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7=6? TABLE OF CONTENTS

List of Tables …………………………………………….……… ix List of Figures……………………………………………………… x Acknowledgements ……………………...... xi

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION...... 1 Background...... 1 1.2 Discourse, World and this Study…...... 13 1.3 CDA, the Palestine Question and this Study...... 20 1.4 Aim of Study…………………………………………..……..... 26 1.5 Statement of the Problem...... 27 1.6 Objectives of Study...... 31 1.7 Research Questions...... 33 1.8 Significance of Study...... 33 1.9 Definition of Key and Newly Minted Terms……………...... 34 1.10 Organisation of Study...... 38

CHAPTER 2: BACKGROUND: THE PALESTINE QUESTION…………………………...…….... 40 2.1 Overview……………………………………………………….. 40 2.2 The Palestine Question: Origins and Evolution...... 45 2.3 The Palestine Question: Formative Events………………... 48 2.3.1 French Revolution (1789)………………….……….. 50 2.3.2 Publication of “The Jewish State” (1896)...... 50 2.3.3 Zionist Claims to Palestine...... 51 2.3.4 McMahon’s Deception: The Roots of Arab Bitterness..…………….……….. 57 2.3.5 Balfour Declaration (1917)...... 59 2.3.6 British Occupation (1917-1948)……………………. 61 2.3.7 White Paper of June 1922...... 61 2.3.8 Stance of British Government...... 62 2.3.9 Zionism and Modern Jewish Ethnic Supremacy…. 63 2.3.10 Zionist Mythology and the Propagation of Israelese……………………...…………………….. 66 2.3.11 Historical Anti-Semitism vs New Anti-Semitism… 67 2.3.12 Rise of Nazism (1930s)...... 68 2.3.13 Proposal of Partition (1937)...... 69 2.3.14 Plan of Partition (UN GA Resolution 181) (1947). 70 2.3.15 Seismic Global Changes in the Balance of Power 71 2.4 The Palestine Question: A Hundred Years of Struggle...... 72 2.5 The Palestine Question: Causes of Exacerbation...... 74

v 2.5.1 Israeli Occupation of the Remnant of Palestine (1967)……………………………………… 75 2.5.2 Apartheid Politics...... 76 2.5.3 Israelispeak and Israeli Media...... 82 2.5.4 Israeli Violations of International Norms of Conduct...... 83 2.5.5 Politics of Expansion and Dispossession...... 83 2.5.6 Dictatorships of the Arab World and Anglo-American Stance…………………………….. 86 2.5.7 Weak Official Palestinian Stance...... 88 2.5.8 PLO and the Change of Strategy………………… 90 2.5.9 Arab Inexperience of the Power of Logos and Pitfalls of Discourse……………………………...... 91 2.5.10 Injustice vs Intifadas...... 94 2.6 The Palestine Question: Is There a Way Out?...... 95

CHAPTER 3: REVIEW OF LITERATURE…………………. 97 3.1 Overview…………………………………….…………………. 97 3.2 Language beyond Communication: An Overview…………. 100 3.2.1 Language: Multifunctionality and Centrality………. 104 3.2.2 Language: Metafunctions…….…………..…………. 109 3.2.3 Language: Thought and Perception……………...... 113 3.2.4 Language: Construction of Reality and our Conceptualisation of it………………………………. 116 3.2.5 Language: Construction of Diversion and Deadening……………………………………………. 119 3.2.6 Language: Positioning and Representation………. 123 3.2.7 Language: Imperialism and “Othering”………..…... 124 3.2.8 Language: Ideology and Power……………………. 127 3.2.9 Language and society: Dialectical Relationship...... 133 3.2.10 Names of Wars and Political Implications………. 134 3.3 Discourse and Discourse Analysis...... 138 3.4 Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA)...... 148 3.4.1Significance, Scope and Application of CDA...... 153 3.4.2 Differences and Similarities, Aim and Objectives… 158 3.5 Eirenic Proposals to end Israeli Occupation: An Overview. 166 3.5.1 One-State Solution...... 167 3.5.2 Two-State Solution...... 168 3.5.3 Palestinian Stance...... 168 3.5.4 PLO and the One-State Solution...... 169 3.5.5 PLO and the Two-State Solution...... 169 3.5.6 Camp David Peace Proposal (July 2000)...... 170 3.5.7 Saudi/Arab Peace Initiative (March 2002)………… 174 3.5.8 Decay of the Two-State Solution...... 175

vi 3.5.9 The Improbable Solution: State of Jerusalem...... 176 3.6 Review of Related Research Works...... 178

CHAPTER 4: METHODOLOGY………………….…………. 184 4.1 Overview……………………………………………………….. 184 4.2 Theoretical/Analytical Framework………………………… 185 4.3 ResearchDesign...... 195 4.4 Data Collection……..………………………………………… 198 4.5 Data Analysis……………………………………...... 199 4.6 Historical Construction of the Palestine Question...... 208

CHAPTER5: DATAANALYSISANDFINDINGS………… 210 5.1 Overview……………………….………...... 210 5.1.1 Discourse and Political Entities...... 212 5.1.2 Research Questions and Assumptions……………. 214 5.2 RQ I: UN Resolutions & ‘Peace’ Discourse, and Right of the Palestinian People to Self-Determination (Q. of Occupation/Territory/Sovereignty)………….……... 216 5.2.1UN Resolution 242 and Right of the Palestinian People to Self-Determination……………………..… 217 5.2.2 UN Resolution 338 and Right of the Palestinian People to Self-Determination………………...... 229 5.2.3 UN Resolution 3236 and Right of the Palestinian People to Self-Determination……………...... 230 5.2.4 UN Resolutions 1397and1515, & Right of the Palestinian People to Self-Determination………… 232 5.2.5 UN Resolution on Israeli Wall, and Right of the Palestinian People to Self-Determination………… 236 5.2.6 Oslo Accords (I) (1993) & the Q. of Palestinian Self-Determination...... 238 5.2.7 Oslo Accords (II) (1995) & the Q. of Palestinian Self-Determination………..…………………………. 251 5.2.8 George W. Bush, Speech at the Aqaba (Jordan) Summit, and the ‘Palestinian State’...... 253 5.2.9 Summary of Research Question I: Findings Related to the Right of the Palestinian People to Self-Determination...... 260 5.3 RQ II: UN Resolutions & ‘Peace’ Discourse, and the Palestinian Refugees Right of Return (Question of the Right of Return)……………………………………………….. 264 5.3.1 UN Resolutions 212, 194, 302, and the Q. of the Right of Return...... 265 5.3.2 UN Res. 242 & the Q. of the Right of Return & Self-Determination…………………………………. 268

vii 5.3.3 UN Resolution 338 and the Question of the Right of Return...... 269 5.3.4 Oslo Accords (I) and the Question of the Right of Return………………………………...... …... 270 5.3.5 Summary of Research Question II: Findings Related to the Right of Return...... 273 5.4 Change of PLO Discourse and Onset of the Slippery Slope: Decline of the PLO in the Mid-1980s...... 277 5.4.1The Khartoum Conference & Onset of the Arab Slippery Slope……………………………………..….. 279 5.4.2 PLO’s Ten Point Programme 1974 & Onset of the Slippery Slope………………………………………... 280 5.4.3 Peace Process: War against the Palestinians by Other Means………………………………………….. 282

CHAPTER 6: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION…………… 284 6.1Overview…………….……...……………………………...... 284 6.2 Summary and Findings……………………….……………… 286 6.3 The Palestine Question: Past, Present, Future……………. 298 6.4 Recommendations and Suggestions for Further Research………………………………...... 307

BIBLIOGRAPHY……………………….…………………...... 308 APPENDICES………………………..………….………………… 322

viii LIST OF TABLES

Table No. Page No.

2.1 Jail sentencing in Israel 79 4.1 Argumentation/discourse strategies 191 4.2 Specific linguistic means 193 4.3 Corpus of Study (Documents Analysied in Chapter 5) 179 4.4 Argumentative structure of Tekoah’s Address 201 4.5 Main nominations and predications in Tekoah’s Address 202 4.6 Corpus of Study (Documents Analysed in Chapter 2) 209 5.1 CDA of UN Resolution 242 220 5.2 CDA of UN Resolution 242 222 5.3 CDA of UN Resolution 242 227 5.4 CDA of UN Resolution 242 228 5.5 CDA of UN Resolution 338 230 5.6 CDA of UN Resolution 3236 231 5.7 CDA of UN Resolutions 1397 and 1515 233 5.8 CDA of UN Resolutions 1397 and 1515 234 5.9 CDA of UN Resolutions 1397 and 1515 235 5.10 CDA of Oslo Accords (I) (Q. of Self-Determination) 240 5.11 CDA of Oslo Accords (I) (Q. of Self Determination) 241 5.12 CDA of Oslo Accords (I) (Q. of Self-Determination) 242 5.13 CDA of Oslo Accords (I) (Q. of Self-Determination) 244 5.14 CDA of Oslo Accords (I) (Q. of Self-Determination) 246 5.15 CDA of Oslo Accords (I) (Q. of Self-Determination) 247 5.16 CDA of Oslo Accords (I) (Q. of Self-Determination) 248 5.17 CDA of Oslo Accords (I) (Q. of Self-Determination) 249 5.18 CDA of the Interim Agreement (Oslo II) 252 5.19 Argumentative structure of Bush’s Speech 256 5.20 Main nominations & predications in Bush’s Speech 257 5.21 Summary of Research Question I 262 5.22 CDA of UN Resolution 194 266 5.23 CDA of UN Resolution 194 267 5.24 CDA of UN Resolution 242 269 5.25 CDA of Oslo Accords (I) (Q. of the Right of Return) 271 5.26 CDA of Oslo Accords (I) (Q. of the Right of Return) 273 5.27 Summary of Research Question II 274 6.1 Discourse Strategies and Linguistic Means 288 characterising UN Discourse on the Palestine Question 6.2 Discourse Strategies and Linguistic Means 289 characterising Peace Discourse on the Palestine Question

ix LIST OF FIGURES

Figure No. Page No.

3.1 Textual analyses 143 4.1 Methodology and Theoretical Framework 186

x ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

My interest in this work has not developed out of vacuum. I wanted to pursue a project of this kind, not out of a desire for personal promotion and self-aggrandisement or just as a sort of intellectual luxury or a form of escapism from a bitter reality, but rather out of a searing pain to contribute to transform such a bitter reality - the reality caused by occupation and discursive injustice; the reality that results from the discursive polarisation between image and reality and hence the perpetuation of domination or such injustice; the reality that makes the apparent advocacy of ‘peace’ to be nothing more than a means to sustain war (the status quo); the reality that has provoked even maidens in quest for freedom in occupied Palestine to become self-immolators. More specifically, I have been driven by a sense of responsibility before God first and then fellow compatriots to help empower - through a critical analysis of the discourse declared to end this reality - the powerless in this dystopia. Now, along with this intrinsic drive, much of the inspiration I received - directly and indirectly - has come from a number of noble quarters, to whom hereI register my gratitude: This heartfelt gratitude, first and foremost, go to the One Who says: “Announce, (O Muhammad) unto My servants that verily I am the Forgiving, the Merciful”. Indeed to Allah, the Absolute Reality, the Creator, the Supreme Power, and the Most Compassionate, Lord of the Universe that I wish to immortalise my words of reverence and acknowledgment for His countless bounties and heart-touching Mercy, for without such Soothing Mercy, this book that finds its roots in my PhD project would have been one of loss and despair. Enshrined in my heart is also my gratitude to the one whose presence in my firmament, has - along with the glorious Quran and noble prophetic precepts - inspired me to pursue knowledge wherever it is, and in light of such knowledge, combat - in an objective and balanced manner - injustice and oppression, my dissertation mentor Dr Subramaniam Govindasamy, along with Prof Theo van Leeuwen, the External Examiner, whose insights and counsel together have expanded my mind and made the journey less thorny.

Aladdin Assaiqeli Occupied Palestine

xi CHAPTER ONE INTRODUCTION

1.1 BACKGROUND

A vital ingredient in the rise of almost any éminence grise or many of those in actual or official positions of power, and the resounding success or failure of many of those seeking power, language is “something one cannot afford to neglect” (Amer, 2009: 26). Away from its being a medium of communication, the centrality of language to power relations, and indeed to the very essence of human life and existence – right from the moment of birth to the throes of death - is again “something one cannot afford to neglect”. Indeed, beyond its role as a tool for communication and social interaction, language is used to effect a myriad of other crucial or more crucial roles. The way we think, the way we perceive or conceptualise the world, the way we conceive of reality, the way we rationalise things, form opinions, and ideologise them, the way we represent and picture events and realities around us, the way we construct our experience of the world, the way we enact social relations, the way we build our meaning potential since childhood, the way we picture social wrongs, the way we stabilise or even intensify social wrongs, the way we become members of a certain culture or group or a discourse type, or construct an identity, the way we take a stroll down memory lane, the way we conceal, mitigate, legitimate, or reproduce a certain political event, the way we perpetuate an ideology, the way we brainwash and get brainwashed for war, the way we programme and become programmed to kill, the way we problematise a figure or a people, etc., are all languaged. In other words, all those ways and many others are all constructed, carried out, shaped and reshaped by and through the apparatus of language. They are all constructed through the power of logos (see Section 1.9), the uniqueness of beyan (see Section 1.9), or the working of discursive processes (Jaworski and Coupland, 1999).Similarly, the way “consent,” as a form of hegemony is manufactured, the way we are socialised, produced as “social subjects” and made to occupy certain “subject positions,” the way certain implicit or background assumptions or presuppositions (e.g. “The Soviet threat cost the West dear”) are subtly imposed upon us as readers and interpreters, the way a certain ideology becomes “common sense” and thus the accepted norm or practice of a certain institution, the way a discourse type becomes normal or

1 “naturalized” (i.e. appearing to be devoid of a particular ideology) and thus commonsensical and thus dominant, the way victim-agent reversal (e.g. Palestinians and Israelis) takes place, etc. (Fairclough, 2001a) are also all constructed through certain “twisted and sinister” selections of language. Thus, beyond communication language is an instrument of wealth, authority and action; power, dominance and hegemony; manipulation, mystification and discrimination; inequality, injustice and domination. In the words of Blakemore (1992: 48), “we need to view language as a vehicle for social action rather than as a vehicle for thought”. Hence, it seems that the notion that language is a means of communication is an incidental function of language given its many other hegemonic functions. Language, for example, according to Montgomery, Durant, Fabb, Furniss and Mills (1992), is an instrument of conceptualising and constructing reality in particular expedient ways. Austin (1962) sees it as a “form of action;” Titscher, Meyer, Wodak and Vetter (2000) as a “form of social behavior;” Fairclough (2001b) as a “mode of action;” and a powerful tool for leverage according to Misaddi (2007). Therefore, language-conscious Machiavellians “seeking to control and influence our ideas in the service of some vested political or commercial interest” (Cook, 2003: 63) will use or abuse; indeed butcher language in “subtle ways” to influence and in many cases mislead the masses. While this concise account might be a revelation to the unpractised eye, to the perceptive observer of language and politics or those cognizant or conscious of the power of logos, and of critical language awareness, it is not. For them, it is something established as the authority of language or the role of discourse or discourses in shaping and reshaping perception and reality is central. For them, discourses are central in constructing the political event; in constructing or manufacturing social categories or “relatively powerless people,” such as “factory workers, criminals and juvenile delinquents;” in constructing “particular people (‘criminals’, ‘deviants’, teenage mothers’) as targets for social control and […] the form the control itself will take” (Cameron, Frazer, Harvey, Rampton and Richardson, 1999: 141-142). For them, the role of discourses in power relations and the perpetuation of power asymmetry; in “maintaining and legitimating unequal social arrangements” (1999: 142) is uncontested. It is uncontested as they can see the relationship between language and power or meaning and power or the “interplay of power and knowledge,” to draw on Michel Foucault (1926-1984), a central figure in this field.

2 A double-edged weapon, language is central to the construction of political and geopolitical entities, and individual, national and political or ethnic identities, and the dismantlement of existing ones; it is central to the hegemonic construction of experience and reality “along certain lines” or “angles of telling” rather than others (Montgomery et al., 1992: 76); it is central to power and control, to social, political, and cultural transformation, or formation, to lies and vilifications, to the misrepresentation of reality and the distortion of facts, to protraction and filibuster, to trickery and treachery, to camouflage and window-dressing, to temporisation and the creation of “facts on the ground,” to enslavement and subjugation, to the politicide or dismemberment of existing nations and the formation of new ones, to cession or secession, to inner emancipation and political liberation, etc. Hence, according to Jaworski and Coupland (1999), the global or macro-structures that take place in and shape the real world are carried through the local or microstructures of language or discourse. Such emphasis on the role and significance of language in the construction or distortion (i.e. hegemonic construction) of a certain reality and our conceptualisation or perception of it, and of the role it plays in social struggle and the change or maintenance of power relations, along with the need to increase consciousness of such significance as a way to reluct or resist manipulation, constitute one of the two main objectives of this study. Hence, for the purposes of this study, I am going to focus - in relation to the Palestine Question (see Section 1.9) - on language in its relation to power and the manufacture of ideology and master narratives and hence control and domination. Accordingly, one of my prime targets is to increase our consciousness of the role of language in the exercise of dominance and hegemony and its centrality to colonialism and the exercise of domination and their perpetuation on the one hand, and the transformation of the status quo or emancipation on the other (Fairclough, 2001a). So more than “naked violence,” language particularly in modern times plays a role central in enacting and sustaining social control and power and domination. An act of murder or a protracted conflict or any other “social wrong” can transpire or be prevented, for example, through words. Though - as told in the Biblical and Quranic story - Cain, for instance, is charged with the act of murdering his brother Abel; it is words that ignited this tragic end, this first incident of murder in the history of mankind. Through his provocative words, Abel - in a way - pushed his spurned brother, Cain, to murder him. This can be better grasped if we are to imagine Abel using rather sympathetic or emollient words to mitigate

3 the severity of the ordeal wroth Cain was undergoing, following the rejection of his offering, rather than enraging him further by representing himself as “righteous” and “God-fearing,” and qualifying his brother with words such as “evildoer” and as a “habitant of the Fire” (Quran, 5: 27-30). Thus, whether on an individual, familial, national or transnational level, vendetta or rapprochement, warmongering or peace-offering, acts of construction or acts of distortion, social inclusion or social exclusion of specific groups, etc. can all be (re)produced - besides coercion or physical force - by discourse. In this sense, both peace and violence are discursive (Buttny and Ellis, 2007). Thus, conceptions of war and visions of peace are discursively produced. Buttny and Ellis (2007: 141) state - with reference to the “intractable ethnonational” “Arab-Israeli conflict” as it is called - that “In the interactional realm, language use is not a mere epiphenomenon of one’s position in the intractable conflict, but becomes the central feature in the production and reproduction of social relations and social structure” and thus the conflict or occupation in this case. Indeed, as Amer (2009: 26) puts it, “conflicts and wars begin and end with words. Before guns are fired and bombs start falling, words commit the first act of war”. Emphasising the same point, Nelson (2003) observes:

Human conflict begins and ends via talk and text. We generate, shape, implement, remember and forget violent behavior between individuals, communities or states through a specific discourse. It is discourse that prepares for sacrifice, justifies inhumanity, absolves from guilt, and demonizes the enemy (449).

Thus - the means to establish every paradigm, discipline and movement, democracy, autocracy and any other system, etc. - words underlie almost every rightful or wrongful act and social practice. They initiate and then either perpetuate or defuse any culpable act, conflict or foreign occupation. They enact and sustain power relations. They naturalise and normalise us into accepting what we thought of - at one time - as bizarre and unacceptable, and what we thought of as acceptable, as bizarre and unacceptable. They “make notions which are in fact debatable seem like ‘givens’” or “questionable ideas or issues more palatable and ‘normal’” (Thomas, Wareing, Singh, Peccei, Thornborrow and Jones, 2004: 52), or in the words of George Orwell: “make lies sound truthful and murder respectable (quoted in Sant, 2008: 35), and hence the victim the aggressor, and the aggressor the victim.

4 In absence of morality or presence of immoralism or Machiavellianism, words make the vulture appears to be the prey, and the prey the vulture. In other words, words cause the victimiser to appear as the victim, and the victim as the heartless victimiser. They delegitimise the powerless as “violent, confused and irresponsible” and legitimise the powerful as “peaceable, rational and flexible” (Amer, 2009: 26). They enslave and subjugate. They cause personal or political paralysis. In this context, Bennabi (1998) - though indirectly - limns in a book that was originally written in French and translated into English and Arabic, a metaphorical picture of the power of words - in relation to colonialism - in effecting a general paralysis in a certain system or network of social relations:

Thus, the activities of colonialism are regularly promoted in more subtle and complicated ways to such an extent that it becomes almost totally beyond our ability to perceive their far-reaching implications. This is because our mental status and attitudes prevent us from following the intrigues and discerning the grain-of-sand like means used by colonialism. In such a situation, it would suffice that a single grain of sand enters the engine to put it out of order. In other words, just as a ‘nothing’ would suffice to paralyze the nervous system of a living being, so too would a ‘pin sting’ in a sensitive area be sufficient to bring paralysis into the social relations network of a colonized country (100).

Apart from the concrete manifestations of colonialism or occupation and in an indirect attempt to increase our consciousness of the power of the word - represented here in the slight but fatal grain of sand or pin sting - Bennabi attempts to draw our attention to the subtle ways imperial powers use in their domination of the less powerful. Hence, Bennabi’s (1998):

We are unfortunately unable, due to our mental attitudes and traditions, to perceive the activities of colonialism unless they are performed with much noise like that of guns, tanks or bombers. In contrast, when these activities are performed by expert artists or rodent-like agents, they reach beyond our awareness for the only reason that they make no noise (103).

5 As language is a “key to understanding both colonialism and the process of becoming emancipated from the strictures of foreign domination” (Divine, 2008: 3), it thus has the power to create ‘facts’ and inequalities, and the power to address and redress them. Seeing how colonialism/imperialism/occupation/foreign domination, social control or global dominance, etc. can be discursively forged or imperilled, justified and perpetuated or how it begins and ends through discourse is central to this study. In other words, central to this treatise is how language can be used or abused to enact, normalise and sustain domination or “facts on the ground” or “social wrongs,” and how it can be sought to address and redress them through the exposition of the discourses or “abusive discursive practices” that have given rise to them. Hence, one of the objectives of this treatise is to stress - through reference to the Palestine Question – “the [Hallidayan] notion of the multifunctionality of language in texts” (Titscher et al., 2000: 149), and its centrality to power creation and power perpetuation on the one hand, and equally its centrality to social change and emancipation. Accordingly, the study seeks to increase our consciousness of the central role discourse plays in altering people’s perceptions; in manufacturing ideology and consent and domination; (Fairclough, 2001a). It seeks to make us conscious of the “reciprocal influences of language and social structure;” of the assumption that there is a dialectical relationship between discourse and reality; that language leads to power and that power is, inter alia, constructed and maintained (or abolished) through language (Titscher et al., 2000; Fairclough, 2001a). It seeks to clarify how influential language or the linguistic sign is. It aims to let us recognise that language can control cognition and draw its responses (al Ghathami, 2004), shape and manage the mind (Van Dijk, 2008), divert or deflect attention, narcotise or deaden the senses (Misaddi, 2007), “naturalise us into accepting certain ideas…” (Thomas et al., 2004: 33), “induce the readers into occupying reading positions,” nudge or inveigle the target audience into adopting certain views and rejecting certain others, instil into our subconsciousness certain notions, suggestions, (background) assumptions and conceptions, and “project positions and perspectives”. It endeavours to show language, when used by the powerful, as a “means of domination” and distortion of reality, a tool employed to sustain and reproduce or perpetuate “hegemonic relations or unequal relations of power” (Simpson, 1993; Fairclough, 2001a); to enact, conceal, legitimate, or reproduce power and dominance, hegemony and inequality (Van Dijk, 1993; quoted in Titscher et al., 2000), and to “represent social realities in

6 determinate ways” (Montgomery et al., 1992: 74), etc. It seeks, especially in this “age of political spin and soundbites” (O’Halloran, 2003: 1-2) to make us read newspapers, listen to politicians and defense intellectuals/analysts, watch television and interact with any semiotic form or media differently - with a pinch of salt - to make us aware of such assumptions about language usage and language capabilities or the mind-taming, perception-shaping potentials to which language can - through such awareness - be put to. The study endeavours to make us aware of and be “sensitized to the linguistic practices” that are deployed to maintain “unequal relations of power”. It seeks to make us conscious of the assumption that the “angles of telling” (from Simpson, 1993) we adopt through the lexical and structural selections we make are not the same and that they are meticulously calculated to serve particular cognitive purposes; and to induce, through the drug of a certain discourse, the illusion of optimism, and hence the maintenance of the status quo. It seeks to sensitise our awareness of the presence of difference in media coverage of events on the one hand, and the significance of such difference or differences in reportage or discourse, as each discourse producer - “depending on their political perspective” (Montgomery et al., 1992: 76) - is motivated by different agenda, on the other hand. In other words, the study aims to sensitise our awareness of the media text or discursive event orchestrated by a certain discourse producer to frame or represent a certain political event as not being the same as another news text or discursive event representing the same political event. Each linguistic representation, depending on the motive and ideological viewpoint or affiliation of its producer, has its own ensemble of lexical and structural items and thus implications, which can, not only be quite different, but quite significant as well. Representing, for example, what took place in 1948 in Mandate Palestine, as “voluntary exodus” or “voluntary transfer” as maintained by the official Israeli version (Pappe, 2006), or as forced hijra/“Forced Exile”/“forced relocation”/“forced expulsion”/“forcible removal”/“forcible displacement” or “mass expulsion” as maintained by Arab academics (Khalidi, 1992; Masalha, 1992; Saleh, 2003), or as a crime of “ethnic cleansing,” as revealed by Israeli New Historians (Morris, 1988; Pappe, 2006), or as (population) transfer as it was originally conceived or represented by Theodore Herzl (1895), or “compulsory transfer” as was framed by David Ben- Gurion (1886-1973), is not the same, though the event being represented here is the same: the expulsion of “around a million people” (Pappe, 2006) from their homeland or the homelessness of

7 “85%” (Badil Resource Centre: Facts and Figures) “of the Palestinians living in the areas that became the state of Israel”. Thus, here we can see “how the same event can generate two different stories” and hence reactions with significant political and ideological implications, or at least “a difference in perspective” (Thomas et al., 2004: 63). Each discourse producer wants the masses to react and interpret the event in a particular way; to experience it and conceptualise reality from their own perspective or ideological stance. So while the event or people represented is the same, the way they are being represented is not the same. This is a fact that brings language at the heart of the political event, not as “a mere epiphenomenon” or tool of mere reflection or neutral narration but construction of the event (Montgomery et al., 1992), of the version deemed expedient of the event. In the media coverage of events representing the December 17, 2010 popular revolt against the political establishment in Tunisia, different media outlets/discourse producers framed the event in quite different terms; each in accordance with their political stance and ideological affiliations. Al Arabiya, (14/1/2011), a generally pro-government news channel, for example, chose to frame Tunisia’s president Ben Ali’s action, following the Tunisian Intifada against his “23 years iron-fisted rule,” with discursive qualifications such as ‘quitting’ and ‘leaving,’ as in the headline: “Ben Ali quits after 23 yrs in power & leaves Tunisia”. Al Jazeera (15/01/2001), supporter of the mass protesters, on the other hand, chose to represent the event as ‘ousting,’ as in the headline: “Tunisian Ben Ali Officially Ousted [...]”. So, while, Al Jazeera chose predications or representations such as “swept aside,” “ousted,” “fled the country,” “Ben Ali’s apparent downfall,” etc., Al Arabiya chose rather euphemistic representations such as “quit,” “leaves,” and “flying out of Tunis,” which, unlike Al Jazeera’s unmitigated discursive characterisations, downplays or mitigates the event, as though Ben Ali has chosen of his own accord to leave his office, and not been forced (for more examples, see Chapter 3). Therefore, how a political event is being discursively constructed differs from a discourse to another; or it can be stated the other way round, that the way a certain discursive event is orchestrated makes the political event, though one and the same, different and susceptible to various interpretations. That is why the coverage of one political event - the role of language in making such coverage - by different news agencies or interested parties cannot be identical as each reports the event from their own angle and in accordance with their own political perspective and ideological stance or at least

8 bent; an assumption that makes what is called ‘neutrality’ a rare coin and what is called ‘fact’ in politics multifactorial and multifaceted and thus relative. In short, language plays a significant or determinant role in how we (tend to) perceive a certain incident or political event and accordingly or eventually react. Our reactions - whether violent or peaceful for example - might not result from the political event as such but rather from the way the event has been discursively represented. Thus, away from communication in the narrow traditional sense, language is far more functional (see Chapter 3). It does not merely or neutrally communicate events but in the process of communication, it makes (constructs or distorts) the events and hence our reactions; it creates the version of events expedient to one’s political or commercial interests and ideological affiliations. Furthermore, our selection of a certain lexical and structural item, as a choice among a set of other choices, does not only encode a certain view of the world and “promote and maintain unequal relations of power” but also result in or entail a certain positioning and hence a certain responsibility and accountability; it can also result in empowerment if this assumption or potential about language and positioning is unknown to others (Misaddi, 2007). In other words, what we say reveals our position towards what is being said, and if a certain discourse participant is being unaware of this language dimension, then what is said will be a source of empowerment to the one aware of such potential. The lexicogrammatical formulae or the “angles of telling” we adopt towards a particular political event or issue reflect the kind of stance or ideology and responsibility we have towards that event or issue. Choosing, for example, to represent a Palestinian girl or young woman who - as a backlash to the atrocities of Israeli occupation (often misrepresented as the Arab-Israeli conflict, with the parity this (mis) representation connotes) - blows herself up among certain Israelis as a “martyr” or a “suicide bomber,” and her act as a “terrorist attack” or a “martyrdom operation” in defense of the defenceless, entails different positioning, (Misaddi, 2007), “responsibility and blame attribution” (Amer, 2009: 11), and hence liability. Such nominations or “discursive construction of social actors,” along with others such as “fedayee” or “freedom fighter” or “resistance fighter” reveal whether a discourse producer legitimates or delegitimates (Amer, 2009), incriminates or glorifies such acts, validates or invalidates them, criticises or deflects criticism, attributes blame or exonerates. They reveal whether he or she is being pre-emptive and proactive or defensive and reactive, apologetic or stigmatising, sympathetic or accusing, condemnatory

9 or celebratory. They reveal whether he or she thinks of such acts as “war crimes” or heroism, terrorism or self-defence, “weapons of the weak” and “tools for resisting oppression” (Gavron, 2004) or crimes against humanity, noble hara kiri and kamikaze acts or criminal and terrorist acts. They reveal whether he or she considers them as martyrdom or suicide or “self-immolation” operations. Thus, with or without being conscious, what one states is bound to position him or her in a certain position inside the straightjacket of discourse (Misaddi, 2007). This makes reality and the adoption of a certain position towards contentious issues a consequence of discourse, or in the words of Misaddi (2007: 35), “the construction of reality passes through the construction of discourse”. This is an assumption that makes language to be a mighty weapon, a tool constitutive of and at the helm of domination, as it manufactures or shapes, or twists the political or discursive event in accordance with the political interests of the discourse producer. In Israelispeak (see Section 1.9), it is common to hear the lexical item “disproportionate” in relation to the use of force, which manipulates us subtly into considering the use of “hard” power or force as ‘legitimate’ as long as it is not being ‘disproportionate’. Can we see the extent to which discourse can eventually normalise and naturalise us into accepting concepts we once conceived of as repugnant and dreadful? Can we see how language can be manipulated to make us view certain events in certain calculated determinate ways? When - at any point in time during the Israeli occupation - has Palestinian tyre-burning, “demonstrations and stone-throwing in support of an independent Palestine” and recently out of despair, self-immolation operations - as the primary means of defence - been proportionate anyhow to the Israeli Merkava or the up-to-date, cutting edge arsenal of the IOF (Israeli Occupation Forces) – “the heavily-mechanised Israeli army,” “the strongest military power in the region, with its Apache helicopters, tanks and bulldozers” (Pappe, 2006: 243)? When has it ever been proportionate to the Israeli “Military repression,” “armed troops,” “snipers in civilian clothes” (Smith, 2007: 422), “depleted uranium, white phosphorous, D.I.M.E. and other nuclear-based illegal weapons” (Ismail, n.d.)? To what extent can such sadist employment or abuse of words and cunning cynicism, diversion and deadening of the senses, justification of wars and inhumanity, discursive maquillage (see Section 1.9) and deception – all exercised through the construction of discourse in ad hoc workshops - go? Can we see/sense the brutalisation of language, language as a means of brutalisation and

10 language as an object of brutalisation; language as brutalising and language as being brutalised? In an age that makes use of the power of soundbites, power in many cases becomes a product of language. This is an assumption that makes language, not only a mighty weapon, as noted, but rather the mightiest weapon, a supreme authority. Thus, not only do we need to recognise that language is “an authority in itself,” but also accord to language the authority it deserves – a goal of this study. This interdisciplinary Critical Discourse Study seeks on the one hand to sensitise readers towards such assumptions, such concomitance between discourse and society (Fairclough, 2001a), discourse and mystification of social events, discourse and manipulation, discourse and positioning (Misaddi, 2007), discourse and the making (through construction or distortion) of reality, discourse and (de)legitimation of a certain event and political actors (Amer, 2009), discourse and the stabilisation or even intensification of social inequalities and injustices in society (Wodak and Meyer, 2009), and CDA and emancipation on the other. Indeed, it is through the apparatus of language and the critical analysis of language, or the construction and deconstruction of discourse that power relations can be maintained or changed (Fairclough, 2001a). Consequently, this study is driven by the motive to first instil into our consciousness that discourse is instrumental in enacting and shaping power relations, that in the arena of international relations, as concluded by Misaddi (2007: 358), the mightiest of weapons is that of language “as it belongs to the abstract world and because of what it does to the psychological being where it tames the mind until it becomes possible to penetrate its barriers”. Second, the study is driven by the motive that “the emancipation of man from the oppression of politics starts with the critical analysis and exposition of the linguistic manipulations or manoeuvres of politicians” (2007: 358); that what is reported or appears on the surface is only a modicum of what is unreported, or hidden; that we begin to notice or ‘taste’ such a fact only upon the submission to such a fact: ‘atrophy’ of what is being reported versus ‘hypertrophy’ of what is being hidden (2007); that if a nation hankers after disclosing the hidden and thus disengaging herself from the abuse of the powerful, then it is a prerequisite for such a nation to become conscious of language power or the discursive event in the hegemonic construction of the political event, since in Fairclough’s (2001a: 1) words: “consciousness is the first step towards emancipation”. Such “sensitized awareness,” such “critical language awareness” - if optimised among citizens and those we entrust with power - can make us, rulers and ruled, “more able to resist manipulation” and

11 “domination” (Fairclough, 2001a; Cook, 2003: 122; O’Halloran, 2003: 1). It can help the dominated and manipulated, the oppressed and less-advantaged, what Fairclough (2001b: 125) calls “the ‘losers’ within particular forms of social life - the poor, the socially excluded, those subject to oppressive gender or race relations” and so forth, to resist and fight against the domination or abuse of the dominant bloc, and the oppression of the political cabal, those Machiavellians and self-seeking opportunists, those rodent-like agents. Against this overview as a background, I foreground this Critical Discourse Study with its tripartite structure (or three main conceptual features), which concerns itself, (I) with the reproductive function of discourse in power relations and the reproduction of domination, (II) the enlightening and emancipatory role or transforming function of the critical study of discourse in social change and in empowering the “victims of discursive injustice” to reluct or resist the status quo, and (III) the past, present and future of the Palestine Question as shaped by discourse. Hence it is in light of this reproductive function of discourse, and that of the transforming function of CDA - theroleCDAplaysinpolicing and unearthing the textual properties that sustain domination; and thus sounding the clarion call for change to help eliminate social inequalities – that the present study on the Palestine Question - a protracted, century-long and tragic “social wrong” - has been conducted. Accordingly, I set out to work recursively on the Palestine Question; discourse - the means through which domination gets enacted and then reproduced - and on what Fairclough (1995) called critical language awareness and the critical study of language - formerly known as Critical Linguistics (Wodak and Meyer, 2009) and now as Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) - “a resource for people who are struggling against domination and oppression in its linguistic forms” (Fairclough, 1995: 1). It should be noted, however, that though the study is motivated in particular by the problem created in Palestine out of Zionist terrorism, its objectives are not restricted to that wrong only but to any other similar injustice that might have originated from a certain dominant discourse or is being legitimated and reproduced through a certain discourse. It is within this context that this study - on the role of discourse in the history, present, and future of the Palestine Question - has been undertaken.

12 1.2 DISCOURSE, WORLD AND THIS STUDY

Discourse -the mere fact of speaking, of employing words…is in itself a force. Discourse is, with respect to the relation of forces, not merely a surface of inscription, but something that brings about effects. (Michel Foucault, 1976; quoted in Clarke, 2005:174)

A “way of behaving and making others behave” (Firth, quoted in Brown, 2000, 250), language (discourse) as stressed in the previous section is “something one cannot afford to neglect” (Amer, 2009: 26) as it permeates (shapes, manipulates, creates, makes, breaks, regulates, represents, affects) reality, our lives, conceptualisation, and relationships in respects subtle and serious, far-reaching and innumerable. This realisation, this modern awareness of the Hallidayan Firth- based notion of the “multifunctionality of language in texts” (Titscher et al., 2000: 149) and its centrality to the essence of “the species ‘social man;’” and his power relations – the awareness of the centrality of discourse to power relations; of the construction or distortion of reality and the inception of social structures through language and vice versa, or of the notion that language is “both socially constitutive and socially determined” (Fairclough, 1995; quoted in Titscher et al., 2000: 148); that language is a form of action (Austin, 1962); that “practices are discursively shaped and enacted;” that “power is exercised and enacted in discourse” (Fairclough, 2001a: 61); that discourse plays a central role in the ever going battle of social struggle; that “social control and power are exercised with increasing frequency by means of texts […]” (Titscher et al., 2000: 152-153); that “inequality and injustice are repeatedly reproduced and legitimized by language” (2000: 164); and that “domination and oppression” take place in “linguistic forms” (Fairclough, 1995) – have all given birth to what has come to be known as the ‘linguistic turn’. This is the realisation that language is/can be used for purposes other than those of mere communication. This in turn has given rise to significant fields of language research such as Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) or the more comprehensive designation, Critical Discourse Studies (CDS) as preferred to be called by Van Dijk (2009: 62). Such interrelation of discourse and domination or the nexus between discourse and society has also provided the theoretical origin of this critical discourse study. Language as viewed by Halliday (1978) - and those that take an external or functional 13 perspective of language - is a social or socio-semiotic system. It does not take place in isolation of a social cultural context. Language and language structures and use occur, as perceived by Malinowski, within the context of a culture and that of a situation (1978). Indeed, language (made up of a lexicon and a grammar) is itself originally or historically the written or textual product of a culture. So, theoretically, what has given impetus to this CDA study is the realisation of the interrelations of language and society; of language and power and ideology” (Fairclough 2001a); of the assumption that “the use of language could lead to a mystification of social events which systematic analysis could elucidate” (Wodak and Meyer, 2009: 7); of the views, notions and assumptions that language makes or constitutes things rather than being a mere or neutral means of labelling things; that the structure of language determines, as maintained by linguistic relativists, the structure of thought; that language constructs or distorts reality or realities and vice versa; “that in modern and contemporary (‘late modern’) society discourse has taken on a major role in sociocultural reproduction and change” (Fairclough, 1995: 2); that “Meanings are produced and reproduced in a dialectic process of negotiation” (Titscher et al., 2000: 145); that “discourse cannot exist without social meanings, and that there must be a strong relation between linguistic and social structure” (Kress and Hodge 1979; cited in Titscher et al., 2000: 145). So, the study has been prompted from the realisation of the “strong” or “dialectical relationship” between discourse and society, and the consciousness that language is and can be employed for purposes other than those of the telementation of ideas from the mind of one individual to another, to that of action, power and social control. It has emerged from a heightened sense of the role of language in structuring power relations in society (Wodak and Meyer, 2009); from “Habermas's claim that language is also a medium of domination and social force […]” (2009: 10); from a post-war recognition of “the roles and importance of language and communication in totalitarian regimes and their propaganda” (2009: 17); from a Foucauldian emphasis that discourses “construct particular people (‘criminals’, ‘deviants’, teenage mothers’) as targets for social control” (Cameron et al., 1999: 141); from the consciousness of the role of language in naked, structural and symbolic violence… It has developed from the recognition that “language is centrally involved in power, and struggles for power, and that it is so involved through its ideological properties” (Fairclough, 2001a: 14); that “language determines our perception of the world” (Thomas et al.,

14 2004: 39 ); and that thus “language can be used to influence people’s political and ideological views” (2004: 41); that “different points of view, or ideologies, are constructed linguistically” (2004: 59); that “new pieces of knowledge (constructed in the form of certain discourses) function as forms of social control” (Cameron et al., 1999: 141); that “human existence is by definition, a linguistically articulated existence” (Saussure 1916; cited in Harris and Taylor, 1989); that “the construction [or distortion] and reflection of social realities through actions that invoke identity, ideology, belief, and power” (Young, 2009: 1) occur through discourse; that “social realities are linguistically/discursively constructed” (2009: 2); that discourse is “not merely a surface of inscription, but something that brings about effects” (Foucault 1976; quoted in Clarke, 2005:174). It has developed from the awakening zeitgeist that language is responsible for positioning and hence responsibility; that language is an authority and that “nothing can be perceived outside this authority” (Misaddi, 2007); that empty signification or the elasticity of language renders precise interpretation difficult (2007); that language is far from being that innocent; that “meaning is negotiated in interaction, rather than being present once-and-for all in our utterances” (Young, 2009: 2); that insidious discourse canbeused as a “tranquillising drug of gradualism,” indefinite temporisation and deceptive optimism; and that language is a key to understanding both colonialism and the process of decolonisation, and such indefinite temporisation... It has consequently developed out of a personal conviction that the way the Palestine Question - a significant question for world peace - has been discursively constructed “along certain lines” or “angles of telling” rather than others is what has kept Palestine and the Middle East in the way it is now; and that the emancipation from “the strictures of foreign domination” (Divine, 2008: 2) or the “oppression of politics” (Misaddi, 2007) starts with the critical analysis and exposition of the linguistic manipulations or manoeuvres of politicians and the powerful forces. Hence, as a means, not only for reflecting the world and our perception of it, but also constructing or distorting it and shaping and controlling how we are to perceive it, it is not an overstatement to state that language or more accurately logos or the faculty of beyan engulfs or creates or permeates or at least mediates - apart from certain limited number of biological or instinctive acts - every aspect or act of human existence - from uttering, to thinking, to understanding, to officiating, to conceiving, to perceiving, to deceiving, to indoctrinating, to inspiring, to writing, to interpreting, to analysing, to creating, to enacting, to establishing, to acculturating,

15 to taming, to ordering, to subjecting, to offering, to concealing, to praising, to condemning, to worshipping, to denying, to promoting, to making advances, to ‘making love,’ to divorcing, to legitimating, to incriminating, to exasperating, to exacerbating, to hurting, to bating, to healing, to supporting, to refuting, to defending, to obscuring, to mitigating, to foregrounding, to backgrounding, to occupying “subject positions,” to covering up, to fabricating, to equivocating, to misleading, to perpetuating the status quo, to persuading, to dissuading, to qualifying, to disqualifying, to formulating pretexts, to desensitising, to diverting, to deadening the senses... This sensitised awareness, realisation or zeitgeist - brought about by “rapid and radical changes” in methods and media of communication (Cook, 2003: 5) - though belated, has revolutionised the way we are to look at discourse and the world, discourse and the actual role we are consequently to accord to it in the enactment and exercise of power, and in the delineation and shaping of power relations among individuals, sovereign states, political entities, and social structures. The exercise of power and the delineation of power relations through the manufacture of ideology through discourse or ISAs (Ideological State Apparatuses) as instruments of hegemony or the hegemonic construction of reality - though not new - had until recently been undemonstrated. Critical Theory and recent critical language studies have revealed that discourse, in modern times, produces and reproduces control and domination and that social and political structures are shaped, structured and very much influenced by the subtleties of language - as opposed to that of the war machine or coercion. In this connection, Fairclough (1995) observes:

The role of discourse within the society and culture is seen as historically variable, and I argue that in modern and contemporary (‘late modern’) society discourse has taken on a major role in sociocultural reproduction and change (2).

In modern times, social change takes place largely as a result of discourse and what Fairclough (1995: 3) calls the technologization of discourse, a “calculated intervention to shift discursive practices as part of the engineering of social change”. In this sense, discourse is being technologised, i.e. developed to effect certain institutional and societal change. So discourse “has effects upon social structures and contributes to the achievement of social continuity or social change” (Fairclough, 2001a: 30). It “contributes to the reproduction of social structures” (2001a: 61).

16 Therefore, and as noted, our existence and the way we view it, our social relations and structures and the way we enact them, and our inception, maintenance or change of such relations and structures are all the product of certain “discourse types” or generic structures, which make up the “order of discourse” - “a particular relatively stabilized configuration of discourse practices” (Fairclough, 1995: 2) of an institution. It should be noted here that order of discourse is a concept adapted by Fairclough from Foucault “to refer to the ordered set of discursive practices [discourse types] associated with a particular social domain or institution (e.g. the lecture, the seminar, counselling, and informal conversation, in an academic institution), and boundaries and relationships between them” (Fairclough, 1995: 12). So, “the ‘order of discourse’ of a social domain refers to the totality of discourse types and the relationships between them in this domain” (Titscher et al., 2000: 149). For example, “For the social domain ‘school’ this would include the discourse types of the classroom, the school playground and the staffroom” (2000: 149). So, besides the “societal order of discourse,” each social domain or institution has its own “‘local’” order of discourse (“totality of discourse types and the relationships between them in this domain”); their own conventions; their own (ordered set of) discursive practices, which “may be relatively strongly or relatively weakly demarcated” and their own boundaries, which “may be rigid or permeable” (Fairclough, 1995: 12). In this context, Fairclough (1995; quoted in Titscher et al., 2000: 149) observes:

The investigation of whether the different discourse types found within one order of discourse, or different orders of discourse, are strictly separate from one another, or whether they frequently overlap, may provide the key to conflicts and power struggle or social and cultural changes.

Discourses are multifarious and heterogeneous. There are discourses or discourse types such as tabloidese, legalese, medicalese, journalese, bureaucratese, computerese, israelese; “medico-legal discourses,” Zionist (biblically invoked) discourses of the ‘historical right’ or ‘ancient historic connection’ and the ‘spiritual connection’ (concerning Palestine), “opinion discourse,” “argumentative discourse,” “Friedman’s discourse”... These are “conventional ways of talking that both create and are created by conventional ways of thinking” (Johnstone, 2002: 3). These socially constructed ways (Foucault, e.g. 1977) or “linked

17 ways of talking and thinking,” according to Johnstone (2002: 3), “constitute ideologies (sets of interrelated ideas) and serve to circulate power in society” (see Chapter 3). “In other words,” Johnstone further states, ““discourses”” in this sense involve patterns of belief and habitual action as well as patterns of language” (2002: 3); leading to what Foucault describes as “regimes of truth” – “sets of understandings [such as the programmes of social scientific research of “criminality,” “sexual deviance,” and “teenage motherhood,” etc.] which legitimate particular social attitudes and practices” (Cameron et al., 1999: 142) towards newly constructed types of people “as targets for social control,” hence acting as means of influence, regulation and social control. Other discourses include intellectual discourse, “Islamic reformist and renewalist discourse” (Hassan, 2010: 186), “‘development’ discourse” (Gilbert Rist, 1997; quoted in Hassan, 2010: 191), Israeli discourse, Orientalist discourse, therapeutic discourse, “television and radio discourse” (Thomas et al., 2004: 56) or “media discourse” (Wodak and Meyer, 2009: 3), “expulsion discourse,” academic discourse, gay discourse, “discourse of justification” (Titscher et al., 2000: 162), “discourse of violence” (Buttny and Ellis, 2007), Islamist and secularist discourses… In the domain of politics, the following are examples of political discourse types: Zionism, fascism, Nasserism, Thatcherism, Pan- Arabism, ummatism or supra-nationalism, Marxism, Islamism, Pan- Islamism, etc. - conventional ways of talking that both create and are created by conventional ways of thinking”. All these discourse types affect us in a way or another. We – peoples and nations, languages and identities, nationalisms and colonial enclaves for example - are constructed, for instance, by identity discourses, nationalist identity discourses, national security discourses, Islamist discourses, secularist discourses, territorialist discourse, historical discourse, commercial discourse, propagandist discourse (e.g. in elections), and those of diplomacy and promotion (Misaddi, 2007). We are affected, manipulated and moulded, shaped and reshaped by discourses of Anti-Semitism, of English as a global language, of dominant and non-dominant dialects, of the notion of a restricted code and elaborated code, of the dominant bloc and minorities here and there, of sex and sexuality, of male femaling or sex-changing, of gay pride and gay liberation, of abortion and the normalisation of homosexuality, of change and reformation, of ethnicity and identity, of climate change and global warming, of gendered and racial discourses. In a similar vein, people are influenced by discourses on globalisation, on political platforms such as vision 20/20 or Islam

18 Hadari or 1 Malaysia as articulated by successive Malaysian prime ministers Mahathir, Badawi and Najib, respectively, on the global credit crisis, on Islam and secularism, on the 2011 ‘Arab Spring’ or the popular revolts in the Arab world, on the intellectual war against Islam, on the Israeli occupation of Palestine, and the American occupation of Iraq and Afghanistan, on educational polices, on the effects of secularisation, on the clash of civilisations; on social status and power, on discourse and domination, on ethnic cleansing and “the homogeneous territorial nation,” on citizen’s rights, on “discoursal rights,” on the rights or access to “cultural capital,” on “access to prestigious sorts of discourse and powerful subject positions” (Fairclough, 2001a: 53), on “social struggle,” on the Right of Return of Palestinian refugees, on the rhetoric of peace and the “discourse of violence,” on religious discourse, on nationalist discourse, on Zionist discourse, etc. This wide “range and heterogeneity of discourses” (Clarke, 2005:154) are thus a fact of life dealing with almost every aspect of our existence. Discourses are diversely constructed (depending on the ideology behind a certain discourse) and variedly distributed (through various media or semiotic modes) (Govindasamy and Khan, 2006). It is obvious that every aspect of life seems to be governed by a certain discourse or “regime of truth;” an assumption that shows the role of discourse and discourses “in the course of the struggle for power,” (Fairclough, 2001a: 78) in the pursuit of continuity or change of a certain state of affairs, in “enlightenment and emancipation” or domination and enslavement, in freedom and democracy or thraldom and autocracy, in equality and justice or inequality and injustice, in the betterment or otherwise of human conditions. It is clear that some discourses are meant to construct a certain reality, and some to distort, while there are also others that are meant to construct through distortion. Further, the same discourse could be viewed by different people differently. Thus, to say that Palestinians are terrorists, from the Palestinian perspective, this would be a distortion of reality, while from the Zionist view, this would be a construction or an imposition of reality. Herzl’s influential discourse (see Chapter 2) in 1896 – Der Judenstaat (The Jewish State) - was a milestone in the national construction of Zionist Jews and simultaneously the national destruction of the Palestinians. So whether discourse is being used as a means of construction or distortion is relative to one’s position in a given situation or conflict. However, the point I want to emphasise here is that in either case, that of the construction of reality and that of the distortion of reality, discourse is the means to do that. So discourse can construct a

19 reality, which could be just (construction) or unjust (distortion - what I called earlier hegemonic construction). However, regardless of the ideological or hidden drive behind a discourse or a regime of truth, they are modes of belief and action, modes of regulation and social control, modes of representation, and modes of behaviour actuated by language, by “the pronouncements of expert discourse” to draw on Foucault. They are tools that contribute to “social continuity or social change”. Hence, they are used by the powerful, and according to Foucault, those involved in social scientific research for the constitution of ideologies or “regimes of truth” and thus the circulation and exercise of power and the enactment and maintenance of social control.

1.3 CDA, THE PALESTINE QUESTION AND THIS STUDY

A “young science;” an “emerging strand of research in linguistics;” a “field of language research;” a “critical social science;” a “democratic resource;” a form of resistance; a “sort of forensic activity;” a “set of principles;” a “school or paradigm;” “a research enterprise;” a “research programme;” an “established paradigm in linguistics;” a “critical perspective, position or attitude;” an “established academic discipline;” a “movement of critical scholars in the field of discourse studies” (T.A. van Dijk, personal communication, February 22, 2012); a “constitutive, problem-oriented [and] interdisciplinary” framework with a “bulk of approaches;” an “analytical framework - a theory and method - for studying language in its relation to power and ideology” (Fairclough, 1995: 1); an umbrella term to a number of “methodological and theoretical approaches” to the analysis of discourse; a significant field of research that is proliferating and in the ascendant since the early 1990s, CDA - in all its variants - (see Chapter 3) plays a transforming role in detecting and exposing linguistic manipulation, in demystifying social events, in policing and deconstructing discursive practices, thus revealing “the ways social and political domination are reproduced by text and talk,” and other semiotic modes or resources. So a great resource, CDA is used by researchers and scholars committed to social equality and justice to uncover ideological work and political agenda; to show up hidden connections (Fairclough, 2001a), and to make “opaque structures of power relations and ideologies manifest” (Kendall, 2007: 17); to expose “opaque and explicit discourse structures and strategies in dominant discourses responsible for enacting and perpetuating domination and control of less powerful social groups” (Amer, 2009: 7), and to thus, free the

20 dominated from domination “in its linguistic forms” (Fairclough, 1995: 1). So besides other forms of resistance to either physical or structural or “symbolic violence,” it is CDA that can sound the clarion calls for change. Mastery of constructing and deconstructing discourse is thus the second step – after consciousness – not only to the domination of a certain grouping of another, but also to the liberation of a certain people from the domination of another. Hence, as CDA is central to “enlightenment and emancipation” or social change through the policing of “abusive discursive practices,” we need to recognise its role in elucidating the mystification (Wodak and Meyer, 2009) that results from the “sinister and twisted” uses of discursive processes as a result of their “overt denial of the underlying ideology” (Jaworski and Coupland, 1999: 496) – a goal of this critical social research. With its critical orientation, CDA can, as I shall elaborate later, be used to shed light on the dark side of discourse use or those “sinister and twisted” workings of discursive processes where language can be brutalised or manipulated in certain ways to achieve hidden motives and unspoken agenda. CDA , with its critical insight into the fine workings of language or the way discourses are orchestrated, can be used to uncover such manipulation, and thus prompt changes in discourse; and as such empower those manipulated to resist being manipulated (Cook, 2003). It is against this backdrop - this awareness that discourse is central to exercising power and domination, and CDA to expositing the “non-trivial” or less evident discourse structures and linguistic means underlying such domination, along with a personal conviction that the way the Palestine Question has been discursively constructed “along certain lines” is what has kept Palestine in the way it is now - that this study has been undertaken. Accordingly, the study draws much of its justification from its attempt to conduct a CDA of the discourse and discursive practices on the Palestine Question and find the kind of role they play in the status quo. So this is a study on the Dome of the Rock: the Holy Land, or the apparent holy grail of a Palestinian state. It is a study on the politicide of a nation - a peaceful rustic one - and the birth of another - a high-tech one; a study on the loss of a nation and the role of discourse in either effecting (some sort of) irredentism or perpetuating occupation; in setting things to rights and reinstating the expellees in their homeland or continuing the sufferings of the dominated, and obfuscating further their cause.

21 It is thus a Critical Discourse Study on the Palestinian state-to-be in political discourse; a study on discourses on the proposed ‘establishment’ of Palestinian statehood; a study on the discursive construction of a Palestinian state or more accurately the re- construction of historic Palestine, the whole of Palestine “with the boundaries it had during the British Mandate [... as] an indivisible territorial unit” (Article 2 of the Palestinian National Charter) and thus the re-constitution of Palestinians (back) into such Palestine. I say ‘re-’ because Palestine was there before; it was there as a geography and as a nation, and it was there from time immemorial (see Chapter 2). Palestine has always been there. So what has been happening following the 1948 Zionist attempt at the sociocide and politicide of Palestine as a nation and as a state and then the systematic “memoricide” of such genocide is a reconstruction of a state or reconstitution of a nation or a people that have existed for millennia. Hence is my emphasis on the ‘re’ in ‘re-construction’ or ‘re-constitution’. It is a study on the origins and evolution of this Question, on the intellectual or rather mythological roots of the Israeli occupation, on the formative events leading to the planned “compulsory transfer”or forced exile of the natives of Palestine (Morris, 1988; Masalha, 1992; Pappe, 2006) and the consequent formation of ‘Israel,’ on the ongoing causes of exacerbation of this miserable reality in Palestine (see Chapter 2). It is a study on the “in-built” and systematic “notion of Zionist design:” the premeditated 1948 transfer/mass expulsion of the Palestinians (Morris, 1988; Masalha, 1992; Pappe, 2006), beginning from its nineteenth-century Herzlian intellectual roots (Schulze, 2008), and the actual operations of cleansing in the 1940s, with the culmination of this design - “of over a half century of effort, plans and brute force,” (Masalha, 1992) - in 1948 (see Chapter 2). It is a study on the (Herzlian) discourse leading ultimately to the hebraisation and the “green-washing” of Palestine’s original landscape; and a study on those ensuing Zionist Anglo-American discourses aimed at not only intensifying the systematic whitewashing of the original landscape but also at attempting to obliterate the memoryscape of the uprooted indigenes of such “scape” or soil. It is a CDA study on image and reality or aspirations and realities: aspirations of a people who have been ousted by Zionist terrorism from their territories, their ancestral villages and rustic homes to languish in diaspora, and realities of a nation-state that identifies itself as Jewish and solely for the Jewish (see Chapter 2).

22 It is a study on the aspirations of a people, whose understanding of peace and offering of concessions mean living together, and on the realities of a political cabal, whose intransigence, constant creation of stumbling blocks or “facts on the ground,” and understanding of ‘peace’ means the annihilation of the other (see Chapter 5). It is a study on the doves’ call for the Palestinians’ Right of Return and their ingemination of peace, and the hawks’ call for the Israelis’ Law of Return and their perpetuation of “cleansing”. It is a study on the past diaspora of the Jews or the Jewish Question, present diaspora of the Palestinians or the Palestine Question, and future hopes of Arabs, Muslims, and millions of other free citizens of the world everywhere. It is a study on uprooted, dispossessed and occupied Palestinians whose need to find a solution to their dispossession and suffering makes them ready to make unprecedented concessions and accept unjust solutions; and a study on the occupying Zionists whose penchant to temporise and create more obstacles makes them ready to constantly slight such concessions and reject any solution. It is a study on the unpaved road to Palestinian statehood; on the long struggle for Palestinian liberation of territory, and national independence; on world peace in the face of Zionism; on the sufferings of the Palestinians, both homeless and occupied under the heel of Israeli Machtpolitik (see Chapter 2). It is a study on Palestine; the nation that exists both in law and in fact, but who is not yet a state (George, 2004). It is a study on the rather awkward and uncertain future of a State of Palestine and a people who are almost stateless. It is a study on calls and prospects for Palestinian self-determination and Israeli security; on “a secure state of Israel and a viable Palestinian state” (from Tony Blair- Prime Minister’s Address to the Nation, March 20, 2003); on survival and self-preservation; on the old Negro spiritual, “Free at last!”. It is a study on the centrality of the Palestine Question to peace, discourse to power relations and CDA to social change and thus the contribution to peace. It is a CDA of UN resolutions and ‘peace talks’ on the present and future of a people whose homeland has long been carved out and who as a result been eviscerated from such homeland, forced to lead a peripatetic existence in diaspora under grim conditions (Morris, 1988; Masalha, 1992; Saleh, 2003; Pappe, 2006; Smith, 2007). It is a CDA of discourses declared to end such peripateticism or homelessness; it is a study on perils and possibilities: possibilities of the reconstruction of Palestine, and thus bringing to an end such

23 homelessness and occupation, and perils of discourses that could have ulterior political ends, and thus further prolong such homelessness and protract the status quo (see Chapter 5). More specifically, this is a CDA attempt at the role, intent and practicality of those UN resolutions and peace discourses in the dynamics of the unequal Israel-Palestine conflict, in perpetuating or putting to an end the morass of Palestine: the continuity of the Palestinian sufferings, and the continuation of the “Zionist ideology and praxis” that have caused the past and present encroachments on the geography and demography of Palestine. Therefore, and as is the case with CDA, the study examines the “non-trivial” discourse strategies of such UN and peace discourse, and the linguistic means through which such strategies are subtly carried out where it is assumed that linguistic structures and discourse strategies are constructed in such subtle ways as to influence perception in determinate ways, induce certain or even conflicting interpretations, mystify social events and maintain “unequal relations of power”. Quite often, these subtle structures and strategies “are not self-evident to the casual reader” and even discourse participants. In such attempt to increase consciousness, the study, in particular, investigates the transitivity selections or the grammatical features of the clause that make up discourse. It is not just lexical categorisation through various nominations and predications or choice of vocabulary that promotes a certain ideology or conceptualisation, but also syntax or transitivity - the way a text is structured. Denying a certain people from occupying any subject position or certain subject positions, for example, while casting or representing them consistently in powerless object positions can create consciously or subconsciously in the minds of the target audience a certain image or view of such people where a certain view of reality is encoded, conceptualised and constructed or distorted, and certain truths diluted or camouflaged, and atrocities whitewashed. Elucidating this requires more than the investigation of lexicalisation. It requires besides vocabulary a CDA of what is called in Systemic Functional Grammar (SFG) “transitivity structures”. The following are examples of the linguistics of (mis) representation or the kind of whitewash of words or “angles of telling” the study aims to investigate: when certain Occupied Territories being referred to simply as “territories that are disputed,” and certain others as “liberated” or “independent,” and occupation or the Arab struggle against Israeli occupation – this unequal conflict - as “the Arab- Israeli conflict,” and Palestine as “Palestinian Territories,” and brutal use of force as “disproportionate use of force,” state terror as “self-

24 defence,” extremist Israeli terrorists as “extremist elements,” ethnic cleansing or forced exile or forcible removal as “voluntary exodus,” “transfer” or “War of Independence,” apartheid walls or segregation barriers as “security barriers” or “fences” or “acoustic walls,” human corpses and the incineration of cities as “collateral damage” or “civilian casualties,” acts of murder as “loss of human life,” Israeli occupation forces (IOF) as “Israeli security forces” or “IDF” (Israel Defence Forces), destroyed as “taken out,” the Zionist entity or occupying force as “Israel” or the “State of Israel,” Zionist colonies built on confiscated Palestinian land as “settlements” or (the little Sharonian term) “outposts,” or “existing major Israeli population centers,” the 1967 Israeli Aggression of 5 June and then occupation of the remnant of former Palestine as the “Six Day War” with its biblical intimations, freedom-fighters as “terrorists” or “suicide bombers” or “Islamic bombers and fanatic Moslems,” “legitimate acts of revolution and revolt,” as “terrorism” (Victor, 2005: 113), resistance as “violence” or “terror” and blatant Israeli attacks as “escalation,” etc. In addition, while certain lexical and structural selections can invalidate or promote certain perspectives, others work the other way round. When the Israeli political cabal decides to build a wall that rips Palestinian lands and families further apart, they are quite aware of why they want to call it a “security fence” or a “terror prevention fence” or an “acoustic wall” rather than a “segregation barrier” or an “expansionist wall” or “apartheid wall” or a “wall of disgrace”. Similarly, choosing, as noted above, to represent a Palestinian who blows him or herself up among certain Israelis as a “martyr” or “suicide bomber” or “freedom fighter” or “self-immolator” entails different types and levels of mitigation, condemnation, legitimation, positioning and responsibility, and hence a different construction (or here distortion) of reality. As can be seen from the above instances or euphemisms or mitigations or distortions of reality or indeed the brutalisation of language - taken from the “Zionist mythology” (see Chapter 2) and the discursive arsenal of the Israeli “angles of telling,” that are aimed at defending the indefensible - “the selection of one term rather than another often entails choosing particular modes of conceptualizing the reality in question” (Montgomery et al., 1992: 73). It entails a certain positioning and hence the discourse producer’s view of the event and whether he or she is being liable for it. It entails encoding certain views of the world or making us ideate the world or a particular issue or event or philosophy or even a whole people or society in a particular way.

25 Therefore, this CDA study - and in an attempt to nudge the unaware of the role discourse plays in making us conceptualise and experience reality in determinate ways - seeks to examine further examples of such manipulations or slanted representations that collectively make up what the American Jewish political scientist Norman Finkelstein describes as the “Zionist mythology” (2005).

1.4 AIM OF STUDY

As discourse is an instrument of the social construction or distortion of reality and as Zionist discourse is seldom innocent of political spin and linguistic manipulation, the study thus seeks to investigate the discursive practices on the question of Palestine. This would mean a scrutiny of the discourse strategies and linguistic means used to represent this reality. It would mean subjecting such representations – often taken for granted – to patient and critical scrutiny. More specifically, the study - first out of recognition of the role of discourse in “enacting and perpetuating domination” and second out of a personal conviction that the way the Palestine Question has been discursively constructed “along certain lines” or “angles of telling” rather than others is what has kept Palestine and the Middle East in the way it is now, and third out of a heightened sense that CDA can help in changing the status quo and in emancipating “victims of discursive injustice” - aims to conduct a CDA of the discourse (that of UN and that of ‘peace process’) declared to realise a Palestinian state and bring to a halt “decades of confrontation and conflict” in the Middle East and see what role this discourse plays in the status quo. This effort should result in a sensitised awareness of the gravity or elasticity of many of the signifiers or terms used to represent or rather misrepresent this reality, and their crucial roles in the perpetuation of “power, dominance and inequality”. This increased consciousness should consequently or eventually result in a change of the language or linguistics of representation; it should result in a change of the terms we often repeat without often realising their insidious role in sustaining the status quo. It should result, for example, in discarding the abovementioned set of terms or deceptive misrepresenting angles of telling; it should result in getting rid of misnomers such as “Nakba” (see Subsection 2.5.9), “the Arab- Israeli conflict,” “the peace process” (see Subsection 5.4.3), etc., all are misrepresentations that by virtue of such misrepresentation work subtly to protract the status quo or the Arab struggle against Israeli occupation or Zionist hegemony in the region.

26 1.5 STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

The Palestine Question is a time bomb and has come of age, whether it will be ignited or defused...only time will tell. (Forji Amin George, 2004: 13)

The Palestine problem or rather the problem created in Palestine - a protracted wrong, “born of design” rather than ‘the circumstances’ (Masalha, 1992; Saleh, 2003; Pappe, 2006) or any other (mis) representation - has created much sufferings and caused much death in Palestine, public disaffection and growing exasperation in the Muslim world, and much perplexity and agitation among certain Christians, Jews, Buddhists, Hindus, and indeed many of the free citizens of the world. It has created, among many, a sense of disgruntlement towards imperial forces and superpowers - past and present - as abettors before and after the (1948) Zionist encroachments that have transformed the heart of Palestine into a Jewish state; leading to the mass expulsion and politicide of an existing people, and the formation of a new one on the debris of the former. It has engendered - as a backlash to this historical injustice, and ongoing apartheid practices of the new entity, systematically denying the uprooted and occupied their right of return and self- determination - a constant state of strife and insecurity between this 1948-formed “country of immigrants” (the Israelis) and the besieged and occupied remnants or descendants of what was Palestine (the Palestinians). Engulfing also neighbouring countries, this festering condition, augmented by foreign interventionism in the area and the succession of oligarchies and dictatorships, has also resulted in regional violence and instability; making the Palestine Question throughout the second half of the twentieth century, a question in the eyes of the international community, the United Nations and the public. According to Troen (2008):

Provoked by the Arab/Jewish conflict over Palestine, international commissions, private groups, and an interested public turned for guidance to scholars and thinkers from a wide variety of disciplines-from biblical scholarship, archaeology, theology, and history to various social sciences (195).

27 The Palestine Question - a century-long multifaceted social problem born out of Anglo-Zionist interests and still being unresolved - has also been a major player in the politics of the twenty first century since its very inception. Besides a host of other present and past causes, outlined in Chapter 2, , Israeli occupation or the grand Zionist scheme, hatched more than 100 years ago to create a national homeland for the Jews in Palestine - this premeditated Herzlian scheme, or well-defined policy for the immigration and settlement of Zionists in Palestine, beginning from 1882, and the forced “resettlement” or expulsion of the indigenous Arabs away from it through the forcible seizure of their villages and land - constitutes, in a nutshell, the genesis and impetus for the so-called Arab-Israeli conflict - the Arab struggle against staggering Zionist domination/Israeli occupation. Thus, the settler Zionist occupation of Palestine, the “still alive” “Zionist ideology and praxis,” and the ongoing refugee tragedy following the Zionist encroachments on their homes and villages in the 1940s, this homelessness - indelibly seared not only onto the memories of Palestinians alone, but also onto those who can hearken to the woes of uprootedness and occupation - is the driving force behind this torn reality in Palestine, and indeed much of the instability in the Middle East and the world at large. Indeed, the 1948 Zionist radical procedures against the “human geography of Palestine” (Pappe, 2006), resulting in the Palestinian Holocaust or First Massive Wave of Ethnic Cleansing (i.e. refugees of 1948) and exacerbated by the 1967 Zionist/Israeli occupation of the rest of historic Palestine (and adjacent sovereign territories) and the resultant Second Massive Wave of Ethnic Cleansing (i.e. refugees of 1967) is what - in essence - the problem or the Palestine Question about. It is what constitutes the genesis, crux and impetus of the Arab struggle against Israeli occupation or this unequal Israel/Palestine conflict; it is the pith and core of much of the turbulence in the Middle East. So, in essence, the Palestine Question is the question of a people whom the Zionists have driven out of their homeland and made to languish in diaspora; the question of a people whom the Zionists have uprooted and expelled by force of arms and then denied return; the problem of a “body alien to the region [...] which came from outside and imposed itself on a land and a people, drove people away from their land, and replaced them with an immigrant diaspora from all over the world”; it is the question of a nation that existed in Palestine from time immemorial before it has been - through Zionist dominance: discursive and military - subjected to gradual erosion.

28 Therefore, any attempt at resolution that does not address or redress sufficiently those issues is believed to be doomed to failure and to just act to perpetuate this “social wrong” or at best result in a certain modus vivendi (see Chapter 6) - a temporary arrangement or a hudnah (truce) for some time, to use a Hamas term. These issues - heart of the Palestine Question, or indeed “the essentials of the conflict” to use Pappe’s (2006: 242) terminology - pose in the face of occupation or Israeli intransigence and arrogance of power and “American tolerance” of such intransigence major impediments to reconstructing Mandatory Palestine and thus any attempt at peaceful coexistence between the two peoples. And hence, it is not surprising that the apparent attempts of the UN, the international community, the recent Quartet (the US, the UN, the EU, and Russia), and others who have seemed to debate proposals and visions or scenarios for an end to Israeli occupation, have all been to no avail; leading eventually to the eruption of the first and later second Palestinian intifadas; those popular Palestinian uprisings in December 1987 and September 2000, respectively as a reaction to occupation; the exponential increase in the number of Jewish Zionist colonies in the 1967 Occupied Territories and the discrimination enforced there, and most prominently as a reaction against this lack of genuine international concern, and this Israeli intransigence. This in turn has led to a wave of discourses upon this festering condition the apparent goal of which has been the achievement of “just, lasting and comprehensive peace”. This has further in turn led to drastic discursive shifts (in thinking) and crucial changes in the linguistics of discourse, especially among the weaker side of the equation. Accordingly, many new or old-new proposals (see Chapter 3) have seemed to work towards ending this bitter and long-continued occupation through establishing a Palestinian state and hence put an end to the sufferings and homelessness of the Palestinians, but all have invariably ended with the same dead-end. This is along with visions and eirenic proposals of prominent intellectuals, which have also failed, also as a direct result of the ongoing Israeli occupation, “American tolerance of Israeli intransigence,” and the “still alive” Zionist ideology and praxis (see chapters 5 and 6). Now, the Palestine Question - an epoch of Zionist infiltration, and Palestinian resistance and martyrdom, a history of struggle for national independence and self-determination, freedom and salvation... - is not only a cog in a big machine, a question in a world fraught with unanswered questions, it is the machine; it is the world; indeed the axis or pivot around which much of world peace and

29 stability revolves. It is the fulcrum of this study, and the cynosure of Muslims, the international community, the Quartet and other global forces. It is a main source of the turbulence in the Middle East in particular, and the world in general. Therefore, the Palestine Question is a major contributor to Middle- Eastern instability, and to some degree global ‘terrorism;’ and a resolution of this Question, therefore, can significantly reduce such instability and terrorism. Indeed, as one of six specific steps, outlined as part of a Grand Strategy to reduce terrorism or the ongoing confrontation between the Muslim world and the United States, former CIA official and current professor of history at Simon Fraser University, Graham Fuller (2010), in a highly intriguing book, states:

An early solution to the Palestinian problem must be found. It is perceived across the Muslim world as the single most egregious case of foreign imperialism, which has displaced local people and cast them into desperate living conditions in refugee camps, imposed second-class citizenship upon them in Israel, or pushed them into exile – for more than sixty years. Palestinian suffering has grown, accompanied by a radicalization that has spread beyond Palestine. The crisis demands a quick solution, the general outlines of which are well known to all parties. The Israeli colonization efforts in Palestinian territories must end and be reversed (302).

The Palestine Question – a century-long multifaceted social problem – has, in brief, thus been throughout the second half of the twentieth century a cause for much violence and bloodshed in the Levant – andstillbeingunresolved–amajorsourceof grievancesandunrest in the Middle East and the Muslim world, and a main shaper of the politics of the twenty first century, and perpetuator of the animosities present between the East and the West or Muslims and the United States. In the blurb to her 2009 monograph, Anidah Robani, a Malaysian, states:

In the contemporary world, the Palestinian Issue remains explosive and unresolved. Its resolution is an urgent necessity as well as a major international concern. This is particularly so to all Muslims who view it not merely as a regional or an Arab problem, but more importantly a paramount religious issue (blurb, The Palestinian Issue: A Malaysian perspective: 1957-2003).

30 Indeed, the religious, strategic, and historical position of the land at stake, coupled with the contemporary reality in this torn land, appears to function as a safety valve for world peace and stability. This is captured succinctly by Salloomi (2008):

The Palestinian issue is a global issue where different interests and principles intersect and some others clash. It is not just a Middle Eastern or even an Arab issue. Not only is it the issue of more than a billion Muslims, but of some of the Christians and the Jews as well. Global forces such as the U.S., EU, and others compete for a resolution of the problem that may or may not be just (215).

Thus, the Palestinian issue is an issue with which – not only Machiavellians identify for certain interests or strategic agenda, but also – Muslims worldwide and free citizens everywhere. One does not have to be a Palestinian to identify with the plight of Palestinians. Indeed, whether Malaysian or Indonesian, Indian or American, Japanese or Chinese, aboriginal or Maori, Arab or non-Arab; believer or atheist, indeed regardless of the nationality or ethnicity, religion or ideological affiliation, Muslims, and non-Muslims among the free citizens of the world do identify with the plight of the Palestinian people and do pray for an end to this domination and injustice, for an exposé of the distortion of facts and mystification of social events – a goal to which this work aims to contribute.

1.6 OBJECTIVES OF STUDY

I have maintained that this study has evolved out of the realisation of the inseparable dialectical relationship between language or rather discourse and society; out of the recognition of the role of discourse in social continuity or change, or the reproduction or transformation of the status quo where discourse use is used to either reproduce or transform reality. Against such assumption, and in light of what the study aims to achieve, and the statement of the problem, this interdisciplinary problem-oriented CDA study has been undertaken and its two objectives formulated, with the first being theoretical and the second having or aiming to having practical relevance or applications as stated below. Firstly, the study in its theoretical objective seeks– throughaCDA of some Palestine discourse – to demonstrate to readers (leaders, publics and institutions) the constitutive role discourse yields in

31 forging and sustaining a certain discourse and hence domination (the reproductive function of language use where the status quo is being reproduced) on the one hand; and the role CDA plays in unearthing the means underlying such domination (the transforming function of language use where social change is induced), thus empowering the dominated, on the other. So here the objective is to help increase readers’ consciousness of these functions of discourse and CDA in reproducing and transforming reality, respectively. Secondly, as the study involves an issue central to regional stability, it is then timely to investigate discourses on the Palestine Question for they are assumed to be catalysts in perpetuating the status quo. Hence, the practical objective centres on conducting a CDA of the Palestinian issue to reveal the nature of the discursive practices on this Question to detect the intent underlying such discourse and hence reveal whether such discourse is geared towards achieving what it articulates. In other words, the objective here is to find, through a CDA analysis of the linguistics of UN and peace discourse on the Palestine Question, whether such discourse is bona fide and practical and accordingly whether it has contributed and if so in what ways and to what extent to the protracted status quo, and the abortive attempts of years of negotiations. To this end, the study examines first UN resolutions, past and present, on the Palestine problem, and second some discourses of the ‘peace process’ - started off at Oslo (1993) as “an outgrowth of the Madrid Conference of 1991” - concerning promises made to the Palestinians regarding establishing a “viable” Palestinian state. My interest in this corpus of discourse or set of texts stems from the assumption that this set of texts is produced by an influential body and taken as the basis for a process declared to bring peace to a torn Middle East, and that it is about a people with whom I identify; an identification that is not only based on nationalist affiliation but also human. It is this ‘produced by’or‘about,’ according to Clarke (2005), that usually stimulates a discourse analyst, in their quest for contributing to “the understanding and the solution of serious social problems, especially those that are caused or exacerbated by public text and talk, such as various forms of social power abuse (domination) and their resulting social inequality” (Van Dijk, 2009: 63-64) to conduct a textual analysis of a certain discourse. The study here seeks through textual analysis to deconstruct those texts and clarify “the political positioning of discourse participants:” how impartial and dispositive they are in ending oppression and occupation; thus, verifying the intent and seriousness of the signatories involved and the practicality of such resolutions and

32 discourses in achieving what is articulated: a “viable,” “sovereign” and “independent” Palestinian state or a mere bantustan, a state planned to take place in the offing or a state planned to take place mañana, a real bona fide and practical project for peace and coexistence or only a means to perpetuate the status quo.

