was cheaper in the north, there was not a single petrol station open in Clones. People referred to Clones as a ‘ghost town’. Although there had been many protestant businesses in the town, many of them closed and the town became much less diverse. Indeed, it later acquired a reputation as ‘a Republican town’. The period of the conflict had a big impact on the town: the sense of being cut off; additional journey lengths; the reduction in social contact; the tension arising from endless searches and checkpoints, especially for women, and a big fall in social life. ‘Clones used to be jammed on Saturday night’, many said.

Clones was bombed twice - October 1972 and December 1972, with a factory bombed in April 1973. The bombed shops and houses remained derelict for over thirty years and are only now being rebuilt. Some other buildings were bombed, for example a school which had to close.

Not only did people leave the area because of the conflict, but the negative environment meant that no new people moved in. Clones became depressed to the point that applications were no longer made to funding agencies. The level of community activity fell to a very low level.

88 By the mid-1990s, Clones had a an overwhelmingly negative socio-economic profile. Its rank deprivation score was 9 out of a possible 10, higher than the county average of 7 and the town was characterized by population decline, a dependance on traditional economic activity (principally farming) and low levels of educational attainment (McGearty, 1998). 45 businesses closed in the course of the conflict. Clones became, in effect, a microcosm of the conflict, exhibiting in sharp relief the experience of the southern border communities as a whole: loss of its hinterland; waves of economic decline, disinvestment by the state; the effects of physical violence, tension arising from the militarization of the surrounding area; the fractured social connections arising from the road closures; protestant exodus.

5.6 Conclusions

This chapter provides the backdrop for the work of the focus groups of this study. This context provides basic information, where it is available, on the situation of ex-prisoners, displaced persons, women, the protestant minority community and Clones and its townland extending into east Erne. The chapter gives some idea of the scale of the groups and issues involved, the historical framework, the key elements identified by research and a suggestion of the current situation. This will now be reported in more detail in chapter 6.

By way of final comment on chapters 3, 4 and 5, the researchers were struck by the degree to which the peacetime and conflict impacts of the border permeated throughout the border counties. While, as noted earlier, there were some parts of some southern border counties at some distance from these impacts (e.g. southern Leitrim), the effects of the border were by no means confined to a narrow strip of land confined to the immediate land border, like Clones. The effects reached far inland, with towns and communities citing impacts and effects essentially similar, if not identical, to the immediate border areas. To be more concrete, many of the impacts and issues noted in Clones were also evident in Ballybay, a town much further inland. The pervasiveness of border issues was remarkable.

89 THE EMERALD CURTAIN Chapter 6 Specific groups: the lived experiences of ex-prisoners, displaced persons, the protestant minority community, women and Clones/Erne east THE EMERALD CURTAIN

The border remains a dominant reality on people’s personal and political landscapes

Here in chapter 6 we look at the present-day social impact on the five groups that were the primary focus of the study (6.1 to 6.5). The views of informants, where appropriate, have also been added to this chapter. Each group is taken in turn. Specific conclusions are drawn (6.6) and common themes explored (6.7). Finally, conclusions are drawn about the implications for community development (6.8). What the focus groups had to say is a contribution to living history: we record the experiences and views of particular groups and people finding themselves in unique circumstances.

An important feature of the focus groups was the extent to which the participants focussed on the historical circumstances around the establishment of the border. Much time was devoted to debating the period from the failure of home rule to the boundary commission, 1912-1925. From the point of view of Republicans, the imposition of the border was a grave political wrong, with enduring social and economic effects that persist to the present day. From the point of view of the protestant community, partition also had serious, negative economic and social effects, although their reasons and perspectives differed. Although the economic, social and political effects of the border have mutated over time, they remain a dominant reality on people's personal and political landscapes.

This research focussed on the southern side of the border and did not interview those who had pressed for the establishment of the border and who would have regarded it as a protection. Research on the situation of border protestants on the northern side of the border shows that while they remained in the jurisdiction of their choice, their circumstances remained difficult and even insecure, hardly a happy outcome. This in turn raises the question of who actually benefited from the border. In immediate terms, partition may have had the effect of defusing an imminent civil war (critics will say at the cost of delaying a satisfactory and comprehensive political settlement). The principal long-term political beneficiary of the border appears to have been the substantial unionist community of the greater Belfast area and those living at a far, safe distance from the border.

6.1 Ex - prisoners

The principal issues arising from the ex-prisoners focus group were:

Isolation & exclusion Many within the ex-prisoner group spoke of their experiences of isolation and exclusion. Although there was a perception in the north that 92 Republicans were safe and welcome in the south, the reality for many was that they did not feel welcomed or wanted by their southern neighbours.

Rejection The group also spoke of the demonization of ex-prisoners and their families. Many experienced stigmatization and discrimination; ex-prisoners and their families were instantly labelled in the community and many were made to feel like 'second class citizens'. Avoidance and rejection by businesses and the rest of the community was frequent. There was a fear and reluctance among people to associate with those considered subversives and this left many in the ex-prisoner community feeling rejected and abandoned.

Discrimination Discrimination against the ex-prisoner community cropped up in all kinds of ways, at a legal and institutional level in access to certain areas of work, credit, travel and adoption but also at a local community level.

Employment Many spoke of the difficulties in the area of work and employment. There was discrimination in applying for and accessing employment, with many employers not wanting to be seen to employ ex-prisoners. Even though Gardai no longer informed employers of who was an ex-prisoner, by this stage so many of them knew 'your past kept catching up with you'. There were limited areas in which ex-prisoners could find work; and glass ceilings even for those who did find employment. Certain areas of work were closed off for ex-prisoners (e.g. telecommunications). Many were forced to find work in the informal economy.

Poverty Few ex-prisoner families achieved a good standard of living. Discrimination in accessing employment and the prevalence of informal work arrangements created a cycle of poverty and low income within the ex- prisoner community. Many spoke of the fear that this cycle of poverty would be passed on to the next generation, the lack of a financial legacy to pass on to children and also the discrimination that children of ex-prisoners can still face in accessing employment.

Impact on families & children It is clear that the issues facing ex-prisoners are not confined to the individual ex-prisoner: the impact on their partners, children and extended family has been profound. The families and children of ex-prisoners also suffer the backlash of labelling and suffer associated levels of discrimination and exclusion.

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Although children might not advertise the fact that their father was an ex- prisoner, other people would be aware of it and children were frequently hassled about it. Most children suffered from their fathers’ prolonged absence and some exhibited anti-establishment attitudes that crossed into antisocial behaviour. Some became very political, others very anti-political later on.

Partners also suffered from the long-term absence of the other partner. Many suffered isolation and exclusion within the local community. Neighbours ‘cut off links with you', adding to the stress involved in taking care of a young family on one’s own. Many relationships ended as ex- prisoners found it difficult to re-establish their relationships with their partners. In some cases, their partners had not waited for them.

Many families also suffered the associated issues of displacement which further exacerbated the experience of isolation, exclusion and discrimination. Families were divided and access to and support from the extended family was limited.

Surveillance & harassment Surveillance by the gardai and worry about travelling north resulted in many deciding not to do so. Gardai surveillance of people attending homecomings was a problem. The employers of ex-prisoners were informed which sometimes resulted in dismissal. Prisoners and their families spoke of the sense of 'being watched', and the impact surveillance, harassment and the constant threat of raids on their homes had on their lives and the lives of their children.

Many ex-prisoners developed a mistrust of authority and found it difficult to differentiate between different forms of authority. Experience of the authorities discouraged many from using any part of the state: there was a reluctance to use state services, or its arbitration systems in the event of a dispute, for fear of drawing attention to oneself.

Health Many ex-prisoners suffered from stress, depression and poor health. Many prisoners emerged from prison traumatized and in poor health, there was no active help or support structures within the prison system and services after release were very often poor.

Identity Many experienced a problem of identity: Were you northern or southern? Children especially experienced an identity crisis, identifying with the north while growing up in the south. Those who lived in the border regions were

94 seen as 'free staters' in the north and northerners in Dublin and the rest of the south.

The future The work being done at ground level within the ex-prisoner community is important in building up an acceptance and recognition of the needs and issues associated with the ex-prisoner community. Community work is seen as a positive way of rebuilding the lives and confidence of ex-prisoners. Most ex-prisoners are now in the 40s and 50s (the youngest internee is now 50, for example). Little attention has been given as to how they should be assisted into retirement, a situation many will reach from around 2010. Few ex-prisoners have financial resources and for a significant number, their family relationships have broken down, leaving them single.

6.2 Displaced persons

The principal issues arising from the displaced persons focus group were:

Differences of experience The experience of displacement was quite varied, reflecting many different personal circumstances. Some were forced out of their homes, while others left because a family member had been killed. For some people, it was much more difficult than others. For others, there was no particular single event which caused displacement, but a culmination of many.

Identity Many experienced a loss of a sense of belonging. In the south, you were called a blow-in or a northerner and made to feel like an outsider. People became refugees in their own country. There was a loss of identity, of where allegiances lay, except for Republicans, who felt allegiance to the Republican community. This identity crisis is particularly evident among the children of displaced families. Many children identify Belfast as ‘home’, despite living and often being born in the south.

Isolation & exclusion The sense of isolation spoken about by the displaced community was both physical and emotional. Many didn't feel part of the community in the south either socially or culturally. They spoke of feeling 'trapped, cocooned', cut off from their families and the life they knew.

Some had a feeling of being watched. Anyone either openly Republican or considered Republican was shunned at the workplace and in pubs people were frightened to be associated with them. They were angered about the way in which the northern conflict was portrayed in the media, they felt 95 THE EMERALD CURTAIN

demonized and labelled within the community. Any trouble was ‘blamed on the northerners'. For them, the quality of life did not improve markedly following their arrival in the south.

Rejection This was not universal, but some displaced people felt that they had been discriminated against in the south just as much as in the north. 'We didn't expect to be welcomed with open arms, but we didn't expect what we got either’. Displaced persons were accused of taking the best jobs and getting the best housing. Similarities were drawn with the treatment and situation facing the current population of refugees and asylum seekers. 'You expected better because it was your own country'.

Community within a community Many described the displaced community as a 'community within a community'. With no access to traditional family support networks and in the absence of support from the state or the wider community in the south, the community looked to each other for support. It created its own informal support structures: for many, there was safety and comfort in their shared experiences. Many did not want to become part of the wider community, didn't want to integrate or get involved, preferring instead to stay within their 'own community'. For many integration into the wider community would constitute an acceptance of their situation. Many resented living in the south, the decision to move had not been made voluntarily and they felt they had 'been forced out of one situation and forced into another'.

Impact on families & children Some northern women became very isolated if their partner moved south. If the entire family moved south, the women in the household found themselves isolated, living in areas where there was no family support and no one they knew.

Displacement was particularly hard for children, having to 'leave behind all they knew'. Many parents worried how children would cope, whether other children would accept them. Children suffered from the identity and labelling problems affecting their parents. If children followed their parents' Republican politics, parents were accused of indoctrinating them. There is a continuing worry about the effect displacement has had on children as they grew older.

Benefits For some northerners who moved south, there were benefits. There was a relief not to be under security surveillance. Religion was not an issue when applying for jobs, whilst religion and the school you went to was something

96 applicants were very much aware of in the north. They were very much aware of catholic-protestant relationships which had not improved much in the north but were not a day-to-day issue in the south.

Poverty The financial situation of displaced families in the south has not improved over the time: many moved from a disadvantaged community in the north to one in the south, from discrimination in one place to discrimination in another. Work had been hard to find and people felt financially and emotionally stressed.

The future With the conflict over, many face a choice as to: Where to go to now? At one level, some displaced people did want to go back to the north. But what was left for them there? Family homes were gone and families were now broken up. Most could not go back and could not afford to do so. They were angry about their lost years as displaced people and their uncertain future. There was, for many, a reluctant acceptance that they were now permanently part of the south.

6.3 Women

The principal issues arising from the women's group were:

Hidden Gender equality issues in the southern border counties were subtle, hard to pin down and so deeply rooted in the many other problems of the area that they were difficult to isolate and identify.

Isolation, division, disruption The isolation of border communities was felt strongly. The border, exacerbated by road closures and security checkpoints, broke up parishes, left communities enclosed and disrupted social and economic patterns.

There was a division of families across the border, with family members no longer visiting each other. Even people from other parts of the south would not come to visit the border region, either because they thought Monaghan was part of the north or too dangerous anyway, nor would relatives visit from England. The fracturing of family support networks and access to the extended family had a particularly isolating impact on young women in the home.

There was a fracturing of shopping patterns. Shoppers were slowed on

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their journeys to market days on the other side by security checks and then had to organize themselves around different currencies and currency rates.

Political abandonment, punishment There was a sense of abandonment by government. There was a feeling that people were being punished for supporting Republicans and independents in elections. There was no inward investment into the region: 'we lost the army, we lost the furniture factory, we lost the seed factory and we only got very small outfits to replace them'. Many felt that it was policy at national level not to give the border region anything because it was seen not to vote the right way. Tourism, jobs, investment did not come into the southern border counties. Many women felt there was more economic opportunity for advancement in the north because education was better there. There was a lack of political voice for women in the border countries.

Tension People were put off travelling into the north because of the security checks, the hassle and intimidation involved, being told not to go to particular places or the wrong areas, fear of the Ulster Defence Regiment at checkpoints. The checkpoints became a normal part of life, but their real effects were not properly appreciated. On top of the tension, mothers worried for their children - that they would get involved in the conflict and put themselves in danger.

Some small benefits Some aspects of the conflict brought mixed benefits. Castleblayney was estimated to have benefited economically from the presence of more soldiers in the town. Some had done well out of smuggling, but there was huge resentment of the way in which some people had done well out of the border through dishonest trading, kickbacks and smuggling. Living on the border brought some advantages, such as the wider range of consumer goods available by crossing into the north for shopping. Religion was not as big an issue as north of the border, though it could still be in the event of a mixed marriage. For those used to the conflict in the north, the atmosphere was much more relaxed on the southern side.

6.4 Protestant minority community

The principal issues arising from the protestant minority focus group were:

Identity The protestant community experienced identity problems at several levels. Southerners perceived them to be different, leftovers of the empire, as coming from Scottish presbyterians. Protestants themselves spoke of 98 feeling different, feeling like an outsider, a sense of orientation or belonging elsewhere.

Several looked toward Northern Ireland, for example Derry, for shopping, second level education and further afield for third level. Many Donegal protestants who went north for secondary education went on to the northern labour market and did not return to the county, reducing the protestant community there further still. Some southern protestants joined the British security forces and as a result could not safely visit their homes south of the border county again.

Problems of identification with, involvement in, the new state The level of political representation by the protestant community remains poor, reflecting a low level of public involvement, 'keeping to ourselves'. The integration of protestants in the southern state was impeded by the compulsory Irish policy. This was an obvious difficulty for southern protestants who went across the border for secondary education but was also a difficulty for those who found it a difficult language, where there had not been a prior family exposure to the language or where it was seen as having political overtones. As a result, public service employment became a problem area for protestants e.g. few protestants join the Gardai (one cited figures that there were only 14 protestants out of 12,000). Many felt there was job discrimination for southern protestants educated in the north.

Abandonment Many experienced a strong sense of abandonment by Britain in 1921, but kept their hopes alive until 1925 that the Boundary Commission would put them back on the right side of the border. Protestants on the southern side of the border felt that they had been left on the wrong side of the border. They were also disappointed when Derry farmers persuaded the British government to impose duties on southern milk coming across from Donegal, in order to keep milk prices up in Derry.

Self-imposed isolation Quite a number gradually moved north when the conflict worsened in the 1970s. Among the protestant community, there was a sense of keep your head down, don't draw attention to yourself, get on with your work, don't talk about the war. The protestant community tended to hold on to its parish halls, using them only for the protestant community and not applying for public money that would require cross-community use. There was a tendency for protestant businesses to favour the employment of protestant workers. A sense of tension was most evident in the protestant community along the border corridor but might hardly be evident at all in the parishes distant from the borderline.

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Disruption, leading to economic decline Many protestants had a pattern of shopping across the border. This diminished with the break with sterling. Many had accounts in the north but they were obliged to close them by the Revenue Commissioners. For many years after partition, many Donegal protestants continued to travel to Derry and other northern border towns to work, but these jobs gradually ebbed away, leaving a 'dead end community'. The economic war in the 1930s was considered to have done much damage to cross-border trade and the farming community was badly hit. The Newry canal, formerly a busy waterway distributing coal and corn products throughout the border communities, slipped into disuse as the border affected those trading patterns.

Peace, but crime Participants identified as a negative consequence of the ceasefires a growth in break-ins. This was due to a reduced security presence. Break-ins declined during the foot-and-mouth epidemic when security was temporarily restored.

Need for single identity work Many spoke of the need for single identity work with the protestant community and the necessity for funders to recognize this. Many spoke of a reluctance to apply for cross community funding and to engage in cross community work. Many feared that the protestant community was not ready yet to engage effectively in cross community work.

6.5 Clones/Erne east

The principal issues arising from the Clones/Erne east focus group were:

Immediate disruption The period of the conflict had a big impact on the town: a sense of being cut off; additional journey lengths; the reduction in social contact; the tension arising from endless searches and checkpoints, especially for women, and a big fall in social life. Some of the consequences were very practical. For example, people could not get help from the gardai because the quickest route took guards through the north, which was not permitted.

Enduring disruption The consequences of the road closures are felt to be still enduring. They cut off commercial and trading contact for years. People felt the tradition of cross-border marriage and social contact had been ruptured. They produced a constant state of tension and unease. There is still resentment 100 that the effects of the closures were punitively social and economic and of no military benefit.

Political neglect People in Clones felt a sense of political neglect; depression and helplessness in the town; and it was little surprise that young people tended to leave. The group listed many of the traditional family businesses that had either left the town or closed - in such trades as chemists, furniture, law and printing. The town had declined to the point that it was not considered a desirable place in which to live. Even teachers in the secondary school in the town lived outside it and commuted in. Even after the end of the conflict, the government has been slow to restore the town. Broadband was brought to Monaghan and Cavan, but not to Clones (similarly, on the northern side, it was brought Enniskillen and Lisnaskea, but not to Roslea).

Still no economic improvement Although very few people left the area because of the conflict, the negative environment meant that no new people moved in. Improvement has been slow in Clones, businesses are still failing and there are still premises to let and for sale for a long period. The upturn in the region has benefited Monaghan, Cavan and Enniskillen. Trading and shopping patterns around Clones were broken a generation ago and many fear that they may never return. People got out of the habit of coming to Clones. The same is true of the rural areas of west Monaghan, where there is depopulation, bad roads and a sense of depression. In the Connons area, many houses still lie derelict. In the north, there are grants for restoring houses, but not in the south - yet renovation would bring people back to the area. There is still insufficient investment in physical infrastructure - for example, there is still no community facility in Clones. Despite all the funding available for the border region, little seems to be going to the immediate area around the border.

Community development Such improvement as there has been has come from community development activities for example, Drum community development group has brought confidence back into the local community, things are now getting done and childcare services may be developed. Elsewhere, computer training has brought people into community activity and there is resulting life and vibrancy, breaking the fatalism of the past.

Although things have improved at community level, jobs and investment have still to follow. One project that could make a huge difference is the reopening of the Ulster canal. If devolved government were to return to Northern Ireland, then hopes would be high for such a project. The stretch from Clones to Belturbet would be huge boost. A third level college in the

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region would keep people there, saving the strain for parents of children studying in Dublin or Dundalk. Hospital services require development and could and should be provided on a cross-border basis.

6.6 Specific conclusions

It is apparent that the southern border communities have suffered a range of interconnected effects. The focus groups amplify and provide a level of detail and contemporary experience on many of the issues identified in earlier chapters, such as local and regional economic decline, peripheralization, the direct and indirect effects of violence and social disconnection. The individual focus groups add a number of dimensions. These are grouped under five appropriate headings.

6.6.1 Ex-prisoners In the case of ex-prisoners, it is apparent that many issues affecting this group have yet to be addressed. Positively, the supports put in place to assist the reintegration of ex-prisoners, both through the Peace programmes and otherwise, have had important positive outcomes and given this group a sense of re-belonging to the community. Equally, it is apparent that there is a substantial bundle of issues yet to be resolved around the legal status of ex-prisoners. This group continues to face difficulty in accessing employment due to both legal and illegal discrimination. Concretely, the reintegration of ex-prisoners will not be complete until such time as present legal barriers are lifted in the area of discrimination in employment, the holding of vehicle licences and travel. Many ex-prisoners, aware of these difficulties, prefer to aim for self- employment, but even this can be difficult, due to obsolete skills. The focus group identified a number of areas where support systems should be improved. Two stand out. First, it is clear that the families and children of ex- prisoners have faced and still face difficulties of adjustment, but it is less clear whether any statutory social services have assisted them. Second, levels of mental illness, stress and poor adjustment have been reported, yet the level of assistance to help prisoners work through these difficulties is not evident.

McKearney (2003) has put forward the proposal that a service be developed, modelled on the Lifeline service in Canada, which would prepare prisoners for adjustment to life in the community after a long period in prison. Jamieson & Grounds (2002) drew attention to the need to recognize the shortcomings in the existing arrangements for the rehabilitation and resettlement of ex-prisoners and appealed for a lifting of the barriers to employment, travel and other social norms imposed on them. These would require administrative and legislative action. 102 6.6.2 Displaced persons The displaced persons focus group echoes several of the problems facing ex-prisoners, such as isolation, stigmatization and problems of identity, especially for children. Discrimination may be less direct, but there is still a sense of exclusion. There is little evidence of any outreach by health or social services to assist their families and their children. While displaced people survived in their new locations, they do not appear to have thrived and have not prospered educationally, financially or economically.

6.6.3 Women For women in southern border communities not in employment, social contact, networks and interaction are all the more important. These were shattered by the conflict, the road closures and the militarization of the area. Isolation was compounded by a sense of abandonment by government, be that reflected in the lack of municipal facilities or the lack of inward investment bringing jobs.

6.6.4 Protestant minority community The protestant minority community has shared in a sense of abandonment, isolation, neglect and decline, albeit for entirely different reasons. Protestants also experienced the levels of military-induced tension reported by women. There was a sense of discrimination in public service employment.

6.6.5 Clones/Erne east The Clones group paints a picture of extreme geographical exclusion that descended on the area from 1920. A once-prosperous market town was ruined by one disaster after another coming in waves: partition, the economic war, the border campaign, railway closure, the conflict, cratering and the break with sterling. The breaking of social links was more severe each time, exacerbated by the military presence around the area. At this stage, commercial and trading patterns have been broken for so long that they may never recover. There is anger that the government not only did so little to help but actually contributed to the towns demise. The area still has good prospects for tourism (e.g. the Ulster canal) that could make a big difference.

6.7 Common themes and issues

Whilst not detracting from the unique and specific perspective of each of the focus groups it is evident from the work of the focus groups that a number of emergent themes and common issues exist across the diverse groups.

Issues associated with identity were raised across several of the groups. At 103

THE EMERALD CURTAIN a general level participants spoke of the question of identity of the border counties themselves and the notion of an 'invisible line' separating the border counties from the rest of the country, a 'no man’s land' where they lived. More specifically, the displaced community spoke of the identity crisis facing the children of displaced families, having grown up in the south but still identifying with the north. The protestant community also spoke of the identity questions facing the southern protestant minority community. Overall, issues and questions of identity; difference; belonging; and questions over allegiances, northern, southern, British, Irish have emerged as a dominant theme within border communities.

Experiences and feelings of exclusion, isolation, division and discrimination also cross the five focus groups. Whilst the specific manifestations of these experiences vary across the groups, they are to varying degrees expressed and referred to by all participants. At a basic level, all of those communities living in the border area have spoken about a profound sense of isolation exacerbated by road closures and security checkpoints. Participants across the different focus groups spoke about feeling trapped, enclosed and cocooned within their own community, both in a geographical and cultural sense.

They have also pointed to a feeling of isolation and exclusion from the wider community in the south, a feeling of neglect and abandonment. The experience of prolonged neglect by the government in addressing the needs and issues of disadvantage within the border region was echoed across the groups. Investment in areas such as job creation, tourism, education and health were called for.

Many participants in the five focus groups reflected a feeling of tension and unease, of intimidation and harassment, a mistrust and fear of authority and security forces. Many referred to an underlying sense of tension that existed in border communities and the impact and stress this caused in the lives of those communities.

The impact on families and particularly the continuing impact on children and the next generation of border communities is again evident across all five focus groups. The ex-prisoner community spoke of the associated discrimination and labelling experienced by their children. The women's group spoke of the fears they carried for children; they also spoke of the need for investment in jobs and education in the border region to create opportunities and to attract young people to stay in the area as did the Clones Erne East group. The protestant community spoke again about ways of keeping young people in the area and of protecting and continuing the protestant culture and identity in the face of falling church attendance. The displaced community spoke of the identity crisis and difficulties facing children. It is clear that work needs to be done to ensure that

104 patterns of discrimination and disadvantaged are broken. All groups spoke about disconnection from the extended family and the impact of lack of support from extended family.

Many participants also spoke of the trauma experienced by people in the southern counties as a result of the conflict. The impact felt was similar in kind if not in extent or intensity as that experienced in the north, but has received no acknowledgement. While in the north since the ceasefires a number of victims' organizations now offer counselling, no equivalent services were provided south of the border.

Many areas along the border comprise a complex mix of different communities of interest including those whose views are reflected through the focus groups. The issues are not constant and may vary in intensity, both geographically and overtime. A range of factors will determine the extent to which different issues impact on these communities such as: - The relative size of the community. The ex-prisoner, protestant and displaced people's focus groups which informed this research were focussed on areas where there were high concentrations of members of the respective groups. Other members of these communities are more dispersed in other border areas and as a result more isolated and less visible.

- The mix and inter-linkages between the various communities, where there are two or more communities affected by the border. The situation around Clones is an example where members of all of the five focus groups are living and experiencing the impact of the border.

- The issues identified through the focus groups are sometimes combined with or placed on top of extreme social deprivation e.g. many displaced families found themselves living in areas of extreme social and economic disadvantage.

- Actual proximity to the border is also significant as experiences often appeared to be heightened and more intense dependent on the proximity to the border (e.g. rural communities lying on the border around Clones; the experience of southern protestants living in the area immediately surrounding the border).

- The incidence of violence in the locality over the years is particularly important in determining the impact of these issues on communities and people’s perceptions of the border.

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6.8 Conclusions - the implications for community development

By way of final remarks at this stage, specific conclusions were drawn for each group (6.6) and cross-cutting themes were then identified (6.7). The implications for community development are now drawn out here (6.8).

Recurrent issues to emerge from the focus groups are poverty and social exclusion, concerns of immediate interest to the sponsors of this research, the Combat Poverty Agency and Area Development Management. Many ex- prisoners are now in the 40s and 50s, but, lacking insured work records and family support, will risk of poverty as they reach pensionable age. Similarly, the economic situation of displaced people and their families does not appear to have improved significantly. Women of the southern border counties had little sense of efforts being made to improve their situation. Spatial poverty affecting the Clones district is all too apparent. Focus groups and informants remarked on the value of community development groups in the area. Support for ex- prisoners had made a difference in assisting prisoners to access education, articulate their needs as a group and find their way to economic improvement. Clones Community Forum has begun the process of assisting what had hitherto been a beleaguered community. Indeed, community development had brought a resurgence of community life there - but this has not been matched by state economic investment. The absence of community development support for the other groups was notable though. There are few women's groups in Monaghan.

The Border Minority Group (2004) makes a strong case for community development within the protestant community. This would have the effect of: - Increasing the confidence of that community, enabling the protestant minority community to articulate its needs and voice and develop its leadership; - Ensuring that it obtained its fair share of public resources (sports, community facilities); - Enabling issues of culture, reconciliation and tolerance to be addressed; - Promoting improved community relations and contributing to the building of a more diverse society in Ireland.

Equally, the benefits of the community development work being done by the Derry and Raphoe Action Group in the protestant community were highlighted by participants in the protestant focus group in Donegal. It was stressed that this is still a relatively new concept within the protestant community and that there is a lot of catching up to be done. This is reinforced by Walsh (2003) who states that the situation of the protestant minority community in the southern border counties is not just a Monaghan issue. The issues are national ones 106 relating both to provision for support for equality of opportunity and to addressing the legacy of the conflict and as such they need support from a national level over a long period. She recommended that support be sought for the development at a national level of a sustained programme of community development for protestant minority communities in the border region. Many people stressed that there was still much work to be done to achieve a better relationship between the protestant community and the main community. The fact that the protestant community had deliberately avoided a high level of visibility did not mean that there were not issues of reconciliation that must be addressed, for there were. The protestant community in the southern border counties had only recently began to engage with mainstream community organizations. This work would require the continued funding of a peace programme of some kind for some time. Organizations like the Monaghan Community Network and Derry and Raphoe Action provide a place where cross-community learning can take place.

These are strong arguments for reinforcing existing community development work, structures and activities in the area, where its value has already been affirmed - and for extending community development approaches, resources and techniques into new communities of interest and needs highlighted here.