1.7 RESEARCH QUESTIONS

In view of and in line with the aim and objectives of study, the following two overarching major Research Questions (RQs) that govern my investigation have been correspondingly formulated:

1. How practical and bona fide are UN resolutions and ‘peace talks’ in ending the status quo - “Israel’s oppression and occupation” - in realising the Palestinian People Right to Self- Determination, and thus paving the road to “peace” in the Middle East?

2. To what extent has such UN and ‘peace’ discourse gone in implementing the Palestinian Refugees Right of Return or the reconstitution of the Palestinians - rendered since1948 homeless - as a nation in their historic homeland?

Each of the two Questions is concerned with a Palestinian right; the first is the Right to Self-Determination and the second the Right of Return. Both of these rights are essential to the pursuit of some sort of peace. Palestinian survival, and Israeli security, and hence a peaceful Middle East are contingent upon the acknowledgement and realisation of such rights. Any discourse on the Palestine question that does not tackle comprehensively these issues or essentials of the conflict is bound to fail. In other words, the issues of occupation and uprootedness are the questions on whose answers the viability and foundation stones of such peace depend. Hence, what is the position of these questions or essential inalienable rights - pivotal to Palestinian salvation and Israeli security and hence any attempt at reconstitution and rehabilitation - on the agenda of such UN and peace discourse?

1.8 SIGNIFICANCE OF STUDY

The intrinsic interrelation of language and the mind, of language and society, of man and beyan or human speech and human reason, of

33 language and ideology, of discourse and domination, of language and thought, of the inseparability of thought and sound or sound and thought (Saussure, 1916; cited in Harris and Taylor, 1989) (see Chapter 3), of the “strong relation between linguistic and social structures” (Kress and Hodge 1979; cited in Titscher et al., 2000: 145) all make language or discourse to be central in relations of power and thus in either reproducing or changing the status quo. So, social change or continuity results from changes in discursive practices. In other words, change or continuity of the status quo results from changes in discourse, in meaning-making practices. Changes in discourse in turn lead to change in society. As CDA, a resource for the oppressed against oppression, is driven by the impetus to change the status quo, then part of its forensic task, which, according to Kress (cited in Dellinger, 1995: 5) has an "overtly political agenda,” is to focus on the negative or hegemonic aspects of discourse and be “critical” of them. This is in an attempt to enact positive social change through new and improved changes in discourse. Hence is the significance of this study, which is CDA- based. More specifically, significance of the study lies (1) in its attempt to make us, rulers and ruled, conscious of domination in its linguistic forms; and (2) endeavour - through conducting a CDA of UN resolutions and discourses on the Palestine Question - to bring to light the intent underlying such discourse and hence revealing whether such discourse is practical in achieving what it articulates, and thus contribute to openness, social change and peace.

1.9 DEFINITION OF KEY AND NEWLY MINTED TERMS

Beyan – an Arabic word, translated as ‘speech and articulate thought’ (Mohd Asad) or ‘speech and Intelligence,’ according to Abdullah Yusuf Ali (2007), with the Greek word logos, translated as ‘speech,’ ‘word’ or ‘reason’ being the closest English equivalent – designates “not merely the capacity for articulate discourse but the [inseparable] rational faculty underlying and informing the spoken word in all its forms” (Harris and Taylor, 1989: xi).

Critical, as for Fairclough (2001a: 4), is used here “in the special sense of aiming to show up connections which may be hidden from people - such as the connections between language, power and ideology”. Wodak, in an interview (2007) observes that critical “means not taking things for granted, opening up complexity, challenging reductionism, dogmatism and dichotomies, being self- 34 reflective in my research, and through these processes, making opaque structures of power relations and ideologies manifest”. “Critical,” thus, does not imply the common sense meaning of “being negative”- rather “skeptical” (17). Reisigl and Wodak (2009: 87-88) state that critical “should be understood as gaining distance from the data […], embedding the data in the social context, clarifying the political positioning of discourse participants, and having a focus on continuous self-reflection while undertaking research. Moreover, the application of results is aspired to”.

Discursive maquillage refers to the deception or linguistic makeup intended to spin or improve one’s image discursively to help perpetuate the status quo.

Deceptive purveyance of optimism (DPO) is a discourse strategy used by language-conscious users or discourse technologists. DPO refers to instances of discourse or manipulative language use where a (false) sense of optimism is being induced or made to be felt, despite complex existential crises (see Chapter 5).

Ethnic Cleansing as defined by Petrovic (1994, quoted in Pappe, 2006: 1) is:

[...] a well-defined policy of a particular group of persons to systematically eliminate another group from a given territory on the basis of religious, ethnic or national origin. Such a policy involves violence and is very often connected with military operations. It is to be achieved by all possible means, from discrimination to extermination, and entails violations of human rights and international humanitarian law... Most ethnic cleansing methods are grave breaches of the 1949 Geneva Conventions and 1977 Additional Protocols.

According to the electronic encyclopaedia Wikipedia, as quoted in Pappe (2006), ethnic cleansing, “at the most general level”:

can be understood as the forced expulsion of an ‘undesirable’ population from a given territory as a result of religious or ethnic discrimination, political, strategic or ideological considerations, or a combination of these (4).

It is against such “well-defined policy” “to systematically eliminate another group from a given territory” - “a crime against humanity” -

35 that I contextualise Palestinian Diaspora and the Palestine Question: the deliberate collective dispossession”/“mass expulsion”/“forcible removal”/“forced exile”/“uprootedness” or what happened in Palestine in the 1940s and particularly1948, and then 1967 and has always been happening, though more subtly, ever since. Hence, I call what the Palestinians call the Nakba of 1948, as the Palestinian Holocaust or the First Massive Wave of Ethnic Cleansing, and what they call the Naksa of 1967 as the Second Massive Wave of Ethnic Cleansing (see chapters 2 and 5). The First Massive Wave of Ethnic Cleansing refers to the planned ethnocide of 1948, committed by the then predecessor of the Israel “Defence” Forces (IDF): the Zionist terrorist gangs against the native people of Palestine. It thus refers to the expellees of 1948 who constitute more than half of the torn Palestinian fabric, and who were made by Zionist terrorism to flee their homes and live ever since in diasporic communities in neighbouring countries under grim conditions. Accordingly, the term signifies the refugees of 1948 as distinguished from those the Zionists/Israelis have made refugees since 1967 (see Chapter 5). So contrasted with the First Massive Wave of Ethnic Cleansing, the Second Massive Wave of Ethnic Cleansing refers specifically to the Palestinians rendered refugees as a result of the Israeli Aggression of 5 June (1967), and called by ‘Israel’ as “Displaced Persons” .

Gazacaust or the latest Palestinian holocaust (as part of this well- defined Zionist policy) refers to the latest act of ethnic cleansing committed by ‘Israel’ against the “‘undesirable’ population”. It is the December 2008- January 2009 Operation Cast Lead, where the use of white phosphorous and other internationally proscribed weapons against Palestinian civilians in the Gaza Strip were cast on their heads.

Historic Palestine - when talking about Palestine nowadays, many people, tend to mentally conceptualise Palestine as being the territories incorporating the West Bank, East Jerusalem and the Gaza Strip (i.e. 22% of the total area of historic Palestine). The term historic Palestine, used interchangeably with Mandate Palestine, is used to denote the whole territory of Mandatory Palestine; Palestine as it was in history. It thus denotes Palestine prior to the (de facto) creation of the Jewish state or any partition such as that of Resolution 181 of November 29 1947, or that proposed earlier by the Palestine Royal (Peel) Commission (July 1937). Therefore, unlike what the term “Palestine” nowadays may signify given the colonialist Zionist entity’s politicide of Palestine and its de facto existence in its place, historic Palestine is Palestine “with the

36 boundaries it had during the British Mandate [... as] an indivisible territorial unit” (Article 2 of the Palestinian National Charter), not the 22% the Zionists “regretfully” (see Chapter 2) did not manage to annex at the time of the First Massive Wave of Ethnic Cleansing (but which they have been ever since trying to do).

Israelispeak or israelese or Israeli discourse or Zionist discourse - using the combining form speak and the adjective “Israeli,” - has been coined to denote (and simultaneously denounce) the “Zionist whitewash of words” and “Zionist disinformation machinery” - the sort of deceptive or ambiguous language ‘Israel’ consistently employs in her (mis) representation and defamation of the Palestinians, in a manner that positions her "in the semantic patient role of the ‘victim’” while blaming and demonising the real victim. The writer opines that such diplo-israelispeak (hasbara) plays, in fact, a central role in perpetuating inequalities, discrimination, and hence the status quo.

Linguistic brutalisation or the brutalisation of language refers to language as a means of brutalisation when employed by language- conscious Machiavellians, and language as an object of brutalisation when it is being subjected to achieve nefarious hidden agenda; language as brutalising and language as being brutalised.

The Palestine Question is in essence the question of a homeland stolen, and a people downtrodden; the question of a people whom the Zionists have uprooted from their homeland and made to languish in diaspora; the question of a people whom the Zionists have expelled by force of arms and then denied return; the problem of a “body alien to the region [...] which came from outside and imposed itself on a land and a people, drove people away from their land, and replaced them with an immigrant diaspora from all over the world;” it is the question of a nation that existed in Palestine from time immemorial before the Zionists have subjected it to systematic and gradual erosion. Thus, the 1948 Zionist radical procedures against the “human geography of Palestine,” resulting in the First Massive Wave of Ethnic Cleansing (i.e. refugees of 1948); and exacerbated by the 1967 Zionist/Israeli occupation of the rest of Palestine and the resultant Second Massive Wave of Ethnic Cleansing (i.e. refugees of 1967); along with ‘Israel’’s continued denial of the Right of Return of the Palestinian refugees and their self-determination, constitute the genesis, crux and impetus of the Palestine Question, and consequently much of the turbulence in the Middle East and the world at large.

37 1.10 ORGANISATION OF STUDY

The dissertation is organised into six chapters. Chapter 1: Introduction, presents the conceptual trio or tripartite structure of the study or its three conceptual features: Discourse, CDA, and the Palestine Question, thus serving as an orientation and background, as shown, to the whole study, limning a concise account of the problem, methodology, aim and objectives, research questions, significance and implications of the study, and a glossary of coinages and key and technical terms. Chapter 2: Background: The Palestine Question, presents background information about the historical course of the Palestine Question. It sculpts an account of its complex background, origins and evolution with an accent on the major formative events leading to the Zionist settler occupation of Palestine, and the events leading to such creation. Under succinct headings, the chapter ends with an exploration of the causes exacerbating the Palestine Question. Chapter 3: Review of Literature, reviews major works dealing with the relationship between language and power or the material and dialectical relationship between discourse and society. Exploring the ideological use of lexical items, the chapter thus discusses the multifaceted functions of language beyond traditional communication, stressing the notion of the “multifunctionality of language in texts,” language in its relation to power relations and the construction or distortion of reality and our perception of it, etc. The chapter also, in emphasising the critical and emancipatory role of CDA in liberating the powerless from “oppression in its linguistic forms” reviews the concepts of language, discourse, Discourse Analysis and CDA. Next, the chapter gives an overview of the proposals presented to bring to an end the Israeli occupation, and closes with a review of some related research works. Chapter 4: Methodology, describes the methodology of the study, the research methods and CDA approach/variant adopted in the analysis and conduct of this qualitative textual analysis. It discusses the theoretical framework, research design, data collection and data analysis. It lists “the population of relevant texts” to be analysed, and of the sources of data collection and a sample of analysis. The final section mentions - as part of the document analysis undertaken in this study - some of the documents analysed in Chapter 2 as part of the content of that chapter. Chapter 5: Data Analysis and Findings, attempts to conduct a CDA of UN resolutions and discourses of the ‘peace process’ concerning ending decades of occupation and oppression through the discursive construction of Palestine. The chapter thus presents a

38 critical analysis of the discourse of UN and that of ‘peace’ on the Palestine Question. Finally, the chapter looks into the change of discursive practices in the official Arab and Palestinian discourse, and the resultant change of stance regarding the Israeli occupation. Finally, Chapter 6: Summary and Conclusion, presents, following an overview, a summary of the study and its findings, stressing the tripartite structure of study: the role of discourse in power relations, role of CDA in social change, and the Palestine Question, underscoring some of the main challenges facing the Palestine Question, and concluding with recommendations and suggestions for further research.

39 CHAPTER TWO BACKGROUND: THE PALESTINE QUESTION

[...] such a painful journey into the past is the only way forward if we want to create a better future for us all, Palestinians and Israelis alike. (Pappe, 2006: preface)

1 OVERVIEW

AS a background to the study and in light of the “still alive” Zionist ideology that has driven the settler Zionist enterprise since its early years beginning from the second half of the nineteenth century until the present day, this chapter, in 6 consecutive sections, historicises current research and presents background information about the historical course of the Palestine Question: its origins and evolution until the forcible creation of the Jewish state in the heart of Palestine in 1948. The chapter traces the premeditated steps, major contributing causes, and formative events leading to such creation. The chapter closes with an exploration of the causes that exacerbate the century-long unequal conflict, following the realities createdin1948. Nineteen forty eight –anannus horribilis, not only to the Middle East but the civilised world as well; a date etched on the collective memory of the natives of Palestine, those “reluctant warriors,” “veterans of creative suffering” - was the year Zionist terrorist gangs: the Hagana, Stern Gangs, and Irgun had intensified measures against the people of Palestine; a campaign that resulted in the sociocide of the Arab indigenous society and the consequent creation of ‘Israel’ on the débris of their occupied homes and villages. This inexorable fact of history - the “forcible removal” (Pappe, 2006), “uprootedness” (Barakat and Dodd, 1968), “forced exile” (Omran, 1966) of the natives of Palestine - while described by Palestinians as the ‘Nakba’ or catastrophe, founders of the new state have framed it as the ‘War of Independence’. However, what was perpetrated against the demography and geography of Palestine in 1948 was neither a ‘War of Independence’ as propagated by the agents or founders of ‘Israel’ nor a ‘Nakba’ as inappropriately called by the affected, but rather a predetermined scheme, a well-defined

40 policy of forced population “transfer” or mass expulsion, a method known in modern parlance as ethnic cleansing, as the present homelessness of about “80%” (Finkelstein, 2003) of the Palestinians attests, and as revealed by researchers such as the Palestinian academic Nur Masalha (1992), the American political scientist Norman Finkelstein (2005), and revisionist Israeli New Historians such as Benny Morris (1988) and Ilan Pappe (2006). Such a paradigm also suggests as spelled out by Morris (1988), a “great documenter of the sins of Zionism” that what stops the new state from eliminating the remaining 20% of Arabs it “regretfully” failed to “cleanse” in 1948 are “purely temporary and tactical” reasons (New Left Review 26, March-April 2004). In light of such a paradigm, and the fact that such ideology is “still alive” (Morris, 1988; Shash, 1999; Pappe, 2006), the chapter traces the socio-political factors that facilitated the settler Zionist takeover of Palestine and thus the set destruction of the indigenous society, and hence the Palestine problem. In an attempt to trace the foundation stones for the emergence and development of this problem or occupation, of the “Zionist nation- building project” (from Divine, 2008: 5) in Palestine, and the homelessness and sufferings of the Palestinians; and in order to provide a historical review of the factors orchestrated to “cleanse” Palestine for “Jewish habitation” (Pappe, 2006), to make room for the “establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people,” the chapter posits a number of tools and factors as the causes behind the genesis and evolution of the Zionist enterprise in Palestine; measures and macro socio-political factors that had given since 1948 birth to the Jewish State and made the bulk of the Palestinians homeless and stateless. With particular emphasis, the chapter highlights the premeditated long-standing and centralised well-defined Zionist policy of transfer (Morris, 1988; Masalha, 1992; Simons, 2004) or ethnic cleansing (Pappe, 2006) of the native Palestinians carried out systematically since the 1940s as steps of racial extermination which have virtually wiped historic Palestine off the map. So here the chapter examines the premise that those Zionist encroachments - specifically those of the 1948, which have resulted in the First Massive Wave of Ethnic Cleansing of Palestinians, and the 19-year later occupation of the rest of historic Palestine that resulted in the Second Massive Wave of Ethnic Cleansing, along with the latest 2008/2009 Gazacaust of the besieged Strip or present-day Auschwitz - have all been, as maintained by the majority of the myth-debunking Israeli New Historians, “born of design, not by war” (see also Chapter 6).

41 The chapter does that through highlighting a number of stages and schemes that Zionist leaders have consciously employed, before, during and after the creation of the Jewish nation and the politicide of that of the native Arabs. Ever since the 1896 visionary Herzlian conception and scheme for the establishment of a Jewish state (see Subsection 2.3.2) in Palestine or the Argentine, all throughout the ensuing 52 years of gestation, which have culminated in 1948 in the birth of the Jewish or Zionist colonial enclave and onset of the Palestinian Diaspora, until the present day, those tools, measures and factors were the shaping forces behind the immigration of Zionists to Palestine and the expulsion of the Palestinians from it. Now, I shall provide as orientation a compressed overview of such diverse factors and shaping forces, underlying the Palestine Question or creation of the Jewish state and politicide of that of the Palestinian Arabs (some of those factors are explained in details in Section 2.3): divine or historical inevitability; advent of Protestantism in the sixteenth century and the spread of Christian or “non-Jewish Zionism;” French Revolution in 1789 (see Subsection 2.3.1), and the ensuing political changes in the systems of governance in Europe; Zionism and the Darwinian notion of ‘survival of the fittest’ (Saleh, 2003), publication in 1896 of Herzl’s The Jewish State (see Subsection 2.3.2); founding of the (World) Zionist Organization in August 1897, with its First Zionist Congress held in the same year; establishment in 1899 of the Jewish Colonial Trust (JCT) and the Jewish National Fund (JNF) in 1901as important financial tools for carrying out the settler Zionist enterprise in Palestine (Pappe, 2006). Further, the following were also among the factors: decline and dissolution of the Ottoman Empire in 1918; disintegration of the Muslim world as a result of imperialism and later nationalism which has thenceforth perpetuated the state of disintegration (Saleh, 2003); coalition of the Jew-infiltrated Young Turks and their deposition of the Ottoman Sultan Abdul Hamid II (1842-1918) in 1909 following the Young Turk Revolution in 1908;Young Turks and Turkishisation or the pulling away, according to Fraser (1995: 3) of the empire “from what had become a partnership with Arab élites;” failure of Turkish authorities to stand firmer against “Jewish immigration and land purchases” as can be inferred from a poem by the Palestinian poet, Sulayman al-Taji al-Faruqi in 1913 (Sulaiman, 1984: 10-13) (see Section 2.4). Besides the abovementioned, the following socio-political factors were also instrumental in bringing about the settler Zionist enterprise in Palestine: London Imperial Conference (1905-1907) and the notion of establishing a “buffer state” in the Palestine (Saleh, 2003:

42 521); McMahon’s Deception (Smith, 2007: 67) or the ambiguity of wording in the 1915-1916 Husayn-McMahon Correspondence over the inclusion of Palestine as part of Arab independence; (Shash; 1999; Saleh, 2003; Smith, 2007) (see Subsection 2.3.4); Balfour’s Declaration in 1917 (Saleh, 2003) (see Subsection 2.3.5); direct British occupation of Palestine (1917-1948) (see Subsection 2.3.6), with the motive to implement the Zionist project. The following were also among the factors: “structural weaknesses” of Palestinian society (Morris, 1988; 1999); “the conscious creation” of Jewish ‘folklore’ and Hebraisation where “thousands of names were given to streets, public squares and landscape, with signs in Hebrew everywhere” (Troen: 2008: 197; Pappe, 2006); foundation of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem in 1925 which has been “of immense significance for the revival of Jewish life in Palestine” (Fraser, 1995: 10); “revival of Hebrew into a living language” (Troen, 2008: 196); “militant Zionism;” Jewish education and the “conscious instilling of feelings of hatred” against Arabs (Jensen, 1948: 6-8); acumen and commitment of Zionist leadership versus naivety and selfishness of Arab leadership (Sulaiman, 1984); foundation of the Jewish Agency for Palestine in 19291 whichactedasastatewithina state (Saleh, 2003); outbreak of World War II in 1939 (see Subsection 2.3.13), and the ensuing rise of Nazism; “American Jewish support for Zionism” (Fraser, 1995: 18); and “the penchant among Yishuv leaders to regard transfer as a legitimate solution to the “Arab problem”” (New Left Review 26, March-April 2004, in an interview with Benny Morris) (see Subsection 2.3.12 and passim). It should also be noted in this overview that of particular relevance to the events of 1948 was Plan D or Dalet (Shash, 1999; Pappe, 2006) as it is called in Hebrew. This was the March 10 1948 “fourth and final version” of a blueprint for "compulsory transfer": the harboured Zionist “ideological vision of an ethnically cleansed Palestine” (Pappe, 2006), which according to Pappe would spell out the war crimes that would have to be committed for such envisioned creation of a Jewish state in the heart of Palestine to take place. Many scholars - such as Shash (1999), Saleh (2003), and Pappe (2006) - are unanimous in their view that the Massacre of Deir Yasin,2 a manifestation of Plan Dalet, and perpetrated by Zionists in

1 See Appendix C: The Palestine Mandate (1922) 2 Considering this massacre (the execution of 254 unarmed Palestinian men women and children) a landmark event and a great achievement, Menachem Begin (1913- 1992) - “a fanatical Arab-hater” (Pappe, 2006) who proved to be more so than his guru, Vladimir Jabotinsky (1880-1940) (Shash, 1999), and who would become a future Prime Minister but who was at the time of the massacre leader of the Irgun, one of the Zionist gangs – boasted: “had it not been for Deir Yasin, [had it not been for this slaughter of innocent people] Israel would not have been created” (Shash, 1999: 110). 43 April 1948 - in which, “according to very Zionist sources, 254 men, women, and children were slaughtered” - had caused enormous consternation among the unarmed Palestinians; it instilled through Zionist terrorism fear and trauma, and thus the impetus among defenceless Arabs to flee for survival. Finally, scholars on the Israeli occupation often include the belated, incommensurate outside Arab and UN intervention to be among the factors that contributed to the realities of 1948 and the consequent problem of occupation in Palestine. While backgrounding the Zionist occupation of Palestine, collectively those foundation stones, tools and milestones had brought an end to what was propagated as the ‘Jewish Question,’ and have concurrently initiated the ‘Palestine Question;’ an indication that sufferings of the Palestinians had actually begun about 50 years prior to the “cleansing” in 1948; a historical fact that makes this “condition of distress” to exceed now a hundred years (see Section 2.4); thus making this Question the longest-running premeditated incident of large-scale population expulsion in modern history. Such background is necessary as it traces and contextualises the issue of interest and its development over decades. Understanding the background causes and course of the protracted Israeli occupation of Palestine is significant for understanding the present logjam in the “peace process” between the two sides. More importantly, such understanding, I would say, is the sine qua non for any serious attempt at restitution. Indeed, as Galgano, Arndt and Hyser (2008: 42) put it, “[...] it is absolutely essential that the reconstruction and interpretation of past events take place within the discipline of historical context,” an assumption taken by CDA – which views discourses as historical – as one of its principles (see Chapters 3 and 4). In this regard, Smith (2007: v), in his preface to the Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict: A History with Documents, observes:

An understanding of the pre- 1948 history of Arab-Zionist relations reveals the foundations of subsequent Arab and Israeli attitudes and suggests how crises can be evaluated by partisans on both sides with reference to events that extend back to World War I and earlier.

Therefore, history in this document study is central to the grasp of the most intractable contemporary form of colonisation. Or as Clarke (2005: 264) puts it, “many qualitative research projects have historical dimensions that should be taken into explicit account to make better sense of a contemporary situation of interest”.

44 2.2 THE PALESTINE QUESTION: ORIGINS AND EVOLUTION

The settler Zionist enterprise in Palestine had taken years to develop before the Zionist entity was created. In the words of Ben- Gurion’s official biographer, “‘The Zionist vision could not be fulfilled in one fell swoop,’ ‘especially the transformation of Palestine into a Jewish state…’” (Finkelstein, 2003: xv). Therefore, the origins and evolution of the Zionist/Israeli occupation of Palestine, initiated, amongst others, by the calls for national construction of the Jews, following the waves of “nationalism and racialism” in Europe, and their aspirations for the establishment of an “independent kingdom in the Holy Land as it was before Christ” are as noted in the Overview deep-rooted and long-standing. The origins and evolution were also prompted by the freedom the Jews attained in many parts of Europe after the French Revolution (Amin, 1994), and their “loss of the power of assimilation” leading thus to the waves of Anti-Semitism and the resultant Jewish problem (see Subsection 2.3.9). Besides these coincidental propelling forces, many of the factors that led to the Zionist enterprise in Palestine which in turn led to increasing “Jewish infiltration into Palestine” and consequently occupation, and much of the ensuing turbulence and anarchy engulfing the entire Middle East and much of the world were actually pre-planned and premeditated. Premeditated and embedded in history, many of those factors began to develop prior to the turn of the nineteenth century as adumbrated in the Overview. While some of those factors, however, might be dated back to the first half of the nineteenth century, the foundation stones or actual genesis would be dated back to the beginning of the second half of the nineteenth century, and thus prior to Herzl’s 1896 publication: “The Jewish State”. Thus, “The beginnings of the Jewish renaissance,” as stated by Louis Lipsky, “preceded the appearance of “The Jewish State” by several decades (Herzl, 1896/1946/1988: 13). “With the advent of Herzl, however,” Lipsky continues, “Zionism was no more a matter of domestic concern only. It was no longer an internal Jewish problem only [...]. The problem of Jewish exile now occupied a place on the agenda of international affairs” (14); an assumption that made Theodore Herzl (1860-1904) - writer of the 1896 political pamphlet, “The Jewish State,” and Founding President of (World) Zionist Organisation (1897-1904), and founder or father of the Zionist National Movement and thus in effect the ‘State of Israel’ - to write towards the end of the second half of the nineteenth century (1897) in his diary, following the First Zionist Congress: “At Basle I founded the Jewish State”.

45 Those fin de siècle origins or developments of the Zionist enterprise in Palestine including Herzl’s apocalyptic vision and proposed “scheme” or “well-defined policy” would not have been possible, however, had Great Britain’s interests not been intersecting with Zionism and its aspirations; for the actual momentum of aliyoth or influxes of Zionist immigration to Palestine had - only under the aegis of the British Government - actually begun to mushroom and threaten the extermination of the native population (Sulaiman, 1984; Saleh, 2001; 2003). As noted, the Jewish thought to inhabit Palestine was entertained long before Herzl’s Zionist National Movement in the l890s, which began to gain increasing momentum under the British occupation of Palestine (1917-1948). In this regard, Isseroff observes (2002- 2003):

Herzl did not invent either practical or 'political' Zionism. Practical Zionism, the settling of the land for purposes of rebuilding a Jewish community in Palestine, had been practiced by the Bilu and other groups before Herzl. Political Zionism, the attempt to secure a "charter" for a Jewish state from Turkey, Egypt or another country, had been around for hundreds of years. It was the program of the false Messiah Shabetai Tzvi in the seventeenth century. In 1839, Sir Moses Montefiore [a British Jew] had petitioned the Khedive of Egypt for a Jewish homeland in Palestine.

Thus, according to Sulaiman (1984), onset of the Zionist project in Palestine goes as back as 1839:

Any claim that the Zionist threat to Palestine was generated all of a sudden by the Balfour Declaration in 1917 would be evading a number of important facts and events preceding the issuing of that declaration. As a starting point one may mention that, from the year 1839 onwards, important changes in the situation of the Jews in the Middle East were beginning to occur. On 3 November of that year, the Ottoman Sultan ‘Abd al-Majid (1839-1861) issued an important decree [...], assuring equal rights and security to the life and property of all subjects of the Ottoman Empire [...]. From then on, the Sultan made official the appointment of a Chief Rabi, who was chosen by the Jewish community; some Jews were appointed to government posts; a number of Jewish

46 schools were founded, and government schools, too, were opened to Jewish students (1).

Sulaiman (1984: 1) continues that “Several years later, the Jewish colonization of Palestine began to develop, when, in 1855, an estate near Jaffa was bought by Sir Moss [sic] Montefiore (1784-1885), scion of an old Italian-Jewish family”. It should be stressed again, however, that though the colonial or settler project began sometime in the nineteenth century, actual realisation of the Zionist settler enterprise in Palestine began to take actual shape and mushroom only under the involvement of Whitehall when in 1917 Palestine came under direct military occupation by the sceptred isle. Since then, implementation or the official initiation of practical premeditated Herzlian steps towards the Zionist transfer or expulsion “of the poor population across the border;” this act of “ethnic cleansing” or “forcible removal of the indigenous” Arab population of Palestine (see Section 2.3), and its replacement with that of the then incipient growth of the adventitious Jewish population had virtually begun. This process had presaged Palestinian Diaspora and thus the Palestine Question and homelessness for in 1948, a date that has been deeply etched on the memory of the Palestinians; this process had ‘inevitably’ ended up in the establishment of ‘Israel’ - “a country of immigrants” - and the homelessness of the Palestinians, the problem commonly known as the Refugee Problem. Indeed, premeditation, which initiated the Zionist threat and later the occupation of Palestine, did involve, besides Zionist attempts at land-selling bargains and land purchases through bribery and other nefarious means from Arab landowners and Ottoman officials, the notion of population transfer (Masalha, 1992; Simons, 2004), a crime identified in modern parlance as a method of ethnic cleansing. Thus, defending the indefensible, this is a euphemism for mass expulsion (Morris, 1988; Masalha, 1992; Simons, 2004) or the settlement of Jews and resettlement of Arabs, as Leo Motzkin, an early Zionist thinker put it in 1917, as quoted in Pappe (2006):

Our thought is that the colonization of Palestine has to go in two directions: Jewish settlement in Eretz Israel and the resettlement of the Arabs of Eretz Israel in areas outside the country. The transfer of so many Arabs may seem at first unacceptable economically, but is nonetheless practical. It does not require too much money to resettle a Palestinian village on another land (7- 8).

47 Clearly, since the resettlement (“forced relocation,” or just “ethnic cleansing” as it would be called today) of “a Palestinian village on another land” does not – in Zionist thinking – require much money, Motzkin was thinking of ‘cleansing,’ as mass expulsion to homogenise the population was not viewed to be costly. Thus, “t(T)hrough settlement the Zionist movement aimed - in Ben- Gurion’s words,” observes Finkelstein (2003: xiii) “‘to establish a great Jewish fact in this country’ that was irreversible (emphasis in original),” a fact that would obviously be at the expense of the defenceless native ‘Red Indians:’ the Palestinians. Zionist premeditation on schemes advocating “compulsory transfer”/“ethnic cleansing,” however, dates, as suggested, many years prior to Motzkin’s proposal. The genesis of the notion of (population) transfer - a crime, as noted, called in modern parlance, “ethnic cleansing” - finds its roots in the year 1895 (Shash, 1999), two years prior to the First Zionist Congress. The brainchild of Herzl, in that year, i.e. 1895, Theodor Herzl, founder of the (World) Zionist Organization (1897), wrote in his diary, as mentioned by Shash (1999: 110-111) in Arabic, and Pappe (2006: 250) in English:

We shall endeavour to expel the poor population across the border unnoticed, procuring employment for it in the transit countries, but denying it any employment in our country.

It is clear then that ‘cleansing’ rather than at least coexistence or any other modus vivendi was the harboured and preferred Zionist way to do it right from the start!

2.3 THE PALESTINE QUESTION: FORMATIVE EVENTS

[...] and a new state, of a one-off or bizarre kind, was established. Its population at the time did not exceed 716,000 of Jews and 156,000 of Palestinians. However, it has opened its gates to Jewish immigrants from all over the world. It had no borders save those of the Partition Resolution, which the embryo state had accepted, then in its wars with Arabs, vastly exceeded them; a state or a motley, which, due to the influx of different ethnic groups [immigrant diaspora], has become a mosaic: eastern Jews (Sephardim), Western Jews (Ashkenazim), coming from eastern, western and central Europe, from the

48 United States, Yemen, Iraq, Morocco, etc.; all with different historical, linguistic and social backgrounds; a state whose survival, amongst Arab enmity is dependent on foreign complicity and an army that is made up of former terrorist gangs ; a state whose institutions are run by figures who were centrally involved in the activities of those Zionist gangs. (Shash, 1999: 13)

As can be gathered from the abovementioned account, contemporary homelessness of the Palestinians was not a bolt from the blue or a non sequitur, but rather the foregone conclusion of Zionist vision, British involvement, long-standing enterprise in Palestine, and years of plotting and machination. Indeed, it was not the result of a fluke or an accidental ‘big bang’. It was “calculated and intentionally executed”. However, this vision, enterprise and plotting would not have been possible - as noted in the previous two sections and as I shall further elaborate in this section -without the uncanny concomitance of a number of portentous events on the one hand, and the conscious British aid on the other; historical facts that have contributed to this longest-running unequal conflict in modern history, ending up in the homelessness of the Palestinians and the establishment of ‘Israel,’ a state whose every “village was,” according to Moshe Dayan (1915- 1981) - one of its former army commanders and defence ministers - “built on its Palestinian counterpart” (Saleh, 2001: 46). Based on the factors noted in the compressed overview and based on my readings, and de- and re-contextualisation, the following fifteen subtitles/ subsections, presented largely in a chronological order, constitute the macro formative events and factors, the milestones behind the creation of ‘Israel,’ and the ensuing Palestinian homelessness and Zionist occupation: French Revolution (1789); Publication of “The Jewish State” (1896); Zionist Claims to Palestine; “McMahon’s Deception: The Roots of Arab Bitterness;” Balfour Declaration (1917); British occupation (1917- 1948)/the Palestine Mandate (1922); White Paper of June 1922/Churchill White Paper; Stance of British Government; Zionist Mythology and the propagation of Israelese; Historical Anti-Semitism vs New Anti-Semitism; Rise of Nazism (1930s); Zionism or Jewish Ethnic Supremacy; Proposal of Partition (1937); Plan of Partition (UN GA Resolution 181) (1947); and finally Seismic Global Changes in the Balance of Power (1914-1945). A brief discussion of those events and factors is provided below:

49 2.3.1 French Revolution (1789)

Of some prominence among such macro socio-political factors and formative events was the eruption of the French Revolution in 1789. Though indirect, this factor played a role in the emergence of Jewish nationalism, Zionism and eventually the occupation of Palestine and the creation of the Jewish state in 1948. With its emphasis or call for the Enlightenment or Age of Reason, and its constructs or tripartite motto: “Liberté, Égalité, Fraternité (Saleh, 2003: 168)- which liberated Jews from life of the ghetto but which at the same time threatened, according to many of the religious leaders of Judaism, the self-imposed exclusion of the Jews to maintain their Jewishness- the Revolution, beginning from the second half of the nineteenth century, led to calls of Jewish nationalism (Amin, 1994). These calls were also inspired by the waves of “nationalism and racialism” (Fraser, 1995) or the nation-state, “the homogeneous territorial nation” (Hobsbawm, quoted in Finkelstein, 2003) that has been on the rampage since “the late 19th Century” (Saleh, 2003: 521). Such developments in Western Europe and the consequent changes in the situation of the Jews of Western Europe led eventually to the emergence of Zionism or the Zionist movement in Western Europe, and the consequential Zionist enterprise in Palestine. So the Zionist enterprise was paradoxically “a reaction to this liberation of Jews and their equality and integration, and not Anti-Semitism, as generally held” (Amin, 1994: 149) or misheld by many as the cause behind the emergence of Zionism.

2.3.2 Publication of “The Jewish State” (1896)

A landmark event and a seminal work of discourse that provided the intellectual basis and the well-defined policy for the foundation of the ‘State of Israel,’ Herzl’s startling publication of TheJewishStatein 1896 was so instrumental in galvanising Zionists into political action. “As one of a series of books, variations on the same theme, composed by the same author,” and preceded by “The New Ghetto” (1894), and “Address to the Rothschilds,” and proceeded by “Altneuland” or “The Old New Land” (1902) and “Diaries,” Der Judenstaat or The Jewish State (1896), was Theodore Herzl’s third work in which he proposed a “modern solution for the Jewish question” and explained his vision of and “scheme” for a Jewish state (Herzl, 1896/1946/1988). A political document, TheJewishStatewas a propelling force that conceptualised the Jewish question and made it an international

50 problem, mobilised the Zionist movement and some contemporary imperial powers, started the settler Zionist process of territorial occupation, eventually culminating in the creation of this Jewish state. Thus, not only did this publication liberate the spirits of Jews from the ghettos, but also launch Zionism on its course, eventually establishing a Jewish state. So instrumental in carrying out the Zionist enterprise in Palestine and the ultimate creation of the ‘State of Israel’ 44 years after the death of Herzl, TheJewishStatewas, according to Lipsky (1988), “one of the chapters in the story” of Herzl “to achieve in eight years [i.e. 1896 until his death in 1904] what his people had not been able to achieve in two thousand years” (Herzl, 1896/1946/1988: 20).

2.3.3 Zionist Claims to Palestine

In the words of Gavron (2004: 17), “The Israeli-Palestinian issue has been correctly described as complicated, but the basic problem is simple: Two peoples lay claim to the same piece of real estate”. This is the problem now but this is not how it began where might suppressed right, and where Palestine was just one of a number of options that the Zionist movement debated. Prior to the onset of the Zionist settler occupation of Palestine towards the turn of the nineteenth century, Palestine was a country almost fully inhabited by Palestinian Arabs. With the onset of the Zionist enterprise in Palestine, however, the problem began as the indigenous Arabs were gradually encroached upon and eventually uprooted by the immigrant settler Zionists whose historical and spiritual claims to Palestine were recognised by the imperial Powers of the day. In light of such transformations in the demography or “human geography” of Palestine, occasioned, inter alia, by those Zionist claims, it is necessary that such israelese or territorial “claims” be examined as such claims were, whether valid or invalid, crucial to “the creation of Jewish statehood” and the concurrent homelessness of the Palestinians. According to Troen, a professor of Israel Studies (2008): In essence, the widely held assumption - found throughout the literature of the social sciences and humanities - that Jews had a deep and vital historical connection to the land was essential to asserting the right to resettle in it (195).

51 Part of a series of ongoing discursive events and an early factor in Zionist territorial occupation of Palestine, those israelese or claims about the historical and spiritual connection with Palestine, still being employed today by Israelis to legitimate or discursively perpetuate their settlement and occupation of Palestine, are according to Newton (1946; quoted in Jensen, 1948: 1), “none other than an ancient imposture”. Indeed, according to Article 20 of the Palestinian National Charter (PNC) (1968):

The Balfour Declaration, the Palestine Mandate [British occupation (1917-1948)], and everything that has been based on them, are deemed null and void. Claims of historical or religious ties of Jews with Palestine are incompatible with the facts of history and the conception of what constitutes statehood. Judaism, being a religion, is not an independent nationality. Nor do Jews constitute a single nation with an identity of their own; they are citizens of the states to which they belong.

Further, besides their national Zionist enterprise that resulted largely from their lack of assimilation in other races following the liberty they gained in Western Europe after the French Revolution (Amin, 1994), Zionist Jews’ interest in Palestine was kindled by certain hidden, investment-driven motives (similar to those that made the Argentine – where there were many Zionist investments - also at the time an option for Zionism and its national Zionist enterprise) (Rasheed, (1998)). One such motive was the desire to “acquire complete control and outright ownership of the proven Five Trillion Dollar [...] chemical and mineral wealth of the Dead Sea” (Jensen, 1948: 5). This was a motive despite Troen’s (2008: 204) contention that the Zionist occupation of Palestine “was not a consequence of industrialization and financial interests”. Another was the “hope of resurrecting in Palestine their former eastern European Jewish kingdom (Khazar [or Khazaria])” (Jensen, 1948: 5) (see below). It is suggested that the majority of today’s Jews who are blue-eyed and blonde-haired is made up of “non-Semitic Tartar-Asiatics” or Khazar Jews (Sand, 2009; Hussein, 2002; Saleh, 2003; Koestler, 1976; Jensen, 1948: 2). A Caucasian race, they are “a non-Semitic Turkish-Finnish race which came into Europe from Asia about the first century A.D. by a land route north of the Caspian Sea,” “settled in eastern Europe and there established the Khazar kingdom”. Thus, according to a number of scholars such as Koestler (1976); Saleh (2003); Hussein (2002), etc., modern day Jews were originally pagan and historically known as Khazars living in Khazaria, now the

52 Caucasus, and as such, it is argued that their racial affinity cannot be traced to Abraham (Hussein, 2002). They, following the conversion of one of their kings (Bulan) to Judaism in “740” (Saleh, 2003: 67), converted and established over time a strong Jewish kingdom. Defeated for the first time in their history by the Russians towards “the end of the 10th Century A.D.,” “the Khazar population and former Khazar territory were thus incorporated into the expanded Russian state;” a fact that “accounts for the presence in southern Russia of the large and concentrated population of the Jewish faith” (Jensen, 1948: 2-3). In his book, The Thirteenth Tribe: The Khazar Empire and its Heritage, Koestler (1976), found out that today’s Jews have “not descended from the historical Israelites of antiquity, but from Khazars, a people originating and populating the Caucasus region (historical Khazaria) who converted to Judaism in the 8th Century”. So, according to Koestler (1976), genealogically, today’s Jews claiming to be descendants of Jacob do not actually belong to any of the Twelve Tribes or Children of Jacob/Israel. Consequently, this should base, according to the Jewish writer Koestler (1976), “the claim of Jews to Israel,” “not on Biblical covenants or genetic inheritance” as Zionists claim but “on the United Nations mandate”. This position – despite recent DNA analyses that try to prove otherwise – is also maintained by a 2009 monograph by Shlomo Sand, an Israeli professor of history at the University of Tel Aviv. Corroborating this line of argument, Patricia Cohen (2009), in commenting on Sand’s book: The Invention of the Jewish People, moreover, states that “experts pretty much agree” that “modern Jews owe their ancestry as much to converts from the first millennium and early Middle Ages as to the Jews of antiquity” ( (accessed 28 March, 2012)]. According to Sand (2009), the whole idea of the existence of an independent ethnic Jewish nationality or “nation-race” is nothing but a modern invention, a mythical conception developed, following the waves of European nationalism and racialism in the nineteenth century, so as to make room for the ideological and political “spiritual” and “historical” connection invention, on which the notion of the ‘Return to Zion’ rests. In addition, Saleh (2001: 18) states that the historical and religious claims of the Jews over Palestine are “groundless” as their “rule was only on some parts of Palestine and for a short duration of four centuries, while Muslim domination of the entire sacred land lasted twelve centuries (638-1917), with a brief interval [of 88 years, 1099- 1187] during the crusades”. He further states that the “Jews had,

53 furthermore, left Palestine, and their actual relationship with it had completely discontinued for eighteen centuries, from 135 A.D. to the 20th Century” (2001). Furthermore, according to The Arab Awakening (1938) by George Antonius, “a leading Lebanese/Palestinian Christian intellectual, scholar and public servant who served under the British in Palestine and spent much time in London” (Troen, 2008):

[...] the Arabs of Palestine have deep roots and an unbroken connection with the land far beyond the Muslim conquests of the seventh century and actually extends to the Canaanite period preceding the invasion of Hebrews. In sum, Palestine has been Arab since time immemorial, absorbing one conqueror after another. Arabs are the only authentic, long-resident, and indigenous population [...]. Importantly, this [...] can be applied to Christians as well as Muslims, and is so understood by both. Jews are another matter. It was the Hebrews whose connection to the land was interrupted or lapsed (198).

This has also been emphasised by George (2004) who states, in the context of his discussion of Palestine, and population as the second element of statehood:

In occupied Palestine, there lives the population of the Palestinian people; they have lived there forever, since time immemorial. They are the original inhabitants of this territory. They are fixed and determinate, and so they definitely constitute a distinguishable population [...]. they have always been in possession of their land and therefore are entitled to create a state therein (5).

Moreover, Troen (2008: 198) states that Arab writers have not been the only writers rebutting the Zionist claim to Palestine, as the English historian Arnold Toynbee (1889-1975), for example, “another former British official and intellectual familiar with Antonius,” had “described Jews as ‘fossils’, thereby vitiating the Zionist claim for restoration [...]”. Further, besides Arab (e.g. George Antonius, 1938; Edward Said, 1988; 1993; Naim Ateek, 1989; Nur Masalha, 1992; Walid Khalidi, 1992; Saleh, 2001; 2003, etc.) and non-Arab scholars (e.g. Jensen, 1946; Koestler, 1976; Morris, 1988; Shafir, 1989; Whitlam, 1996; Finkelstein, 2003; Pappe, 2006, etc.), who have either refuted the Zionist claim to Palestine or exposed the Zionist cleansing of

54 Palestine, along with Israeli New Historians who emerged in the 1980s to challenge traditional Israeli historiography and assumptions about Israeli history, and “revisionist archaeology,” and “the minimalist school of biblical criticism that originated in Copenhagen [...] around 1970” (Troen, 2008: 201), Troen further states:

There is yet another part of the academy that contributes to distancing Jews from the land. This is to be found in the regnant, if not hegemonic, analysis found among sociologists, historical geographers, and political scientists who identify Zionism as built out of the injustices of a ‘settler society’. Although Jewish settlement of Palestine had once been supported, even celebrated, by an earlier generation of social scientists, it is now viewed as a negative and destructive phenomenon whose consequences require correction. This is, in large measure, a product of choosing a radically different historical paradigm (202-203).

Earlier I have adumbrated that Palestine was not the only “portion of the globe” the Zionists debated for a Jewish homeland. The Argentine or rather part of the Argentine was debated for such a goal. Similarly were Canada, Mozambique, the Congo, Uganda, South Africa, etc… (Rasheed, 1998). In TheJewishStateitself, founder or father of the Zionist National Movement Herzl, under the heading PALESTINE OR ARGENTINE?, wrote in 1896:

Shall we choose Palestine or Argentine? We shall take what is given us, and what is selected by Jewish public opinion. The Society will determine both these points. Argentine is one of the most fertile countries in the world, extends over a vast area, has a sparse population and a mild climate. The Argentine Republic would derive considerable profit from the cession of a portion of its territory to us. The present infiltration of Jews has certainly produced some discontent, and it would be necessary to enlighten the Republic on the intrinsic difference of our new movement. Palestine… (95-96).

So Palestine was not the only debated potential homeland for the Zionist Jews. Now, this very fact that Palestine was not the only option but rather one of a number of Herzlian Zionist proposals proves the falsity and invalidity of those claims of the “historical” and “spiritual” connection to Palestine. It proves that such statements are

55 “none other than… an imposture,” than a Zionist discourse; and that those notions or claims of the “historical” connection came after Palestine was made the Zionist movement’s strategic option (Rasheed, 1998). It proves that those “spiritual” ties with Palestine were none but Zionist concoctions and a calculation of possibility, investment and profitability. Actually in the words of Herzl himself, he wrote that he considered the Jewish question to be “neither a social nor a religious one”. But now regardless of all these anti-Israel discourses, of these “counter proofs/counter theses” and of whether Jews are “fossils” or not, whether they are true descendants of the historical Israelites of antiquity or not, whether they constituted a nation and denationalising them from that nation would emasculate their claim to statehood and render them, “at their peril, to the will of the Gentile majority” (Troen, 2008: 1999) or not, and even if their rule over Palestine had lasted more than 4centuriescompared with the 12 centuries of Muslims,’ and even if their claims to Palestine are not specious, and even if the Arabicity of Palestine cannot be traced back to the Canaanites, and even if the historical assumption that the Jews were subjected to “unremitting savagery: the bloodletting of the Middle Ages, the expulsion of the Jews from England, Spain and Portugal, the wholesale slaughter of the Jews of the Ukraine, the pogroms in Russia, culminating in the greatest of all - the Holocaust”3 is not being manipulated and exaggerated - does this give them the right to drive another nation homeless and stateless so that they can have their own nation and state, an exclusively Jewish nation-state? Does this justify why the Palestinians must be subjected to what the Jews were subjected to at the hands of Europeans - to such “unremitting savagery,” “expulsion,” “Holocaust” and Nakba? Does this justify why the native Palestinian people must be subjected to elimination through settler colonialism? Does this give them the right to invade and slaughter systematically the natives of Palestine the way the Spanish and Portuguese conquistadors in the 18th century invaded and slaughtered “56 million” (Yasin, 2004) natives of Latin America? Does this give them the right to eliminate Palestinians the way the white man liquidated “89 million native Indians as they call them,” following what they called the “discovery of America” (2004) (see 3.2.7)? Does this give them the right to perpetuate the status quo the way the white man perpetuated the international slave trade that resulted in 80 million people being traded like hogs and dogs for 400 years (Yasin, 2003)?

3 Text of the Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu’s AIPAC Speech, (accessed April 21, 2010). 56 Or does this make the fact that the Palestinians being born and bred - generation after another - in that land, a crime or an act of terrorism? Is this a reason, whether valid or invalid, why the oppressed must give up resistance and continue their sufferings under an apartheid system? Does this make Jewish self- preservation more important than Palestinian self-preservation? Are Jewish children dearer to their mothers than Palestinians’ to Arab mothers? To some Israelis, the Palestinians ‘might’ indeed have historically been wronged but that this has been “inevitable” (see Benny Morris) to their survival and self-preservation, and that is - in their view - justice that surpasses the historic wrong they caused the Palestinians, they; being ‘the Chosen’. In a talk in 1956 with Goldmann about “the Arab Problem,” Ben- Gurion asks:

Why should the Arabs make peace? If I was an Arab leader, I would never make terms with Israel. That is natural: we have taken their country… There has been anti-Semitism, the Nazis, Hitler, Auschwitz, but was that their fault? They only see one thing: we have come here and stolen their country. Why should they accept that? They may perhaps forget in one or two generations’ time, but for the moment there is no chance. So it is simple: we have to stay strong and maintain a powerful army (Goldmann, 1978: 99).

2.3.4 McMahon’s Deception: The Roots of Arab Bitterness

Central to the uprootedness of Palestine and “the Roots of Arab Bitterness” was Britain’s or “McMahon’s Deception” (Smith, 2007: 67) or the deliberate ambiguity of certain expressions in the 1915- 1916 Husayn-McMahon Correspondence over the inclusion of Palestine as part of Arab independence; (Shash; 1999; Saleh, 2003; Smith, 2007). In the words of Smith (2007):

[...] feeling the need to encourage the Arabs to side with the British, McMahon wrote to Husayn on October 24, 1915 [...] with promises that became the basis of Arab claims that Great Britain betrayed them after the war. McMahon acknowledged Husayn’s concern about the definition of boundaries and outlined British recognition of

57 Arab areas of independence subject to reservations, which he left in some cases deliberately vague. He argued that northwest Syria (Mersin and Alexandretta) and “portions of Syria [notice ‘Syria’ not ‘Palestine’] lying to the west of the districts of Damascus, Homs, Hama, and Aleppo” were not “purely Arab” and would be exempted from Arab areas of postwar self-rule [...] (67).

Husayn-McMahon Correspondence or the pledges made by Sir Henry McMahon, the British High Commissioner for Egypt to Husayn ibn Ali (1854-1931), Sharif of Mecca between 1915 and1916, “concerning the future political status of the lands under the Ottoman Empire” were a formative event. Indeed, deception of Britain where might precedes right had led to what Smith (2007: 67) calls “the roots of Arab bitterness” over the loss of Palestine as a result of such duplicity and those false promises that made the Sharif of Mecca “side with the British” against the Ottoman Empire. Hence, Smith (2007) continues:

A bone of contention has been the use of the word “district” to refer to Damascus, Homs, Hama, and Aleppo. The Arabic word used was wilaya [in Turkish Vilayet], which usually meant” province,” and was employed in that sense with respect to Basra and Baghdad in the same letter. But when referring to the four Syrian cities, it signified to McMahon “cities and adjacent environs,” a meaning clear in McMahon’s own references to the term and the areas involved (68).

Now the “importance of this distinction,” continues Smith (2007):

[...] rests in what was intended to lie west of these “districts.” If “districts” meant cities, as McMahon felt at the time, then the areas west of them would incorporate an area from the Lebanon, including Beirut, in the south extending north beyond Alexandretta, already omitted from the region that Husayn had demanded. In this interpretation, Palestine, unmentioned in the letter, was not specifically excluded from the Arab territory to be independent after the war. The British later claimed, however that the term “wilaya” signified an administrative district when applied to Damascus. According to this interpretation, the wilaya of Damascus included eastern

58 Palestine, the land across the Jordan River, and omitted western Palestine, which by this time had been promised to the Zionists by the Balfour Declaration (68).

Smith (2007: 68) also adds that “As subsequent developments demonstrate, the British never intended to cede Palestine to the Arabs, even though some officials acknowledged privately that McMahon’s letter seemed to include it”.

2.3.5 Balfour Declaration (1917)

Before the emergence of David Lloyd George as prime minister and Arthur James Balfour as foreign secretary in December 1916, the Liberal Herbert Asquith government had viewed a Jewish entity in Palestine as detrimental to British strategic aims in the Middle East. Lloyd George and his Tory supporters, however, saw British control over Palestine as much more attractive than the proposed British-French condominium. [...] Lloyd George was determined, as early as March 1917, that Palestine should become British and that he would rely on its conquest by British troops to obtain the abrogation of the Sykes-Picot Agreement [1916]. [...] In the new British strategic thinking, the Zionists appeared as a potential ally capable of safeguarding British imperial interests in the region. Furthermore, as British war prospects dimmed throughout 1917, the War Cabinet calculated that supporting a Jewish entity in Palestine would mobilize America’s influential Jewish community to support United States intervention in the war and sway the large number of Jewish Bolsheviks [...] to keep Russia in the war. Fears were also voiced in the Foreign Office that if Britain did not come out in favor of a Jewish entity in Palestine the Germans would preempt them. (The Balfour Declaration, (accessed 5 July, 2011))

With the declared aim or pledge to establish in Palestine “a national home for the Jewish people,” Balfour Declaration was instrumental in bringing about the settler Zionist enterprise. An “instrument created after the Husayn-McMahon Correspondence and the Sykes- Picot Agreement [1916],” this declaration or British commitment to

59 the Zionist cause had resulted in exponential growth of Jewish aliyoth to Palestine. It espoused an undertaking or fiat made by the British Government to facilitate through its then recent occupation (1917) of Palestine “the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people”. In addition to what can be gathered from the epigraph at the beginning of this subsection, outlining “the new British strategic thinking” to benefit from Zionism by establishing a Jewish entity in Palestine - a region being geographically the link between the largest two continents and thus strategically significant - the historical Anti-Semitic inclination of Arthur Balfour (1848-1930), the then British Foreign Secretary, “to rid Europe of the Jews as the solution to the “Jewish question,”” (Elmessiri, 2001) could be a reason behind this prejudicial declaration. Hence, on November 2nd 1917, this intersection of interests or the motive of the British Government to avail itself from the Zionist movement as a “possible ally in a war which seemed to be going badly for the Allies on all fronts” (Fraser, 1995: 8), along with Balfour’s inclination (whether out of intense contempt or genuine support), had led to the issuance of this milestone declaration:

His Majesty's Government view with favour the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, and will use their best endeavours to facilitate the achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non- Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country.

A pithy 67-word unconvoluted but-of-fatal consequences statement of policy, couched in simple English, based on the work of the first (Jewish) British High Commissioner for Palestine (1920-25), Sir Herbert Samuel (1870-1963), and sculpted by Balfour under the aegis of Whitehall, and addressed to leader of the British Jewish Community, Lord Rothschild (1868-1937) (vide APPENDIX B), this declaration with its royal promise of a national home for the Jews in Palestine, has authorised Jewish immigration to Palestine, leading eventually to the homelessness and statelessness of the Arabs.

60 2.3.6 British Occupation (1917-1948)/ the Palestine Mandate

Concurring with Balfour Declaration, the British occupation of Palestine, formalised in 1922 in “the guise of a mandate,” was a formative event in the ensuing social wrong, or subjugation of the Palestinians to the pre-planned ‘cleansing’. Through her Declaration and consequently occupation/Mandate of Palestine, which meant the placement of Palestine, as stated in Article 2 of the Palestine Mandate, 1922, “under such political, administrative and economic conditions as will secure the establishment of the Jewish national home” (vide APPENDIX C), Britain - given her imperial and strategic interests in the region - had found it expedient to recognise the Zionist claims concerning the ancient (1800 years ago) spiritual and “historical connection of the Jewish people with Palestine”. Thus, the British Government stressed, as stated in the preamble to the Palestine Mandate, that as the Mandatory, it “should be responsible for putting into effect the declaration originally made on November 2nd 1917 by the Government of His Britannic Majesty [...] in favor of the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people,” apparently based on those claims about spiritual and historical connections (see Chapter 5, Subsection 5.1.1), which are, as refuted in Subsection 2.3.3 “none other than an ancient imposture”. A formative factor, as such, the British occupation/Mandate of Palestine had played a central role in bringing about the Zionist enterprise in Palestine and the resultant problem.

2.3.7 White Paper of June 1922/Churchill White Paper

[…] So far as the Jewish population of Palestine are concerned it appears that some among them are apprehensive that His Majesty's Government may depart from the policy embodied in the Declaration of 1917. It is necessary, therefore, once more to affirm that these fears are unfounded, and that that Declaration, reaffirmed by the Conference of the Principle Allied Powers at San Remo and again in the Treaty of Sevres [1920], is not susceptible of change. (White Paper of June 1922)

Another formative event/factor that facilitated the Zionist immigration to and occupation of Palestine, the White Paper of June 1922 (also

61 called the "Churchill White Paper" or “British White Paper”) was issued “on June 3, 1922, after investigation of the Arab riots of 1920- 1921”. This 1922 White Paper “was the first official manifesto from the British Government interpreting the Balfour Declaration and the Palestine Mandate” (White Paper of 1922, (accessed 5 July, 2011)). Though through the issuance of this White Paper, the British Government attempted to “mollify Arab feelings” (Smith, 2007: 116) by declaring that it did “not contemplate that Palestine as a whole should be converted into a Jewish National Home, but that such a Home should be founded in Palestine,” still the Paper had affirmed Whitehall’s commitment to establish in Palestine, “a Jewish national home,” and that this “should be internationally guaranteed, and [...] formally recognized to rest upon ancient historic connection”. Hence, the Paper had again reiterated British Government’s position that it stood by the Balfour Declaration and that the increasing immigrant Jewish community “should know that it is in Palestine as of right and not on the [sic] sufferance” (vide APPENDIX D), making this White Paper of June 1922 to be among the formative events/factors in the ongoing occupation of Palestine.

2.3.8 Stance of British Government

Between 1882 and 1917 the Zionist Movement settled approximately 50,000 European Jews in our homeland…Its success in getting Britain to issue the Balfour Declaration once again demonstrated the alliance between Zionism and imperialism. Furthermore, by promising to the Zionist movement what was not hers to give, Britain showed how oppressive the rule of imperialism was. As it was constituted then, the League of Nations abandoned our Arab [largely Muslim] people, and Wilson’s pledges and promises came to naught. In the guise of a mandate, British imperialism was cruelly and directly imposed upon us… [to] enable the Zionist invaders to consolidate their gains in our homeland…. (from Arafat’s Address to the U.N. General Assembly, November 13, 1974; cited in Smith, 2007: 349)

As can be educed or gathered from the foregoing, the role of British Government through McMahon’s deception (Subsection 2.3.4),

62 issuance of biased Balfour Declaration (Subsection 2.3.5), Mandate/occupation of Palestine (Subsection 2.3.6), White Paper of June 1922 (Subsection 2.3.7), and later policies reveal the kind of stance British Government had in the initiation and implementation of the Zionist enterprise in Palestine. Such stance has resulted in the Jewish immigration and occupation of Palestine, ill-treatment and agony of the people of Palestine, and present-day morass. This stance between Zionism and British imperialism was so expedient that neither Britain nor Zionism had any twinge of pain or guilt pangs that such stance to facilitate “the achievement of this object” would be at the expense of an entirely innocuous nation. They did not debate the thought that their biased involvement would constitute the onset of an odyssey of sufferings for the indigenous people whose only ‘crime’ was the inexorable fact that they were born and bred, generation after another, in that land where their fathers and forefathers had lived and died. Britain did not take the necessary precautions so as to protect their birthrights, in the same manner it protected the Zionist settler population which it had facilitated and empowered over the indigenes. Indeed, the Great Arab Revolt (1936-1939) against British “colonial rule and Jewish immigration,” and the massive encroachments that Zionists perpetrated 31 years after the Balfour Declaration or British occupation against the “human geography of Palestine,” along with the ongoing inhuman living conditions of the Palestinians until this day prove that Britain had not introduced measures to guard against the prejudice of “the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine,” as stated in the Declaration. It was not committed to put this second part of the declaration into effect as it was in the first part concerning “the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people,” which reveals how pro-Zionist the British stance was and how inhuman.

2.3.9 Zionism and Modern Jewish Ethnic Supremacy

The General Assembly, [...] Taking note of the Declaration of Mexico on the Equality of Women [...] held [in] July 1975, which promulgated the principle that “international co-operation and peace require the achievement of national liberation and independence, the elimination of colonialism and neo-colonialism, foreign occupation, Zionism, apartheid and racial discrimination in all its forms, as well as the

63 recognition of the dignity of peoples and their right to self- determination”, Taking note also of resolution 77 (XII) [...], which considered “that the racist regime in occupied Palestine and the racist regimes in Zimbabwe and South Africa have a common imperialist origin [...]”. Determines that Zionism is a form of racism and racial discrimination. (UN Resolution 3379: Zionism is a form of Racism 1975)

Zionists are driven, inter alia, by the Talmudic shibboleth that all people born from a mother other than a Jew are considered racially inferior. Accordingly, “the Jews,” according to Werner Sombart - as quoted in Jensen (1948: 37) - “wished to live separated from the rest because they felt themselves superior to the common people around them. They were the Chosen Race [...]”. Sombart further states:

The Rabbis did all that was required to fan the flames of pride - from Ezra, who forbade inter-marriage as a profanation of Jewish purity, down to this very day, when the pious Jew says every morning: ‘Blessed are Thou, O Lord, King of the Universe, who hast not made me a Gentile [...]’.

This Zionist ideology or invention of Jewishness or Zionism (Sand, 2009), this invented Jewish ethnic supremacy (Pappe, 2006) or the superiority of all that is Jew vis-à-vis the inferiority of all that is non- Jew, i.e. the Gentiles or goyim as called in Hebrew, a racial imprecation that relegates non-Jews to a rank lesser than that of cattle, was a main cause, as noted, in the rise of Zionism or “Jewish nationalism” in the second half of the nineteenth century in Western Europe so as to prevent being ‘profaned’ by integrating or mixing with the goyim or other (sub) races. Thus, such ideology has historically guarded or prevented Jews from assimilation, a major cause behind Anti-Semitism as indicated also by the founder of Zionism when he observed that the Jews’ “loss of the power of assimilation” was the “remote cause” behind Anti-Semitism. Following their emancipation, after the French Revolution, the Jews resisted assimilation (Herzl, 1896/1946/1988). Therefore, when Herzl referred to assimilation in his influential pamphlet, The Jewish State, he wrote:

I do not for a moment wish to imply that I desire such an end. Our national character is too historically famous,

64 and, in spite of every degradation, too fine to make its annihilation desirable (91).

Herzl found the idea of assimilation discreditable. Hence is his statement in the introduction to The Jewish State: “Wherever we remain politically secure for any length of time, we assimilate. I think this is not praiseworthy” (1896/1946/1988). Hence, for fear of loss of “national character” and Jewish “peculiarities,” the Jews have chosen to remain under pressure rather than assimilate. Assimilation, according to Herzl (1896/1946/1988), along with (the resultant) prosperity would weaken Judaism and extinguish Jewish peculiarities. Therefore, Herzl continues: “It is only pressure that forces us back to the parent stem; it is only hatred encompassing us that makes us strangers once more” (p. 92). He further states that thus, “whether we like it or not, we are now, and shall henceforth remain, a historic group with unmistakable characteristics common to us all” (1896/1946/1988: 92). Obviously, such sense of ethnic supremacy and thus tendency against assimilation into other peoples has also been the major force behind the present discrimination that ‘Israel’ practises against the Palestinians, whether those in the Occupied Territories of the 1967 or those forming part of its citizenry or those languishing in diaspora since 1948 or 1967. It is also, according to Amin (1994), the reason behind ‘Israel’’s ongoing indecision about whether to seriously seek a settlement with the Palestinians and her Arab neighbours or perpetuate the status quo (i.e. belligerency and occupation), fearing that actual peace might lead gradually to loss of the Jewish identity or character, one of the main causes, as adumbrated in the Overview and elucidated in this subsection, behind the emergence and development of the Zionist enterprise in Palestine, and actually the ongoing exacerbation of the sufferings of Palestinians. It is what makes the problem intractable (see also Subsection 2.5.4 and Section 6.3). Indeed and as noted in the first chapter and stressed in the final, such ethnic supremacy or the Zionist ideology, leading to Israeli intransigence and the continuation of discrimination, are major obstacles to any modus vivendi, let alone a disposition to the “tragic morass” engulfing the region. Therefore, this modern groomed “distinctive nationality of Jews” (Herzl, 1896/1946/1988: 79), this cliquish penchant of Jewry, or the “Zionist ideology of ethnic supremacy,” significant also for the rise and prevalence of the sentiment of European Anti-Semitism

65 (facilitated whether consciously or unconsciously by Jews themselves) and Hitler’s Nazism and the final solution; is one of two main factors that, according to Pappe (2006) “deter conflict resolution” today; the other being “the so-called “peace process” that’s always been structured to avoid peace at all costs” (Lendman, 2007: 12) (see Chapter 5):

From the former stems ‘Israel’’s continuing denial of the Nakba; in the latter we see the lack of international will to bring justice to region - two obstacles that perpetuate the refugee problem and stand in the way of a just and comprehensive peace emerging in the land (Pappe, 2006: 234).

2.3.10 Zionist Mythology and the Propagation of Israelese

It pains our people greatly to witness the propagation of the myth [or what I call israelese] that its homeland was a desert until it was made to bloom by the toil of foreign settlers, that it was a land without a people, and that the colonialist entity caused no harm to any human being. (from Arafat’s Address to the U.N. General Assembly, November 13, 1974; cited in Smith, 2007: 348)

Central to the effacement and mnemocide of historic Palestine was and still is the Zionist propagation of myths and israelese captured collectively and succinctly by Finkelstein (2003) as the “Zionist mythology”. These are pieces of fiction spun; a Zionist master narrative emploted based on the ideological construct of “omission and invention” (Elmessiri, 2001), constructed by Zionism in ad hoc workshops of discourse and israelese, and employed as part of the Zionist mythology to fictionally and discursively construct reality where myths become facts and facts become myths. Troen (2008: 195), a professor of Israel Studies, for example states in connection with the myth concerning the ‘historic connection’ (see Subsection 2.3.3) that “the widely held assumption - found throughout the literature of the social sciences and humanities - that Jews had a deep and vital historical connection to the land was essential to asserting the right to resettle in it”. These ‘rights’ are nothing more than fallacies or “none other than an ancient imposture,” to use Newton’s words (1946; quoted in Jensen, 1948: 1). They are twisted ideological inventions analogous to the

66 ever-growing body of israelese or “foundational myths of the State of Israel” with which the Zionist mythology abounds. They are thus similar to biblically-invoked Zionist myths and demagogic israelese such as ‘Next year in Jerusalem’ or ‘a land without people for a people without land’ or ‘the promised land’ or the ‘historical right’ or ‘ancient historic connection’ or ‘biblical land’ or ‘Return to Zion’ or ‘Eretz Yisrael’ or ‘Land of Israel’ or ‘settling an empty land’ and ‘making the desert bloom’ or ‘voluntary exodus’ (of about a million indigenous Arabs) or ‘God’s ‘chosen people’ or anti- Semitism (see subsection below) or any other Zionist discourse or Zionist metanarrative or “hegemonic identity narrative” of this sort whose prime function is to distort facts, misrepresent reality and enact, exercise and sustain hegemony and inequality; a typical colonialist practice considered central to the creation and survival of the Zionist colonialist entity implanted in Palestine.

2.3.11 Historical Anti-Semitism vs New Anti-Semitism

Just like the abovementioned israelese, ideologies and events which had played a role in the settlement of Jews in Palestine and the resettlement or ‘cleansing’ of the Palestinians away from it, was Anti-Semitism or European Anti-Semitism, a formative factor in the immigration of Zionist Jews and their settlement into Palestine. Faced with the “Jewish problem” that resulted from Jewish resistance to integrate into the peoples of Europe, thus leading to European Anti-Semitism, “Jews began to leave Europe in large numbers” (Fraser, 1995:12) and emigrate since 1882 from Russia to the United States despite restrictions and other territories such as Palestine and the Argentine. Zionist aliyoth or immigration was in particular prompted by the assassination in 1881 of the Tsar of Russia, Alexander II of whose murder Jews were convicted (Fraser, 1995; Saleh, 2003). This gave Jews the kairos or opportunity to think their problem over and find a solution (1995; 2003). It is at this time that they, for example, founded the movement known as Hibbat Zion (Love of Zion) in 1882 in Russia “to channel small groups of idealists in Palestine” (Fraser, 1995: 6). Thus, there was the lack of assimilation, which prompted historical or European Anti-Semitism, which in turn led to Zionism, which advocated a national home for the Zionists in Palestine, taking the myth of “historic connection” as a basis. However, it has to be noted in this context that today’s anti- Semitism, called by Finkelstein (2005) as “New Anti-Semitism,” is different from this (historical) European anti-Semitism. It is different,

67 for example, from that felt by Hitler whose anti-Semitic sentiments were engendered partly from the forgery known as Protocols of the Learned Elders of Zion, “a forgery that claims to describe a secret Jewish conspiracy for world domination,” and partly from the groomed exclusive nature of much of the Jewry (see above), a factor in the rise of the sentiment of European Anti-Semitism, and thus a formative event. Today’s New Anti-Semitism, according to Finkelstein (2005), is a misuse of anti-Semitism, as shown by the title of his book: Beyond Chutzpah: On the Misuse of Anti-Semitism and the Abuse of History. It is based on the ideological construct of “omission and invention” (Elmessiri, 2001) mentioned above, constructed by Israeli historiography (Pappe, 2006) and employed as part of the Zionist mythology to fictionally construct reality and brand any attempt at criticising ‘Israel’ for human rights violations as anti-Semitism and thus maintain “unequal power relations”. Another reason behind the continuous construction and propagation of the discourse and flames of anti-Semitism is to push as many Jews as possible to migrate to ‘Israel’ (Rasheed, 1998: 180), as one way of ‘Israel’’s methods of countering what Israeli leadership calls the demographic problem (see Subsection 2.5.2). Thus, while European Anti-Semitism, a rise in the hatred of Jews, can be thought of as a formative factor/event in the development of the “Zionist nation-building project” (from Divine, 2008: 5) or territorial occupation of Palestine, its new phantom (New Anti- Semitism) is being used to justify and perpetuate ‘Israel’’s further violations in occupied Palestine against human rights.

2.3.12 Rise of Nazism (1930s)

A formative factor, the rise of Hitler’s Nazism and the Reich’s Kristallnacht in November 1938, which resulted in massacres of Jews during the Second World War, had made the size of Yishuv, or settlement of the Jewish community in Palestine to increase exponentially (Gavron, 2004). Hence, Jewish population which did not exceed “5,000” at the onset of the nineteenth century (Saleh, 2003: 69), had by 1936, according to Fraser (1995: 12), “grown to 370, 483 in a total Palestinian population of 1, 336, 518”. “These events,” Fraser continues, “are fundamental to any understanding of the Arab-Israeli conflict. They led to what the American Department of State described as a ‘cosmic’ urge on the part of survivors to secure a Jewish state” (p. 17).

68 Now, though we understand some of the forces behind the Jewish problem, the question that arises is that why should the solution of the Jewish Question and the restitution for what they had suffered at the hands of the ‘white man’ be at the expense of Arabs or Muslims who had actually always provided protection for Jews? Such protection began since the Islamic Conquest of Jerusalem in 638 (Gavron, 2004) during the patriarchal orthodox caliphate or reign of Umar ibn al-Khattab (634-644), and continued throughout the 12- century-long Muslim rule and Islamic civilisation - the longest and most stable period of rule over Jerusalem (Shash, 1999). In other words, Arabs believe what David Ben-Gurion said in a conversation with Nahum Goldmann about “the Arab Problem” in 1956 that there was “anti-Semitism, the Nazis, Hitler, Auschwitz, but was that their fault (Goldmann, 1978: 99)?” Why should they pay for the crimes of others, whether Jews deserved such hatred or not? To sum up, Hitler’s Nazism or the Nazi Holocaust - an event exploited consistently by Zionists prior to the creation of the Zionist entity as a cause to secure a Jewish state, and following the formation of the entity in 1948 to further the interests of the entity (Finkelstein, 2003) - was a formative event in Zionist immigration and thence occupation of Palestine, and an ongoing cause, along with New Anti-Semitism, which Israel consistently draw upon and amplify to perpetuate the status quo.

2.3.13 Proposal of Partition (1937)

As a result of the collusion between the mandatory Power and the Zionist movement and with the support of some countries, this General Assembly early in its history approved a recommendation to partition our Palestinian homeland.... (from Arafat’s Address to the U.N. General Assembly, November 13, 1974; cited in Smith, 2007: 348)

As explained in previous subsections, the intersection of interests between Zionism and British imperialism played a central role in bringing about the Zionist enterprise in Palestine and the resultant fatal consequences. A direct consequence of such intersection was the issuance of Balfour declaration in 1917 and then direct British occupation of Palestine (1917-1948), events that were central to the immigration of large numbers of European Zionist immigrants to Palestine. As those growing numbers of Zionist immigrants began

69 clearly to pose a threat to the indigenes, this had inevitably led to frequent clashes between the natives and immigrants. One major clash was that that came to be known as the Great Arab Revolt which lasted for three years, from 1936 to 1939. A reaction to British occupation and Zionist immigration to Palestine, the revolt was massive that the mandatory Power had to set up a commission, the Palestine Royal (Peel) Commission to investigate the causes behind the revolt. In its report of 1937, the Commission had recommended, as a solution to the escalating problem in Palestine, the partition of Palestine, “with 33% of the country to become a Jewish state” and “Part of the Palestinian population is to be transferred from this state” (Pappe, 2006: 284). Now, though this 1937 proposal of partition, proposed by “The Palestine Royal Commission under Lord Peel” (Fraser, 1995: 12- 13), was relinquished two years later by the British Government in its White Paper of November 1939 “in favour of creating an independent Palestine governed by Palestinian Arabs and Jews in proportion to their numbers in the population by 1949 (section I),” it was a formative event. What was formative about this notion of partition at the time of the proposal in 1937 was that it stated that “at least several hundred thousand Palestinian Arabs--if not all of them” were to be transferred from the Jewish state-to-be, which gave the Founding Fathers of ‘Israel’ the impression that the long-standing notion of transfer was “a legitimate solution” to the problem (Morris, 1988). It made Ben- Gurion write in his diary in that same year: “This could give us something that we never had [...], an opportunity that we never dared to dream in our wildest imaginings” (Gavron, 2004: 231). Hence are Ben-Gurion’s words in 1938: “I favour compulsory transfer. I see nothing immoral in it” (Simons, 2004: 3; Shash, 1999; Saleh, 2003; Pappe, 2006).

2.3.14 Plan of Partition (UN GA Resolution 181) (1947)

The notion of partition proposed on November 29, 1947 by the UN, and previously, as noted in the previous subsection, by the Palestine Royal (Peel) Commission in 1937 was a formative event in the history and tragedy of modern Palestine. The UN’s plan of partition proposed, as stated by Pappe (2006), not only 56% of the territory for a Jewish state but also “allotted the most fertile land and almost all urban and rural territory in Palestine to the new Jewish state” (Lendman, 2007: 5).

70 Hence, the Partition Plan or Resolution 181 has not only established a basis for this unequal conflict in the sense that it was a formative factor in the tragedy of Palestinians, but has also empowered the European Zionist immigrants over them until our present day - and this was not an accident; it was calculated to be the case.

2.3.15 Seismic Global Changes in the Balance of Power (1914-1945)

Besides the abovementioned shaping macro factors, events and israelese, the following were some other seismic formative events that also played a role in the Zionist encroachments on Palestine: eruption of the First World War (1914-1918), collapse of the Ottoman Empire (1516-1914), formulation of the League of Nations as a product of the 1919-1920 Paris Peace Conference among the Triple Entente or Allied Powers to promote colonial mandates or rather occupation of territories previously administered by the Ottoman Empire, and finally Second World War (1939-1945), which also came to be constitutive in the modern history of Palestine. It should be stressed here that this seemingly ‘Peace Conference,’ taking place in the aftermath of the First World War was of far- reaching warlike consequences to the whole region and the history that was to come. Indeed, being the antithesis of peace as the reality of the region would come to witness and as the title of David Fromkin’s (1989) book: A Peace to End All Peace: The Fall of the Ottoman Empire and the Creation of the Modern Middle East reveals, this ‘Peace Conference’ was a formative event not only in the geopolitics of Europe, and ongoing tragedy of Palestine but also in that of the whole region of the Middle East. It was ‘peace’ that, according to Shash (1999), was based on “deception,” where Britain played a major role in serving her imperial and strategic interests and where the downtrodden peoples of the Middle East have been, as a result, and until now paying its exorbitant price. Those Machiavellian imperial interests, strategic events and seismic global transformations in the balance of power with their creation of new realities had, along with the foregoing account and the tools and socio-political factors outlined in Section 2.1, facilitated the Zionist premeditated ‘cleansing' of the Palestinians, leading in 1948 to the transformation of Palestine into a Jewish state. Those events and factors have simultaneously led to the “inevitable” deracination of Palestinians or, according to Morris (1988), “the birth of the Palestinian refugee problem;” the large uprooted and displaced bulk (“more than 80 per cent”) (Masalha, 1992; Finkelstein, 2003; Saleh,

71 2003; Pappe, 2006) of the indigenous Arabs whom the Zionists have forced to live in “diasporic communities in neighboring Arab countries and elsewhere,” ever since.

2.4 THE PALESTINE QUESTION: A HUNDRED YEARS OF STRUGGLE

I don’t know of a single example in history where a country was colonised with the courteous consent of the population. (Vladimir Jabotinsky when “arguing for a Jewish military force at the Zionist Congress in Prague in 1921,” quoted in Smith, 2007:124)

The roots of the Palestinian question reach back into the closing years of the nineteenth century... to that period which we call the era of colonialism and settlement as we know it today. This is precisely the period during which Zionism... was born; its aim was the conquest of Palestine by European immigrants, just as settlers colonized, and indeed raided, most of Africa. This is the period during which, pouring forth out of the west, colonialism spread into the further reaches of Africa, Asia, and Latin America, building colonies everywhere, cruelly exploiting, oppressing, plundering the people of those three continents. This period persists into the present. Marked evidence of its [...] presence can be readily perceived in the racism practised [...] in Palestine.... (from Arafat’s Address to the U.N. General Assembly, November 13, 1974; cited in Smith, 2007: 349)

This account of the longtime Zionist policy of the ‘cleansing’ of Arabs and the “transformation of Palestine into a Jewish state,” this overview of the ad hoc tools and formative events behind the Zionist occupation makes it clear that the sufferings of the Palestinians have not commenced all of a sudden or only since the 1948 massive Zionist encroachments on Palestine, but rather tens of years prior to that. For example, in his affirmation of British Government’s commitment to put the Balfour Declaration into effect by establishing in Palestine, based on the ‘ancient historic connection,’ “a national home for the

72 Jewish people,” Sir Herbert Samuel wrote in the British White Paper of June 1922:

The tension [...] in Palestine is mainly due to apprehensions [...] which are as far as the Arabs are concerned [...] partly based upon exaggerated interpretations of the meaning of the [Balfour] Declaration favouring the establishment of a Jewish National Home in Palestine, made on behalf of His Majesty’s Government on 2nd November, 1917.

However, those “apprehensions” of the native Arab inhabitants of Palestine were not ‘exaggerated’ as mitigated by the High Commissioner for Palestine. There are two events which prove those fears of the indigenous population to be far from ‘exaggerated’. Those events were the Great Arab Revolt (1936- 1939) against British “colonial rule and Jewish immigration,” and the “compulsory transfer” or ‘cleansing’ Zionists perpetrated 31 years after the Balfour Declaration against the “human geography of Palestine”. Those two events confirm retrospectively that those “apprehensions” of Palestinians at the time were not ‘exaggerated’ as Sir Herbert Samuel tried through stratagem to mitigate or cover up. They prove that the Palestinians were in pain as they were conscious of the dangers of Zionism or the “Zionist threat to Palestine” as an imperialist settler movement. Those “apprehensions” are also indicators that ascertain that the Palestine Question has actually begun tens of years before the Jewish Question had ended where “Every Jewish village” of the new state “was,” according to Moshe Dayan (1915-1981) - a former Israeli army commander and Defence Minister - “built on its Palestinian counterpart,” (Saleh, 2001: 46) causing the loss of Palestine. The “loss of Palestine,” and thus the struggle of Palestinians against the aliyoth of olim or Zionist immigrants could be educed from certain literary works to have existed even before the Balfour Declaration in 1917. According to Sulaiman (1984), fear and thus sufferings of the Palestinians have actually begun “even before the turn of the 19th Century”. Indeed, according to Saleh (2003), the first incident of clashes between Palestinian fellahin and Zionist olim or immigrants to Palestine took place in 1886. Muhammad Is’af al- Nashashibi (1885-1948) - a Palestinian poet - bespoke, as quoted in Sulaiman (8-9), of the “Zionist threat to Palestine,” and lamented the “loss of Palestine” in a poem: Filastin wal-Isti’mar al-Jadid (Palestine

73 and the New Colonization), as early as October 1910 - indeed a hundred years ago:

˯ΎϛΑϟ΍Ε˶ ϣ˸ έ΍Ϋ˵ ·ϊϣΩϟ΍ϝΩΑ˯ΎϣΩϟΎΑϱΩϭΟ˵ ϲ˷ Σϟ΍ΓΎΗϓΎϳ ˯ΎϣΩέϳϏϰϠόϟ΍ΕΧ΃Ύϳ ϕΑϳϡϟϭϥϳργϠϓΕ˴ ˷ϟϭΩϘϠϓ ˯ΎϛΑϟ΍ ϲϧϐϳϻϭ˵ ϱΩΟϳ˵ ϻϡϭϳ ˱ΎϣΩϥϳϛΑΗϭϥϳϛηΗϑϭγ ˯΍Ωϋ έϳγϥϋϩϭΩόϳϥ΃ϥ˳ ϭΩϯΩϣϟ΍ίΎΟΩϗέΎϣόΗγϻ΍ϥ˷ · ˯΍ϭΩϟΎΑ ˱ΎόϳέγϩϭϓϼΗϓ ˯Ύϳϋϰγϣ΃Ωϗ˯΍Ωϟ΍΍Ϋϫ˱ ϥ˷ · ˯ϼΧΩ ϡϭϘϟΎϫϭόϳΑΗϻ΍ϭυ˳ ϘϳΗγΎϓϡϛϧΎρϭ΃ΎϬϧ˷ ·

O young woman of our homeland! Shed blood instead of tears if you want to cry. Sister of exaltedness! Palestine is lost; nothing but blood is left now. You will suffer and weep with blood, when weeping tears becomes of no avail. The colonization [of Palestine] has gone too far with none to stand out against it. This disease has become grave. You should overcome it with [real] remedies. Awake! It is your homeland. Do not let it be sold to the strangers!

Beyond doubt, this visionary 1910 early poem of al-Nashashibi, a significant piece of alarming poetic discourse proves that the increasing alarm of the Palestinians and their attempts to reluct or resist, at least at the (poetic) discourse level at this stage, the “Zionist threat to Palestine,” and British Government’s stance to “use,” as stated in the declaration, “their best endeavours to facilitate the achievement […] in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people” have started even before the Balfour Declaration where Palestine was felt as early as that time (i.e. 1910) to have been “lost” and that “nothing but blood” was “left”. This is a primary source that traces the apprehension, alarm and suffering of the Palestinians, and later Zionist occupation, and the ensuing and ongoing homelessness of the Palestinians – “victims of discursive injustice,” “veterans of creative suffering” – to at least a hundred years until now (i.e. 1910-2010).

2.5 THE PALESTINE QUESTION: CAUSES OF EXACERBATION

All the formative or constitutive events along with the tools and socio-political factors mentioned in the Overview were crucial to the implementation of the settler Zionist enterprise in Palestine and the 1948 Zionist encroachments and the consequential creation of the Zionist entity. There are, however, causes that, following the colonialist entity’s formation, have aggravated the Palestine 74 Question. Under ten consecutive subtitles/subsections, I shall highlight, just as I did about the genesis and evolution of the problem created in Palestine, a number of events and root causes that aggravate this time “the complexity of the conflict,” and that I thus believe to be central to such exacerbation. It should be noted that some of these events and causes tend to overlap with what I have called formative events behind the establishment of the Zionist entity. The following subtitles, explained briefly below, summarise these events and causes of exacerbation: Israeli Occupation of the Remnant of Palestine (1967); Apartheid Politics; Israelispeak and Israeli Media; Israeli Violations of International Norms of Conduct; Politics of Expansion and Dispossession; Dictatorships of the Arab World and Anglo-American Stance; Weak Official Palestinian Stance; PLO and the Change of Strategy; Arab Inexperience of the Power of Logos and Pitfalls of Discourse; and finally Injustice vs Intifadas.

2.5.1 Israeli Occupation of the Remnant of Palestine (1967)

The war of 1967 was to prove as decisive in its consequences as that of 1948-9. It left Israel firmly in control of all the land of mandatory Palestine, as well as extensive Egyptian and Syrian territory, and tilted the balance of Middle East power firmly in an Israeli direction. (Fraser, 1995: 81)

I begin with the demoralising defeat of ‘Arab armies’ in the 1967 Israeli invasion or the aggression of 5 June. This full-scale “blitzkrieg [Israeli] surprise attack, starting on 5 June 1967 on Egypt, Syria and Jordan" (Hasan Abu Nimah, 2010) that resulted in the new state’s Anschluss or annexation, besides Syria’s Golan Heights and Egypt’s Sinai Peninsula, of the rest 22% (Saleh, 2001) of historic Palestine: the West Bank, East Jerusalem, and the Gaza Strip, has wiped Palestine off the map completely. This complete and utter rout, and the resultant sprawling expansion of the colonialist entity over all historic Palestine and adjacent sovereign territories has acted as a coup de main that, given the bubble of Nasserism, was beyond all Arab and especially nationalist or Nasserist expectations, hence the designation an-Naksa (Setback), as described by Gamal Abdel Nasser (1918-1970). A decisive event in the geography and ideology of the Levant, an- Naksa served, ipso facto, as the death knell to certain borrowed ideologies and a realty check to others. Being such a watershed, the

75 Naksa tilted the regional balance of power greatly in favour of the Zionist entity; hence, as mentioned by Hasan Abu Nimah (2010), creating through aggression new further “irreversible facts” or what Israelis call “facts on the ground” that would sooner or later dictate new realities. In particular, an-Naksa gave the Palestine Question a novel trajectory in the art of dictates and diktats. It created a new reality that would later come to function as the starting point to any future settlement or ‘final’ disposition with the Palestinians. It is significant to emphasise here that the 1967 Israeli occupation of the rest 22% of historic Palestine was not the result of a miscalculation or a fluke, or circumstances or as Michael Oren suggests, ‘the vagaries and momentum of war’ (Finkelstein, 2003: xvi), but rather the result of long-standing harboured Zionist premeditation. In this regard, Sternhell, (cited in Finkelstein, 2003: xvi), observes:

The role of occupier, which Israel began to play only a few months after the lightning victory of June 1967, was not the result of some miscalculation on the part of the rulers of that period or the outcome of a combination of circumstances, but another step in the realization of Zionism’s major ambitions.

To conclude this macro cause of exacerbation - the 1967 Israeli Occupation of the remnant of Palestine, known among Arabs as the ‘Setback’ as was first called by Nasser and the Six-Day War (see Chapter 1) among Israelis - has exacerbated further the woeful condition of Arabs, in general in their struggle against the colonialist entity, and the Palestinians, in particular, both the uprooted4 and the now occupied.

2.5.2 Apartheid Politics

There is democracy in Israel but none in the territories. A whole generation of Israelis grew up with a nondemocratic system next to them, as nondemocratic rulers. There is a difference between the arrest of Arabs and Jews. When you [a Jew] get arrested, the police or

4 “In fact, within 10 days of the [1967] war, more than 125,000 Palestinians were expelled by the Israelis from their land, mainly East Jerusalem, Ramallah, and Jericho, and became DPs [Displaced Persons], while after this date Israel continued to brutally expel an average of 500 Palestinians everyday from their land. The majority of these were from the districts of Hebron, Bethlehem, Nablus, Jenin and Qalkiliya” (Zakariah, 2008: 192). 76 secret service people will say, “We will give you Jewish treatment.” You will be slapped around perhaps but not tortured. Arabs who are arrested are beaten and tortured. It is difficult to convince Israelis that this undemocratic way of ruling and treating Arabs is wrong or evil. Israelis see it as a normal practice [toward Arabs, not themselves]. (An Israeli journalist; cited in Smith, 2007: 421)

Institutionalised discrimination and “apartheid politics” is another exacerbating factor in the Arab struggle against Israeli occupation and the appalling and harsh daily reality of the Palestinians. Jewish ethnic supremacy discussed in Subsection 2.3.10 or the extant racial ideology of Zionism and the Jewish tradition of Halacha, calls for discrimination between the Jew and the Gentile, i.e. the non-Jew, in a way that denigrates and dehumanises the other (Ismail, 2009). A settler society (Troen, 2008), ‘Israel’ practises discrimination against the Palestinians. It does so against those expelled in 1948 and those in the 1967 Occupied Territories and those Arab citizens forming part of its citizenry. While the Israeli Law of Return, “one of the first pieces of legislation to be enacted by the new state” (Gavron, 2004: 26), for example, allows every foreign Jew who has never been to Palestine to come from any part of the world to the new state and get naturalised, it deprives the very sons of the soil it has expelled of such Right to Return. A consequence of her “Zionist ideology and praxis” to keep the ‘State of Israel’ a Jewish state, Israel has enacted and codified a number of other discriminatory laws against its Israeli Arab citizens; laws that intensify the agony of the occupied and sufferings of “Arab Israelis” or those remaining Palestinians who managed to survive the 1948 “radical procedure”. Many of these laws the Zionist Israeli leadership has enacted in particular with the aim to confiscate Palestinian lands. Indeed, by “the termination of the British Mandate in May 1948, the Jews were [only] holding a total area of 372,925 acres, or 5.67 per cent of the total land area of the country” (Sulaiman, 1984: 33). So, “prior to the declaration of the State of Israel,” as mentioned by Ismail (2009):

[...] the Zionists did not have more than 5.5% of the total area of Palestine [...] and at best the area did not exceed 8%. However, through systematic land confiscation and expropriation, more than 93% of the land has been transferred to Jewish ownership (48).

77 Among these Israeli laws concerning land and property confiscation are the Land and Property Law (1951); Prescription Law (1960); Absentee Property Law (1950); Development Authority (Transfer of Property) Law (1950); Land Acquisition Law (1953) (Ismail, 2009). These laws and “a host of others that followed” such as Law of the Land of Israel (1960), Law of the Israel Land Authority (ILA) (1960), Law of Agricultural Settlement (1967) (Pappe, 2006) have been central to the expropriation of Palestinian properties and lands. According to the Law for Absentee Property mentioned above, for example, “about 20-30% of the Palestinians in Israel have been considered “present-absentees”. “This law has allowed the Israeli authorities to expropriate their lands and estates despite their being “citizens”” (2009: 49).

Israelispeak, however, misrepresents reality by showing ‘Israel’ as a ‘liberal’ democracy. In the words of Ismail (2009: 45):

Zionist political literature pretends that Israel is a democratic liberal state, but the nature of the Zionist political system shows actually the opposite. It reveals a “state of domineering ideology, i.e. Zionism, which demarcates the state boundaries in a way irrelevant to the geography occupied by this state, and considers it a state for the Jews wherever they are, rather than a state for the citizens dwelling in it”.

This has made the Israeli academic, Sami Smooha, as mentioned by Zreiq (1996: 320) to state that Israel is not a liberal democracy but rather an “ethnic democracy”. Indeed, Israeli discrimination engulfs every sphere and “aspect of the life or reality of the Palestinians” (Ismail, 2009: 29). It is manifested in the sphere of job representation and budgets, in education, in sentencing and judgements, in naturalisation, and all other aspects of life (2009). To show Israeli discrimination in the sphere of sentencing as an example, let us consider the table overleaf as provided by Ismail (2009: 55), based on a study conducted by Hagit Turgeman at the University of Tel Aviv, on “1,200 criminal cases in the two central courts of Nazareth and Haifa.

78 Table 2.1 Jail sentencing in Israel according to convict and victim

Percentage of those sentenced to Convict Victim jail (%) Jew Arab 14 Jew Jew 40 Arab Arab 46 Arab Jew 77 Source: Ismail (2009: 55)

Such discrimination has led the Palestinians to experience daily harsh and inhuman living conditions. Ismail (2009) stresses that such discrimination and such discriminatory laws are against the principles of the 1965 International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination, and the December 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights. They are, to quote Martin Luther King, Jr. (28 August 1963) in his speech I HaveaDream, bespeak the past “manacles of segregation” and present “chains of discrimination” (James, 2004: 67). They are laws reminiscent of South Africa’s Apartheid Regime, Europe’s disenfranchisement, and Nazi Germany’s eugenics laws. Indeed, viewing Palestinians as but goyim, a sub-race unworthy of living, and hence Zionism’s mission in making Palestine a Jewish state, a state for Jewish habitation only, has made Israeli politicians to consistently and openly play the race card and speak of ‘Israel’ as a Jewish state created for the ‘God’s Chosen’ only. Gilad Sharon, son of former Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, for example, states openly that “Israel was not established to bring a democratic regime to a benighted region. ‘Israel’ was established as a national home for the Jewish people” (Ismail, 2009: 38). He asserts that the “fact that the Arabs of Israel are citizens of the Jewish state and not citizens of an Arab state is a mishap of history” (2009: 38). Indeed, as stated by a B’Tselem (Israeli Information Center for Human Rights in the Occupied Territories) study, cited in Finkelstein (2003: xx):

Israel has created in the Occupied Territories a regime of separation based on discrimination, applying two different systems of law in the same area and basing the rights of individuals on their nationality. This regime is the only one of its kind in the world, and is reminiscent of distasteful regimes from the past, such as the Apartheid regime in South Africa. 79 As a manifestation of this harsh reality created by ‘Israel’’s “regime of separation based on discrimination” in the Occupied Territories, it might suffice in this context to quote from Smith (2007) a horrifying longueur about the conditions in the Gaza Strip:

Conditions in the Gaza Strip have always been harsh owing to the extraordinary population density of the area, in world statistics perhaps second only to Bangladesh. Refugees from 1948 and 1967 made up about 70 percent of the population in an area one-fifth the size of the West Bank. The Palestinian population had been squeezed by the Israeli expropriation of 42 percent of Arab land after 1967 […]. As Sara Roy has shown, “One [refugee] camp, Jabalya, is home to sixty thousand people living on one- half square mile of land, giving the camp a population density…double the density of Manhattan. […]”. On the other hand, sixteen Jewish settlements created out of land taken from Arabs housed approximately 2,500 Israeli settlers, compared to a Palestinian population of 750,000. Water-use restrictions imposed on Arabs to benefit Israeli settler agriculture resulted in a severe decline in the productivity of the Gaza citrus industry. When population imbalances are set against resource allocations, “individual Israelis consume seven times the amount of water consumed by individual Gazans.” (416- 417).

Indeed, Israeli discrimination against Palestinians - whether those in Palestine or even those in the diaspora - do not only conjure up horrible images of the Apartheid regime once practised in South Africa, but also confirm that the events of 1948 against the native civilian population of Palestine, perpetrated by the early Zionists, were in every sense calculated, pre-planned and predetermined. A “central plank in Israel’s founding ideology,” Zionist practices have also led - in Israeli discourse - to the so-called ‘demographic threat’ or problem and thus the ongoing calls or proposals for further “compulsory transfer”/expulsion of the remnant of Palestinians as a continuation of the politics of apartheid and transfer harboured and premeditated, as stressed in this study, decades prior to 1948 and as a solution to counteract the higher rate of birth among the Palestinians that is, according to Israelis, posing a demographic threat. In an article: More Israeli Jews Favor Transfer of Palestinians, Israeli Arabs, Haaretz writer Amnon Barzilai (2005, October) observes, as

80 phrased by Smith (2007: 533) that “A growing number of Israelis [...] favor transfer of Palestinians out of the territories and Israeli Arab citizens from Israel”. Indeed and until today, we still find statements such as that made by MK Yehiel Duvdevani that “If there is a way to solve the problem through the transfer of the [...] remaining Arabs, then we will do this” (Ismail, 2009: 74). Indeed alive still is this rightist Israeli dogma that “Only Transfer Will Bring Peace,” as a huge “Right-Wing Israeli Demonstration against the 1995 Interim Agreement (Oslo 2)” (Smith, 2007: 466) on October 5, 1995 advocated openly without any sense of shame or humanity. The percentage of Jews supporting compulsory transfer (see Section 2.2 and Subsection 2.3.13) has, according to the Arab Institute for Human Rights (AIHR), reached 62% (Ismail, 2009). However, according to the Israeli New Historian Ilan Pappe (2006), such percentage goes actually up to 90%. In his 16-page review of The Ethnic Cleansing of Palestine, Lendman (2007: 14) states that “Pappe believes the consensus in Israel today is for a state comprising 90% of Palestine “surrounded by electric fences and visible and invisible walls” with Palestinians given only worthless cantonized scrub lands of little or no value to the Jewish state”. Actuated through various pretexts and means (Ismail, 2009), institutionalised discrimination and systematic elimination of Palestinians are a day to day reality experienced by the Palestinians. The erection of territorial and residential segregation or walls, and assassination, for example, are manifestations visible enough on such policies. Such segregation embankments separate Arab neighbourhoods from those of the Jews in a number of mixed cities in ‘Israel,’ a form of segregation that is not practised in any part of today’s world save in the self-styled ‘Jewish State’. Ethnic supremacy and settler Zionism have always been a driving force in the elimination or ‘cleansing’ of Palestinians to establish a new settler society, in the racial discrimination practised in that land, in making the problem intractable, a fact that does not only render ‘Israel’ a settler colonialist state from the very start, but also aggravates the complexity of the ongoing Palestinian suffering and the prospect of an amicable solution. In a nutshell, ‘Israel’’s Zionist ideology and institutionalised discriminatory measures against the Palestinians not only bring to mind dark past apartheid regimes and prove the existence of two distinct strata of citizens, but what also, I believe, make this unequal conflict chronic, and the Palestinian issue “intractable” (see Chapter 6).

81 2.5.3 Israelispeak and Israeli Media

It pains our people greatly to witness the propagation of the myth that its homeland was a desert until it was made to bloom by the toil of foreign settlers, that it was a land without a people, and that the colonialist entity caused no harm to any human being. No: such lies must be exposed from this rostrum, for the world must know that Palestine was the cradle of most ancient cultures and civilizations. Its Arab people were engaged in farming and building, spreading culture throughout the land for thousands of years, setting an example in the practice of freedom of worship, acting as faithful guardians of the holy places of all religions... Those who call us terrorists wish to prevent world public opinion from discovering the truth about us and from seeing the justice on our faces. They seek to hide the terrorism and tyranny of their acts, and our own posture of self-defense. (from Arafat’s Address to the U.N. General Assembly, November 13, 1974; cited in Smith, 2007: 348)

Another cause in the exacerbation of the Arab struggle against Israeli occupation is hasbara or what I referred to prior to ‘Israel’’s creation in 1948 as israelese (see Subsection 2.3.10) and what I am inclined also to call following ‘Israel’s creation as Israelispeak, what Ismail (n.d.) calls “Zionist disinformation machinery” and Finkelstein (2005): “Zionist mythology” (see Subsection 2.3.10 above). A Hebrew untranslatable, hasbara, while literally denoting ‘explanation,’ is used to connote “public diplomacy,” “advocacy” or “soft power”. Thus, a euphemism for pro-Israel propaganda, hasbara plays a role in the mystification rather than ‘explanation’ of reality. There is the periodic falsification of inconvenient facts through manipulation of statistics. This has to do with “the periodic reappearance of spurious scholarship”5 and thus “the fictional

5 Examples of spurious scholarship, as exposed and refuted by scholars such as Finkelstein, Chomsky, Arthur Koestler, Frank Menetrez, Edward Said, Mohsen Saleh, Ilan Pappe, Charles Smith, Fayez Rasheed, etc., are the following books: 1. Protocols of the Learned Elders of Zion, first published in 1903 2. From Time Immemorial: The Origins of the Arab-Jewish Conflict over Palestine, by Joan Peters, published in 1984 3. A Place Among the Nations: Israel and the World, by Benjamin Netanyahu, published in 1993. 4. Myths and Facts: A Guide to the Arab-Israeli Conflict, by Mitchell Bard, published in 2001. 5. The Case for Israel, by Alan Dershowitz, published in 2003 by Wiley

82 construction of reality”. It has also to do with Israelispeak and its role in shaping and reshaping “concepts and realities in the minds of the target masses,” in moulding the mentality and opinion of the public in a way that perverts the truth and creates a gap between “image and reality”. It has to do with establishing ideologies and “hegemonic identity narratives” such as the ‘historical right,’ ‘ancient historic connection,’ ‘Return to Zion,’ ‘Land of Israel,’ etc. Elmessiri (2001) states that Zionist propaganda, “a construct founded on omission and invention”:

[...] refutes or discards anything that does not jibe with what is convenient and vests such sweeping propositions as “a land without people for a people without land,” with a sanctity of mythical proportions (1).

2.5.4 Israeli Violations of International Norms of Conduct

In a long list of violations, “Jeremy R. Hammond (2010) provides “a list of 79 United Nations Security Council resolutions directly critical of Israel for violations of U.N. Security Council resolutions, the U.N. Charter, the Geneva Conventions, international terrorism, or other violations of international law” (Hammond, Israeli Violations of UN Security Council Resolutions, (accessed 21 April, 2010:1). Hence, it needs little argument to prove that ‘Israel’’s constant violation of the Charter of the UN, international norms of conduct; and according to Philo and Berry (2004), Friel and Falk (2007), and Hammond (2010) violations of international law and UN resolutions is another cause that aggravates the Arab struggle against Israeli occupation.

2.5.5 Politics of Expansion and Dispossession

Construction in the settlements has continued virtually uninterrupted since 1967, under dovish Labor governments as well as during periods of right-wing rule. In 1977, there were 31 settlements with a combined population of 4,400; by 1992 the number had risen to 120 settlements with 100,000 inhabitants. By the end of 2009, the settler population of the West Bank had reached 306,000. There are another nine settlements, or settlement neighborhoods, in annexed East Jerusalem, which are home to around 190,000 people.

83 (Largest Jewish Settlements in the West Bank, (accesses 27 May, 2012))

Through the ongoing and sprawling construction of Israeli settler colonies in the West Bank, ‘Israel’’s systematic politics of expansion and dispossession is yet a further and main cause of exacerbation in the sufferings of the “reluctant warriors”. It is maintained by Finkelstein (2003) and actually a great number of other political pundits that this cause, in particular, aggravates the situation to a ferocious degree, as it constitutes one of the major Israeli-designed obstacles towards the realisation of an independent Palestinian state or Palestinian self-determination and thus peace. Supported by Menachem Begin and initiated by Gush Emunim (‘Bloc of the Faithful’) (Shash, 1999) - the extremist racist settler movement, founded by Moshe Levinger in ‘Israel’ - the construction of settlements or those massive colonies has begun shortly after ‘Israel’’s territorial occupation of the rest of historic Palestine. Since then and more dramatically since the late 1970s, and more particularly when Likud came into power for the first time in 1977, the construction of such Israeli settler colonies in the territories occupied by force in 1967 (Gavron, 2004) has started to mushroom, and yet more exponentially since the early 1990s following the ‘peace process’. According to Gavron (2004), activists of Gush Emunim consider those territories as the rest of ‘Israel,’ ‘liberated’ rather than ‘occupied’. For them, settling those territories will hasten the coming of what they call the “messianic age”. With such ideology, such extremists belong to Revisionist Zionism or the Zionist Revisionist Movement founded “in the 1920s” (Smith, 2007: 565) by Vladimir Jabotinsky (1880- 1940), a Revisionist Russian Zionist leader who, unlike the other trend in Zionism, “advocated a Jewish state in an area both west and east of the Jordan River” (Britannica Concise Encyclopedia 2010). A bit different from Labour Zionism or the Zionist ideology of Labour, the Zionist ideology of Likud (lit. “consolidation”) - the other main political camp in ‘Israel’ - is that of Revisionist Zionism (Shash, 1999). Shash (1999) and Smith (2007) maintain that since the coming of Likud into power for the first time in 1977, and particularly “once Menachem Begin took office in 1978” (Smith, 2007: 413), more “land requisitions” took place as the move in the Israeli government has been towards the Anschluss or annexation of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, occupied by force in 1967 as lands of historic ‘Israel,’ ‘liberated’ and thus must not be returned to Arabs, a position different from that held by Ben-Gurion or Labour Zionists

84 in general who attribute more importance to preserving the ‘Jewish character’ of the state rather than its ‘historical’ boundaries. Hence, in the words of Smith (2007):

Whereas an annual average of 770 Israelis settled in the territories from 1967 to 1977, that average increased under Likud to 5,960 annually from 1978 to 1987. The location of settlements also changed: now they were often deliberately planned to abut Arab communities and to take over their lands, constituting a visible threat designed from Ariel Sharon’s point of view to intimidate Arabs and encourage them to leave [...] (413-414).

Therefore, and a bit different from Revisionist Zionists, Labour Zionists view returning part of such territories to Arabs in return for peace, as (more) advantageous. However, Shash (1999) maintains that actually both trends of Zionism or Israeli political camps view their positions as advantageous and as the ‘right thing to do,’ whether to include to ‘Israel’ or exclude from it the territories or 22% of former Palestine occupied by force in 1967. The difference is ideological, and thus it is generally these two trends that actually control the position of each of these two political camps in Israeli politics regarding their stance and conceptualisation of the nature and future of the Palestinian entity. Hence, as Likud came into power in 1977, politics of expansion or the construction of Israeli settler colonies in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip - championed by Israeli figures such as Menachem Begin, Yitzhak Shamir, Ariel Sharon, and Benjamin Netanyahu - has particularly begun to mushroom (Shash, 1999), despite obvious violations to international law, and in particular the UN Charter (1945) and the Fourth Geneva Convention (1949). This is in an attempt to create “facts on the ground,” a policy of which ‘Israel’ is typical (see Chapter 5). However, it should be noted, as observed by Shash (1999) that despite the ideological differences among the right and the left in ‘Israel,’ concerning the remnant of Palestinian lands ‘Israel’ occupied in 1967; whether they are, for instance, to withdraw from or annex such territories debated for a Palestinian entity, a general consensus among them about certain principles is maintained. Among those general common denominators which are relevant to this context are the unanimity among Israelis that there is “no return to the pre-June 5 lines (of 1967)” (Pappe, 2006) or as stated by Ehud Barak in 1999 - as one of four security “red lines” - “no return to the 1967 borders”

85 (Smith, 2007: 499), and that thus most of the huge townships they have constructed on such lands occupied since 1967 are to remain (Shash, 1999), thus making what is called the ‘peace process’ nothing other than a means to temporise and thus further consolidate Israeli power in those occupied territories through the continued creation of ‘facts on the ground’ (see Chapter 6). Furthermore, it is maintained that these huge townships or “settlement blocks” (Reinhart, 2006) constructed on lands of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip,6 both debated as site of a future Palestinian state based on the two-state formula, are a major Israeli- designed obstacle to any attempt at conflict resolution, particularly these attempts that are based on partition or the two-state solution (see Chapter 3). Such politics of expansion, the constant attempts of the colonialist entity to create “facts on the ground” to further its “annexationist ambitions,” and in the process undermine any real prospect for Palestinian self-determination, are a major cause in the aggravation of the Arab struggle against Israeli occupation.

2.5.6 Dictatorships of the Arab World and Anglo-American Stance

It is maintained that international “biased interests and power struggles,” along with absence of serious Arab/Muslim official stance, impact of the Israeli lobby on US foreign policy, US “tolerance of Israeli intransigence” and long-time “subservience to Jewish influence” despite “two thousand years of Christian contempt for Jews” (Andreas Griffin; quoted in Victor, 2005: 115), all play central roles in aggravating this century-long morass. In this connection, Karma Nabulsi, following his exposition of the venality of the Palestinian Authority, states as reported by Al Jazeera and The Guardian (January 24, 2011) (http://warincontext.org/2011/01/24/the-palestine-papers/):

The same is true of the outrageous role of the US and Britain in creating a security bantustan, and the ruin of our civic and political space. We already knew, because we feel its fatal effects.

6 It should be mentioned here that since September 2005, those settlements in the Gaza Strip have been, as a result of Palestinian resistance, evacuated and dismantled following Israel’s plan to put an end to its costly presence in the Gaza Strip, and hence Ariel Sharon’s unilateral disengagement plan of 2004. 86 Similarly, it is maintained that contemporary autocratic or oligarchic rule in most Muslim nation-states; their lack of joint action and sequacity to their colonial masters and the adoption of their secular, anthropocentric (rather than the Islamic holistic theocentric) paradigm of civilisation (Hassan, 2010), have all exacerbated the struggles and sufferings of the Palestinians. Such a stance on the part of those unelected leaderships, those “post-colonialist appointed puppet leaders of Muslim countries” (Yasin, 2004) has made the Palestinians’ national struggle for the restoration or reconstruction of their polity, the body politic they aspire to, “a dream far from reality”. Indeed, as reported by Al Jazeera Center for Studies (4/1/2011: 1), this constitutes, according to Saleh (2011), the first major “sign of decay in the Palestinian Statehood project”:

Arab and Islamic weakness and disunity, including the absence of a common stance or vision towards the Palestinian issue and a concrete strategy of support in various political, financial and resources’ forms. The Palestinians thus have been standing almost alone in facing the Occupation.

This reality of the dictatorial systems of governance implanted in the Muslim world lends support to the widespread assumption that most current leaders of the Muslim world and particularly the Arab world have been appointed by external intervention rather than elected by their peoples. In the words of Friedman, they are “unelected autocrats” (Amer, 2009: 25). Thus, they have always been enslaved and are thus devoid of any political will. Indeed as Divine (2008: 5) - a professor of Jewish Studies at Smith College, Northampton, Massachusetts - states, “One could easily argue that Middle Eastern regimes and the liberation movements they have supported - perhaps, even more than Israel - have deprived the Palestinians of their political birthright”. Hence, the tribal or dictatorial “politics of the Arab world” have contributed to “Palestinian failures to achieve self-determination” (2008), and hence they are a cause for the exacerbation of the undeniable pain of the Palestinians. It needs little argument to state that such positions on the part of those regimes, those oppressive fascist juntas, which are antithetical to Islam and thus the sanctity of human life, exacerbate the sufferings of the Palestinians who expect out of a sense of Muslim brotherhood as Islam ordains other Muslim nations to extend a hand and help liberate Palestine; a task which is, according to Islam, is

87 the responsibility of every Muslim, each within his or her own capacity. However, given such regimes and the consequent trend to normalise relations with the occupier, what is seen in reality is the opposite of such a Dunkirk spirit. Egypt’s 1978 normalisation of relations with ‘Israel,’ according to a host of men of letters and intellectuals, for example, was a shocking “new shift in Egypt’s policy” towards the “enemy,” which dealt a blow to Muslims or “the general view which, sees the conflict with Israel as a historical and national [or religious] imperative” (Sulaiman, 1984: ii). This is a fact that led in 1981, for instance, to the assassination of Sadat (1918- 1981), President of Egypt, as the one behind such “new shift in Egypt’s policy” towards the “enemy”. This stance on the international plane, particularly the Anglo- American (Evangelical Christians), and impotence on the official Arab and Muslim plane are central factors to the growing sufferings of the Palestinians. As noted, this stance motivated by imperial interests was also among the formative factors that have facilitated in the first place the implementation of this colonialist entity or colonial enclave in the heart of the Arab-Muslim world. Earlier I also described, based on the 2006 work of Pappe, the Arabs and UN’s role in solving the problem created in Palestine as incommensurate, as the UN did not act responsibly, and the arrival or expected succour of “Arab armies” was late; it took place actually after much of the “cleansing” of Palestinians at the hands of the marauding Zionist gangs: the Hagana, Stern Gangs, and Irgun had already taken place. The role of the UN and the Arabs could was ignominious and failing as the UN could have done something, and the Arabs despite their inexperience in warfare and nascent independence from colonial powers (Saleh, 2003) could have been something.

2.5.7 Weak Official Palestinian Stance

Corruption of the Palestinian Authority (PA), and lack of a unified stance among Palestinian factions can be thought of as an exacerbating cause in Palestinian struggle. It is maintained (Saleh, 2011) that this corrupt stance of the PA, along with that of the US and the UK (see Subsection 2.5.6), and the lack of a common ideology and unity of purpose among other Palestinian factions have played a significant role in undermining Palestinian decision-making and thus the ability to resist occupation.

88 In this context, Karma Nabulsi, following an exposition of “the largest-ever leak of confidential documents related to the Israeli- Palestinian conflict,” states, as reported by Al Jazeera and The Guardian (January 24, 2011):

With any luck the sheer horror of this account of how the US and Britain covertly facilitated and even implemented Israeli military expansion – while creating an oligarchy to manage it – might overcome the entrenched interests and venality that have kept the peace process going. A small group of men who have polluted the Palestinian public sphere with their private activities are now exposed (http://warincontext.org/2011/01/24/the-palestine- papers/).

According to Pappe (2006), the unpatriotic stance of the Fatah-led Palestinian Authority and its pro-Israeli measures against Palestinian resistance to the Israeli occupation, along with its widespread corruption, makes the role of the PA in Occupied Palestine as that of a “quisling proxy comprador enforcer for Israeli and US imperial interests” (Lendman, 2007: 15). Indeed, the PA is in no way - being appointed rather than elected - less Orwellian than those oligarchies or oppressive juntas in the rest of the Middle East. It is just another implanted or appointed, subservient and self-interested Middle- Eastern regime whose main role, besides the pursuit of their own self-interests, is to ensure whether willingly or otherwise the implementation of the dictates and diktats of the masters rather than the interests of their downtrodden peoples, thus making the PA irrelevant to Palestinian interests in their quest for freedom and independence. Hence, Nabulsi’s words:

For the overwhelming majority of Palestinians, official Palestinian policy over these past decades has been the antithesis of a legitimate, or representative, or even coherent strategy to obtain our long-denied freedom (http://warincontext.org/2011/01/24/the-palestine- papers/).

Palestinians lack a unified vision and stance as to national liberation of the whole of historic Palestine or the establishment of a state on part of Palestine. The PLO, for example, in 1974, in its Ten Point Programme, and in a historic compromise and attempt “at a peaceful resolution” with the Zionist entity had implicitly adopted the one-state solution and thus called for the establishment of a “national

89 authority” on any liberated Palestinian territory (which is to be understood as part of a democratic, bi-national state in Israel/Palestine) (see Chapter 5). This gradual slackness in the PLO’s vision and position, and her overt renunciation of “armed struggle” as the only means of liberating Palestine weakens the Palestinian stance and hence adds to the aggravation of the Palestinian reality as it not only neutralises a big section of the Palestinian population but also works to undermine the resistance of other Palestinian factions who view “armed struggle” as the only means that can force the enemy to change its intransigent position.

2.5.8 PLO and the Change of Strategy

The PLO’s original position and strategy regarding the case and liberation of Palestine was that of “armed struggle”. The goal was the liberation of all of Mandate Palestine as clearly stated in Article 9 of the Palestinian National Charter (PNC) (1968): “Armed struggle is the only way to liberate Palestine”. However, ever since The Khartoum Conference in August 1967, and the Ten Point Programme in 1974 (see Chapter 5), the official Arab firm stance towards full restoration of Mandate Palestine has begun to waver and become continuously concessive, leading - overtime and as further Israeli “facts on the ground” get created - to drastic changes not only in tactics but also the strategy. Seeing Israeli intransigence to implement the implicit proposal for the binational solution, the PLO has officially since 1988 made a second historic compromise that was the beginning on a roller coaster for further explicit (this time) compromises, and changed its stance further. It began advocating the old notion of partition or the two-state solution. However, this was not based on the 1937 Peel Partition Plan or Peel Commission proposal of partition which allocated 33% of Palestine to a Jewish state, nor was it based on the 1947 UN proposal which allocated 56% of the land to a Jewish state, but rather on the June 4, 1967 de facto borders, which meant a de facto recognition of 78% of the territory of historic Palestine the Zionists seized in 1948. Thus, based on Resolution 242, previously rejected for it gave the Jewish state 78% of historic/Mandate Palestine (see Chapter 5), the PLO had, in Algiers in November 1988, announced Declaration of the State of Palestine (Shafiq, 2009), a few years before the 1993 Oslo Accords or Declaration of Principles (DOP) in which ‘Israel’ and the PLO had exchanged letters of recognition (see Chapter 5).

90 2.5.9 Arab Inexperience of the Power of Logos and Pitfalls of Discourse

The two official historical narratives that compete over the story of what happened in Palestine in 1948 both ignore the concept of ethnic cleansing. While the Zionist/Israeli version claims that the local population left ‘voluntarily’, the Palestinians talk about the ‘catastrophe’, the Nakba, that befell them, which is […] an elusive term as it refers more to the disaster itself rather than to who or what caused it. (Pappe, 2006: preface)

While certain utterances can warrant action and have repercussions of far-reaching scope, certain others don’t; and worse still, might even obfuscate a crime as to make it as though it was an act of God rather than the result of man’s inhumanity to man; a fact of which many Arabs seem to be nescient, and hence a cause for exacerbation. A prime example of this is the infelicitous term ‘Nakba’(ΔΑϛϧ), heard in Arab discourse or literature when talking about the 1948 mass expulsion of the Arabs of Palestine at the hands of the then predecessor of the Israel “Defence” Forces (IDF), the Zionist gangs of the Hagana, Stern Gangs, and Irgun. Representing this “crime against humanity” as the “Nakba” (Saleh, 2003; Pappe, 2006), Palestinians have inadvertently helped in the obfuscation of the nature and magnitude of this man-made crime. The ‘Nakba’ or ‘Catastrophe,’ is a linguistic (mis) representation of what Zionists committed with malice aforethought in 1948, for what was committed then was (and still is) a crime, not calamity. First used by the Syrian historian Constantine Zureiq in his 1948 book: Ma’na al-Nakba (the meaning of “catastrophe”) to record the atrocities perpetrated by Zionists in 1948 against the unarmed native population of Palestine is hollow and shallow as a catastrophe or cataclysm, as Ilan Pappe (2006) suggests can mean any natural disaster, and not necessarily, the man-made forcible removal of the Palestinians, committed with malice aforethought. In other words, the term ‘Nakba’ de-agentialises (Van Leeuwen, 2009) the event as being the product of a calamity or natural disaster to be saddened at, rather than the product of human agency to be deplored, condemned and reversed (see also Table 5.6). Thus, the term ‘Nakba’ being such an “elusive” term obfuscates or renders absent the agent behind such ‘disaster,’ and thus helps perpetuate injustice. It obscures causal agency and hence obviates

91 the need for blame attribution, responsibility and accountability and hence rehabilitation. As Pappe (2006: xvii) puts it, ‘Nakba’ “refers more to the disaster itself rather than to who or what caused it,” hence mitigating or diluting or obfuscating the severity of the event being “a crime of ethnic cleansing”. However, Pappe (2006.) explains that “The term Nakba was adopted, for understandable reasons, as an attempt to counter the moral weight of the Jewish Holocaust (Shoa),” which literally means ‘catastrophe’. So this explains why the term ‘Nakba’ is being used by the Palestinians and Arabs, and why Ismail (n.d.) refers to it as the “Palestinian Holocaust”. However, “in leaving out the actor,” Pappe continues, “it may in a sense have contributed to the continuing denial by the world of the ethnic cleansing of Palestine in 1948 and after” (xvii). Indeed, what Zionists committed in 1948 was an act of ethnic cleansing, i.e. depopulation, mass destruction and mass expulsion; and there must be “no room for ambivalence in this matter,” as emphasised by Pappe (2006); it was a crime against a people whose only ‘crime’ was the inexorable fact that they were born and bred, generation after another, in that land. Thus, ‘Nakba,’ or even more misleading ‘voluntary exodus’ – rather than forced exile or mass expulsion – as maintained by the official Israeli version or Israeli historiography, being such a misnomer, does not have the shocking and galvanising legal implications that ‘ethnic cleansing’ as a crime has, and thus does not warrant any commensurate action or attempt at rehabilitation. It makes the criminal premeditated act of “forced exile” as though it was an act of God; a fait accompli that has to be acquiesced, and that nothing could be done to redress it. It is because of this that I am inclined to feel that this “elusive” designation might have been - besides ‘voluntary exodus” - popularised by Zionists themselves as it serves in the obfuscation or mystification of such a war crime, and hence its obliteration from the “global public memory”. Or else, it is an indication that, unlike Jewish Zionists, Arabs and Muslims at large have evidently failed to conceptualise their problems properly, failing to present and represent their usurped rights at the level of discourse, an ability in which Israelis are quite adept. Evidently, Arabs and Muslims in toto have failed at the level of beyan or articulate discourse and representation, tools synonymous with mystification and domination, enlightenment and emancipation. They have failed to represent their sufferings. They have failed to propagate or articulate their ongoing enslavement by those

92 conscious of the power of logos; a cause that perpetuates their enslavement. Indeed, enslavement, as articulated by Fairclough (1989) and Misaddi (2007) and indeed many other CDA scholars, starts from discourse, and emancipation from such enslavement starts from the critical analysis of such discourse. Hence, Arabs or the Palestinian negotiator in particular has to recognise the extent to which social and political change or continuity is the result of linguistic representation or discursive practices. In his seminal book: Politics and the Authority of Language, written in Arabic, Misaddi (2007) observes:

It will not benefit Arabs [or any one for this matter] greatly to possess the weapon of wealth, nor will it help them to be the sole producer of oil or make use of the nuclear energy peacefully unless they possess the weapon of discourse. Arabs will not make a political victory in the international arena unless they master the construction of discourse, excel in its deconstruction, and gain mastery over its subtleties (116).

Indeed, unlike Arabs - as Chapter 5 finds out - Zionists have not failed to make utmost use of logos; they speak to the world in spiel so ciceronian, and in a manner so glib, and in English almost flawless. They have mastered manufacturing discourse, and made use of the discourse industry to their interests. Calling the 1948 “ethnic cleansing” or “forcible removal” (Pappe, 2006) or “uprootedness” (Barakat and Dodd, 1968) or “forced exile” (Omran, 1966) - what Palestinians until today call the “Nakba” - as the “War of Independence,” or “voluntary exodus” - as noted at the beginning of this chapter - for example, is one example; is a case in point (for further examples of Zionist or Israeli expedient lexicalisation or manipulation of terms with which Israelispeak or the “Zionist mythology” abounds, refer to Section 1.3 of Chapter 1, and Chapter 5 for a CDA of discourses that have been orchestrated, in ad hoc workshops of discourse to sustain the status quo). So, in terms of linguistic felicity, ingenuity and manoeuvrability, the kind of language used by the Arab negotiator seems less effective than the language employed by their Israeli counterparts who have perfected the discourse of peace, far less effective in terms of representation and persuasion, let alone any aptitude for whitewash, discursive maquillage and the virtuoso manipulation of either facts or lies, perfected by Zionists.

93 This is an assumption that underlies being unaware of the material and dialectical relationship between discourse and society; of the power of logos in institutional and societal change; of the role of discourse in the reproduction or transformation of the status quo – a goal to which this study contributes. Indeed, the assumption that Arabs and Muslims have largely failed to articulate their sufferings at the discourse level is a major reason why they are still suffering. Unlike the progenitor of political Zionism and in effect ‘Israel’ when he articulated Jewish sufferings and established their question as a world question in his 1896 discourse of The Jewish State, Arabs and Muslims have failed to be as effective. Of course, this must not be taken as diminishing the role and interests of British government or “exploitative British colonialism” with “expansionist Zionism” and the Jewish Agency - as explained in this chapter - in bringing about the Zionist enterprise into existence, and the current role of the US in ensuring the perpetuation of the current status quo or the military supremacy of Israel in the region. On the contrary, this should be taken to enforce my argument that discourse is a powerful tool used by those conscious of such power to dominate those unaware of such power (see Subsection 2.3.4: “McMahon’s Deception: The Roots of Arab Bitterness”). Now, this account ought to stimulate the dominated or manipulated to realise some of their points of weakness and some of the causes behind the perpetuation of the status quo or this bitter reality, and then set out to improve them accordingly as this is a central cause in the ongoing exacerbation of the Palestinian reality. This has after all been a major drive behind this study:

No one can master politics unless they master the game of language; and we should not grow tired of reiterating that it will not avail Arabs [or any one for this matter as noted earlier] to have wealth, glory and great numbers; unless, in an age of ‘political spin and soundbites,’ they become distingué in the strategies of discourse (Misaddi, 2007:168).

2.5.10 Injustice vs Intifadas

All those events, complexities and facts resulting from the build-up of all those intertwined past and present causes - the 1948 mass expulsion of Palestinians; Israeli occupation of the remnant of Palestine in 1967; discrimination against its own Palestinian citizenry and those in the territories; Israelispeak and Israeli media; Israeli

94 antipeace politics; violations of international law; politics of expansion or ongoing construction of massive Jewish population centres in the territories; continued oppression and policies of realpolitik; dictatorial politics of the Arab world; inexperience of Arabs of the power of logos and pitfalls orchestrated in discourse; along with the mutuality of interests of certain past and present superpowers with those Israeli encroachments - had galvanised the Palestinians in the territories to rise up “in December 1978 against the occupation in a basically non-violent civil revolt, the intifada” (Finkelstein, 2003: xix), and to another intifada in 2000, as a corollary of the continuation of such encroachments, of the continuation of the occupation. Landmark events, those popular uprisings were in particular reactions to the iniquities of the Israeli system of apartheid practised against the Palestinians, ongoing Israeli occupation. They were expressions of pent-up frustration and fury; reactions that stress the reflection that “a riot is at bottom the language of the unheard”. Indeed, in Chapter 1, I stated that this is a study on the dispossessed and occupied Palestinians whose eagerness to find a solution to their dispossession and sufferings makes them inclined to accept even unjust solutions; and a study on the occupying Israelis whose penchant to temporise and create more obstacles, in an attempt to create “facts on the ground” makes them ready to reject even just solutions. Hence are the words of the Jewish Haaretz Journalist, Amira Hass as cited in Finkelstein (2003: xxii):

the Palestinians would accept a situation of coexistence in which they were on an unequal footing vis-à-vis the Israelis and in which they were ranked as persons who were entitled to less, much less, than the Jews. However, in the end the Palestinians were not willing to live with this arrangement. The new intifada [...] is a final attempt to thrust a mirror in the face of Israelis and to tell them: ‘Take a good look at yourselves and see how racist you have become’.

2.6 THE PALESTINE QUESTION: IS THERE A WAY OUT?

Individually and collectively, the formative events and factors contributing to the Zionist annexation of Palestine and the resultant homelessness and sufferings of the Palestinians, along with those exacerbating the Palestine Question, have all made the Palestinians feel to have been stuck in a time warp where the past 1948 Nakba

95 or “ethnic cleansing of Palestine,” the 1967 Naksa or Israeli occupation of the rest of Palestine, and present or continued attempts at the elimination of the rest 20% of those natives remaining, despite..., in Palestine, seem to be infinite, thus making the Palestinian people share what a Haaretz writer, as cited in Finkelstein (2003: xx) has recently lamented:

Where is the public outcry against this attempt to divide the territories and enforce internal passports [... and] humiliate and inconvenience a population that can scarcelyearnalivingorlivealifeasit is?

Ironically, “all this takes place at a time when the whole world is drawling about” (Ismail, 2009: 5) “the sanctity of human life,” “human rights,” “animal rights” and ‘gay rights’ and ‘gay liberation’. Nevertheless, it ignores blissfully and insouciantly, the ongoing slaughter, diaspora and sufferings of the Palestinians. As hard to believe as it is for what ‘Israel’ commits does defy belief or logic. Still, this is a fragment of the appalling reality of the embattled and beleaguered Palestinians: whether those rendered homeless 64 years ago and who are still languishing in diaspora under grim conditions, or those - facing with stones the juggernaut of the Israeli war machine - in the remaining 22% territories of Palestine occupied since 1967, or those forming part of the citizenry of ‘Israel’ since its formation in 1948 on 78% of the territory of former Palestine. As the Chapter is coming to an end, though the Palestine Question - as a corollary of the systematic encroachments on and transformations of the physical and “human geography” of Palestine, and the ongoing Israeli disregard for The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), the Fourth Geneva Convention (1949), and the International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination (1965), along with the “American tolerance of Israeli intransigence,” and this ‘blissful’ international indifference to such violations - has not yet come to an end, I wonder and ask: when will the Palestinian people - those “reluctant warriors,” “victims of discursive injustice,” of Zionism and racism, “veterans of creative suffering,” those defenceless underdogs - be able “to join hands” with other free citizens of the world and “hew out of the mountain of despair a stone of hope”?

96 CHAPTER THREE REVIEW OF LITERATURE

3.1 OVERVIEW

How do we recognize the shackles that tradition has placed upon us? For if we can recognize them, we are also able to break them. (Franz Boas; quoted in Fairclough, 2001a: 1)

IN outline, this chapter reviews works dealing with the relationship between language and power or the material and dialectical relationship between discourse and social structures. It explores the ideological use of lexical items. The chapter thus first discusses the multifaceted functions of language beyond traditional communication, stressing the notion of the “multifunctionality of language in texts,” and the role language plays in perception, in positioning and representation, in the construction or distortion of reality and our conceptualisation of it, etc. It explores the dialectics and interplay between the authority of language and politics, between discourse and the (re) production of domination, discourse and socio-political change; and the role discourse plays in the social mystification of events, (de)legitimation of others, in the stabilisation or perpetuation of inequalities and injustices, etc. The chapter also reviews in details the concepts of discourse, Discourse Analysis, and Critical Discourse Analysis in their relation to domination and emancipation. Next, the chapter, in an attempt to map the literary history of the most debated overtures of peace aimed at the resolution of the Palestinian struggle, gives an overview of the proposals debated for an end to this protracted problem; and closes with the review of some related research works. Going into more detail, I wish to state that in Chapter 1 and in line with the theoretical objective of this study, I attempted to stress the need for what Fairclough called critical language awareness (1995; 2001a). In doing so, I tried to adumbrate the central role language plays in enacting and sustaining domination, in constructing the political event; in altering people’s perceptions; in manufacturing ideology and consequently consent and domination. I attempted to draw attention to the indirect interrelation of language and power (Fairclough, 2001a); of the interplay between “politics and the authority of language;” of the ideological relationship between singularity of the political event and plurality of its discursive versions (Misaddi, 2007); of the nexus between “language and

97 sociocultural change;” language and “social-institutional practices;” language and “social and political structures” (Fairclough, 1995), language and “societal disparities and inequalities” (Wodak and Meyer, 2009: 32). I drew attention to “the apparent determinism of the relationship between the macro and the micro” (Fairclough, 1995: preface) or the reciprocal influence between discourse and social structure (Titscher, Meyer, Wodak & Vetter, 2000) discourse and the acquisition of power and “exclusion and subordination” or the perpetuation of such states of affairs on the one hand, and CDA and emancipation from such states on the other (Fairclough, 2001a). I attempted to sensitise readers to some of the linguistic properties deployed by the Israeli political cabal to influence perception to induce certain interpretations and mystify social events and thus maintain “unequal relations of power”. I attempted to project the assumption that the “angles of telling” discourse orchestrators adopt through the nominations (discursive construction of social actors) and predications (discursive qualification of social actors) they select or sculpt are meticulously calculated to serve particular cognitive and ideological purposes. In this chapter, I endeavour through the review of certain seminal works pertaining to language and its centrality to power relations and human existence, to further highlight such dialectical or two-way relationship between linguistic and social structure (Kress and Hodge, 1979), concomitance between the political and literary crafts, and dialectics between the discursive and political event (Misaddi, 2007) or “linguistic and social structure” (Kress and Hodge, 1979). I highlight the role language plays in constructing the political event and hence our reactions; the role language plays in twisting the political event, and vice versa. I highlight the concept of interdiscursivity or the discursive event in its veiled relation to other discursive events drawn from the collective political memory. I highlight the role language or discourse plays in the construction, continuity or transformation of reality (Montgomery et al., 1992); in the “constitution of identities, relationships and knowledge” (Halliday, 1978, 2004; Fairclough, 1995, 2001a; Titscher et al., 2000: 149); in the “mystification of social events” (Wodak and Meyer, 2009: 7); in the stabilisation of inequalities and injustices (2009); in the management of the mind (Van Dijk, 1993); in the perpetuation of a certain reality (Fairclough, 2001a); in othering (Said, 1978); in (de)legitimation (Amer, 2009); in positioning; in constructing the operational names of wars and their implications (Misaddi, 2007). I look into the mechanics of discourse and domination (Fairclough, 2001a), of discourse and the reproduction of social structures; and emphasise the fundamental notions of discourse as “a form of social

98 practice,” of the “multifunctionality of language,” of the assumption that “language is both socially constitutive and socially determined” (Fairclough, 1995; quoted in Titscher et al., 2000: 148-149); the notions or assumptions upon which the whole area of CDA is predicated and with which it is concerned and to which CDA scholars are and should always, as stated by Van Dijk (2008) remain committed. In light of such notions and interconnection between human speech and human reason, I further highlight here the instrumental role language plays as a vehicle, not only in the transmission and reception of a certain knowledge or the reflection and description of reality but also as a means central to the construction of this reality (Montgomery et al., 1992) and our perception of it, and the angle we adopt in our interpretation of it; I highlight the role of language as a means central to the establishment and maintenance of ideologies and hence the perpetuation of the status quo; a means central to social control and domination, to normalisation and naturalisation (Fairclough, 2001a; Thomas et al., 2004), to persuasion (Cook, 2003), to manipulation and mystification (O’Halloran, 2003; Wodak and Meyer, 2009), to “abstraction and euphemism” (Cohn, 1987), to desensitisation and deadening (Misaddi, 2007), to “power and power abuse,” (Van Dijk, 2008), to legitimation or delegitimation (Amer, 2009), etc. Here I stress the problem-oriented, eclectic and interdisciplinary, critical and hermeneutic, transforming or emancipatory and linguistic character and orientation of CDA, characteristics that, according to Wodak and Meyer (2009: 2) set it apart from other approaches to Discourse Studies such as Discourse Analysis. I lay great emphasis on the transforming or emancipatory role CDA plays in demystifying Israelispeak, in detecting and unearthing the discourse strategies and linguistic means used to justify, legitimate, delegitimate, stabilise, intensify, perpetuate, etc. a certain state of affairs. I highlight the democratic role CDA plays in enlightenment and emancipation, or as Misaddi (2007) - in his seminal book: Politics and the Authority of Language, crafted in Arabic - puts it: “the emancipation of a people from the oppression of politics,” which “starts with the critical analysis and exposition of the linguistic manipulations or manoeuvres of politicians” (p. 357). As stated in Chapter 1, such critical analysis can sensitise readers’ awareness and thus make them “more able to resist manipulation” (Cook, 2003: 122; Fairclough, 2001a). It helps uncover newspeak or those linguistic manipulations of politicians, and thus “empower those who are being manipulated” (Cook, 2003: 62) to discursively resist such manipulation to free themselves from the domination or

99 abuse of the dominant bloc, and the oppression of what I called in Chapter 1the political cabal. Next, the chapter provides a concise review of the prominent proposals, presented for an end to the Israeli occupation, through the construction of a certain modus vivendi, and closes with a review of related research works. Therefore, this chapter can be thought of as made of two conceptual parts; while the first is devoted to the elaboration and review of certain cornerstones or works in the fields of discourse and CDA and their relation to domination and control and enlightenment and emancipation, respectively, the second - an extension of Chapter Two - provides an outline of the major patterns of settlement proposed for ending “decades of confrontation and conflict” through the ‘establishment’ of a Palestinian state as a solution to the protracted Arab-Israeli entanglement. In dealing with the first part, the chapter focuses primarily on the first prime objective of this study: demonstrating and hence sensitising readers’ awareness of the reproductive function of language or discourse, the role discourse plays in constructing reality and reproducing the status quo on the one hand; and helping increase readers’ consciousness of the transforming function of discourse, the role the critical studies of discourse play in emancipation or social change on the other. In brief, this chapter reviews literature on the three main conceptual features, referred to in Chapter 1 as the tripartite structure of study: Discourse, CDA, and the Palestine Question.

3.2 LANGUAGE BEYOND COMMUNICATION: AN OVERVIEW

Physically, human beings are generally among the weakest of animals. In terms of strength or celerity or agility, for example, humans, when compared with many other creatures in the kingdom of animals or birds or even insects, pale into insignificance. Despite such fact, the human being has conquered, not only the planet Earth and tamed and harnessed the forces and resources of nature to their needs, but also gone into other spatial and temporal dimensions as to conquer and yield malleable other Worlds. Homo sapiens have been able to do this and far more, primarily through one extraordinary and unique human-specific faculty: beyan. According to Harris and Taylor (1989: 177), “Many philosophers had agreed that without language (beyan) human reason would be deprived of its principal instrument of expression,” thus making this faculty central to the essence of man. Indeed, as Harris and Taylor

100 (1989: xi) proclaim, it is “the power of logos,” the characteristic that is, not only “distinguishing man from beast” (1989: 126) but also empowering man over beast that sets apart the human being as unique and powerful. What Ferdinand de Saussure (1857-1913) called in his theory of the linguistic sign: langue, the Greek word logos - translated into English as ‘speech’ (“word, reason”) or the Arabic word beyan, translated as ‘speech and articulate thought’ (Mohd Asad) or ‘speech and Intelligence,’ according to Abdullah Yusuf Ali (2007) - designates “not merely the capacity for articulate discourse but the [inseparable] rational faculty underlying and informing the spoken word in all its forms” (Harris and Taylor, 1989: xi). Hence, what logos or beyan and Saussure’s notion of langue have in common, according to Harris and Taylor (1989: 177) “is the idea of a single organizational structure which accounts simultaneously for both human speech and human reason”. They account for the inseparability of thought and sound or sound and thought as stressed by Saussure in his 1916 posthumously published Cours de Linguistique Générale, thus setting apart the human being as unique. This intrinsic interrelation of human speech and human reason, of language and the mind or brain, of language and perception, of thought and articulation, of the human being and beyan, this “intrinsic inseparability of the phonetic and conceptual facets of language” (Saussure, 1916; cited in Harris and Taylor, 1989: 177), of the signifier (sound sequence or label) and signified (meaning or concept) as termed and stressed by Saussure (1989) (Thomas et al., 2004), is what makes language come into a unique position of power and influence and what makes man, as noted, unique. So without language, not only do humans cease to be humans in the sense of being articulate, rational and intelligent, but also become possibly the most vulnerable among the Sustainer’s diverse creations. So, it is beyan, logos, this capacity for articulate discourse and thought, speaking and thinking which, in the words of Harris and Taylor (1989: xi), “distinguishes humanity from all other living species, and it is logos which provides the basis for the Classical definition of the human being as the ‘rational animal’”. It is clear, therefore, that it is language, this miraculous or God-given faculty of beyan that has distinguished man, making him a unique creation, a human being. It is this that has thus made man articulate, and thus rational, intelligent and accountable; a thesis that makes language to precede thinking or determine it; the (relativist) notion that the structure of language determines the structure of thought; or to use Badi and Tajdin’s (2005: 193) words: “I Speak, Therefore I

101 Think,” with its obvious allusion to Descartes’ Latinate formula: “cogito ergo sum”: I think, therefore I am. Hence, according to Saussure, who viewed sound and thought or thought and sound as inseparable, languages are “the instruments which enable human beings to achieve a rational comprehension of the world in which they live” (Harris and Taylor, 1989: 177). Therefore, “instead of seeing words as mere adjuncts to our grasp of reality, Saussure saw our understanding of reality as depending essentially upon our social use of the verbal signs which constitute the language we use” (1989: 177). So it is because we speak that we think. Hence is the view that language constitutes reality; that our perception, conception and comprehension of reality are dependent on language; that our understanding of what exists around us is language-dependent; that our “composition, decomposition and recomposition of thoughts and ideas” as noted by Condillac (Harris and Taylor, 1989) are dependent on language; that “thought is dependent on words” (Orwell, 1949/2008). In other words, if language does not exist, what we perceive as a laptop or table, for instance, will not exist; it is through logos that they have been conceived; it is through what we call language that a laptop has become or come to be known as a laptop, and a table, a table, etc. Similarly, the manufacture of events and the development of social and professional positions are largely constructed and made possible through language. Thus, not only does language reflect one’s subject position, as qualified and constrained by a certain discourse type, e.g. medical discourse, but also construct it. In other words, there is no way a doctor or a professional in any field can become so without the constructing medium of language. Thus a subject who has become a doctor, for example, has become so because of being trained through language in the discourse type responsible for the constraint and hence qualification of that subject in that field, the medical field (Fairclough, 2001a), a fact that goes beyond the traditional conception of language as a mere means of communication. Thus again, in the words of the founder of structuralism, “words are not peripheral but, on the contrary, central to human life (Harris and Taylor, 1989: 177). “Human existence,” according to Saussure, “is by definition, a linguistically articulated existence”. It is all about language! Many of our daily activities and “professional practices” are, as suggested by Christopher Candlin in his preface to Fairclough’s 1995 publication: Critical Discourse Analysis, “most obviously languaged”. “We manage our affairs by use of language. We use it to construct a social reality to suit our needs” (Widdowson,

102 1992: 75). Indeed, as put by Cook (2003: 3), “Language is at the heart of human life”. “Without it,” he continues:

most of our activities are inconceivable. Try to imagine relating to your family, making friends, learning, falling in love, forming a relationship, being a parent [...], having political ideals, or taking political action, without using words.

An instrument central to human existence and coexistence, thus, language or more accurately beyan is what makes human beings when compared with all other living organisms or creations, powerful, unique, and accountable. It is what, as can be gathered from the works of such scholars, makes the rational animal, rational or man, man. As such a fact or connection might not be lucid to ordinary people given the notion that language is conceived of as merely a means of communication, and not the essence of their humanity, rationality and thus singularity and accountability, I set out in this section of the chapter to look into some purposes and aspects of language uses, purposes and aspects or functions other than those of mere communication and social interaction. I look in particular into those functions of language where the tussle in power relations and social change is the focus. My aim from this is to clarify, in relation to or through a review of literature, such connection and the notion of the “multifunctionality of language” and its centrality to power creation and power perpetuation (discourse or the reproductive function of language)on the one hand, and enlightenment and emancipation from such domination (CDA or the transforming function of language) on the other hand. Hence, it is this focus or these two functions of language use in particular that are the primary concern of this chapter and one of the two main objectives of the study as a whole; an aspect of language use that makes us view language as a hegemonic, mind-taming, mind-shaping tool rather than a neutral means of communication; a tool for wielding influence; and a tool for political emancipation rather than mere chatting, and hence the title of this section: Language beyond Communication. Thus, away from language as a tool of mere or neutral communication, let us now explore some of the functions besides or beyond mere communication; and hence look into the roles/functions language - through the various discourses that make up identities, relationships and “bodies of knowledge” (Halliday,

103 1978; 2004; Fairclough, 1995; 2001; Titscher et al., 2000) that in turn constitute “sets of practices,” and through the various “societal meaning-making systems” or the ideological apparatuses of the state - plays in the dynamics of power.

3.2.1 Language: Multifunctionality and Centrality

According to Thomas, Wareing, Singh, Peccei, Thornborrow and Jones, (2004: 6), “There are several different ways of thinking about language; which way you think about it depends on which aspect of language you are interested in”. Thus, language can be approached from a Structuralist perspective or a Functionalist perspective, as a meaning potential; or can be thought of a system for the conveyance of social and personal needs, or in terms of diversity and variation, or the different pragmatic functions carried out through various linguistic structures, or in terms of competence and performance, or as a means of dominance and hegemony, or enlightenment and emancipation, etc. Put differently, language can be viewed or studied from many different angles. This is an aspect about language that corroborates the assumption that language mediates human life in all its aspects and complexities; making it possible for us to carry out a wide array of various instrumental functions we need to carry for us to live and function in a given community or society (for an exposition of some of those functions, see Halliday, 1973 and 1975). Drawing on Roman Jakobson’s (1896-1982) work on the six basic functions of language, Thomas and associates (2004) observe that “In the course of a day you will probably use language referentially, affectively, aesthetically and phatically” (p. 8). The other two functions are the “conative” and “metalingual” as expounded by Jakobson. Out of these six functions, it is only the referential that is concerned with the transmission of information; and though the transmission of information is associated with power and is hence significant, it is the other purposes behind communication that I focus on in this work: communication, not in the traditional sense of language being an innocuous or neutral means for the transmission of information but rather, as observed by Thomas and associates (2004: xviii), “a channel for how we see and construct the world around us,” a means of shaping thoughts and affecting perception, “a way of behaving and making others behave” (Firth, quoted by Brown, 2000, 250), a means of naturalising us into accepting certain ideas […] (2004), a tool for positioning and representation, for defending the indefensible, for the exercise of power, or as aptly put

104 by Habermas (1967: 259) “a medium of domination and social force” (quoted in Wodak and Meyer, 2009: 10). In other words, my focus here, as noted, is on the reproductive and transforming functions of language; those concerned with the reproduction or perpetuation of domination, and those concerned with transformation and social change; functions that again, as stressed, go beyond the traditional role of language as a means for the exchange of information, at least in that simplistic sense. Thus “utterances,” as observed by Bourdieu (1991; quoted in Jaworski and Coupland, 1999):

are not only (save in exceptional circumstances) signs to be understood and deciphered; they are also signs of wealth, intended to be evaluated and appreciated, and signs of authority, intended to be believed and obeyed” (emphasis in original) (502).

Therefore, Bourdieu comes to the conclusion that “Quite apart from the literary (and especially poetic) uses of language, it is rare in everyday life for language to function as a pure instrument of communication” (Jaworski and Coupland, 1999). Hence, not in being a medium for communication per se does the power of language lie, but rather in its being a shaper of realities and perception and a tool for the exercise of power and social control, hegemony and dominance, and the perpetuation of such realities or their transformation. Thus, far from being a wide gulf as some may think, particularly those who view language as a mere or neutral medium of communication, there is the closest of links between language and power, language and politics (Misaddi, 2007), and language and domination (Fairclough, 2001a). There is such interrelation between linguistic representations and political realities. Hence, according to Halliday (1975), language is a modality not only for the transmission of culture, but also the construction of reality; it is a means of “construing experience and enacting interpersonal relations” (Halliday and Matthiessen, 2004: 30); a means of enacting and defining social relations and ‘social roles’ (see Subsection 3.2.2) or what Fairclough (2001a: 31) calls subject positions such as doctors, teachers, engineers, architects, actors, scientists, practitioners, sexologists, lawyers, etc. It is a means of creating agents of action and affected entities; of celebrity or the making of celebrity (Misaddi, 2007); a means of positioning and representation; of perpetuating “unequal relations of power;” of (de)legitimation of actors and events, including self-

105 legitimation (Amer, 2009); of exposition or concealment; of the mystification or demystification of social events (Wodak and Meyer, 2009: 7); of deadening; of the stabilisation or intensification of inequalities and injustices (Wodak and Meyer, 2009), of “Othering” or the construction of the “Other” where the other is being always denied agency and often made to occupy powerless object positions (Said, 1978); of “the production, maintenance, and change” of power relations in society, of the construction of the political event; of supranational or cross-national détente; of peace or war; indeed, of a whole battery of functions. Hence, as noted, away from its being a medium of communication, the centrality of language to the very essence of human life and existence, from the moment of birth to the throes of death, is “something one cannot afford to neglect” (Amer, 2009: 26). The centrality of language to human affairs is indeed pervasive or we can state it the other way round that the pervasiveness of language in human affairs is central. Hence, language, according to Misaddi (2007) is central to positioning and responsibility; and according to Simpson (1993) to the adoption or projection and communication of a certain attitude or position, and the change of existing ones. It is, as observed by Misaddi (2007) central to the encapsulation of the past and present, to the undertaking of a certain promise with history, to the ciphered reduction of politics and history, and to the change of the course of history. Misaddi (2007) further notes that language is also central to warmongering or pacification; to the construction of operational names of wars (see Subsection 3.2.10) that cause certain connotations to reverberate or illusively bespeak some calculated political implications; it is thus a means for mystification and manipulation. A “loaded weapon,” a tool instrumental in power acquisition and power relations, language according to Thomas and associates (2004), is central to the manufacture of ideology, consent and domination. It is, as observed by Van Dijk (1993; quoted in Titscher et al., 2000) central to management of the mind, and, as al Ghathami (2004) states, the control of cognition and the elicitation of its responses. Furthermore, language, in the words of Thomas and associates (2004: 170) is often central to one’s “sense of cultural identity”. They note that it is central to the construction and preservation of personal or individual, and group/social or ethnic identity; central also it is to the accentuation of the “‘alien’ identity of ethnic minorities” (p. 110). More specifically, they observe that “the construction of personal

106 identities” takes place through “the use of names and systems of address,” and “the construction of group identity” takes place through “types of representation and adherence to linguistic norms” (p. 172). Now, as the sole means to do this, i.e. naming and representing, is language, then again we can see how central language is to the construction of our identities and thus who we are, “and where we belong and why, and how we relate to those around us” (Joseph, 2013: 55). Language, as noted by Thomas and associates (2004) is also central to “creating social distance or intimacy,” to “marking deference [...] or insult,” etc. (p. 164). The centrality of language, according to them, can also be seen in its role in making a certain member a core or peripheral member of the membership of a particular group, as well as their position within it. Thomas and associates (2004) also note that language is also the means to carry out style-shifting or audience design as termed by Bell (1984) or simply register: the linguistic convergence or linguistic divergence made by speakers to either “fit more closely with those of the person they happen to be talking to” in order to “show solidarity and approval in their dealings” or to “emphasise the difference between themselves and the person or people they are talking to” (p. 169). So whether a speaker chooses, for whatever reason, to converge (linguistic convergence) with or diverge (linguistic divergence) from the linguistic norms of a certain group, variety or register and hence display either solidarity or distance is language-dependent. Central is also language, as noted by Misaddi (2007), to the construction of deflection or diversion of attention, collective unconsciousness and desensitisation, doping and the deadening of the senses (see infra Subsection 3.2.5). Therefore, the linguistic sign or linguistic representation can be used, as maintained by various language scholars and CDA researchers such as Cohn (1987); Montgomery and associates (1992); Simpson (1993); Titscher and associates (2000); Fairclough (2001; 2009); Cook (2003); O’Halloran (2003); al Ghathami (2004); Thomas and associates (2004); Misaddi (2007); Van Dijk (2008; 2009); Amer (2009); Wodak and Meyer (2009); Reisigl and Wodak (2009), etc., to influence and control cognition; to manage the mind and determine or at least shape thought, to affect perception and deflect attention, to mystify events, to manipulate us into mechanically doing things we would not, if said the normal way, do, to deaden the senses, to “foreground or [...] obscure responsibility and agency,” to “make notions which are in fact debatable seem like ‘givens’” or to make “questionable ideas or issues more palatable

107 and ‘normal’” or in the words of Orwell (1949): “to make lies sound truthful and murder respectable, and to give an appearance of solidity to pure wind” (cited in Sant, 2008: 35). So, language can be employed, in connection with political events, by “power-holders” (Fairclough, 2001a) and “powerful social actors” (Amer, 2009) or more generally those conscious of its power to either dispose the target audience towards a particular interpretation and angle of view or, according to Misaddi (2007), keep their minds wandering without being able to delve into the deep recesses of orchestrated hidden meanings where different shades of implications are being reflected against the subtlety of phraseology, thus making it difficult to arrive at a reliable interpretation, and hence creating diversion. Therefore, the traditional conception of language as a means of communication or the “telementational conveyance of ideas” (Harris and Taylor, 1989: 114) to use Lockean terms, fails to capture the multiple functions and hegemonic roles language can be brutalised to play. Indeed, far beyond communication or the mere transmission of messages, language can be effectively employed in politics and other fields to construct reality, to make us ideate the world in a particular way, to produce and maintain “hegemonic relations or unequal relations of power,” to enact, conceal, legitimate and reproduce “power, dominance, hegemony, [and] inequality” (Van Dijk, 1993; quoted in Titscher et al., 2000: 147), “to identify potential allies and enemies” (Joseph, 2013: 56), to affect perception, to position and represent, and to empower man over other beings on the one hand, and one man over another on the other. Thus, besides its being a means of communication, a vehicle for “telementation” or “the conveyance of ideas from the mind of one individual to that of another (Harris and Taylor, 1989: 110), a role which might be deemed secondary given what the language or its use in certain ways can effect beyond such role, language is “socially constitutive;” it is a medium of domination and control where the status quo is being reproduced, hence the reproductive function, or social change and emancipation, hence the transforming function, an assumption about language which makes it, in the words of Fairclough (Titscher et al., 2000: 149) “doubly constitutive;” constitutive in a “conventional” sense, i.e. maintenance of the status quo, and constitutive in a “creative” sense, i.e. social change (2000). So language can be employed to either reproduce or resist power abuse and domination. This is a long with a host of other related functions, which as noted above makes it “rare in everyday life for language to function as a pure instrument of communication” (Bourdieu, 1991; quoted in Jaworski and Coupland, 1999: 502).