This concludes the past and present of the research. Now we explore the issues raised by the study in a European context (chapters 7-8) to see how the work raised by the focus groups may be brought forward in a broader context (chapter 9) before final conclusions are drawn (chapter 10).

107 THE EMERALD CURTAIN Chapter 7 The Irish Border in a European Context THE EMERALD CURTAIN

European integration has not been about removing or altering borders, but about accepting them as permanent and making them as permeable as possible; in fact, about guaranteeing that people, things, commerce, finance and almost everything else can move across them. The Irish border is little different from any other. - Dennis Kennedy, in Logue (1999).

Irish history and contemporary analysis have often been governed by particularism - the belief that our case is unique. The more one examines changing borders, the impacts of borders and models of cross-border development across Europe, the less exceptional the Irish experience seems. European borders have been constantly re-drawn in a process that did not end in the 20th century (Irish Times, 2004). Gillespie (2001) makes the point that only ten European states had the same borders in 1989 as they had in 1889. Many of the issues which we believe to be unique to the Irish border can also be found on other borders, like crossing to Switzerland for cheaper petrol, or to Poland for cheaper shopping, or smuggling, which may be universal.

Having examined the impact of the border in Ireland in general and on the southern border counties in particular, this chapter now moves on to set the Irish border as explored in chapters 2 to 6 in a European context. Can we situate the social experience of the Irish border in a European model? Thanks to an emerging literature on borders and the work of students of borders, this debate is now much better informed than had these questions been posed twenty years ago.

Chapter 7 first examines what are understood to be the impacts of all borders (7.1). Next, the chapter looks to how models of cross-border cooperation evolved (7.2).

7.1 Impact of all borders

Borders are now considered to have a similar pattern of impacts across all European countries. Indeed, Donnan (1999) wrote of how the Irish border was historically, with its queues of lorries, money changers, smuggling and periodic violence evocative of borders even further afield, from Peshawar in Pakistan to Berlin and to Mexico. In a pioneering study, Robb (1995) pointed out that typical features of European borders are: - Distortions to local markets because of exchange rates, leading to fluctuating patterns of cross border shopping; - Border industries developing around cross-border formalities (customs, currency change, documentation); - Lower levels of prosperity than the rest of their state (the Rhine being an exception); 110 - Isolation associated with natural barriers (lakes, mountains); - Disparities, one side often being more prosperous than the other; - Settlement close to one side of the border to take advantage of work opportunities, or price differences on the other (especially housing).

The European Commission (1994) saw the problems of the Irish border as fitting within the broader context of European border areas: peripherality, isolation, remoteness from administrative centres, leading to low levels of income and higher levels of unemployment. But the Irish situation had accentuated peripherality, having no land links to the rest of the European Union, thus increasing transport costs. Commission working documents for the INTERREG programme identified a further common set of problems for most European borders (Stutt, 1999), adding to those of Robb above. These the Commission itemized as: - Cutting off communities economically, socially and culturally; - Fragmented management of ecological systems; - Peripheralization within national economies; - Neglect by national governments.

These themes will be familiar enough to readers by this stage. How applicable are they to Ireland? KPMG (1996), emphasized that the Irish border had isolated larger towns from their natural hinterlands and inhibited the development of normal economic and social relations. Bradley (2001), in his analysis of the impact of the border, returned to the question of hinterlands, what he called its ‘spatial disruptive effects’. The border cut north and east Donegal off from its Derry hinterland, north Louth and east Monaghan from their Newry hinterlands, causing a problem of internal peripherality. He cited an unpublished Industrial Development Authority report on the difficulties the authority experienced in trying to persuade companies to locate in the north west. Their reluctance was attributed to poor road and air access, the northern troubles, limited sub-suppliers and small urban structure.

‘Back to back’ approaches to economic development in border areas were also identified as a part of the cross-border problematic (ADM/CPA, 1999). ‘Back to back’ is the process whereby governments develop up to each side of their own border but do not cooperate across the borders concerned. Hamilton (2001) noted how Ireland fell, like many other European countries, into this mode of development:

A continuing legacy of the border is that the physical infrastructure has been developed within each region in physical isolation from the other, with little account taken, until recently, of how it could best be coordinated to maximize all-island development needs. The border has created areas of internal peripherality and cut regions off from their natural economic hinterlands. Road

111 THE EMERALD CURTAIN and rail networks were largely developed according to intra-regional priorities rather than the needs of the island as a whole.

This was exacerbated by the highly centralized nature of decision-making both in Belfast and Dublin and the different economic agenda followed by the two states. We return to some of these themes later, when we look at the story of Irish cross-border development.

Leontidou, Afouxenidis, Donnan et al (2004) make a valuable contribution to our understanding of borders by distinguishing between central borders and peripheral borders. Some central border regions, like the Rhine, are self- evidently prosperous. But Ireland shares characteristics similar to other borders in the peripheral regions of Europe - a disadvantaged labour market, unemployment, dependence on traditional economic sectors, higher rates of deprivation, restraints on trade, a widespread informal economy and fractured social relations. Social marginalization and spatial marginalization compound one another. A particular feature of these peripheral borders is that the people of these regions experience difficulty in finding and expressing their political voice. Borders diminish their self-confidence and their ability to act as social agents. If one overlays an additional problem of conflict, then the problems of peripheral borders are accentuated. Confrontational borders are likely to be even more marginalized than cooperative ones. Ireland may share some similarities with Cyprus - another island with a conflicted border, also peripheral to the European land mass.

7.2 Models of cross-border cooperation

The review now moves on to consider models of cross-border cooperation. These are important in two respects. First, because they are necessarily based on assumptions on the impact of borders in the first instance, seeking to diminish those impacts. Second, they point the way to what might be possible on the Irish border in the future.

An axiomatic feature of these studies is that the impacts of borders have generally been considered, from an economic view at least, to be negative. A pivotal point in this discussion was the Cecchini report initiated by European President Jacques Delors (1985-95). Cecchini (1988) investigated what he called the cost of the ‘non-Europe’: how frontiers and different national practices created inefficiencies that retarded the European economy and made it an unsuccessful competitor in the global economy, especially compared to its prime rivals, the United States and Japan. Cecchini estimated that the gains to be achieved from removing border and national barriers affecting trade, production and competition, coupled with economies of scale, would be in the

112 order of €200bn (Baine, Bennington & Russell, 1992). The impacts of borders were considered to be: • Problems arising from administrative differences; • Different national standards inhibiting cross-border trading and procurement; • Distortion of costs due to different national systems and indirect taxes, inhibiting cross-border trading and retailing (e.g. the car sector, drinks trade) • The retarding of trade and transport due to customs checks and formalities. These issues are familiar to readers of chapter 3.

The Cecchini report ultimately played a major role in the development of what we now call the single market and the INTERREG programme of cross-border cooperation (Jones & Budd, 1995).

Although in the popular mind the development of cross border cooperation is associated with the European Union, the single market and INTERREG, in reality it predates the European Union. One could even make the point that the treaty of 1921 established an advanced model of cross-border cooperation in Ireland, although it turned out to be stillborn. European cross-border cooperation dates to the late 1950s and began with exchanges between officials on both sides of borders, the extent of their relationship dependant on the moods of their prevailing capitals (Christiansen, 1999). The idea properly belongs to the Council of Europe, established some years earlier in 1949. The Strasbourg-based council first promoted a triangular policy of cooperation between European institutions, national states and border regions, developing these models on the Dutch, German, Belgian, French and Swiss borders. This led eventually to the Framework convention on transfrontier cooperation (1981). The European Communities’ INTERREG programme was in part, a successful attempt to seize this high ground; a means of strengthening the imminent single market; and a belated attempt to counteract the potentially centralizing tendencies of the single market (O’Dowd, 1994).

This battle between the regions and the national capitals was an early, latent and almost universal feature of cross-border relationships and experiences, from which Ireland was not to be spared. When the regional authorities of Saar, Lorraine and Luxembourg developed a cooperation project on the French-German-Luxembourg border, reviving old economic ties and industries (coal and steel), they soon found that they were testing the limits of tolerance of their national centres, but they eventually and successfully formed one of the earliest zones of European cross-border cooperation.

They were followed by a coalition of local authorities in North Rhine Westphalia, lower Saxony and four Dutch provinces, who eventually formed themselves into

113 THE EMERALD CURTAIN a European region or Euregio for short. Facing a series of national administrative and bureaucratic hurdles, they too had to work hard to build their institutions, pushing back the limits of what they could do together. Not until the 1990s did the Franco-German-Dutch cooperation groups reach maturity, eventually symbolized by a state treaty between these countries. A number of features of this Euregio stand out (Meijer, 1999). The triangle that it occupied at the junction of the Rhine, Ijssel and Ems was once a poor one, exacerbated by the collapse of traditional industries there in the 1970s. Its situation has now much improved, which most people attribute to the level of cooperative economic development undertaken in the area. Strikingly, the cooperation is underpinned by a strong intercultural, interprofessional civil society programme in which about 150,000 people participate every year.

Another instructive case for Ireland is that of Schleswig. Although this border is no longer confrontational, it was settled almost the same year as temporary partition in Ireland (1920) and likewise left minorities on either side: Danes on the German side of the border and Germans on the Danish side (Becker–Christensen, 2001). Tensions and disagreements between the respective majorities and minorities persisted until the Copenhagen - Bonn declarations (1955) set a new framework for the coexistence of these minorities. Sectoral cooperation began in 1972 with the Joint Committee for Flensburg Fjord and this was followed by a much broader cooperation body, the Danish German Forum in 1977. This evolved into what was initially known as Euroregion Schleswig (1996), with a joint council, secretariat and management system for cross border cooperation. The reason for relaying this institutional trajectory is to show how a project can evolve, albeit quite slowly, in a region dating to the same period of border demarcation as that in Ireland and with a minority problem embedded in the process.

A further model is evident in the case of the PAMINA cross-border region of Karlsruhe, Strasbourg and Heidelberg, so named after the regions of PAlatinate, MIddle Upper Rhine and Nord Alsace. Comparisons with Ireland can again be made, for this border was contested as recently as 1940; and the region had been neglected by the authorities on both sides. Again, this was a cooperative enterprise between the local authorities of the region, beginning with a common analysis, joint cross-border development plan and eight pilot projects. This led to a joint secretariat, information centre and cross-border administrative union ratified by the inter-state Karlsruhe treaty of 1996.

O’Dowd (1994) and other analysts warn us that cross-border histories vary in their origins, longevity, permeability, quality, formality and informality. This is true, but Gillespie (2001) has drawn together a useful typology of cross border development:

114 Alienated, actively contested borderlands where cooperation is minimal

Coexistent borderlands, where conflicts are managed but cooperation is at a low level

Interdependent borderlands, with a mixture of controls and limited sectoral cooperation

Integrated borderlands, where these barriers are discarded to form a viable region

Laffan & Paine (2001) refined this typology and presented trajectories of evolution that could be summarised as follows:

Forums of consultation, with weak and limited structures leading to

Networks of cooperation between existing entities leading to

Structures formed to operate the INTERREG programme – projects in defined sectors leading to

Integrated structures, with broad cooperation across all socio-economic activities (Euregio)

In studying the Irish border later (chapter 8), we can trace an evolution through these stages. Here, features of immature cross-border cooperation are all too evident, such as: • Insufficient and erratic resourcing; • Back-to-back, rather than genuinely integrated projects; • An emphasis on physical infrastructure; • Disregard for soft factors such as social capital and trust. These elements are quickly evident in the Irish experience. Clearly the Euregio represents the highest, most mature, ultimate form of cross-border cooperation. Euregio integrated structures operate at several levels: consultative (between local authority councillors), management (between local authority officials), with a joint planning office and secretariat, with a degree of financial and political autonomy from their national governments. They are permanent, have a distinct legal identity, their own decision-making systems, and own administrative, technical and financial resources (Gabbe (1999)). 36 Euregio structures now exist. They are most common on the borders of Germany, France, Benelux and the nordic countries. They are still in formation, with the most recent, Euregio Mediterranean - Pyrenees formed in November 2004.

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Still, the European Commission pointed out that ‘strong’ Euregio cooperation is still the exception, not yet the norm (Stutt, 1999).

7.3 European Union policies for cross-border development and programming

Next we trace European Union interest in cross-border cooperation and programming. From the 1970s, the European Communities (as they were then termed) had experimented with structural fund grants as a means of overcoming disadvantage in designated regions: Belfast and Naples were early beneficiaries of what were then termed ‘integrated operations’. From 1980-5, what was called a non-quota component of the European Regional Development Fund was made available for border areas on this basis. Cross- border cooperation was encouraged but not a condition of aid and in practice most such non-quota projects functioned on a back-to-back basis (Laffan & Payne, 2001).

Cross-border cooperation became a theme within the Community Initiative Programmes launched in 1988 as part of the reformed structural funds. This took programmatic form as INTERREG, which eventually ran as INTERREG I, II and III and now the new objective for territorial cooperation. In INTERREG I, the Commission encouraged the development of cross-border projects by shared administrative or institutional structures in the place of back-to-back development. Little notice appears to have been taken of this exhortation in Ireland, where the European Court of Auditors 1994 annual report complained that not enough of the projects funded were genuinely transfrontier and there were similar comments from other countries. When INTERREG II followed a pattern similar to I, the Commission tightened the guidelines for INTERREG III, requiring a genuine cross-border component, or projects on one side of one border to have a demonstrable impact on the other.

The European Commission outlined its model for cross-border development in The future of cross border and interregional cooperation. One of the first things it acknowledged was how difficult it was to work out a detailed modus operandi for cross-border activities. Despite these difficulties, the Communities endeavoured to push back the limits of what was possible. In 2004, the European Commission announced the ending of the INTERREG programme and that it would be mainstreamed as the new objective for territorial cooperation of the structural funds in 2007. The European Commission (2004) states that there will be ‘integrated programmes managed by a single authority’ acting under the authority of a new legal instrument in the form of a cross- border regional authority. In effect, the Euregio is to be the standard model of development.

116 To develop this model, we see the following evolution:

Evolution Phase

Realization of common problems INTERREG I (1989-93) Opening of process Experimental cooperation INTERREG II (1994-99) Generation of strategic thinking Devolution INTERREG III (2000-06) Cooperation between regions New objective for Withdrawal of central govenment territorial cooperation Self-governing cross border cooperation (2007 - 2013)

7.4 Conclusions

This chapter has shown that the Irish border has characteristics that are familiar to students of borders throughout the European continent. Ireland fits in well with this experience. Within Europe, we may make a distinction between the borders of central regions, which tend to be more prosperous and where cooperation has historically been stronger; and peripheral borders, where the problems of borders are most problematical. But even strong central borders have had to overcome problems of conflict, distance from government and relative economic disadvantage, as our examples from the Rhine and Schleswig illustrated.