108 3.2.2 Language: Metafunctions

For Halliday, language - as a socio-semiotic system, what he calls a social semiotic (1978) – involves and serves three generalized overarching functions, what he calls the metafunctions:

1. ideational – to represent people, objects, events, and states of affairs in the world 2. interpersonal – to express the speaker’s attitude to these representations 3. textual – to array [or weave together]1. and 2. in a cohesive and appropriate manner. (O’Halloran, 2003: 16)

Through the [Hallidayan] notion of the multifunctionality of language in texts, Fairclough operationalizes the theoretical assumption that texts and discourses are socially constitutive: ‘Language use is always simultaneously constitutive of (i) social identities, (ii) social relations and (iii) systems of knowledge and beliefs’ (Fairclough 1993: 134). The ideational function of language constitutes systems of knowledge; the interpersonal function creates social subjects or identities or the relationships between them. That implies that every text contributes -albeit in a small way - to the constitution of these three aspects of society and culture […]. (Titscher et al., 2000: 149)

In his attempt to expound a theory of language and learning, and more specifically, of language functions, Michael Halliday in the 1970s introduced the concept of metafunctions; the notion that language as conceived by Halliday (1978; 1985; 2004) is multifunctional, that each text has simultaneously a number of functions to play. Thus, “Halliday, following Malinowski’s argument that language is a mode of behaviour, writes that there is no such thing as a “purely” grammatical element”. The assump tion is that language leads to certain behaviour, to act in a particular manner. It is behavioural. It is functional. It is actional. Halliday’s success in his tripartite systemic functional model of language lies in his delineation of this functional nature of language; of his view of grammar “as functionally organized, where ‘function’ is understood as a reply to the general question ‘why is language as it is?’” (Titscher et al., 2000: 170). He has changed or replaced “the

109 traditional grammatical classifications and the constituent elements of clauses which we identify” with:

systemic functional categories which realise or achieve one of the three macro-functions of language. The functional terminology is significant because it makes explicit the behavioural, functional, origins of grammar. ( (accessed 24 February 2010)).

Halliday (1978/1994/2004) perceived language as a means (i) to represent experience and represent the world, (ii) to enact social relations and “produce social interactions between participants in discourse,” and (iii) to relate that to the world through the text or discourse,” hence the “notion of the multifunctionality of language in texts,” which forms the basis for Fairclough’s Dialectical-Relational Approach (DRA) to Critical Discourse Analysis (Titscher et al., 2000: 148- 149). Within the context of his view of language as multifunctional, Halliday looks at the major functions of language, this “meaning potential,” from three broad all-inclusive angles, hence the three metafunctions: the ideational, interpersonal, and textual. So every text or discursive event or “instance of language use” has simultaneously an ideational function, an interpersonal function, and a textual function, where experience is being represented and the world constructed, social relations enacted and social interactions with other people are made possible, and where all this is made coherent and related to the world through the text (Fairclough, 1993: 138; 1995: 6; quoted in Titscher et al., 2000: 148- 149). Drawing on this Hallidayan notion of the “multifunctionality of language in texts,” Fairclough (1995) observes:

Texts are social spaces in which two fundamental social processes simultaneously occur: cognition and representation of the world, and social interaction. A multifunctional view of text is therefore essential. I have followed systemic linguistics (Halliday 1978) in assuming that language in texts always simultaneously functions ideationally in the representation of experience and the world, interpersonally in constituting social interaction between participants in discourse, and textually in tying parts of a text together into a coherent whole (a text, precisely) and tying texts to situational contexts (e.g. through situational deixis). This multifunctionality of

110 language in texts can be used to operationalize theoretical claims about the socially constitutive properties of discourse and text [...] (6).

According to Bloor and Bloor (1995), the three Hallidayan metafunctions represent the ways human beings utilise language to bring about a number of functions that are enacted by and associated with language. In their work: The Functional Analysis of English, Bloor and Bloor (1995) give a précis of the functions each Hallidayan metafunction plays as follows:

1. Language is used to organize, understand and express our perceptions of the world and of our own consciousness. This function is known as the ideational function. The ideational function can be classified into two subfunctions: the experential and the logical. The experiential function is largely concerned with content or ideas. The logical function is concerned with the relationship between ideas. 2. Language is used to enable us to participate in communicative acts with other people, to take on roles and to express and understand feelings, attitude and judgements. This function is known as the interpersonal function. 3. Language is used to relate what is said (or written) to the real world and to other linguistic events. This involves the use of language to organize the text itself. This is known as the textual function (9).

So while the ideational metafunction is concerned with how we ideate the world and with what it is we want to talk about, the interpersonal metafunction is concerned with how we interact, and the textual metafunction is concerned with how we organise what we want to talk about: our message, in the form of text. Halliday also introduced the concepts of field, tenor and mode. According to Chakorn (n.d.):

Halliday successfully [re] introduces the concept of context of situation. He states that context is originally associated with register in terms of the three dimensions: Field, Tenor, and Mode, which together construe the context of situation in texts (4).

111 Field (topic or the subject matter), tenor (role of the speakers, their tone and level of formality) and mode (“form of textualization” (from Fairclough, 1995: 14) or medium of communication) are three proposed determinants or factors of variation in texts or registers. In other words, field, tenor and mode can help us distinguish a register or probably genre from another. Now, within the context of situation, the ideational metafunction is concerned with field or topic or content of the text; the interpersonal metafunction is concerned with tenor or the relationship between the speaker and listener or writer and reader, and the textual metafunction is concerned with the communicative mode or “form of textualization” or medium of communication, i.e. whether speech or writing, etc. The metafunctions have been contributory and instrumental in many other works across language studies including CDA as suggested. The beauty or contribution of Halliday’s functional model, as I see it, is that, unlike traditional grammar labelling, they have made us conceive of language as functional and defined broadly those higher functions enacted by and through language, and provided us with a descriptive framework. As Chakorn (n.d.: 2-3) alludes, they have shown us “the functional relationship between language and other social aspects especially the social character of texts”. They have helped us see how texts are structured and why they are structured in the ways they are. For example, when we talk about “the representational meaning” or the ideational metafunction, which deals with field or the content of the text, and which is realised by “transitivity structures” (Halliday et al., 2004: 309), or by choices of process, participants, and circumstances, we know we are talking about register variation. When we talk about “the interactional meaning” or the interpersonal metafunction, which deals with tenor or the relationship between the speaker/writer and listener/reader, and which is realised by “mood structures,” or the mood system of English, and modalisation with its two aspects: modality and modulation, we know we are talking about language and society, the interaction between language producers and the audience, and the “communication roles chosen”. When we talk about “the organization of the message” or the textual metafunction, which deals with mode, or how the text is organised, and which is realised through “theme structures” (2004: 309), or theme and rheme, and given and new, we know we are talking about the different media of expression within a language, i.e. written and spoken. The metafunctions have shown us that the lexicogrammatical features of a clause or discourse are instrumental in conceptualising

112 reality in particular ways. Therefore, analysing language in light of the metafunctions can provide us with insights about the role each participant plays in constructing reality and our perception of it; and about who is being represented as powerful and who as powerless, who is being an agent/actor, and who is being represented as the affected/patient/goal. Analysing a text ideationally through a breakdown of the transitivity structures can thus reveal the agents of action and the affecteds (Montgomery et al., 1992) as mediated by language. Hence, as noted, experiential analysis of “transitivity selections” (Amer, 2009) or “transitivity analysis of clause structure” will enable us to “identify who plays an important role in a particular clause and who receives the consequences of the former’s actions” (Shakila, 2007: 8). It can reveal to us “who (or what) does what to whom (or what)” (Montgomery et al., 1992: 74). In the words of Montgomery and associates, “The patterning of transitivity choices in a text can reveal its predispositions to construct experience along certain lines rather than others” (p. 76). “The analysis of transitivity, therefore,” Montgomery and associates continue, “becomes a useful way of exploring the ideological dimension of texts” (1992: 76). It can reveal to us how language can be manipulated to make us view certain people or events or indeed whole societies in certain calculated determinate ways. In brief, the metafunctions, such function-driven or function-oriented terminology, I would say, have revolutionised grammar; they have done so in the sense that they have made us conceive of grammar as “functionally organized,” as essentially functional and behavioural in nature, as a tool for the construction of experience and reality “along certain lines” or “angles of telling” rather than being thought of as a mere set of boring rules or a neutral medium of representation.

3.2.3 Language: Thought and Perception

The background linguistic system (in other words, the grammar) of each language is not merely the reproducing instrument for voicing ideas but rather is itself the shaper of ideas, the program and guide for the individual’s mental activity, for his analysis of impression, for his synthesis of his mental stock in trade … We dissect nature along lines laid down by our native languages. (Benjamin Lee Whorf and J. B. Carroll, 1956; quoted in Fromkin, Rodman and Hyams, 2011:3011)

113 Depending on the “angles of telling” (Simpson, 1993) adopted, a particular version of reality is constructed, and a particular perception is induced. In this connection, Thomas and associates (2004) provide a good example on how the different “angles of telling” discourse producers orchestrate for ingenuous consumers, can affect perception. They observe that when in the 1990s:

the tobacco industry in Britain was accused of not explicitly warning consumers of the dangers of low-tar cigarettes, which were instead marketed as a ‘healthier’ alternative to the standard, high-tar varieties…a spokesperson for the anti-tobacco league stated in a radio interview that such ‘irresponsible advertising’ was akin to telling people that they’d be safer jumping out of a second, rather than fifth, storey window (18).

Thus, beyond its banal use as a tool of telementation and the transmission of ideas, language influences our perception of the world where a certain variety of tobacco, in our case, becomes, not, for example, less lethal or detrimental but ‘healthier;’ and where “smoking seriously” – notice only “seriously” – as I once accidently read on a cigarette pack “harms you and others around you;” giving you the image of a loving advising and responsible company, in place of that of the actually totally irresponsible, self-seeking criminal company that exploits the tantalising power of signs in further manipulating the perception of the victims. So use or manipulation of language can affect the way we perceive the world and even our own selves in a particular way. It can alter our perception of the world. In the words of Thomas and associates (2001: 4), “which word is chosen may… affect people’s perception of the world, and of themselves”. Hence, according to Thomas and associates (2001), when one is given the impression that their bad performance at school was the result of “low attainment” rather than “low ability” for example, they may want to return to “learning later in life”. While the lexical selection “low ability” might indicate to a person that they can never improve, “low attainment” might encourage the same person to return back to learning later in life as an opsimath or an autodidact as their bad performance or low attainment early in life might be thought of as the result of “poor teaching, or an inappropriate curriculum, or government policy,” etc. rather than the result of their own poor capabilities (2001). So while the choice “low ability” would have a negative impact on the learner’s perception of his/her own self, “low attainment” would not where here a whole battery of

114 reasons could be brought to justify one’s “low attainment”. Therefore, it is clear how our choice of words can affect our perception of ourselves and of the world. Linked to this or more than this is the arguable notion that language shapes thinking and controls thought. So it is not only that language affects one’s perception but also as suggested by Sapir and Whorf “the thought processes of its speakers” (Thomas et al., 2004: 25). Thus, as noted by Thomas and associates, not only do people speaking different languages view the world differently (linguistic relativism), but also think differently (linguistic determinism). So the way one views the world and the way one thinks about the world are all tied up with the kind of language one speaks. In other words, the way we think seems to be relative to the language or languages we speak. And since each language is a different system of representation “that mirrors, and indeed so reinforces, the ‘world’ of its speakers” (2004: 19), then the way those speakers perceive and think about the world is different. Now, whether linguistic relativity and determinism, known as the Sapir-Whorf Hypothesis remain a hypothesis or not is not a concern for this research. My concern is that certain uses of a language do affect and influence, in a way or another, the perception and thought processes of their speakers. Thomas and associates (2004: 27) note that within the resources of each language, various “angles of telling” are possible. Different linguistic signs and syntactic constructions (linguistic representations) can make us perceive things and people, and think about them in particular way or ways. As observed by Whorf, in his capacity as a fire inspector:

…people were much more careful around what were labelled gasoline drums than with empty gasoline drums. People’s interpretation of the linguistic sign empty influenced their perception of these drums as being safer than their full counterparts, and obscured the fact that they still contained explosive vapour. (quoted in Thomas et al., 2004: 25)

In light of this, “angles of telling” - instantiated in the different lexical items and or syntactic constructions that wily politicians or those who wield power in society or generally those who are conscious of the power of beyan select or derive or even sculpt out of the supple body of language - can influence our perception differently. In the words of Montgomery and associates (1992: 76), they can produce different or “particular versions of reality”. Hence, the choices logos- conscious users make through meticulous orchestration of

115 transitivity relations, and the “linguistic and discursive strategies” they deploy can encode certain views of the world or make us ideate the world or a particular issue or event or a certain people or philosophy or even our own selves in a particular way. As noted in Chapter 1 and passim, such linguistic practices: lexicogrammar and strategies, which are “invested with power relations and ideological processes” (Fairclough, 1992: 7) as can be detected from discourses of othering and sexism, and in general colonialist discourses (Said, 1978), for example, can help “project positions and perspectives,” “communicate attitudes and assumptions,” stereotype certain people in certain ways, “induce the readers into occupying reading positions,” instil into our subconsciousness certain notions, suggestions and conceptions, and promote certain ideas of some sort about the subjects that are being dealt with or represented in a certain discourse. So the way clauses are worded and constituents are ordered serves to construct certain attitudes and positions, perceptions and ideologies. Such lexicogrammar or “angles of telling” is meant as it shapes the political event or reality and our perception of it in a particular way, the way expedient to the discourse producer and their interests. Therefore, language, “the great Conduit,” to use Lochean terminology, is not a neutral medium. Language when put into discourse becomes as noted by Fairclough (1992) ideologically marked and to do with power. Implicitly or explicitly, each discourse has or directed by or calling for a particular ideology, a particular function, a particular mode of action, a particular view of the world. Hence, instead of being a neutral tool, “language,” as stated by Thomas and associates (2004: xviii), “is a channel for how we see [or are meant to see] and construct the world around us”.

3.2.4 Language: Construction of Reality and our Conceptualisation of it

Montgomery and associates (1992: 73) observe that the “Selection of one term rather than another often entails choosing particular modes of conceptualizing the reality in question”. Hence, as maintained throughout this study, the “angles of telling” we adopt through particular “structural and sign choices,” and the transitivity choices text or discourse producers choose, construct our experience of reality and our conceptualisation of it (to others) in certain determinate ways. They serve particular cognitive purposes, and allow, according to Simpson (1993: 89), “speakers to encode in language their mental picture of reality and how they account for

116 their experience of the world”. Thus, as maintained by Montgomery and associates (1992); Thomas and associates (2004); and Misaddi (2007), depending on their political perspective or ideological bent, viewpoint, or affiliation or harboured agenda, speakers, in general, and discourse producers or technologists, in particular, frame or represent events in quite different ways (see Chapter 1 and passim). For example, in the media coverage of the 1983 miners’ strike, Montgomery and associates (1992: 76) observe:

the action of picketing was constructed in quite different linguistic ways by different newspapers, depending on their political perspective. The Daily Mail, which generally supported the government position, described events on the picket line in sentences such as the following:

41 policemen had been treated in hospital; police horses and their riders were stoned; five police horses were also injured; pickets demolished a wall; pickets bombarded the police.

Here, as observed by Montgomery and associates (1992: 76), we find that “‘the police’” figure in the accounts mainly in the (semantic patient) role of the affected (of usually violent actions). Where ‘picketing miners’ appear in action clauses it is usually as agents, mostly of (violent) actions performed against the police”. Now, “In contrast to the Daily Mail,” Montgomery and associates (1992: 76) state that “a newspaper such as the Morning Star, whose support for the miners was unwavering throughout the strike, described events on the picket line in sentences such as:

police attacked isolated groups of miners; several miners were hit with truncheons; one miner was pounced upon by other policemen; the miners massed around the entrance; 3000 pickets yesterday gathered outside Cortonwood Colliery”.

On their comments on these sentences or transitivity selections produced by the Morning Star, Montgomery and associates (1992), state:

Here police become agents of (violent) actions by which the miners are affected. And whilst the miners are

117 sometimes presented as agents, it usually involves processes of non-violent movement (as in ‘the miners massed around the entrance’) (76).

The transitivity choices or linguistic representations produced by each newspaper construct, as noted, reality and what we see or meant to see differently, in a manner that would result in different ideation of the world or the event in question and hence actions or reactions. The event in these examples, which is “the 1983 miners’ strike,” is the same. However, the event’s representation by different discourse producers is quite different; a difference that underlies different political perspectives; a difference that is carried out through language. In other words, this “brief analysis,” as observed by Montgomery and associates (1992: 76), “shows that the actual events of the picketing are constructed in quite different ways through the transitivity choices adopted in the respective newspapers”. Such analysis of “the way events are represented” can reveal to us, as stated by Thomas and associates (2004: 59) “how different points of view, or ideologies, are constructed linguistically”. Therefore, how agents or agency is represented entails different interpretations and thus the construction and conceptualisation of the political event and hence reality. Thus, choosing, as Misaddi (2007) states, to describe a person who has been trained for travelling in a spacecraft as an “astronaut” or “cosmonaut” or “spationaut” or “taikonaut” is not the same as each would be represented by the Americans, Russians, French, and Chinese, respectively. Not only will each lexical choice or linguistic representation (text production) position you differently but also entail constructing and interpreting reality differently (text consumption) and hence projecting or foisting a different version of and conceptualisation of reality. Similarly, calling the mechanism of Hamas’ takeover of Gaza since June 2007 as a “coup” or a “military showdown” entails conceptualising the event in question and hence one’s position differently, and with each having different implications and repercussions. While the former linguistic selection incriminates, for example, and makes the act of takeover as a putsch or Anschluss or usurpation, the latter justifies it as a decisive inevitable measure to end a morass (the status quo) and settle a dispute. So, soundbites or discourse is employed by those conscious of its distinct power to linguistically construct the version of events or reality that serves their interests, whether noble or ignoble; to “produce and maintain social inequalities;” to perpetuate “hegemonic

118 relations or unequal relations of power” (Simpson, 1993; Fairclough, 2001a), etc. Accordingly, language “can be recruited in an attempt to promote or legitimate particular versions of reality” (Montgomery et al., 1992: 74); to establish and maintain ideologies “to naturalise us into accepting certain ideas [by making them sound natural and commonsensical] about ‘the way things are and the way things should be’” (Thomas et al., 2004: 33).

3.2.5 Language: Construction of Diversion and Deadening

My reason for wanting to spend a year among these men [US defense intellectuals] was simple, even if the resulting experiences were not. The current nuclear situation is so dangerous and irrational that one is tempted to explain it by positing either insanity or evil in our decision makers. That explanation is, of course, inadequate. My goal was to gain a better understanding of how sane men of goodwill could think and act in ways that lead to what appear to be extremely irrational and immoral results. (Cohn, 1987: 1)

Words are brutalised, used or abused by certain quarters not only to dispose receivers towards a particular way of conceptualising reality or to deprive them through language-induced reductionism and mystification of conceptualising such reality in the way it should be perceived, but also to create, in the process diversion and deadening, leading gradually to the total removal from the reality or war or domination behind the abstract, sanitised, euphemised, friendly, sentient and metaphorical arcane language used, where the chasm - caused by such apparently innocent sanitised language - between image and reality is astounding, to say the very least (Cohn, 1987). The numbing language of defense intellectuals, the language of nuclear war – what Cohn (1987) calls “technostrategic” – this technostrategic discourse is a prime example of this kind of language brutalisation, where language is made to defend the indefensible, and desensitise us to the horrors of war through “abstraction and euphemism” and the use of recurring deceptive and illusive imagery – technostrategic discourse. According to Carol Cohn (1987), as mentioned by Thomas and associates (2004), using terms or euphemisms, for example, such as clean bombs or taken out or counter value attacks or collateral

119 damage, as used by the specialised language of the US nuclear industry, to mean “warheads,” “destroyed,” “destruction of cities,” and “human corpses,” respectively, can show us the extent to which language can normalise and naturalise us into accepting things we would normally conceive of as repugnant and dreadful. This is language! This is technostrategic discourse! This is nuclear parlance! This is Israelispeak! This is discourse with its “enormous destructive power”. This is the role it plays, as maintained by Cohn (1987) and Misaddi (2007), in euphemism and reductionism, in the manufacture of diversion and the construction of deadening; in exercising desensitising effects on us; in making us accept subconsciously horrific ideas and horrendous concepts, and view them as normal and natural. When the phrase “cookie cutter” is deployed to describe “a particular model of nuclear attack” (Cohn, 1987) and names such as “Little Boy” and “Fat Man” (1987) are given to the bombs that reduced Hiroshima and Nagasaki to a Guernica, and when “clean bombs areemployedinsurgically clean strikes where an opponent’s weapons or command centres can be taken out, meaning that they are accurately destroyed without significant damage to anything else” (Thomas and associates, 2004: 28), we can recognise in such language, as maintained by Thomas and associates (2004), Cohn (1987), and Misaddi (2007), the horrific power of logos in evoking images contrary to the grisly reality behind such ‘clean’ words or sanitised strikes; in desensitising defense intellectuals and those “sane men of goodwill” involved in ‘defense’ rather than offence; in evoking images of domesticity, cleanliness, harmlessness and birth in place of mass destruction, incineration of cities, mass murder and human death; and thus distorting and redefining our perceptions of reality and the world; in “minimizing the seriousness of militarist endeavors [and in] denying their deadly consequences” (1987); in “changing the reality of war through semantics” to use Robert Fisk’s words (quoted in Shaun Ho, 2010) and taming us “to pat the bomb” where the bomb’s lethality, as a result, would disappear. It will be like patting a baby or pet dog – small, cute and harmless; “not terrifying destructive” (1987). Cohn (1987), “who wrote of her first-hand experiences of the technostrategic language used in the US nuclear industry,” thus “believes,” as stated by Thomas and associates (2004):

that the ‘angle of telling’ embodied in such modes of representation makes it easier to ignore the human cost of nuclear war. It is weapons, not people, that are seen as vulnerable, which have to survive, and which can get

120 killed, sometimes through fratricide (the destruction of one warhead by another from the ‘same side’). Nukespeak is relative to the perspective of the creators and controllers of nuclear weapons: the worldview it encodes is not that of the victim (28-29).

Hence, in the words of Montgomery and associates (1992):

Adopting a phrase such as collateral damage makes it more likely that one will also select phrases such as surgical strikes with 80 per cent success rate because they all serve to represent war from a particular perspective [which is that of the “creators and controllers of nuclear weapons,” as mentioned by Cohn] (73).

The term collateral damage – a term out of hundreds as indicated by Cohn (1987) – where the mass murder of people and incineration of cities is being thought of as collateral, “collateral to the real subject” which is weapons, helps not only obfuscate reality where “the seriousness of militarist endeavors” is being minimised, but also programme and desensitise those involved in the war business - since human death here does not count or is not the actual cost or loss. In technostrategic discourse, “the reference point” as pointed out by Cohn (1987), “is not human beings but the weapons themselves”. Hence, human death is collateral; it is additional or secondary damage to the ‘real’ loss – weapons. Thus, “Cohn felt,” as Thomas and associates (2004: 29) state, “that, as she gained fluency in this ‘new language,’ the less concerned she became about nuclear war” and the less concerned those involved in this business would become about human beings. She learnt how to “pat the bomb”. Language here is being used as a force for the manufacture or construction of desensitisation and deadening. And though, Cohn (1987) attributes two other factors behind this desensitisation process and lack of concern about human life, she believes language to be the most “significant” factor, where what language reveals here is “a whole series of culturally grounded and culturally acceptable mechanisms that make it possible to work in institutions that foster the proliferation of nuclear weapons, to plan mass incineration of millions of human beings for a living:

Language that is abstract, sanitized, full of euphemisms; language that is sexy and fun to use; paradigms whose referent is weapons; imagery that domesticates and deflates the forces of mass destruction; imagery that

121 reverses sentient and non sentient matter, that conflates birth and death, destruction and creation--all of these are part of what makes it possible to be radically removed from the reality of what one is talking about, and from the realities one is creating through the discourse (Cohn, 1987).

Such examples show us the extent to which language can affect and “alter our perception of certain signifieds (concepts) by replacing old signifiers (labels) with new ones” (Thomas et al., 2004: 41); to “manufacture an ideology” and consequently naturalise us into accepting certain ideas […] (2004), to deflect attention and deaden the senses (Misaddi, 2007); to desensitise us to the horrors of war through deceptive and illusive “war terminology” (Cohn, 1987), etc. When on December 17, 1998, as observed by Misaddi (2007: 66), American helicopters had bombarded Baghdad, Bill Clinton appeared on television and said in an unprecedented Anglo-Arab accent, after he spoke about the end of his ‘smart attacks,’ “Ramadan Karim!”. Can we see the extent language or the conscious orchestration of words can go in the construction of diversion and deflection of attention away from criminal acts? Misaddi (2007) provides another linguistic representation or discursive strategy or instance of calculated language use that directs perception away and thus constructs deadening or at least cloudiness of vision and diversion through taming language itself and the receivers of language psychologically by nudging them to conceptualise or not to conceptualise an event in a particular way. This representation is the antithetical phrase “friendly fire”. According to Misaddi (2007), first constructed and employed by Americans, following the shooting and killing on April 4, 1994, by mistake of 26 soldiers from the coalition forces by the coalition forces, this antithetical construction was calculated to make room for defusion and diversion. So apart from defusing tension as a result of this fatal flaw and possibly inexcusable error, this antithetical dyadic construction, as termed by Misaddi, along with other antithetical constructions such as “creative anarchy” or “peaceful force” and their ensuing analogous formations, such as “peaceful revolution,” “peaceful change,” “peaceful estrangement,” “violent peace” or “peace offensive,” etc. are all meant to make an outlet for diversion and deadening through directing perception away from the true nature of things or the horror of reality. In the same fashion, Misaddi observes (2007) that we are also to understand, not only François Mitterrand’s 1981antithetical dyadic

122 construction, “peaceful force,” and its subsequent uses and ensuing analogous formations as pointed out above, but also to view, in the same manner, the politicism or antithetical illusive dyad: “Peace of the Brave” or “La Paix des Braves,” its 1958 etymological de Gaullean origin or its Arabic equivalent ϥΎόΟηϟ΍ϡϼγ" as clung to and repeated every now and then by Yasir Arafat; ever since deciding to “leave the horse lonely,” and take the slippery slope to the “peace offensive,” despite mounting criticism. This concise account shows us the grave role discourse plays through meticulous calculation and orchestration of certain patterns of lexicogrammar in the construction of not only diversion but also complete deadening or unconsciousness of a certain event or its thorny dimensions.

3.2.6 Language: Positioning and Representation

According to Misaddi (2007), what one says reveals their position towards what is being said (see Chapter 1). Thus, discursive events or “particular linguistic choices” - used to enact or conceal, legitimate or mystify a certain event or intimate something in particular, or leave the imagination to run wild without arriving at a particular implication or...or...- “often,” as observed by Montgomery and associates (1992: 73), “involve adopting certain positions regarding contentious issues and rejecting others”. Therefore, Simpson (1993: 6; quoted in Thomas et al., 2004: 32) states:

we can assume that language is not a transparent, objective medium for communication but, instead, a ‘projection of positions and perspectives... a way of communicating attitudes and assumptions’.

In this context, Misaddi (2007) gives a good example regarding linguistic representation and positioning and hence responsibility. He says that if we assume that a group of people were discussing an issue and that when they were at the heart of their discussion, a newcomer, known well to them all and they known well to him, comes in and joins the discussion, we are to imagine, after the discussion is over, each of the discourse participants, in reporting the event, as saying, as a way of representation: “and while we were discussing, Mr so and so came in;” “[...] Mr... barged in on our conversation;” “Mr... surprised us;” “Mr... had joined us” (p. 169). On his comment on this example where representations are different in the case of each reporter of the event, Misaddi (2007) states that

123 though “the truth is one, and the event is one,” each reporter or discourse participant had represented the event differently as each verb used, signals different indications or connotations and hence positions or positioning. The point Misaddi (2007) is raising or emphasising in this context is that whatever one says, the mere act of saying something gets him or her to be semantically involved, what he describes as “semantic involvement,” and hence responsible for that position made by the very words uttered, whether one was conscious of the implications of what he or she said or unconscious. So, whether you choose, for example, to describe what took place on 9/11 as the “events of 9/11” or “crimes...” or “terrorist acts...” or “suicide attacks...” or “America’s Black September” or just “detonation of the towers,” you will have to be semantically involved; “you will not be able to escape from the grip of language as you are obliged to take a certain position inside the straightjacket of discourse” (Misaddi, 2007: 240). So, positioning and representation - or the notion that what a discourse participant says (positioning) or how they say it or “chooses to refer to something or someone” (Thomas et al., 2004) (representation) reveals their position towards what is being said - is made through language. Language here does not only reflect one’s position towards a particular issue or event but also constructs this position. This is an assumption that, according to Misaddi (2007), makes 5 issues about language or the “angles of telling” we adopt, clear. First, it makes a discourse participant or producer responsible for what he or she utters even if he or she had thought that what they uttered was mere or neutral description or narration. Second, it makes the margin for objectivity or impartiality very narrow or limited. Third, it makes language to no longer be viewed as that innocent or objective as it is often mistakenly thought of. Fourth, it makes clear the point that people’s awareness of this other dimension of language varies from one to another. Fifth, it makes the point that the exploitation of this dimension by a discourse participant or producer upon their knowledge of the others’ unawareness of this dimension is what makes language to be a mighty weapon in the field of discourse and domination.

3.2.7 Language: Imperialism and “Othering”

As shown in the previous subsections, language can be used to subtly promote a certain idea, concept or stereotype or ideology; to

124 shape one’s perception of things and ideation of the world; to forge a certain discourse to enact and sustain domination. This, as maintained throughout this CDA study takes place through a certain selection of vocabulary and a certain pattern of transitivity structures. As stated in Chapter 1, denying a certain people from occupying any subject position or certain subject positions, for example, while persistently representing them in powerless object positions, can shape the minds of the target audience in accordance with a certain harboured image or twisted view of such people, an image of them as the “Other,” as argued by Edward Said in his influential book, Orientalism. In the words of Divine (2008), “[...] a catalyst for the development of postcolonial studies”:

Orientalism presumably showed how the West both created the Orient as a proving ground for its own identity and forged a discourse that sustained its domination over a large part of the globe (1).

According to Said (1978), imperialists and writers of colonialist discourses tend to construct the Orient as the “Other,” “securing them in powerless object positions and reserving the more powerful subject positions for the Westerners”. “To Said,” as stated by Divine (2008):

Imperialism was the great moral monstrosity that had escaped both scrutiny and a full moral judgement. It may have quickened the pace of European commerce, but it also siphoned off wealth and freedom from peoples too weak to resist the onslaught of modern canons. A large portion of the globe was presumed to exist primarily for the convenience and enrichment of Europe and America. For centuries, Europeans and Americans…hid the magnitude of their oppression and violence behind improvised rationales that celebrated their power to encircle the globe as bringing enlightenment and civilization to peoples depicted as ‘savages’ (2).

What is important in this context is that, as noted, discourse has been crucial and central to the initiation and perpetuation of imperialism on the one hand, and “enlightenment and emancipation” from the trammels of imperialism or occupation as stressed by Misaddi (2007) and other language-conscious scholars on the other. Hence Divine (2008) states:

125 One might ask whether the view of language as the key to understanding both colonialism and the process of becoming emancipated from the strictures of foreign domination has not encouraged postcolonial theoreticians to treat all texts as alike. Novels, political speeches, policy statements, and newspaper articles are cast, simultaneously, as reflective of a distribution of power and of an outlook (3).

Let us now consider an extract taken from the novel A Passage to India by E. M. Forster (1924/1952):

These hills look romantic in certain lights and at suitable distances, and seen of an evening from the upper verandah of the club they caused Miss Quested to say conversationally to Miss Derek that she should like to have gone, that Dr. Aziz at Mr. Fielding’s had said he would arrange something, and that Indians seem rather forgetful (138-139).

Here Indians, represented as the other, are forgetful. Such representation or stereotyping cannot take place outside language. Notice how Indians, all Indians with no exception, as a race or a ‘sub-race,’ are being viewed, categorised and discursively represented as rather “forgetful”. Let us now consider a slightly longer extract that shows “othering,” taken also from the same novel:

…“Here is my cousin, Mr. Mohammed Latif. Oh no, don’t shake hands. He is an Indian of the old-fashioned sort, he prefers to salaam. There, I told you so. Mohammed Latif, how beautifully you salaam. See, he hasn’t understood; he knows no English.” “You spick lie,” said the old man gently. “I spick a lie! Oh, jolly good. Isn’t he a funny old man? We will have great jokes with him later. He does all sorts of little things. He is not nearly as stupid as you think, and awfully poor. It’s lucky ours is a large family.” He flung an arm round the grubby neck. “But you get inside, make yourselves at home; yes, you can lie down.” The celebrated Oriental confusion appeared at last to be at an end. “Excuse me, now I must meet our other two guests!”

126 He was getting nervous again, for it was ten minutes to the time. Still, Fielding was an Englishman, and they never do miss trains, and Godbole was a Hindu and did not count, and, soothed by this logic, he grew calmer as the hour of departure approached… (142-143).

Just reflect upon this: “The celebrated Oriental confusion appeared at last to be at an end,” pan-Oriental confusion, a characteristic that is portrayed as a congenital genetic feature of all Orientals, of whole societies, and not only that, but also celebrated Oriental confusion that seems nothing less than a genetic fact; how cruel! How snobbish! And look at this: “Still, Fielding was an Englishman, and they never do miss trains, and Godbole was a Hindu and did not count”. This is also not to mention stigmatising, stereotyping labels of the natives or locals as: “old-fashioned,” “…hasn’t understood…,” “grubby neck,” and “…not nearly as stupid as you think”. Is this a compliment? These are two examples of “othering” where the other or them as opposed to us or we is represented in prejudicial and pejorative stereotypical terms like ‘forgetful,’ ‘unpunctual,’ ‘backward,’ ‘criminal,’ ‘terrorist,’ ‘primitive,’ ‘savage,’ ‘stupid,’ ‘grubby,’ ‘old- fashioned,’ ‘lazy,’ etc. My point from this CDA account is to show how discourse, as maintained by Said (1978); Misaddi (2007); Fairclough (2001a); Thomas and associates (2004); and Montgomery and associates (1992: 76) etc., can be used or abused (brutalised) to accomplish hidden motives; to show the insidious workings or uses of language in shaping our worldview, in nudging us almost subconsciously into encoding certain views of the world, and maintaining “hegemonic relations or unequal relations of power,” in conceptualising the world in a particular way, in shaking our belief systems, “in establishing and maintaining ideologies,” in sowing doubts into our minds regarding concepts we (might have) thought of as universals or truisms.

3.2.8 Language: Ideology and Power

[…] the study of ideology requires us to investigate the ways in which meaning is constructed and conveyed by symbolic [semiotic] forms of various kinds, from everyday linguistic utterances to complex images and texts; it requires us to investigate the social contexts within which

127 symbolic forms are employed and deployed; and it calls upon us to ask whether, and if so how, the meaning mobilized by symbolic forms serves, in specific contexts, to establish and sustain relations of domination. (Thompson, 1990: 7)

Organizations that strive for power will try to influence the ideology of a society to become closer to what they want it to be. When most people in a society think alike about certain matters, or even forget that there are alternatives to the status quo, we arrive at the Gramscian concept of hegemony. (Wodak and Meyer, 2009: 8)

Misaddi (2007: 46) observes that throughout human history, rhetoric in relation to politics had simultaneously functioned “like a two-track railway: one as a tool for conveying the message, and the other as a vehicle for influence and sway”. Misaddi (2007), further, notes that in the past, getting the message across, whether that of telementation or that of influence was in direct proportion with the length of rhetoric or discourse. In other words, the longer a discourse was, the higher the chances of achieving the end result were. Hence, according to Thomas and associates (2004):

Politicians throughout the ages have owed much of their success to their skilful use of rhetoric, whereby they attempt to persuade their audience of the validity of their views by their subtle use of elegant and persuasive language (39).

However, Misaddi (2007) states that things have now changed where the relationship is based on inverse proportion. Co-option or persuasion now depends on brevity and concinnity rather than verbosity and tautology, hence the birth of political soundbites which employ rhetorical devices and propaganda as tools for political discourse (2007). Thus, Thomas and associates (2004) state:

Although politicians today do not follow the original Greek rules in their strictest form, they often adopt identifiable habits of speech and observe a broader ‘body of rules’ which govern the linguistic structures and devices which they use to increase the impact of their ideas (45).

128 Now, besides the use of presupposition and implicature as “two categories of implicit content” (Fairclough, 1995: 5), or devices, Thomas and associates (2004) quote the following five rhetorical devices used in political discourse as examples of “identifiable habits of speech” used by politicians as tools for persuasive language to “achieve ideological and communicative potency” (p.53) and consequently influence people’s “perception of events or of whole societies” (p.46): metaphor, euphemism, pronouns, ‘rule of three’ or the three-part-statement, and parallelism (pp. 45-53) (for further examples of such linguistic techniques of persuasion and or masking rhetorical devices, see Table 4.1). Besides, effective acquisition and perpetuation of political power is contingent upon the establishment of a dominant ideology: “one which makes the beliefs which you want people to hold appear to be ‘common sense’, thus making it difficult for them to question that dominant ideology” (Thomas et al., 2004: 38). Ideology, a product of discourse/ISAs, is thus the pathway to effective control and power or “at least acquiescence,” as “ideology is the prime means of manufacturing consent” (Fairclough, 2001a: 3). Ideology, according to Thompson (1990) is “meaning in the service of power”. Thus, ideologies are “sets of interrelated ideas” (Johnstone, 2002: 3) that “serve to circulate power in society” (2003: 3), to help sustain the domination of one individual or group or cultureover theother. Ideologies or those “sets of interrelated ideas,” which are meant to “circulate power” or the domination of one over the other are established through discourses or through what Althusser calls ISAs -(Ideological State Apparatuses) as opposed to RSAs (Repressive State Apparatuses) - such as “political parties, trade unions, religious and educational institutions, the family and culture,” etc. whose means of performance is language. In other words, to secure and perpetuate power, you need, as noted by Thomas and associates (2004), based on the work of the French philosopher Louis Althusser (1918-90), to establish an ideology. The mechanism for establishing and maintaining an ideology is the ISAs which collectively “act to integrate individuals into the existing economic system by subjecting them to the hegemony of a dominant ideology” (p. 11). This “subjecting,” according to Thomas and associates (2004) is created by “the organisations and institutions around us” - what Althusser calls ISAs - through language for it is language that makes the dominant ideology seems “common sense”. Put differently:

129 [...] the values and beliefs we hold which seem to be ‘normal’ and ‘commonsense’ are in fact constructs of [the ISAs,] the organisations and institutions around us, created and shared through language. It is more effective and efficient for a system to control our behaviour by controlling our perception of reality than it is to control us with force [what Althusser calls RSAs or Repressive State Apparatuses] (such as the police, prisons and the military) (Thomas et al., 2004: 11).

Hence, Reisigl and Wodak (2009) state:

Ideologies serve as an important means of establishing and maintaining unequal power relations through discourse: for example, by establishing hegemonic identity narratives [e.g. Zionism: the ‘historical right’/ ‘ancient historic connection’/ ‘Return to Zion’/ ‘Land of Israel’/ “land of their fathers”/ ‘promised land’ etc.], or by controlling the access to specific discourses or public spheres (‘gate-keeping’) (88).

Reisigl and Wodak (2009) further state:

[...] ideologies also function as a means of transforming power relations more or less radically. Thus, we take a particular interest in the ways in which linguistic and other semiotic practices mediate and reproduce ideology in a variety of social institutions (88).

Examples of ideologies are Socialism, Capitalism, Fascism, Zionism, “political correctness,” etc. Over time, some ideologies might wane in popularity and the number of adherents, and some may remain to exert influence for a longer time or even for good. One particular dominant ideology that has been there for hundreds of years is Christianity as it is today, and not as it was revealed about two thousand years ago; it is the ‘divinity’ of Jesus Christ which the Church “invented” by rewriting the gospel accounts”. “Jesus Christ has been invented by (Paul and made official by) Constantine and the Church for political purposes;” to subject the people to the ideology of the Divine Right of Kings. Ideologies, as maintained by Thomas and associates (2004), are difficult to question as one is certain to risk being socially stigmatised as a heretic or dissident or insane. One might even risk, in certain cases, being murdered:

130 People who question the dominant ideology often appear not to make sense; what they say won’t sound logical to anyone who holds that ideology [...]. So, while it is possible to question the dominant ideology, there is often a price to be paid for doing so (Thomas et al., 2004: 38).

Ideologies are powerful tools of control and subjection. Thus, what is made on the ground is a progeny or the result of a certain ideology which is the product of a discourse of some kind especially political discourse. In the words of Misaddi (2007: 13): “it is political diction versus political action” or the political event versus the discursive event. In a different place, he states that “the speech act or linguistic event is a political event par excellence,” (p. 338) and that “the construction of reality passes through the construction of discourse” (p. 35). Thus, the relation between discourse and social structures is clearly dialectical. Discursive events or generally semiotic practices, whether at the dimension or level of situation, institution or social structure affect the political event, and the political event produces certain discursive events. Indeed, the reproductive function discourse has in politics, in “establishing and maintaining ideologies” (from Thomas et al., 2004: 38) that appear natural and commonsensical, in constructing and conceptualising reality, and constructing through distorting a certain reality should not be underestimated. According to Misaddi (2007), language and politics go hand in hand. They are concomitant. The presence of one entails the other. Thus and in a manner dialectical, a political course of action is a consequence of a certain political discourse and vice versa. As such, language is not only a means of communication for a certain political event but also a means of construction for that event (Misaddi, 2007), and not only that but also continued mystification, and thus sustained domination. Language, as observed by Misaddi (2007), constructs and shapes and reshapes the political event. It manufactures or colours or twists the event in accordance with the vested political interests and ideological affiliation of the discourse producer. It can be used or indeed abused to validate or at least obscure the nature of things by not calling a spade a spade and hence serve in sustaining domination. This is an assumption that makes language a tool constitutive of and at the helm of domination. So, as suggested by Misaddi (2007), it is all about the game of language in the chess of discourse. Misaddi (2004) observes that when imperial Powers began at the eve of the Industrial Revolution to invade, under the guise of “bringing enlightenment and civilization” (Said, 1978, quoted in

131 Divine, 2008: 2) and occupy foreign nations of the ‘Third World’ – the “savages” as they called them - a change in colonialist nomenclature had to take place for such territorial occupation and economic exploitation to endure in the Orient and other colonised or would-be colonised parts of the world. They had to call such terrorism – but which they have never for two hundred years of exploitation and oppression defined or called as terrorism – something else. It became ‘terrorism’ later when those nations under the yoke of injustices and the heat of exploitation began to rise against the ‘white man’s duty’ or this oppression and daylight robbery of their lands and livelihood (Yasin, 2004). Hence, in 1910, Machiavellian discourse technologists came up with the euphemism “colonialism” whose etymology can be traced to the Latin word colonia, denoting ‘settlement, farm,’ from colonus ‘settler, farmer,’ from colere ‘cultivate’. This served in the intended obfuscation or mystification and hence domination of the “savages,” whether those in Asia or Africa or Latin America, etc. Accordingly, an invader and occupier became as someone who “cultivates” and “reclaims wasteland,” thus turning bloody “occupation” and terrorism into a noble mission of cultivation and land reclamation, instead of exploitation and domination (Concise Oxford English Dictionary). However, as Misaddi (2007) observes, when “colonialism” in the minds of the occupied began to transpire as a cunning linguistic sign for “occupation” or rather terrorism, though as a cultivator in the minds of the occupiers, the euphemism had to undergo a further change, and hence was called, following the formulation of the League of Nations in 1919, a “mandate,” and a “protectorate” in the second half of the twentieth century; another new invention that meant to disguise “occupation” again by giving it, through linguistic manipulation, a new cloak of promotion. However again, as “mandate” transpired to be nothing but another guise or linguistic ploy, an instance of discursive maquillage or camouflage for the same event, a further change took place when the League of Nations was in 1945 replaced by the United Nations when “mandate” became “tutelage” (Misaddi, 2007). Thus, observing the history of the selections or linguistic formulae/ representations given to occupation or foreign domination and terrorism whether colonialism where the impetus is the ‘white man’s duty’ and the impression thus given is that people are in a raging need of help in cultivating, constructing and investing their lands, or mandate where the impression given is that every care is being taken in selecting and thus mandating someone over someone rather than through the use of force, or tutelage where the minor

132 under tutelage is being taken care of until he or she grows up one day and become strong enough to take care of him or herself, we can recognise in all these instances the sinister workings of language or rather the sinister role language is being put to where language is being brutalised to achieve such nefarious interests. We can recognise the enacting and reproductive function of discourse in establishing and maintaining ideologies, in maintaining a certain state of affairs, in distorting reality, in sustaining domination or “asymmetrical relations of power,” and justifying or legitimating enslavement. Notice also how in all these examples of linguistic representation how a spade is not simply being called a spade.

3.2.9 Language and Society: Dialectical Relationship CDA sees discourse […] as a form of ‘social practice’. Describing discourse as social practice implies a dialectical relationship between a particular discursive event and the situation (s), institution (s) and social structure (s), which frame it. The discursive event is shaped by them, but it also shapes them. That is discourse is socially constitutive as well as socially conditioned- it constitutes situations, objects of knowledge, and the social identities of and relationships between people and groups of people. It is constitutive both in the sense that it helps to sustain and reproduce the social status quo [the reproductive function of discourse], and in the sense that it contributes to transforming it [the transforming function of discourse]. Wodak and Meyer (2009: 5-6)

It should be clear by now that the relationship between discourse and society is dialectically constitutive as discourse, as maintained by Fairclough (1995; 2001), constitutes and is constituted by society. For example, “the discursive event,” as stated by Wodak and Meyer above (2009: 6), “is shaped by situations, institutions and social structures, but it also shapes them”. Hence, unlike two ships that pass in the night, discourse and society are dialectically interrelated. Discourse constitutes social structures, and those structures constitute discourse. Thus, in the words of Fairclough (1995), “language is both socially constitutive and socially determined” (quoted in Titscher et al., 2000: 148). So discourse can constitute or construct and deconstruct social structures on the one hand and social structures can impinge or have effects on discourse on the other. Or in the words of Fairclough 133 again (1995: 27) “[...] social structures determine properties of discourse, and [...] discourse in turn determines social structures,” hence is Fairclough’s description of the relationship between discourse and social structures as “dialectical,” and Titscher and associates’ of “language and social structure” as “reciprocal”. Titscher and associates (2000) further state:

Society and culture are dialectically related to discourse: society and culture are shaped by discourse, and at the same time constitute discourse. Every single instance of language use reproduces [sustains] or transforms [emancipates] society and culture, including power relations (146).

So, dialectically, discourse has ideational and material effects on society (Harman and Ramirez, 2007), and institutions existing in society can effect and affect discourse.

3.2.10 Names of Wars and Political Implications

The use of grammatical devices is not capricious or arbitrary; that it directly reflects the semantic values communicated by these devices, and the rational behaviour of the humans who are using them in an attempt to communicate particular types of messages under particular communicative conditions. (Huffman, 1993: 48)

It has been stressed all throughout this study that grammatical devices or syntax, as well as vocabulary can achieve such “particular types of messages”. Therefore, syntactic and lexical choices or what Halliday (2004) calls lexicogrammar (i.e. grammar and lexis) are integrated to produce calculated effects and behaviours. Semiotic representations in discourse whether political, commercial, promotional, propagandist, etc., are, as stated by Huffman (1993) thus not arbitrary or whimsical or coincidental as each representation whether linguistic or non-linguistic entails a different mode of representing a particular event and hence the validation or invalidation, (de)legitimation, etc. of such event. Thus, arbitrariness of the linguistic or semiotic sign, particularly that of the designations and phrases of wars has begun in the age of imperialism and soundbites to cease, as indicated by Misaddi

134 (2007). Hence, unlike the past, names of wars in modern times are selected in advance as each operational name is being part and parcel of the psychological war and preparation for the intended campaign and premeditated operation or war. So unlike the Hundred Years’ War, for example, which was named after 1453, that is after the end of the “intermittent armed conflict between England and France over territorial rights and the issue of succession to the French throne” (Britannica Concise Encyclopedia 2010), the December 2008- January 2009 Gazacaust, the latest neo-Nazi Israeli attempt at “cleansing” in Palestine in which internationally proscribed white phosphorous against besieged Palestinian civilians in the beleaguered Gaza Strip was cast on their heads, was named in advance as Operation Cast Lead. It is not feasible that the Hundred Years’ War could or would have been named before the onset of those conflicts. It must, unlike Operation Cast Lead which was named in advance by the military and discursive experts of the IDF, have been named by historiographers after the end of those territorial conflicts. Following America’s ‘Black September,’ the US administration, as told by Misaddi (2007), resolved to reprise by launching on November 20, 2001 “Justice without Borders,” the ‘manifesto’ or operational name selected for the campaign it would use for its protracted war on ‘terrorism’. “Justice without Borders,” with its subtle implications is meant, as observed by Misaddi (2007) to justify and legitimate the harboured premeditated militant dogmatic confrontations and then invasions and then occupation the US was planning discursively to carry out. So ‘justice’ “without Borders” here would be synonymous with justified military action that is neither obstructed by time nor by space, “without Borders’. Thus, according to Misaddi (2007: 267), “The operational phrase has [in advance] conformed to the strategic project, harboured by the US administration”. Bringing into the picture another example, Misaddi (2007) states that when the US-and-UK-led coalition forces deployed troops during the First Gulf War (1990-1991) in the Gulf region to force Iraqi troops to withdraw from Kuwait, the following operational names were employed as names for the following US combat operations: “Operation Desert Shield,” “Operation Desert Storm,” “Operation Desert Sabre” and “Operation Desert Farewell”. Misaddi (2007) further adds that with such consistency, the US also dubbed its operation against Iraq in 1998 as “Operation Desert Fox,” and others during the Second Gulf War or US-led occupation of Iraq as “Operation Desert Scorpion” (Jun. 2003), and “Operation Desert Thrust” (Oct. 2003).

135 Such meticulous consistency in the selection of “desert” in the naming of those military operations was certainly beyond coincidence or arbitrariness. Misaddi (2007) asserts that only the gullible can conceive of operational names of wars in our age as being “arbitrary or the result of improvisation or the presence of mind” (p. 255). He observes that one of the implications of such consistency in the conscious deployment of “desert” in those US operational names of war could be the intimation or insinuation that war was born in that region rather than being brought to it from outside. He further observes that “it is true that the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait is from within the region, but the war of expelling the invader is brought to the region from without” (Misaddi, 2007: 255). It is also to give the impression that the US military involvement was to liberate Kuwait rather than, let us say, protect US oil and other strategic interests in the region (2007). When Sharon, as told by Misaddi (2007) visited the White House in 2002, he managed to persuade Bush of the necessity to eliminate Arafat who was depicted as an aide to ‘terrorists’ from the scene (see Chapter 5). Consequently, the Bush administration took measures to eliminate Arafat. Bush spoke of his resolve to talk with a new leadership (Reinhart, 2004), of his demand for regime change in Palestine as articulated in his Rose Garden Address in June 2002 (Smith, 2007). His Vice President Dick Cheney spoke of a plan to execute the “fox,” and American discourse began, while trying to convince others of what they have harboured regarding “Arafat’s removal from office” to talk about the “Palestinian Fox”. Recall, as observed by Misaddi (2007), that the US combat operation of 1988 against Iraq was coded “Operation Desert Fox”. Now while we know who the “Palestinian Fox” is, the question is: who is being implicated by the fox in “Operation Desert Fox”? Misaddi (2007) states that as certain political events derive their codes or names, for mystification or manipulation purposes, from past discursive events representing certain political events, rooted in the collective political memory, it might not be easy for us to know who is being exactly implicated by this designation. We might never know unless we try to draw on CDA concepts such as interdiscursivity, “the centripetal-centrifugal intertextuality of texts” (Fairclough, 1995: preface) or in the words of Misaddi (2007) “the collective political memory” or unwritten dictionary (see Chapter 4) behind this implicit operational phrase. Therefore, Misaddi (2007) states that we probably need to bring into the picture the well-known and highly qualified German Field Marshal, Erwin Rommel (1891-1944). Called, according to Misaddi

136 (2007), by Hitler as the “Desert Fox,” following Hitler’s doubts about his loyalty and his implication in the July Plot to kill him, Rommel was forced to commit suicide by taking poison (Britannica Concise Encyclopedia 2010). Now realising that “fox” is being historically linked with cunning or machinations and disloyalty, we can obviously see, as Misaddi (2007) reveals, how Arafat came to be implicitly represented, from the Israeli and American perspective, as the “Palestinian Fox,” and why the “fox” in “Operation Desert Fox” must or could well be thought of as Saddam Hussein. Again, here we see how words are being selected or sculpted with such care, depth and deceptive enigma. With such consistency, such implications of implications and such subtlety, war codes or operational names of wars are, therefore, certainly far from being capricious, improvised or chosen randomly or thoughtlessly. At this point, the conclusion reached by Misaddi (2007: 357) that “the emancipation of man from the oppression of politics starts with the critical analysis and exposition of the linguistic manipulations or manoeuvres of politicians,” along with that reached by Montgomery and associates, 1992: 73) that the “Selection of one term rather than another often entails choosing particular modes of conceptualising the reality in question,” and that “Particular linguistic choices, then, can often involve adopting certain positions regarding contentious issues and rejecting others,” which, in turn, create different “social and political consequences” ought to be clear. It should be clear that lexicogrammatical features involve and invoke certain calculated dimensions. It should be clear that words or wording in political discourse is not arbitrary or spontaneous or simply: “it’s just a word”.

137 3.3 DISCOURSE AND DISCOURSE ANALYSIS

To discourse analysts, “discourse” usually means actual instances of communication in the medium of language. “Discourse” in this sense is usually a mass noun […]. Media such as photography, clothing, gesture, architecture, and dance are meaningful, too, and discourse analysts often need to think about the connections between language and other such semiotic systems. […] Scholars influenced by Foucault (1972; 1980; 1990) sometimes use “discourse” in a related but somewhat different sense, as a count noun. “Discourses” in this sense can be enumerated and referred to in the plural. They are conventional ways of talking that both create and are created by conventional ways of thinking. These linked ways of talking and thinking constitute ideologies (sets of interrelated ideas) and serve to circulate power in society. In other words, “discourses” in this sense involve patterns of belief and habitual action as well as patterns of language. Discourses are ideas as well as ways of talking that influence and are influenced by the ideas. (Johnstone, 2002: 2-3)

We consider ‘discourse’ to be: • a cluster of context-dependent semiotic practices that are situated within specific fields of social action • socially constituted and socially constitutive • related to a macro-topic • linked to the argumentation about validity claims such as truth and normative validity involving several social actors who have different points of view. (Reisigl and Wodak, 2009: 89)

My view is that ‘discourse’ is use of language seen as a form of social practice, and discourse analysis is analysis of how texts work within sociocultural practice.

(Fairclough, 1995: 7)

The premise underlying Discourse, Discourse Analysis (DA), and Critical Discourse Studies or CDA is one. They are all bound up with 138 the notion of discourse as a form or mode of “action” (Titscher et al., 2000: 26), of “social practice,” of social action (Fairclough and Wodak, 1997; Fairclough, 2001, etc.), of “use of language seen as a form of social practice” (Fairclough, 1995: 7), of constituting reality and of ideologies that “serve to circulate power in society” (Johnstone, 2002:3), of reproducing and sustaining the status quo or transforming it, inducing action and social change. Hence, talking about discourse and its critical analysis entails discussing – constructing and deconstructing – “discursive structures and strategies” (Amer, 2009: 8), employed by social institutions, social agents and those in the corridors of power or those conscious of the power of the sign to constitute and express, mystify and obscure, reproduce and sustain, legitimate and perpetuate, normalise and naturalise their domination and control over the masses and the powerless, or to transform all this. Discourse has been noted by various scholars to be notorious for being difficult to define. In this section, I review various definitions given to discourse, with an emphasis on meaningful signs or objects or cultural artefacts as being a major element in many of these definitions. Accordingly, I begin with a short definition provided by Stubbs (1983: 1; cited in Jaworski and Coupland, 1999: 1) who defines discourse as “language above the sentence or above the clause”. It is language use “beyond the sentence boundary”. According to Fasold (1990: a), “The study of discourse is the study of any aspect of language use,” and according to Brown and Yule (1983: 1; quoted in Jaworski and Coupland, 1999):

the analysis of discourse is, necessarily, the analysis of language in use. As such, it cannot be restricted to the description of linguistic forms independent of the purposes or functions which these forms are designed to serve in human affairs (1).

Thomas and associates (2004) define discourse as:

[…] any piece of connected language which contains more than one sentence. It is also sometimes used to refer specifically to conversations. In sociology, it can be used to refer to the way belief systems and values are talked about, as in ‘the discourse of capitalism’. The prevailing way that a culture talks about or represents something is called the dominant discourse, that is, the ‘commonsense’ or ‘normal’ representation (213).

139 Fairclough (1992: 8) observes that discourse is “language use, whether speech or writing, seen as a type of social practice”. It is “use of language seen as a form of social practice” (Fairclough, 1995: 7). Hence, Fairclough and Wodak (1997), and Titscher and associates (2000: 26) state that the “action aspect” is central to their understanding of discourse, and that “the idea of discourse as constitutive of reality is emphasised here” (2000: 27). So what is central to discourse and the critical analysis of discourse are their being actional, behavioural, functional, reproductive, transforming, etc.; they are a form or mode of action. Discourse, whether viewed in its singular sense or plural (see epigraph above or the review below) is understood by discourse analysts and particularly CDA researchers as being “constitutive of reality,” of “social change at a macro level” (Wodak and Meyer, 2009), of domination, of the autocratic policy of: après moi le déluge, etc. Hence, Jaworski and Coupland (1999) see discourse as “language use relative to social, political and cultural formations- it is language reflecting social order but also language shaping social order, and shaping individuals’ interaction with society” (p.3). In this sense, they further observe that discourse is:

a means which both constructs and is constructed by a set of social practices…and in so doing both reproduces and constructs afresh particular social-discursive practices, constrained or encouraged by more macro movements in the overarching social formation (3).

Acknowledged by the “CDA Group” and other scholars such as Foucault (1972) to have “rather fluctuating meaning” (1972: 80) or “many meanings,” ‘discourse,’ according to Fairclough and Wodak (1997), “is used in various ways within the broad field of discourse analysis”. “Thus,” Wodak and Meyer (2009) observe:

discourse means anything from a historical monument, a lieu de mémoire, a policy, a political strategy, narratives in a restricted or broad sense of the term, text, talk, a speech, topic-related conversations, to language per se” (2-3).

Generally defined by Van Dijk (1977; quoted in Titscher et al., 2000: 23) as “text in context,” discourse is used in applied linguistics “with a range of meanings,” ranging from “semiosis” or the meaning- making practices or modes/systems (semiotic systems) of which

140 “language, but also visual semiosis, ‘body language’ etc.” are included, to discourses as categories “for designating particular ways of representing particular aspects of social life” (Fairclough and Wodak, 1997: 2). Fairclough and Wodak (1997) thus define or look at discourse in two, inter alia, relevant ways. The first way is that of semiosis (meaning-making), or semiotic systems (meaning-making systems) of which language is only one system, as opposed to non-semiotic elements of social life. Here, discourse is used as an abstract noun (mass noun). The second way is that of discourse being a countable noun, a “way of signifying experience from a particular perspective” (1997) or, as noted above:

…a category for designating particular ways of representing particular aspects of social life (e.g. it is common to distinguish different political discourses, which represent for example problems of inequality, disadvantage, poverty, ‘social exclusion,’ in different ways) (Fairclough and Wodak, 1997: 2).

Hence, according to Young (2009), discourse has more recently developed an extended meaning which goes beyond the formal original sense and use in applied linguistics as “stretches of language above the level of the sentence in conversations or written texts” (p. 2), in at least two ways:

First, in the extended meaning of the word, language is not the sole system of signs to be studied as discourse; other semiotic systems are included, such as habits of dress, the built environment, and, of course, gesture. Second, the meaning of “discourse” has been further extended to include societal meaning-making systems [what Althusser calls Ideological State Apparatuses (ISAs)] such as institutional power, social differentiation of groups, and cultural beliefs that create identities for individuals and position them in social relationships (2).

So discourse or the study of discourse is not restricted only to the “actual instances of communication in the medium of language” (Johnstone, 2002: 2); it covers other “media of communication” (2002: 3);” it covers any significant semiotic event and system (mode). It is thus not restricted to language per se as language is only one semiotic system/mode or one realisation of what Halliday (1975: 139) calls the social semiotic (1978), and Fairclough and

141 Wodak (1997) semiosis (meaning-making; the process of signification in language). The social semiotic or “the system of meanings that defines or constitutes the culture” (or society) (Halliday, 1975: 139) is made up of a number of semiotic systems or modes or practices of which language or the linguistic semiotic system is only “one mode of realization of these meanings (1975: 139)”. Thus, the extended meaning of discourse is meant to count for those other semiotic systems or devices or elements. It is meant to count, for example, for “visual semiotics” (Jorgensen and Phillips, 2002: 61), “multimedia semiotics” or semiotic media or what semiotic technologies have afforded us with or produced or may produce (Wodak and Meyer, 2009: 15). It is meant to include what Christopher Candlin calls “the discoursed and the non-discoursed communication” (Fairclough, 1995: preface). In other words, discourse is meant to count for the multimodal ways or modes of communication or signification, what Van Leeuwen (2006: 292) calls “the multimodality of discourse” (quoted in Wodak and Meyer, 2009: 16), which integrate but go beyond the spoken or written (elements of) discourse as to include besides writing and “verbals” as elements of discourse or interaction and communication other semiotic modes (e.g. musical, aural, gestural, visual, etc.) or systems, or resources, or events or forms or elements, or data or acts or technologies or means or devices or practices or aspects or any modern semiotic affordances or “media and genres” – all part or realisations of what Halliday calls, as noted, the social semiotic (1978). Multimodal, discourse thus includes all that is meaningful; all that falls within the social semiotic; hence part of discourse as semiotic practices are verbals, visuals, ‘aurals,’ “multimedia semiotics,” “social semiotics,” gesture or gesticulation, traffic signs, codes of dress or “clothing”, “photography,” “dance,” nudity or déshabillé, hunger strikes, “film, the internet,” “architecture,” “a building, a piece of music,” pragmatics and paralanguage, etc. Hence, Theo van Leeuwen, as quoted by Wodak and Meyer (2009), observes:

[c] ritical discourse analysis has also moved beyond language, taking on board that discourses are often multimodally realized, not only through text and talk, but also through other modes of communication such as images… Overall, then, critical discourse analysis has moved towards more explicit dialogue between social theory and practice, richer contextualization, greater interdisciplinarity and greater attention to the multimodality of discourse (16).

142 Therefore, CDA researchers, especially those whose “disciplinary base is outside linguistics or language studies” (Fairclough, 1995: 4) must take into consideration this multisemiotic nature of texts or multimodal nature of discourse. They ought to take into account when analysing a text that “textual analysis should mean analysis of the texture of texts, their form and organization, and not just commentaries on the ‘content’ of texts which ignore texture” (1995). So here textual analysis should incorporate analysis of the content of texts (linguistic analysis) as well as analysis of what Fairclough (1995: 5) calls the content of texture (textural analysis). Such a critical analysis should also pay attention to the multisemiotic or intersemiotic nature of modern discourse or texts noted above. It should pay close attention to what I want to call the multisemioticity or intersemioticity of texts or the multimodality of discourse as called by Van Leeuwen (2006; cited in Wodak and Meyer, 2009) is being taken into account. Using another semiotic form as part of this multi- or intersemioticity of texts, I would like to represent graphically and thus enhance what I am talking about here as follows:

Textual Analysis

Linguistic Textural

(Content of texts) (Content of texture)

(Analysis of other) (Analysis of other) semiotic media or forms embedded in discourses and genres the text (intertextuality) (interdiscursivity)

Figure 3.1: Textual analyses

The above diagram shows us the multiplicity or complexity of textual analysis. So, textual analysis, also as noted by Fairclough (1995: 7) “demands diversity of focus not only with respect to functions but also with respect to levels of analysis”. In this context, Fairclough (1995: 7) stresses that “discourse analysis itself is not here taken to be a particular level of analysis” as in Sinclair and Coulthard’s (1975) view of discourse analysis as “analysis of text structure above the sentence”. According to Fairclough (1995), analysis:

143 requires attention to textual form, structure and organization at all levels; phonological, grammatical, lexical […] and higher levels of textual organization in terms of exchange systems (the distribution of speaking turns), structures of argumentation and generic (activity type) structures. A working assumption is that any level of organization may be relevant to critical and ideological analysis (7).

Talking about another angle of discourse, let me now state that at the outset to this section, I noted that discourse/discourses are uses of language (or now any other semiotic system) seen as “a form of social practice” (Fairclough, 1995: 7). According to Fairclough and Wodak (1997; quoted in Titscher and associates, 2000: 26), “Describing discourse as social practice implies a dialectical relationship between a particular discursive event” and the three dimensions of discourse outlined by Fairclough (2001a): “the situation (s), institution (s) and social structure (s), which frame it”. Accordingly, the discursive event is shaped by these dimensions “but it also shapes them”. So it is “socially constituted and socially constitutive:”

[…] discourse is socially constitutive as well as socially conditioned- it constitutes situations, objects of knowledge, and the social identities of and relationships between people and groups of people. It is constitutive both in the sense that it helps to sustain and reproduce the social status quo, and in the sense that it contributes to transforming it (Wodak and Meyer, 2009: 6).

Further, Wodak and Meyer (2009) maintain that “since discourse is so socially consequential, it gives rise to important issues of power”:

Discursive practices may have major ideological effects- that is, they can help produce and reproduce unequal power relations between (for instance) social classes, women and men, and ethnic/ cultural majorities and minorities through the ways in which they represent things and position people (6).

In the words of Fairclough (1995: 18), “a discursive event works ideologically”. It works ideologically in the sense that “it contributes to the reproduction of relations of power” (1995: 18). Hence is Titscher and associates’ (2000) statement:

144 […] it emerges clearly that questions of power and ideology are closely related to discourse: ‘Since discourse is so socially consequential, it gives rise to important issues of power. Discursive practices may have major ideological effects - that is, they can help produce and reproduce unequal power relations… through the ways in which they represent things and position people’ (ibid.). This introduces the notion of discourse used in critical discourse analysis (27) (see Section 3.4).

This leads us to the Foucauldian emphasis on the “interplay of power and knowledge”. Foucault (1972; 1973; cited in Clarke, 2005) had moved discourse analysis:

away from formal linguistic emphases toward framings of discourses as bodies of knowledge constituting sets of practices, distinctive disciplinary formations through which power/knowledge (power as knowledge/knowledge as power) operates (149).

This is a realisation or contribution that has sensitised our awareness to a great dimension or source of power and social control, that of social science or discourses. Hence, “putting a new spin on the familiar saying ‘knowledge is power’,” and in an attempt to reveal that “social science is not and has never been a neutral enquiry into human behaviour and institutions,” but rather being “strongly implicated in the project of social control, whether by the state or by other agencies that ultimately serve the interests of a dominant group” (Cameron, Frazer, Harvey, Rampton and Richardson, 1999: 141), Foucault, according to Cameron and associates (1999) observes:

the citizens of modern democracies are controlled less by naked violence or the economic power of the boss and the landlord than by the pronouncements of expert discourse, organised in what he calls ‘regimes of truth’ – sets of understandings which legitimate particular social attitudes and practices. […] subjects [or discourses such] as ‘criminality’ or ‘sexual deviance’ or ‘teenage motherhood’ [etc.] have contributed to ‘regimes of truth’. […] they have both helped to construct particular people (‘criminals’, ‘deviants’, teenage mothers’) as targets for social control and influenced the form the control itself will take (141-142).

145 Hence is Foucault’s depiction of bodies of knowledge or disciplines or discourses as “technologies of power” (Wodak and Meyer, 2009: 9), as discourses act as a means to construct and then control social categories or “relatively powerless people” such as “factory workers, criminals and juvenile delinquents” (Cameron et al., 1999: 141). It is a means as noted to “construct particular people (‘criminals’, ‘deviants’, teenage mothers’) as targets for social control and […] the form the control itself will take” (1999: 142). It is a means to interpret and explain certain social phenomena or behaviours such as “criminality,” or “insanity,” or “abnormality,” etc. in certain ways and then regulate and control the social categories that would result from such discoursing and categorising; thus making “these new pieces of knowledge function as forms of social control” (1999); an assumption that makes discourse synonymous with power and power with discourse, what Foucault (1972) says knowledge/power. Now, having reviewed the multifaceted, multimodal or multisemiotic concept of discourse and its relation to power and the exercise of domination and social control, it is time now to turn our attention to Discourse Analysis (DA) and later CDA and their role, particularly CDA in enlightenment and emancipation:

a general term for a number of approaches to analyzing written, spoken, signed language use or any significant semiotic event. The objects of discourse analysis— discourse, writing, talk, conversation, communicative event, etc.—are variously defined in terms of coherent sequences of sentences, propositions, speech acts or turn-at-talk (Wikipedia).

It is also stated that “Contrary to much of traditional linguistics, discourse analysts not only study language use ‘beyond the sentence boundary’ but also prefer to analyze 'naturally occurring' language use, and not invented examples,” what is known as corpus linguistics (Wikipedia). Further and unlike traditional text linguistics or text analysis where the focus and scope of analysis is largely on text-internal factors (i.e. cohesion and coherence), discourse analysis, according to Titscher and associates (2000), pays central attention to the five criteria of text-external factors (see Chapter 4). Hence, Titscher and associates (2000: 24) state that “it is precisely these external factors that play an essential role” in discourse analysis.

Cook (2003: 127) defines discourse analysis as:

146 The study of how stretches of language in context are perceived as meaningful and unified by their users, and/or the study of how different uses of language constitute and express the values of social institutions.

So DA or CDA studies how social institutions or societal-meaning making systems - what Althusser calls Ideological State Apparatuses (ISAs) such as “political parties, trade unions, religious and educational institutions, the family and culture, including the mass media” (Thomas et al., 2004: 11) - employ language to express their values and hence (stay in power). In this regard, Jaworski and Coupland (1999) state:

Discourse analysis offers a means of exposing or deconstructing the social practices which constitute ‘social structure’ and what we might call the conventional meaning structures of social life. It is a sort of forensic activity, with a libertarian political slant (6).

Jaworski and Coupland (1999: 6) further state that the “motivation for doing discourse analysis is very often a concern about social inequality and the perpetuation of power relationships, either between individuals or between social groups”. That is why, according to Fairclough (2001a: x), CDA is “a resource in social and political struggles for equality and justice,” “a resource for people who are struggling against domination and oppression in its linguistic forms” (Fairclough, 1995: 1). Coming to the end of this section about discourse and discourse analysis, one might say that it should be clear by now that all social semiotic practices are part of discourse; that everything that is meaningful is discourse or part of discourse; that all the various ways of thinking and talking or drawing or dancing or posing or stripping or representing in whichever manner expressive or meaningful about something are discourse. Hence, capitalism is a discourse, sexism is a discourse, Christology is a discourse, ‘the Holocaust’ is a discourse, and so is a leaflet, a policy, a play, nudism, Zionism, ‘terrorism,’ architecture, vision 20/20 and Islam Hadari, this dissertation, etc... Any significant semiotic event is discourse. Discourse analysts and CDA researchers must take into account this multimodality of discourse when analysing discourse(s) - a form of social practice that is “socially constitutive as well as socially conditioned”. They need often as Johnstone (2002: 2) states “to think about the connections between language and other such semiotic systems.

147 3.4 CRITICAL DISCOURSE ANALYSIS (CDA)

In language studies, the term ‘critical’ was first used to characterize an approach that was called Critical Linguistics (Fowler et al., 1979; Kress and Hodge, 1979). Among other ideas, those scholars held that the use of language could lead to a mystification of social events which systematic analysis could elucidate. ‘For example, a missing by-phrase in English passive constructions might be seen as an ideological means for concealing or “mystifying” reference to an agent’ (Chilton, 2008). (Wodak and Meyer, 2009: 7)

[CDA aims] to analyse, and thus contribute to the understanding and the solution of serious social problems, especially those that are caused or exacerbated by public text and talk, such as various forms of social power abuse (domination) and their resulting social inequality. This analysis is conducted within a normative perspective, defined in terms of international human rights, that allows a critical assessment of abusive, discursive practices as well as guidelines for practical intervention and resistance against […] domination. The analysis specifically takes into account the interests, the expertise and the resistance of those groups that are the victims of discursive injustice and its consequences. (Van Dijk, 2009: 63-64)

Cook (2003: 68) observes that in order to “understand and assess the information we receive and the motives and interests of those who are giving it to us,” “critical approaches to discourse” come into play to investigate systematically discursive practices to unearth the linguistic resources deployed by the powerful to sustain their domination over the powerless; and hence help those less powerful groups, what Fairclough (2001b: 125) calls “the ‘losers’ within particular forms of social life” to resist being manipulated or dominated forever. Against this sneak preview, I begin this section on CDA: its genesis, significance and application, and aim and objectives. However, before I start a review of CDA - “an interdisciplinary approach [to a bulk of critical approaches] to the study of discourse that views language as a form of social practice [social semiotic] and focuses on the ways social and political domination are reproduced by text

148 and talk” (Wikipedia) - I start off with a compressed overview of its literature. CDA – an “emancipatory project,” a “critical perspective, position or attitude” (Van Dijk, 2009: 62) a “field of language research” (Fairclough, 2001a: ix), a “critical social research” (Govindasamy and Khan, 2006), an “analytical framework - a theory and method - for studying language in its relation to power and ideology” (Fairclough, 1995: 1), a “young science,” a “set of principles,” a “school or paradigm,” a research enterprise, a “research programme,” an “established paradigm in linguistics,” an “established academic discipline” (Wodak and Meyer, 2009: 3-5), a “constitutive, problem-oriented,” “multi-disciplinary and multi- methodical” (p.2) framework, an umbrella framework to a number of non-unitary “methodological and theoretical approaches” to the analysis of discourse such as Wodak’s DHA, Fairclough’s DRA, Van Dijk’s SCA, Mautner’s CLA, and Van Leeuwen’s SAA (see Chapter 4) (Wodak and Meyer, 2009) – “subsumes,” according to Fairclough and Wodak (1997: 1), “a variety of approaches [or CDA variants] towards the social analysis of discourse…which differ in theory, methodology, and the type of research issues to which they tend to give prominence”. It is thus, in essence, the “socially situated […], politically motivated […], and […] discursively constituted […] study of contemporary social problems” (Govindasamy and Khan, 2006: 146). It is “the study of the relationship between linguistic choices and effects in persuasive uses of language, of how these indoctrinate or manipulate (e.g. in marketing and politics), and the counteracting of this through analysis (Cook, 2003: 8). It is the critical analysis of discourse strategies and structures “in search of politically and ideologically salient features, which are constitutive of the (re) produced power relations without often being evident to participants” (Jaworski and Coupland, 1999: 497). It is any “politically involved research” with a libertarian slant that “questions the authority of truth established by means of language” (Govindasamy and Khan, 2006: 146). Now, as suggested by Fairclough and Wodak (1997), these various CDA approaches or methodologies of discourse analysis “differ in their theoretical underpinnings” (Kendall, 2007: 23). For example, while Fairclough draws in his Dialectical-Relational Approach (DRA) on Halliday’s tripartite model of language or Functional Systemic Grammar (FSG), Reisigl and Wodak (2009) draw, in their Discourse- Historical Approach (DHA), on Critical Theory, and use of “argumentation theory and rhetoric when analysing texts and discourses” (2007: 23). In this connection, Wodak and Meyer (2009), state:

149 The dialectical-relational approach [DRA] draws on Halliday’s multifunctional linguistic theory (Halliday, 1985) and the concept of orders of discourse according to Foucault, while the discourse-historical approach [DHA] and the socio-cognitive approach [SCA] make use of theories of social cognition (e.g. Moscovici, 2000) (21).

Thus, Wodak and Meyer (2009: 31) observe that though there is no “consistent CDA methodology” and canon, the theoretical origins of CDA are traceable:

The theoretical framework – even when this is not explicitly stated – is derived from Louis Althusser’s theories of ideology, Mikhail Bakhtin’s genre theory, and the philosophical traditions of Antonio Gramsci and the Frankfurt School (Titscher and associates, 2000:144).

Titscher and associates (2000) also add:

Michel Foucault has also been a major influence on some exponents, including Norman Fairclough. In addition, Fairclough’s CDA is related to Michael Halliday’s systemic functional linguistics […], whereas Ruth Wodak or Teun van Dijk have been more influenced by cognitive models of text planning (144).

A widespread misconception, some may think of CDA as a method of discourse analysis (Van Dijk, 2009). However, CDA is not a method. It is, as noted earlier, “a critical perspective, position or attitude, (2009: 62); it is a critical approach to “a bulk of approaches” or methods; an umbrella term to a number of “methodological and theoretical approaches” to the analysis of discourse. It thus includes a number of critical methods whether linguistic such as DHA, and DRA where analysis includes “coherence and cohesion as well as the relationship between these two ‘textual criteria’,” and “text-external factors;” or non-linguistic such as content analysis, distinction theory text analysis, or any other sociological method of text analysis where the focus and scope of analysis is mainly on coherence (“the meaning of the text”) or only on “a few instances of one of these two dimensions” (Titscher et al., 2000: 24 and 227). Hence, according to Wodak, (critical) “discourse analysis is not only to be perceived as a “method” or “methodology” but also as theories about text production and text reception” (Kendall, 2007: 38).

150 Critical Discourse Analysis/Studies, as “a separate field” and unlike “many other disciplines (such as history, sociology, psychology, etc.)” that study texts, examine and analyse texts “in detailed, systematic and retroductable ways” [retroductable “means that such analyses should be transparent so that any reader can trace and understand the detailed in-depth textual analysis”.] (Kendall, 2007: 38). Having provided an overview about CDA, now I proceed to limn an account of the genesis of CDA. I foreground this account with the following two quotations:

Since the publication in 1989 of Norman Fairclough’s Language and Power and Ruth Wodak’s Language, Power and Ideology, and the launch in 1990 of Teun van Dijk’s journal, Discourse & Society, Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) has not only grown into a major field of research in its own right but has also been widely adopted by researchers in a range of disciplines from biblical studies (van Noppen 1996) to urban planning (Hastings 1999) (Haig, Some Observations on the Critique of Critical Discourse Analysis, (accessed 2007:129).

My view is that the abuses and contradictions of capitalist society [“which divides society into two classes: nonowning workers and nonworking owners”] which gave rise to critical theory have not diminished, nor have the characteristics of discursive practice within capitalist society which gave rise to critical discourse analysis.

(Fairclough, 1995: 16) According to Wodak and Meyer (2009: 3), historically, “CDA as a network of scholars emerged in the early 1990s, following a small symposium in Amsterdam, in January 1991”. In this symposium, the “CDA Group,” pioneers of CDA researchers: “Teun van Dijk, Norman Fairclough, Gunther Kress, Theo van Leeuwen and Ruth Wodak” met for two days and discussed “theories and methods of Discourse Analysis, specifically CDA” (2009). Wodak and Meyer (2009), observe:

Since then, new journals have been created, multiple overviews have been written, and nowadays CDA is an established paradigm in linguistics […] In sum, CDA has

151 become an established discipline, institutionalized across the globe in many departments and curricula (4).

CDA or its theoretical origins seem, based on my readings and cognition, to have stemmed or developed from “Critical Theory” – the result of “the abuses and contradictions of capitalist society” (Fairclough, 1995: 16) - and Critical Linguistics (CL) (Wodak and Meyer, 2009) and “Louis Althusser’s theories of ideology, Mikhail Bakhtin’s genre theory, and the philosophical traditions of Antonio Gramsci and the Frankfurt School” (Titscher et al., 2000: 144), and what has come to be known in social theory as the ‘linguistic turn,’ the zeitgeist consciousness that language is and can be employed for purposes other than those of the telementation of ideas from the mind of one individual to another, to that of action, power and social control. CDA was born out of the abusive “characteristics of discursive practice within capitalist society” (Fairclough, 1955: 16). It has emerged from a heightened sense of the role of language in structuring power relations in society (Wodak and Meyer, 2009); from “Habermas's claim that language is also a medium of domination and social force […]” (2009: 10); from a post-war recognition of “the roles and importance of language and communication in totalitarian regimes and their propaganda” (2009: 17); from the consciousness of the role of language in naked, structural and symbolic violence; from the views, notions and assumptions that language is multifunctional (Halliday, 1978, 2004); “that in modern and contemporary (‘late modern’) society discourse has taken on a major role in sociocultural reproduction and change” (Fairclough, 1995: 2); that “domination and oppression” take place and get legitimated and perpetuated in and through “linguistic forms;” that “social control and power are exercised with increasing frequency by means of texts […]” (Titscher et al., 2000: 152-153); that “inequality and injustice are repeatedly reproduced and legitimized by language” (2000: 164); that “discourse cannot exist without social meanings, and that there must be a strong relation between linguistic and social structure” (Kress and Hodge 1979; cited in Titscher et al., 2000: 145); that “Meanings are produced and reproduced in a dialectic process of negotiation” (2000); that discourse constitutes things rather than being a neutral tool of labelling things. It has developed from the zeitgeist that “human existence is by definition, a linguistically articulated existence” (Saussure 1916; cited in Harris and Taylor, 1989); that “the construction and reflection of social realities through actions that invoke identity,

152 ideology, belief, and power” (Young, 2009: 1) occur through discourse; that “social realities are linguistically/discursively constructed;” (2009: 2); that discourse is a form of “social practice” (Fairclough, 2001a) or “social action” (Young, 2009, 2); that discourse is “not merely a surface of inscription, but something that brings about effects” (Foucault 1976; quoted in Clarke, 2005:174); that discourse constructs reality or social structures and vice versa; “that language is centrally involved in power, and struggles for power” (Fairclough, 2001a: 14); that the structure of language determines, as maintained by linguistic relativists, the structure of thought; “that language determines our perception of the world” (Thomas et al., 2004: 39 ); that thus “language can be used to influence people’s political and ideological views” (2004: 41); that “different points of view, or ideologies, are constructed linguistically” (2004: 59); that “language is both socially constitutive and socially determined” (Titscher et al., 2000: 148); and that “meaning is negotiated in interaction, rather than being present once-and-for all in our utterances” (Young, 2009: 2). It has developed from the recognition that discourses “construct particular people (‘criminals’, ‘deviants’, teenage mothers’) as targets for social control” (Cameron et al., 1999: 141); that “new pieces of knowledge (constructed in the form of certain discourses) function as forms of social control” (1999); that language is responsible for positioning and hence responsibility, that language is an authority and that “nothing can be perceived outside this authority” (Misaddi, 2007). It is a development from the recognition that “the use of language could lead to a mystification of social events which systematic analysis could elucidate” (Wodak and Meyer, 2009: 7); that discourse can be used as a “tranquillising drug of gradualism,” indefinite temporisation and deceptive optimism; and that language is a “key to understanding both colonialism and the process of becoming emancipated from the strictures of foreign domination” (Divine, 2008: 2) and such indefinite Such developments behind the emergence and proliferation of CDA, the interrelation of discourse and domination and the interplay of power and knowledge have provided, as noted earlier and in Chapter 1, the theoretical origin of this study.

3.4.1 Significance, Scope and Application of CDA

CDA is interested in a very general way in dominance and power relations between social entities and classes,

153 between women and men, between national, ethnic, religious, sexual, political, cultural and sub-cultural groups. […] Its point of departure is always the assumption that inequality and injustice are repeatedly reproduced in language and legitimized by it. (Titscher et al., 2000: 164)

Based on those notions, assumptions and developments that have provided the genesis for CDA - and the theoretical origin of this Critical Discourse Study - CDA has emerged and developed as a highly significant area of enquiry whose applications are - due to its diverse and eclectic theory and methodology (Wodak and Meyer, 2009: 31), critical and problem-oriented approach, linguistic character and interdisciplinary orientation – quite wide and whose major aim is to make through its “emancipatory and democratic purposes” and properties (2009: 120) our world a better world. Hence, CDA, according to Titscher and associates (2000):

sees itself as politically involved research with an emancipatory requirement: it seeks to have an effect on social practice and social relationships, for example in teacher development, in the elaboration of guidelines for non-sexist language use or in proposals to increase the intelligibility of news and legal texts. The research emphases which have arisen in pursuit of these goals include language usage in organizations and the investigation of prejudice in general, and racism…in particular (147).

CDA, as noted, is “a critical perspective, position or attitude within the discipline of multidisciplinary Discourse Studies” (Van Dijk, 2009: 62). It is, according to Fairclough (2009: 167), “a form of critical social science geared to a better understanding of the nature and sources of social wrongs, the obstacles to addressing them and possible ways of overcoming those obstacles”. Hence, CDA, a science for the critical “analysis of language” or discourse and thus a “resource in social and political struggles for equality and justice” (Fairclough, 2001a: x) is “an interdisciplinary approach [to a bulk of critical approaches] to the study of discourse that views language as a form of social practice and focuses on the ways social and political domination are reproduced by text and talk” (Wikipedia); all with the goal to enlighten and emancipate; to help eradicate inequalities and injustices, and in so doing make the world a better place for habitation.

154 Unlike linguistics, CDA is concerned with actual speech and writing and their relation to social action and problems. Hence, it is more about what actually happens in a society rather than what should or could or would have happened. It is not aimed at analysing an ideal speech situation. Thus, CDA is concerned with actual everyday speech or locution, with data from the real world; it is, in linguistic or Saussurean terms, concerned with parole (speaking) rather than langue (language). Saussure stated the importance of langue, the deep abstract structure/system that generates parole. So Saussure’s focus was not the actual and variable individual use of language (parole)as would be the case by CDA, but rather on the unobservable and invariable “underlying system of language” (langue); a fact about linguistics found “paradoxical” by CDA scholars such as Fairclough (2001). So while linguistics is concerned with langue (language), the invariable inward hidden “abstract system” of language (Aitchison, 1972: 30), or what Chomsky (1986) calls competence or I-language, CDA is concerned with parole (speaking), with what is seen, with the individual “outward manifestation of language” (Brown, 2000: 10), or what Chomsky (1986) calls performance or E-language. It is concerned with linguistic or “abusive discursive practices” and their relation to dominance and power relations in the real world. It is concerned with the “linguistic character” of social injustice; with social problems emanating from or exacerbated by discourse. CDA, as shown, seeks to liberate people from “oppression in its linguistic forms’. So unlike the emphasis of “the father of modern linguistics,” which was on langue – apparently a fault in or shortcoming to Saussurean linguistic thought - CDA’s emphasis is on actual language practice rather than on language as a system or potential or capacity or cognitive faculty or abstract internal competence, etc. As such, CDA is a “field of language research” that has to do with the relationship between language and power or discursive practices and social structures so as to ensure democratic practices. CDA is driven by the impetus to set “social wrongs” to right through the critical investigation and exposition of language usages that lead to specific and calculated forms of social behaviour or reproduce certain social structures, or states of affairs. Thus, CDA “focuses on the ways social and political domination is reproduced by text and talk” and so the overriding objective of CDA is“togiveaccounts…of thewaysinwhichandextent towhichsocial changes are changes in discourse…” (Fairclough and Wodak, 1997: 1). Jaworski and Coupland (1999) eloquently observe:

155 CDA examines the structure of spoken and written texts [among other semiotic modes] in search of politically and ideologically salient features, which are constitutive of the (re) produced power relations without often being evident to participants (497).

Hence is O’Halloran’s (2003: 1) view of CDA as a branch of applied linguistics that is being concerned, “broadly speaking, with highlighting the traces of cultural and ideological meaning in spoken and written texts”. According to Luke (1992: 2), CDA “refers to the use of an ensemble of techniques for the study of textual practice and language use as social and cultural practices”. In trying to show the significance of CDA, O’Halloran (2003: 1) states: CDA has a number of techniques for uncovering language mystification as well as language manipulation more generally which, in an age of political spin and soundbites, gives it an obvious appeal (1-2).

Indeed - in a technologically predaceous and cut-throat world where “political spin and soundbites” are characteristic, and where logos is being consciously employed by power-holders or “socially powerful groups” to influence perception; to construct particular categories of people “as targets for social control” or to satisfy their insatiable lust for power and cupidity; to produce and maintain hegemonic relations of power, and legitimate and perpetuate the status quo – sensitising ourselves to the ways and strategies of constructing and deconstructing discourse whether political, commercial, propagandist, etc. cannot be more pressing. Such sensitised awareness - where the exercise of power and social control in modern society are exercised less by “naked violence or the economic power of the boss and the landlord,” and more instead by “the pronouncements of expert discourse” (Foucault, quoted in Cameron, 1999:141) - cannot be more crucial as such awareness can empower the dominated to resist the status quo or such domination. It can help free them from the deliberate mystification, or “false clarity” or gimmicks or ploys of modern multisemiotic communication such as conversationlisation and synthetic personalization (Fairclough, 2001a) - “a compensatory tendency to give the impression of treating each of the people ‘handled’ en masse as an individual” (Fairclough, 2001a: 52) as though each one is being individually engaged in a casual conversation with the communicator.

156 Such awareness can help raise, according to Cook (2003) our consciousness of:

the presentation of the same facts in ways which, while not altering the truth of what is said, nevertheless influence, and are perhaps calculated to influence, the reader’s attitude. Thus just as a glass might be described as ‘half full’ or ‘half empty’ with rather different implications, so the same food item can be truthfully described either 90% fat-free’ or ‘10% fat’. Both are equally true, but to a consumer bent upon reducing their calorie intake the former description seems more attractive (65).

It can help raise our awareness of linguistic techniques so that when Kaspersky says, for example, that “Already more than 250 million users are enjoying the benefits of Kaspersky Lab protection,” we can recognise that there are more than 5 billion 250 million who are (for different reasons) not enjoying those benefits of Kaspersky. So, as Cook (2003: 64) stresses, “Understanding linguistic techniques of persuasion can enhance our ability to make the rational informed judgements on which decision making depends”. It can enable us to improve our sales resistance or the ability to resist spiel or everyday “commercial persuasive discourse” (2003: 66). You can, as observed by Thomas and associates (2004), begin listening to what people say, reading newspapers, and watching television commercials differently. You resist being nudged into a certain direction or being manipulated by what could be truthfully but not as transparently said. Now, though as noted, the overriding objective of CDA is “to give accounts…of the ways in which and extent to which social changes are changes in discourse…” (Fairclough and Wodak, 1997: 1), and hence “increase consciousness of how language contributes to the domination of some people by others,” all with the libertarian goal to enlighten and emancipate; and help eradicate inequalities and injustices, and in so doing make the world a better place, the significance, scope and applications of CDA are wide and proliferating as can be gathered from Haig’s observation that CDA “has not only grown into a major field of research in its own right but has also been widely adopted by researchers in a range of disciplines from biblical studies (van Noppen 1996) to urban planning (Hastings 1999)” ( (accessed 2007:129)).

157 3.4.2 Differences and Similarities, Aim and Objectives

In general, CDA as a school or paradigm is characterized by a number of principles: for example, all approaches are problem- oriented, and thus necessarily interdisciplinary and eclectic […]. Moreover, CDA is characterized by the common interests in de-mystifying ideologies and power through systematic and retroductable investigation of semiotic data (written, spoken or visual). (Wodak and Meyer, 2009: 3)

Out of the abovementioned review of literature, discussion and analysis, a picture of the differences and similarities between CDA approaches and other approaches, and the aim and objectives of CDA should have begun to register and crystallise. Therefore, in this section, I shall only remind the reader of these differences, aims and objectives, which centre on correcting “a widespread underestimation of the significance of language in the production, maintenance, and change of social relations of power” and helping “increase consciousness of how language contributes to the domination of some people by others, because consciousness is the first step towards emancipation” (2001a: 1). This is in an attempt to curb the wrongful exercise of power through subtle linguistic and discursive representations; goals that, if achieved, can make the world a better place. Thus, and based on the 1937 essay, “Traditional and Critical Theory” of the Frankfurt School philosopher and social or critical theorist Max Horkheimer (1895-1973) - in which he indicated that unlike traditional theory where the orientation is just to understand and explain, “social theory [and hence Critical (social) Theory] should be oriented towards critiquing and changing” - critical discourse analysis is driven by the impetus to change the status quo (Wodak and Meyer, 2009, 6; Britannica Concise Encyclopedia 2010). It is emancipatory and socially transformative in orientation and aims. In Fairclough’s (2009) words:

CDA is a form of critical social science geared to a better understanding of the nature and sources of social wrongs, the obstacles to addressing them and possible ways of overcoming those obstacles (167).

Fairclough (2009) further states:

158 CDA oscillates… between a focus on structures…and a focus on the strategies of social agents, i.e., the ways in which they try to achieve outcomes or objectives within existing structures and practices, or to change them in particular ways (165).

For Fairclough, as depicted in his approach to critical discourse analysis, CDA “should pursue emancipatory objectives, and should be focused upon the problems confronting what can loosely be referred to as the ‘losers’ within particular forms of social life” (Wodak and Meyer, 2009: 27). CDA is thus concerned with the ways discourse is used to enact, normalise and reproduce dominance and power relations, or in other words, the ways Machiavellians - esurient for more power - deploy discursive/linguistic resources/textual properties to sustain their purchase on the powerless on the one hand; and with addressing social wrongs through the exposition of those discursive practices or “structures and strategies,” carved by those Machiavellians to sustain their power on the other, and thus work towards enlightening and emancipating those powerless. It is this concern which thus makes CDA linguistic, eclectic, critical, hermeneutic, transforming or emancipatory, and interdisciplinary, constitutive and problem-oriented (Wodak and Meyer, 2009: 2 and 19-22), and thus different from all other approaches to language study, and thus humanitarian, enlightening and empowering in purpose and character. CDA is critical, according to Fairclough, 2001a: 4), “in the special sense of aiming to show up connections which may be hidden from people - such as the connections between language, power and ideology”. Hence, according to Wodak and Meyer (2009: 7), “‘critique’ is essentially making visible the interconnectedness of things […]”. In her response, in an interview conducted by Kendall (2007) by “means of email” to a question about “why “critical” discourse analysis?” Wodak observes:

“Critical” means not taking things for granted, opening up complexity, challenging reductionism, dogmatism […], being self-reflective in my research, and through these processes, making opaque structures of power relations and ideologies manifest. “Critical”, thus, does not imply the common sense meaning of “being negative”-rather “skeptical” (17).

159 Wodak (Kendall, 2007) further adds that “Proposing alternatives is also part of being “critical””. In their reader/anthology: Methods of Critical Discourse Analysis, Wodak and Meyer (2009: 2) stress that thinking of the term “critical” in negative terms “as in common-sense usage” is one of the misunderstandings of CDA. In trying to clarify such misunderstanding, they add that “Any social phenomenon lends itself to critical investigation, to be challenged and not taken for granted” (2009). In discussing critique, as one of three concepts (the others being “power” and “ideology”) that indispensably figure in all variants of CDA, Reisigl and Wodak (2009) make the following statement concerning “critical” or the concept of “critique”:

‘critical’ stance should be understood as gaining distance from the data […], embedding the data in the social context, clarifying the political positioning of discourse participants, and having a focus on continuous self- reflection while undertaking research. Moreover, the application of results is aspired to, be it in practical seminars for teachers, doctors and bureaucrats, in the writing of expert opinions or in the production of school books (87-88).

Reisigl and Wodak (2009: 88) mention three related aspects of “critique,” to which DHA adheres: (I) text or discourse-immanent critique (aimed “at discovering inconsistencies, self-contradictions, paradoxes and dilemmas in the text-internal or discourse-internal structures”), (II) socio-diagnostic critique (“concerned with demystifying the – manifest or latent – persuasive or ‘manipulative’ character of discursive practices”), and (III) and future-related prospective critique (meant to “contribute to the improvement of communication (for example, by elaborating guidelines against sexist language use or by reducing ‘language barriers’ in hospitals, schools and so forth)”). CDA or any discourse study that “adopts ‘critical’ goals” (Fairclough, 1995: 27) aims, according to Fowler (1981: 25), to offer us “the possibility that we might profitably conceive the world in some alternative way” (quoted in Jaworski and Coupland, 1999: 33). Hence, the aim of CDA is not literary criticism or “intolerant fault- finding” (1999: 33). Rather, in its endeavour to deconstruct “discursive structures and strategies,” CDA seeks to reconstruct the world to change “existing perception detrimental to most people in a society” (Govindasamy and Khan, 2006). It deconstructs discourse practices to reconstruct reality in a more equitable manner.

160 As such, “a critical orientation is not merely ‘deconstructive;’ it may aim to be ‘reconstructive’, reconstructing social arrangements” (Jaworski and Coupland, 1999: 35). So it is deconstruction that aims at (re) construction. It deconstructs language use “to reveal underlying ideologies” to detect the discourse strategies and linguistic means used to justify, (de)legitimate, stabilise, perpetuate, etc. “unequal social arrangements” (Cameron et al., 1999: 142); all with the libertarian goal to enlighten and emancipate. Hence, in the words of Wodak and Meyer (2009):

Critical theories, thus also CDA, want to produce and convey critical knowledge that enable human beings to emancipate themselves from forms of domination through self-reflection. Thus, they are aimed at producing ‘enlightenment and emancipation’. Such theories seek not only to describe and explain, but also to root out a particular kind of delusion. Even with differing concepts of ideology, critical theory seeks to create awareness in agents of their own needs and interests (7).

Thus, “The fundamental positive in discourse is therefore the possibility of a greater clarity of vision, specifically of how language permeates human affairs, offering us opportunities […]” (Jaworski and Coupland, 1999: 37). Indeed, part of the forensic task of CDA which, according to Kress (cited in Dellinger, 1995: 5) has an "overtly political agenda,” is to focus on the negative aspects of discourse and expose them so as to enact positive social change through new and improved changes in discourse. So, the aim of CDA is to redress social inequalities and injustices resulting from the perpetuation of unequal power relations (Fairclough, 2001a) or “unequal social arrangements” through linguistic means. In the words of Jaworski and Coupland (1999: 6), “the motivation for doing discourse analysis is very often a concern about social inequality and the perpetuation of power relationships, either between individuals or between social groups”. In this sense, CDA scholars, as stated by Wodak and Meyer (2009: 19), “play an advocatory role for socially discriminated groups;” for what Fairclough (2001b: 125) calls “the ‘losers’ within particular forms of social life - the poor, the socially excluded, those subject to oppressive gender or race relations;” to oppression and occupation, cleansing and elimination, racism and Zionism, and so forth. Jaworski and Coupland (1999: 6), state that CDA is a “sort of forensic activity, with a libertarian slant”. The political slant is offset by libertarian goals, which, in my opinion, cannot be nobler. In this

161 regard, CDA is like positive discrimination that aims at egalitarianism. Jaworski and Coupland (1999) further observe:

Critical discourse analysis in this view is a democratic resource to be made available through the education system. Critical discourse analysts need to see themselves as politically engaged, working alongside disenfranchised social groups (35).

Hence is Van Dijk’s (2009: 63) view of CDA scholars as being “sociopolitically committed to social equality and justice". They are committed to eliminate “social wrongs” and social inequalities. They are committed to deconstruct discursive practices legitimating “unequal social arrangements” and perpetuating domination and such wrongs. They are, Van Dijk (2009: 63) states:

typically interested in the way discourse (re) produces social domination, that is, the power abuse of one group over others, and how dominated groups may discursively resist such abuse.

Titscher and associates (2000) observe that CDA:

sees itself as politically involved research with an emancipatory requirement: it seeks to have an effect on social practice and social relationships, for example in…the elaboration of guidelines for non-sexist language use or in proposals to increase the intelligibility of news and legal texts (147).

Wodak and Meyer (2009: 7) add that “In any case, CDA researchers have to be aware that their own work is driven by social, economic and political motives like any other academic work and that they are not in any privileged position”. They further state:

Naming oneself ‘critical’ only implies specific ethical standards: an intention to make their position, research interests and values explicit and their criteria as transparent as possible, without feeling the need to apologize for the critical stance of their work […] (7).

CDA approaches or various analytical frameworks are all critical and problem-orientated. They are interested in social problems and social wrongs. They are characterised for being critical, for showing

162 up “connections which might be hidden from people,” for “opening up complexity,” for “gaining distance from the data,” for “embedding the data in the social context,” for “clarifying the political positioning of discourse participants,” for “having a focus on continuous self- reflection while undertaking research,” and for aspiring for “the application of results” (Reisigl and Wodak, 2009: 87-88). They are characterised for the explicitness of their “position and commitment” to solving such problems and wrongs (Titscher et al., 2000: 164) and thus their choice of topics and issues. They are characterised for being interdisciplinary; for the treatment of discourses as being historical (“historicity of discursive events”) and can therefore only be understood with reference to their [intertextual/interdiscursive] context”. They are characterised for being linguistic or the need for linguistic expertise and the salient integration in their systematic analyses of linguistic categories such as deixis, pronouns, performatives, processes or transitivity, global strategies, or any other structures of meaning, etc. Wodak and Meyer (2009: 31) state that “CDA approaches […] are problem-oriented and not focused on specific linguistic items, yet linguistic expertise is obligatory for the selection of the items relevant to specific research objectives […]. CDA, as stated by Wodak and Meyer (2009: 19), “asks different research questions”. It is motivated by a concern about social inequality, as triggered and perpetuated by linguistic/discursive practices rather than a concern about the formal aspects of those practices per se. “In any case,” Wodak and Meyer (2009) observe:

related to the object of investigation, it remains a fact that CDA follows a different and critical approach to problems, since it endeavours to reveal power relations that are frequently obfuscated and hidden, and then to derive results which are also of practical relevance (20).

Hence, CDA is always issue-based, problem-based, that is, if there is no problem or “social wrong,” there will be no need to conduct a critical discourse analysis of any sort. In the words of Wodak and Meyer (2009: 15), “CDA starts from a complex social problem”. Hence, according to Titscher and associates (2000):

CDA is concerned with social problems. It is not concerned with language or language use per se, but with the linguistic character of social and cultural processes and structures (146).

163 “CDA is therefore,” Wodak and Meyer (2009: 2) observe:

not interested in investigating a linguistic unit per se but in studying social phenomena which are necessarily complex and thus require a multi-disciplinary and multi- methodical approach” (italics in original).

So it is not the linguistic unit per se that is the focus of CDA but rather the text “as a manifestation of social action” (Wodak and Meyer, 2009: 10); as a means of enacting and/or perpetuating social injustice. That is why, “CDA researchers rarely work with interactional texts such as dialogues” (2009: 10). Hence:

it is not the individual resources and not the specifics of single-exchange situations that are crucial for CDA analyses, but the overall structural features in social fields or in overall society. Power is central for understanding the dynamics and specifics of control (of action) in modern societies, but power remains mostly invisible. Linguistic manifestations are under investigation in CDA (Wodak and Meyer, 2009:10).

As a final note, I would like to add that CDA, as captured succinctly by Amer (2009):

aims at denaturalizing and exposing opaque and explicit discourse structures and strategies in dominant discourses responsible for enacting and perpetuating domination and control of less powerful social groups (7).

Or in the words of Wodak and Meyer (2009): CDA can be defined as being fundamentally interested in analysing opaque as well as transparent structural relationships of dominance, discrimination, power and control as manifested in language. In other words, CDA aims to investigate critically social inequality as it is expressed, constituted, legitimized, and so on, by language use (or in discourse). Most critical analysts would thus endorse Habermas’s claim that ‘language is also a medium of domination and social force. It serves to legitimize relations of organized power. Insofar as the legitimizations of power relations… are not articulated… language is also ideological’ (Habermas, 1967: 259) (10).

164 It is these characteristics or principles or tenets of CDA: being linguistic, eclectic, critical, hermeneutic, transforming, interdisciplinary, constitutive, and problem-oriented (Wodak and Meyer, 2009: 2 and 19-22), which set it apart, as noted, from other language studies or DA or sociolinguistic approaches; and which simultaneously formulate – first out of the recognition of the dialectical relationship between discourse and society, between micro discursive practices and macro social structures; and second out of “a concern about social inequality and the perpetuation of power relationships” – its emancipatory libertarian goals, which concern the reproductive function of discourse to the enactment, exercise and reproduction of dominance and power relations, and the exposition (transforming function of discourse) of discursive practices, structures and strategies deployed by the powerful to sustain (the linguistic sources of) their power. Now following this survey in the literature of discourse and CDA and their relation to domination and control and enlightenment and emancipation, respectively, I move on to the next section to review or provide an outline of the major patterns of settlement proposed for ending decades of occupation and oppression through the ‘establishment’ of a Palestinian state as a solution to the problem created in Palestine.

165 3.5 EIRENIC PROPOSALS TO END ISRAELI OCCUPATION: AN OVERVIEW

[…] some Israeli and Palestinian thinkers have previously argued for a bi-national state [the one-state solution] as a more attractive alternative to separatism [the two-state solution]. (Oslo Accords, Wikipedia, accessed 26 Dec., 2007: 8)

There is no simple solution for the Palestinian refugee problem - only a creative one. [...] The model of two extraterritorial nation states - Israeli and Palestinian - is a model that falls somewhere between the two-state solution which due to power inequalities is now leading to an apartheid system, and the absolutely unpopular solution of a bi-national state. A sort of “confederation” may be a more feasible solution: two extraterritorial nation states, with Jerusalem as their capital, contemporaneously forming, without territorial divisions, two different states. (Hanafi, 2004, The broken boundaries of statehood and citizenship, (accessed July 1, 2011))

If the state of Jerusalem is established, the Palestinians will be required to give up their independent Palestinian state, even before experiencing it. Paradoxically, they might be the first to welcome the proposal, provided it brings them genuine equality. Many Palestinians have told me that they would prefer a single state but accept a two-state solution because that is what the Jews want. (Gavron, 2004: 235)

In the protracted Arab struggle against Israeli occupation, past, present and future all intricately integrate where one tense draws on the other. Therefore, research on the Palestine Question, its origins and evolution, as discussed in Chapter 2, entails canvassing and reviewing a complexity of literary history. Similarly, reviewing works dealing with overtures of peace aiming at the discursive construction of historic Palestine requires sifting through a tapestry of literature of views, presented in forms of various proposals, visions and eirenicons, by various bodies, leaders and prominent figures. Such review also requires some analysis and critical evaluation of those proposals aiming at ending or rather suspending such problem through the orchestration of a

166 modus vivendi of some sort between Israelis and Palestinians or Muslims in general worldwide. Due to the orientation of study, however, a complete survey of the many proposals, which actually exceed 100 in number (Saleh, 2003) beginning from 1937, is outside the scope and significance of study. Therefore, my review in this chapter focuses only and in general on two major patterns or trends of settlement that have emerged and been debated over the years: the one-state solution and the two- state solution (see below). However, I shall provide an in-depth critical evaluation – as a transition to the forthcoming analysis chapter – of an Israeli proposal touted as ‘Israel’s best and final offer’ - the July 2000 Camp David peace proposal. Now, besides the “Husayn-Arafat Accord” (Smith, 2007: 409) of 1985 or the “so-called Jordanian option,” which treats the “Palestinians as non-existent” (Pappe, 2006: 239), and the three- state-solution or the Egyptian-Jordanian Solution, following Hamas’ electoral victory in the democratic election of January 2006 and then takeover of Gaza in June 2007, overtures of peace and eirenic proposals that have been put forth since 1937, in an attempt to ‘end’ the status quo, are primarily of two sorts. There are those envisioning a one state or one country: the unitary solution, i.e. the establishment of a single bi-national democratic Israeli-Palestinian state, or the establishment of a “multicultural nation” as it would be called today (Gavron, 2004) on the one hand, and those envisioning separatism or two nation states: the two-state solution, i.e. one Jewish nation state and one Arab nation state on the other. In addition, there are those who envision “the model of two extraterritorial nation states - Israeli and Palestinian,” as advocated by Sari Hanafi (2004), a Palestinian sociologist who states, as noted in one of the epigraphs to this section, that this is:

a model that falls somewhere between the two-state solution which due to power inequalities is now leading to an apartheid system, and the absolutely unpopular solution of a bi-national state (6).

3.5.1 One-State Solution

Prominent proposals and intellectuals or supporters of the one-state solution, the single bi-national state or the “multicultural nation” (Gavron, 2004) as would be described in modern parlance, consist of or include Ali Abunimah (2006); Daniel Gavron (2004); Ilan Pappe (2003); Edward Said (1999; cited in Gavron, 2004); and the PLO

167 (1974), etc. Such proposals or solution dates back to the 1920s when the German Jewish theologian and philosopher Martin Buber (1878-1965) “advocated Jewish-Arab cooperation in Palestine” (Britannica Concise Encyclopedia 2010).

3.5.2 Two-State Solution

As for proposals of those calling for separatism or the two-state solution, two separate nation states, “the two states for two peoples” solution, they date back to 1937, ten years before the November 1947 UN GA Resolution 181, known as the (Palestine) Partition Plan or Partition Resolution, which meant to divide historic Palestine between Palestinians and Jews. This was stated in the report of the Palestine Royal (Peel) Commission, set up by the British, following the 1936-1939 Great Arab Revolt that erupted in Palestine as a reaction to British occupation and the ensuing Zionist immigration in large waves or aliyoth to Palestine. Among adherents of the two- state solution are Sari Nusseibeh; Abdulla Abu-Hadid; Shlomo Sand (2009); and the PLO (since 1988).

3.5.3 Palestinian Stance

Coupled with the popular position, the official Palestinian stance regarding those eirenic proposals was until 1974 firm and clear cut: full liberation of historic Palestine. Hence, neither partitioning or the two-state solution nor the unitary solution was entertained as Palestine was seized by force of arms, and that thus the only conceivable just solution would be its restoration in full. This stance towards full liberation, however, began in the 1970s to shake as the PLO (Palestine Liberation Organization), found itself almost alone in the face of Zionist encroachments, “American tolerance of Israeli intransigence,” and Arabs’ trend towards normalisation of relations with the ‘enemy’. Hence, the stance of full liberation or the establishment of a “secular state for Muslims, Christians, and Jews” - “who were living in Palestine before the start of the Zionist invasion” - has, beginning from 1974, begun to diminish.

168 3.5.4 PLO and the One-State Solution

In 1974, the PLO, in its Ten Point Programme, and in a historic compromise and attempt “at a peaceful resolution” - despite the ongoing belligerent Israeli occupation and ‘Israel’’s denial of being the perpetrator of the Palestinian ‘Nakba’ - had implicitly adopted the one-state solution and called for the establishment of a “national authority” (NB rather than a “Palestinian state” in Mandate Palestine) on any liberated Palestinian territory (which is to be understood as part of a democratic, bi-national state in ‘Israel’/Palestine). However, and despite this unprecedented concession or major transformation in the PLO stance and discourse, which meant that the PLO was implicitly abandoning “the 1968 PLO Charter that called for Palestinian statehood in what was now Israel” (Smith, 2007, 409), seeing Israeli intransigence to implement the implicit proposal for the binational solution, the PLO has officially since 1988 made a second historic compromise that was the beginning on a roller coaster for further explicit (this time) compromises, and changed its stance and discourse further.

3.5.5 PLO and the Two-State Solution

As noted, the PLO’s stance and discourse have changed drastically. It began advocating the old notion of partition or the two state- solution, not based on the 1937 Peel Commission proposal which allocated 33% of historic Palestine to a Jewish state, nor on the 1947 UN proposal of partition which allocated 56% of the land to a Jewish state, but rather now on the June 4, 1967 de facto borders, which meant the de facto cession of 78% of historic Palestine the Zionist forces seized in 1948. Thus, beginning from 1988 throughout Oslo, the PLO, based on Resolution 242 (1967) - previously rejected categorically, for it implicitly acknowledged the 78% of historic Palestine the Zionist Hagana forces dominated in 1948 - announced the Declaration of the State of Palestine on November 15 1988 in Algiers (Shafiq, 2009), a few years before the 1993 Oslo Accords or “Israel-PLO letters of recognition”. So moving “toward the concept of “two states for two peoples,” beginning officially from December 1988 until the signing of the Accords in September 1993 in Oslo, “the PLO has accepted the existence of Israel in the 1967 borders” (i.e. the de facto cession of 78% of the land of Historic Palestine to a Jewish state) (Gavron, 2004: 233), rather than those corresponding to the UN partition plan

169 of 1947 (i.e. the de facto cession of 56% of the land to a Jewish state) as was pursued by the PLO until 1988. This has meant, as noted, the de facto recognition of not only the 33% proposed in 1937 for a Jewish state or the 56% of 1947, but rather 78% of the territories the Zionists have colonised from Palestine by force of arms since 1948. However, even those 78% of the total area of historic Palestine - 22- “23% more than Israel was granted pursuant to the 1947 UN partition plan” - have not seemed enough to the leaders of the nascent expansionist state, as they are, in their pursuance of expansionist antipeace politics (see Chapter 2) regarding the 22% remnant of former Palestine: the West Bank and the Gaza Strip – site of a future Palestinian state – thwarting any attempt at clinching a settlement (see below).

3.5.6 Camp David Peace Proposal (July 2000) (‘Israel’s best and final offer’)

Example of an Israeli ‘Peace Offer,’ - touted as ‘Israel’s best and final offer’ - the July 2000 Camp David Summit was hosted by President Bill Clinton and promoted by Prime Minister Ehud Barak, Israelispeak or discourse and “compliant media” as the “best deal any Israeli leader had ever proposed” (Gavron, 2004: 2). Outwardly appearing to be in quest for the two-state solution, this supposedly “best and final” Israeli “offer” coming after decades of occupation and suppression is, according to Finkelstein (2003), Saleh (2003), Pappe (2006), and Smith (2007) nothing but expansion and “consolidation of Israeli power” through the further cantonisation of the West Bank into useless disconnected enclaves that lack geographical contiguity, territorial integrity and sovereignty or control of territory and thus viability. In the words of Smith (2007), this situation is referred to as “Israel’s carving up of the West Bank into enclaves overseen by Israeli checkpoints” (preface). Related to this context and in response to the question: “How did Israel’s [Camp David peace] proposal envision the territory of a Palestinian state?,” the Negotiations Affairs Department of the PNA stated the following:

Israel’s proposal divided Palestine into four separate cantons surrounded by Israel: the Northern West Bank, the Central West Bank, the Southern West Bank and Gaza. Going from any one area to another would require crossing Israeli sovereign territory and consequently

170 subject movement of Palestinians within their own country to Israeli control. Not only would such restrictions apply to the movement of people, but also to the movement of goods, in effect subjecting the Palestinian economy to Israeli control. Lastly, the Camp David proposal would have left Israel in control over all Palestinian borders thereby allowing Israel to control not only internal movement of people and goods but international movement as well (quoted in Chang, 2005: 362).

Initially, according to Camp David, while Israel would permanently keep 20% of the West Bank, it would return a total of 80% of the territory to the Palestinians, 66% upon Camp David and 14% would be retained by ‘Israel’ “for periods ranging from twelve to twenty years”. So ultimately, according to ‘Israel’’s “best and final” “offer” “after twenty years, the Palestinians would have 80% percent of the West Bank and Gaza” (Smith, 2007: 503), whose totality if returned in toto, does not exceed 22% of historic or former Palestine. As seen by Pappe (2006), what Camp David offered was the withdrawal “from parts of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, leaving the Palestinians about fifteen per cent of original Palestine. But [still more tragic] that fifteen per cent would be in the form of separate cantons bisected by Israeli highways, settlements, army camps and walks” (p. 242). So, the 20% of the West Bank ‘Israel’ wants to permanently retain and which preserve “90.6 percent” of the settlements or rather huge Jewish Zionist colonies, “effectively cut the West Bank into three sections with full Israeli control from Jerusalem to the Jordan River” (Smith, 2007: 503). As ‘Israel’ would remain permanently in control of “the banks of the Jordan River,” Barak’s proposal was also “intended to provide encirclement of “independent” Palestinian areas” (2007: 503). Therefore the outcome of the “viable,” “independent” Palestinian “state” proposed by Barak - again “Israel’s best and final offer” - would be surrounded from the east and west by ‘Israel’. It would be encircled by ‘Israel’ proper along the western border, cantonised or “cut into three pieces” from inside separated by Jewish Zionist colonies and encircled by “Israeli checkpoints and military bases” along the eastern border – the border with Jordan. “Such a Palestinian state,” according to the Negotiations Affairs Department of the PNA, “would have had less sovereignty and viability than the Bantustans created by the South African apartheid government” (quoted in Chang, 2005: 362).

171 Furthermore, regardless of the 15% or “the few crumbs thrown from the master’s table” (Finkelstein, 2003: xx) - and touted as “unprecedented” and “extremely generous,” and that Barak had “defied an Israeli axiom and shattered a strong taboo” and “offered the Palestinians concessions that no one had dreamed Israel would volunteer” (see Chapter 3: Section 3.7) as fancied to be framed by Machiavellians and unscrupulous discourse orchestrators -“the issue is not one of percentages as stated by the Negotiations Affairs Department of the PNA:

...the issue is one of viability and independence. In a prison for example, 95% of the prison compound is ostensibly for the prisoners - cells, cafeterias, gym and medical facilities but the remaining 5% is all that is needed for the prison guards to maintain control over the prisoner population. Similarly, the Camp David proposal, while admittedly making Palestinian prison cells larger, failed to end Israeli control over the Palestinian population (quoted in Chang, 2005: 361).

Thus, according to Halper (2000: 5; quoted in Amer, 2009: 19):

regardless of what Barak offered to hand back to the Palestinians at Camp David, Israel would continue to exercise its control over Palestinian territories through a ‘matrix of control’, which is ‘an interlocking series of mechanisms, only a few of which require physical occupation of territory, that allow Israel to control every aspect of Palestinian life in the Occupied Territories’.

It is significant to note before leaving this part that “Barak’s final proposals at Camp David [which amounted finally to an offer of 91% of WB; 77% of which would be in actual Palestinian possession for up to twenty years, not 91%] were,” according to Smith (2007: 502), nonetheless “pathbreaking”. They were so “in that,” Smith (2007) continues:

no Israeli leader had ever made such terms available to Palestinians, but they were unofficial rather than official offers and doubts remained as to his commitment to them. Throughout Camp David, he refused to talk to Arafat, even at social occasions. Moreover, Barak would not put anything in writing (he feared a record that his opponents at home could use against him) and he never

172 made offers personally, using Clinton to suggest they were American ideas (502).

But Smith (2007) also asks if Barak’s proposals or ideas were really “as generous as later proclaimed”. Smith (2007) adds that the fact is that what “Barak presented Arafat with” was a Hobson’s choice, “an all-or-nothing set of choices,” an application of the autocratic policy of après moi le deluge; ““a corridor leading either to an agreement or to confrontation” where the blame would be laid on the Palestinians and relations would be downgraded “[resulting in] a situation far grimmer than the status quo [i.e. eruption of a second intifada]”” (502). Smith (2007) states that “observers were highly critical of Barak, noting that his take-it-or-leave-it approach to the Palestinians and refusal to consult his negotiating team contradicted his image of flexibility” (503). But Israeli and American global media discourse has presented the story differently, thus, through a systematic policy or discourse strategy of victim-agent reversal (see analysis chapter) misrepresenting reality and distorting facts. The Americans and “Israelis were provided with a one-sided version,” states resigned head of Shin Bet, Ami Ayalon, in an interview (December 22, 2001) recorded in Smith (2007:547): ““We were generous and they refused.” This is ridiculous. And everything that follows from this misperception is flawed”. In reality, ‘Israel’’s Camp David ‘peace’ proposals (and for this matter those that followed until the writing of this dissertation), touted and promoted discursively as “unprecedented,” meant, in light of Israeli intransigence, American tolerance of such intransigence, manipulation and bad faith (see analysis chapter), little more than the maintenance of Israeli control of the life and livelihood of the beleaguered Palestinians, and guaranteed security for ‘Israel’ in exchange for a group of disconnected cantons, a group of “disconnected islands in an Israeli-controlled sea,” “a fragmented and emasculated Palestinian state,” surrounded by checkpoints allowing no freedom of movement, “a truncated and divided Palestinian state in the West Bank,” a ‘state’ “separated into enclaves, with Israelis manning checkpoints and barriers at Palestinian enclave boundaries,” a group of enclaves that lack economic viability, territorial or geographical contiguity, territorial integrity and sovereignty and thus viability and independence, but still represented as a ‘state,’ and as “We were generous and they refused,” blaming and victimising the victim further, discursively.

173 3.5.7 Saudi/Arab Peace Initiative (March 2002)

Likewise, though with significant change in the language of discourse, the March 2002 Saudi/Arab Peace Initiative, and its re- adoption at the 2007 Riyadh or Arab League Summit has also been held in pursuance of the two-state settlement to which again the invariable Israeli hallmark has been either outright rejection or neither acceptance nor rejection: a tertium quid. Example of a Palestinian/Arab peace offer, the Saudi/Arab peace initiative was proposed by Crown Prince Abdullah, and approved by “all twenty-one other members of the Arab League”. The initiative is:

a plan making concessions that actually went beyond the international consensus. In exchange for a full Israeli withdrawal [from the territories occupied by force in 1967], it offered not only full recognition but ‘normal relations with Israel’, and called not for the ‘Right of Return’ of Palestinian refugees but rather only a ‘just solution’ to the refugee problem […]. Were Israel truly committed to a comprehensive withdrawal in exchange for normalization with the Arab world, the Saudi plan and its unanimous endorsement by the Arab League summit ought to have been met with euphoria” (Finkelstein, 2003:xxi).

But again it was met by the Israeli hallmark noted above. Besides such a hallmark - consistently supported by Israelispeak (see analysis Chapter), particularly ‘Israel’’s discursive strategies of positive ingroup presentation and negative outgroup presentation: misrepresenting reality, polarising the situation, denying responsibility or guilt, creating false impressions, evoking fear and alarm, using non-committal or ambiguous statements, resorting to ambiguity and vague formulations, presupposing and implicating, purveying deceptive optimism, creating facts on the ground, making apparent concessions, and blaming the victim (see analysis Chapter) - making an Augean task Sisyphean - such a pan-Arab offer, in light of the occupying Power’s insistence on dismembering the occupied territories into “four separate cantons” - debated for a Palestinian state - that are “entirely surrounded, and therefore controlled, by Israel,” - becomes like many other proposals simply impracticable.

174 3.5.8 Decay of the Two-State Solution

A majority of Israelis and Palestinians supported the idea of a two-state solution, but the reality of ongoing settlement growth in the occupied territories, especially the West Bank, led many Palestinians to question the goals of the peace process [see analysis chapter]. (Smith, 2007: 480)

In his recent study: The Lost Course of the Palestinian Statehood, Saleh, General Manager of Al-Zaytouna Centre for Studies and Consultations in Beirut, argues, according to AlJazeera Center for Studies (4/1/2011):

[...] the two-state solution has entered- or shall be entering in short - a stage of “clinical death”; thus leaving the question of “will the one-state solution be the alternative?” or “will the alternative be the return of armed struggle?” or is it a combination of the two (2)?

The author bases his argumentation (critical evaluation) of the “decay” of the current project for “the two states for two peoples” solution, on seven socio-political, local and global factors, as mentioned by AlJazeera Center for Studies (4/1/2011: 2):

-Arab and Islamic weakness and disunity, including the absence of a common stance or vision towards the Palestinian issue and a concrete strategy of support in various political, financial and resources’ forms [see Chapter 2]. The Palestinians thus have been standing almost alone in facing the Occupation.

-Egypt's signing of Camp David peace treaty with the Israeli Occupation, thus [diminishing] the possibility of having a [...] war against Israel [...] for Egypt being the largest Arab country adjacent to Palestine.

-The affection of some Palestinian decision makers with Realist Pragmatism [de facto recognition of ‘Israel’].

- The dissolution of the Soviet Union, end of bipolarity, and the American hegemony on the world, added to the increasing influence of evangelists in the American decision-making process.

175 - The Palestinian internal strife [Israel-instigated communal tensions] and failure to arrange the internal Palestinian house, in addition to the external interference in the Palestinian decision-making.

- The catastrophic consequences of Oslo accords, which mortgaged the Palestinian issue in the hands of the Israeli Occupation and America [see subsections 5.2.6, 5.2.7, 5.2.8, 5.3.4 and 5.4.3 in the analysis chapter].

- The international dealing with Israel as a state above law, especially from major powers.

3.5.9 The Improbable Solution: The State of Jerusalem

I referred in Chapter 2 to the many huge Israeli settler colonies constructed on lands of the West Bank as a major obstacle to any attempt at conflict resolution, particularly those based on partition or the two-state solution. Presence of those townships on the West Bank, with their “system of bypass roads, bridges, and tunnels, linking the Jewish settlements to each other and to Israel makes it almost impossible,” as seen from ‘Israel’s best and final offer’ (discussed above) and as suggested by Israeli architect Eyal Weizman, “to detach the West Bank from Israel” (Gavron, 2004: 227). “It is therefore,” Gavron (2004: 227) concludes, “legitimate to suggest that partition has become the “impossible solution””. Hence, viewing partition or the two-state solution as “the impossible solution,” Jerusalem Post feature writer, Daniel Gavron, has advocated “the improbable solution:” the one-state or “multicultural nation” he calls “State of Jerusalem”. He calls this as “the improbable solution that remains after eliminating the impossible” (2004: 229). Gavron (2004: 229) states that “Having reached the conclusion that the territory between the Mediterranean and the Jordan River must be shared but cannot be sensibly partitioned, we are left with only one alternative: Israeli-Palestinian coexistence in one nation,” what he proposes to designate as the “State of Jerusalem,” the “improbable solution,” rather than “Israel” or “Palestine,” the “impossible solution”. Suggesting that “Israel and the Palestinian territories can be merged into a dynamic, multiethnic, culturally rich nation, with new forms of coexistence between its different constituents,” (Gavron, 2004: 240) and pointing out the impracticality of the two-state settlement given

176 the inseparability of geography or the impossibility of geographical partitioning, Gavron (2004) states:

If the state of Jerusalem is established, the Palestinians will be required to give up their independent Palestinian state, even before experiencing it. Paradoxically, they might be the first to welcome the proposal, provided it brings them genuine equality. Many Palestinians have told me that they would prefer a single state but accept a two-state solution because that is what the Jews want (235).

When dealing with a central issue to the Palestine Question, the Question of Refugees or the Right of Return, Gavron (2004) observes that though the “Palestinians are still full of pain at what they see as the gross injustice of Israel’s establishment and the turning of so many of their people into refugees,” they, out of realism and self-interest, should “accept a pragmatic solution to the problem of refugees,” which “should involve a combination of reparation, compensation, and resettlement outside the borders of the new state”. Therefore, he suggests that “One of the first pieces of legislation to be discussed should concern the Israeli Law of Return and the Palestinian Right of Return,” and that though “various ideas can be suggested,” “the simplest and most logical is to abolish both the law and the right” (pp. 233-234). “Abrogation of the Law of Return and the Right of Return,” Gavron continues, “coupled with the fair and full application of democratic rules, should ensure a secure and safe life for all of us” (p. 237). Towards the end of his vision, and proposal, Gavron (2004) states, despite the existential crises and difficulties:

The establishment of the state of Israel, despite all the obstacles, was a miracle. The survival of the Palestinian dream over the past five decades has been remarkable. Let us now embark on another daring project. Both of us, Israelis and Palestinians, must repudiate our phobias and prejudices and make a quantum jump- a leap into a different dimension-vaulting beyond despair to a new time of hope (240).

177 3.6 REVIEW OF RELATED RESEARCH WORKS

In this section, I review some related research works, works that critically analyse discourses (language-based analysis) on the Palestine Question. Two related papers, namely: Accounts of Violence from Arabs and Israelis on Nightline; and ‘Telling-it-like-it- is’: the delegitimation of the second Palestinian Intifada in Thomas Friedman’s discourse, are reviewed below, respectively. Published in 2007 in Discourse & Society, Vol 18 (2): 139-161, the paper, “Accounts of Violence from Arabs and Israelis on Nightline” is the first piece of related research work I review here. Seeing violence as discursive or as a discursive resource, professors Richard Buttny of Syracuse University, USA, and Donald G. Ellis of University of Hartford, USA, attempt, through careful and systematic examination of “accounts of violence from Arab and Israeli participants on the US news interview program, Nightline,” “broadcast from Jerusalem on October 10 2000, to see how “violence gets told, how versions get constructed or contested” (139). The interview discussion took place about two weeks after the eruption of the second Palestinian intifada on September 28, 2000, following Ariel Sharon’s march to al-Aqsa Mosque, which, as quoted by the researchers, Buttny and Ellis (2007), has left until December 19, 2005, “3751 Palestinians and 992 Israelis killed” (p. 140). So the data for this study “comes from [the viewings and transcripts of] a televised ABC Nightline town hall meeting from Jerusalem, entitled ‘The Holy Land: Moment of Crisis’, aired [as noted] on October 10 2000” (141). In light of this background, Buttny and Ellis (2007) state that “The facts of violence - shootings, killings, the number of people dead or wounded - are something that needs to be told (p. 140):

Telling of suffering, pain or trauma from the violence puts these events into context to make them more concrete, tangible. Even these horrible realities of violence require interpretation; the events get further elaborated on, discussed or contested. We examine the communicative practices whereby participants tell violence and position themselves and others with regard to moral or political accountability. In particular, we focus on participants’ portrayal of events or discursive uses of affect/feeling in positioning (140).

178 Here violence is seen as “a discursive resource which persons can draw upon and tell to various audiences” (p. 158). “Both sides use references to violence to portray in-group members as victims or unjustified recipients, while out-group members are positioned as the aggressor or perpetrators of atrocities” (p. 140). Therefore, the “focus has been on the communicative practices in telling violence, that is, on the portrayal of events and the use of affect/feeling in positioning self and other (p. 156). Using “discursive analysis (Buttny, 2004) and positioning theory (Langenhove and Harré, 1999)” as the analytic method for their study, Buttny and Ellis (2007) show “how violent events get interactionally formulated or contested by interlocutors and how participants position themselves in relation to these accounts”(p. 142) or “how these tellings can impact the positioning and accountability of participants” (p. 158). In doing that, the authors (2007), as noted, “examine the communicative practices interlocutors use in formulating, ascribing and accounting for problems” (2004). Buttny and Ellis (2007) find out or conclude that these communicative practices (i.e. the selection of membership categories, action descriptions, avowals or ascriptions of affect/feeling, and the positioning of self and other):

matter in how events get portrayed. For instance, violent events are represented, not just as an isolated incident, as happening only to the individual narrator, but as part of a pattern, told as part of a list of atrocities […]” (156-158).

Therefore, Buttny and Ellis (2007) stress:

These practices in portraying violent events are consequential in how persons or groups get positioned. As we have seen, the Israeli military/police gets positioned by Arab panelists and even an Israeli audience member as being excessive, brutal or immoral in their use of deadly force (157).

Now, I proceed to review the second paper, “‘Telling-it-like-it-is’: the delegitimation of the second Palestinian Intifada in Thomas Friedman’s discourse,” published in 2009 in Discourse & Society, Vol 20 (1): 5-31. In an endeavour to examine “the delegitimation of the second Palestinian Intifada in the “discourse of the well-known American journalist Thomas Friedman…” (p.6), doctoral candidate, M.

179 Mosheer Amer (2009) of the University of Melbourne, Australia, critically analyses the discursive resources or linguistic or textual properties deployed to delegitimise the second intifada “in a column which Friedman contributed to the op-ed page of the New York Times” (NYT) on October 13 2000, “two weeks into the Intifada” (2009). In this paper, Amer (2009) begins by limning a picture of the September 28, 2000 Israeli event, then coinciding with “the fifth anniversary of the signing of Oslo 2” (see Chapter 5) (Smith, 2007: 212); an event that ignited the flame of the second Palestinian intifada, following the then Israeli opposition leader Ariel Sharon’s “‘right-of-ownership walk-about’” march to the compound of al-Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem - third of the two holiest sites in the world of Islam after those in Mecca and Medina - while “accompanied by nearly 1,000 police and media personnel” (Smith, 2007: 512); a march perceived as absolutely provocative and outrageous by Muslims. Amer (2009) then elaborates on the number of human corpses, largely Palestinians, resulting from such an event. Getting closer to his subject, Amer then proceeds to state that discourses “of and about war and conflict are profoundly interconnected with legitimation” (p. 6). So, as the title of the study suggests and as noted above, Amer (2009) examines the discursive resources or linguistic properties deployed in the delegitimation of the second Palestinian Intifada in a column by Thomas Friedman. He does that by:

examining the column’s argumentative structure and moves employed in Friedman’s delegitimizing construction of the Intifada and demonstrating throughout how the legitimation and delegitimation of political actors, including self-legitimation, is closely linked to Friedman’s argumentation and his discursive representation of the Intifada (7).

Using CDA or textual analysis as a framework, Amer (2009) analyses a “combination of thematic contents, argumentative moves, intertextual references and a range of linguistic properties” that “reinforces Friedman’s argumentation and his dichotomous representation of the situation” (p. 26). Besides his deployment- within the strategy of “positive self-presentation and negative other presentation” as “a powerful argumentative strategy”- of an ensemble of techniques and strategies “in order to preclude the possibility of being seen as biased, racist, or prejudiced” (p. 10), Friedman, Amer (2009) adds also anchors his delegitimation of the

180 intifada through a self-legitimation, “whereby he positions himself as more rational and objective, and as having better knowledge of the situation than his assumed opponents” (p. 26). Hence, in delegitimising the second Palestinian intifada and framing it as “Arafat’s War,” Friedman, according to Amer (2009), does not only depend discursively on his employment of a number of discourse strategies, argumentative moves and certain “linguistic properties of modality and style” (p. 22), but also draw meta- discursively through a process of self-legitimation upon his own “social status” and “social power” as an “authoritative voice on the Middle East and his position in an influential media institution” (p. 26) such as the New York Times. Drawing on Bourdieu (1991: 111), Amer (2009) writes in this connection:

In this way, the authority to perform acts of legitimation and its symbolic efficacy…depend on the interdependent relationship between ‘the properties of discourses, the properties of the person who pronounces them and the properties of the institution which authorizes him to pronounce them’ (8).

Drawing on a number of CDA scholars such as Van Dijk (1999; 1993; 1995; 1998); Fairclough (2001; 2003); Hodge and Kress (1993); Martin Rojo and Van Dijk (1997); Wodak, de Cillia, Reisigl, and Liebhart (1999); Van Leeuwen (2007); Friel and Falk (2007), and scholars writing on the Arab struggle against Israeli occupation such as Reinhart (2002); Finkelstein (2003); Said (2004); Philo and Berry (2004), Amer (2009) begins his CDA examination of Friedman’s column by drawing readers’ attention to the “polarizing characterization of the situation” found right in the title of Friedman’s column: “Arafat’s War”. Here, Amer (2009) urges us to note “the categorical assertion communicated in the title” where Friedman signals his “delegitimation of Arafat from the very early days of the Intifada” (p. 11). Amer (2009) further draws our attention to the fact that “framing the violence between Palestinians and Israelis as ‘Arafat’s War’ has ideological implications in terms of causal agency, responsibility and blame attribution” (2009). Thus, his observation:

Here Arafat and the Palestinians are cast in the negative agent role of the ‘attacker’ and the ‘transgressor’, and therefore are held responsible and blameworthy for the events. By implication, this negative agency and responsibility to the Palestinian side is likely to position Israel in the semantic patient role of the ‘victim’, which is

181 facing Arafat’s transgression and war. The reader is drawn to confirm this inference as the text unfolds (11).

Following this, Amer (2009) starts his critical analysis of the text where he reveals the discursive and linguistic resources Friedman employs in his delegitimation of the second Palestinian intifada. The following, according to Amer (2009), are examples of some of the Van Dijkian argumentative moves Friedman deploys in his delegitimation of the second intifada: “delegitimation through contrast,” “apparent concessions,” “blaming the victim,” “mitigation and excuse,” “ridicule,” “polarized” or “dichotomous representation of the situation,” “appeal to political authority,” “appeal to expert authority,” “appeal to reasoning and rationality,” “amplification of the ‘others’ negative action,” and “empathizing with ingroup members” (pp. 13-18), etc. In the final section or “remainder of the paper” (p. 7), Amer (2009) summarises the findings of another CDA study he conducted on “a corpus of 20 columns written by Friedman…” and “published over a six-month period between 2000 and 2003 in the NYT’s op-ed page” (2009). Such findings, in the words of Amer (2009), “support the analysis findings of the main text” (p. 5). Finally, in the coda of his Critical Discourse Study, Amer (2009) states:

I demonstrated that an overall discourse strategy of positive in-group presentation and negative out-group presentation dominates the text and takes place within an overall argumentative structure which delegitimizes the Palestinians as violent, confused and irresponsible and legitimizes Israeli actors as peaceable, rational and flexible (26).

At the very end, Amer (2009) ends his study with an important note about the crucial role discourse plays in times of war and conflict, and the necessity of CDA as a way to increase readers’ consciousness of how language can be used or abused to (re) produce, legitimate, and sustain power and domination, and thus initiate “the first step towards emancipation,” as the following closing paragraph asserts:

Underlying this analysis is a sensitized awareness of the role of language in times of war and conflict…conflicts and wars begin and end with words. Before guns are fired and bombs start falling, words commit the first act of war. It ultimately has serious material consequences on

182 individual lives and societies. The role of language is something one cannot afford to neglect, and this could not be more relevant than in subjecting the discourses of those in positions of power to critical analysis with the aim of sensitizing readers’ consciousness to the ways in which language can be used to normalize and sustain domination and control, since in Fairclough’s (1989: 1) words: ‘consciousness is the first step towards emancipation’ (26-27).

It is hence this consciousness and it is this prospect of emancipation that have prompted the present study, a textual analysis - done in light of Critical Discourse Studies - that aims, in relation to the Palestine Question, to conduct a CDA of dominant UN and peace discourses to discover what role they play in the perpetuation of the status quo or this “social wrong”. Discourses, as shown, play a formative role in the enactment, exercise and naturalisation of domination. Meanings and semiotic systems or modes shape and are shaped by relations of power and “social interests and ideologies,” making the melioration or deterioration of the world dependent on discourse or discursive practices; a reality that makes CDA as “a democratic resource” a necessity if we are, as noted, to strive to live in a better world or make us “profitably conceive the world in some alternative way” (Fowler, 1981: 25; quoted in Jaworski and Coupland, 1999: 33). In this context, the study in particular has availed itself (see chapters 4 and 5) of the Discourse-Historical Approach (DHA), one of the theoretical and analytical approaches within the framework of CDA, which, according to Titscher and associates (2000) “seeks to facilitate the analysis of implicitly prejudiced utterances and to assist in the decoding of allusions typically concealed in such utterances by referring to background knowledge (165)” to detect the intent and meaning underlying such utterances and hence reveal whether such discourse on Palestine is practical or impractical in achieving what it articulates. The study makes use of this variant or theoretical framework of CDA (discussed in the next chapter) so as to examine UN resolutions on the Arab struggle against Israeli occupation on the one hand, and peace discourse concerning the reconstruction of historic Palestine and reconstitution of her natives on the other, as a step towards consciousness-raising and ultimately emancipation.

183 CHAPTER FOUR METHODOLOGY

4.1 OVERVIEW

THIS chapter describes the methodology and framework of the study. It provides a concise account of the research methods and CDA approach adopted in the conduct of this qualitative CDA Study/document study/textual analysis. It discusses the CDA variant and mechanisms or CDA tools used for the pronounced analysis of the linguistic means and discourse strategies underlying the discourse in question. The chapter thus discusses the research methodology, theoretical framework, research design, data collection and data analysis. It provides a table of the corpus of study to be analysed critically, and of the sources of data collection and a sample of data analysis. The final section mentions - as part of the document analysis undertaken in this CDA research -someof the documents or discourse fragments analysed in Chapter 2 as part of the content of that chapter. Grave, complex and multifaceted, the problem under investigation does not belong to one distinct discourse or discipline. There is a great deal of imbrication. Entangled with the politics and geopolitics of today, the Palestine question is also related to past social and political factors, and cultural and historical aspects. This inseparable interrelatedness of the past and the present inherent in the Palestine problem makes this Critical Discourse Study more of a qualitative social research rather than a pure or applied research, and simultaneously warrants a “methodological merging” or the deployment of a number of approaches and research methods necessary for developing a comprehensive picture of the object under investigation. Hence, in constructing the content of study and analysing data, the study makes use of three research methods/approaches: the descriptive method, the historical-analytical framework, and textual analysis (CDA). The descriptive method, a fact-finding approach related mainly to the present (Ghosh, 2000), is used to describe the status quo, the current status of the phenomenon under investigation. This is in order to identify the causes of what is happening: ‘Israel’’s ongoing oppression and occupation, and the Palestinians’ hopelessness in the face of such wantonness. The historical approach (historical document analysis), however, through attention to chronology and the evolution of the problem, is

184 used to establish facts about the genesis and root causes of the problem created in Palestine. The analytical approach, along with CDA, is used to examine, in relation to the Palestine Question, the linguistics of the UN resolutions and peace discourse - aimed purportedly at ending “decades of confrontation and conflict” through the discursive construction of an independent Palestinian state. While the historical approach is used in Chapter 1 and Chapter 2 to establish facts, the analytical approach is used, along with CDA in some parts of Chapter 3 and throughout Chapter 5 to analyse the data critically.

4.2 THEORETICAL/ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK

Major theorists and scholars of CDA/CDS, such as Fairclough (2001), Reisigl and Wodak (2009) Van Dijk (1997; 1998), Van Leeuwen (2009), etc. have provided us – within the framework of CDA – with a number of approaches for the critical analysis of texts and talks and other significant semiotic modes, systems, means, events or meaning-making practices. Fairclough’s view of CDA is that of a critical, interdisciplinary problem-oriented approach that “subsumes a variety of [critical] approaches towards the social analysis of discourse…which differ in theory, methodology, and the type of research issues to which they tend to give prominence” (Fairclough and Wodak, 1997: 1). So, as noted in Chapter 3, those various “methods of text analysis” or CDA analytical approaches or variants or methodologies “differ,” as stated by Wodak, “in their theoretical underpinnings” (Kendall, 2007: 23). While Fairclough, for example, draws in his discourse analytic framework: the Dialectical-Relational Approach (DRA) on Halliday’s tripartite model of language or Systemic Functional Linguistics, Wodak, in her Discourse-Historical Approach (DHA), uses cognition theories, Theory of Text Planning, Critical Theory and “argumentation theory and rhetoric when analysing texts and discourses” (2007: 23). However, for purposes of this discourse study that uses the framework of CDA (where critical linguistic, textural and intertextual analyses are incorporated), Ruth Wodak’s three-dimensional approach, the Discourse-Historical Approach (DHA), is used as the main discourse analytic framework. Graphically hence, the methodology and framework employed in or by this study can be represented as follows:

185 DĞƚŚŽĚŽůŽŐLJ Θ dŚĞŽƌĞƚŝĐĂů&ƌĂŵĞǁŽƌŬ dĞdžƚƵĂůŶĂůLJƐŝƐ ͬ^

,

Figure 4.1: Methodology and Theoretical Framework

In addition, and in an attempt to optimise the “volitional” diversity of CDA approaches in studying the social problem under investigation, and benefit from this “eclectic” nature of the theories and methodologies underlying such approaches (Wodak and Meyer, 2009: 31), the study, along with DHA, draws where useful on other CDA variants such as the DRA (Dialectical-Relational Approach), SCA (Sociocognitive Approach) or CLA (Corpus Linguistics Approach) where resort to quantitative procedures and analysis at times, for example, can be useful. My adoption of Reisigl and Wodak’s (2009) “analytical apparatus” or DHA, as a variant of CDA within the field of multidisciplinary Discourse Studies, is warranted by the nature of the issue under investigation, which involves history and present-day politics. For though discoursing on the creation of a Palestinian state is a present issue, the issue itself is not new; it is foregrounded in history; it is a hundred years long (see Chapter 2); a fact that must be taken, given how the problem in the first place started, into serious consideration when proposing a “just, lasting and comprehensive peace settlement” to the Palestine Question. This is in order to demarcate the various aspects of the phenomenon at stake, put things in their right historical perspective, and thus propose a “just” solution. Now talking about DHA, Titscher, Meyer, Wodak and Vetter (2000) state:

The discourse-historical approach seeks to facilitate the analysis of implicitly prejudiced utterances and to assist in the decoding of allusions typically concealed in such utterances by referring to background knowledge (165).

Titscher and associates (2000: 158) state that within DHA or its “analytical apparatus,” there are three “systematically and recursively related” steps or levels of analysis - similar to or 186 evocative of Fairclough’s (1995; 2001) “descriptive, interpretive and explanatory” dimensions or stages of CDA - where a “fundamental distinction is made between contents, argumentation strategies, and forms of linguistic implementation as analytical levels”. So in DHA, critical analysis begins first with an establishment or identification of contents and topics of a specific discourse (“the main discourse topics of the text”); second, identification of discourse or argumentation strategies employed; and third, identification of the forms of linguistic implementation. Wodak and associates (1999; 1996; quoted in Titscher et al., 2000: 158) mention that “The procedure of the discourse-historical method” “is viewed as being hermeneutic and interpretive, with some influence from cognitive science”:

It should therefore be understood not as a sequence of separate operational steps but as a cycle in which the three analytical dimensions are systematically and recursively related to the totality of contextual knowledge” (2000: 158).

Drawing probably on Van Dijk’s (Titscher, Meyer, Wodak & Vetter, 2000: 23) conception of discourse as “text in context,” Wodak and Meyer (2009: 26), observe that DHA - which is critical, “interdisciplinary, problem-oriented, and analyses changes in discursive practices over time and in various genres” (Kendall, 2007: 4) - understands or views context and discourses “as mainly historical”. Thus, according to them, “[…] all discourses are historical and can therefore only be understood with reference to their context” (p. 20). Therefore, reference, “in intricate ways,” has to be made “to such extralinguistic factors as culture, society and ideology” (Wodak and Meyer, 2009). “Hence,” Wodak and Meyer (2009: 21) state that “the notion of context is crucial for CDA, since this explicitly includes social-psychological, political and ideological components and thereby postulates interdisciplinary procedures” (20-21). DHA, as seen by Wodak and Meyer (2009: 26), “focuses on the field of politics, where it develops conceptual frameworks for political discourse”. Now in analysing texts, attention (within the analytical apparatus of DHA) is paid to the following aspects, summarised by Wodak and associates (1990: 57; quoted in Titscher et al., 2000: 159-162):

• [“Setting and context”] Setting and context should be recorded as accurately as possible, since discourses can

187 only be described, understood and interpreted in their specific context. • [“Theme and content, intertextuality”] The content of an utterance must be confronted with historical events and facts as well as presented reports [...]. • [“Confrontation with data and reported facts”] Texts must be interpreted by other subject specialists (sociology, history, psychology). All stages imply an interdisciplinary approach as an important characteristic of the discourse- historical method. • [...precise description... of the text at all linguistic levels] Texts must be described as precisely as possible at all linguistic levels.

Wodak and associates (1999; 1996; quoted in Titscher et al., 2000: 158-159) maintain that “The exact description of individual texts and the analysis of larger corpora of data allow statements to be made, at both micro and macro levels, on the reconstruction of discourse contexts”. This indicates the significance of detailed description of texts, or the level of textual analysis in Fairclough’s approach. According to Fairclough, as mentioned in Chapter 3, “[…] social control and power are exercised with increasing frequency by means of texts, so text analysis becomes an important part of critical discourse analysis” (Titscher et al., 2000: 152-153). Here, Fairclough clearly “emphasizes the significance of the textual level in discourse analysis and criticizes the inadequate attention given to text analysis in the social sciences, despite the prominence of the supposed ‘linguistic turn’” (see Chapter 3) (2000: 152). Similarly, Titscher and associates (2000: 160) stress with reference to the “general principles of the discourse-historical method” that “Texts must be described as precisely as possible at all linguistic levels”. Fairclough (1995: 7) maintains that “Textual analysis demands diversity of focus not only with respect to functions but also with respect to levels of analysis”. Hence is the study’s focus on the analysis of both the content of texts and the content of texture (see Chapter 3). Within the analytical apparatus of DHA, Wodak and Meyer (2009: 29); and Reisigl and Wodak (2009: 93-94; 112-116) mention five heuristic discursive strategies, which can be used as general guidelines. Outlined below are these strategies, along with their purposes presented next to them in round brackets:

188 • Nomination strategies (“discursive construction of social actors, objects/phenomena/events, and processes and actions”)

• Predication strategies (“discursive characterization/ qualification of social actors, objects, phenomena, events, processes and actions (more or less positively or negatively)” )

• Argumentation strategies (“persuading addressees of the truth and normative rightness of claims”)

• Perspectivization, framing or discourse representation Strategies (“positioning speaker’s or writer’s point of view and expressing involvement or distance”)

• Mitigation and intensification strategies (“modifying the illocutionary force of utterances in respect of their epistemic or deontic status”)

Reisigl and Wodak (2009: 93) stress that those “five types of discursive strategies,” which upon critical analysis reveal how “social actors, objects, phenomena/events and processes” are being nominated/constructed, qualified and positioned vis-à-vis the “other,” “deserve special attention when analysing a specific discourse and related texts”. The study examines discourse strategies and argumentative moves of “positive ingroup presentation and negative outgroup presentation” (Van Dijk, 1991; cited in Amer, 2009: 10). Examples of such strategies/moves are the following: “denial of responsibility or guilt,” “victim-agent reversal”/blame the victim: “they ‘act in such a way that prejudice or unequal treatment is justified’,” “devaluation or defamation by distortion” (Matouschek, et al., 1995: 60; quoted in Titscher et al., 2000: 159), “delegitimation through contrast,” “evoking fear and alarm,” agency: negative/positive/agent deletion, “apparent concessions: ‘most of them are law-abiding citizens, but...’,” “contrast: ‘we are not intolerant, but they are’,” “mitigation and excuse: ‘the police were forced to act in this harsh way’,” “ridicule: using ridicule and sarcasm to discredit the opponent’” (Van Dijk, 1991; quoted in Amer, 2009: 10), polarisation or “polarized” or “dichotomous representation of the situation,” “appeal to political authority,” “appeal to expert authority,” “appeal to reasoning and rationality,” “amplification of the ‘others’ negative

189 action,” “empathizing with ingroup members,” “attacking the rationality of the outgroup’s members” (2009: 13-18), presupposition (e.g. “We want to set people free so that they have greater power over their own lives”) (Thomas et al., 2004: 42), and implicature (2004) as “two categories of implicit content” (Fairclough, 1995: 5), heteroglossia or “intertextual traces of other voices and discourses” (Amer, 2009: 24), “impression formation and credibility enhancement,” temporisation, and what I have termed in Chapter 1 as deceptive purveyance of optimism, etc. For further clarity, I reproduce these global discourse strategies and argumentative moves that underlie an overall discourse strategy of “positive ingroup presentation and negative outgroup presentation” (Van Dijk, 1999) - culled and consolidated from various sources - in the form of a table overleaf:

190 Table 4.1 Argumentation/discourse strategies/techniques/communicative practices

No. Discourse strategies/argumentative moves/ (justification) positive ingroup presentation and negative outgroup 1 presentation 2 assertion of ingroup allegiances and solidarity 3 empathising with ingroup members 4 denial of responsibility or guilt perpetrator/victim dichotomy or victim-agent reversal/blame 5 the victim devaluation or defamation by distortion/demonisation of the 6 other 7 delegitimation through contrast/self-legitimation 8 amplification of the ‘others’ negative action 9 agency: negative/positive; obscuring causal agency 10 apparent concessions 11 mitigation and excuse 12 ridicule: using ridicule and sarcasm to discredit the opponent dichotomous representation of the situation/positioning of 13 self and other 14 appeal to political authority 15 appeal to expert authority 16 appeal to reasoning and rationality 17 generalisation 18 legitimation 19 heteroglossia 20 allusions, evocations 21 impression formation and credibility enhancement 22 evoking fear and alarm 23 attacking the rationality of the outgroup’s members 24 using non-committal or ambiguous statements 25 creating false impression 26 deceptive purveyance of optimism 27 obscurantism; resort to ambiguity and vague formulations 28 presupposition and implicature/implication 29 manipulation of facts/misrepresentation of reality 30 elasticity or empty signification 31 hedging and temporisation/creating facts on the ground 32 otherisation

191 Along with these aspects, five heuristic discursive strategies, global discourse strategies and argumentative moves of “positive ingroup presentation and negative outgroup presentation” mentioned above, the study is also - in examining semiotic data - guided by and looks for specific linguistic means deployed for the realisation of discourse strategies. Hence, uncovering specific linguistic techniques of persuasion; noting calculated “grain-of-sand like means” such as the following is attempted whenever detected: obscuring causal agency through de- agentialisation/passivisation/passive agent deletion (e.g. “Redundancies will be announced”) (Cook, 2003) or nominalisation (e.g. “Genetic modification is a powerful technique.”), antithetical dyadic constructions (e.g. “friendly fire,” “peaceful force,” “cold war,” or “creative chaos”) (Misaddi, 2007), empty signifiers, manipulation of articles, through addition or deletion (e.g. withdrawal from territories instead of withdrawal from the territories), hedges or linguistic devices that “‘dilute’ an assertion” (e.g. she lost it and I think she lost it.) (Thomas et al., 2004: 214), modality and categorical assertions, and use of the simple present tense to signal factuality or as “a powerful form that reflects the author’s ‘certainty, unquestionableness, continuity, and universality’” (Fowler and Kress, 1979: 207; quoted in Amer, 2009: 22-23). The study also looks into certain rhetorical devices “used [as linguistic means] to influence [...] people’s political and ideological views” (Thomas et al., 2004: 41) such as the following: metaphor, euphemism, pronouns, the ‘rule of three’ or the three-part statement and parallelism (2004: 45-53). For further clarity, I reproduce or represent - using a different semiotic form - these specific linguistic means used for the realisation of discourse strategies – culled and consolidated from various sources – in the form of a table overleaf:

192 Table 4.2 Specific linguistic means for the realisation of discourse strategies

No. Structures/grammatical systems/linguistic means/ techniques for the realisation of discourse strategies transitivity selections and the characteristic use of certain 1 processes rather than others lexicalisation/use of misnomers: use of certain lexical 2 selections (e.g. “voluntary exodus” or “transfer” or “Arab- Israeli conflict” or “terrorists” in the ‘Israel’/Palestine context) passivisation/de-agentialisation/passive agent deletion: (“The favouring of passive constructions rather than active 3 ones, with the effect of disguising who is responsible for an event”) (Cook, 2003, 130) nominalisation: (“The use of inanimate nouns to refer to actions and 4 process, thus omitting mention of who is responsible for them”) (Cook, 2003: 130) antithetical dyadic constructions (to mitigate the severity of 5 an event as in “peaceful force” or “friendly fire,” etc. 6 weasel words manipulation of articles 7 (e.g. “withdrawal from territories” instead of withdrawal from the territories) use of empty or floating signifiers (e.g. “at the earliest 8 practicable date”) modality and categorical assertions (e.g. ‘It’s because even the participants can’t explain what 9 it’s about’ and ‘that is why this is Arafat’s war’) (Amer, 2009: 23) 10 use of the simple present tense 11 metaphors/metaphorical lexemes/use of imagery 12 euphemisms 13 Pronouns and deixis 14 ‘rule of three’ or the three-part statement 15 parallelism 16 quotations 17 rhetorical questions 18 hedges (to dilute an assertion or to temporise) (over) use of the subjunctive mood (making “every assertion 19 hypothetical”) 20 reiterations/rhetorical repetitions 21 performatives 22 active clause structures/negative clause structures 193 All the foregoing discourse strategies/argumentative moves of “positive ingroup presentation and negative outgroup presentation,” and the specific linguistic means of their realisation are selectively and consciously used by powerful social actors, all with the intent and mala fides to dominate and control “less powerful social groups,” enact and exercise power (Fairclough, 2001a), normalise and naturalise domination, legitimate or delegitimate events or conflicts or social players. They are deployed to make us “pat the bomb” (Cohn, 1987), make an outlet for a preconceived political event, cover up a certain one, mystify and manipulate, divert attention and deaden senses (Misaddi, 2007), influence and control cognition, manage the mind and shape thought, hedge and dilute, “foreground or [...] obscure responsibility and agency” (Thomas et al., 2004: 52), “naturalise us into accepting certain ideas” (33), affect and alter people’s perception of things, “influence people’s political and ideological views” (41), defend the indefensible, “make notions which are in fact debatable seem like ‘givens’” (53), or “questionable ideas or issues more palatable and ‘normal’” (48). They are used to “make lies sound truthful and murder respectable,” to “give an appearance of solidity to pure wind” (Orwell; quoted in Sant, 2008: 35), to “reinforce a particular perception of event or of whole societies” (Thomas et al., 2004: 52). They are used to “normalize and sustain domination and control” (Amer, 2009: 26-27), to perpetuate “hegemonic relations or unequal relations of power” (Simpson, 1993; Fairclough, 2001a); to enact, conceal, legitimate, or reproduce hegemony and inequality (Van Dijk, 1993). They are deployed to stabilise and intensify “unequal social arrangements” (Cameron et al., 1999: 142), to “represent social realities in determinate ways” (Montgomery et al., 1992: 74). They are deployed to delegitimise the powerless as “violent, confused and irresponsible” and legitimise the powerful as “peaceable, rational and flexible” (Amer, 2009: 26)... Furthermore, and as part of my account of DHA as the major analytical apparatus used for this CDA analysis, it is important before leaving this section that I draw special attention to one of the main characteristics characterising all CDA approaches; indeed, it is a feature or characteristic without which CDA ceases to be what it claims to be. This characteristic is “critical;” CDA being critical; critical not in the common sense usage of being negative, as noted in Chapter Three, but “in the special sense of aiming to show up connections which may be hidden from people - such as the connections between language, power and ideology;” critical in the sense of being “sceptical” and “not taking things for granted;” critical in the sense of “opening up complexity,” of “challenging

194 reductionism, dogmatism and dichotomies,” of being self-reflective in one’s research, thus making “opaque structures of power relations and ideologies manifest” (17) (for a discussion of this aspect of CDA, reference is to be made to Chapter Three). In discussing critique, as one of three concepts (the others being “power” and “ideology”) that indispensably, as noted, figure in all variants of CDA, Reisigl and Wodak (2009: 88) mention three related aspects of “critique,” to which DHA adheres: (I) text or discourse-immanent critique (aimed “at discovering inconsistencies, self-contradictions, paradoxes and dilemmas in the text-internal or discourse-internal structures”), (II) socio-diagnostic critique (“concerned with demystifying the – manifest or latent – persuasive or ‘manipulative’ character of discursive practices”), and (III) future- related prospective critique (meant to “contribute to the improvement of communication (for example, by elaborating guidelines against sexist language use or by reducing ‘language barriers’ in hospitals, schools and so forth)”). This is how CDA, in general, and DHA, in particular, understands “critical,” and this is how this study, accordingly, understands and applies it.