Cross-border cooperation, was not, as we saw a European Community idea, but one developed by the Council of Europe. The European Communities certainly breathed new life and fresh impetus into such cooperation, both through the single market project and the development of the INTERREG programme. Through the combined impact of the Council of Europe experience, the single market programme and INTERREG, model trajectories of cross-border cooperation developed. In the next chapter, 8, we can see how these evolved in Ireland.

117 THE EMERALD CURTAIN Chapter 8 Evolution of Cross-border Cooperation in Ireland THE EMERALD CURTAIN

Nothing that is happening between the two jurisdictions - or planned to happen - bears comparison with the vast resourcing of Franco - German youth exchanges in the aftermath of the second world war, where the hugely ambitious and ultimately realized intention was to effect fundamental cultural changes in the way in which the future citizens of these two countries viewed one another. - Andy Pollak, Director of the Centre for Cross Border Studies

Chapter 8 examines the evolution and development of cross-border cooperation in Ireland, with an eye to its impact on the border and the communities living there. First, the historical evolution is traced (8.1). The evolution of the INTERREG programme in Ireland is then narrated (8.2). The present programme, INTERREG III, is then described (8.3) before an examination of the civil society role within the programme (8.4). Other forms of cross-border cooperation, beyond the INTERREG programme, are then reported, first in the Peace programme (8.5) and then under the Good Friday Agreement (8.6). Conclusions are then drawn (8.7).

8.1 Historical evolution

Cross-border cooperation was an important aspect of the Anglo-Irish settlement of 1921. The arrangements proposed at the time were advanced by the European standards of the day. The Government of Ireland Act established: - A Council of Ireland - Equal representation of the two governments in Ireland on the Council - Designated cooperation in such areas as railways, fisheries, contagious animal diseases and other public services agreed between the two jurisdictions.

As noted already in chapter 2, in the tripartite agreement of 1925, the President of the Executive Council agreed to let the council lapse, agreeing with the Northern Ireland Prime Minister that there should be informal meetings between the two governments instead. However, no such meetings ever took place (Murray, 2004).

Contact between the two governments was minimal until the Lemass - O’Neill meetings of 1965. Students of these events have tended to focus on the political outcomes and consequences of these events, especially for Captain O’Neill. Here, the relevance is in the cooperation areas proposed. Lemass proposed structured cooperation in the following areas: - Abolition of restrictions on private cars crossing the border; - Exchanges of students, teachers and scholarships; - Cooperation in culture and tourism; - The sharing of health services; 120 - Joint bidding for industrial investment from abroad; - Joint agricultural research; - The reduction of tariffs; - Electricity cooperation, including the joint development of nuclear power; and - Protection of fisheries.

The Lemass - O’Neill rapprochement also opened prospects for the normalization of intergovernmental relationships, but such hopes quickly vanished with the conflict in 1968. The Republic’s government had frosty relationships, at best, with the Stormont government over 1968-72 and following its suspension dealt directly with the British government. Although the Republic’s government and opposition had ongoing contacts with the northern political parties, it had few systems for intergovernmental, interagency or interinstitutional cooperation for many years.

This vacuum in institutional contact prompted a response from civil society. Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), or voluntary and community organizations, felt that there was an important role for people-to-people cooperation. They argued that in the absence of governmental cooperation, it was all the more important that trust be built between the people of both parts of the island through informal contacts. In the terminology of international peace-making, this is called ‘track 2 diplomacy’ whereby civic organizations and citizens complement the peace-building efforts of governments (track 1). Perhaps the best known of these groups was Cooperation North, later renamed Cooperation Ireland, which establish structured systems of cooperation between schools, educators, youth groups and civic associations. In addition, a small number of organizations established themselves to make a specific political contribution to seeking solutions to the conflict, though not all were able to last (e.g. Peace Train, New Consensus). The most enduring of these proved to the Glencree Centre for Reconciliation.

Returning to cross-border cooperation, this was principally developed by Cooperation Ireland and was mainly funded by donations from Ireland and abroad. By 1995, the Centre for Peace & Development Studies at the University of Limerick estimated that there were about 330 bodies cooperating on a north-south basis, a figure rising to 500 by 1998 (Murray, 1998). The level of cooperation varied - from the occasional to the continuous, from the sporadic to the undertaking of joint projects. Not many formed themselves into permanent structures. An exception was the establishment by the Confederation of Irish Industry and the Confederation of British Industry of a Joint Business Council (1991). The initiative came from the north and it proved to one of the most effective examples of track 2 diplomacy, with many benefits to the business community and the economies of both parts of the island.

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Inter-governmental cooperation remained minimal during most of the conflict. Bradley (1996) notes that several joint initiatives were proposed by local authority and tourism promotion organizations in the 1980s, but they failed to obtain governmental support. He points out the irony that there was a good example of regional development in the Republic of Ireland led by state and regional agencies – but it was in Shannon, not on the border (it may not be coincidental that the area covered by Shannon Development is now the richest part of the Republic outside Dublin).

The first sign of change was the International Fund For Ireland (IFI), set up in 1986 following the Anglo-Irish agreement. Although structured as a private funding body, it was funded by the governments of the United States, New Zealand, Australia, Canada and by the European Union to promote the economic and social development of Northern Ireland and the six border counties of the Republic. Its board and advisory body were appointed by the British and Irish governments and it operated from the Department of Foreign Affairs. Its brief was to promote economic and social advance and encourage contact, dialogue and reconciliation between nationalists and unionists. Between 1986 and 2000, the IFI provided funding for 4,600 projects to the value of €604m in both parts of the island, most in Northern Ireland but also in the southern border counties. In 2002, 225 projects were assisted, to a value of about €32m (International Fund for Ireland, 2003).

8.2 Evolution of the INTERREG programme in Ireland

The INTERREG I programme was the first of three European cross-border programmes. ‘The border’ was defined as the six southern border counties and Northern Ireland except for Belfast and its surrounding area (the later Peace programmes did not make the last distinction).

The INTERREG I programme ran from 1989 to 1994, but was heavily criticized (Stutt 1996). These criticisms focussed on the way in which such cooperation was top-down, tightly controlled by government, supply-led (by grants), limited in nature, disjointed and tactical rather than strategic or lasting. Critics described the programme as having parallel rather than related projects with little connection between them and biased toward infrastructure. Pollak (2001) in his analysis of INTERREG I described it as being insufficiently transfrontier, the two governments using the extra money for their own jurisdictional projects with little reference to, still less cooperation with, the other. O’Dowd, Moore & Corrigan (1994) estimated that only 38% of the programme was used for cross- border purposes. There is now a general acceptance that INTERREG I and II were run on a back-to-back by two central governments acting relatively independently of one another. There was one glowing exception, whereby the

122 two government’s linked the River Shannon to Lough Erne, putting Ireland and Europe’s longest navigable leisure waterway on a cross-border basis.

The Commission responded to this criticism by insisting that, for the €160m INTERREG II, there be a more decentralized management structure. The Commission proposed the appointment of development officers to decentralize, animate and broaden the programme. This was strenuously resisted by the Department of Finance, which eventually agreed to one development officer. His work did not receive the hoped-for endorsement and the new programme continued to operate according to separate agenda, back-to-back, in a piecemeal way. There was no joint management and decision-making continued to be centralized (Laffan & Payne, 2001). Pollak (2001) concurred, describing the lack of commitment to joint civil service management and working as the most serious blockage to genuine cross-border cooperation. There was also little involvement by private, local, regional and voluntary organizations. The highly centralized nature of INTERREG I and II caused considerable irritation not only at local authority and voluntary and community sector level but further afield (Robb, 1995). Although the INTERREG II programme funded 850 projects, the proportion actually reaching community and voluntary organizations was estimated to be very small, less than 1% (Harvey, 1996).

Despite these discouraging circumstances, Robb (1995) sketched the way in which INTERREG could, in the future, be an important vehicle for cross border development. Robb identified the need to support cross-border communities and build their capacity. Robb specifically identified community development as an essential tool of cross-border development, not just to attack poverty and deprivation, but to build the economic capacity of the region, especially SMEs. The European Commission (1997) recognized the importance of building up the human and institutional capacities for cross-border cooperation. By this stage, local authorities had positioned themselves to play a key role in the next programme.

Local authority cooperation networks dated back to the 1970s. The first was the North Western Region Cross Border Group, (1975) based in Derry and comprising the local authorities in Derry, Limavady, Strabane and Donegal. The local authorities of the region were conscious of the discrete nature of the north- western region of the island as an interdependent economy and their sense of remoteness from the centres of power in Belfast and Dublin. The local authorities came together to discuss common issues, lobby for investment in the region, develop the issues arising from their work and carry out practical cooperation. Practical cooperation focussed on such areas as promoting foreign direct investment, regional tourism, waste management and

123 THE EMERALD CURTAIN infrastructure (e.g. ferries). The Eastern Border Region Committee followed in 1976 and the Irish Central Border Area Network in 1995. Stutt points out (1999) that these networks maintained a level of cross-border and regional development during many difficult years of violence, even when the political and economic environment was hostile to doing so.

Over the 1990s and building on the studies and work done in the 1970s and 1980s, three cross border partnerships emerged in Ireland, reflecting the three distinctive cross-border zones. As in Europe, they were based on the local authorities:

North West Region Cross Border Group (NWRCBG) (Donegal County Council, Derry, Limavady and Strabane District Councils);

East Border Region Committee (EBRC) (Monaghan and Louth County Councils; Craigavon, Down, Banbridge, Ards, Newry & Mourne District Councils); and

Irish Central Border Area Network (ICBAN) (Donegal, Sligo, Leitrim, Cavan and Monaghan county councils with Fermanagh, Omagh, Cookstown, Dungannon/South Tyrone and Armagh district councils).

Although they were prospective development agencies for cross-border cooperation programmes, government was slow to turn to them for implementation. Some small funding was made available to the partnership groups under INTERREG II, but it was limited to research and feasibility studies. The three cross-border networks found it extremely hard to persuade the two departments of finance that they had the capacity to manage cross- border cooperation in the forthcoming INTERREG III programme. In the event, the deadlock was broken by the interventions of their respective ministers, Mark Durkan and Charlie McCreevy, assisted by pressure from the European Commission itself. When the INTERREG III programme was finally agreed - after Commission rejection of the first draft plan - the outcome was that NWRCBG, ICBAN and the EBR were awarded delivery of measures 1.1, 1.2 and 1.3 of INTERREG III. This was a sizeable part of a €182m programme. Leaving aside the financial value, the new role for the local authorities marked a radical opening up of INTERREG in Ireland. The arrival of the local authorities meant that Ireland had joined the mainstream of continental cross- border cooperation. Next, INTERREG III is described in more detail (8.3), before we look at the important question of the role of civil society in the programme.

124 8.3 INTERREG III (2000-6)

The following table, 6, gives details of the main elements of the programme, highlighting the local authority network programmes and the civil society programme which will be discussed in more detail later.

Table 6: priorities and measures in INTERREG III

Priority Measures Agency Amount

1: Integrated 1.1 Integrated local Irish Central Border Area €69.01m local development Network (ICBAN) development strategies with strategies North West Region Cross €32.3m 1.2 Knowledge Border Group (NWRCBG) economy and Eastern Border Regional €10.7m 1.3 Human resource Group (EBRG) development and skilling 1.4 Rural The two departments of development agriculture 2: Supporting 2.1 Interregional Government departments €53.89m physical economic responsible for roads, infrastructure infrastructure enterprise, and telecommunications, environment 2.2 Environmental energy and marine protection and management Government departments €20m for the environment 2.3 Renewable energy and energy Government departments €6.8m efficiency responsible for energy 3: Civic and 3.1 Social and ADM/CPA and €19.17m community community Cooperation Ireland networking infrastructure Cooperation and Working €9.58m 3.2 Health & well- Together (CAWT) being 4: Technical 4.1 Monitoring, Special EU Programmes €10.38 assistance evaluation and Body implementation (SEUPB) 4.2 Programme information and publicity

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The development of the INTERREG III programme was slow and many operations did not effectively get under way until 2004. The programme has a complex management structure with a standing committee, monitoring committee and a system of project selection through measure assessment, verification by Joint Technical Secretariat and for larger projects, economic appraisal and then a further round of departmental scrutiny. The lessons arising from INTERREG I and II appear to have been taken to heart. Projects are expected to be conceived, developed, managed and implemented on a cross- border basis. There appears to be a general acceptance that projects must be demonstrably cross-border and that the old days of back-to-back development are over. Reports from the standing and monitoring committees indicate that these criteria are now scrupulously applied.

8.4 Civil society in INTERREG III

A serious weakness of INTERREG I and II in Ireland was that they neither funded projects by community and voluntary organizations, nor did they involve civil society in the management of the programme. INTERREG III attempts to make good these defects through the work of the local authority networks (1.1, 1.2 and 1.3) and the people-to-people measure (3.1). INTERREG III also includes two NGO representatives on its standing committee (21 members) and three on its monitoring committee (30 members).

The INTERREG III legislation specifies ‘cross-border social integration’ as one of the areas of work of the programme, specifically:

Increased communication and cooperation between citizens, private or voluntary organizations and administration and institutions to develop the relations and institutional basis underlying cross-border integration in border areas (Official Journal of the European Union, C226, 10.09.2004).

In advance of INTERREG III, Stutt (1999) advised the local authority networks to adjust their membership to comprise half councillors and the other half social partner organizations, including the voluntary and community sector. The European Commission (1997), in laying down its outline for INTERREG III, was insistent on a local territorial approach, bottom-up strategies and the involvement of a balanced, representative group of the different socio-economic actors. In the event, the local authority networks reconstituted themselves into two tiers: a board, limited to councillors; and a broader partnership to manage the INTERREG programme, where civil society is represented. For example, the ICBAN INTERREG partnership comprises 20 local councillors and 20 members drawn from the classic social partners and the Local Strategy Partnerships (LSPs) (Northern Ireland) and the County Development Boards (CDBs) (Republic). Voluntary and community sector representatives are 126 selected through the LSP and CDB representation. In the case of the Eastern Border Region, the INTERREG III partnership comprises 14 councillors (two from each of the seven local authorities/district councils) and 14 social partners (two from each of the seven local authority areas, selected by the Local Strategy Partnerships (NI) and the County Development Boards (RI)).