4.3 RESEARCH DESIGN

The methodology deployed for this Critical Discourse Study is largely textual analysis. The sources of data are chiefly based on “existing texts” such as “mass media communication,” documents found in Charles D. Smith’s 2007 monograph: Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict: a History with Documents, and relevant UN resolutions. Besides, the study makes use of certain Internet sources or online existing data such as those concerning UN resolutions, and The Palestine Papers, a “leak of confidential documents related to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict,” exposed by Al Jazeera and The Guardian (Jan 23-26, 2011) and other sources such as WikiLeaks. Therefore, and as is the case with “Most of the approaches to CDA,” explicit sampling is not recommended (Wodak and Meyer, 2009: 27). Already “existing texts” can do the job. In addition to the ones analysed in Chapter 2 as part of constructing the content of that chapter (vide Section 4.6 or Table 4.6 at the end of this chapter for a list of these documents), and some others interspersed here and there, the following texts form the main body of data or corpus of study:

195 • Texts of UN resolutions (9 in number) (see Table 4.3) concerning the Palestine Question and the termination of hostilities between Arabs and Israelis

• Some negotiation and peace process discourses - conducted “based on U.N. Resolutions 242 and 338, as well as the Camp David Accords of 1978:” the formula or framework7 established originally by Menachem Begin (Shash, 1999) – drafted pursuant to the December 1988 PLO de facto recognition of ‘Israel,’ and the ensuing October 30, 1991Middle East Peace Conference in Madrid, co-sponsored by the US and the then Soviet Union, with the apparent goal to put an end to “decades of confrontation and conflict” between Arabs and Israelis:

So through the critical analysis of those discursive events, those texts of UN resolutions and the peace process, the study endeavours to find how practical and bona fide such UN and peace discourse is in ending the status quo or “Israel’s oppression and occupation,” in realising the Right of the Palestinian People to Self- Determination, and in implementing the Palestinian Refugees Right of Return, and thus paving the road to “just” and “lasting” peace in the Middle East. The study seeks to linguistically investigate how and why the Palestine Question - Palestinian homelessness and sufferings following their forcible removal from their homeland in 1948 - has been discursively shaped. Now overleaf is a table outlining these UN and peace discourses. For the detailed critical analysis of these discursive resources in Chapter 5, excerpts are quoted as part of the analytical and hermeneutic process. However, the resolutions can all be found appended unabridged in APPENDIX A at the end of this study.

7 This framework refers to the other agreement of the 1978 Camp David Accords, the first being that between Israel and Egypt which led to the Israel-Egypt Peace Treaty of 1979. The second agreement, which was not implemented at the time, created “a framework for a broader peace in the region that included a plan for Palestinian self- rule in the West Bank and Gaza Strip” (Britannica Concise Encyclopedia 2010). It is significant also to note here that those agreements or Accords (1978), which are used as the framework for Oslo Accords (1993) were rejected at the time by the PLO and the rest of Arab states, boycotting Egypt as a result of them (Shash, 1999) (see Chapter 5). 196 Table 4.3 Corpus of Study (Documents Analysed in Chapter 5)

Ite Source for No. of m UN Discourse Document/Discourse Pages No. UN GA Resolution 212 Al-Zaytouna Centre for Studies 1 of November 1948 and Consultations 3 (http://www.alzaytouna.net/arabic) UN GA Resolution 194 Al-Zaytouna Centre for Studies 2 of December 1948 and Consultations 3 (http://www.alzaytouna.net/arabic) UN GA Resolution 302 Al-Zaytouna Centre for Studies 3 of December 1949 and Consultations 4 (http://www.alzaytouna.net/arabic) UN SC Resolution 242 Charles D. Smith (2007) Palestine of November 1967 and the Arab-Israeli Conflict: a 4 History with Documents (pp. 344- 2 145) UN SC Resolution 338 Charles D. Smith (2007) Palestine 5 of October 1973 and the Arab-Israeli Conflict: a 1 History with Documents (p. 348) UN GA Resolution Al-Zaytouna Centre for Studies 6 3236 of November and Consultations 2 1974 (http://www.alzaytouna.net/arabic) UN SC Resolution Al-Zaytouna Centre for Studies 7 1397 of March 2002 and Consultations 1 (http://www.alzaytouna.net/arabic) UN GA Resolution on Al-Zaytouna Centre for Studies 8 Israeli Wall and Consultations 3 of October 21, 2003 (http://www.alzaytouna.net/arabic) UN SC Resolution Al-Zaytouna Centre for Studies 9 1515 of November and Consultations 1 2003 (http://www.alzaytouna.net/arabic)

‘Peace’ Discourse

Israel & PLO Al-Zaytouna Centre for Studies Exchange Letters of and Consultations 10 Recognition (http://www.alzaytouna.net/arabic) 3 (September 9,1993) Oslo I Accords: The Charles D. Smith (2007) Palestine Israeli-PLO and the Arab-Israeli Conflict: a Declaration of History with Documents (pp. 493- 11 Principles, 498)/Al-Zaytouna Centre for 12 Washington, D.C. Studies & Consultations (September 13,1993) (http://www.alzaytouna.net/en/) (http://www.alzaytouna.net/arabic) The Israeli-Palestinian Charles D. Smith (2007) Palestine Interim Agreement and the Arab-Israeli Conflict: a 12 (Oslo 2) on the West History with Documents (pp. 493- 6 Bank and the Gaza 498) Strip (Sept. 28, 1995) George W. Bush, Charles D. Smith (2007) Palestine Speech at the Aqaba and the Arab-Israeli Conflict: a 13 (Jordan) Summit, June History with Documents (pp. 550- 2 4, 2003 551)

197 4.4 DATA COLLECTION

There is no accepted canon of data collection, but many CDA approaches work with existing data, i.e. texts not specifically produced for the respective research projects. (Wodak and Meyer, 2009: 32)

For purposes of this Critical Discourse Study, critical textual analyses of discourses pertinent to the Palestine Question, e.g. existing texts of UN resolutions on the Arab struggle against Israeli occupation and the discursive (re) construction of Palestine, along with discourses on the peace process, i.e. the Oslo and post-Oslo peace process are carried out. Such “data corpora” or discursive resources represent the main body of data for the analysis of this study. However and “similar to Grounded Theory (Glaser and Strauss, 1967),” “data collection [in CDA] is not considered to be a specific phase that must be completed before analysis begins” (Wodak and Meyer, 2009: 27). Here, data collection is systematic and can be a continuous process that begins when the research begins and ends as the research ends. Hence, Wodak and Meyer’s (2009):

[…] it is a matter of finding indicators for particular concepts, expanding concepts into categories and, on the basis of these results, collecting further data (theoretical sampling). In this procedure, data collection is never completely excluded, and new questions always arise which can only be dealt with if more data are collected or earlier data are re-examined (Strauss, 1987; Strauss and Corbin, 1990) (27).

Finally, in a study that deals with a present-day issue that is deeply rooted in the past, identification of and reliance on both secondary as well as primary source materials is significant. From such sources, identified and collected during the “research trail” or literature search (Galgano, Arndt, and Hyser, 2008), a list of major reference sources and a bundle of primary documents have been selected for use throughout the study.

198 4.5 DATA ANALYSIS

A first step in text analysis is to make certain generalizations [assumptions] which are then classified according to the analytical apparatus. This is then followed by a renewed analysis of the text, and so on. (Titscher et al., 2000: 160)

DHA unfolds a four-step strategy of analysis: after (1) having established the specific contents or topics of a specific discourse (e.g. with racist, anti-Semitic, nationalist or ethnicist ingredients), (2) the discursive strategies (including argumentation strategies) are investigated. Then (3), the linguistic means (as types) and the specific, context-dependent linguistic realizations (as tokens) of the discriminatory stereotypes are examined (4). (Wodak and Meyer, 2009: 29)

In this section, I provide two examples where textual analysis of the language of discourse is informed by CDA. While the first example is meant to illustrate the role of discourse in representing and constructing, “the other,” in delegitimising it as part of an overall discourse strategy of “positive ingroup presentation and negative outgroup presentation” and hence our perception of it, the second example stresses the importance of tracing “intertextual and interdiscursive relationships between utterances, texts, genres and discourses, as well as extra-linguistic [meta-discursive] social/sociological variables, the history of an organization or institution […]” (Reisigl and Wodak, 2009: 90), the “heteroglossia of voices” embedded in a text and hence creating through (a process of) de- and re-contextualisation a “new hybrid or nodal” discourse. The purpose of the second example is not only to show how a discourse is normally the imbrication or product of a number of other past and present discourses, all being de- and then re- contextualised to produce a new hybrid interdiscourse, but also the importance of realising these intertextual, interdiscursive relationships by invoking their historical context, digging deep in the collective memory or code or jargon of a certain discourse type, i.e. political discourse. The first example or text was a response, by Israeli UN Ambassador Yosef Tekoah, to Yasir Arafat’s Address to the UN General Assembly, November 13, 1974. In making his case, Tekoah employs a number of discourse strategies and delegitimising

199 argumentative moves meant to discursively construct and discredit “the other,” primarily the PLO as “a murder organization” which must, as a result, have “no place in international diplomatic efforts”. Overleaf, I now provide a table that includes extracts from Tekoah’s Address,8 along with his argumentation: his dichotomous representation of the situation, his discursive delegitimation of the PLO and by implication the Palestinians, his victim-agent reversal, his defamation by distortion or demonisation of the “other” his delegitimising argumentative moves dominant in his text that underlies an overall discourse strategy of “positive ingroup presentation and negative outgroup presentation,” associated with ‘peaceable,’ ‘victimised’ and ‘self-defending’ Israelis; and ‘bestial,’ ‘terrorist,’ and ‘brutal’ Palestinians, respectively. This is in an attempt to “facilitate the analysis of implicitly prejudiced utterances and to assist in the decoding of allusions [and projected images] typically concealed in such utterances” (Titscher and associates, 2000: 165); and to patiently note “the linguistic means used by the privileged (in this case Bush) to stabilize or even to intensify inequalities in society” (Wodak and Meyer, 2009: 32).

8 Source: Charles D. Smith, Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict: A HISTORY WITH DOCUMENTS (Bedford/St. Martin’s, 2007), 351-353. 200 Table 4.4 Argumentative structure of Tekoah’s Address

No. Extracts Discourse strategies/ Argumentative moves 1 On 14 October 1974 the General Assembly defamation by distortion; turned its back on the UN Charter, on law ridiculing and blaming; and humanity, and virtually capitulated to a murder organization which aims at the demonisation of the other; destruction of a State Member of the UN. On 14 October the UN hung out a sign victim-agent reversal; reading “Murderers of children are implication that ‘Israel’ is law- welcome here.” abiding 2 Today these murderers have come to the defamation by distortion; General Assembly, certain that it would do their bidding. Today this rostrum was defiled presupposition of the by their chieftain, who proclaimed that the shedding of Jewish blood; shedding of Jewish blood would end only when the murderers’ demands had been victim-agent reversal accepted…. 3 Today bloodshed and bestiality have devaluation or come here to collect the spoils of the UN defamation by distortion; surrender… The victim of bloodshed and delegitimation of the other bestiality should not even defend himself. through contrast

4 The United Nations is entrusted with the manipulation of facts; responsibility to guide mankind away from implicating violence and war, away from violence and oppression, oppression (as opposed to toward peace… What remains of that legitimate resistance and responsibility now that the UN has freedom-fighting) to the PLO; prostrated itself before the PLO, which appeal to reasoning and stands for premeditated, deliberate murder rationality; of innocent civilians, denies to the Jewish appeal to political authority; people its right to live, and seeks to destroy the Jewish State by armed victim/perpetrator dichotomy force?... 5 The United Nations, whose duty it is to manipulation of facts; combat terrorism and barbarity, may implicating terrorism and agree to consort with them. Israel will not. barbarity to Palestinians; dichotomous representation of the situation by representing Ísrael’ in the semantic patient role of the mere self-defender; victim/perpetrator framework 6 The murderers of athletes in the Olympic defamation by distortion; Games of Munich, the butchers of amplification of the‘ others children in Ma’alot, the assassins of negative actions; diplomats in Khartoum do not belong in delegitimation through self- the international community. They have legitimation; no place in international diplomatic polarised representation; efforts. Israel shall see it that they have victim-agent reversal no place in them. 201 There are four social actors nominated or constructed discursively in Tekoah’s delegitimising text. These are “the General Assembly,” “the United Nations,” “Jews,” and “the PLO”. Table 4.5 below lists the most salient predications relating to these actors.

Table 4.5 Main nominations (social actors) and predications in Tekoah’s Address

No. Social Actors Predications (discursive qualification of social actors)

1 The General • an organisation that turns its back on the Assembly UN Charter, on law and humanity • a body capitulating to a murder organization • hangs out signs reading: “Murderers of children are welcome here.” 2 The United Nations • responsible to guide mankind away from war, violence and oppression • a worker toward peace • prostrating before the PLO • fighter of terrorism and barbarity

3Jews• victims of [Palestinian] bloodshed and bestiality 4The• a murder organization PLO/Palestinians • murderers • defiling the rostrum of the General Assembly • shedders of Jewish blood • bestial • collectors of the spoils of the UN surrender • perpetrators of premeditated, deliberate murder of innocent civilians • deniers of the Jewish people the right to live • seekers to destroy the Jewish State by armed force • murderers of athletes • butchers of children • assassins of diplomats • perpetrators of atrocities • shedders of the blood of Jewish children

202 As Table 4.5 illustrates, Tekoah constructs the PLO/Palestinians only by means of negative predications. As for the General Assembly, it appears as a powerless dependent agent who is being bullied by ‘a murder organisation’. While detailing through self- legitimation the responsibilities of the United Nations, Tekoah presupposes that the UN is prostrating to ‘a murder organisation’ and by implication implicating that the UN is failing to carry out such responsibilities on the one hand, thus justifying past and future Israeli military response against the Palestinians, and that ‘Israel’ is law-abiding on the other. Three of the predominant argumentative moves employed in the text are victim-agent reversal, dichotomous representation of the situation, and the consistent defamation by distortion or demonisation of the other where members of the PLO are consistently being constructed - and in so construction comes the delegitimation of the other - as “murderers,” “butchers,” “assassins,” perpetrators of “premeditated, deliberate murder of innocent civilians,” shedders of “the blood of Jewish children,” etc. in a way that implies that ‘Israel’ is innocent of all these crimes and that it is only a ‘victim’ to “a murder organization,” and not a settler society whose then nascent existence entailed the brutal elimination of a whole peaceful nation (see Chapter 2). The transitivity selections used as specific linguistic means to realise linguistically such strategies, augment such aspects. So wherever the PLO features as the agent/actor, then it is an agent/actor of “murder” and assassination, of “violence and oppression,” of “bloodshed and bestiality,” of “terrorism and barbarity,” acts of which ‘poor’ ‘Israel’ is the affected/goal. For instance, the PLO is consistently being featured or represented in negative subject positions or in semantic agents of negative processes such as “The PLO… denies to the Jewish people its right to live, and seeks to destroy the Jewish State by armed force” whereas ‘little’ ‘Israel’ is being implicitly positioned in the semantic patient role of someone who is defending him or herself against such “atrocities,” against “a murder organization,” and the capitalisation of the General Assembly to such an organisation, against “bloodshed and bestiality,” against “butchers of children,” and “murderers of athletes,” assassins of diplomats, and perpetrators of “premeditated, deliberate murder of innocent civilians,” and not the other way round, thus polarising the situation, which is tantamount to another discourse strategy, victim-agent reversal, where the victim becomes the ‘criminal’ and the criminal the ‘victim;’ a strategy employed within an overall discourse strategy of positive ingroup presentation and negative outgroup presentation.

203 My point from the above detailed critical analysis is to show the powerful role of discourse in constructing the“other,”increatinga certain image of the “other,” in delegitimating the “other”. Thus, my goal has been to show how discourse structures and strategies can be employed - within the discourse strategy of “positive self- presentation and negative other presentation” - in the discursive representation - actual construction and characterisation (rather than mere or neutral description) and delegitimation of the “other” vis-à- vis “we” or the self. Let us now look at the second example where I examine the importance of tracing or unraveling “intertextual and interdiscursive relationships between utterances, texts, genres and discourses” (Reisigl and Wodak, 2009: 90) in deciphering a discursive event. As noted at the beginning of this section, the purpose of the second example is not only to show how a discourse is normally the product of a number of other past and present discourses, being de- and then re-contextualised to produce a new hybrid interdiscourse, but also the importance of realising these intertextual, interdiscursive relationships by analysing, interpreting, consulting subject specialists, and invoking their original historical context by digging deep in the collective memory or code or jargon of a certain discourse type. To illustrate interdiscourse or interdiscursive relations, let us now consider the following extract, taken from the preface to Ilan Pappe’s (2006) monograph: The Ethnic Cleansing of Palestine:

…it is indeed my own J’Accuse against the politicians who devised, and the generals who perpetrated, the ethnic cleansing. Still, when I mention their names, I do so not because I want to see them posthumously brought to trial, but in order to humanise the victimisers as well as the victims: I want to prevent the crimes Israel committed from being attributed to such elusive factors as ‘the circumstances’, ‘the army’ [or any other elusive discursive label or justification] …and similar vague references that let sovereign states off the hook and enable individuals to escape justice (xvi).

Now, “…it is indeed my own J’Accuse,” what does this discursive event, “J’Accuse,” used by Pappe, mean? Notice that I am not after the literal meaning which is simply “I Accuse”. How are we to understand what Pappe means by “it is indeed my own J’Accuse

204 against the politicians who devised, and the generals who perpetrated, the ethnic cleansing”? Why “my own”? Looking at the literal or lexical meaning of the phrase does not help, nor does the present context alone seem to help, nor does the grammatical construction help, despite its simplicity: “I Accuse”. Meaning lies beyond the syntactical-grammatical, lexical- lexicographical, and textual-contextual constituents of the discursive event in question (Misaddi, 2007). So our question persists. Where does meaning lie and where are we to find it? It is certainly beyond the boundary of the sentence or the clause as I have indicated. It is beyond the text. It is meta-textual. It is extra-linguistic. It is beyond the text-internal factors of cohesion and coherence. Here, in search of meaning, one has to go beyond words; “beyond” and “over” grammatical or syntactic constructions; beyond their “locutionary content with an aim to search their illocutionary forces” (Grundy, 2000; quoted in Govindasamy and Khan, 2006: 158). Therefore, traditional text or linguistic analysis where the focus and scope of analysis is on the text-internal factors alone does not also help. We have to go in beyond the discursive to the meta-discursive where meaning lies somewhere in one of the five criteria of text- external factors (see below) which in discourse analysis “play an essential role” (Titscher et al., 2000: 24). It lies in interdiscourse; in the discourse strategy described as allusions or evocations; it lies in “the historicity of discursive events” (Fairclough, 1995: preface); it lies in a specific historical event shrouded in the interconnected heteroglossia of voices or “Mikhail Bakhtin’s (1986) concept of interdiscursivity and Julia Kristeva’s intertextuality (Moi 1986)” (1995: 150, emphasis added) where “historical and social facts” are incorporated; the notion that “every discourse is bound up with many others and can only be understood on the basis of others” (Wodak and Meyer, 2009: 26), on the unraveling of such intertextual, interdiscursive (inter) connectedness. This intertextual interpretation or interpretive analysis of the text is equivalent to the second dimension or stage of analysis in Fairclough’s DRA’s analytical apparatus, the discourse or discursive practice, a stage preceded by the descriptive linguistic analysis (first dimension/stage) of a discursive event, and proceeded by the explanatory social or sociocultural practice analysis, as the third stage in the DRA’s process of analysis as outlined by Fairclough (1995; 2001). Thus, as noted in the section on Critical Discourse Studies, “language use per se” is not the focus of discourse analysis. Besides its interest in the internal “textual-syntactic connectedness,”

205 known as cohesion, (critical) discourse analysis is also interested in “textual semantics” or coherence (“the meaning of the text”), along with the five criteria of text-external factors (see below) (Titscher et al., 2000). CDA researchers are interested in those implications that go beyond the immediate context but that are shrouded in and signalled by the immediate context, the “text in context”. They are interested, not only in the “text-internal” factors of cohesion and coherence, but also in the “text-external factors” of intentionality, acceptability, informativity, situationality and intertextuality, as the seven text criteria of de Beaugrande and Dressler (Titscher and Wodak, 2000: pp. 21-24, and p. 227). Therefore, according to Misaddi (2007), we have to stretch our imagination beyond the immediate context and browse through the layers of the collective political memory to find intertextual links. The meaning might be shrouded in a tenuous, allusive and veiled admixture of interdiscursivity, in “the centripetal-centrifugal intertextuality of texts” (Fairclough, 1995: preface); in a discursive hybrid collage that makes the text or discursive event an imbrication of immediate linguistic ingenuity or creativity and a past disguised allusion or intertextual reference. Therefore, “discourses,” which are, according to Wodak (1996), by definition “historical” as they “can only be understood in relation to their context,” “are not only embedded in a particular culture, ideology or history, but are also connected intertextually to other discourses” (quoted in Titscher et al., 2000: 148). This is what Christopher Candlin and Michel Foucault, I assume, mean by “the historicity of discursive events” and “the archaeology of knowledge” and experience, respectively (Fairclough, 1995). So to unveil the implicit, the implication behind some discursive events, the receiver or discourse analyst needs to infer by benefiting but going beyond the immediate context and entailment or literal wording, and digging, at times, into the past original context and drawing, in an attempt to recover an explicature (“an enrichment of an original utterance […] to a fully elaborated propositional form” (Grundy, 2000:102)), and then the implicature (s), on the historical political memory that makes up political convention or parlance. As political discourse is like any discourse-type a cluster of semiotic practices that are context dependent (Reisigl and Wodak, 2009), without such sophistication and encyclopaedic or meta-contextual knowledge – knowledge that goes beyond the immediate syntactical-grammatical, lexical-lexicographical, and textual- contextual constituents of the discursive event in question - of the original context and the circumstances that gave rise to it, one may

206 never arrive, as stressed by Misaddi (2007) at the implicatures or get the intended message behind certain discursive events as certain propositions need first to be explicated or semantically enriched (Grundy, 2000) based on such real-world knowledge and then attempt our chance at deriving the implicatures or what is implicated (recall our investigation of the meaning of and referent behind “Fox” in Operation Desert Fox, the operational war code given by the US military discourse orchestrators to dub an operation against Iraq in 1998). This is an assumption that makes CDA researchers and scholars of great value as they deconstruct or decode the discursive event and let us see – besides unearthing the linguistic resources - those “grain-of-sand like means” or the linguistic “pin-sting” - that legitimate the “other” and sustain domination (see example one) – the veiled intertextual, interdiscursive links between the immediate or present textual-context and the allusive meta-textual or meta- discursive reference of a past discursive event. That is why Reisigl and Wodak (2009: 90) state that “DHA,” as a variant of CDA takes into account “intertextual and interdiscursive relationships between utterances, texts, genres and discourses [where meaning can be “de- and re-contextualized, i.e. newly framed,” thus acquiring a partly new meaning], as well as extra- linguistic social/sociological variables, the history of an organization or institution, and situational frames". Having said this, let us now get back to the event in question: “…it is indeed my own J’Accuse”. According to Misaddi (2007: 99-100) and Britannica Concise Encyclopedia 2010, in 1894, Alfred Dreyfus (1859- 1935), a French army officer of Jewish extraction, “was accused of selling military secrets to Germany”. Convicted, he was court-martialed and as a result sentenced to life imprisonment. However, it was found that the evidence was irregular and insufficient, which caused a lot of unrest nationwide. The Dreyfus Affair, consequently, turned into a national crisis. At this juncture, Émile Zola (1840-1902), a French novelist and critic, rose up and wrote a famous letter titled: “J’Accuse,” accusing the military of covering up its errors in making the case,” thus bringing the affair again into public attention; and eventually, based on the authority of the word, acquitting Dreyfus of the false charge. Now back to Pappe’s own version of “it is indeed my own J’Accuse,” it is clear that without this intertextual meta-contextual historical knowledge, rooted in (the archeology of) the collective political memory, in the “intertextual traces of other voices and discourses” (Amer, 2009: 24), no precise cognition can be made out of this discursive event which encapsulates a hundred years of history.

207 It is also clear that this meta-knowledge (knowledge of the knowledge) or historical background which makes up political parlance or convention goes beyond, as noted, the immediate syntactical-grammatical, lexical-lexicographical, and textual- contextual knowledge of the uttered words, where meaning lies beyond phraseology, beyond the immediate context, beyond the boundaries of the clause; and indeed, “beyond the temporal and spatial horizon of the immediate occasion of interaction” (Erickson, 2004; quoted in Young, 2009: 3).

4.6 HISTORICAL CONSTRUCTION OF THE PALESTINE QUESTION

Document analysis - as part of the corpus of study analysed in this study- formed an important part in data collection in order to write Chapter 2: BACKGROUND: THE PALESTINE QUESTION (see Table below). Data were collected and collated to construct the Palestine Question - the issue under investigation - as a background to the whole study. As mentioned in Chapter 2, such synthesized data were meant to bring to light, inter alia, the major contributing factors and formative events behind the development of the “Zionist enterprise in Palestine” and the consequent pre-planned “transformation of Palestine into a Jewish state”. In the process, analysis was conducted on a number of primary historical documents (some of which can be found appended at the end of this study) as such contributing factors.

208 Table 4.6 Corpus of Study (Documents Analysed in Chapter 2)

Discursive Ite No. Events/ m of Documents/ Source for Document/Discourse No Pa Discourse . ges Fragments The Jewish Herzl, T. ([1896]1988). The Jewish pp. 1 State (1896) State. New York: Dover 67- Publications, Inc. 157 Husayn- Al-Zaytouna Centre for Studies and McMahon Consultations 2 2 Correspondenc (http://www.alzaytouna.net/arabic) e (1915-1916) Balfour http://www.mideastweb.org/mebalf 3 Declaration our.htm 1 (1917) the Palestine http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/j 4 Mandate source/History/Palestine_Mandate. 5 (1922) html British White http://www.mideastweb.org/1922w 5 Paper of p.htm 3 June1922 British White Al-Zaytouna Centre for Studies and Paper of Consultations 6 6 November (http://www.alzaytouna.net/arabic) 1939 Resolution 181 Al-Zaytouna Centre for Studies and (Plan of Consultations 2 7 Partition) http://www.alzaytouna.net/arabic +23 (November 29, 1947). Filastin wal- Sulaiman, Khalid A. (1984). Isti’mar al- Palestine and Modern Arab Poetry. Jadid London: Zed Books (pp. 8-9) 8 2 (Palestine and the New Colonization)

209 CHAPTER FIVE DATA ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

Thus, the activities of colonialism are regularly promoted in more subtle and complicated ways to such an extent that it becomes almost totally beyond our ability to perceive their far-reaching implications. This is because our mental status and attitudes prevent us from following the intrigues and discerning the grain-of-sand like means used by colonialism. In such a situation, it would suffice that a single grain of sand enters the engine to put it out of order. In other words, just as a ‘nothing’ would suffice to paralyze the nervous system of a living being, so too would a ‘pin sting’ in a sensitive area be sufficient to bring paralysis into the social relations network of a colonized country. (Bennabi, 1998: 100)

5.1 OVERVIEW

This chapter concerns itself with a CDA of the discourse declared to bring to an end “decades of confrontation and conflict” in the Middle East through the reconstruction of Mandate Palestine so as to establish a Palestinian state; a state that embodies the national aspirations of the Palestinian people and their right to self- determination. The chapter, following this overview, and a brief section on discourse and political entities, starts with the first Research Question, a CDA of UN resolutions and ‘peace’ discourse on the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination; and next moves on to the second Research Question concerning the Palestinian Refugees Right of Return in such discourse. The chapter in the process continues to provide critical insights into the ‘peace’ proposals (see Section 3.5) or “peace offensive:” the PLO’s implicit then explicit abandonment of the 1968 Charter “that called for Palestinian statehood in what was now Israel” (Smith, 2007, 409), the “open acceptance of Resolution 242,” the de facto recognition of ‘Israel’ in 1988, the 1993 Oslo Accords, and the Interim Agreement (Oslo 2) in 1995, and certain discourse fragments of the Roadmap discourse of the Quartet. Following a look into the change of the official Arab and consequently Palestinian discourse and thus stance regarding the Zionist entity as an “enemy,” the chapter closes with an evaluation of the ‘peace process’.

210 Now, throughout this treatise, I have maintained that social control and domination are being exercised “with increasing frequency by means of texts” and that mystification of social events is conducted by discursive and linguistic means, and that demystification, enlightenment and social change can be achieved by means of patiently noting those subtle “grain-of-sand like means;” by “subjecting the discourses of those in positions of power to critical analysis” (Amer, 2009: 26); by “careful systematic analysis, self- reflection at every point of one’s research and distance from the data which are being investigated” (Wodak and Meyer, 2009: 32). So, if a nation or a powerless or disenfranchised social group is to be disengaged from the trammels of discourse or abuse of those in positions of power, then it is a prerequisite for such a nation or group or ‘losers’ to become conscious of logos, of the double-edged weapon of discourse. They have to become conscious since “consciousness is the first step towards emancipation” (Fairclough, 2001a: 1). Without this language consciousness or what Fairclough (2001a) calls critical language awareness - this consciousness of discourse as a mighty double-edged weapon - we are prone to enslavement and manipulation by opportunists, colonialists or Machiavellians, those “rodent-like agents” conscious of the power of the “grain-of- sand like means” or the linguistic “pin-sting” induced by the linguistic sign. It is from this attempt at language consciousness raising, the attempt to make us, rulers and ruled, far conscious of domination in its linguistic forms that this study draws much of its significance (i.e. first objective of study), where readers are being sensitised to language as a vehicle for social action rather than (mere) thought; a vehicle not only for the reflection of reality or as a method of communication for the political event, but also the actual construction or distortion of such reality and such a political event; a vehicle for the perpetuation of a certain reality. Given this, this work encourages CDA scholars and researchers in particular to always remain - like a morally committed artist in pursuit of liberty, equality and justice - engagé, not dégagé. It urges them to always be driven by “emancipatory and democratic purposes” (Reisigl and Wodak, 2009: 120). It emphasises the moral obligation upon them to always be, as stressed by Van Dijk (2009: 63) “sociopolitically committed to social equality and justice" – a goal of this CDA study.

211 5.1.1 Discourse and Political Entities

While charisma can be a determinant in the future of a presidential candidate, his or her powers of oratory, rhetoric or soundbite can have the upper hand in such presidential races or electoral debates (Misaddi, 2007). Similarly, while resistance and intifadas or popular revolts play a role in irredentism and revanchism, or the restoration of occupied territories, discourse, depending on the political perspective, vested interests and ideological affiliations of its producer can either enhance the efficacy of such struggle or undermine it. Indeed, the way discourses project a certain people, events or phenomena can greatly construct or adversely distort their past, present and future. Thus, depending on power-holders or discourse producers, political discourse can result into certain peaceful modi vivendi among nations, groups, or factions that are at war, or into warmongering and the escalation of political fray and or even the outbreak of wars among countries that are actually or ostensibly at peace. As noted in Chapter 1, “conflicts and wars begin and end with words”. Therefore, discourse as such and as being “socially constitutive” can bring about far-reaching social consequences and political transformations that are of momentous magnitude. It can be used, again depending on the political perspective and vested interests of its producer, as an instrument of conflict management and resolution, or strife and revolution, confrontation or negotiation, political repression or political emancipation, legitimation or delegitimation. It can be used as a vehicle for construction or destruction, obfuscation or elucidation, peaceful coexistence or ideological confrontation, aggression or non-aggression, political stability or political unrest, détente or impasse, bellicosity and belligerence or entente and non-belligerence, amity or enmity, power of logic or logic of power, peace or war, etc. In short, discourse can generate momentum that tanks alone cannot; an assumption that lends credit to the saying: “the pen is mightier than the sword,” or “persuasion is better than force”. Dialectically, it is now obvious that a certain political event is a consequence of a certain discursive event and vice versa (see Chapter 1). Hence, the emergence of new nation states, new political entities and new national identities, and the collapse or dissolution or indeed elimination or ‘cleansing’ of certain others can all result from the struggles for power and power of the soundbite where “the composition of cultural groups, the management of social relations, the constitution of social institutions, the perpetuation of social prejudices, and so on” (Jaworski and Coupland, 1999: 5) are

212 all induced or constituted (enacted and exercised) by discourse (see Chapters 1 and 3). A case in point is that of the politicide of Palestine and the consequent creation of that of the settler colonialist Zionist entity. As it is now, discourse was instrumental in the early years or development of the settler Zionist enterprise. It was instrumental in such politicide and such creation. It played a major role in the diplomacy and propagation of israelese. It played a major role in the fiction spun about the ‘historical right ‘or ‘historic connection’. It was significant in the choice of Palestine over the Argentine as a more profitable Zionist enterprise (see Chapter 2). It was central to justification, (de)legitimation and domination. Discourse has also been instrumental in perpetuating the status quo, following the creation in 1948 of ‘Israel,’ a new nation state or settler society in the heart of Palestine (see Chapter 2). So, discourse was not only instrumental in bringing about the Jewish state but also in maintaining, besides the biased involvement of certain Powers, its survival despite its alien presence in a region that is different from it in every aspect, and until the very moment. In this context, it is apposite to draw attention to Der Judenstaat or TheJewishState, the (nationalist identity) discourse the founder of Zionism forged in 1896 - mentioned in Chapter 2 as one of the factors or formative events behind the creation of the Jewish state and the resultant homelessness and sufferings of the Palestinians. This is the startling pamphlet in which Theodore Herzl (1860-1904) - visionary and father of the ‘State of Israel’ - had proposed a “modern solution for the Jewish question” and explained his vision and “scheme” of a Jewish state. This influential little pamphlet - this Herzlian discursive conception of a Jewish state, this visionary work which conceptualised the Jewish Question and made it an international problem - was a milestone in the national construction of Zionist Jews and portentously the national destruction of the Palestinians (see Subsection 2.3.2, and p. 71 of 2.3.3). It inaugurated the Zionist national movement and mobilised some of the imperial powers of the day. It indicated the need to have a sovereign right to conduct “organized emigration,” rather than colonisation through “gradual infiltration of Jews,” which would be “bound to end badly”. It drew up a detailed plan as a solution to the Jewish Question and pointed out the means and mechanisms to carry out such a “scheme” and achieve such a solution. It started the settler Zionist process of immigration and resettlement, and eventually the creation

213 of this Jewish state on the ‘cleansed’ Palestinian homes and villages. So, as noted, discourse was instrumental in carrying out the Zionist enterprise in Palestine and (along with the use of force later on) the ultimate creation of the ‘State of Israel’ 44 years after the death of Herzl. Indeed, as captured succinctly by Lipsky (1988), (discourse of) The Jewish State was “one of the chapters in the story” of Herzl “to achieve in eight years [i.e. 1896 until his death in 1904] what his people had not been able to achieve in two thousand years” (Herzl, 1896/1946/1988: 20). So, it all starts and ends with discourse. Inner and political emancipation start with discourse and are maintained via discourse. Through discourse, not only did Herzl start to make an invented piece of fiction a reality, but also created the piece of fiction which eventually became a reality. Indeed, not only did Herzl discursively - or through the power of logos and the buildup of a “Zionist mythology” - accomplish self- emancipation or liberation of the spirits of Jews from the ghettos, but also in the process political emancipation, aided in the course of development by force of arms. So not only did Herzl indicate destiny in his discourse (s) on the Jewish question and its solution instantiated in the establishment of a Jewish state, but also galvanised Zionist Jews to political action after he had inspired them discursively. In his words in The Jewish State - published in a pamphlet in 1896 - Herzl writes:

It depends on the Jews themselves whether this political pamphlet remains for the present a political romance. If the present generation is too dull to understand it rightly, a future, finer and a better generation will arise to understand it. The Jews who wish for a State shall have it, and they will deserve to have it (Herzl, 1988: Preface).

5.1.2 Research Questions and Assumptions

As stated in Chapter 1, the Research Questions centre on two overarching major questions or inalienable rights essential to Palestinian statehood and thus instrumental in bringing about any settlement or modus vivendi to the Arab struggle against Israeli occupation. Cornerstones for Palestinian salvation and Israeli security, these are (i) the Palestinian People Right to Self-Determination (supposedly articulated in UN Resolution 3236 of November 1974), and (ii) the

214 Palestinian Refugees Right of Return (supposedly articulated in UN Resolution 194 of December 1948). These are the questions on whose answers the foundation stones of such a state and peace depend. Therefore, the Research Questions centre on the position of these pillars or inalienable rights - pivotal to Palestinian survival and statehood, termination of hostilities between Muslims and Zionists, and a peaceful Middle East and hence any attempt at rehabilitation - on the agenda of UN and peace discourse on the Palestine Question. The study endeavours to find how practical and bona fide those resolutions and subsequent ‘peace’ discourse (s) in constructing those pillars or rights are. Since Palestine has been colonised through Zionist discourse and the force of arms, any discourse that does not tackle adequately these issues or undo this injustice is bound, in my view, to be impractical, and hence ineffective or at best impermanent. It remains so as long as such discourse legitimates, whether de facto or de jure, implicitly or explicitly, the Zionist annexation of more than 80% of historic Palestine (Question of Occupation/Territory/Sovereignty or Self-Determination), and as long as it denies the return of the 85% of Palestinians the Zionists expelled in 1948 and 1967 (Question of the Right of Return). Now, before I begin dealing with the position of each of these two inalienable rights in UN and peace discourse in detail, I reproduce below the Research Questions, along with my assumptions towards them:

1. How practical and bona fide are UN resolutions and ‘peace talks’ in ending the status quo - “Israel’s oppression and occupation” - in realising the Palestinian People Right to Self- Determination, and thus paving the road to “peace” in the Middle East? (I assume that they are neither practical nor bona fide.)

2. To what extent has such UN and ‘peace’ discourse gone in implementing the Palestinian Refugees Right of Return or the reconstitution of the Palestinians - rendered since 1948 homeless - as a nation in their historic homeland? (I assume that it has dodged the implementation of this right.)

215 5.2 RQ I: UN RESOLUTIONS AND ‘PEACE’ DISCOURSE, AND RIGHT OF THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE TO SELF- DETERMINATION (QUESTION OF OCCUPATION/ TERRITORY/ SOVEREIGNTY)

As a point of departure, I set out to deal with Research Question I concerning the role of UN resolutions and ‘peace’ discourse in ending the Israeli occupation and realising the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination by aiding them reconstitute themselves in their historic homeland, and thus paving the road to “peace” in the Middle East. Hence, Research Question I centres on the position of this inalienable right - the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination through an end to the Israeli occupation - in UN and ‘peace’ discourse. The Question can be divided into five detailed heuristic sub-questions as follows:

• To what extent do UN resolutions and contemporary discourse of the ‘peace process’ reshape and demarcate the geopolitical map of former Palestine? What territory out of Mandate Palestine does the discoursed-upon state have?

• How practical or dispositive and bona fide such resolutions and discourses are in ending occupation and realising a Palestinian state that is politically sovereign and economically viable?

• What territorial integrity and contiguity does such state have in light of Israeli settler colonies, those huge Jewish population centres that rip Palestinian territories and families and mothers and their parity apart?

• What is thestatusof al-Quds/Jerusaleminsuchdiscourses? Can there be a Palestinian state without Jerusalem being its capital, given its religious, historical and cultural significance, not only to Palestinians, but also to Muslims and even Christians worldwide?

• What sovereignty does the proposed state have over the envisioned or negotiated territory?

In an attempt to provide an answer to these sub-questions posed under Research Question I, critical analysis is conducted on six UN resolutions, namely: 242 (1967), 338 (1973), 3236 (1974), 1397

216 (2002), 1515 (2003), and that related to the erection of the latest Israeli segregation barrier on the West Bank (2003). In addition, an attempt is also made to deconstruct the language of three documents of the peace process/peace discourse, namely: Oslo Accords (Sept 13, 1993), The Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement (Oslo 2) on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip (Sept 28, 1995), and George W. Bush, Speech at the Aqaba (Jordan) Summit, June 4, 2003.

5.2.1 UN SC Resolution 242 and Right of the Palestinian People to Self-Determination (Question of Occupation and Territory)

After extensive consultations with Arab states, Israel, and the Palestinians, the United Nations and the Soviet Union believe that an historic opportunity exists to advance the prospects for genuine peace throughout the region. The United States and the Soviet Union are prepared to assist the parties to achieve a just, lasting and comprehensive peace settlement, through direct negotiations along two tracks, between Israel and the Arab states, and between Israel and the Palestinians, based on United Nations Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. The objective of this process is real peace. (Letter of invitation to the Middle East Peace Conference in Madrid, 19-10-1991)

Issued 20 years after the Partition Resolution (181 of November 1947), UN SC Resolution 242 (November 22, 1967) (vide Appendix A (v)), has created a new reality in Palestine. Through this Resolution, “the United States has laid down the foundation stone for a new map for the Jewish state, commensurate with the role it plays in the context of her strategy in the region” (Shash, 1999: 19). Here, producers of this UN discourse have laid down the grounds for an indefinite pro-Israeli reality. Ironically, becoming one of the most commonly referred to in Middle Eastern politics or the Israel/Palestine question, Resolution 242 has thus been instrumental in granting or rather arrogating to the European Zionist immigrant diaspora further land requisition or annexation of Palestinian territory, while paradoxically depriving the indigenes of further rights. Drafted by Lord Caradon, the then Britain’s representative to the UN, Resolution 242 - through deliberate linguistic ambiguity

217 reminiscent of that of McMahon, the British High Commissioner for Egypt (1915-1917) (see Chapter 2) - has been a bone of contention not only since the very moment of its adoption, but also its interpretation. In this subsection, I want to study whether this resolution - taken along with 338 as noted in the above epigraph, as the basis for “permanent status negotiations” and the construction of “a just, lasting and comprehensive peace settlement” - genuinely and practically works towards the “termination of hostilities” between Arabs and Israelis through recognising and realising the Palestinian people’s right to self-determination, or whether it is only a means to temporise to create further “facts on the ground” to elicit more concessions and thus “enable further consolidation of Israeli power”. In other words, the study seeks to ascertain if this Resolution is really geared towards and linguistically structured to achieve “a just, lasting and comprehensive peace,” as foregrounded in the invitation to the Middle East Peace Conference or whether it is a linguistic means to protract the Arab struggle against Israeli occupation and gain more time to create further “irreversible” realities? The critical analysis is aimed to reveal this and to ultimately find out if this resolution, taken - as noted - as the basis “to advance the prospects for genuine peace throughout the region” is bona fide and practical (in achieving its purported objectives). As a background to its setting and context, Resolution 242 was adopted in the aftermath of the Israeli Aggression of 5 June (1967) (framed by Israelis as the Six-Day War) and the consequent occupation of the remnant of historic Palestine, along with the sovereign territories of the Sinai Peninsula (of Egypt) and the Golan Heights (of Syria). Thus, the resolution was issued supposedly in order to end “the state of belligerency then existing between Israel and Egypt, Jordan and Syria,” following the 1948 implantation of ‘Israel’ in the heart of the Arab world, and then intensified following this Aggression of 5 June - this full-scale blitzkrieg Israeli surprise attack on 5 June 1967 that has resulted in the new state’s Anschluss or annexation of the remnant 22% (Saleh, 2001) of historic Palestine: the West Bank, East Jerusalem, and the Gaza Strip, wiping Palestine off the map completely. Proposed by the British, and supported by the British and the Americans, text of Resolution 242 has, in violation of the UN principle of “the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war,” not only authorised ‘Israel’’s existence within the 78% of Palestine it annexed in the 1948 Zionist encroachments on the territory and human geography of Palestine - formalised in 1949 Armistice Agreements - but also provided for her the grounds or linguistic

218 means to dodge and debate the extent of withdrawal from the remaining 22% of the territory of Mandate Palestine it occupied in the aggression of 5 June the resolution is supposed to demand for its immediate return. Drafters of Resolution 242 begin by emphasising “the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war [...], which creates, given how ‘Israel’ was established on most of Mandate Palestine by means of war (1948), a contradiction. The resolution next proceeds as to state that “the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East” requires, amongst other things:

(i) Withdrawal of Israel [i] armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict [and] (ii) Termination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect for and acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every State in the area in their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force.

By making or restricting reference to “the recent conflict,” i.e. 1967, the resolution first ignores 1948 as the year marking a new juncture in the Palestinian struggle against Zionist immigration and domination. Notwithstanding this disregard of this historical fact of the annus horribilis of 1948 as the year of the creation of ‘Israel’ and the consequent homelessness of the Palestinians, the resolution has to do with, and was adopted as a development of such a historical fact. It has to do with the UN principle of “the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war,” hence its call (i) for the “withdrawal of Israel [i] armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict” and (ii) “Termination of all claims or states of belligerency”. However, in ignoring the then recent fact that ‘Israel,’ which was founded in 1948, was established through Zionist terrorism or “the acquisition of territory by war,” the resolution contradicts itself when it emphasises “the territorial inviolability” and “the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war” (see below for another contradiction in the resolution concerning this point). Furthermore, this rather ambiguous resolution gives the impression that ‘Israel’ is to withdraw from the territories it occupied in that same year (i.e. 1967). However, a critical analysis of the linguistics or grain-of-sand like means used reveals, much to the manipulative nature of the Israeli side, and frustration and naiveté of the Palestinian side, something else. Let us first take a look at the

219 following extract taken from paragraph 1 (i) of the resolution with its reconstructed or deconstructed version next to it:

Table 5.1 CDA of UN Resolution 242 and Right of the Palestinian People to Self-Determination (Question of Occupation and Territory)

Original text Deconstructed

Withdrawal of Israel[i] armed “Withdrawal of Israel[i] armed forces forces from territories occupied in from [the] territories occupied in the the recent conflict recent conflict”

According to the phraseology or wording of the original text above, ‘Israel’ is to withdraw from territories it occupied in the recent conflict; territories, any territories; five or ten percent of the area of the occupied territories can, from the Israeli point of view or the Machiavellian discourse producer, for example, fulfill the “requirements”. The way discourse here is carefully worded with the calculated omission of the definite article “the,” for instance, makes or gives room for ‘Israel’ to withdraw from “some” or “certain” territories rather than the territories, i.e., all the territories it occupied in that invasion. The linguistics of the resolution do not specify the extent of withdrawal, which must be; given “the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war,” full withdrawal. So this creates another contradiction between the preambular phrase, “the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war” discussed above and this deliberate ambiguity in the extent of withdrawal from territories occupied by force through “the acquisition of territory by war”. In other words, if “the acquisition of territory by war” or “force” is inadmissible, then full and immediate withdrawal from all the territories occupied by aggression must take place, and immediately and unconditionally. Such self-contradictions embedded in the discourse-internal structures, and vague formulations deployed as discursive strategies - detected only upon careful critical patient analysis, “self-reflection […] and distance from the data […]” - give ‘Israel’ much wiggle room to really indefinitely temporise, stonewall and hedge the principles of the UN Charter and Geneva Conventions, disputing and denying the interpretation of the Palestinian viewpoint of the resolution, which is total and immediate Israeli withdrawal. And it is this total and immediate Israeli withdrawal that is the logical thing to do, if those power-holders are to be logical and appear to be fair. Any other interpretation, such as the one dogmatically adopted

220 by ‘Israel’ and supported by the UK and USA, is a fallacy, carried out or made possible discursively. But if these powerful groups insist on such interpretations, then they have also to say that some “Israel [i] armed forces” are to withdraw, rather than all, since “Israel [i] armed forces” similarly lacks the definite article (Shash, 1999). It is “Withdrawal of Israel[i] armed forces [not the Israel[i] armed forces] from territories occupied in the recent conflict”. Otherwise, this besides, being illogical or fallacious will amount to another contradiction. I cannot totally, though, exclude the possibility that this might have also been deliberate, for similar purposes: withdrawal of some Israeli armed forces rather than the or all forces; as a way of redeployment for example, however paradoxical this may sound. Further and in contrast to this omission of the definite article from paragraph 1 (i) of the Resolution: “Withdrawal of Israel[i] armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict,” we find that “the” is used in paragraph 2 (c), in connection with the necessity “For guaranteeing the territorial inviolability and political independence of every State in the area [...] (emphasis added)”. So it appears that when it comes to territorial withdrawal where ‘Israel’ is the one to withdraw, it is “Withdrawal […] from territories,” “some” territories without specification, but when it comes to guaranteeing the inviolability of the territory where ‘Israel’ is particularly involved and particularly concerned given its formation in the region by force of arms, it is “the territorial inviolability,” with “the” being used: specific and unambiguous. In other words, when it comes to the Israelis, the phrasing of the resolution makes it less demanding, while making it more demanding when it comes to the Arabs Before leaving this point, I do not wish to pass over the use of modality in the UN’s affirmation “that the fulfilment of Charter principles requires the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East which should include the application of both the following principles (emphasis added):” that of the “Withdrawal of Israel[i] armed forces,” discussed above and that of the “Termination of all claims or states of belligerency…” (see Table 2 below). So for “just and lasting peace” to take place, the Security Council advises (i.e. does not obligate: “should” rather than “must”) the invading forces to apply the principle of “withdrawal”. They “should,” they are advised in other words, if they wish, to withdraw. But they are not obliged to do so. Here the discourse producers make the withdrawal of Israeli armed forces a matter of advisability, rather than an obligation: “should”. This choice of modality will certainly be different and have a binding

221 rather than advising effect if “must,” for example, were used in lieu of “should”. An exhortatory wishy-washy word, “should” is not “must”. It does not have the force or level of urgency and enforceability as the obligatory “must” even if one is to argue that it is being used in a legal sense. In such contexts, “should” has the capacity to be manipulated. It can provide room for debate. Whatever the case, it is my feeling that had “must” been used in place of “should” in the above-mentioned apparent UN affirmation, reality could have been different, or at least might have been different. But for such change from “should” to “must” to take place, then a change has to take place in the intent underlying such construction of linguistics or calculated use of discourse. Let us now consider another issue or pitfall in the resolution. As shown in the following table, producers of this resolution speak of “secure and recognized boundaries” – apparently an “innocent” phrase that does not merit attention.

Table 5.2 CDA of UN Resolution 242 and Right of the Palestinian People to Self-Determination (Question of Occupation and Territory)

Original text Deconstructed

The Security Council, Now, notice that the ‘little’ word [....] “secure” is what CDA researchers 1. Affirms that the fulfilment of would call a floating or empty Charter principles requires the signifier - “a signifier without a establishment of a just and lasting signified” or a word without referent peace in the Middle East which or at least a particular one. should include the application of both In other words, what constitutes the following principles: what is “secure” for one might not be necessarily the same for (i) Withdrawal of Israel [i] armed another. A word like this is open to forces from territories occupied in the one’s resourceful imagination. How recent conflict; would you define “secure”? The elastic or floating (property of the) (ii) Termination of all claims or states lexical selection “secure” - or its of belligerency and respect for and derivatives such as “security” - acknowledgment of the sovereignty, lacks any particular referent or territorial integrity and political signified, hence, making it here all independence of every State in the open to ‘Israel’’s unshackled area and their right to live in peace resourceful and agile imagination to within secure and recognized envisage and dictate – since it is boundaries free from threats or acts the belligerent force – what is of force (emphasis added). “secure;” to fill in this empty signifier in accordance with her own specifications and expedience. 222 Indeed, the ambiguity and elasticity of this locution or empty signifier, “secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force (emphasis added),” found in paragraph 1 (ii) of the resolution, gives, in a manner similar to the omission of ‘the’ from principle (i), much leeway to ‘Israel’ - whose problems with boundaries and perception or complex of “security” differs from any other state or perception given how it was founded - to decide what boundaries it deems “secure” and in accordance with her own unshackled robust imagination. Given the mythological foundational stones and the blood path the colonialist Zionist entity were built upon, it is always security- conscious. Indeed, given the blood path on which the colonialist Zionist entity was created, it is always security-conscious. The fact that every Israeli village or city was, as stated by Moshe Dayan (1915-1981) - one of the Zionist entity’s former army commanders and defence ministers - “built on its Palestinian counterpart” (Saleh, 2001: 46) makes Israel to be beset with issues of security despite the present imbalance of power. Given this asymmetry of power, this gives ‘Israel,’ the occupying Power, the upper hand to dictate, out of a relatively “genuine fear” (Pappe, 2006), what is “secure” and consequently needs to be “recognized”. Clearly, “secure and recognized boundaries” go in tandem with “Withdrawal [...] from territories”. The elasticity or floating signification of “secure” complements or corroborates the ambiguity of “Withdrawal [...] from territories”. These are instances of the way language or linguistic means can be used or rather abused as they are meant to be obscure or not evident to the casual reader or certain participants, so as to achieve certain hidden ends that sustain domination. A further instance of such elastic linguistics or selections where a sufficient wiggle room can be made for a rhino” can be found in Principle (c) of Paragraph 2, where 242 affirms the necessity:

For guaranteeing the territorial inviolability and political independence of every State in the area, through measures including the establishment of demilitarized zones [...].

Here consider the locution “[...] through measures including the establishment of demilitarized zones [...]. Demilitarised zones! Now what could this mean, apart from giving ‘Israel,’ the occupying force, carte blanche or further means to sustain its power and domination over the region? What could it denote apart from further enacting

223 and reproducing unequal arrangements of power; apart from laying to ‘Israel’ – and it must be ‘Israel’ since it is ‘Israel’ that is the alien entity in the region – the ground to perpetuate hegemonic relations or asymmetrical relations of power in the Middle East? Notice also that the establishment of “demilitarized zones” is not everything. It is one of a series of open-ended “measures,” “For guaranteeing the territorial inviolability [...] “through measures,” one of which is demilitarisation. So “measures including” have to be noted and underlined. It deserves much self-reflection for what other potential “measures” might be is open to ‘Israel’’s unshackled imagination and what it would again deem “secure”. Further, Resolution 242 also, as quoted at the beginning of this subsection, states in paragraph 1that “the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East” requires (i) “Withdrawal of Israel [i] armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict” and (ii) “Termination of all claims or states of belligerency [...]”. So, 242 calls for “the establishment of a just and lasting peace”. Here I wish to underline “a just and lasting peace,” peace in the Middle East as being qualified with “just” and “lasting”. Now recall that Chapter 1 states that this is a Critical Discourse Study on the uprooted and occupied Palestinians whose eagerness to find a solution to their uprootedness and occupation makes them inclined to accept even unjust solutions; and a study on occupying Israelis whose eagerness to temporise and create more obstacles, to annex the rest of Palestine, makes them ready to reject even just solutions. This reminds us that Palestine has been taken by force of arms, a fact that renders 242, however ‘just’ it might appear to certain stakeholders, to remain unjust; it remains so as long as the belligerent Israeli occupation still exists on more than 80% of historic Palestine, or as long as it legitimises the Israeli seizure of more than 80% of former Palestine. Actually it remains so as long as ‘Israel’ itself exists (in the heart or at the expense of another nation) or at least as long as the bulk of the Palestinian people is still homeless and stateless. Therefore and in connection with the question of practicality, talking about “the establishment of a just and lasting peace” can never be the case. Calling it “just” and “lasting” when it is nothing but a travesty of justice and a gross distortion of inexorable historical facts is an illusion calculated to divert one’s attention; a discourse strategy designed to titillate one’s feelings and in the process deaden one’s senses. Indeed, how can it ever be “just” and “lasting” when the same resolution gives the occupying Power much leeway to even debate the extent of withdrawal from territories whose totality, if

224 returned in toto, would still only constitute 22% of Mandate Palestine? How can it be “just” and “lasting” when this occupying Power has been for 44 years so far debating withdrawal and is still debating, refusing to withdraw from those territories it occupied by force of arms in 1967, and desperately needed by the homeless and stateless Palestinians for a state to bring to an end such national trauma, prolonged homelessness, burning nostalgia and continued sufferings? Nothing but a myth, ‘peace’ can neither be “just” in this case nor “lasting,” unless the words “just” and “lasting” denote or connote something else in the English language or to the drafters of the resolution or those adopting it. In fact, the total withdrawal of the Israeli armed forces from the “territories occupied in the recent conflict” would still be unjust as this would constitute only 22% of former Palestine as noted. Indeed, the whole notion of partitioning Palestine (UN Resolution 181 of November 1947) was unjust, let alone the reality created following 1948 and then the 1967 Israeli occupation of the remnant 22 percent left off Palestine which Resolution 242, as analysed, makes it - contrary to what it might seem on the surface of it - possible for ‘Israel’ to even keep of such vestige what it judges convenient to her, i.e. “Withdrawal [...] from territories” rather than “the” or “all” “territories occupied in the recent conflict,” and to the extent it deems “secure” as revealed. In this context, I quote Article 19 of the PLO Charter (also known as the Palestinian National Charter (1968):

The partition of Palestine in 1947 and the establishment of the state of Israel are entirely illegal, regardless of the passage of time, because they were [and still are] contrary to the will of the Palestinian people and to their natural right in their homeland, and inconsistent with the principles embodied in the Charter of the United Nations, particularly the right to self-determination [and the Principle of “the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war”].

Further, it should be stressed that the way 242 is constructed leaves it open as to when exactly or even approximately this “withdrawal” - regardless of its disputable extent - is to take place as there is nothing in the resolution that specifies immediacy or stipulates a certain deadline for withdrawal, which must be immediate given the resolution’s apparent emphasis on the “inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war,” and its affirmation that “the fulfilment of [UN] Charter principles requires the establishment of a just and

225 lasting peace in the Middle East”. It is ambiguous, nebulous, indefinite; it only says “withdrawal of Israel [i] armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict,” which, in practice, may take effect in a day or on the Judgement Day. Recall that 242 was adopted in 1967, and we are so far in 2013, and 'Israel’ is still stonewalling debating withdrawal: from “territories” or “the territories”. The ambiguous and elastic linguistics of the resolution have provided the settler state with the subtle means to sustain its domination over the 78% of Palestine it occupied in 1948, and further debate withdrawal from the rest 22% of it, it annexed in 1967 - the remnant of Palestine needed by the Palestinians for a state to mitigate the angst and agony of their First Massive Wave of Mass Expulsion, which was to be exacerbated rather than reversed by a Second Massive Wave of Ethnic Cleansing. The belligerent Israeli occupation has therefore continued, and “the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war” has been nothing but discourse, and “the need to work for a just and lasting peace” has been nothing but mirage, and the perpetuation rather than termination of hostilities has been nothing but the case. Therefore - and based on (1) the inherent contradiction embedded in the preambular phrase of the resolution: “the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war” and how ‘Israel’ was established, and the deliberate commission or calculated omission of the article “the” contradicting this supposed “inadmissibility,” (2) the elasticity of “secure and recognized boundaries,” (3) the lack of enforceability as represented by the calculated use of modality: “should include” rather than “must” or has to,” (4) the sustainment of Israeli domination “through measures” that include “the establishment [in neighbouring countries and any potential future Palestinian “entity”] of demilitarized zones,” to ensure Israeli hegemony in the region (5) the deceptive purveyance of optimism as a discourse strategy found in paragraph 1: “the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East,” (6) the contradiction between “the need to work for a just and lasting peace” and the much leeway or deliberate ambiguity in “withdrawal […] from territories,” and (7) the intentional lack of a timeframe for withdrawal of the occupying Power - the paper concludes that UN SC Resolution 242 of November 1967 is flawed, contradictory and biased, and is thus neither practical nor bona fide in putting an end to Israeli occupation and domination. In view of all this, the study further concludes that if ‘peace’ is to be achieved based on this resolution; it is bound to be precarious and temporary.

226 Using a different semiotic form - as a way of making use of what I calledinChapter3 themultisemioticity of texts - the table overleaf sums up those text-internal linguistic mechanisms used in Resolution 242 to sustain and reproduce domination:

Table 5.3 CDA of UN Resolution 242 and Right of the Palestinian People to Self-Determination

Resolution/original text Text-internal self-contradictions and inconsistencies, discourse strategies and linguistic means used in Resolution 242 to sustain and reproduce domination [Emphasises] the (1) - Hasn’t ‘Israel’ been established on inadmissibility of the most of Mandate Palestine by means of war acquisition of territory by (1948)? war [...]. - “demilitarized zones” and other “measures” – Affirms further the this provides ‘Israel’ with means to sustain its necessity power and domination over the region (c) For guaranteeing the territorial inviolability [...] - “Withdrawal of Israel[i] armed forces from through measures including territories [rather than the territories] the establishment of occupied in the recent conflict [1967]”. This demilitarized zones [...]. calculated manipulation of articles can ensure infinite hedging and temporisation. Withdrawal of Israel[i] armed forces from (2) - lack of a timeframe for withdrawal of territories occupied in the the occupying Power recent conflict. Affirms that the fulfilment - deceptive purveyance of optimism: of Charter principles Calling it “just” and “lasting” peace is a requires the establishment misrepresentation of reality and a gross of a just and lasting peace distortion of and disregard for inexorable facts; in the Middle East [...]. an illusion or a call calculated to divert one’s attention, titillate one’s feelings and in the process deaden one’s senses. Affirms [...] every State - resort to deliberate ambiguity and vague [’s...] right to live in peace formulations within secure and - use of elasticity or empty signification recognized boundaries [...]. [Emphasizes] the need to - “withdrawal […] from territories” work for a just and lasting peace

Now, in addition to all the above-mentioned problems inherent in Resolution 242, the resolution ignores a number of important historical facts. It treats the Palestine Question as though it was the product of 1967 and not, for example, 1948 (see Table 5.4 below). 227 The fact is that the Palestine Question is that of a nation rendered since 1948 by Zionist terrorism homeless - a nation distinguished from the rest by a common history, descent, language, culture, religion, physical characteristics, historical continuity, national homogeneity, common political present, and primordial territorial attachment to the land (Amer, 2012), etc. The Palestine Question is that of a homeland stolen, and a people downtrodden; it is the question of a people who have been denied by successive Israeli leadership their right to national independence and self- determination; it is the mass deportations or “mass forcible removal” of a people from their roots; it is the 1948 Zionist encroachments on the human geography and demography of Palestine, resulting in the First Massive Wave of Ethnic Cleansing (i.e. refugees of 1948); and exacerbated by the 1967 Israeli occupation of the rest of historic Palestine and the resultant Second Massive Wave of Ethnic Cleansing (i.e. refugees of 1967)9:

Table 5.4 CDA of UN Resolution 242 and Right of the Palestinian People to Self-Determination (Question of Occupation and Territory)

Original Deconstructed text Withdrawal Resolution 242 simply ignores all the above-mentioned of Israel[i] inexorable historical facts created by Zionist terrorism; it armed disregards the heart of the problem: the problem as a “national forces cause;” the problem as a people whom Zionists (later from constructed as Israelis) have uprooted from their place of territories origin and made to languish in different places of the world; occupied the problem of a people whom Zionists have “expelled from in the their homes at gunpoint” and then denied return; the problem recent of a nation that existed in Palestine from time immemorial conflict before Zionists (i.e. the Hagana, Stern Gangs, and Irgun) have [1967]. ‘gang-raped’ it, pillaged it, and plundered it; it is the sociocide and politicide of Palestine as a nation and then the systematic mnemocide or “memoricide” or perpetuation of such politicide through the continued Hebraisation and green-washing of Palestine’s geography and ongoing Israelispeak and resolutions of this kind.

9 “In fact, within 10 days of the [1967 Israeli Aggression or] war, more than 125,000 Palestinians were expelled by the Israelis from their land, mainly East Jerusalem, Ramallah, and Jericho, and became DPs [Displaced Persons], while after this date Israel continued to brutally expel an average of 500 Palestinians everyday from their land. The majority of these were from the districts of Hebron, Bethlehem, Nablus, Jenin and Qalkiliya” (Zakariah, 2008: 192). 228 Resolution 242 ignores all those facts as though the Palestine Question finds its roots only in 1967; and as though it was an act of God, and not the result of Zionist machination and years of plotting and premeditation, contributing to a warped or distorted perception. The resolution does not deal with those issues or with the Palestine Question as such, which can obscure and obliterate the cause and give ‘Israel’ more leeway to again debate, temporise and stonewall, effecting in the process the total “memoricide of the Nakba,” of the Palestine Question as a “national cause;” and despite all this, the resolution is taken as the basis for settlement and peace. This contributes to a perception that reality is not what it is; that the Palestinians have been uprooted from their roots, and that the Israelis are the perpetrators of such uprootedness and continued dispossession. Resolution 242 deals with the Palestine Question as a refugee problem,” thus treating the Palestine Question “as one of resolving the refugee issue” and not that of a national cause. By dealing with such a Question as nothing but a “refugee problem,” Resolution 242 or the politically powerful group behind its drafting does not only dilute and dissolve the Palestine Question and thus the inalienable right of the Palestinian people to self-determination, but also disregard the axis or pivot around which much of the world’s peace and stability revolves, hence directly contributing to global ‘terrorism’. By reducing the Palestine Question from being a national cause, from being the cause of a homeland stolen, and a people downtrodden to a mere refugee problem, Resolution 242 not only fails to be practical and bona fide, but also helps obfuscate and obliterate “the patriotic and national rights” of the Palestinian people and hence perpetuate the status quo.

5.2.2 UN SC Resolution 338 and Right of the Palestinian People to Self-Determination (Question of Occupation and Territory)

Issued on October 22, 1973 during the Ramadan/October War, SC Resolution 338 “sought to end hostilities in the 1973 war and to resume negotiations based on Resolution 242” (Smith, 2007: 348) discussed above. The war was initiated by Egypt and Syria in an attempt to recover the territories ‘Israel’ occupied in the aggression of 5 June or the 1967 War. In its call for “the implementation of Security Council Resolution 242 (1967) in all of its parts,” Resolution 338 does not therefore differ in essence regarding the question of the practicality and that of good

229 intent as to end belligerent occupation and realise a viable and sovereign Palestinian state from Resolution 242 as shown in the table below:

Table 5.5 CDA of UN Resolution 338 and Right of the Palestinian People to Self-Determination (Question of Occupation and Territory)

Original text Deconstructed The Security Council, In its call to implement 242 “in all of its Calls upon all parties concerned parts,” Resolution 338 endorses the to start immediately after the same problems rife in resolution 242, cease-fire the implementation of thus perpetuating rather than ending Security Council Resolution 242 “fighting” as far as the Palestine (1967) in all of its parts... Question is concerned.

Therefore, the study concludes that Resolution 338 (1973) is neither practical nor bona fide in ending the occupation and reconstituting Mandate Palestine.

5.2.3 UN Resolution 3236 and Right of the Palestinian People to Self-Determination (Question of Sovereignty)

Adopted on November 22, 1974, UN GA Resolution 3236 recognises and reaffirms the rights of the Palestinian people to “self- determination without external interference” (paragraph 1/a) and “national independence and sovereignty” (paragraph 1/b) (see Table 5.6 overleaf).

230 Table 5.6 CDA of UN Resolution 3236 and Right of the Palestinian People to Self-Determination (Question of Occupation)

Original text Deconstructed The General Assembly, So, as far as recognition, reaffirmation, and emphasis [...] Expressing its grave are concerned, they are there in the Resolution. The concern that the Resolution, however, lacks the language that turns Palestinian people has such words from being mere rhetoric to reality, from been prevented from acting as a discursive drug of gradualism and enjoying its inalienable deceptive optimism to action and “facts on the rights, in particular its right ground”. to self-determination [...], Palestinians are not in need of ones to tell them about Recalling its relevant their inalienable rights but rather resolute actions or resolutions which affirm decisive measures that can put those inalienable the right of the Palestinian rights into reality. people to self- determination, In addition, a fact that characterises this Resolution and the UN discourse on the Question of Palestine in 1. Reaffirms the general is the systematic use of verbal processes (i.e. inalienable rights of the recognises, emphasises, affirms and reaffirms) where Palestinian people in what the UN says remain in the sphere of rhetoric; Palestine, including: there is nothing material here. No material processes, for instance, are used. (a) The right to self- determination without Attention has also to be given to the fact that the external interference; actions of which the Israelis are agent have passive agent deletion (“have been displaced and uprooted” or (b) The right to national “the Palestinian people has been prevented from independence and enjoying its inalienable rights,” thus obscuring rather sovereignty; than foregrounding who is responsible for such displacement and uprootedness and the impediment 2. Reaffirms also the behind the Palestinian people exercising their inalienable right of the inalienable rights. Palestinians to return to their homes and property This UN de-agentialisation of the event as being the from which they have been product of a calamity or natural disaster to be displaced and uprooted, saddened at, rather than the product of human agency and calls for their return; (i.e. Zionists) to be deplored, condemned and reversed helps perpetuate injustice. Such calculated 3. Emphasizes that full use of agentless passives obscures causal agency respect for and the and hence obviates the need for blame attribution, realization of these responsibility and accountability and hence inalienable rights of the rehabilitation. Palestinian people are indispensable for the As such, the Resolution, while it may be bona fide, it is solution of the question of impractical. It is impractical in the sense that it does Palestine... not – through its verbal process, de-agentialisation and rhetoric put those rights it recognises, emphasises, affirms and reaffirms into reality, as noted, where the Palestinians can actually exercise their (a) right to self-determination without external interference; [and] (b) The right to national independence and sovereignty”. 231 5.2.4 UN SC Resolutions 1397 (2002) and 1515 (2003), and Right of the Palestinian People to Self-Determination (Question of Occupation and Territory)

Adopted “in the face of mounting violence and failure to obtain a ceasefire between Israel and the Palestinian Authority,” both UN SC Resolution 1397 of March 12 2002 and 1515 (Endorsing the Roadmap) of November 19 2003 almost echo each other (see table below). Both Resolutions recall, express, affirm or reaffirm, and welcome the same issues. Both Resolutions, for example, recall all previous relevant SC Resolutions, “in particular resolutions 242 (1967) and 338 (1973),” demand for an “immediate cessation of all acts of violence [...] and affirm the Security Council’s “vision of a region where two States, Israel and Palestine, live side by side within secure and recognized borders” (see Table 5.7 overleaf). While Resolution 1397 (2002), however, “Calls upon the Israeli and Palestinian sides and their leaders to cooperate in the implementation of the Tenet work plan and Mitchell Report recommendations [recommendations of The Sharm al-Sheikh Fact- Finding (Mitchell) Committee formed “at the request of former President Clinton in November 2000 and chaired by former senator George Mitchell” to “investigate causes of the intifada and to recommend “a path back to the peace process”” (Smith, 2007: 521)] with the aim of resuming negotiations on a political settlement” and “Expresses support for the efforts of the Secretary-General and others to assist the parties to halt the violence and to resume the peace process,” Resolution 1515 (2003) “Endorses the [then recent] Quartet Performance-based Roadmap to a Permanent Two-State Solution to the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict” and “Calls on the parties to fulfil their obligations under the Roadmap in cooperation with the Quartet; and to achieve the vision of two States living side by side in peace and security”.

232 Table 5.7 CDA of UN Resolutions 1397 and 1515 and Right of the Palestinian People to Self-Determination (Question of Occupation and Territory)

Resolution 1397 Resolution 1515 Deconstruction (March 2002) (November 2003) The Security Council, The Security Council, Having provided the setting and context, and theme and content of 1397 and Recalling all its previous Recalling all its previous 1515 - as stipulated by DHA, the relevant resolutions, in relevant resolutions, in analytical apparatus used in this study - particular resolutions particular resolutions we can see that when it comes to the 242 (1967) and 338 242 (1967), 338 (1973), issue of withdrawal (ending occupation) (1973), 1397 (2002) and the apparently or supposedly stipulated in Madrid principles, Resolution 242; these two resolutions still do not stipulate immediate and full Affirming a vision of a Reaffirming its vision of withdrawal. They do not stipulate “a full region where two States, a region where two and complete return to the 1949 Israel and Palestine, live States, Israel and armistice lines,” which if done would side by side within secure Palestine, live side by immediately make the “vision of a region and recognized borders, side within secure and where two States, Israel and Palestine, recognized borders, [living] side by side within secure and [...] recognized borders” a reality.

Expressing its grave Expressing its grave Recall that the whole “Peace offensive,” concern at the concern at the from the PLO’s perspective, is based on continuation of the tragic continuation of the tragic the reconstruction of Palestine within the and violent events that and violent events in the pre-June 5 lines or the June 4, 1967 have taken place since Middle East, borders which in their totality constitute September 2000, as noted only 22% of the total area of especially the recent Mandate Palestine, which is even less attacks and the increased than half of what the UN in its (Partition) number of casualties, [...] Resolution 181 of 1947 allocated to the Arab state, which again, from a practical 1. Demands immediate Reiterating the demand viewpoint, makes such resolutions cessation of all acts of for an immediate means to sustain the Arab struggle violence, including all acts cessation of all acts of against Israeli occupation through of terror, provocation, violence, including all further temporisation and negotiations incitement and acts of terrorism, and until, and only until the question of destruction; provocation, incitement “secure and recognized borders” is and destruction, answered, and which will never, given the harboured intent to deceive, be 1. Endorses the answered. Recall that this debate has Quartet been going on since 1967/1988. Performance-based Roadmap to a Notice also this UN consistency in Permanent Two-State deliberately de-agentialising the events in Solution to the Israeli- question (Expressing its grave concern at Palestinian Conflict the continuation of the tragic and violent (S/2003/529); events that have taken place since 2. Calls upon the Israeli 2. Calls on the parties to September 2000, especially the recent and Palestinian sides and fulfil their obligations attacks and the increased number of their leaders to cooperate under the Roadmap in casualties), thus again obscuring who is in the implementation of cooperation with the responsible for such “tragic and violent the Tenet work plan and Quartet and to achieve events” and the “recent attacks and Mitchell Report thevisionof twoStates increased number of casualties”. recommendations with living side by side in the aim of resuming peace and security... negotiations on a political (emphasis added). settlement...

233 Neither Resolution 242 as noted - with its ambiguous, contradictory, and tendentious and thus impractical nature - and 338, used along with 242 as the basis for a settlement, nor now 1397 and 1515, used as echoes or reiterations of 242 and 338 (see table below), is structured to make it for the two-state solution. All four resolutions, given their lack of practicality and the harboured intent - as can be revealed from such critical discourse analysis - to drag the Arab struggle against Israeli occupation or this unequal conflict to perpetuate Zionist hegemony in the region, fail - unsurprisingly - to bring an end to the protracted problem by establishing a Palestinian state (even) within the pre-June 5 lines.

Table 5.8 CDA of UN Resolutions 1397 and 1515 and Right of the Palestinian People to Self-Determination (Question of Occupation and Territory)

Original text Deconstructed The Security In its call for the implementation of 242 (1967) and Council, 338 (1973) in particular, Resolution 1515 (2003) Recalling all its again endorses the same problems inherent in previous relevant those resolutions, thus perpetuating rather than resolutions, in ending the status quo, a reality beneficial only to particular resolutions ‘Israel’ as it gives her more and more time to annex 242 (1967), 338 further Palestinian lands through the creation of (1973), 1397 (2002)... further “facts on the ground” and further “new realities” that help ‘Israel’ “consolidate its hold over land it intended to retain and then declare its willingness to negotiate peace”.

As noted, there is also the ongoing semantic stratagem ploy of “secure and recognized borders” or boundaries reiterated in all those resolutions. As analysed in Subsection 5.2.1, the floating signification or ambiguity and elasticity of the locution, “secure and recognized borders” or “boundaries” as mentioned in 242, gives wide latitude for disagreement and much leeway to ‘Israel’- as the sole Power in the region - to decide what boundaries it deems “secure” at its own convenience and thus further temporisation, further creation of “facts on the ground,” extraction of concessions and thus “further consolidation of Israeli power” (Smith, 2007: 425), “fundamental objectives” and “annexationist ambitions” (see table below).

234 Table 5.9 CDA of UN Resolutions 1397 and 1515 and Right of the Palestinian People to Self-Determination (Question of Occupation and Territory)

Resolution Resolution Deconstruction 1397 1515 (Mar 2002) (Nov 2003)

The The Reiterations of Resolutions 242 and 338; hence Security Security the use of empty signifiers that still give ‘Israel Council, Council, ‘the upper hand to decide what borders it deems Affirming a Reaffirming “secure” and consequently need to be vision of a its vision of “recognized” and hence continuing temporisation. region aregion where two where two We must not grow tired of repeating that the way States, States, Resolution 242 (and its almost duplicate 338) is Israel and Israel and structured, harbours bad faith and avoids Palestine, Palestine, practicality. live side by live side by side within side within Why don’t those resolutions say, for example, “a secure secure vision of a region where two States, Israel and and and Palestine, live side by side within” the borders recognized recognized drawn by the Partition Resolution (181 of borders... borders... November 1947), or at least demands - (emphasis (emphasis unambiguously - Israeli withdrawal from all the added). added). territories occupied by force by ‘Israel’ in the aggression of 1967 first and then talk about ‘secure’ and ‘recognized’ borders?

Logically (though still of course unfairly), this how it must be, given the fact that this territory was occupied by force of arms, and the supposed UN Charter principles make such “acquisition of territory by war” inadmissible. Why does it become admissible when it comes to the powerless?

To show some good intents and make it practical, discourse producers of the UN SC resolutions in question could have at least demanded complete and immediate withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from all the territories ‘Israel’ occupied by force in 1967, or an immediate return to the 1949 Armistice Agreements/the pre-June 5 lines, instead of the ambiguous and mala fide “Withdrawal of Israel[i] armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict,” and the elastic/floating “secure and recognized borders,” reiterated in 338 (1973), 1397 (2002) and 1515 (2003), and therefore keeping revolving in the same vicious circle where further Israeli “facts” are being daily created “on the ground,” and toll of the victims of this 235 discursive injustice on the other side of the equation goes up from a crescendo to another, also daily. Elucidated through continuous self-reflection and systematic analysis, these are calculated lexicogrammatical structures that render 242, along with its almost duplicates: 338, 1397 and 1515 mala fide and impractical, hence perpetuating the status quo.

5.2.5 UN GA Resolution on Israeli Wall, and the Question of Occupation and Territory

Adopted on October 21, 2003, UN GA Resolution on Israeli Wall came as a result of a massive expansionist segregation barrier ‘Israel’ began constructing in 2002 on 1967 occupied Palestinian lands on the West Bank - site, along with the Gaza Strip, of a future Palestinian state - and was completed in 2010 despite international opposition to the construction of such wall, described by some as “Wall of Disgrace” and which, according to this Resolution, makes the long-debated “two-state solution physically impossible,” hence bringing the two-state solution to a “stage of “clinical death”” (see Chapter 3), and hence corroborating our CDA analyses that those discourses of the powerful have always been forged to sustain domination and the Zionist Anglo-American trinity of hegemony and interests in the region. The resolution begins by “Recalling” all relevant UN resolutions, “Reaffirming the principle of the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war,” the “vision of a region where two States [...] live side by side within secure and recognized borders,” “condemning all acts of violence, terrorism and destruction” and “in particular the suicide bombings [...],” “Deploring the extrajudicial killings and their recent intensification, in particular [...] in Gaza,” “Stressing the need to end the occupation that began in 1967, and the need to achieve peace based on the vision of two States mentioned above,” “Reiterating its call upon Israel, the occupying Power, to fully and effectively respect the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949 [“relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War”], and “Reiterating its opposition to settlement activities in the Occupied Territories and to any activities involving the confiscation of land, disruption of the livelihood of protected persons and the de facto annexation of land,” and therefore, (1):

Demands that Israel stop and reverse the construction of the wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including in and around East Jerusalem, which is in departure of

236 the Armistice Line of 1949 and is in contradiction to relevant provisions of international law; [and (2)] Calls on both parties to fulfil their obligations under relevant provisions of the Road Map; the Palestinian Authority to undertake visible efforts on the ground to arrest, disrupt, and restrain individuals and groups conducting and planning violent attacks; the Government of Israel to take no actions undermining trust including deportations and attacks on civilians and extrajudicial killings.

Now, apart from blaming and vilifying the victim by “condemning in particular the suicide bombings” - the only means left for the occupied desperate victim to get his voice heard - the Resolution - which as noted reaffirms “the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war,” deplores “extrajudicial killings,” stresses “the need to end the occupation that began in 1967,” and reiterates “its call upon Israel, the occupying Power, to fully and effectively respect the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949” - does not take any practical measure, i.e., sanctions as to enforce or practically ensure the end of Israeli occupation - the source of all evils - or to ensure that this reaffirming, deploring, stressing and reiterating become a reality; and not just lip-service and thus more time for the occupying Power to temporise while annexing more and more Palestinian lands and creating more and more “irreversible” “facts on the ground”. The construction of the wall has now, after all, been completed without any physical interruption – apart of course from the victims’ stone-throwing, tyre-burning and ‘suicide bombing’ against this systematic daylight robbery of their lands and livelihood – despite all this reaffirming, deploring, stressing and reiterating. And this construction of the wall, now deplored, tomorrow constitutes a new starting point for new concessions to be imposed on the helpless ‘suicide bombers,’ victims of this ongoing discursive injustice. This is in line with an established and systematic Israeli policy of realpolitik, of creating “facts on the ground” that given the impunity exercised by ‘Israel,’ makes such rigmarole of the usual “recalling,” “condemning,” “deploring,” “stressing,” “expressing,” “reaffirming” and again “reaffirming” and again “reaffirming” indeed nothing but discourse or linguistic means that gradually provide the occupying Power with the time necessary to create or present the international community with further faits accomplis or further requisition and de facto annexation of Palestinian lands that as time passes, become the normal new point of reference for ongoing purported future settlement. And this seems to go on like that ad infinitum or at least as long as there are still Palestinians in the territories and ‘stones’ -

237 as their primary means of defence against armed Israeli troops, the Israeli Merkava and Apache helicopter, against “the strongest country in a thousand miles,” to use Ehud Barak’s words, one of the Israeli figures to be added to the Zionist pantheon of Israeli heroism. Therefore, due to this lack of practical measures – whose absence underlies the intent to deceive – to ensure enforceability and accountability in the resolution, the study concludes that this resolution of October 2003 is no different from its predecessors, is no different in being or acting as a discursive drug of gradualism and deceptive optimism in the face of facts created daily on the ground; and hence does not serve to end occupation, but on the contrary works indirectly to perpetuate the status quo.

5.2.6 Oslo Accords (I) (Sept 1993) and the Question of Palestinian Self-Determination

The Israeli-Palestinian pact of 1993 was fraught with obstacles, with each side holding radically different conceptions of what its terms signified. Many of the accord’s provisos were never implemented, requiring a second agreement, Oslo 2 or “The Interim Agreement,” of September 1995. (Smith, 2007: 450)

Based on Camp David Accords of 1978 – previously rejected by the PLO – and negotiated “from December 1992 to August 1993” in Oslo and “independently of the Madrid talks and without American involvement” (Smith, 2007: 250), but signed officially at the White House on September 13 1993, and considered a framework “for the future relations” and all “subsequent agreements” “between ‘Israel’ and the PLO,” Oslo Accords - formally known as Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements - had in essence “provided for the creation of a Palestinian Authority” (Oslo Accords, Wikipedia, accessed 26 December, 2007: 1) or, according to Annex II/2 of the Declaration of Principles (DOP):

the right of Palestinians to self-government over parts of the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, areas to be administered by a Palestinian Authority, following immediately and beginning with “an accelerated and scheduled withdrawal of Israeli military forces from the Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area”.

238 Structurally, the DOP is composed of 17 Articles (Principles), 4 Annexes (Protocols), and the Agreed minutes to the Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements. Starting on the date of Israel’s withdrawal from Gaza and Jericho,10 pursuant to the PLO and ‘Israel’’s signing of the Agreement on the Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area (May 4 1994), “It was anticipated that this arrangement would last for a five year interim period during which a permanent agreement [the Interim Agreement] would be negotiated (beginning no later than [“the beginning of the third year of the interim period”] May 4 1996),” and ending on May 4 1999 where a final agreement would be concluded (Shash, 1999; Oslo Accords, Wikipedia, accessed 26 December, 2007: 1; Smith, 2007). The DOP stipulates that “Interim self-government was to be granted in phases” (2007: 1). The “five-year "transitional period would commence with the withdrawal from the Gaza Strip and Jericho area” (2007: 4) and a “redeployment of Israeli military forces in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip would take place” (2007: 5). “The Declaration of Principles would enter into force one month after its signing” (2007). Rejected by significant sections of Arabs and Palestinians such as Hamas and the Islamic Jihad, and the Israeli right (Shash, 1999), the PLO-Israel Letters of Recognition (September 9, 1993) and the ensuing Declaration of Principles (DOP) (September 13, 1993), together constitute Oslo Accords, finalised in Oslo, Norway, in August 1993, and signed in Washington D.C. on September 13, 1993 (Smith, 2007). Now, permanent issues - heart and organs of the Palestine Question - were postponed; they were not dealt with upon or as part of the signing of the Accords or the Declaration of Principles in September 1993. Disposition or even mere discussion of core “permanent issues” such as “Jerusalem, [Palestinian] refugees, settlements [or Israeli settler colonies], security arrangements, borders, relations and cooperation with other neighbours, and other issues of common interest” (Article V, paragraph 3) - questions on whose answers the foundation stones or viability of Palestinian statehood would depend - were “left to be decided at a later stage” as part of “permanent status negotiations” (Oslo Accords, Wikipedia, accessed 26 December, 2007: 1). It should be noticed at the start of my analysis of the DOP that in Article V of paragraph 3, it is stated that “It is understood that these negotiations shall cover remaining issues” such as the ones

10 Originally, this commencement was supposed to take place as specified in the DOP from the election of the council, which was scheduled for nine months after the DOP went into force. 239 mentioned above, “and other issues of common interest,” but without specifying these issues exclusively. Thus, the phrase, “and other issues of common interest,” though sounds useful, leaves it open, which - given ‘Israel’’s bad faith (see below) - may prove to be problematic or significant one day. The aim of the ‘peace process’ or the track of “Israeli-Palestinian negotiations” was, as noted, “to establish a Palestinian Interim Self- Government Authority” (2007: 4) based on Resolutions 242 and 338. Now, the fact that the DOP or generally the ‘peace process’ is based on UN Resolutions 242 and 338 makes the process impractical (see table below):

Table 5.10 CDA of Oslo Accords (I) (Question of Palestinian Self-Determination)

Original text Deconstructed The aim of the Israeli-Palestinian Basing the ‘peace process’ negotiations within the current Middle East on UN Resolution 242 and its peace process is [...] to establish a duplicate 338 makes the Palestinian Interim Self-Government process anything but Authority [...] for the Palestinian people in practical, bona fide or just the West Bank and the Gaza Strip [...] given the problems inherent leading to a permanent settlement based in them (see analysis of on Security Council resolutions 242 Resolutions 242 and 338 (1967) and 338 (1973) (emphasis added). above)

In addition to the many problems with which resolutions 242 and 338 are fraught and the way they are linguistically designed to sustain domination rather than construct a solution, just or unjust, as analysed earlier, they make no mention of 1948 as though the problem created in Palestine was the product of 1967 and not 1948, ignoring a number of historical facts that underlie the to drag the Arab struggle against Israeli occupation or this unequal conflict to perpetuate Zionist hegemony in the region. This is a fact that makes the basis of the ‘peace process’ not only problematic, and lacks good faith, but also simply impractical. In this connection and under the heading: THE EXCLUSION OF 1948 FROM THE PEACE PROCESS, the Israeli New Historian, Ilan Pappe (2006) mentions in his book: The Ethnic Cleansing of Palestine the following:

The first of Israel’s three guidelines - or rather, axioms - was that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict had its origin in 1967: to solve it, all one needed was an agreement that would determine the future status of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. In other words, as these areas constitute 240 only twenty two per cent of [historic/Mandate] Palestine, Israel at one stroke reduced any peace solution to only a small part of the original Palestinian homeland. Not only that, it demanded - and continues to demand today - further territorial compromises, either consonant with the business-like approach the US favoured or as dictated by the map agreed upon by the two political camps in Israel (239).

Further, it is significant to notice that there is no explicit mention whatsoever in the Accords of a sovereign Palestinian state but rather Palestinian self-rule and within (parts of) the West Bank and the Gaza Strip (see table below). Table 5.11 CDA of Oslo Accords (I) (Question of Palestinian Self-Determination)

Original text Deconstructed The aim of the Israeli- There is no mention of a viable and sovereign Palestinian negotiations Palestinian state but rather Palestinian self-rule within the current Middle and within (parts of) the West Bank and the East peace process is [...] Gaza Strip, leading, following a transitional to establish a Palestinian period of five years, to a permanent settlement Interim Self-Government - a permanent settlement, not a Palestinian Authority [...] for the state; not necessarily a viable and sovereign Palestinian people in the Palestinian state where a group of West Bank and the Gaza disconnected Bantustans may - from the Israeli Strip, for a transitional or Zionist perspective - do the job. period not exceeding five The lack of explicit mention of an independent years, leading to a sovereign Palestinian state is problematic permanent settlement [...] and lacks good faith. (emphasis added).

While the PLO has recognised the colonialist Zionist entity as a state (see Section 5.4 below), no such recognition was made in Oslo Accords to the Palestinian people whom the Zionists have forcibly removed from their homeland (see Chapter 2), and who are still being denied their right to self-determination (Resolution 3236) and national independence, and are still made stateless. This is despite inexorable historical facts and the fact that the Palestinians are being a nation, “distinguished from the rest by common descent, language,” culture, religion, history and physical characteristics, etc. Arafat (1929-2004) “recognized Israel’s existence without gaining mutual acknowledgement of a Palestinian right to self-determination” (Smith, 2007: 451). So, Oslo Accords or the DOP does not speak of the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination despite what 241 international covenants state that “All peoples have a right to self- determination”. It rather speaks, as stated in the preambular paragraph to the DOP, of “political rights”. Obviously, the difference between the two is not a bagatelle; it cannot be insignificant. Recognising the political rights of the Palestinian people is not recognition of their right to self-determination. While self- determination means a Palestinian state; political rights is a stratagem that opens the door in front of Machiavellians to foist upon the beleaguered other modes for a ‘final’ “permanent settlement” (Shash, 1999). Therefore, the aim of the ‘peace process,’ which is based on Resolutions 242 and 338 - and the framework established by Menachem Begin in Camp David Accords (1978) between ‘Israel’ and Egypt (see Chapter 4) - is clear right from the start: the establishment within parts of an area constituting 22% of historic Palestine, of “a Palestinian Interim Self-Government Authority”. So it is a Palestinian Authority, not a Palestinian State; it is “political rights,” not the de jure recognition of the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination, it is a Palestinian Authority, not a disposition of the Palestine Question as the question of a homeland stolen and a people downtrodden. I am not blind to the word “Interim,” but the word “Interim” is problematic and harbours a great deal of bad faith (see table below):

Table 5.12 CDA of Oslo Accords (I) (Question of Palestinian Self-Determination)

Original text Deconstructed The aim of the The word “interim” could and has actually been used Israeli-Palestinian as an expedient to give ‘Israel’ time to expropriate negotiations within more Palestinian ands and construct on them Israeli the current Middle settler colonies as a mechanism to create further East peace process “facts on the ground” and hence elicit deeper is [...] to establish a concessions before reaching a ‘final’ or the ‘final’ Palestinian Interim settlement, and thus further and “further Self-Government consolidation of Israeli power”. Authority [...] for the Palestinian people in The word “Interim” is a subterfuge typical of ‘Israel’’s the West Bank and discursive strategy of creating “facts on the ground” the Gaza Strip, for a that would later become irrevocable and the starting transitional period point for a fresh round of mala fide negotiations, not exceeding five leading eventually, not to a “permanent settlement” - years [...] (emphasis regardless of what this settlement may be - as we added). are discursively made to believe, but to Palestinian annihilation or at best cantonisation.

242 Therefore, this self-rule or “Interim Self-Government Authority” (Article I of DOP) which, though supposed to be “interim,” might - given ‘Israel’’s bad faith and systematic policy of creating “facts on the ground” through politics of expansion or the ongoing construction of Israeli settler colonies on Palestinian lands (see Chapter 2), along with the unlikelihood of reaching an agreement in the “five-year transitional period” (Article I) - end up to be the case: self-rule, and not self-determination and national independence, as the ‘final’ “permanent settlement” (Shash, 1999), as was originally conceived by Begin. And if the five-year “transitional” or “interim” period proves to be insufficient for ‘Israel’ to create through continued construction of colonies further cantonisation and dismemberment of the Palestinian territories meant for a Palestinian ‘state,’ then the commitments or rather restrictions imposed on the PLO in Oslo - such as the renunciation and fighting of ‘terror’ - would be employed (as has actually been the case) as being unfulfilled as a pretext for ‘Israel’ to shirk from fulfilling her own commitments, and keep dodging to extend the period to consolidate control of the territory. After all, the “permanent settlement” and hence Palestinian independence was supposed to be reached by May 4 1999 - the date marking the end of the Interim period. But this has never taken place or been the case, recalling that we are in 2013 now. Thus, more than 19 years so far - not just five - have passed since signing the Declaration of Principles in September 1993, with Israeli domination in the ascendant and the Palestinians reaching the slough of despond. In other words, the status quo or the continuous annexation of Palestinian lands, extortion or extraction of deeper concessions through creating more “facts on the ground” has not changed. What has changed is the number of Palestinian deaths in the 1967 Occupied Territories, and Jewish Zionist colonies constructed on expropriated Palestinian lands. Obviously, this would also remain like that until ‘Israel’ comes to a point (which may or may never come) where it would ‘now’ feel ‘secure’ with the reality or the group of disconnected enclaves it would have created by then for the beleaguered Palestinians, and offered as another “fact on the ground,” irrevocable and irreversible, and not only that but also as an offer or a concession that no one would have ever dreamed “Israel would volunteer,” as typical Israelispeak and compliant media would then fancy representing (see Subsection 3.5.6). This is perhaps part of what I was driving at by stating that language or linguistic means could be deployed as a “tranquillising drug of

243 gradualism,” indefinite temporisation, and the deceptive purveyance of optimism. So apparently, it is a mere word, which might even in most cases go unnoticed but as I have analysed, it opens the door wide in front of ‘Israel’ to be dilatory and desultory, and to temporise and for as long as it deems enough for the creation of a new tailor-made geopolitical reality. The word “Interim” shows actually how mala fide ‘Israel’ and the US - or those Machiavellian political groups abetting ‘Israel’ - are in their intent and pursuit of the ‘peace process:’ a means to achieve their hidden ends in the (new) Middle East; a means to sustain domination. Full stop! Now away from the preamble and Article I of the DOP, Article IV: JURISDICTION, states that “Jurisdiction of the Council will cover West Bank and Gaza Strip territory, except for issues that will be negotiated in the permanent status negotiations”. An apparent concession, we need to pause here awhile and underline the ‘little’ word “except,” which might otherwise go unnoticed or be deemed inappreciable or far from misleading. Ironically, those “except” issues, obfuscated and deflated or played down by the surrounding discourse, are in fact the vital organs of the Palestine Question, the “critical constants” or - to use Pappe’s (2006: 242) terminology - “the essentials of the conflict” (see Table 5.13 below).

Table 5.13 CDA of Oslo Accords (I) (Question of Palestinian Self-Determination)

Original text Deconstructed Jurisdiction of the Inducing a false impression, those issues played Council will cover down as “issues that will be negotiated in the West Bank and permanent status negotiations” are issues such as Gaza Strip territory, territory, Palestinian refugees, Jerusalem, except for issues sovereignty, territorial boundaries, security and that will be borders, military locations, water, Jewish colonies or negotiated in the those huge townships in the West Bank that rip permanent status Palestinian territories, families and mothers and their negotiations parity apart – etc., clearly all central to a resolution of (emphasis added). the Palestinian national trauma or Palestinian dispossession and sufferings. Now when such pivotal issues, vital to Palestinian self-determination or an end to their century-long sufferings are treated as “issues that will be negotiated” later, what is there then left to be negotiated at present? What the Palestine Question is apart from these issues?

244 Indeed, it is this little “except” – “Jurisdiction of the Council will cover West Bank and Gaza Strip territory except for issues that will be negotiated in the permanent status negotiations” - that made Arafat claim that “Oslo 2 guaranteed the return of 80 percent of the West Bank to the Arabs while Rabin assured the Knesset that the pact left 70 percent of the same land, or all of Area C, in Israel’s hands” (Smith, 2007: 462). When people talk of ‘exceptions,’ normally such exceptions are really ‘exceptions’. They are so in the sense that they are just ‘someone’ or ‘something’ (not with everyone or everything in mind) that is not included. But here it is actually the obverse. What is being treated as an exception is actually the heart of the matter; it is everything, and what is being offered on the other hand is the ‘exception’. As noted, when those vital issues, vital to the exercise of the Palestinians to their right of self-determination or to any resolution of the problem of occupation - conceivable or inconceivable - are treated as ‘exceptions’ or “issues that will be negotiated” later, what is there then left to be negotiated about? What is, in this case, not an ‘exception’? Dealing with such issues as ‘exceptions’ or issues to be “negotiated” (still to be “negotiated,” with what this could mean) as part of the permanent status talks, and given Israel’s intent to deceive, would only enable Israel to continue rather than freeze “building and natural growth” of the settlements, meaning that existing settlements would continue expanding to absorb more Palestinian land, making room for more territory to be “under permanent Israeli control”. And this would go on like that until, and only until a final agreement would be concluded, which again, as noted, given Israel’s bad faith, may never be reached; not as long as the “Zionist ideology and praxis” are still in force or the current imbalance of power remains the same (see Chapter 6: Section 6.3). Away from this and related to the context of sovereignty, I now move on to examine certain aspects of paragraph 1 of Article VI of the Agreed Minutes to the Declaration of Principles on Interim Self- Government Arrangements, stated in Table 5.14 below:

245 Table 5.14 CDA of Oslo Accords (I) (Question of Palestinian Self-Determination)

Original text Deconstructed

It is agreed that [...] The Palestinian side will inform Is this sovereign? the Israeli side of the names of the authorized Palestinians who [...] will assume the powers, authorities and responsibilities that will be transferred to the Palestinians according to the Declaration of Principles in the following fields: education and culture, health, social welfare, direct taxation, tourism and any other authorities agreed upon.

In addition to another article: namely, Article VII/paragraph 5, which stipulates that “The withdrawal of the military government will not prevent Israel from exercising the powers and responsibilities not transferred to the Council [i.e. the Palestinian Authority]” and apart from the fact that those authorities transferred to the PLO are unlike those of “external security, control over airspace,” foreign affairs, for example, my question here is the demeaning and interventionist stipulation that “the names of the authorized Palestinians who [...] will assume the powers, authorities and responsibilities that will be transferred to the Palestinians” will have to be reported to and approved by the occupation authorities. So if ‘Israel’ rejects certain or all of the nominees, then they have to be changed to ones ‘liked’ by her. They have to be replaced by ones who, for example, might frame legitimate acts of Palestinian resistance to illegitimate occupation as ‘terrorism,’ and freedom-fighting as ‘violence,’ and Zionist colonies built on confiscated Palestinian land as “settlements” or “outposts,” to use the little Sharonian lexical item, etc. Such dictates, played down by discourse, deprive any future Palestinian state of real sovereignty. They emasculate any state. The ‘State of Israel’ does not, for example, submit to the PA the names of her cabinet or Knesset members in advance for approval or disapproval, verification or refusal. In this context, I also wish to quote ANNEX II under the Agreed Minutes to the Declaration of Principles (see table below):

246 Table 5.15 CDA of Oslo Accords (I) (Question of Palestinian Self-Determination)

Original text Deconstructed It is understood that, subsequent to the Israeli My question remains withdrawal, Israel will continue to be responsible for the same: is this part external security, and for internal security and of what we know as public order of settlements and Israelis. Israeli sovereignty? Does military forces and civilians may continue to use this empower or roads freely within the Gaza Strip and the Jericho emasculate area. Palestinians?

According to Article VI/paragraph 2 or paragraph 1 of Article VI of the Agreed Minutes as noted: “authority will be transferred to the Palestinians in the following spheres: education and culture, health, social welfare, direct taxation and tourism”. ANNEX II (3/b) states that “Structure, powers and responsibilities of the Palestinian authority [will be limited to] such areas, leaving sovereign authorities under the sole control of ‘Israel’. This does not aid the Palestinian nation achieve her dream of statehood, aspiration to national independence and right to self-determination. It does not help end Israeli hegemony over the Palestinians, and as such does not contribute to putting “an end to decades of confrontation and conflict” as stated in the Middle East Peace Conference in Madrid. It does not help achieve “a just, lasting and comprehensive peace settlement and historic reconciliation” as we are nudged to believe by the discourse of such Accords. In a word, such terms emasculate any potential Palestinian state of real statehood as this state of affairs deprives such state of the elementary attributes or authorities such as external security, control over airspace, sea space and security responsibility at all border crossings and terminals. Furthermore, recalling resolutions 242 and 338, which as mentioned constitute the basis for the ‘peace process’ or for a “just, lasting and comprehensive peace settlement” as indicated in the Letter of invitation to the Middle East Peace Conference in Madrid (19-10- 1991) (see Subsection 5.2.1 above or Section 5.4 below), now I move on to examine Article XIII of the DOP: REDEPLOYMENT OF ISRAELI FORCES. Since the adoption of Resolution 242 in 1967 and the 24-year-later inception of the ‘peace process’ following the Middle East Peace Conference convened in Madrid on October 30, 1991, ‘Israel’ has not yet withdrawn from most of the territories it has occupied in the aggression of that year; areas whose totality as stated a number of times earlier does not exceed 22% of the whole territory of former Palestine. This, as explained in Subsection 5.2.1, has always been 247 the case because of the deliberate ambiguity and much leeway the carefully-worded resolution has provided for ‘Israel’. It has given ‘Israel’ the linguistic means to indefinitely hedge and debate the extent of withdrawal; and now language, through the conscious employment of the term “redeployment” instead of actual “withdrawal” along with other subtle linguistic means is being resorted to again to continue the process of obfuscation, temporisation; and in the interim create new “facts on the ground” that would consequently be the starting point for a novel trajectory in the world of dictates and diktats, and for a new geopolitical ‘reality’ on the ongoing slippery slope to Palestinian elimination, where at that point, “far in the future,” Israel would, given her intent to deceive, have pre-empted “issues to be discussed in permanent status talks” and rendered them nonnegotiable, or as observed by Smith (2007: 455), “there might be nothing [actually] to negotiate because an Israeli fait accompli would have occurred”. It should also be noted in this context that there is no mention of withdrawal in the permanent status issues, which signifies that whatever form of redeployment takes place in the West Bank is going to remain the case. Now I come to a very obscure and ambiguous term in Article VIII: PUBLIC ORDER AND SECURITY, selected by the discourse producers precisely for its obscurity and ambiguity - “overall security”.

Table 5.16 CDA of Oslo Accords (I) (Question of Palestinian Self-Determination)

Original text Deconstructed In order to guarantee public order and internal Use of empty/floating security for the Palestinians of the West Bank signifiers to allow for and the Gaza Strip, the Council will establish a creating further “facts on strong police force, while Israel will continue to the ground,” carry the responsibility for defending against manipulating, external threats, as well as the responsibility for temporising, retracting overall security of Israelis for the purpose of and the like, and thus safeguarding their internal security and public further and “further order (emphasis added). consolidation of Israeli power”.

Another instance of ‘Israel’’s mala fides or intent to deceive, the term “overall security” demands some self-reflection. An empty signifier, can anyone clarify what this general and manipulative term “overall security” denotes or could connote? Can anyone predict the interpretations and dimensions this elastic term could have when it 248 comes to ‘Israel’’s view of “security” and what is “secure”? Clearly, “overall security” is prone to various interpretations, not to an exegesis. Everything could be or become, at least from the Israeli perspective, part of the “overall security”. The ambiguity and elasticity of this term is intertextually remindful of that of the locution “secure and recognized boundaries,” found in Resolution 242 and other resolutions, dissected in previous subsections. It gives ‘Israel’ - the occupying Power - the upper hand to dictate what is “secure” (see Subsection 5.2.7 below). Finally, I conclude this subsection on Oslo Accords (I) or Declaration of Principles and the Question of Palestinian Self-Determination with a critical analysis of Article XV: RESOLUTION OF DISPUTES. According to Article X, “a Joint Israeli-Palestinian Liaison Committee will be established in order to deal with […] disputes”. Therefore, Article XV, paragraph 1, stipulates:

Disputes arising out of the application or interpretation of this Declaration of Principles, or any subsequent agreements pertaining to the interim period, shall be resolved by negotiations through [this] Joint Israeli- Palestinian Liaison Committee.

Further, paragraph 2 of Article XV states that “Disputes which cannot be settled by negotiations [through the Joint Israeli-Palestinian Liaison Committee] may be resolved by a mechanism of conciliation to be agreed upon by the parties”. As shown in Table 5.17 below, Paragraph 3 of this Article further indicates the following:

Table 5.17 CDA of Oslo Accords (I) (Question of Palestinian Self-Determination)

Original text Deconstructed The parties may agree to submit to The parties “may,” not “shall”. The arbitration disputes relating to the parties may/and may not agree… interim period, which cannot be Use of the subjunctive/use of a settled through conciliation. To this weasel word- may; a word elastic end, upon the agreement of both enough as to “create enough wiggle parties, the parties will establish an room for a rhino” - since it can well Arbitration Committee” (emphasis be taken to mean the exact added). opposite - may not.

So, “disputes arising out of the application or interpretation” of the DOP “or any subsequent agreements pertaining to the interim period” are to be resolved only by the two parties, ‘Israel’ and the PLO, without external interference or arbitration. However, if a 249 dispute proves to be intractable, then “a mechanism of conciliation to be agreed upon by the parties” may be considered. So it remains that resolution of disputes must remain an internal affair. No third parties - who might do justice - are allowed; a fact that gives ‘Israel,’ since it is the more powerful party in this unequal conflict, the upper hand to dictate what it deems a resolution, however inequitable it might be to the other party, the weaker side in this inequitable equation. Now, one might argue, however, that paragraph 3 of Article XV provides a way for arbitration, hence the introduction of a third party. Here I wish to draw attention to a key word I consciously wrote in bold in paragraph 3 of this Article in Table 5.17 above. This key word is may, found in the phrase, may agree to submit to arbitration disputes. A weasel word, “may” is a modal. In other words, “may” could well; as well mean “may not” and thus the exact opposite. Therefore, “may” as a weasel word expressed in the subjunctive mood - which makes “every assertion hypothetical” - has the elasticity to “create enough wiggle room for a rhino” as would be described by Sant (2008). This means that if ‘Israel,’ for example, or one of the parties involved decides for some reason to decline the resort to arbitration, then the modalised phrase may agree to submit [...], this modality expressed by “may” can create enough room for this declination since the semantic function of this modal is only that of advisability, and since the subjunctive as an irrealis mood expresses only possibilities or hypothetical, imagined or wished situations, not facts. Can we feel the conscious sadism of employing words with the intent to deceive? Can we sense the brutalisation of language, language as a means of brutalisation and language as an object of brutalisation; language as brutalising and language as being brutalised? While the PLO might have been unconscious of such conscious linguistic brutalisation and manipulation of structural and sign choices, it is very unlikely that ‘Israel’ - a master of discourse - could have been unaware of such lexicogrammatical selections and their far-reaching implications. Hence is again my assertion of ‘Israel’’s lack of good faith, and thus the conclusion that the Declaration of Principles on Interim Self- Government Arrangements - taken as the “framework “for the future relations” and all “subsequent agreements” “between Israel and the PLO” - not only does not do justice to the Palestinians and unjustly obviate their right to self-determination, but also create the conditions conducive to the occupying Power to ever remain in control of affairs and to always have the upper hand in this national

250 trauma or tragic reality, constructed through discourse and the force of arms, and perpetuated or prolonged chiefly through discourse or the power of discourse.

5.2.7 Oslo Accords (II) (1995) and the Question of Palestinian Self-Determination: The Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement (Oslo 2) on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip (September 28, 1995)

The West Bank was to be divided into three areas labeled “A,” “B,” and “C.” [...] But it was Area C, and its link to issues to be decided only in the permanent status talks, that suggested how misleading certain clauses of theaccordcouldbe. Arafat claimed that Oslo 2 guaranteed the return of 80 percent of the West Bank to the Arabs while Rabin assured the Knesset that the pact left 70 percent of the same land, or all of Area C, in Israel’s hands (emphasis added). (Smith, 2007: 462)

I shall deal in this subsection with Article XII of The Israeli- Palestinian Interim Agreement (Oslo 2) on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip (September 28, 1995). But as a point of departure, I want to start with a pithy statement as a background to the agreement. Hence, and in brief, this “agreement was 307 pages long; 284 of them consisted of annexes and appendices” (Smith, 2007: 493). It “called for implementation of arrangements and Israeli withdrawal originally foreseen under the 1993 DOP,” analysed above (2007: 493). Similar to Article VIII of the DOP (Oslo 1), Article XII of the Interim Agreement (Oslo 2): ARRANGEMENTS FOR SECURITY AND PUBLIC ORDER, states that the Council or Palestinian Authority “shall establish a strong police force,” ostensibly “to guarantee public order and internal security for the Palestinians of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip” (see Table 5.16 above) and that “Israel shall continue to carry the responsibility for defending against external threats, including the responsibility for overall security of Israelis and Settlements [...] (emphasis added)”. Now apart from using “shall” instead of “will”, and “including” instead of “as well as” (cf Table 5.16 above with Table 5.18 below), this Article of the Interim Agreement, unlike Article VIII of Oslo I, adds the apparently ‘innocuous’ phrase: “and [Israel] will have all the powers to take the steps necessary to meet this responsibility...”

251 (emphasis added) - all the powers without any limit whatsoever, even if all the Palestinians have to be decimated one after another, for ‘Israel’ “will have all the powers to take the steps necessary...” (see below Table 5.18):

Table 5.18 CDA of the Interim Agreement (Oslo 2) (Sept 28 1995) (Question of Palestinian Self-Determination)

Original text Deconstructed In order to guarantee public order Besides the ambiguous elastic and internal security for the expression or floating signifier “overall Palestinians of the West Bank and security,” dissected in the previous the Gaza Strip, the Council shall subsection, I have already highlighted establish a strong police force [... the ‘little’ word all in the phrase all the to crush the Palestinian resistance powers to draw attention to the the occupation forces failed to magnitude and latitude such an quell]. Israel shall continue to unsuspecting word would or could carry the responsibility for defense provide for ‘Israel’ in her then ‘rightful’ against external threats, including suppression of the Palestinians – the responsibility for overall Israel shall continue [...] and will security of Israelis and have all the powers to take the Settlements [...] and will have all steps necessary– and for her claims the powers to take the steps to security and what entails security- necessary to meet this “overall security”. responsibility...

The insidious locutions “overall security” and “all the powers to take the steps necessary,” reinforced by the use of “shall” which means nothing but “must” are indefinitely open to ‘Israel’’s robust and unshackled imagination. Thus, whatever, absolutely whatever, ‘Israel’ deems “necessary” “to meet this responsibility,” then it is necessary. Given her bad faith and politics of creating “facts on the ground” to “enable further consolidation of Israeli power,” I shall leave what ‘Israel’ might enforce as “necessary” and “secure” to readers’ imagination. Israel’s entrenched intent to deceive to create “facts on the ground” to bring under her permanent control more territory seems - besides the systematic attempts to ‘cleanse’ the Palestinians remaining in Palestine - to be the only ‘genuine’ agendum it is pursuing, and with vengeance. Otherwise, why would the Palestinians whose bulk was expelled at gunpoint from their homes more than 6 decades ago, remain until now, homeless and stateless? While such intent to deceive has always underlain the misleading terms of the negotiation process, Israel’s discursive ability to dictate such terms has also shaped the implementation of the process - in this context the Interim Agreement. As stated in this agreement 252 (Oslo 2), several clauses declared that “the integrity and status [of the territories] will be preserved during the interim period” and that “neither side shall initiate or take any steps that will change the status of the West Bank and Gaza Strip pending the outcome of permanent status negotiations”. Now without tergiversation, equivocation or linguistic manipulation - the intent to deceive -, the logical interpretation of such clauses as has actually been interpreted by “Palestinian and most other observers” would be understood to denote that “expansion of settlements violated the accord,” an interpretation to which ‘Israel’ argues that “the terms referred to political status only,” “a reservation not mentioned in the documents” (Smith, 2007: 464). Smith (2007) further adds:

In Israel’s view, Arafat could not declare a state because that would alter the political status of the territories, but as Rabin noted to the Knesset, Israel reserved “total freedom of action in order to fulfil those security and political aims that touch on the permanent solution [Recall “all the powers to take the steps necessary”].” These aims included consolidating the settlement blocs so as to argue that uprooting them would be too disruptive [a fact on the ground], and because, as Peres had noted, “to force [settlers] to leave... [would] risk a civil war.” [a fait accompli] (464).

In the long run, this would mean or have already meant, as stressed by Smith (2007), that “to evade a civil war within Israel, Palestinian expectations regarding the Oslo process would be denied, with the apparent compliance of American negotiators, while the Palestinians would be blamed for any rupture in that process” (464).

5.2.8 George W. Bush, Speech at the Aqaba (Jordan) Summit, and the ‘Palestinian State’

Taking place within the context of interminable “peace talks,” at the Aqaba Summit in Jordan, on June 4 2003, this is a speech in which after ‘referring to a U.S. victory in Iraq, Bush calls for a two-state solution and refers to the Road Map [April 2003] and the “tangible immediate steps” each side should take toward this goal’ (Smith, 2007, p. 550):

253 As the road map accepted by the parties makes clear, both must make tangible immediate steps toward this two-state vision.

However, in his lopsided or partisan speech, “Bush alters the sense of mutual obligations in the Road Map. He refers specifically to the Palestinian need to halt terror, end the violence, and commit to peaceful negotiations with Israel […]” (Smith, 2007, p. 550) as though it is the Palestinians - and not the Israelis - who are the occupying force and thus the obstacle to peace efforts:

Prime Minister Abbas recognizes that terrorist crimes are a dangerous obstacle to the independent state his people seek. He argues that the process for achieving that state is through peaceful negotiations…. He has promised…to end the armed intifada. He has promised to work without a compromise for a complete end of violence and terror….

Conversely, Bush projects or constructs Sharon, this veteran known for having no peace strategy, “no roadmap beyond his iron fist” as described by Thomas Friedman (Amer, 2009, p. 25), as a peaceful peace-loving Santa Claus, a good Samaritan par excellence:

I welcome Prime Minister Sharon’s pledge to improve the humanitarian situation in the Palestinian areas and to begin removing unauthorized outposts immediately. I appreciate his gestures of reconciliation on behalf of prisoners and their families, and his frank statements about the need for territorial contiguity.

An exemplar of discourse, this talk misrepresents reality and polarises the situation in a manner simply discursive, in a manner topsy-turvy, turning the occupied or powerless into a monster and the occupying force into a good Samaritan, making the dove a hawk and making the hawk a dove. Such polarised or dichotomous (mis)representation of the situation misrepresents reality; making ‘Israel,’ the occupying Power to seem ‘praiseworthy,’ ‘humanitarian’ and ‘peace-loving,’ while conceptualising the Palestinians, the powerless in this unequal equation, as ‘blameworthy,’ ‘terrorist,’ and ‘a dangerous obstacle to peace,’ respectively. Now away from this polarised (mis) representation, Smith (2007) says that “because Israel lobbied him to change the wording for Israel’s commitments, Bush makes no mention here [in his speech] of a settlement freeze and calls for the removal only of

254 “unauthorized outposts,” an ambiguous, misleading term suggested by the Sharon government” (p. 550). Smith notes that this term suggests that ‘government-authorized outposts/settlements could stay. And he reworded his description of a Palestinian State to omit references to it as “independent […] and sovereign.” Here, Bush’s agenda, and that of the United States, appears to be that demanded by Sharon’. Now having outlined the “setting and context” and confronted the “theme and content,” I move on to confront in detail Bush’s speech by identifying in the text the deployed discourse strategies and argumentative moves, of which the polarised or dichotomous (mis) representation of the situation mentioned above is one. Accordingly, I now provide below two tables, with the first (Table 5:19) reproducing the text of Bush’s speech, along with (an identification of) the argumentation strategies or argumentative moves advanced in the column opposite; and the second (Table 5:20) mentioning the nomination strategies (“discursive construction of social actors”) or the main actors in the speech, along with the predication strategies (“discursive characterization/qualification of social actors”) attributed to these actors next to them. Here, as noted, I examine Bush’s speech, unearthing his discourse strategies or argumentation: his misrepresentation of reality, his dichotomous representation of the situation, his empathising with ingroup members, his insidious, indirect characterisation of the powerless as ‘violent’ and ‘terrorist,’ his victim-agent reversal, his apparent concessions, his deceptive purveyance of optimism; this is along with other argumentative moves dominant in his text that underlie an overall discourse strategy described by Van Dijk (1999) as “positive ingroup presentation and negative outgroup presentation,” associated in this context with ‘peaceable,’ ‘rational’ and ‘flexible’ Israelis, and ‘violent,’ ‘terrorist,’ and ‘a dangerous obstacle to peace’ Palestinians, respectively. This is in an attempt to “facilitate the analysis of implicitly prejudiced utterances and to assist in the decoding of allusions [and projected images and discriminatory stereotypes] typically concealed in such utterances” (Titscher et al., 2000, p. 165); and to detect or unearth “the linguistic means used by the privileged (in this case ‘Israel’ and the USA) to stabilize or even to intensify inequalities in society” (Wodak & Meyer, 2009, p. 32).

255 Table 5.19 Argumentative structure of Bush’s Speech

No. Extract Discourse strategies/ Argumentative moves 1 It is fitting that we gather today in Jordan…. empathising with ingroup I’m pleased to be here with Prime Minister members; Sharon. The friendship between our countries asserting ingroup began at the time of Israel’s creation. Today allegiances and solidarity America is strongly committed to Israel’s security as a vibrant Jewish state. 2 I’m also pleased to be with Prime Minister deceptive purveyance of Abbas. He represents the cause of freedom optimism; appeal to and statehood for the Palestinian people […]. reasoning and rationality

3 Great and hopeful change is coming to the deceptive purveyance of Middle East. In Iraq, a dictator who founded optimism appeal to political terror… has been removed. Prime Minister Abbas authority; implicating terror now leads the Palestinian cabinet. to the victim or Palestinians By his strong leadership […] and by rejecting terror, he is serving the deepest hopes of his people. 4 All here today now share a goal: false clarity; manipulation of The Holy Land must be shared between the reality State of Palestine and the state of Israel […]. 5 All sides will benefit from this achievement… deceptive purveyance of I welcome Prime Minister Sharon’s pledge to optimism; improve the humanitarian situation in the misrepresentation of reality; Palestinian areas and to begin removing apparent concession unauthorized outposts immediately. I appreciate his gestures of reconciliation […], and his frank statements about the need for territorial contiguity 6 As I said yesterday, the issue of settlements apparent concession; must be addressed for peace to be deceptive purveyance of achieved…. optimism These are meaningful signs of respect for the rights of the Palestinians and their hopes for a viable, democratic, peaceful Palestinian state. 7 Prime Minister Abbas recognizes that terrorist appeal to reasoning and crimes are a dangerous obstacle to the rationality; independent state his people seek. He argues appeal to political authority; that the process for achieving that state is implicating violence and through peaceful negotiations…. He has terror on the part of the promised…to end the armed intifada. He has Palestinians; promised to work without a compromise for a victim-agent reversal complete end of violence and terror […]. 8 The journey we’re taking is difficult, but there evoking fear and alarm is no other choice […]. 9 The United States is committed to that cause. deceptive purveyance of If all sides fulfill their obligation, I know that optimism peace can finally come.

256 Discursively, there are three main social actors constructed in Bush’s speech. These are “I,” “Prime Minister Sharon,” and “Prime Minister Abbas”. Table 5.20 below lists the most salient predications attributed to these actors.

Table 20 Main nominations (social actors) and predications in Bush’s Speech

No. Social Actors Predications (discursive qualification of social actors) 1I • someone who is pleased to be with Prime Ministers Sharon and Abbas • strongly committed to Israel’s security • concerned with the issue of settlements • strongly support the cause of freedom and statehood for the Palestinian people • welcomes Sharon’s pledge to improve… • appreciates (Sharon’s) gestures… 2 Prime Minister • someone who pledges to improve the Sharon humanitarian situation in the Palestinian areas • someone who pledges to remove unauthorized outposts immediately • expresses frank statements about the need for territorial contiguity • recognizes that it is in Israel’s own interest for Palestinians to govern themselves in their own State • a champion of reconciliation and human rights 3 Prime Minister • someone who represents the cause of Abbas freedom and statehood for the Palestinian people • leader of the Palestinian cabinet • server of the deepest hopes of his people • rejecter of terror • someone who recognizes that terrorist crimes are a dangerous obstacle to the independent state his people seek • agrees that the process for achieving that state is through peaceful negotiations • promises his full efforts …to end the …intifada • promises to work without compromise for a complete end of violence and terror

As illustrated in Table 5.20 above, Mr Bush constructs both Sharon and Abbas in positive terms. However, the way he constructs Abbas makes it as though it is the Palestinians who are the “obstacle” to peace, and not the converse. This is understood or implied from the

257 way he characterises and qualifies Abbas as someone who rejects “terror;” someone who “recognizes that terrorist crimes are a dangerous obstacle to the independent state his [‘terrorist’] people seek;” someone who promises “full efforts and resources to end the armed intifada;” someone who promises to “work without compromise for a complete end of violence and terror,” etc. This barrage of the rejection of terror, recognition of the danger of “terrorist crimes,” and the promises to “work without compromise” to end such ‘violence and terror’ on the part of Abbas implicates insidiously on the one hand that it is the Palestinians who are the obstacle rather than the Israelis to peace, and indirectly obliges Abbas to take a tougher stance against what he calls as ‘terror,’ which could also - as has actually always been the case - be employed again and again as a pretext that the Palestinian Authority (PA) has not fulfilled her ‘promises’ and commitments towards fighting ‘terror,’ and so why should ‘Israel’. The way Mr Bush constructs Abbas subtly nudges the addressee or discourse consumer, whether a listener or reader to conceptualise the Palestinian people as being aggressive, recalcitrant and uncouth, as being the ‘terrorist’ ones - since their leader rejects, recognises, agrees and promises - and thus the cause behind every breakdown or logjam in the so-called ‘peace process,’ every stumbling block or obstacle to peace...to which Mr Sharon - this war veteran - in contrast, is committed since he expresses “frank statements about the need for territorial contiguity,” [Israeli or Palestinian by the way?] and pledges to improve…and remove… Such predications can subconsciously nudge discourse consumers - who might not be well-versed in the realities of the Palestinian struggle against Israeli occupation, in the image and reality due to such barrage of Zionist deceptive discourse and misrepresentation of reality- to even sympathise with the Israelis as being – ironically – the victim to implicated Palestinian ‘terror’. Can we see how the perpetrator/victim dichotomy (Amer, 2012) or the discourse strategy of victim-agent reversal - part of an overall discourse strategy of “positive ingroup presentation and negative outgroup presentation” - works? Who is the occupied and who is the occupying force? Who is the one whose means of ‘terror’ are stones, Molotov bottles, protest demonstrations “in support of an independent Palestine” and recently out of despair, self-immolation operations; and who is the one whose means of fighting such ‘terror’ and primitive arms are “live ammunition,” gunships and armed troops that shoot to kill, “Apache helicopters, tanks and bulldozers” (Pappe, 2006, p. 243), “depleted uranium, white phosphorous, D.I.M.E. and other nuclear-based illegal weapons, not to mention F-

258 16’s and other sophisticated weaponry supplied by the USA [by Mr Bush]”? Who? Victim-agent reversal is a discourse strategy that ‘Israel’ and the country whose comradeship with it “began at the time of Israel’s creation” - as stated in the discourse under question - often resort to in an attempt to not only juggle or distort facts, misrepresent and manipulate reality and discursively masquerade their evil workings, but also to sustain the status quo to elicit deeper concessions and further consolidate Israeli control of the territories. So even though the transitivity selections used here – deployed to realise the discourse strategies – feature Abbas in a positive light, they are crippling: “leads,” “rejecting,” “is serving,” “recognizes,” “argues,” “agrees” and “has promised”. They are meant in a way to provide more pretexts for the occupying Power to carry on its politics of expansion, of creating “facts on the ground” to enable further “consolidation of its “fundamental objectives” and “annexationist ambitions”. Now in contrast to this constructed image of Abbas and by implication the Palestinians by Bush, the way Mr Bush constructs Sharon discursively makes Sharon, this veteran warrior, “architect of settlement expansion,” seem a man of ‘peace’ and ‘good intentions’. Mr Bush makes the man – described by Friedman (a generally pro- Israeli journalist) as a leader noted for his militancy, lack of “pragmatic wisdom” and for having no peace strategy, “no roadmap beyond his iron fist” (Amer, 2009, p. 25) – as someone whose “gestures of “reconciliation” are to be appreciated, as someone who pledges to “improve the humanitarian situation in the Palestinian areas” and to “remove unauthorized outposts immediately” – note, “unauthorized,” not authorised “outposts” and “immediately,” - and as someone who expresses “frank statements about the need for territorial contiguity”… Apart from perpetuating rather than really ending Israeli occupation, such representation or indeed misrepresentation and polarisation of the situation makes one, despite his or her convictions about the realities of the conflict, wonder at least for a while about who the occupying force is and who the occupied are; who the subject of domination is and who is the object; who is the victim and who is the victimiser... As constructed here, Sharon is a man of peace exuding humanity, and thus are his sacred pledges to improve and remove…. The Palestinians, on the other hand are, as constructed, an embodiment of ‘terrorism’ and barbarity, and thus are Abbas’s constructed promises of “full efforts and resources to end the armed intifada;” of

259 his rejection and then implicit assignment to fight such implicated constructed ‘terror’. He is constructed, as noted, as someone who “recognizes that terrorist crimes are a dangerous obstacle to the independent state his people seek” and thus promises “to work without compromise for a complete end of violence and terror”. This is also a mechanism consistently used as a pretext that the Palestinians have failed to stem ‘violence’ and hence a ‘cause’ to temporise to protract the status quo: the Israeli annexation or requisition of further lands through creating more “new realities on the ground” where it would become one day - as it is always the case - “unrealistic to expect” - as uttered in another context by Mr Bush himself by the way - a reversal:

in light of new realities on the ground [...], it is unrealistic to expect that the outcome of final status negotiations will be a full and complete return to the 1949 armistice lines (Bush in response to a letter to Sharon on April 14, 2004, following the latter’s outlining of the Disengagement Plan; as cited in Smith (2007, p. 527)).

It is “reality,” not justice that governs power relations. It is in light of “new realities,” not in light of equality and the dispensation of justice. It is the powerful, not justice; it is the right of the mighty to rule; it is might, not right; it is the polarising fascist dictatorial dogma of “Either you are with us or you are with the terrorists” (George W. Bush – Address to Congress & American people – 09.20.01; cited in James, 2004, 30); it is the autocratic policy of: après moi le déluge.

5.2.9 Summary of Research Question I: Findings Related to the Right of the Palestinian People to Self-Determination

Is it not time to create an independent Palestinian state with Jerusalem as its capital [...]? (Abbas while addressing the UN GA on Sept 29, 2007)

Research Question I concerns itself with the role of UN resolutions and ‘peace’ discourse in ending “Israel’s oppression and occupation,” in realising the right of the Palestinian people to self- determination by aiding them reconstitute themselves in their historic homeland, and thus paving the road to peace in the Middle East.

260 Hence, Research Question I centres on the position of this inalienable right - the right of the Palestinian people to self- determination through an end to Israeli occupation - in UN and ‘peace’ discourse. Accordingly, the study has endeavoured to find out about the intent and accordingly practicality of those UN resolutions and subsequent ‘peace’ discourse in constructing this pillar or implementing this inalienable right; pivotal, along with the Right of Return, to Palestinian salvation and Israeli security, to and end of hostilities and hence any attempt at reconstitution, rehabilitation and peace. Now, reproduced in the table overleaf is RQ I, along with its five sub- questions and a synopsis of their findings:

261 Table 5.21 Summary of Research Question I: Findings Related to the Right of the Palestinian People to Self-Determination

Item Questions Findings No. How practical and Structured subtly to provide the occupying Power with the time bona fide are UN and cover necessary to create “facts on the ground” and hence resolutions and enable further consolidation of Israeli control of territory, the study ‘peace talks’ in has contributed to highlighting the discursive intricacies involved ending the status in the temporisation of the Palestine problem, and concluded that quo - “Israel’s neither UN resolutions, nor the protracted ‘peace process’ oppression and discourse in all its guises - pursuant to the 1988 PLO recognition occupation” - in of ‘Israel’ and the ensuing Middle East Peace Conference in realising the 1991, with the declared goal to end “decades of confrontation and Palestinian conflict” - is found to be bona fide or practical in ending “Israel’s People Right to oppression and occupation,” in implementing the Right of Return Self- (see Section 5.3.5 below) or reconstituting the Palestinian Determination, refugees in their historic homeland, and realising a Palestinian and thus paving state or the Palestinians’ Right to Self-Determination. the road to That those UN resolutions and ‘peace talks’ are about justice and “peace” in the fairness found to be a myth, the study has shown that those Middle East? discourses are responsible for reproducing domination rather than trying to genuinely work out a “just, lasting and comprehensive” solution to the Palestine State problem. The study has detailed that the whole basis for the ‘peace process’ - UN Resolutions 242 and 338 - is flawed, mala fide and impractical. The way these resolutions and ‘peace’ discourses is structured does not lay the ground for justice and peace, but rather indefinite protraction of the Palestinian struggle against Israeli occupation where, given the current imbalance of power, the Palestinians would continuously remain the main “losers” within this form of RQ I social life. The study has shown that those discursive practices as they are have given the powerful the mechanisms for further expansionism. They have arrogated to Israelis further de facto annexation of Palestinian lands and deprived Palestinians of further de jure rights. The study has shown that while many of those UN resolutions and ‘peace talks’ concerning the Arab struggle against Israeli occupation act to dilute and defuse indignation and agitation at the systematic encroachments committed by ‘Israel’ while giving it more time to create more “facts on the ground,” they are designed or constructed to purvey a sense of optimism while the underlying intent is to sustain the status quo to create “facts on the grounds;” “facts” that will continuously make it “unrealistic to expect”... Consequently, the study has found that temporisation and protraction of the issue, of finding an amicable solution to the Palestine State problem was an indirect result of the bad faith and linguistic manipulation of the powerful forces. As such, such UN and ‘peace’ discourse - found to be little more than Zionist war against the powerless by other means - is meant in light of the bad faith underlying those discursive practices to sustain, rather than end the status quo, to wage war rather than peace, for the powerful to be able to further consolidate their “fundamental objectives” and “annexationist ambitions”. In this context, the study has stressed that the apparent pursuit of ‘peace’ as an American-Israeli means to sustain war (the status quo) need not be a paradox.

262 To what extent do The whole “Peace offensive” is based on Resolutions 242 and UN resolutions and 338, i.e. on the reconstruction of Palestine within the pre-June 5 contemporary lines or the June 4, 1967 borders, which in their totality discourse of the constitute only 22% of the total area of former Palestine, less ‘peace process’ than half of what the United Nations in its (Partition) Resolution reshape and 181 of November 1947 allocated to the Arab state. demarcate the But what is more tragic and problematic is the fact that those geopolitical map of UN resolutions and ‘peace talks’ are structured linguistically in a former Palestine? way so as to always give the occupying Power much leeway to What territory out of even debate the extent of withdrawal from territories whose Mandate Palestine totality - as noted - if returned in toto, would still only constitute does the 22% of Mandate or former Palestine? Sub- discoursed-upon Neither Resolution 242 - with its ambiguous, contradictory, and Q1 state have? biased nature - and Resolution 338, used along with 242 as the basis for a settlement, nor Resolution 1397 and Resolution 1515, used as echoes or reiterations of 242 and 338, nor the Oslo discourse is structured (practically and bona fide) to end “Israel’s oppression and occupation” and make it for the two- state solution. The way such UN resolutions and ‘peace talks’ are structured has made ‘Israel’ so far for 44 years (i.e. since 1967) to debate withdrawal and is still debating, refusing to fully withdraw from those territories it occupied by force in 1967, and needed by the Palestinians for a state to bring to an end their homelessness and sufferings.

The study has linguistically detailed that the whole basis for the ‘peace process,’UN Resolutions 242 and 338, is faulty and flawed, mala fide and impractical. The subtle and ambiguous How practical or way Resolution 242 and its duplicate 338 is structured has dispositive and revealed, upon careful systematic analysis, bad faith and bona fide such impracticality. They do not demand - unambiguously - Israeli resolutions and withdrawal from all the territories occupied by force in 1967. discourses are in 1397 and 1515, these two resolutions still do not stipulate Sub- ending occupation immediate and full withdrawal. They do not stipulate “a full and Q2 and realising a complete return to the 1949 armistice lines” or the June 4 1967 Palestinian state borders. that is politically 3236, as far as recognition, reaffirmation, and emphasis are sovereign and concerned, they are there in this Resolution. The Resolution, economically however, lacks the language that turns such words from being viable? mere rhetoric to reality, from acting as a discursive drug of gradualism and deceptive optimism to action and “facts on the ground”.

What territorial In light of Israeli intransigence, manipulation and bad faith, integrity and discourse of the ‘peace’ process has in reality meant little more contiguity does than the maintenance of Israeli control of the life and livelihood such state have in of the beleaguered Palestinians, and the bantustanisation or light of Jewish dismemberment of the Palestinian territories through the Zionist colonies, creation of disconnected cantons, a group of “disconnected Sub- those huge Jewish islands in an Israeli-controlled sea,” “a fragmented and Q3 population centres emasculated Palestinian state,” surrounded by checkpoints that rip Palestinian allowing no freedom of movement, “a truncated and divided territories and Palestinian state in the West Bank,” a ‘state’ “separated into families and [four] enclaves, with Israelis manning checkpoints and barriers mothers and their at Palestinian enclave boundaries,” thus making the ‘Palestinian parity apart? state’ nothing more than a group of enclaves that lack economic viability, territorial or geographical contiguity, territorial integrity and sovereignty and thus viability and independence. 263 What is the status Though treated according to the November 29 1947 UN of al-Quds/ Resolution 181 (Plan of Partition) as a corpus separatum to be Jerusalem in such “administered by the United Nations,” independently of either discourses? Can the Arab state or Jewish state to be created in accordance with there be a such resolution, Israel, upon its forcible creation in 1948 Palestinian state declared (West) Jerusalem since January 1950 as its capital. without Jerusalem And 17 years later, upon its forcible acquisition or occupation of being its capital, the rest of former Palestine in 1967, ‘Israel’ “claimed all of Sub- given its religious, Jerusalem as its capital,” annexing in 1980 East Jerusalem (the Q4 historical and part of Jerusalem falling in the territories occupied since 1967) cultural and claiming it as part of Jerusalem proper, unifying East and significance, not West Jerusalem, and calling them since 1980 Israel’s unified only to capital, “a united Jerusalem under its sovereignty,” creating the Palestinians, but impression it was part of the original city”. also to Muslims and So with Jerusalem made “a red line” or “non-negotiable,” with even Christians this in mind, ‘Israel,’ the occupying Power ‘talks’ about ‘peace’. worldwide? What sovereignty With the previous facts in mind, the question of sovereignty does the proposed needs not any further elaboration. state have over the Sub- envisioned or Q5 negotiated territory?

5.3 RQ II: UN RESOLUTIONS AND ‘PEACE’ DISCOURSE AND THE PALESTINIAN REFUGEES RIGHT OF RETURN (QUESTION OF THE RIGHT OF RETURN)

It is estimated that there were more than 7 million Palestinian refugees and displaced persons at the beginning of 2003. (Badil Resource Centre: Facts and Figures)

Enshrined in the heart and memory of every Palestinian and free citizen of this world, and in The Universal Declaration of Human Rights - adopted in the same year the Palestinians got uprooted by Zionist Jews from their homeland - the Palestinian Refugees Right of Return is the focus of Research Question II, raised and investigated in/by this CDA study: To what extent has UN and ‘peace’ discourse gone in implementing the Palestinian Refugees Right of Return or the reconstitution of the Palestinians - rendered since 1948 homeless - as a nation in their historic homeland? As I did with Research Question I, Research Question II on the Right of Return or the reconstitution or repatriation of the Palestinians – made since 1948 (and 1967) by force of arms to flee their homes and to live ever since in diasporic communities in neighbouring countries under grim conditions - can be divided into two detailed heuristic sub-questions as follows: 264 • Can any serious solution or discourse on the Palestine Question exclude or ignore this inalienable right despite its obsolescence: return of those refugees whom the Zionists have uprooted and forced to live in diaspora in miserable and squalid refugee camps? In other words, can any attempt at achieving peace in the Middle East be “just, lasting and comprehensive” - as claimed by such discourse - without undoing this gross injustice?

• So what is the status of those refugees - who constitute more than half of the torn Palestinian social cohesion - in such UN resolutions and ‘peace talks’?

In an answer to RQ II and its two sub-questions, critical analysis is conducted on five UN resolutions, to wit: 212 (1948), 194 (1948), 302 (1949), 242 (1967) and 338 (1973), and on a document of the peace process: Oslo Accords (I).

5.3.1 UN GA Resolutions 212, 194, 302, and the Question of the Right of Return

[The conflict is] not just about the future of the Occupied Territories, but that at its heart are the refugees Israel had cleansed from Palestine in 1948. (Pappe, 2006: 244)

Adopted on December 11, 1948, UN GA Resolution 194, known as Palestinian Refugees 1948, calls for the return of the refugees “wishing to return to their homes and live at peace with their neighbours”. The Resolution was issued a few months after the establishment of ‘Israel’ by force of arms and the resultant homelessness of “about 80%” (Finkelstein, 2003) of Palestinians. Now, while it may be bona fide, Resolution 194 is not practical. The words chosen are not forceful and precise enough to make the undoing of this “social wrong” or through the immediate restoration of the status quo ante or the voluntary “repatriation, resettlement and economic and social rehabilitation of the refugees and the payment of compensation” a reality. Paragraph 11, for instance, states that “the refugees wishing to return to their homes and live at peace with their neighbours should be permitted to do so at the earliest practicable date”. Here the Resolution again makes the repatriation of the Palestinian refugees a matter of advisability, rather than an obligation: “should be permitted”. This choice of 265 modality will certainly be different and have a binding rather than advising effect if “must,” for example, were used in lieu of “should” as shown in the following table where the original version of the text is being contrasted with the reconstructed or deconstructed version next to it:

Table 5.22 CDA of UN Resolution 194 and the Palestinian Refugees Right of Return (Question of the Right of Return)

Original text Deconstructed The General Assembly, that the refugees Having considered further the situation in wishing to return to their Palestine, Resolves that the refugees wishing to former homes and live return to their homes and live at peace with their at peace with their neighbours should be permitted to do so at the neighbours must/have earliest practicable date [...] (emphasis added). to/are to be permitted to do so [...].

This gets further clear when we know that the selection of “must” rather than “should” is being used in UN resolutions but where deemed expedient. For example, in the preamble to Resolution 212 (November 1948) about assisting those refugees, we see the following:

Whereas the problem of the relief of Palestine refugees of all communities is one of immediate urgency and the United Nations Mediator on Palestine in his progress report of 18 September 1948, part three, states that "action must be taken to determine the necessary measures [of relief]... (emphasis added).

Here, “must” rather than “should” is being used: “action must be taken [...],” which clearly shows that “should” and “must” are not synonymous or interchangeable. Furthermore, in the second paragraph of the preamble to the same Resolution, we see the following:

Whereas the Acting Mediator, in his supplemental report of 18 October 1948, declares that "the situation of the refugees is now critical"3/ and that "aid must not only be continued but very greatly increased if disaster is to be averted" [...] (emphasis added).

266 Would the use of “should” instead of “must” in the above two examples be the same? Can they be semantically equated? Can “must” be changed with “should” without affecting the sense of urgency called for or implored by the Mediator - and that aid should not only be continued but...? An exhortatory wishy-washy word, “should” is not “must”. It does not have the force or level of urgency and enforceability as the obligatory “must” even if one is to argue that it is being used in a legal sense. In such contexts, “should” has the capacity to be manipulated. It can provide room for debate. Whatever the case, it is my feeling that had “must” been used in place of “should” in the locution “the refugees wishing to return to their homes [...] should be permitted to do so,” reality could have been different, or at least might have been different. But for such change from “should” to “must” to take place, then a change has to take place in the intent underlying such calculated use of language. Finally, the lack of a clear and definite timeframe for the return of the refugees makes the resolution to lack practicality. 194 speaks of “the earliest practicable date,” and now we have gone past the 65th anniversary (i.e. 1948-2013) of this “forcible removal” - in which the “architect of the Jewish state” and the Zionist entity’s first Prime Minister sees “nothing immoral” - and the refugees are still awaiting “the earliest practicable date”. To clarify this point further, let us look at Table 5.23 below where the original and deconstructed texts are being contrasted:

Table 5.23 CDA of UN Resolution 194 and the Palestinian Refugees Right of Return (Question of the Right of Return)

Original text Deconstructed “the refugees wishing to return to the refugees wishing to return to their their homes and live at peace with homes and live at peace with their their neighbours should be neighbours must/are to be permitted permitted to do so at the earliest to do so not later than 31 December practicable date ... (emphasis 1950 (for example or any other added)” specified date)

I need to draw attention also here, before leaving this subsection, that UN GA Resolution 212 (1948) of Nov 19, preceding 194, and GA Resolution 302 (1949) of Dec 8, proceeding 194, have nothing to do with the question of the Right of Return. Aiding Palestinian Refugees and establishing the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) for Palestine Refugees in the 267 Near East, they were both concerned with “assistance for the relief of the Palestine refugees [...] to prevent conditions of starvation and distress among them” (Resolution 302, Paragraph 5) (vide APPENDIX A (ii) and (iv). Therefore, the study concludes that due to such lack of stipulation or at least mention of the Right of Return in 212 (1948) and 302 (1949), and the lack of a timeframe in 194 for the repatriation of refugees, along with the framing of repatriation in the modal form of advisability, resolutions 212 and 302 are irrelevant to the question of the Right of Return, while Resolution 194 lacks the necessary enforceability to make it practical; an assumption that given the scale of the tragedy brings the intent of the discourse drafters or those behind the resolution into question.

5.3.2 UN SC Resolution 242 and the Question of the Right of Return and Self-Determination

With support from imperialist and colonialist Powers, [Israel] managed to get itself accepted as a United Nations Member. It further succeeded in getting the Palestine Question deleted from the agenda of the United Nations and in deceiving world public opinion by presenting our cause as a problem of refugees in need of charity from do-gooders or settlement in a land not theirs…. (from Arafat’s Address to the U.N. General Assembly, November 13,1974; cited in Smith, 2007: 348)

For background information about the setting and context, other themes and content of this Resolution of November 1967, reference is to be made to Subsection 5.2.1 above. Rejected “categorically” by the PLO for 21 years (i.e. 1967-1988), Resolution 242 advocates a “just settlement of the refugee problem” (see Subsection 5.2.1 above, and Table 5.24 below).

268 Table 5.24 CDA of UN Resolution 242 and the Palestinian Refugees Right of Return (Question of the Right of Return)

Original text Deconstructed The Security By boiling down the Palestine Question from being a Council, “national cause” to a mere “refugee problem,” and by [...] not specifying the Right of Return as the just 2. Affirms further solution/settlement - for any other settlement, however the necessity just it may sound to certain stakeholders, it is unjust - [...] Resolution 242 not only harbours mala fides regarding (b) For achieving a implementing the Right of Return or reconstituting the just settlement of Palestinians - rendered homeless by Zionist terrorist the refugee gangs - as a nation in their historic homeland, but also problem helps obfuscate and obliterate “the patriotic and (emphasis added); national rights” of the Palestinians, their right to self- determination (see Subsection 5.2.1 above).

Further, it must be noted that producers of the resolution make no explicit mention of the agent behind the “refugee problem,” which takes attention away from and obfuscates the perpetrator (the Zionists in collaboration with the British) of this crime against humanity, played down as a “refugee problem”. Qualifying the crimes of mass expulsion Zionists committed against the native people of Palestine (Palestinian Arabs) in 1948 as a “refugee problem” along with the omission of the actor can contribute to a perception that this premeditated crime of ethnic cleansing might have been the result of a natural disaster such as a flood or earthquake to be saddened at, rather than the work of human agency (i.e. Zionists) to be deplored, condemned and reversed. This UN de-agentialisation or the deliberate omission of the agent of the event helps perpetuate injustice. Such calculated use of agent deletion obscures causal agency, thus obviating the need for blame attribution, responsibility and accountability. We are told that there is a “problem;” but we are not told about what or who has caused the ‘problem”.

5.3.3 UN SC Resolution 338 and the Question of the Right of Return

For background information on the setting and context, theme and content of this Resolution of October 22, 1973, reference is to be made to Subsection 5.2.2. As stated in that Subsection, Resolution 338 (1973) is in essence, a reiteration or call to implement 269 Resolution 242 (1967). A concise three-paragraph Resolution, 338 “Calls upon the parties concerned to start immediately after the cease-fire the implementation of Security Council Resolution 242 (1967) in all of its parts”. Thus, 338 does not add anything new as to the Right of Return. Hence, the study concludes that Resolution 338 does not differ in any way from Resolution 242 (see Subsection 5.3.2 and 5.2.1 above) as to implementing the Right of Return or reconstituting the Palestinians, rendered homeless in 1948, back into their homeland.

5.3.4 Oslo Accords (I) and the Question of the Right of Return

Oslo Accords (I) or the Declaration of Principles on Interim Self- Government Arrangements (DOP) taken as the basis or framework “for the future relations” and all “subsequent agreements” “between Israel and the PLO (see Subsection 5.2.6) - does not make any mention of the Right of Return of the Palestinian refugees of 1948, refugees of what I previously called as the First Massive Wave of Ethnic Cleansing. The DOP speaks only of “displaced Palestinians” (Annex I, paragraph 3); the “persons displaced from the West Bank and Gaza Strip in 1967” (Article XII). These are the refugees of 1967 who were made homeless during the 1967 Israeli Aggression of 5 June. They were made to wander, along with those of 1948 as refugees in diaspora. In other words, the DOP makes mention only of the Second Massive Wave of Ethnic Cleansing. This is a fact that confirms ‘Israel’’s “continuing denial of the Nakba” - largely the result of the “still alive” “Zionist ideology of ethnic supremacy,” the ideology underlying ‘Israel’’s entrenched intent to deceive, which is, as stated by Pappe (2006: 234), one of “two obstacles that perpetuate the refugee problem,” the other being the so-called ‘peace process’”:

The Nakba and the refugee issues have been consistently excluded from the peace agenda, and to understand this we must assess how deep the level of denial of the crimes committed in 1948 remains today in Israel and associate it with the existence of a genuinely felt fear on the one hand, and a deeply rooted form of anti-Arab racism on the other, both heavily manipulated (236-237).

Emphasised also by Shash (1999), ‘Israel’’s denial of its responsibility for the Palestinian homelessness and thus its stance

270 against their return is largely due to undisguised ideological reasons: the establishment of a pure Jewish state. Historically, Zionist leaders were unanimous in their intent and goal to transfer the Palestinians or rather “cleanse” Palestine or to use the words of the founder of Zionism - as entered in his diary in 1895 - “to expel the poor population across the border unnoticed”. Hence, the embryo Jewish state had “regretfully” failed in 1948 to totally “transfer” or “expel” the remaining 20% of natives. Now, according to Article XII: LIASON AND COOPERATION WITH JORDAN AND EGYPT of the DOP:

[The] two parties [‘Israel’ and the PLO] will invite the Governments of Jordan and Egypt to participate in establishing further liaison and cooperation arrangements between the Government of Israel and the Palestinian representatives, on the one hand, and the Governments of Jordan and Egypt, on the other hand (see Table 5.25 below).

Table 5.25 CDA of Oslo Accords (I) (Question of the Right of Return)

Original text Deconstructed These arrangements will include Besides obscuring – through passive the constitution of a Continuing agent deletion - who is responsible for Committee that will decide by the displacement of those persons from agreement on the modalities of their homeland, what about those admission of persons displaced Palestinians made refugees since from the West Bank and Gaza 1948? Strip in 1967, together with necessary measures to prevent A central issue, one of the “essentials disruption and disorder of the conflict,” the “critical constants,” (emphasis added). the Right of Return or the right to repatriate and rehabilitate the Palestinian refugees the Zionists have rendered homeless since 1948 is not mentioned.