INTERREG III introduced a new priority, 3.1, called Civic and community networking, which matched the people-to-people elements of continental European cross-border cooperation. It is a small but important part of the new programme, about 9% of the total. 3.1 has been operated by ADM/CPA in cooperation with Cooperation Ireland. The aim of 3.1 is to develop and extend cross-border networks, provide integrated services for the community and voluntary sector and promote cross-border competency in public services, building a sustainable cross-border community infrastructure. Measure 3.1 has a definite focus toward building the ability of civil society to contribute to policies, policy-making and structures. Objectives of the measure include ‘to increase the quality of statutory, voluntary and community sector support of border areas through new planning, policy making and funding arrangements that are based on community development principles’ and support for new cross border structures of participation. Projects must demonstrate that they will ‘Show a contribution to cross border policy development’ (emphasis added). A number of the funded projects do indeed make this a priority.

This measure has been slow to develop, but 60 projects had been approved by autumn 2004 in the areas of networking, capacity building, the health services, sport, mental health and physical planning. An example of 3.1 is the Monaghan Community Network Development of Infrastructure and People Project (DIPP) which is intended to support the development of protestant community halls and facilities. The project will provide resources both for human development (training, diversity awareness) as well as physical development (heating, doors etc). If it comes to fruition, this will be the first statutory funded programme for the development of protestant community infrastructure in the state. Several ICBAN projects under 1.1 have also assisted civil society development.

8.5 Cross-border cooperation in the Peace programme

INTERREG is not the only programme to promote cross-border cooperation in Ireland. The other is of course the Peace programme, which has played an important role in the development of cross-border relations in Ireland, especially at community level. The Peace programme was an initiative by European president Jacques Delors in the period immediately following the ceasefires in August 1994. Jacques Delors argued that European funding could play an important role on consolidating the ceasefire, build peace and reconciliation 127 THE EMERALD CURTAIN and be a model to the rest of Europe in the resolution of conflict. The first Peace programme ran from 1994 to 1999, the second from 2000 to 2004, subsequently extended until 2006 (referred to as Peace I and Peace II respectively).

The Peace programmes were primarily concerned with peace and reconciliation between the two communities in Northern Ireland, but they are important here for several related reasons. First, the programmes had an important element concerned with cross-border operations, 15% in both programmes. Table 7 summarizes those parts of the two programmes committed to cross border cooperation.

Table 7: Cross-border work in the Peace programme Allocation m Peace I: priority 3

3.1 Business & cultural linkages 11.52 3.2 Infrastructure 10.227 3.3 Cooperation between public bodies 12.5 3.4 Cross-border community reconciliation 23.255

Peace II: priority 5 5.1 Improving cross-border development opportunities 23.418 5.2 Improving cross-border public sector cooperation 26.299 5.3 Developing cross-border reconciliation and 16.013 understanding 5.4 Promoting joint approaches to social, education, 29.356 training and human resource development 5.5 Education cross border school and youth cooperation 5.47 5.6 Agriculture and rural development 6.871 5.7 Cross border fishing and agriculture 4.661

To give some current examples, measure 5.1 Improving cross-border development opportunities has already funded over one hundred projects for business development by small and medium-size enterprises. 5.2, Improving cross-border public sector cooperation provided grants for tourism, local authority cooperation and health projects. 5.3 Developing cross border reconciliation and understanding and 5.4 Promoting joint approaches to social, education, training and human resource development has provided a range of grants for voluntary and community organizations.

Second, a substantial part of the overall programme was delivered to voluntary

128 and community organizations, both organizations working close to the border and across the border. The thrust of Peace I was on the delivery of a large number of small grants, the eventual total being around 18,000. 20% of the programme went to the southern border counties and part of this made a significant impact on the development of voluntary and community organizations there.

Third, the programmes appear to have opened up discussion about the conflict and its legacy (though not enough so, in some views). The Peace programme has, many informants say, opened up dialogue within the Republican community, within the protestant community, the unionist community and between all of them. The programme has supported projects with a structured environment in which the tensions of previous years can be discussed and whilst this process is often painful, it has been an important contribution to the process of healing. Several informants contrasted this with the lack of a peace programme after the end of the border campaign in 1962.

A criticism of the Peace I programme was that its aims and objectives became colonized by a broad range of interest groups. As a result, it became a programme for reinvestment in the social, economic, industrial and physical infrastructure of Northern Ireland and the border counties of the Republic. Whilst the region clearly needed such investment, the argument was that another vehicle should have been found for a programme of regional reinvestment. Although distinct parts of the programme specifically addressed cross-border cooperation and reconciliation, large parts of the programme did not and made no pretence to do so. Opportunities to break away from back-to-back development, promote cross border work and reconciliation were missed. District partnerships in the north and county councils in the south continued to allocate resources according to county needs in a traditional back-to-back manner. O Maolain analysed tourism projects under Peace I (O Maolain, 2000): of 108 tourism projects funded in Monaghan, only 29 had any kind of cross-border dimension and the vast majority impacted only on the southern jurisdiction.

Despite these drawbacks, the two programmes had other merits. Peace I established a consultative forum, drawing in voluntary and community organizations. Both programmes used, as delivery agents, intermediary funding bodies with well-established links to civil society and a sympathy for and understanding of work with the non-governmental sector (e.g. Cooperation Ireland). Peace I was considered to be a broadly-based, participative, involving programme, with many positive effects. Evaluations suggested that it had done much to underpin the peace process by providing close cooperation between civil society organizations and political leaders at local level. The programme validated work between ex-combatants and promoted their social and political reintegration. Cross-border work won increasing acceptance, was seen to be a norm and became

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One of the broader political purposes of the Peace programme was to consolidate the ceasefires and promote a political settlement. The introduction of the first programme was followed by the political agreement of the Good Friday Agreement. Next, its cross-border aspects are reviewed.

8.6 Wider cross-border cooperation in Ireland: the Good Friday Agreement

The Good Friday Agreement, signed between the political parties in Northern Ireland in April 1998, was not just an agreement for the future government of Northern Ireland. The agreement was divided into three strands, of which such an internal agreement was the first part. Strand 2 concerned cross-border cooperation while strand 3 was termed East-West and promoted intergovernmental cooperation throughout the British Isles. A North-South Ministerial Council was established, with a British - Irish Council.

Strand 2 involved the establishment of six north-south bodies and six listed areas of cooperation. These were as follows:

North-South bodies Waterways Ireland Executive Agency (Enniskillen and Carrick on Shannon) Food Safety Promotion board (Cork) Trade & Business Development Body (InterTrade Ireland) (Newry) North-South Language Body (Dublin & Belfast) Foyle, Carlingford & Irish Lights Commission (Derry & Carlingford) Special European Union Programmes Body (Belfast, Omagh and Monaghan)

Cooperation areas Transport Agriculture Education Health (Institute of Public Health) Environment Tourism (Tourism Ireland)

Whereas the new arrangements derived from the dynamic of the conflict in Ireland, they fitted in well with European models for cross-border intergovernmental cooperation and the Euregio ideal. Six years later, their impact has fallen short of what was hoped for in April 1998. Because the

130 political parties failed to agree on the terms of their continued participation in government, the new institutions of the agreement were established and subsequently suspended three times, with the present suspension (2002) being much the longest.

An early activity of the North/South Ministerial Council was the completion of a study of obstacles to cross-border mobility. The study on obstacles to mobility remains the principal publication of the North/South Ministerial Council. This was a large-scale exercise, with a substantial report (244 pages) (Indecon & Price Waterhouse Coopers, 2002). Fifty recommendations were made, covering such areas as taxes on cars, the reciprocity of pensions, interconnectivity of welfare systems, access to health services, mutual recognition of qualifications, transport services, banking charges, housing lists and the accreditation of vocational training. The North/South Ministerial Council prepared the way for a series of cooperative programmes, services, exchanges and structures in such areas as teaching, hospital services, health promotion, youth services and environmental protection.

The new bodies established under the agreement began to make progress on the development of an all-island approach to their thematic areas. Although the institutions were put on a care-and-maintenance basis in late 2002 and although some high-profile cooperation areas were parked, many of the cross- border bodies and cooperation areas have continued their activities, especially those active in the area of trade. They have kept a low profile, trying not to draw attention themselves, for fear of political complications. Scoping and mapping reports by the Centre for Cross Border Studies in Armagh indicate that the level of north-south cooperation is now extensive in many areas and levels, between governments, departments, agencies, institutions, professional groups and civil society organizations.

8.7 Conclusions

A number of issues emerge from this extensive examination of the evolution of cross-border cooperation in Ireland.

First, it is possible to trace the manner in which cross-border cooperation in Ireland has followed the European trajectories outlined in chapter 7. The various elements and phases of these European trajectories are apparent here. The establishment of the cross-border networks, entrusted with the management of three measures, is a significant development. The civil society measure, 3.1, also means that Ireland has at last joined the European mainstream of people-to-people cross-border cooperation.

Second, the intergovernmental bodies established by the Good Friday 131

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Agreement set down a comprehensive programme for cross-border cooperation. Although the institutions of the agreement have been suspended for some time, the work of cross-border bodies has progressed quietly. The many developments in intergovernmental cooperation under the headings of trade, education, culture, agriculture, mobility, travel and health have the potential to significantly improve the quality of life of people living in border communities. The recommendations of the ‘Obstacles to Mobility’ report show just how much could, in practical terms, be achieved. Taken together, they should blunt, reduce and even eliminate at least some of the social impacts of the border identified in earlier chapters.

It is still important to sound a number of critical notes. Turning from the general to the particular, Gabbe (1999) would see the involvement of the ICBAN, EBRC, NWRCBG and local authority networks as falling far short of the Euregio model. They still lack devolved powers from government, they are without substantial financial and personnel resources of their own and outside the INTERREG programme are limited to planning, studies and strategizing, without the authority for further development. The SEUPB (2003) accepts that, within the European model, Irish cross border development would still be considered as at an intermediate stage of development. ‘The overall logic in the context of European integration and cohesion is that border regions move progressively toward higher levels of cooperation and integration [where they would] effectively function as a single socio-economic unit with its own cross- border institutions’. These difficulties are by no means unique to Ireland. Gabbe again (1999) observed how cross-border initiatives have been frustrated by the nature of national administrative systems, constraints on the devolution of powers to local and regional authorities and the legal difficulties involved in operating across jurisdictions.

A second critical note concerns the involvement of civil society, which remains fragile. Although there was a consultative forum in the Peace I programme, one involving a broad range of civil society organizations, it was abolished, without explanation, in Peace II. Civil society’s foothold within the INTERREG programme is limited to the small 3.1 measure, only 9% of the programme and a number of places on the standing and monitoring committees. The representation of the voluntary and community sector in the a local authority INTERREG III partnerships is quite indirect. The work of the local authority networks in INTERREG III is still virtually unknown in the voluntary and community sector.

Are there ways in which cross-border cooperation can be further strengthened in the future? Specifically, how can civil society find its voice in this framework? How will civil society fit into the European Union’s new framework for cross- border cooperation? These questions are the focus of the next chapter, 9.

132 Chapter 9 Ways Forward in Cross-border Cooperation THE EMERALD CURTAIN

Consideration shall be given to: an independent consultative forum appointed by the two administrations, representative of civil society, comprising the social partners and other members with expertise in social, cultural, economic and other issues. - Good Friday Agreement, article #19

The Northern Ireland Executive would support the establishment of an independent North/South Consultative Forum appointed by the two administrations and representatives of civil society. - Intergovernmental, DUP, Sinn Fein draft agreement, December 2004

Here in this chapter we attempt to bring together many of the issues that have arisen in the preceding two chapters and relate them to the new European proposals for cross-border development (9.1). The broader framework for cross-border cooperation is critically examined (9.2) before we take a look at the role of community development in the border counties and in cross-border work (9.3). The potential role of civil society in cross border strategies is examined (9.4) before some conclusions are drawn (9.5).

9.1 Cross-border cooperation 2007-2013: the new proposals

The proposals for the next round of the structural funds, 2007-2013, take the INTERREG idea a quantum step forward. Under the Third cohesion report (European Commission, 2004) cross-border cooperation is elevated from an area of Community cooperation to a formal structural funds objective, called ‘European territorial cooperation’. This lays down the Community commitment to ‘further the harmonious and balanced integration of the territory of the Union by supporting cooperation between its different components’, managed by a single authority in each cooperation area. The Commission stated that it would propose a new legal instrument in order to allow member states, regions and local authorities to address the traditional legal and administrative problems encountered in the management of cross-border programmes and projects. 4% of all the structural funds is now devoted to the new territorial cooperation objective and will be financed by the European Regional Development Fund.

The regulations for the new territorial cooperation objective are subtitled Proposal for a regulation establishing a European Grouping of Cross-border Cooperation (EGCC). The preamble is interesting, for it refers to the way in which existing instruments have proceeded to be ‘ill-adapted’ to organizing structured cross-border cooperation within the old INTERREG programme (preamble 4). Now, preamble 7 says that it is necessary to institute a

134 cooperation instrument which allows the creation of cooperative groupings in the Community territory, invested with legal personality. ‘It is appropriate for the [European Grouping of Cross-Border Cooperation] to be given the capacity to act on behalf of its members and notably the regional and local authorities of which it is composed’ (#8). Its tasks and competences will be set out in a convention for cross-border cooperation.

The political standing of the new EGCC is not exactly clear in the regulation. The preamble specifies that the EGCC is optional, but implies that if member states do not set one up, the Community may, in the light of the fact that conditions for cross border cooperation cannot be created in an efficient way by the member states, ‘take measures’ (#15) while at the same time respecting the constitutional system of each member state.

The articles of the draft regulation specify that EGCCs with legal personalities may be established, with the aim of promoting cross-border cooperation between member states and local and regional authorities to reinforce economic, social and territorial cohesion. The EGCC is composed of regional and local authorities and public bodies. The EGCC may assign its tasks to one of its members. Subsequent articles permit the EGCC to adopt statutes, procedures, establish its own organs and a budget.

In setting down the new objective for territorial cooperation, the European Union makes it clear that it is setting the bar ever higher for the system for cross- border cooperation. Cross-border regions must progress to a more sophisticated model of development if they are to play a part in future structural funding. The regulation for the EGCC should be read in conjunction with the new regulation for the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF). When applied to the new territorial cooperation objective, the ERDF (emphasis added):

‘may contribute to promoting the integration of cross-border labour markets, local employment initiatives, equal opportunities, training and social inclusion and sharing of human resources and facilities for R&D (#6)’.

This provides a welcome integration of social objectives into cross-border cooperation, hitherto a historical weakness of many INTERREG programmes.

Within Ireland, it is considered that the future objective for territorial cooperation will give preference to priorities 1 and 3 of the existing INTERREG III programme. There will be less infrastructural funding available, both because a number of outstanding deficits have now been met and because the European Union will prioritize infrastructural deficits in the new countries to the

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East. There is a disposition to provide space in a future programme to thematic cooperation (e.g. health, social care), ‘softer’ rather than ‘harder’ development and more broadly-based consultation, including with the NGO community. So far, there has been little public discussion of the role of civil society and the people-to-people measures of the new programme. The European Anti- Poverty Network has proposed, in its amendments to the draft regulations, that the EGCC specifically include, as members, voluntary and community organizations.

9.2 A framework for cross-border cooperation

The INTERREG programme and the Good Friday Agreement have provided the principal impetus for cross-border cooperation in recent years. Yet, granted the importance of the border in Irish history and society and the communities living along it, it is remarkable that there has been so little strategic development in the ideas, objectives and purposes of cross-border development. Although the Department of Foreign Affairs is the department charged with relationships with Northern Ireland, the only white paper on foreign policy presented by the state ‘Challenges and Opportunities Abroad’ (1996) makes no mention of the border. The lack of a coherent government policy means that cross-border work takes the form of isolated and independent initiatives and that the learning between them is limited. Some even question whether governments have really left behind back-to-back development for real added-value cross-border cooperation. The recycling campaign launched in September 2004 was a case in point. Although it was a joint publicity campaign run on an all-island basis, the cross-border element was difficult to discern.

Despite having a border in its midst, the Irish state has done little to develop the academic theory and practice of cross-border cooperation so that it may inform policy. There are remarkably few people developing strategies for cross-border development. Theorists of cross-border development are limited to the Centre for Cross Border Studies, the Cross Border Centre in Dundalk, the Centre for International Borders Research and a number of programme leaders (ADM/CPA, Cooperation Ireland). Both the Centre for Cross Border Studies and the Centre for International Borders Research are headquartered outside the jurisdiction (Armagh and Belfast respectively) and the difficulties experienced by the Centre for Cross-Border Studies in attracting Irish government funding are legendary.

Diagnosis of the problems of the border areas has been fairly united. A debate on the best way forward in cross-border development has been less evident. Where debate has taken place, it has focussed on the political concerns of the unionist community. Debate on the methods and priorities of cross-border cooperation has been virtually absent. An exception is O’Dowd, who proposed 136 a Border Development Commission to reverse the peripherality of the region. A Border Development Commission would: - Build on and give strategic direction to existing cross-border networks, especially for the social partners, non-governmental organizations and community groups; - Attract a diversified funding base into the region; - Draw on models of European cooperation; - Provide an inclusive form of democratic participation; - Be overseen by a panel of elected representatives from the area.

Cross-border development in Ireland still has limited connection to cross-border development bodies in continental Europe. An attempt to establish a cross-border observatory in Ireland in the 1990s appears to have fizzled. Stutt (1999) wrote:

Years of conflict have produced a region which is not, generally, outward looking in its approach. There is much to be gained by the border corridor developing a much more confident, outward looking approach - learning in particular from the most successful European border regions. Such perspectives will help to develop understanding of how border area development occurs and matures over long periods of time.

Although the local authority networks are familiar with some of the models of cross-border cooperation in other parts of Europe and some belong to the Association of European Border Regions, there is only a limited structured system of learning in place.

The absence of a strategic framework for cross-border cooperation makes it difficult for the full range of issues necessary to be taken into account in its development. Community development and the role of civil society are two of those issues and these are explored next.

9.3 Community development and cross-border strategies

This research has identified that there are important social impacts arising from the border in Ireland. Chapter 3 assessed these peacetime impacts, chapter 4 the impacts of the conflict, while chapters 5 and 6 examined the experience of five groups particularly affected. Earlier, chapter 2 noted the work of community development bodies in the southern border counties.

Community development experiences difficulties, challenges and costs in the border counties that are not present in other parts of the state. These include the social and economic impacts of the border, the marginalized nature of the border counties, low population density, under-investment in public services, the additional groups requiring assistance as a result of the conflict and the 137 THE EMERALD CURTAIN need to develop strategies to work on a cross-community basis. Community development has a number of important strengths for social development in the border counties. Community development organizations: - Are good at identifying needs; - Are good and speedy at working cross border; - Can carry out policy analysis and bring a wider and critical perspective to policy-making. They bridge deficits in policy-making and strategic development; - Can ensure that policies are proofed for gender and equality and ensure that women play a participative role (e.g. Women Educating For Transformation, WEFT); - Can drive the process of reconciliation; - Provide a voice for marginalized people; - Unite economic and social development. Some examples are now given.

An example of cross-border working is the Sliabh Beagh Partnership, established by community-based organizations in Tyrone, Monaghan and Fermanagh. The partnership’s goal was the economic and social development of the area around Sliabh Beagh mountain, which is intersected by the border. One of their first problems to overcome was cartographic, so as to make possible a high-definition cross-border map that took the mountain itself as the reference point. Having done so, Slieve Beagh mountain is now marketed as an integrated tourist destination and has the potential to become the first cross- border national park. The partnership has, at some financial risk, established a successful hotel and carried out a village regeneration project. It has also demonstrated a high capacity to integrate economic and social development simultaneously.

The transfer of learning across the border is evident if we look at Blayney Blades of Castleblayney, Co Monaghan, which has applied the Opportunities for Women Learning course devised by the Workers’ Educational Association (WEA) in Northern Ireland to women’s courses in the southern border counties; the ‘Moving on’ Course of Youth Action NI to young women at risk; and the ‘Older People Learning’ programme (WEA).

The importance of cross-border transport services has been recognized only in recent times - but the need was identified by community - based organizations (e.g. Rural Lift). The consolidation by government of rural services, especially in health, mean that people have to travel ever further for them. Several community-based organizations, like Community Connections in Blacklion, Co Cavan, have attempted to develop cross-border bus routes in areas poorly served by public transport. Attempts to do so are held back by different permit

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régimes for drivers and different licensing régimes as to where passengers may be picked up or set down.

There is considerable potential for the consolidation of local services, for example in such areas as fire brigades, postal services, schools and pharmacies. Here, many services are possible on a cross-border basis which otherwise might not be economical if provided separately. There must be a place where these bureaucratic issues can be raised and addressed in a reasonably speedy manner.

Although such a role for community development is clear, there is no ready place where social development work may be funded on a long-term basis. At present, community organizations receive funding from a mixture of sources: the Community Development Programme, the Peace II programme, health services, even the Ulster-Scots Agency. The Community Development Programme is closed to new applicants, while the Peace II programme ends in 2006. Venture (2002) found that the main funder for cross-border work, by a big margin, was the Peace programme (74% of groups funded), with INTERREG third on the list (19%). Rural development groups considered that the future availability of funding was the main question mark over future development, much more so than politics. Voluntary and community organizations have pointed to the proliferation of agencies that must be pursued in order to obtain grants, such as Peace and INTERREG. Venture recorded this:

The most significant obstacle was the perceived lack of commitment to and resourcing of cross border cooperation at the highest level. [There] was a lack of integrated planning at policy level. There was no consensus as to who should lead this process and addressing this will be core to future cross-border cooperation (18, emphasis added).

From examining the present work of community development organizations, it is evident that they carry out roles that would, in other developed economies, be carried out by statutory bodies, such as health boards, social workers, youth services and transport bodies. This is not to say that it is inappropriate that community-based organizations should carry out these tasks, but their role draws attention to the resources that enable them to do so. Clones Community Forum and Monaghan Community Network, for example, are dependant on Peace programme funding. Blayney Blades has spent several years attempting to group all its services into a single €6.5m resource centre. While obtaining funding for such a project was never expected to be easy, it has taken the project many years to obtain commitments to grants, many of them very small and cumulatively far short of the total needed. There appears to be no readily

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THE EMERALD CURTAIN available source of funding for community development infrastructure. Although rural development is an important pillar of government policy in the Republic, there is no readily identifiable stream of funding for community development in the rural areas. There have been initiatives, the most outstanding being the Peace programme, but there has never been a government strategy for community development in the region. Short - term funding has encouraged rivalry, competition and territoriality. Community development groups, when asked to identify the needs of the area, have pointed to the needs to assist elderly people, especially those living on their own and whose numbers will rise in line with the ageing of the national population generally from 2010 onward. It is ironic that cooperation in social welfare between the northern and southern governments in the Good Friday agreement prioritized cooperation in combating social welfare fraud, rather than in community development, even though the need for the latter has been much better documented.

The Peace programmes have demonstrated the expertise of community and voluntary organizations in addressing the continued pain arising from the conflict, assisting groups whose origins derived from the conflict and in addressing new need. Here, this research identified the need for work with the protestant minority community in the southern border counties, the need to extend community development work to displaced persons and the need to extend the work already done with women and ex-prisoners. Some community activists estimate that it may take eight to ten years to make a significant improvement for the situation of the protestant minority community.

Critical to retaining the indigenous population is the continued provision of rural public services, for example through schools and community health services; and providing opportunities where the voice of the indigenous people can be heard, widening the socio-economic space from the border line outward. Community development is the best way whereby this can be done - helping people to articulate their needs and devise solutions for themselves. The most important decisions are those by government that make the retention of the populations in the region viable. This does mean favouring public transport, getting broadband and such diverse developments as joint post offices and joint childcare centres that recognize both qualifications. If this were done, decades of decline could be reversed and the Irish border could become a rich region, a desirable residential area in which to live and work.

9.4 Civil society and cross-border strategies

Despite their importance in the border counties, the work of voluntary and community organizations remains poorly recognized. They had no role in a INTERREG I and II, albeit a welcome but small role in INTERREG III. The 140 consultative forum of Peace I was abolished without explanation for its successor programme. The role of civil society is limited and indirect within the INTERREG partnerships run by the NWRCBG, ICBAN and the EBR. All this falls far short of the lofty ideals of multi-level governance outlined by the European Union in European governance - a white paper (2001) or article 47 of the new European constitution in respect of participatory democracy.

Leontidou, Afouxenidis, Donnan et al (2004) have pointed out that civil society has traditionally evolved with its nation state as the prime, if only, point of focus. Developing a civil society model that evolves across state borders is a novel idea, at least since the mediæval period. Yet it should be remembered that original cross-border cooperation was between civil society - and among the voluntary, community, church, sporting and cultural associations that ignored the border. Civil society cooperation persisted during the bleakest years of the conflict. Governmental cross-border cooperation ceased in December 1925, to be briefly resurrected by O’Neill and Lemass, but did not resume until the 1990s, prompted by the European Union, economic dynamics and the single market and raised to a new level by the Good Friday Agreement. Commentators have pointed to the importance of underpinning the new cross- border and North-South institutional cooperation with a broader democratic dynamic. Anderson and Goodman (1998) argue that the new North-South institutions must be legitimized by democratic involvement and political accountability. A single island economy implies an all-island civil society, bridging the border to support, independently, the defusing of conflict and the building of reconciliation. They proposed a North-South social forum, one which would consolidate the peace process, cross-border cooperation and provide space for non-sectarian politics around gender, class and other concerns.

The European Commission agrees: ‘the involvement of civil society and partnership between public authorities, socio-economic partners and NGOs is one of the basic principles of European cohesion policy. Good partnership is a key to the success of programmes providing for enhanced legitimacy, greater coordination, guaranteed transparency and better absorption of funds’ (Hellander, 2005).

Annexe A, strand 2, Article 19 of the Good Friday Agreement sets down provision for:

‘an independent consultative forum appointed by the two administrations, representative of civil society, comprising the social partners and other members with expertise in social, cultural, economic and other issues’.

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The North South Consultative Forum should not be confused with the Civic Forum in Northern Ireland (Article 34 of the agreement), the last of the Good Friday institutions to be established. Unlike the Civic Forum, the North-South Consultative Forum did not even get that far and the article seems to have been largely forgotten by the country’s media and the political élite. Wilson (2001) made proposals to both governments as to how such a forum should be composed, established and operate. He proposed eight tasks for the forum: • Policy advice to the North South Ministerial Council; • Policy dialogue with the North - South implementation bodies; • Engagement with both governments on removing barriers to cooperation; • Specific consideration to resolving the problems of the border areas, especially in the area of social exclusion, with appropriate new structures; • Promoting people-to-people exchange across the border; • Strategic development of north-south cooperation; • Consideration of the legacy of north-south division and identification of the obstacles to reconciliation; • Reflection on multi-culturalism, rights and pluralism.

In a modus operandi reminiscent of the European Economic and Social Committee, Wilson’s forum would present opinions on prioritized themes, such as the labour market, economic linkages, spatial planning, economic performance, social inclusion, equality and human rights, north-south exchanges and issues of identity. This working method would have the advantage of focus, concrete output, the use of outside expertise and policy engagement. He recommended both ad hoc and permanent committees, with representatives from the border areas and a cross-border focus.

He recommended the forum be composed of 60 representatives, drawn equally from north and south but weighted toward the border areas. They would be nominated by the classic social partner organizations and the voluntary and community sector, with representation favouring the border areas and the main organizations with a history of north-south engagement. There could be overlap with the Civic Forum in Northern Ireland and the National Economic and Social Forum in the Republic. The forum would employ a small but effective secretariat.

There the North South Consultative Forum rested. Apparently, the First Minister was not prepared to give it political clearance. Eventually, the North South Ministerial Council minuted a decision to agree the outline structure for such a North South Consultative Forum. This would comprise a twice yearly meeting of civil society representatives from both parts of the island, organized in liaison with the two administrations.

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Wilson (2005) was highly critical of this decision of the North South Ministerial Council. Twice-yearly conferences where participants would ‘turn up relatively unprepared and play a relatively passive role and perhaps not turn up again’ fell far short of its working potential and independence. The proposed outline structure, he said, was minimalist, ineffectual, ill-conceived and unworkable.

The proposed agreement between the British government, the Irish government and Sinn Fein and the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) in December 2004 renewed the commitment to the forum. This is what the proposals said:

The Northern Ireland Executive would support the establishment of an independent North/South Consultative Forum appointed by the two administrations and representatives of civil society.

Although agreement was not reached due to other circumstances, this remains the most up to date text for a resumption of the Good Friday institutions, including the North South Consultative Forum.

One of the cross-border networks, ICBAN, has already articulated the need for cross-border cooperation to be built on new, improved models of civil society leadership, participation and involvement (ICBAN, 2004). The networks insist that they do have an existence and purpose beyond INTERREG. ICBAN, for example, in its development strategy to 2008, sees the development of civic capacity and leadership as essential for an effective model for cross-border cooperation. The development of civic leadership among young people and women is of especial importance in this strategy. A much improved model of civil society involvement and participation is essential if cross-border development strategies are to be widely owned, credible, coordinated and efficient, it says.

9.5 Conclusions

The new European Union proposals for territorial cooperation and for a European Group for Cross-border Cooperation raise the requirements for cross-border cooperation and raise the bar for the method to be used. Social inclusion falls clearly within the remit of the new objective. A key question is: what is the role of community development and civil society in the new objective?

Community development has already made a crucial contribution to the development of the southern (and northern) border counties. Civil society cooperation continued across the border, despite the vagaries and many low points of intergovernmental cooperation. The community development 143 THE EMERALD CURTAIN approach has unique features and can bring to the table experience in cross- border working, the integration of economic and social objectives, the ability to see and define new social needs, social and gender inclusion, skills in promoting reconciliation, and the ability to transfer learning. Its potential to address the specific needs of the groups addressed in this research has been clearly stated. Despite this, the resourcing of community development in the southern border counties is fragile. The main source of this funding, Peace II, will expire in less than two years. The Community Development Programme is closed to new applicants.

This chapter identified a second, broader problem: the failure of the Irish government to develop strategies for cross-border development. Despite the importance of the border, there is no government policy or strategy for cross- border development and the main bodies working on the issue are located outside the jurisdiction. There is no forum whereby the social impacts of the border, nor the issues arising from cross-border community development, can be brought into the policy process. The lack of a framework makes progress difficult and makes the existing arrangements resistant to new approaches and idea. Foremost among these is that civil society has an important role to play in cross-border development. Such an involvement fits in well with modern European theories of social capital, multi-level governance and civil society. A proposal was specifically made in Article 19 of the Good Friday Agreement but so far has not progressed. The proposal was renewed in the proposed intergovernmental - Sinn Fein - DUP agreement in December 2004.

Two imperatives arise from this chapter: the need to support and extend community development initiatives in the southern border counties; and second, the need to ensure that community development and civil society organizations find a voice in the policy-making and decision-making structures currently emerging.

144 Chapter 10 Conclusions and Recommendations THE EMERALD CURTAIN

This research has explored a broad range of issues concerned with the border, its impact and the relationship between cross-border cooperation and community development. Now, in conclusion, we first of all see if a model of the border can be developed from these insights (10.1). The main conclusions from the research, as discussed in the preceding nine chapters, are then presented (10.2). Key messages are then presented, including those likely to be of most interest to the sponsors of this research, ADM/CPA (10.3). Specific recommendations conclude the chapter (10.4).

10.1 A model of the border

Traditional models of the border have focussed on ‘strong’ or ‘weak’ borders and more recently on ‘central’ and ‘peripheral’ borders. One of the lessons of this research is that the Irish border has fluctuated, strengthened and weakened over time, according to the decisions of government and the pressure of external events. This does not claim to be an original idea, for the concept was recently articulated by Leontidou, Afouxenidis, Donnan et al (2004) but is further developed here. To complicate matters, ‘border- strengthening’ events can take place at times close to unrelated ‘border- weakening’ events and influences, so these effects can be contradictory. We can illustrate this in the case of the Irish border:

Strengthening and weakening influences on the Irish border

Decade 1920s 1930s 1940s 1950s 1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s Border Lemass- Accession Internatio- INTERREG weakening O’Neill to EU nal Fund programmes events for Ireland Anglo Irish Single Free Trade European Agreement market

Ceasefires

Good Friday Agreement

Border Boundary Economic World Border Renewal Persistence Republic strengthe- Commissi- War War II Campaign of the of the entered ning on with road conflict conflict Eurozone, events closures Britain not Cratering

Break with sterling

Outcome

146 The end of the conflict, combined with continued economic integration, means that the border is probably now weaker than at any time since the 1920s. Border crossings became much less visible when the customs went in 1993 and then the military checkpoints after the ceasefires. Although not all military posts are gone, most vanished quickly and in most cases ‘not a nail was left behind’.

Academic researchers are divided as to the future endurance of borders. Bradley (2001) recently warned that ‘the disruptive impact of the border is likely to endure for some time’. Chapter 3 noted the continuing social impacts of the border and chapter 4 the shadow still thrown over the border counties arising from the conflict. Chapters 7 and 8 illustrated some of the difficulties that continue to slow cross-border cooperation.

Despite this, most informants to this research believe that the Irish border will, over time, become less important. They believe that with the continued growth of north-south cooperation and assuming a restoration of the institutions set in place by the Good Friday Agreement, it will diminish in impact. At this stage, there is little political opposition to cross-border development. Many informants pointed to the preparedness of councillors of all political persuasions to work together both in the local authority cross-border networks and more generally. Democratic Unionist Party councillors, for example, were now regular participants in cross-border activities and discussions.

Returning to our model as to what factors would weaken or strengthen the border in the future, there appear to be two key determinants. The first is the restoration, or not, of the institutions established by the Good Friday Agreement. Restoration would speed the momentum of progress set in train by the North/South Ministerial Council. The second was Britain’s role in Europe. The border would: - Become weaker, should Britain join the euro currency; - Stay much the same, if Britain continued to say out of the euro; - Become stronger, should Britain decide to leave the European Union, a growing possibility should Britain reject the draft European constitution.

10.2 Conclusions

The following are the conclusions derived from the earlier chapters and discussion:

Low level of documentation • Despite its centrality in the island’s political development since 1922, little has been written about the precise impact of the border, 147 THE EMERALD CURTAIN

especially in the social field. • Despite the importance of the border, thinking, theory, strategizing and the application of border issues have been little developed by the Irish state. This country has only a few experts in cross-border issues or development, although their contribution has been significant.

A region of deprivation and peripheralization • The southern border counties were not characterized until the 1990s. The ‘border region’ was not an identifiable unit in Irish planning and administration until 1994. • The southern border counties have been characterized by researchers and statisticians as having high levels of deprivation and socio- economic disadvantage. Rurality, low levels of urbanization and educational and gender disadvantage are particular features. Almost all the socio-economic indicators have been significantly worse than the national average. There is agreement that these features are exacerbated by the border. • There has been limited foreign direct investment in the region. The border counties have been neglected by state investment decisions. There are no third level educational institutions in the central border area. Tourism is under promoted in this sub-region, despite its many natural assets. • The level of mobilization of voluntary and community organizations is above the national average. They carry out a broad range of social, economic and development functions, many of which would be carried out by statutory bodies in other counties. • In recent years, there is some indication of a modest relative improvement in the southern border counties as the geography of deprivation has moved to the south east.

Not a homogeneous region • The border areas of Ireland are not a homogeneous region. Most studies divide the border counties into three zones: the east, the most prosperous; the north-west, the poorest; and the middle counties, with a large band of deprivation in Leitrim, south west Cavan and parts of Monaghan. • The border corridor (Dublin - Dundalk- Newry - Belfast) has been a pole of development along the east coast. There is a danger that this north- south development pole and other twin city development poles (e.g. Derry-Letterkenny) will eclipse underdevelopment in the central border region. • In 1999, the idea of the border corridor was introduced. This identified the zones immediately close to the border as communities where deprivation was accentuated.

148 Common features of borders across the European Union • Borders have generic effects within the European Union. These are the retarding of trade, the disruption of commerce and the creation of what are called ‘spatial disruptive effects’ or ‘internal peripherality’, whereby areas are cut off from their natural hinterlands. • Smuggling is a universal feature of borders, as is the taking advantage of local price differentials by cross-border shopping. • Borders are often visibly more prosperous on one side than the other (differential development). • Students of European borders have identified the phenomenon on back- to-back development: governments develop up to their borders, but not across them. European Union studies distinguish between central borders, which can be prosperous; and peripheral borders, where the problems of development are most accentuated, compounded by its political isolation. These difficulties are accentuated in conflicted, confrontational borders. Ireland fits in well with the pattern of a peripheral and conflicted border.

Peacetime impacts • Little consideration was given nationally to predicting or anticipating the likely impacts of the border when it was proposed as a political solution to the crisis in Ireland. • Border communities themselves did predict, accurately in the event, some of the likely consequences of the border both before the temporary border was established in 1920 and during the period of the temporary border, 1920-5. Border communities warned that towns would be cut off from their natural trading and retailing hinterlands. The Boundary Commission anticipated these dangers and made proposals to readjust the border accordingly, but none of its proposals were accepted. • The Irish border had direct, immediate and negative effects on peacetime economic and social development. The imposition of customs posts led to the rapid decline of trade, commerce and professional activity. The border disrupted trade, education and transport. The customs almost severed the trade between both parts of the island and by the time of the single market, only 2% of the Republic’s trade went north, while 15% of northern exports went south. As recently as the late 1990s, a new partition arose in the form of the incompatibility of mobile telecom systems, imposing additional cost burdens on local communications. • The border quickly fostered illegal activities of an immeasurable nature (e.g. smuggling, following different subsidy régimes) and later incentivized economic activities around occasionally volatile currency fluctuations. Smuggling across the Irish border may have been more

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extensive than other countries and smugglers less ostracized. Smuggling has constantly evolved, the latest being smuggling in waste. • Differential development has also been evident. From the 1920s to the 1970s, the northern side of the border was always more developed. The Common Agricultural Policy equalized the relationship in the 1970s and from the 1990s the southern side became more visibly developed. • The impacts of the border were exacerbated by the regulatory régimes of the two states and they gradually drew apart. These differences were most apparent in taxation, social security and health. In some areas such as the labour market, travel and immigration, the Republic sought to preserve a common jurisdiction with Britain which continues to the present day. • Neither government had a concept or framework for the development of border counties as a region. This was most apparent in the withdrawal of railway services in the 1950s, the underinvestment in educational provision, continued underinvestment in health services and, most recently, the two spatial strategies. • There have been modest levels of cross-border movement of workers, students and people moving to obtain health services, all within the European norm.

Impacts of the conflict • The impact of the conflict may be divided into the impacts of violence, economic cost and social cost. • Apart from Belfast, the northern side of the border suffered the highest fatality rates of all parts of Northern Ireland. The southern border counties suffered from bombings, killings, assassinations, physical damage and military incursions. For those who witnessed them, the scars remain. Southern society did not respond well, did not provide appropriate services and tried to anesthetize these events. • Energy and transport services were disrupted. • There was a considerable additional security bill for all the Republic. Although the north suffered much more than the south from foregone foreign investment, the border counties in the Republic suffered a shadow effect for being close to the conflict and did not attract investment as a result. • The border counties were, for thirty years, the most militarized part of Europe west of the Berlin wall and the iron curtain. Militarization led to a climate of tension, fear and silence. Travel and socializing, especially at night, were sharply curbed. • Road closures and cratering had a profound effect in fracturing social relationships. Although closures had happened before, this time these were extensive and lasted for a generation. Their true effect seems not to have been appreciated outside the area. They were socially and

150 economically punitive, with no discernible military value. Some, but not all of these relationships have been restored. • Many people in southern border counties lost relatives, friends or acquaintances in the conflict in Northern Ireland. There were particular, isolating effects on the southern protestant community in the border counties.

Ex-prisoners • Several thousand ex-prisoners settled in the southern border counties - about 2,000 from the north, with a further 2,000 of a southern background, and their families. Most now have the assistance of a number of ex-prisoner organizations. Many feel a sense of isolation, stigmatization and discrimination and were put under surveillance for many years after the ceasefires. Many suffered mental illness and considerable difficulty in readjustment on their release. • This group continues to face difficulty in accessing employment due to both legal and illegal discrimination. Legal barriers prevent the holding of vehicle licences and travel. • Many ex-prisoners, aware of these difficulties, prefer to aim for self- employment, but even this can be difficult, due to obsolete skills. • The families of ex-prisoners experienced isolation during their partners’ imprisonment. Wives and children were often stigmatized for the husband’s or father’s politics. They seem to have received little assistance from statutory social services. Their living standards were low and still are. • Supports put in place by the Peace programme have been of considerable assistance in helping ex-prisoners and promoting their reintegration. • There are outstanding issues arising from the continued legal situation of the ex-prisoner community which must be addressed by policy- makers. • Many ex-prisoners are now in their 40s and 50s. Because of their lack of a work record and associated social insurance, they face old age in poverty.

Displaced persons • Displaced people arrived in the southern border counties in a number of waves. There were three early waves of refugees in 1969, 1971 and 1972, many of whom returned to the north. There was then a long period of displacement, from 1972 to 1994, concentrated on Donegal, Monaghan and Louth. These number about 11,000 people. Displacement took a number of different forms, ranging from violent expulsion to the decision to leave home culminating from years of tension.

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• Displaced persons faced difficulties similar to the ex-prisoner group. Displaced families appreciated that they were no longer in physical danger, nor living in as much tension as before, nor likely to endure the job discrimination that continued in the north. Nevertheless, displaced families faced isolation, stigmatization and problems of identity, especially for children. While displaced people survived in their new locations, they do not appear to have thrived and have not prospered educationally, financially or economically. • Discrimination was less direct, but there was still a sense of exclusion. They were assumed to be Republican and they were surprised at the level of hostility to Republicanism in their host communities. • There was little evidence of an outreach by health or social services to assist their families and their children. No programmes were put in place to assist displaced persons.

Women • The situation of women in the southern border counties has been poorly documented. • Women’s work in the southern border counties is poorly developed. It is difficult for women to access the political system. No targeted efforts seem to have been made to involve women in the new structures in local government. • Women in the southern border counties have followed traditional employment patterns in the home, agriculture and farm-related businesses. During the 1980s women began to move into off-farm employment, but they tended to get work in low-paid, insecure or informal economy jobs. In the past five years, there is evidence of women moving up the skills chain. • For women in southern border communities not in employment, social contact, networks and interaction have been all the more important. These were shattered by the conflict, the road closures and the militarization of the area. Isolation was compounded by a sense of abandonment by government, be that reflected in the lack of social facilities (e.g. lack of childcare) or the lack of inward investment bringing new jobs.

Protestant minority community • The protestant minority community dates to the 17th century and by the 20th still had a strong presence in the southern border counties. During the third home rule crisis, the protestant minority community in Monaghan was strongly armed and well organized. The Orange Order was strongest in Monaghan. There was a huge sense of abandonment by the Northern Ireland unionists in 1920.

152 • The protestant population began a long period of population decline at the time of partition. Push and pull factors prompted waves of protestant exodus - some leaving for Northern Ireland, some further afield - especially during the economic war and the prolonged decline of the 1950s. The conflict had a definite effect on the protestant community. The protestant community was inclined to lie low, withdraw and not draw attention to itself. • From the 1990s, there was a modest recovery in the protestant population. Survey data show an increasing inclination to participate in civic life. In Donegal, there have been successful programmes for the regeneration of the community infrastructure (Derry & Raphoe Action). • There remain some significant problems. Protestant community-based organizations, such as the Border Minority Group, have drawn attention to ongoing problems of discrimination, attacks on Orange halls, their continued inability to hold parades, the sense that their community’s cultural traditions are not valued and the failure to attract funding for community infrastructure. These issues are not acknowledged by the state bodies responsible.

Clones/Erne east • Clones was examined because it represented a microcosm of the social effect of the border on a town and townland close to it A once- prosperous market town was ruined by one disaster after another coming in waves: partition, the economic war, the border campaign, railway closure, the conflict, cratering, the split with sterling. The breaking of social links was more severe each time, exacerbated by the military presence around the area. By the 1970s Clones was called a ‘ghost town’. • The business life of the town declined, along with its social and community life. Road closures were especially severe, dividing parishes, farms and neighbours. Social, trading, shopping and commercial patterns were broken for over a generation and may never recover. • Not only did the government do little to help, but by withdrawing transport infrastructure actually contributed to the town’s demise. • The social capital of the town declined to a very low point. Only recently has work begun to rebuild, through the formation of Clones Community Forum and other local groups. There has been a significant improvement at community level, but this has not been matched by government investment. People in the area highlighted several ways in which such reinvestment could take place: the Ulster canal, a third level college in the region and improved hospital services.

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Models of cross-border development • Models for the economic, social and cultural development of border areas do exist in other parts of the European Union. Structured cross- border cooperation dates to the Council of Europe in the 1950s. • Early cooperation across borders has followed an upward trajectory from first contact to sectoral and project cooperation to the model of the Euregio where cooperation is carried out across borders by local and regional authorities with their own cross-border powers, structures, budgets and legal authority. Tensions between border development groups and their national governments and centres have been an endemic and normal feature of their evolution. • Some examples from continental Europe offer important points of comparison for Ireland. Some have involved contested borders and embedded minorities (Schleswig), recently contested borders (Rhineland, 1940) and successful economic development of a deprived triangle (Rhine, Ijssel and Ems). • The best examples have been underpinned by strong civil society, people-to-people programme. • The Euregio model is considered the ideal and will, from 2007, be the standard approach within the European Union in the new round of the structural funds.

Ireland compared to other European models of cross-border development • The trajectory of Irish cross-border cooperation is recognizable in the context of the European experience. Ireland has yet to reach the level of maturity of the Euregio model. • The operation of the INTERREG programme in Ireland was traditional and largely back-to-back. INTERREG I and II were economic in their orientation, focussed on hard infrastructure and had little or no space for voluntary and community participation or that of civil society. • INTERREG III marked a breakthrough in Ireland, with three cross- border local authority-based networks entrusted with the delivery of three measures of the programme (1.1, 1.2, 1.3). A civil society measure was put in place for the first time (3.1), but constituted only 9% of the programme and a shadow of the people-to-people programmes developed in the Euregio areas.

Cross-border cooperation in Ireland • Impressive structures were set up for cross-border cooperation in 1920, but they were shelved by the Free State and the two other governments in 1925. An ambitious attempt to revive them following the Lemass- O’Neill rapprochement (1965) proved short-lived and no intergovernmental cooperation took place for many years. • Cooperation between civil society survived partition. The worst period of

154 the conflict prompted an intensification of civil society cooperation in an attempt to build peace and understanding (‘track 2 diplomacy’). The business community successfully initiated a joint council to promote the Dublin - Belfast corridor and economic cooperation. • INTERREG III is currently the main fully operational vehicle for cross- border cooperation. Civil society has an indirect involvement in the cross-border networks through nomination to the networks’ INTERREG partnerships and is represented on the programme’s monitoring and standing committees. • The Peace programmes have been the main funder of cross-border cooperation by voluntary and community organizations. The use of intermediary funding bodies in programme delivery was vindicated. • For the next round of the structural funds, the Commission has proposed that the Euregio model will be the norm. Cross-border cooperation will be delivered by cross border bodies called European Groups for Cross- border Cooperation (EGCC). Social inclusion is to be a specified area of work. • Significant structures for cross-border cooperation were established by the Good Friday Agreement. Some made remarkable progress before the institutions were suspended. Others have continued their work quietly and made further progress.

Civil society and cross-border cooperation • A prominent role for civil society and people-to-people cooperation is a feature of mature cross-border cooperation in other European countries. • The European Union has already mapped out, through article #47 of the constitution a role for participatory democracy and, under the White paper on European governance (2001), the principle of multi-level governance. • The participation of civil society in cross-border policy-making in Ireland so far has been limited. The cross-border Consultative Forum of Peace I was terminated for Peace II, without any explanation.

Community development and cross-border cooperation • Community development groups already have a track record in integrated cross-border work (the Sliabh Beagh partnership is a classic case in point). They have a record in practical innovation, for example in developing cross-border transport services. They have the scope to drive a range of cross-border services. They have already identified upcoming social needs in the border counties, for example older people (e.g. Community Connections). They are experienced in transferring learning across the border (e.g. Blayney Blades). • Community development groups along the border are good at identifying needs and can unite economic and social development. They can bring

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policy analysis, a strategic approach and a critical perspective to cross- border development. They can proof policies for poverty and equality and drive forward the process of reconciliation. Community and voluntary organizations can provide a neutral ground where the different communities may, in future, be comfortable with one another (an example of work in progress is the Monaghan Community Network’s Celebrating difference programme). • Cross-border policy-making is better if voluntary and community organizations are participants in the process. At present, they remain marginal to the process. • A political settlement must still be underpinned by a strong ‘track 2’ level of civil society cooperation. • Community development is dependant on the Peace programme and there is no steady, dependable source of medium to long-term funding. There is not yet formal, pro-active cooperation between northern and southern government departments in the area of community development.

10.3 Key messages

Recommendations and messages are put forward here, arising directly from the research and the work of the focus groups and responding to the particular interests of its sponsors.

Community development • Community development faces a range of challenges, difficulties and costs in the border counties that are not present in other parts of the state. • Considering the range, extent and scale of work undertaken by community development organizations in the region, it is essential that they be put on a firm financial footing. The closure of the Community Development Programme to new entrants is a short-sighted decision. In practical terms, it will make it impossible for Peace programme - funded organizations to find a new home and will inhibit future community development in the region. This must be reconsidered. • The value of support groups for ex-prisoners is evident. Their functions and services will evolve, especially as ex-prisoners age. The experience of ex-prisoners and their families suggest that there is scope for an extension of some of their services, with appropriate statutory support. Programmes and measures must be developed to prevent old age poverty for this group. • It is evident that there are few supports available to the families of displaced persons. Whilst this is a late stage, it would still be important to find ways of providing support for this group to tackle low incomes, 156 access to the labour market, stigmatization and the dislocation of younger members of families of displaced persons. Like ex-prisoners, their families face the prospect of inter-generational poverty. • The underdevelopment of women’s work in the southern border counties was evident. This suggests the need for programmes and measures to be put in place in the southern border counties to fund community development groups working with women, to encourage political and business leadership by women and ensure parity in public bodies. • A compelling case has been made for there to be a community development project to work with the protestant minority community. The Border Minority Group has outlined the value of such work in articulating the hitherto little-expressed experience of that community, affirm the cultural traditions of that community including the Orange tradition, win its acceptance, tackle discrimination and ensure equal access to public resources. • Community development must be a specified area of cooperation between the two appropriate northern and southern government departments.

Reintegration • The ex-prisoner groups have researched the legal situation of ex- prisoners in some detail. Limited, partial reintegration of ex-prisoners makes no sense, either from a political, economical or a human rights point of view. The continued exclusion of the ex-prisoner community should be ended by a series of concrete actions. • These are: the opening of access to public service vehicle licences and taxi licences; the expunging of the criminal record (with defined exceptions for public safety); the addition of criminality as a tenth ground on which discrimination may not be permitted under the Equality Act (with defined exceptions for public safety); and negotiation of conditions of entry with the north American authorities and others to permit travel. Some of these measures will require legislation. These proposals are along the lines of the National Economic and Social Forum report #22.

North-south and cross-border cooperation • Put into effect article #19 of the Good Friday Agreement for a north- south forum for civil society, but with a broad, active, policy-focussed remit. • Drawn from voluntary and community organizations, its role will be to promote cross-border and north-south cooperation; consolidate civil society and track 2 diplomacy cooperation; comment critically on existing cross-border and north-south cooperation; contribute to policy; and set down strategies for its future evolution. • A mainstream government funding programme to support north-south civil society cooperation.

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The new programme for territorial cooperation in Ireland • An extension of the present people-to-people measure (3.1) as a full priority in its own right. • Increased devolution of authority to the local authority based networks, with them being made responsible for a larger share of the programme. • Direct civil society representation on the structures governing the local authority networks in the next programme for territorial cooperation. • Within the local authority network structures, facilitate and encourage sub-regional planning partnerships (e.g. Blackwater Regional Partnership, Sliabh Beagh Partnership) and a continuing role for intermediary funding bodies. • The European Group for Cross-border Cooperation in Ireland to be accountable and include civil society representatives.

For governments • The need to resume rapid progress, as soon as the institutions of the Good Friday Agreement are restored, of the work begun by the Joint North South Ministerial Council, reinforce the work of the cooperation bodies (e.g. InterTrade Ireland) and progress the issues arising from ‘The Obstacles to Mobility’ report. They should also address outstanding private sector issues in such areas as currency transfers and insurance. • The need for governments to end back-to-back development by moving a series of policy areas into the north-south framework, such as spatial strategy, waste, tourism, environment, rivers and qualifications. For a start, the two spatial strategies should be revised and amended through the development of a third strategy for the border region and thereafter, common chapters to spatial strategies. • The need to accept that investment in public services will cost more in areas of low population density such as those along the border. Sustaining communities there will require modest but defined additional spending in such areas as transport, health, community, postal and social services. A third level institution in the central border counties could make a significant difference. By way of final comment on chapters 3, 4 and 5, the researchers were struck by the degree to which the peacetime and conflict impacts of the border permeated throughout the border counties. While there were some parts of some southern border counties at some distance from these impacts and sheltered from them, the effects of the border were by no means confined to the narrow strip of land confined to the immediate land border, the border corridor. The effects reached far inland, with towns and communities citing impacts and effects essentially similar, if not identical, to the immediate border areas. To be more concrete, many of the impacts and issues noted in Clones were also evident in Ballybay, a town much further from the border.

158 10.4 Specific recommendations

We are in a position to make a small number of specific recommendations, ten in all: • In community development, the need, initially, for three new community development projects: one for the protestant minority community, one for displaced persons and a third to extend welfare work with older ex- prisoners; • Recognition, within the National Anti-Poverty Strategy (NAPS), of the specific needs of displaced persons and ex-prisoners and their families, with their designation as target groups; • The Equality Authority to investigate and report on the situation of the protestant minority community in the southern border counties and propose ways to address the specific issues of intimidation, funding, parades, halls and discrimination explored here; • Application, enforcement and monitoring of government rules and guidelines for gender equality in public bodies in the border counties so as to achieve parity, flanked by a programme to improve take up in applications for work with women in these counties; • The Department of Justice, Equality and Law Reform to implement the recommendations of NESF report #22: the opening of access to public service vehicle licences and taxi licences; the expunging of the criminal record; the addition of criminality as a tenth ground on which discrimination may not be permitted under the Equality Act; and the Department of Foreign Affairs to renegotiate conditions of entry with the north American authorities to permit travel (with defined exceptions for public safety as noted by NESF). • Establishment of the north - south civic forum, as proposed in the Good Friday Agreement and by the draft intergovernmental, DUP and Sinn Fein agreement of December 2004, but along the lines of Wilson (2005), not those of the North/South Ministerial Council; • Department of Foreign Affairs to establish a defined, mainstream programmatic funding line for north-south and cross-border cooperation; • Amendment of the current proposals for the next round of the structural funds for territorial cooperation, with civil society to have representation in its own right on the European Group for Cross-border Cooperation; and the European Group for Cross-border Cooperation to report both to the Oireachtas and Northern Ireland Assembly and the North-South Civic Forum. • The next programme for cross-border cooperation, the successor to INTERREG, to include a people-to-people priority in its own right with double the present funding;

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• Revision, by the government, of the national spatial strategy on a cross- border basis, with the cross-border area deserving of a strategy in its own right.

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172

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Reid, Liam (2004): New Move to Seize Earnings of Illegal Dumpers - Environment Agency Launches Task Force to Crack Down on Cross Border Waste Smugglers. Gunmen Link to Illegal Waste Trade a Worrying Development. Irish Times, 22nd October 2004.

Robb, Professor Harford (1995): Activities for the Joint Chair in Cross-Border Business Enterprise. Dublin & Coleraine, University College Dublin and University of Ulster.

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173

THE EMERALD CURTAIN

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Special European Union Programmes Body (SEUPB) (2002): The Story of INTERREG II. Monaghan.

Special European Union Programmes Body (SEUPB) (2003): INTERREG IIIA programme 2000-6 Ireland/Northern Ireland – Operational Programme. Monaghan.

Stutt, Colin (1996): Special Support Programme for Peace and Reconciliation in Northern Ireland and in the Border Counties of Ireland – Baseline Study. Belfast, Colin Stutt Consulting.

Stutt, Colin (1999): Border Area Strategy and Integrated Area Plans for Border Corridors. Belfast, KPMG.

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Tomlinson, Mike (2004): The Northern Ireland Conflict - Legacies and Impacts. Monaghan, Combat Poverty Agency.

Triskele (1999): Along the Borderline. Carrickmacross.

Triskele (2000): Rural Community Development – Round Table Discussion Report. Carrickmacross.

Triskele (2002): Vibrant Voices – The Future of Anti-Poverty Work in Monaghan. Carrickmacross, for Monaghan Equality Promotion Network.

Turner, Brian S (Ed) (2002) : The Debatable Land - Ireland’s Border Counties. Ulster Local History Trust.

174 Venture International (2002): Joint Cross-Border Education, Training and Research Scoping Study. Dublin & Belfast, Department of Agriculture & Rural Development & Department of Agriculture & Rural Development.

Venture International (2002): Cross Border Rural Development Cooperation Study. Dublin & Belfast, Department of Agriculture & Rural Development & Department of Agriculture & Rural Development.

Walsh, Kathy (2002): Learning Peace by Piece – an Analysis of the Learning from Case Studies Supported by ADM/CPA and Funded Under the EU Special Programme for Peace and Reconciliation. Monaghan.

Walsh, Kathy (2004): An Evaluation of Monaghan Community Network’s Celebrating Difference Project. KW research, Dunboyne, Co Meath.

Wilson, Robin (2001): Initial Draft of Paper to go to the Two Administrations on a North South Consultative Forum. Belfast, Democratic Dialogue.

Wilson, Robin (2005): North - South Civic Relationships - Where Next? Belfast, Democratic Dialogue.

Whyte, J (1983): The Permeability of the United Kingdom – Irish Border: A Preliminary Reconnaissance. Administration, vol 31, #3.

175 Notes