According to the Article above, ‘Israel’ differentiates between those Refugees of 1948 (on whose depopulated and razed villages ‘Israel’ was founded - 78% of Palestine) and those of 1967 (on whose occupied and partly depopulated villages the Israelis have constructed colonies- parts of the vestigial 22% of Palestine). While the first category - those made refugees as a result of the First Massive Wave of Ethnic Cleansing - is postponed or supposedly postponed among “permanent status issues” (Article V) to be 271 worked out through “direct bilateral negotiations” (i.e. ‘Israel’ and the PA only), mention is made of the second category - those made refugees as a result of the Second Massive Wave of Ethnic Cleansing - where a resolution of the issue would be approached through multi-lateral negotiations (i.e. the PA, Jordan, Egypt and ‘Israel’). Dealing only with those Palestinians displaced in 1967 from the West Bank and the Gaza Strip (Second Massive Wave of Ethnic Cleansing), while ignoring or (giving us the semblance of) deferring the Question of the Right of Return of the 1948 refugees (First Massive Wave of Ethnic Cleansing) who constitute more than half of the torn Palestinian fabric proves - based on ‘Israel’’s bad faith - to be nothing more than further temporisation or a delaying tactic until the creation of further ‘irreversible’ “facts on the ground” that would allow ‘Israel’ to further consolidate her power; a policy of which ‘Israel’ - indeed since its pre-embryonic stage - is typical. Deferment of the Right of Return or the issue of the refugees of the First Massive Wave of Ethnic Cleansing until the date of “Permanent status negotiations” might thus, as shown in Subsection 5.2.6, never be realised, especially as the founding Zionist ideology of keeping ‘Israel’ as a “Jewish” state is not only “still alive” but also pursued with vengeance (Morris, 1988; Shash, 1999; Pappe, 2006). So, the DOP, as noted, speaks only of the refugees of 1967, of “modalities of admission of persons displaced from the West Bank and Gaza Strip in 1967” [which are to be decided on by a Continuing Committee to be set up during the interim period]. This quartet Continuing Committee was to be later made up of the PA, ‘Israel,’ Egypt and Jordan. The first of the committee’s meetings took place in March 1995 in Jordan but lack of agreement on who constitutes a “displaced person” took place (Shash, 1999); hence creating an obstacle towards the repatriation of even those expelled in 1967, which shows ‘Israel’’s entrenched intent to always manipulate and deceive or until the “facts on the ground” make it, as usual “unrealistic to expect” not even the return of the refugees of the second wave but the return of any, bearing in mind that the refugees of the first wave are not mentioned at all. To further prove ‘Israel’’s lack of good faith, I wish to draw attention to the phrase in Table 5.26 below:

272 Table 5.26 CDA of Oslo Accords (I) (Question of the Right of Return)

Original text Deconstructed These arrangements will include the This again, given ‘Israel’’s lack of constitution of a Continuing good faith, couldbeemployed Committee that will decide by cunningly by ‘Israel’ to evade, agreement on the modalities of temporise and impede the whole admission of persons displaced from process of the “admission of the West Bank and Gaza Strip in persons displaced from the West 1967, together with necessary Bank and Gaza Strip in 1967” on measures to prevent disruption the grounds of preventing and disorder (Article XII) (emphasis “disruption and disorder”. added).

Finally I would like to add the following as a further proof of ‘Israel’’s entrenched mala fides or lack of good faith negotiations regarding the Palestinian refugees Right of Return, this essential supposedly deferred as a permanent status issue. A year after the supposed end in May 4, 1999 of the “Interim period,” and just before July 2000 Camp David Summit, ‘Israel’ had passed a law prohibiting any Israeli negotiator from even discussing “the Right of Return of the Palestinian refugees to the homes that had been theirs before 1948 [...] with Barak publically committing himself to upholding it as he climbed the steps of the plane that was taking him to Camp David” (Pappe, 2006: 244) (see Subsection 3.5.6 below).

5.3.5 Summary of Research Question II: Findings Related to the Right of Return

Is it not time to [...] find a just solution...to the problem of refugees to put an end to the suffering that they have endured for six decades? (Abbas while addressing the UN GA on Sept 29, 2007)

Research Question II concerns itself with the Palestinian Refugees Right of Return in UN and ‘peace’ discourse. So as was done with Research Question I, Research Question II on the Right of Return or the repatriation or reconstitution of the Palestinians - who in 1948 (the First Massive Wave of Ethnic Cleansing) and 1967 (the Second Massive Wave of Ethnic Cleansing) were made by force of arms to flee their homes and to live ever since in diasporic communities in neighbouring countries under grim conditions - was divided into two sub-questions or areas of doubt (see Table 5.27 overleaf): 273 Table 5.27 Summary of Research Question II: Findings Related to the Right of Return

Ite Questions Findings m No. To what extent Given the “still alive” “transfer” Zionist ideology, the has UN and dogma underlying ‘Israel’’s entrenched intent to ‘peace’ discourse deceive; the dogma that “Only Transfer Will Bring gone in Peace,” the dogma that prohibits “the Right of implementing the Return of the Palestinian refugees to the homes Palestinian that had been theirs before 1948” from even being Refugees Right discussed,” the dogma or Revisionist Zionist belief of Return or the that “between the sea and Jordan there will only be reconstitution of Israeli sovereignty,” the study has concluded that the Palestinians - neither UN resolutions, nor the protracted ‘peace rendered in 1948 process’ discourse in all its guises has been found homeless - as a to be bona fide or practical in implementing the nation in their Right of Return or reconstituting the Palestinian historic refugees in their historic homeland as more than homeland? half of the Palestinians (estimated by Badil Resource Centre to be 7 million persons at the beginning of 2003) are languishing in diaspora. This has always been the case despite decades of resolutions and ‘talks’. Still denying its responsibility for the affluent Palestinian diaspora, ‘Israel’ has never changed its RQ entrenched intent towards the refugees; a visible II fact that makes those resolutions and discourses nothing but means of further domination and consolidation of power on the part of ‘Israel’.

274 Can any serious In simple English words, talking about a “just,” solution or “lasting,” and “comprehensive” peace settlement as discourse on the all those UN resolutions and ‘peace talks’ claim Palestine their goal to be, entails the return of those Question exclude defenceless refugees who were “expelled from their or ignore this homes at gunpoint” and then denied return. inalienable right ‘Israel’ until now denies its responsibility for the despite its collective Palestinian dispossession and obsolescence: homelessness, the crimes that made it possible for return of those her to exist. All ongoing ‘peace’ discourse has until refugees whom now failed to draw a “legal and moral recognition of the Zionists have the ethnic cleansing Israel had perpetrated in uprooted and 1948”. forced to live in The study has emphasised that those UN diaspora in resolutions taken as the basis for the ‘peace miserable and process’ and hence a settlement of the problem of squalid refugee Israeli occupation conflict as such can never lead to camps? In other a “just, lasting and comprehensive peace words, can any settlement” as the dominant Zionist discourse would attempt at always like to advertise it. achieving peace They might one day - though still also unlikely given in the Middle East the fact that the process has entered its third be “just, lasting decade without improving the grim conditions of and Palestinians, both occupied and in diaspora- lead to Sub comprehensive” - acertainmodus vivendi of some kind if ‘Israel’ -Q as claimed by decides to go to the negotiating table without the 1 such discourse - symptomatic intent to dodge and deceive, and to without undoing really want to coexist with the Palestinians. this gross Nonetheless, still to call such modus vivendi -if it injustice? ever takes place - “just,” “lasting,” and “comprehensive” is misrepresentation of and disregard for inexorable facts; indeed not as long as this modus vivendi is being based on resolution 242 and its duplicate 338. Continued... So even if current dilatory discourse ends up with a modus vivendi which is very doubtful as noted, given the basis for such a modus vivendi, with its underlying entrenched intent to deceive, it is unjust to call “just” or “lasting” or “comprehensive” as this is nothing but discourse, hence is my insistence on calling it modus vivendi rather than settlement to connote that such a way of resolving this unequal conflict is temporary, not permanent. Having a “just,” “lasting,” and “comprehensive” peace settlement would require that the whole basis, as a first step, just, which as noted means that the entire basis used currently for a resolution of this unequal conflict has to be changed. But given Israel’s bad faith - the stronger stakeholder in this unequal conflict - apparently neither a just nor unjust settlement seems to be in the offing. 275 As for UN resolutions, by boiling down the Palestine Question from being a national cause, to a mere “refugee problem,” and by not specifying the Right of Return as the just solution, Resolution 242 not only harbours mala fides regarding this Right or the reconstitution of the Palestinians as a nation in their historic homeland, but also helps obliterate “the patriotic and national rights” of the Palestinians, their right to self-determination. In its call for “the implementation of Security Council Resolution 242 (1967) in all of its parts,” Resolution 338 does not add anything new as to the Palestinian Refugees Right of Return. Hence, the study concludes that Resolution 338 does not differ in any way from 242 as to implementing the Right of Return. The study has concluded that due to the lack of stipulation or at least mention of the Right of Return in resolutions 212 (1948) and 302 (1949), and the lack of a timeframe in 194 for the repatriation of refugees, along with the framing of repatriation in What is the status the modal form of advisability, resolutions 212 and of those refugees 302 are irrelevant to the question of the Right of - who constitute Return, while Resolution 194 lacks the necessary Sub more than half of enforceability to make it practical; an assumption -Q the torn that given the scale of the tragedy or crime brings 2 Palestinian social the intent of the discourse drafters or those behind cohesion - in the resolution into question. such UN Dealing only with those Palestinians displaced in resolutions and the aggression of 1967 from the West Bank and the ‘peace talks’? Gaza Strip (Second Massive Wave of Ethnic Cleansing), and in a manner that makes it possible to debate indefinitely who constitutes “a displaced person,” while ignoring or (giving us the semblance of) deferring the Question of the Right of Return of the 1948 refugees (First Massive Wave of Ethnic Cleansing) proves - based on ‘Israel’’s bad faith - to be little more than further temporisation, a delaying tactic until the creation of further ‘irreversible’ “facts on the ground;” where it would later become “unrealistic to expect” a (complete) reversal to the status quo ante, and hence more concessions, and thus further and “further consolidation of Israeli power,” a policy of which ‘Israel’ is typical. As such, such UN and protracted ‘peace’ discourse - found to be little more than Zionist war against the Palestinians by other means - is meant, in light of Israeli intransigence, manipulation and the underlying entrenched intent to deceive, to sustain, rather than end the status quo for Israel to be able to further consolidate her “fundamental objectives” and “annexationist ambitions”. 276 5.4 CHANGE OF PLO DISCOURSE, AND ONSET OF THE SLIPPERY SLOPE: DECLINEOFTHEPLO INTHEMID- 1980s

Let me highlight my views before you. [...] We are bent to [having] peace [...]. Our statehood provides salvation to the Palestinians and peace to both Palestinians and Israelis. Self-determination means survival for the Palestinians. And our survival does not destroy the survival of the Israelis as their rulers claim [...] In my speech also yesterday it was clear that we mean our peoples’ right to freedom and national independence according to resolution 181and the right of all parties [...] to exist in peace [...] including the state of Palestine and Israel [...] according to resolutions 242 and 338. (Statement by Arafat, Geneva, December 14, 1988; cited in Smith, 2007: 448)

The Palestine Liberation Organization today issued a statement in which it accepted U.N. Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 [Notice the speaker’s disregard of Arafat’s mention of Resolution 181], recognized Israel’s right to exist [...]. As a result, the United States is prepared for a substantive dialogue with PLO representatives. [...] Nothing here may be taken to imply an acceptance or recognition by the United States of an independent Palestinian state [Notice his disregard of Arafat’s mention of “the state of Palestine”]. The position of the United States is that the status of the West Bank and Gaza cannot be determined by unilateral acts of either side, but only through a process of negotiations [this is the pretext the US often uses to shrug off or veto certain UN resolutions]. The United States does not recognize the declaration of an independent Palestinian state. (Response to Arafat’s statement by George Shultz, Washington, D.C, December 14, 1988; cited in Smith, 2007: 449)

This final section looks at (the repercussions of) the change of discursive practices occurring over time. It shows the change of the official Arab and Palestinian stance regarding the Israeli occupation or the status of the Zionist entity as an “enemy”.

277 The first epigraph mentioned above shows Arafat or the PLO as recognising, on December 14, 1988 in Geneva [since Arafat was denied a visa to Washington], “the right of all parties [...] to exist in peace [...] including the state of Palestine and Israel”. The other epigraph by Shultz, the US Secretary of State, however, shows his statement as noting Arafat’s recognition of “Israel’s right to exist,” on the one hand, but disregarding Arafat’s equal mention of the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination or the “state of Palestine” “to exist.” Not only that, but Shultz’s statement also, arrogantly and unambiguously, even rejects that possibility. Thus, lopsided or one-sided, those grossly unequal statements, have - while extracting recognition from the PLO of “Israel’s right to exist” - not secured an equivalent right as to the existence of a Palestinian state, or “the right of all parties,” as stated in Arafat’s statement, “to exist”. Arafat’s statement, further, while recognising ‘Israel,’ has failed to draw a “legal and moral recognition of the ethnic cleansing Israel had perpetrated in 1948” and which until now it still denies. Israel still denies its responsibility for the crimes that made it possible for her to exist. Leading to the Madrid talks and simultaneously but secretly to talks in Oslo, Norway where the Oslo Accords (14/9/1993) pre-empted and were concluded, Arafat and Shultz’s statements were unjustly weighted where no recognition of a Palestinian state was acknowledged. Arafat did not also secure on 9/9/1993 upon an exchange of letters of recognition between him and Rabin recognition of a Palestinian state. Therefore, in Rabin’s own words, “There is nothing [in the accord] about a Palestinian state or a capital in part of Jerusalem.... Jerusalem must remain united under Israeli sovereignty and be our capital forever.... (Smith, 2007: 455). For him, he does not “believe there is room for an additional state between Israel and Jordan” (2007: 455). Nonetheless, those historic statements (of 1988 and 1993) - unjustly weighted in favour of the powerful- had first precipitated a historic conference (the Middle East Peace Conference), convened in Madrid on October 30, 1991, and touted by the co-sponsors: the US and the (then) Soviet Union Secretaries of State as “an historic opportunity [...] to advance the prospects for genuine peace throughout the region,” and second the Oslo Accords (13/9/1993), respectively. This PLO de facto recognition of ‘Israel’ in December 1988 and the putative “mutual recognition” in September 9 1993, the day Arafat and Rabin exchanged Letters of Recognition: the PLO recognising “the right of the State of Israel to exist in peace and security” and

278 Israel’s decision to “recognize the PLO as the representative of the Palestinian people” (Israel & PLO Exchange Letters of Recognition (1993), (accessed 21 April, 2010): 1-3) - was a major transformation, indeed a drastic change in the historic stance of the PLO or PLO discourse, which meant that the PLO was explicitly and openly now abandoning “the 1968 PLO Charter that called for Palestinian statehood in what was now Israel” (Smith, 2007, 409). Recall, for example, the position of the PLO in 1974 regarding Resolution 242 which was rejected “categorically” for it implicitly gave the Jewish state the de facto legitimacy or right of 78% of former or historic Palestine:

The PLO reaffirms its previous attitude concerning Security Council Resolution 242 which obliterates the patriotic and national rights of our people and treats our national cause as a refugee problem. It therefore refuses categorically any negotiations on the basis of this Resolution at any level of inter-Arab or international negotiation (emphasis added)… (PLO Resolution on Security Council Resolution 242 (1974); quoted in Smith, 2007: 347)

Being so drastic, this gradual change - indeed metamorphosis - in the discourse of the PLO - from categorical rejection in 1974 to recognition of Israel in 1988, of the “enemy” as no longer being “enemy” and rather a partner in peace, a partner who has the right to exist - is tantamount to death of the Palestinian discourse (see Subsection 5.4.2 below).

5.4.1 The Khartoum Conference (1967) and Onset of the Arab Slippery Slope

Discursive changes in the stance of Arabs regarding the “enemy” have begun since 1967, following the new facts ‘Israel’ has created on the ground through its occupation of the rest of Palestine, the Sinai Peninsula (of Egypt) and the Golan Heights (of Syria). Demoralised, as a result, Arabs or the official Arab stance has since then become gradually concessive and compromising. It has been so since the moment Egypt - the biggest Arab country - and Jordan have acquiesced to Resolution 242 (see Subsection 5.2.1 above). Since that moment of acquiescence to Resolution 242, Arab states have tacitly “recognized the need to give Israel de facto, though not

279 de jure, recognition through negotiations conducted through third parties, specifically the United Nations, if Israel would return to its prewar frontiers” (Smith, 2007, 309). This stance was known as the “land for peace” formula. By agreeing to “unite their political efforts at the international and diplomatic levels to eliminate the effects of the [1967] aggression and to ensure the withdrawal of the aggressive Israeli forces from the Arab lands occupied” in that aggression, the Arab heads of state in The Khartoum Conference in 1967, have tacitly recognised the existence of ‘Israel’ within the pre-June 5 borders or the Armistice Line of 1949, i.e. within 78% of the territory of Mandate Palestine. Talking about Israeli withdrawal to the pre-June 5 lines or the Armistice Line of 1949: “withdrawal […] from the Arab lands which have been occupied since the aggression of 5 June” rather than withdrawal or at least return to the 1947 UN lines of partition (Resolution 181), would implicitly mean such recognition, albeit its being de facto. Tacitly, this implies the recognition of ‘Israel’ to exist in the 78% of the total area of Mandate Palestine it ‘cleansed’ of Palestinians in 1948, which is 22 or “23% more than Israel was granted pursuant to the 1947 UN partition plan”.

5.4.2 PLO’s Ten Point Programme (1974) and Onset of the Slippery Slope…

For nearly four decades Arafat had embodied a national movement whose main aim was to seek legal and moral recognition of the ethnic cleansing Israel had perpetrated in 1948. The notion of how this might come about changed with time, as did the strategy, and definitely, the tactics […]. (Pappe, 2006: 242)

Apart from the first ten years of the history of the PLO, i.e. from the year of its establishment in 1964 to 1974, the PLO’s stance has become progressively concessive (see Subsection 5.4.3 below). The PLO’s original position regarding the case and liberation of Palestine was that of “armed struggle”. The goal was the liberation of all of former or historic Palestine as clearly stated in Article 9 of the Palestinian National Charter (PNC) (1968): “Armed struggle is the only way to liberate Palestine”. Hence, “armed struggle” rather than a political solution was the belief, the strategy and the way. “The Palestinian nation should be

280 reborn in what was then Israel, a goal to be achieved through armed struggle” (Smith, 2007: 345). This position - the creation of a secular democratic Palestinian State, “with the boundaries it had during the British Mandate [... as] an indivisible territorial unit” (Article 2 of PNC) - however, has since 1974 (Shafiq, 2009) shifted, as can be gathered from the PLO’s Ten Point Programme; it has shifted from full restoration and consequently establishment of the state of Palestine on all of Mandate Palestine to an “independent, combatant” national authority on any liberated territory. So, the notion of not only full liberation of former/historic or Mandate Palestine has vanished but also of the prospect of a just solution whatsoever, even if UN and peace discourse producers insist on calling it “just” and “comprehensive”. The PLO has thus begun since 1974 to change its notion from establishing a Palestinian state “with the boundaries it had during the British Mandate,” a “secular state for Muslims, Christians, and Jews” – Jews “who were living in Palestine before the start of the Zionist invasion” - to that of the two states. Thus, it has gradually changed its stance towards full liberation, and moved drastically “toward the concept of “two states for two peoples,” based, initially on the lines of partition (Resolution 181 of 1947) - the borders that “correspond to the UN partition plan of 1947” (Gavron, 2004: 223) - and beginning from 1988 on those of the pre- 1967 - “the pre-June 5 lines” - (Resolutions 242 and 338) where 78% rather than 56% are to remain taken by ‘Israel’. In this regard, the study deplores the Arab heads of state’s tacit recognition of ‘Israel’ (Smith, 2007), following the aggression of 5 June, in The Khartoum Conference (mentioned above) in 1967, and the PLO’s 1974 Ten Point Programme, which commenced its slippery slope from being a “pariah” to “partner” or freedom-fighter to…; this slippery slope that has begun since the Arab heads of state’s tacit recognition of ‘Israel,’ and then the PLO’s implicit then later explicit abandonment of the 1968 Charter “that called for Palestinian statehood in what was now Israel” (Smith, 2007, 409), and then augmented by the 1985 “Husayn-Arafat Accord” (2007: 411) or the Jordanian Option, which treats the “Palestinians as non- existent” (Pappe, 2006: 239), then the PLO’s “open acceptance of Resolution 242,” followed by the recognition of the existence of ‘Israel’ in December 1988; and then the ensuing Madrid Conference in October 1991, and September 13 1993 Oslo Accords, and Interim Agreement (Oslo 2) on September 28 1995, and... Put differently, this CDA study deplores the transformations in the PLO discourse. The study views such change as tantamount to

281 death of the Palestinian discourse - and given ‘Israel’’s entrenched intent to manipulate – liquidation of the Palestine Question.

5.4.3 Peace Process: War against the Palestinians by Other Means

With this end in mind, Oslo 2 provided for the expansion of the network of bypass roads from Israel proper to all settlements, linking them to each other and to pre-1967 Israel. These roads were intended, in Rabin’s words, to “[enable] Israelis to move without crossing the Palestinian population areas that will become the Palestinian Authority’s responsibility.” Rabin did not note that the roads would also cut off Palestinian areas from each other, denying contiguity and blocking effective imposition of any central Palestinian authority independent of Israeli security. (Smith, 2007: 462-463)

For over nine decades now, denied their Right to self-determination - granted by God before international law to the progeny of Adam or all peoples - and their Right of Return - granted also by God and law to any noncombatants fleeing during a conflict to return after the conflict is over - beleaguered and embattled Palestinians had to painfully acquiesce to the notion of partitioning their motherland as a de facto reality. Thus, though the proposal of partition as a political solution to the problem created in Palestine - through the waves of Jewish aliyoth and their escalating terrorism that reached a crescendo in 1948 - was made for the first time in 1937 (see Chapter 2) by the Palestine Royal (Peel) Commission, and later in 1947 by the UN in its Resolution 181, the concept or “principle of partition” (Gavron, 2004: 33) was accepted explicitly and officially by the PLO only in 1988 - 21 years after the Arab heads of state’s tacit and de facto recognition of ‘Israel’ in the Khartoum Conference in August 1967, and 6 years after the Arab Peace Plan in Fez in 1982; and about 51 years after the year of the first proposal (i.e. 1937), and 41 years after the UN Partition Plan (1947); an acquiescence or a drastic change in the discursive practices of PLO that has led to the December 1988 PLO de facto recognition of the existence of ‘Israel,’ and the ensuing slippery slope to Palestinian - not independence but -bantustanisation through the so-called “peace process” - the process “that’s always been structured to avoid peace at all costs”.

282 As noted in the previous subsection, the PLO’s change of stance can be seen as originating from her adoption of the Ten Point Programme in 1974 (Shafiq, 2009), and later her discursive acquiescence to Resolution 242 as a basis for partition or a two- state solution despite its categorical rejection to it at the time of its issuance and for many years - formally until 1988 as noted. Further, based on this “flawed” “principle of partition” or apocalyptic vision of the two-state solution based on Resolutions 242 and 338, the ensuing ‘peace process’ has given the Palestine Question a new dimension to the slippery slope. This ‘peace’ or rather Israeli consolidation of territory process, started since the tacit recognition of ‘Israel’ in 1967 by Arab states and by the PLO in 1974 and expedited by the explicit recognition of the existence of ‘Israel’ in 1988 has led to further Israeli consolidation of power over Palestinian territory rather than granting Palestinians independence. It has given it a fresh continuity for further concessions on the Palestinian side and further expansionism on the Israeli side. It has arrogated to Israelis further expropriation or de facto annexation of Palestinian lands and deprived Palestinians of further de jure rights. So, instead of being a force behind the end of occupation, what is known as the ‘peace process,’ has led to further Zionist expansion, bleeding the Palestinians dry. It resulted, for example, in September 2000 - out of sheer frustration and utter despair created by the realities of Oslo - in the second intifada, and in December 2008- January 2009 in the Gazacaust of the besieged Strip - Israel’s latest attempt at genocide or the racial extermination of Palestinians, whose ‘cleansing’ will certainly lead to the kind of ‘peace’ ‘Israel’ or Israeli leaders harbour or pursue. A cause for exacerbation and the continuance of the status quo, this is a fact that makes “it plain” - as revealed by Benny Morris’ candour - “that the ‘peace process’ in all its guises (see Section 3.5) - as multifarious as they are monotonous: [Madrid talks,] Oslo [1993/1995], Camp David [July 2000], Taba [Jan. 2001], Road Map [2003] or Geneva [2003] - is little more than war against the Palestinians by other means” (New Left Review 26, March-April 2004). In this context, the apparent pursuit of ‘peace’asan American-Israeli means to sustain war (the status quo) need not be a paradox.

283 CHAPTER SIX SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

6.1 OVERVIEW

Currently, there is no formally recognized Palestinian state at the United Nations. There is no Palestinian flag in front of the building. While there are Palestinian representatives, they are only allowed to observe, rather than vote during the decision making process. This epitomizes what it currently feels like to be Palestinian: present, but voiceless. (Feature Writer, April 29, 2011)

This chapter presents a summary of the study, and the discourse strategies and linguistic means characterising the discourse in question, stressing the tripartite structure of this CDA study: (I) the reproductive function of discourse in power relations and the reproduction of domination, (II) the enlightening and emancipatory role or transforming function of the critical study of discourse (CDA) in social change, and (III) the Palestine Question with its past, present and future dimensions. The chapter re-highlights some of the main findings, and challenges facing the Palestine Question, and concludes with recommendations and suggestions for further research. A first conclusion to be drawn from this study is that prior to her formation and throughout her repressive existence, ‘Israel’ has used - to sustain such formation and such existence - two mechanisms of repression: military and linguistic, applying the force of arms for the first and discursive acts for the second. While the former has been used inside the Occupied Territories to keep suppressing the occupied, the latter has been used to project in the outside world an image contrary to the reality inside, polarising the situation. Within this context of ‘Israel’’s repression in its overt and covert or naked and linguistic forms, the Palestinians have been struggling against staggering domination: the declared advocacy of peace, and the actual pursuit of violence. Out of these two mechanisms of Israeli or Zionist repression, it is the second - that is repression in its linguistic forms” – that has been the concern and focus of this study where a CDA of the role of discourse in the realities of the Arab struggle against Israeli

284 occupation was conducted to reveal the role of UN and peace discursive practices in the continuity of the Palestine Question. In realising its aim - the textual analysis of the discourse declared to realise a Palestinian state and bring to a halt “decades of confrontation and conflict” in the Middle East; and its two objectives - the study consisted of six chapters. Foregrounding the three conceptual features of this study: Discourse, CDA, and the Palestine Question, Chapter 1 served as an orientation to the whole study, providing a background, and limning a concise account of the problem, methodology, aim and objectives, research questions, significance and implications of the study, and a glossary of key and newly-minted terms. As a background to the study and in light of the “still alive” Zionist ideology that has driven the settler Zionist enterprise since its early years, Chapter 2 presented background information about the historical course of the Palestine Question: its origins and evolution until the forcible creation of the Jewish state in 1948, bringing to light the major formative events leading to the development of the “Zionist enterprise in Palestine” and the ensuing “transformation of Palestine into a Jewish state”. The chapter also explored the obstacles currently exacerbating the Palestine Question. Chapter 3 reviewed major works dealing with the relationship between language and its many other functions that go beyond traditional communication. The chapter also in emphasising the role of CDA in helping liberate people from “oppression in its linguistic forms,” reviewed in details, the concepts of language, discourse, Discourse Analysis, and Critical Discourse Analysis in their relation to domination and emancipation. The chapter also gave an overview of the main proposals on the ‘Israel’/Palestine Question; and closed with a review of some related research works where language and power or discourse and domination are at work. Chapter 4 described the research methods and CDA approach (theoretical framework) adopted in the analysis and conduct of this qualitative document or discourse study. A central pillar of this work, Chapter 5, and in an attempt to meet the research objectives, conducted a CDA of UN resolutions and discourse of the ‘peace process’ on the Question of Palestine; and endeavoured to detect the intent underlying such discourse, revealing whether such discourse would be practical in achieving what it has been articulating. The chapter next looked into the change of discursive practices in the official Arab and Palestinian stance regarding the Israeli Occupation or ‘Israel’.

285 6.2 SUMMARY AND FINDINGS

“We will never outviolence you Israelis. Israel has proved successful at warfare, imposing its will by force, pursuing a strategy of violence, and acquiring the most advanced weapons, while perfecting the rhetoric [discourse] of peace. It is Shalom this, Shalom that, Shalom the other thing, while being one of the most militarized societies in the world!” (Jonathan Kuttab, quoted in Gavron, 2004: 105)

Struggling in an age of dominant Zionist (media) discourse: whitewash of words, distortion of facts and misrepresentation of reality, I have maintained throughout this critical consciousness- raising discourse study that the way the Palestine Question has been discursively constructed “along certain lines rather than others” is what has kept Palestine and the Middle East and much of the turbulence engulfing the world in the way it is now. I have also maintained that discourse is employed by the powerful to enact, normalise and sustain domination and control; and that “conflicts and wars begin and end with words;” and that “before guns are fired and bombs start falling, words commit the first act of war;” that “Our life is not shaped by the event but by the meaning we attach to it” and that the “Selection of one term rather than another often entails choosing particular modes of conceptualising the reality in question;” that language is a medium of domination and social force; that discourse is “socially constituted and socially constitutive;” that “language is centrally involved in power, and struggles for power, and that “power is exercised and enacted in discourse;” that “domination and oppression” take place in and through “linguistic forms;” and that “the emancipation of man from the oppression of politics starts with the critical analysis of the linguistic manipulations of politicians;” that “inequality and injustice are repeatedly reproduced and legitimized by language;” that “the use of language could lead to a mystification of social events which systematic analysis could elucidate;” that discourse can be used as a “tranquillising drug of gradualism,” indefinite temporisation and deceptive optimism; and that discourse, with its wide heterogeneity, is thus a “key to understanding both colonialism and the process of becoming emancipated from the strictures of foreign domination” (Divine, 2008: 2) and such indefinite temporisation... Accordingly, I set out to investigate the discursive practices on the Palestine Question with the goal to reveal whether protracted UN and ‘peace’ discourse on the Palestine Question is bona fide and

286 practical and accordingly whether it has contributed and if so in what ways and to what extent to the abortive attempts of years of otiose negotiations and the perpetuation of the status quo (second or practical objective of study). The study sought to find out about how practical and bona fide those discursive practices in ending Israel’s occupation, in realising the Palestinian People Right to Self- Determination (RQ I), and the Palestinian Refugees Right of Return (RQ II), and thus paving the road to “peace” are. In the process, the study sought to increase readers’ consciousness of the role discourse plays in reproducing asymmetrical relations of power on the one hand, and the role CDA can play in changing the status quo on the other (first or theoretical objective of study). It sought to make us, rulers and ruled, conscious of domination in its linguistic forms. The CDA approach I took in this study to note, unearth and articulate the discourse strategies and grammatical systems (see Table 6.1 and Table 6.2 below) deployed in the construction of certain calculated illocutionary forces to perpetuate the status quo became possible when I provided, as part of a hermeneutic process and CDA analysis, a detailed historical background in the manner of a discourse-historical approach. So the analysis was done within the framework of Reisigl and Wodak’s discourse analytic approach to CDA, the Discourse-Historical Approach (DHA). Though the study was motivated by the social problem created in Palestine - out of Zionist aspirations - in particular, its objectives were not restricted to that wrong only, but extend to any other similar social inequality that might have originated from or is being legitimated and perpetuated through a certain dominant discourse. The study drew much of its rationale and significance from its demonstration of the centrality of each of the Palestine Question to Middle Eastern politics and regional stability, discourse to power relations, and CDA to social change. Discourse, the study has maintained, is a powerful tool in the hands of those seeking to dominate and impose hegemonic controls on the less empowered. This work has unearthed and patiently noted discourse strategies and linguistic means that the powerful use in constructing the Palestine Question in a way that protracts the problem of Israeli occupation or the Arab struggle against Israeli occupation. Out of a total of 32 discourse strategies outlined in Table 4.1 (Chapter Four), the following 20 global discourse strategies have been found to characterise UN and Peace discourse (see Table 6.1 and Table 6.2 below):

287 Table 6.1 Summary of Discourse Strategies and Linguistic Means characterising UN Discourse on the Palestine Question

No UN Discourse Linguistic Means: Example . Strategies grain-of-sand like means/ s linguistic “pin-sting” 1 agency: passivisation/de-agentialisation/passive agent Table 5.6, obscuring deletion: 5.7 causal agency Here the UN de-agentialises actions of which the Israelis are agent; it has through passive agent deletion helped conceal or obscure human agency (i.e. Zionists/Israelis) as the one bringing about the events in question (“have been displaced and uprooted”/“persons displaced from the West Bank and Gaza Strip in 1967”/“the Palestinian people has been prevented from enjoying its inalienable rights”), thus obscuring rather than foregrounding who is responsible for such crimes of displacement and uprootedness and the impediment behind the Palestinian people exercising their inalienable rights. The marginalisation or omission of the agent in such agentless passives, those calculated de- agentialised constructions, can contribute to a perception that the agent is relatively unimportant. Consequently, a consumer may be more likely to focus on the foregrounded information spending less, if any, time thinking about the agent or actor. 2 deceptive use of the three-part statement Tables purveyance of (e.g. “These are meaningful signs of respect for 5.3, 5.3, optimism the rights of the Palestinians and their hopes for a 5.19 viable, democratic, peaceful Palestinian state,” or “just, lasting and comprehensive” peace in the Middle East. 3 obscurantism; use of verbal processes; Tables resort to use of the subjunctive; 5.6, 5.17, ambiguity and use of modality; 5.22 vague use of weasel words formulations 4 elasticity or use of empty or floating or indeterminate signifiers Tables empty (e.g. “at the earliest practicable date...,” “overall 5.2, 5.3, signification security,” secure and recognized,” “through 5.9, 5.19, measures including…etc.); 5.22 use of weasel words/use of modality (e.g. “may”) 5 hedging and use of empty/indeterminate signifiers; Tables temporisatiom/ manipulation of articles; 5.3,5.7, creating facts reiterations 5.8, 5.9 on the ground 6 using non- use of modality (e.g.) “refugees should be Tables committal or permitted to [return] at the earliest practicable 5.3, 5.22 ambiguous date...;” statements manipulation of articles (e.g.) “withdrawal of Israel[i] armed forces from territories ”

288 Table 6.2 Summary of Discourse Strategies and Linguistic Means characterising Peace Discourse on the Palestine Question

No. Peace Linguistic Means: Example Discourse grain-of-sand like means/ s Strategies linguistic “pin-sting

1 agency: passivisation/de-agentialisation/passive agent Table obscuring deletion: 5.25 causal agency (e.g., “persons displaced from the West Bank and Gaza Strip in 1967” 2 positive transitivity selections Table ingroup (for an idea about what transitivity means, see 5.20 presentation Section 1.3, p. 31; discussion of Table 4.5, and negative and Subsections 3.2.2, and 3.2.4) outgroup presentation 3 assertion of use of modality (adverbs, modal verbs) Table ingroup (e.g. “strongly committed” as in “Today 5.19 allegiances America is strongly committed to Israel’s and solidarity security”) use of the simple present tense 4 victim-agent transitivity selections – Table reversal/blam (e.g. “Prime Minister Abbas recognizes that 5.20 e the victim terrorist crimes are a dangerous obstacle to the independent state his people seek. He argues that the process for achieving that state is through peaceful negotiations…. He has promised…to end the armed intifada. He has promised to work without a compromise for a complete end of violence and terror […]”. This would make one wonder: Who is the occupied and who is the occupying force? 5 devaluation or transitivity selections - Table defamation by through (i) the use of processes that bespeak 5.20 distortion/ of a desire to end violence, acts of which demonisation ‘Israel’ is the affected/goal; and (ii) through of the other representing the Palestinians in implicative subject positions 6 apparent use of modality Table concessions 5.19 7 creating false lexical selections Table impression 5.13 8 deceptive use of the simple present tense; lexical Table purveyance of selections (e.g. except), modality, and the 5.19 optimism three-part statement 9 empathising modality Tables with ingroup 5.19, members 5.20

289 10 dichotomous transitivity choices; Tables representation 5.19, of the 5.20 situation 11 elasticity or use of empty signifiers Table empty 5.16 signification 12 appeal to modality and categorical assertion Table political 5.19 authority 13 appeal to use of the simple present tense; Table reasoning and transitivity choices 5.19 rationality 14 presuppositio transitivity selections (e.g. “By his strong Table n and leadership…and by rejecting terror…” – 5.19 implicature presupposition of terror on the part of the Palestinians; implicating the victim of terror) 15 distortion/ transitivity selections – through Table manipulation (i) the discursive qualification of leader of the 5.19 of facts/ Palestinians as someone who rejects misrepresenta “terror;” someone who “recognizes that tion of reality terrorist crimes are a dangerous obstacle to the independent state his [‘terrorist’] people seek;” someone who promises “full efforts and resources to end the armed intifada;” someone who promises to “work without compromise for a complete end of violence and terror,” etc. (ii) the discursive qualification of Sharon – this veteran warrior – as someone whose “gestures of “reconciliation” are to be appreciated, as someone who pledges to “improve the humanitarian situation in the Palestinian areas” and to “remove unauthorized outposts immediately,” as someone who expresses “frank statements about the need for territorial contiguity”… 16 impression transitivity selections – the discursive Tables formation and characterisation of the actors in question (as 5.19, credibility noted above) provides the ground for 5.20 enhancement impression formation with the Palestinians being thought of as ‘violent,’ ‘terrorist,’ and ‘a dangerous obstacle to peace;’ and the Israelis as ‘peaceable,’ ‘rational’ and ‘flexible,’ respectively. 17 evoking fear use of the simple present tense/categorical Table and alarm assertion 5.19 18 hedging and use of hedges, use of floating signifiers, use of Tables temporisation/ modality, and reiterations 5.7, 5.10, creating facts 5.12, on the ground 5.17

290 Structured subtly to provide the occupying Power with the time and cover necessary to create further “facts on the ground,” to enable further consolidation of Israeli control of territory, in a calculated way that wrecks any real prospect of creating a viable Palestinian state, the study has significantly contributed to highlighting the discursive intricacies involved in the temporisation of the Palestine problem, and concluded that neither UN resolutions, nor ‘peace process’ discourse in all its guises - pursuant to the 1988 PLO recognition of ‘Israel’ and the ensuing Middle East Peace Conference in 1991, with the declared goal to end “decades of confrontation and conflict” - are found to be bona fide or practical in ending “Israel’s oppression and occupation”. Found to be nothing but discourse, the study has revealed that UN resolutions and ‘peace talks’ on the Palestine Question are responsible for reproducing domination rather than trying to work out a peaceful solution to the Palestine State problem. The way these resolutions and ‘peace’ discourses is structured does not lay the ground for peace, but rather indefinite protraction of this unequal conflict where, given the current imbalance of power, the Palestinians would continuously remain the main “losers” within this form of social life. The way such UN resolutions and ‘peace talks’ is structured has made ‘Israel’ so far for 44 years (i.e. since 1967) to debate withdrawal and is still debating, and would continue debating, refusing to withdraw from those territories it occupied by force in 1967, and sought by the Palestinians for a state to bring to an end their sufferings and homelessness; their past displacement and present occupation. An attempt at saving the remnant, this study has shown that those discursive practices as they stand have given the powerful the mechanisms for further expansionism. They have arrogated to Israelis further de facto annexation of lands and deprived Palestinians of further de jure rights. So temporisation and protraction of the issue, of finding an amicable solution to the Palestine State problem, the study has found, was an indirect but calculated result of the linguistic ingenuity of the powerful forces, with its underlying bad faith. Hence, the main thrust of the study has lain in observing/analysing and articulating the linguistic artistry or skilful semiotic manipulation of the powerful, the discursive sources and key textual resources of their power and dominance, and the abusive discursive practices they consistently and consciously use in temporising the issue to pursue their own interests. The ‘peace’ negotiations have been hindered by Israeli indecisions and delays, and the intent to deceive.

291 Tragic or problematic, the study has found, is the fact that the whole “Peace offensive” is based on Resolutions 242 and 338, i.e. on the reconstruction of Palestine within the pre-June 5 lines or the June 4, 1967 borders which in their totality constitute only 22% of the total area of former Palestine, less than half of what the United Nations in its (Partition) Resolution 181 of 1947 allocated to the Arab state. But what is more tragic or problematic is the fact that those resolutions and ‘peace talks’ are structured linguistically in a way so as to always give the occupying Power much leeway to even debate the extent of withdrawal from territories whose totality if returned in toto, would still, as noted, constitute only 22% of Mandate Palestine, hence perpetuating rather than ending the status quo. Neither Resolution 242 - with its ambiguous, contradictory, tendentious and thus impractical nature - and Resolution 338, used along with 242 as the basis for a settlement, nor Resolutions 1397 and 1515, used as echoes or reiterations of 242 and 338, nor the Oslo discourse is structured (practically and bona fide) to end “Israel’s oppression and occupation” and make it for the two-state solution. Therefore, the study has concluded that those discourses of the UN and the ‘peace process’ are not structured to achieve “a just, lasting and comprehensive peace settlement,” as foregrounded in the invitation to the MiddleEast PeaceConference, but are rather being subtle linguistic/discursive means meant to distort the nature and origin of this unequal conflict and provide for the stronger party enough wiggle room and elasticity to indefinitely temporise, dodge, blame the victim, and gain more time to create further “facts on the ground” and “further consolidation of Israeli power”. The study has found in relation to the question of how practical or dispositive and bona fide UN resolutions and discourses are in ending occupation and realising a Palestinian state that is politically sovereign and economically viable that the whole basis for the ‘peace process,’UN Resolutions 242 and 338, as noted, is flawed, mala fide and impractical as these resolutions do not demand - unambiguously - Israeli withdrawal from all the territories occupied by forcein1967first and then begin talking about ‘secure’ and ‘recognized’ borders, thus creating self-contradictions and inconsistencies in the text-internal structures of the Resolution. 1397 and 1515, these two resolutions still, the study has shown, do not stipulate immediate and full withdrawal. They do not stipulate “a full and complete return to the 1949 armistice lines” or the June 4 1967 borders. 3236, as far as recognition, reaffirmation, and emphasis are concerned, they are there in this Resolution. The Resolution,

292 however, lacks the language that turns such words from being mere rhetoric to reality, from acting as a discursive drug of gradualism and deceptive optimism to action and “facts on the ground”. The study has found in relation to the question of territorial integrity and contiguity that in light of Israeli intransigence, manipulation and lack of good faith, discourse of the ‘peace’ process has in reality meant little more than the maintenance of Israeli control of the life and livelihood of the Palestinians, and the dismemberment of the Palestinian territories through the creation of disconnected cantons, surrounded by checkpoints allowing no freedom of movement, “a truncated and divided Palestinian state in the West Bank,” a ‘state’ “separated into [four] enclaves, with Israelis manning checkpoints and barriers at Palestinian enclave boundaries,” thus making the ‘Palestinian state’ nothing more than a group of enclaves that lack economic viability, territorial contiguity, and thus viability and independence. Regarding Jerusalem, the study has stressed that though treated according to the November 29 1947 UN Resolution 181 (Plan of Partition) as a corpus separatum to be “administered by the United Nations,” independently of either the Arab state or Jewish state to be created in accordance with such resolution, Israel, upon its forcible creation in 1948 declared (West) Jerusalem since January 1950 as its capital. And 17 years later, upon its forcible acquisition or belligerent occupation of the rest of former Palestine in 1967, ‘Israel’ “claimed all of Jerusalem as its capital,” annexing in 1980 East Jerusalem (the part of Jerusalem falling in the Palestinian territories occupied since 1967) and claiming it as part of Jerusalem proper, unifying East and West Jerusalem, and calling them since 1980 Israel’s unified capital, “a united Jerusalem under its sovereignty,” and therefore “a red line” or “non-negotiable, creating the impression it was part of the original city”. When talking about sovereignty, with the previous facts in mind, the question of sovereignty needs not any further elaboration. Similarly, orchestrated to create further “facts” and “realities” on the ground, and given the still alive “transfer” Zionist ideology, the Israeli dogma that “Only Transfer Will Bring Peace,” the study has concluded, regarding the Palestinian Refugees Right of Return, that neither UN resolutions, nor ‘peace’ discourse in all its guises has been found to be bona fide or practical in implementing the Right of Return or reconstituting the Palestinian refugees in their historic homeland as more than half of the Palestinians (estimated by Badil Resource Centre to be 7 million persons at the beginning of 2003) are still languishing in diaspora. This has always been the case despite decades of resolutions and ‘talks’. Still denying its

293 responsibility for the affluent Palestinian diaspora, the study has emphasised that ‘Israel’ has not changed its entrenched intent towards the refugees; a visible fact that makes those resolutions and discourses nothing but means of further domination. The study has shown that by boiling down the Palestine Question from being a national cause, to a mere “refugee problem,” and by not specifying the Right of Return as the just solution, Resolution 242 not only harbours bad faith regarding implementing the Right of Return, but also helps obfuscate and obliterate “the patriotic and national rights” of the Palestinians, their right to self-determination. In its call for “the implementation of Security Council Resolution 242 (1967) in all of its parts,” Resolution 338, the study has shown, does not add anything new as to the Refugees Right of Return. Hence, the study has concluded that Resolution 338 does not differ in any way from 242 as to implementing the Right of Return. The study has concluded that due to the lack of stipulation or at least mention of the Right of Return in resolutions 212 (1948) and 302 (1949), and the lack of a timeframe in 194 for the repatriation of refugees, along with the framing of repatriation in the modal form of advisability, resolutions 212 and 302 are irrelevant to the question of the Right of Return, while 194 lacks the necessary enforceability to make it practical; an assumption that given the scale of the tragedy or crime brings the intent of the discourse drafters or those behind the resolution into question. Dealing only with those Palestinians displaced in the aggression of 1967 from the West Bank and the Gaza Strip (Second Massive Wave of Ethnic Cleansing), and in a manner that makes it possible to debate indefinitely who constitutes “a displaced person,” while ignoring or (giving the semblance of) deferring the Question of the Right of Return of the 1948 refugees (First Massive Wave of Ethnic Cleansing) proves, the study has shown, ‘peace’ talks are found to be little more than further temporisation, a delaying tactic until the creation of further ‘irreversible’ “facts on the ground;” where it would later become “unrealistic to expect” a reversal to the status quo ante, and hence “further consolidation of Israeli power”. As for the issue of whether any attempt within the current ‘peace process’ discourse at achieving peace can be “just, lasting and comprehensive” - as claimed by producers of the UN and ‘peace’ discourse - without undoing this gross injustice, the study has stated that in simple unequivocal accents, talking about a “just,” “lasting,” and “comprehensive” settlement as all those resolutions and ‘peace talks’ claim their goal to be, entails theimmediatereconstructionof a territorially contiguous, sovereign and viable independent Palestinian state, along with the unconditional return of those

294 defenceless refugees “expelled from their homes at gunpoint” and denied return. However, Israel, under various guises and pretexts, until now denies her responsibility for the collective Palestinian dispossession, the crimes that made it possible for her to come into existence. All ongoing ‘peace’ discourse has until now failed to draw a “legal and moral recognition of the ethnic cleansing Israel had perpetrated in 1948”. The study has shown that those UN resolutions taken as the basis for the ‘peace process’ to negotiate an end to the Israeli occupation as such can never lead to a “just, lasting and comprehensive peace settlement” as the dominant Zionist discourse projects it, thus revealing that peace accords are about justice and fairness to be nothing but a myth. They might one day - though still also unlikely given the fact that the process has entered its third decade without improving the grim conditions of the Palestinians lead to a certain modus vivendi of some kind if ‘Israel’ decides to go to the negotiating table without the symptomatic intent to dodge and deceive, and to really want to coexist with the Palestinians. Nonetheless, to call such a modus vivendi - if it ever takes place - “just,” “lasting,” and “comprehensive” is misrepresentation and disregard for inexorable facts; indeed not as long as this modus vivendi is being based on resolution 242 and its duplicate 338. Actually it remains so as long as ‘Israel’ itself exists (in the heart or at the expense of another nation) or at least as long as the bulk of the Palestinians is still homeless and stateless. Anything else would be iniquitous! So even if current dilatory discourse ends up with a modus vivendi which is very doubtful as noted, given the basis for such a modus vivendi, with its underlying entrenched intent to deceive, it is unjust to call it “just” or “lasting” or “comprehensive” as this is nothing but discourse, hence is my insistence on calling it modus vivendi rather than settlement to connote that such a way of resolving this unequal conflict is temporary, not permanent. Having a “just,” “lasting,” and “comprehensive” peace settlement would require that the whole basis be, as a first step, just, which as noted means that the entire basis used currently for a resolution of this unequal conflict has to be changed. It would require that the whole Zionist mentality or ideology be changed; it would require a transformation in the shibboleth of Greater Israel; a transformation in the Nile-to-Euphrates ideology; a transformation in the dogma that “EVERY JEW [is] A KING and every gentile a slave” etc. (see Section 6.3).

295 However, given the continuation of this ideology and Israel’s mala fides - the stronger stakeholder in this unequal conflict - apparently neither a just nor unjust settlement seems to be in the offing. The study has shown that while many of those UN resolutions and ‘peace talks’ on the problem of Israeli occupation or the Arab struggle against Israeli occupation act to dilute and defuse indignation and agitation at the systematic encroachments committed by ‘Israel’ while giving it more time to create more “facts on the ground,” they are structured to create a false impression that things are improving; they purvey a sense of optimism that is deceptive as the underlying intent is to sustain the status quo to create “facts on the grounds;” “facts” that will continuously make it “unrealistic to expect” a reversal to the status quo ante. By calling for “Withdrawal of Israel[i] armed forces from [the] territories occupied in the recent conflict [1967],” Resolution 242, for example, has made it possible for ‘Israel’ to debate withdrawing from those territories until today while the creation of Israeli “facts on the ground” is being nonstop. With the way it is phrased, Resolution 242, the study has detailed, ignores a number of inexorable historical facts created by Zionism or Zionist terrorism; it thus disregards the heart of the problem: the problem as a “national cause;” the problem as a people whom the Zionists have uprooted from their place of origin and made to languish in diaspora. Similarly, as we saw in Chapter 5, the use of the word “interim,” as a further example, harbours mala fides as the word “interim” could and has actually been used as an expedient to give ‘Israel’ time to expropriate more Palestinian lands and construct on them colonies as a mechanism to create further “facts on the ground” and hence deeper concessions before reaching a ‘final’ or the ‘final’ settlement. Use of empty signifiers to allow for creating further “facts on the ground,” manipulation, temporisation, hedging, stonewalling, backing out... and the like and thus “further consolidation of Israeli power” was found a common feature of such UN and protracted and mala fide peace discourse. Can anyone, for example, bet what the general and manipulative term “overall security” denotes or could connote? Can anyone predict the interpretations and lebensraum this elastic term could have when it comes to ‘Israel’’s view of “security” and what is “secure”? Similarly, can anyone tell what “secure and recognized boundaries,” could eventually mean to ‘Israel’ whose Greater Israel mentality or the Nile-to-Euphrates ideology are part and parcel of its Zionist thinking? Clearly, “overall security” is prone to various interpretations, not to an exegesis. Everything could be or become, at least from the Israeli perspective, part of the “overall security”.

296 Use of weasel words such as “might,” “seems,” “possibly” or “appears,” etc. to “create enough wiggle room for a rhino” - since such words can well be taken to mean the exact opposite - is again found to be not uncommon in the discourse under question. The word “may,” for example, found in the locution, may agree to submit to arbitration disputes (examined in Table 5.19) is a weasel word par excellence. Since it can be used to mean exactly the opposite, this ‘little’ word that seems as infinitesimal as the loophole of a needle, has the elasticity to “create enough wiggle room” for an elephant. In other words, this apparently ‘innocuous’ word simply makes what appeared possible, impossible. Such possible-impossible instances, discourse strategies and argumentative moves, realized through subtle linguistic means and subtle uses or abuses of language – all derived from the dominant Zionist discourse workshops and the discursive arsenal of the Israeli “angles of telling,” that are aimed to defend the indefensible, dominate and control the powerless, mystify and manipulate, divert attention and obfuscate, distort and misrepresent, legitimate or delegitimate events or social players, “make notions which are in fact debatable seem like ‘givens’,” and “givens” debatable, delegitimise the powerless as violent, terrorist and irresponsible and legitimise the powerful as “peaceable, rational and flexible” (Amer, 2009)... – are systematically found to be used in such UN and ‘peace’ discourse; a fact that not only undermines the possibility of such discourse to forge a settlement or a modus vivendi but also perpetuates, through a battery of discourse strategies and linguistic means underlain by the intent to deceive, the status quo - and indefinitely.

297 6.3 THE PALESTINE QUESTION: PAST, PRESENT, FUTURE

The goal for which we have striven so concernedly for 3,000 years is at last within our reach, and because its fulfilment is so apparent, it behoves us to increase our efforts and our caution tenfold. I can safely promise you that before ten years have passed, our race will take its rightful place in the world, with EVERY JEW A KING and every gentile a slave. – Rabbi Rabinovich (Chang, 2005: blurb)

With “EVERY JEW A KING,” it has been rightfully observed that “No regional crises have great potentials to affect world peace than the Israeli-Palestinian conflict,” instantiated in the ongoing sufferings and homelessness of the Palestinian people and their denial of the Right of Return and Self-Determination. Of this scale is the Palestine Question, the fulcrum of (the practical objective of) this CDA study. In essence, the Palestine Question - pith and core of the Arab struggle against Israeli occupation - is, as maintained throughout this study, the result of a grand Zionist scheme which was hatched more than 100 years ago to create a national homeland for the Jews in Palestine. It is the question of a people whom the Zionists have accordingly uprooted from their homeland and made to languish in diaspora; the question of a people whom the Zionists have expelled by force of arms and then denied return; the question of a nation that existed in Palestine from time immemorial before it has been - through Zionist/Israeli domination - subjected to gradual oblivion. Thus, the 1948 Zionist radical procedures against the human geography and demography of Palestine, resulting in the First Massive Wave of Ethnic Cleansing; and exacerbated by the 1967 occupation of the rest of Palestine and the resultant Second Massive Wave of Ethnic Cleansing constitute the genesis, crux and impetus of the Palestine Question, and consequently much of the turbulence or disorderly state engulfing the Middle East and the world at large. Attempts at the resolution of the Arab struggle against Israeli occupation have always been made, or this is what we have been made to believe. Unsurprisingly however, those attempts have equally always been ineffective as a result of bad faith on the part of the powerful forces. This is not, however, how the reality is being projected, which is what has prompted the conduct of this critical social research, this problem-oriented CDA study. This bad faith as I have often referred to - cause of the failure of every attempt at settlement - is the result of an ideology, a racial

298 ideology, the “still alive” “Zionist ideology of ethnic supremacy” (Pappe, 2006: 234); of believing to be ‘the chosen;’ or, as noted in the above epigraph that “EVERY JEW [is] A KING and every gentile aslave”. This cold superiority – the propelling force behind Zionism – that all people born from a mother other than a Jew are considered racially inferior has made “the Jews,” according to Werner Sombart – quoted in Jensen (1948: 37) – to wish “to live separated from the rest because they felt themselves superior to the common people around them. They were the Chosen Race [...]”. Sombart further states:

The Rabbis did all that was required to fan the flames of pride - from Ezra, who forbade inter-marriage as a profanation of Jewish purity, down to this very day, when the pious Jew says every morning: ‘Blessed are Thou, O Lord, King of the Universe, who hast not made me a Gentile [...]’.

This racial ideology or dogma of Jewish ethnic supremacy, and of Jewish superiority, was a main cause - as noted in Chapter 2 - in the rise of Zionism or “Jewish nationalism” in the second half of the nineteenth century in Western Europe so as to prevent being ‘profaned’ by assimilation. Such ideology has thus historically guarded or prevented Jews from assimilation, a major cause behind Anti-Semitism as indicated also by the founder of Zionism when he observed that the Jews’ “loss of the power of assimilation” was the “remote cause” behind Anti- Semitism; and that “whether we like it or not, we are now, and shall henceforth remain, a historic group with unmistakable characteristics common to us all” (1896/1946/1988: 91). Obviously, such jingoism and tendency against assimilation into other peoples is the major force behind the antipeace politics, Machiavellian realpolitik and discrimination that ‘Israel’ practises against the Palestinians today. It is, as maintained by this study, the cause behind bad faith, which is in turn the cause behind the failure of ‘peace’ discourse. It is thus the cause behind ‘Israel’’s ongoing indecision about whether to seriously seek a settlement with the Palestinians and her Arab neighbours or perpetuate the status quo (i.e. occupation), fearing that actual peace might lead gradually to loss of the Jewish identity or character, which is one of the main causes - as discussed in Chapter 2 - behind the emergence and development of the Zionist

299 enterprise in Palestine, and current exacerbation of the Arab struggle against Israeli occupation. Accordingly, Zionists view the “advocacy of peace [...as] more threatening than the pursuit of violence” (Israeli organisers of a conference that took place in the Spring of 1988 - following the first intifada - where two Arab lawyers from Gaza were incarcerated by ‘Israel’ within two weeks following an invitation “to speak on the goals of the intifada at a gathering at Tel Aviv University” where the two lawyers advocated “peaceful coexistence in separate states”) (Smith, 2007: 422). Such mentality or ethnic pride or Zionist ideology, and particularly the Revisionist Zionist ideology of the Likud which advocates consolidation, militancy, expansionism “east and west of the Jordan River,” temporisation to create further “facts on the ground,” and concessions to “compromise the compromise,” all at the expense of another nation, is a major impediment to any modus vivendi, let alone a final disposition to the Arab struggle against Israeli occupation. Driven by such mentality or ideology, Shamir (1915-), the then Israeli prime minister, in his initiative of May 1989, for example, rather than really working to grant autonomy to the Palestinian people in the territories, as claimed by that initiative (The call “for “free and democratic elections” among Palestinian Arabs in the territories in May 1989, supposedly leading to autonomy that would grant them authority over their [unspecified] “affairs of daily life”” (Smith, 2007: 425).) his hidden agendum was to “stall” the then incipient “negotiating process” between the PLO and Washington that was requesting ‘Israel’ to talk to the PLO, following Arafat’s recognition of ‘Israel’ in December 1988 and thus pursuing a policy of rapprochement. Shamir’s initiative was thus a stratagem to “stall” rather than “promote” peace, to wage war rather than peace to enable further control of the territories and “further consolidation of Israeli power in these areas” (2007: 425). Shamir, Smith (2007) adds “revealed his real intent when he responded to rightist critics, such as Ariel Sharon, who charged that any promise of autonomy would lead to Palestinian independence”:

“We shall not give the Arabs one inch of our land, even if we have to negotiate for ten years. We won’t give them a thing.... We have the veto in our hands.... The status quo of the interim arrangement will continue until all parties reach agreement on the permanent arrangement,” which would ratify acceptance of the territories as part of Israel (425).

300 Consistent with Israel’s bad faith and politics of temporisation, and the creation of “facts on the ground,” and hence the “further consolidation of Israeli power” in the occupied territories of 1967 in a continuous Israeli effort to liquidate the Palestine Question as a “national cause,” Smith (2007), in another context, states:

Shamir’s intent, as he admitted after leaving office in June 1992, “was to drag out talks on Palestinian self-rule for 10 years while attempting to settle hundreds of thousands of Jews in the occupied territories,” giving the appearance of accommodation while working to ensure Israeli retention of the territories [a vision or scenario that Oslo discourse has worked to fulfil] (433).

Such “ideology and praxis:” ‘God’s ‘chosen people,’ “the delusion of a Greater Israel,” “hedging on promises” and retractions, ambiguity and evasion, bellicosity and intransigence, “annexationist ambitions” and “ongoing Israeli settlement expansion,” duplicity and the intent to deceive, such Israeli stances, such Likudism or the Likud platform of “full absorption of Judea and Samaria into Israel” (Smith, 2007: 529), of “We shall not give the Arabs one inch of our land” all make the Palestinian struggle chronic, and the Palestinian issue “intractable”. The Palestinian issue, however, though complex, is not, in essence, intractable. What is “intractable” or what makes it “intractable,” in fact, is this mentality, this modern ideology or invention of Jewishness by Zionism (Sand, 2009), this jingoism, this Zionist ideology of settler colonialism and elimination of the native. Indeed, there has been a number of feasible peace and accommodation proposals put forth by various intellectuals and quarters (see Chapter 3, Section 3.5) but what has consistently undermined all of them - and for this case any other potential future proposals - is this Zionist mentality; this Jewish chauvinism; this “Israeli Likud recalcitrance;” this Revisionist Zionist ideology of militancy and expansionism with its advocacy of a Jewish state “east and west of the Jordan River;” this Nile-to-Euphrates warped perception; this dogma that “EVERY JEW [is] A KING and every gentile a slave;” this policy of creating “facts on the ground,” of victim-agent reversal, of invariably placing “the burden of implementation solely on the Palestinians,” of “If there is a way to solve the problem through the transfer of the [...] remaining Arabs, then we will do this,” of the Zionist belief that “between the sea and Jordan there will only be Israeli sovereignty,” of the fact that even the signatory of the 1993 Oslo Accords (Rabin) states: “I don’t

301 believe there is room for an additional state between Israel and Jordan,” of Netanyahu’s “no Jew hitherto ever longed to give up slices of the homeland,” of Sharon’s declaration: “If they [the Palestinians] aren’t badly beaten, there won’t be any negotiations [meaning deeper concessions],” of Rafael Eitan’s – Sharon’s comrade-in-arms and friend – dehumanising statement of the Arabs likening them to “drugged cockroaches scurrying in a bottle,”11 of Menachem Begin’s conception of the Palestinians as “two-legged beasts”/two-footed animals, of the Israeli axioms of “no return to the 1967 borders,” and no implementation of the Palestinian Right of Return, of the ongoing advocacy “for the “transfer” of [the remaining] Palestinians from the occupied territories” as called for by a number of Israeli parties - this rightist Israeli dogma that “Only Transfer Will Bring Peace,” as a huge “Right-Wing Israeli Demonstration against the 1995 Interim Agreement (Oslo 2)” (Smith, 2007: 466) on October 5, 1995 advocated openly. It is this mental attitude, this mentality of the Israeli leadership, this intransigence, this blatant insensitivity to Palestinian humanity, survival and interests, this dehumanisation and bestialisation of the Arabs, this blinkered Zionist nationalism, this drive for an exclusively Jewish state, this double talk where you try to give the impression that you are bent on having peace when you are actually or when your hidden motive is the antithesis of peace; when your hidden agendum is to actually wreck any prospect of genuine peace and coexistence; when you are concerned only about your own existence; when “settlement expansion and land confiscation” in the territories have never slowed down even when drawling about peace; when Israeli leaders such as Ariel Sharon and “many others” - as noted by Smith (2007: 479) - view a Palestinian state as not meaning “Palestinian independence;” when “Israel’s interests,” in the words of Dore Gold - former ambassador of Israel to the United Nations - “take primacy;” when ‘Israel’’s hegemony is “more important than peace,” when Israeli self-preservation is what is deemed important, and when Palestinian annihilation or decimation is what is deemed the genuine solution for peace - at least the Israeli version or understanding of the word peace: “Only Transfer

11““WHEN WE HAVE settled the land [the 22% remnant of Palestine occupied in 1967], all the Arabs will be able to do about it will be to scurry around like drugged cockroaches in a bottle.” — Rafael Eitan [former Army Chief of Staff of the Israel forces], April 14, 1983” (Delinda C. Hanley, Washington Report on Middle East Affairs, January/February 2005, pages 21, 23). 302 Will Bring Peace” (meaning the expulsion of the remaining Palestinians in the West Bank to make it pure for ‘the Chosen,’). Such antipeace attitudes or politics is not a new development in Zionist dogmatism. It has always been there, before and after the creation of ‘Israel’ as a Jewish state. Zionist leaders have always been unanimous in their intention and goal to “transfer” (expel/cleanse) the Palestinians away from Palestine or to use the words of the founder of practical Zionism - as entered in his diary in 1895 - “to expel the poor population across the border unnoticed”. ‘Israel’’s antipeace politics have been manifested in her ongoing construction of colonies in the territories, and her apartheid politics rather than peace as the title of Jimmy Carter’s (2006) book, Palestine: Peace Not Apartheid indicates. Such settlement blocks with their growing cantonisation of the West Bank into enclaves are an ongoing witness on ‘Israel’’s real intents concerning peace, and the discrimination practised by it, ‘the lone democracy in the Middle East’ indeed, but evidently the only apartheid state existing in the world today. As early as the stage of premeditation on “compulsory transfer,” or “forced relocation” of Palestinians, Zionists’ expansionist policies (Masalha, 2000) and “annexationist ambitions” (Smith, 2007: 435) have always been part of the ideology of Zionism; which renders the ‘peace process’ to none other than Zionist filibuster and discourse. In this regard, Finkelstein (2003) observes:

Israel’s settlement policy in the Occupied Territories during the past decade points up the real content of the ‘peace process’ set in motion at Oslo [...]. Due primarily to massive Israeli government subsidies, the Jewish settler population increased from 250,000 to 380,000 during the Oslo years with settler activity proceeding at a brisker pace under the tenure of Labor’s Ehud Barak than Likud’s Benjamin Netanyahu. Illegal under international law and built on land illegally seized from Palestinians, these settlements now incorporate nearly half the land surface of the West Bank (xix).

So it is this “ideology and praxis,” this use of realpolitik, of antipeace politics and of what Yitzhak Rabin (1922-1995) once called the “iron fist” – politics that stem from the ideology of settler colonialism, from this “still alive” founding Zionist ideology that planned and executed the expulsion of the Palestinians and their Nakba – that is the major cause in the exacerbation of the Arab struggle against Israeli occupation as such repressive, expansionist and discriminatory

303 practices are counterproductive to peace. Such politics are the obstacle and threat indeed to peace and to any prospect of ending occupation - whether the one-state or two-state or extraterritorial states solution or indeed any other settlement or modus vivendi. The Palestinians, despite (or as a result of) their daily sufferings under Israel’s yoke and America’s “tolerance of Israeli intransigence” and the international indifference to such realities, have proven tractable, flexible and willing to coexist. Indeed, in search for peace and salvation, Palestinians have offered proposals “that actually went beyond the international consensus”. But still again and again, Israel’s symptomatic response has always been one of a kind: either outright rejection or neither acceptance nor rejection: a tertium quid. Such tertium quid or attitude makes the resolution of the Palestinian struggle impossible; and unless there is a resolution for the Palestine Question, for the affluent Palestinian Diaspora through implementing the refugees’ Right of Return, for an end to the belligerent Israeli occupation, the powerless will be further victimised, leading to further sufferings locally, radicalisaion regionally, and disgruntlement internationally. One of the Israeli axioms, as noted in this study is that “nothing that occurred prior to 1967, including the Nakba and the ethnic cleansing, will ever be negotiable” (Pappe, 2006: 239). The implications of such denial of or disregard for the events preceding 1967 and particularly those of 1948 are, as stated by Pappe (2006) clear:

[...] it totally removes the refugee issue from the peace agenda and sidelines the Palestinian Right of Return as a ‘non-starter’. This [...] axiom totally equates the end of Israeli occupation with the end of the conflict [...]. For the Palestinians, of course, 1948 is the heart of the matter and only addressing the wrongs perpetrated then can bring an end to the conflict in the region (239).

Relinquishing Zionism and eliminating all forms and ideologies of racialism and thus ending occupation is the only empowerment for coexistence; indeed, the sine qua non of peace and of any prospect for stability in the region. Without this, peace as it stands will be nothing but mirage and delusion, further inequity and injustice, more murder and martyrdom, artillery and mortality; and more importantly, a means to sustain domination and control. Furthermore, the human conscience - if awake - will ever remain troubled. Any hope of local, regional, or international climate of

304 détente will remain unrealisable. Peaceful coexistence will be elusive as reality and history witness and as every passing day does so; a fact that intensifies domination and injustice. Further, this will continue to be the case so long as the Zionist “ideology and praxis” remain in force, shaping the intent to filibuster and deceive in any “peace talks;” and so long as The Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples remain no more than discourse as for the Palestine Question. It will continue to be the case so long as life of the Palestinian is violable; so long as there is no equality; so long as “human rights” when it comes to the oppressed are nothing but rhetoric; so long as it is the bullet and not the ballot that is practised in the land of Palestine, so long as temporisation does not come to a halt, and the discursive drug of gradualism is in force; so long as the Palestinian people remain occupied, dispossessed and deprived of their human or God-given rights, dignity and freedom to live like free citizens in a recognised state that they can call homeland without fear of being assassinated, and so long as the United Nations does not truly subsidise the Palestinians’ struggle by putting an end to their occupation, dispossession and diaspora. It will continue to be the case and the “region will not know stability,” not as long as ‘Israel’ does not stop her “apartheid politics” and recognise “unambiguously its role in the suffering imposed on the Palestinians and its obligation to participate in the solution to the problem;” and not as long as “an unconditional disengagement [end of occupation] from the Palestinian territories” occupied (at least) on June 4 1967 has not taken place, with “a full and complete return to the [pre-June 5 lines, the] 1949 armistice lines;” and not as long as there is no “real withdrawal, that leaves the Palestinians territorial contiguity in a West Bank linked to Gaza, [and] open to Egypt and Jordan”. Discourses declared to “end decades of confrontation and conflict,” and discourses on human rights would be little more than a means of further arrogation of power rather than an end to occupation; and the chapter of the so-called ‘war on terror’ will remain open and, therefore, ‘peace’ as it stands will be a means to sustain domination, as true peace requires, as maintained by the Declaration of Mexico on the Equality of Women and Their Contribution to Development and Peace, adopted at the World Conference of the International Women’s Year, in Mexico City in June 1975:

the achievement of national liberation and independence, the elimination of colonialism and neo-colonialism,

305 foreign occupation, Zionism, apartheid, and racial discrimination in all its forms as well as the recognition of the dignity of peoples and their right to self-determination.

Corroborating the same principle, and as two of six specific steps, outlined as part of a Grand Strategy to reduce terrorism or “the present confrontation between the Muslim world and the United States,” former vice chairman of the National Intelligence Council at the CIA,” Graham E. Fuller (2010), in a highly enlightening and “an intriguingly successful” book, states:

Western military and political intervention in the Muslim world - all highly provocative to Muslims - must cease so that the area can begin to calm. This means withdrawal of all US and Western forces from Muslim soil (301). An early solution to the Palestinian problem must be found. It is perceived across the Muslim world as the single most egregious case of foreign imperialism, which has displaced local people and cast them into desperate living conditions in refugee camps, imposed second-class citizenship upon them in Israel, or pushed them into exile – for more than sixty years. Palestinian suffering has grown, accompanied by a radicalization that has spread beyond Palestine. The crisis demands a quick solution, the general outlines of which are well known to all parties. The Israeli colonization efforts in Palestinian territories must end and be reversed (302).

A conclusion drawn by a number of scholars, Western and non- Western, Muslims and non-Muslims, indeed, without a “withdrawal of all US and Western forces from Muslim soil,” and an end to western or Zionist dominance in the Muslim world, and an end to the apartheid practised in Palestine, an end to occupation, and realising the Palestinian people Right to Self-Determination, neither will Palestinian sufferings end nor will Israeli security and global turbulence.

306 6.4 RECOMMENDATIONS AND SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH

Initially, this problem-driven interdisciplinary and emancipatory CDA study was meant to include a CDA - as part of the discourse of the ‘peace process’ - of Hebron Agreement (1997), Wye River Memorandum (1998), Sharm e-Sheikh Memorandum (1999), Taba Talks (2001), the Rose Garden Address (June 2002), the Middle East Road Map, officially announced on April 30 2003, the Geneva Accord (2003), Israel’s Revised Disengagement Plan (June 6, 2004), and subsequent and apparently infinite ‘peace’ discourse. The study was also meant to include a CDA of related divulged documents such as WikiLeaks (2010) and The Palestine Papers (2011). However, due to limitations of study and some other constraints, the study has stopped short of these documents; a task that can be recommended for further research as a follow-up project or CDA study that can proceed on the same lines as this study. If nothing else, this work has been meant – besides increasing readers’ consciousness of the functions of discourse and CDA in reproducing and transforming reality or the status quo, respectively – to provide new insights into the rigmarole of a discourse constructed in such a way as to perpetuate domination on the part of the powerful, and protraction of the status quo on the part of the powerless. I therefore, recommend researchers - driven by the impetus to change the status quo, to help “victims of discursive injustice” put an end to their further being victimised; to help “analyse, and thus contribute to the understanding and the solution of serious social problems, especially those that are caused or exacerbated by public text and talk” - to build on this problem-oriented CDA study and extend analysis of the ‘peace process;’ its ensuing developments or ongoing discursive attempts geared ostensibly towards the arrival at a settlement of a century-long unequal conflict.

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321 APPENDICIES

APPENDIX A (i)

UN RESOLUTION 181(1947)

UNITED NATIONS ______A General Assembly A/RES/181(II) 29 November 1947 Resolution 181 (II). Future government of Palestine

A The General Assembly,

Having met in special session at the request of the mandatory Power to constitute and instruct a special committee to prepare for the consideration of the question of the future government of Palestine at the second regular session;

Having constituted a Special Committee and instructed it to investigate all questions and issues relevant to the problem of Palestine, and to prepare proposals for the solution of the problem, and

Having received and examined the report of the Special Committee (document A/364) 1/including a number of unanimous recommendations and a plan of partition with economic union approved by the majority of the Special Committee,

Considers that the present situation in Palestine is one which is likely to impair the general welfare and friendly relations among nations;

Takes note of the declaration by the mandatory Power that it plans to complete its evacuation of Palestine by 1 August 1948;

Recommends to the United Kingdom, as the mandatory Power for Palestine, and to all other Members of the United Nations the adoption and implementation, with regard to the future government of Palestine, of the Plan of Partition with Economic Union set out below [due to certain constraints, I have not included the text of this Plan of Partition here in the appendix]; Requests that

(a) The Security Council take the necessary measures as provided for in the plan for its implementation;

(b) The Security Council consider, if circumstances during the transitional period require such consideration, whether the situation in Palestine constitutes a threat to the peace. If it decides that such a threat exists, and in order to maintain international peace and security, the Security Council should supplement the authorization of the General Assembly by taking measures, under Articles 39 and 41 of the Charter, to

322 empower the United Nations Commission, as provided in this resolution, to exercise in Palestine the functions which are assigned to it by this resolution; (c) The Security Council determine as a threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression, in accordance with Article 39 of the Charter, any attempt to alter by force the settlement envisaged by this resolution;

(d) The Trusteeship Council be informed of the responsibilities envisaged for it in this plan;

Calls upon the inhabitants of Palestine to take such steps as may be necessary on their part to put this plan into effect; Appeals to all Governments and all peoples to refrain from taking action which might hamper or delay the carrying out of these recommendations, and

Authorizes the Secretary-General to reimburse travel and subsistence expenses of the members of the Commission referred to in Part I, Section B, paragraph 1 below, on such basis and in such form as he may determine most appropriate in the circumstances, and to provide the Commission with the necessary staff to assist in carrying out the functions assigned to the Commission by the General Assembly.

B 2/

The General Assembly

Authorizes the Secretary-General to draw from the Working Capital Fund a sum not to exceed $2,000,000 for the purposes set forth in the last paragraph of the resolution on the future government of Palestine.

Hundred and twenty-eighth plenary meeting 29 November 1947 [At its hundred and twenty-eighth plenary meeting on 29 November 1947 the General Assembly, in accordance with the terms of the above resolution [181 A], elected the following members of the United Nations Commission on Palestine: Bolivia, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Panama and Philippines.]

Source: http://www.alzaytouna.net/arabic

323 APPENDIX A (ii)

UN RESOLUTION 212 (November 19 1948) UN Resolution 212: Aid to Palestinian Refugees 202 (III) Assistance to Palestine Refugees

Whereas the problem of the relief of Palestine refugees of all communities is one of immediate urgency and the United Nations Mediator on Palestine in his progress report of 18 September 1948, part three, states that "action must be taken to determine the necessary measures [of relief] and to provide for their implementation"1/ and that "the choice is between saving the lives of many thousands of people now or permitting them to die";2/

Whereas the Acting Mediator, in his supplemental report of 18 October 1948, declares that "the situation of the refugees is now critical"3/ and that "aid must not only be continued but very greatly increased if disaster is to be averted";4/

Whereas the alleviation of conditions of starvation and distress among the Palestine refugees is one of the minimum conditions for the success of the efforts of the United Nations to bring peace to that land,

The General Assembly

1. Expresses its thanks to the Governments and organizations which, and the individual persons who, have given assistance directly or in response to the Mediator's appeal;

2. Considers, on the basis of the Acting Mediator's recommendation, that a sum of approximately 29,500,000 dollars will be required to provide relief for 500,000 refugees for a period of nine months from 1 December 1948 to 31 August 1949; and that an additional amount of approximately 2,500,000 dollars will be required for administrative and local operational expenses;

3. Authorizes the Secretary-General, in consultation with the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions, to advance immediately a sum of up to 5,000,000 dollars from the Working Capital Fund of the United Nations, the said sum to be repaid before the end of the period specified in paragraph 2, from the voluntary governmental contributions requested under paragraph 4;

4. Urges all States Members of the United Nations to make as soon as possible voluntary contributions in kind or in funds sufficient to ensure that the amount of supplies and funds required is obtained, and states, that, to this end, voluntary contributions of non-member States would also be accepted; contributions in funds may be made in currencies other than the United States dollar, in so far as the operations of the relief organization be carried out in such currencies;

5. Authorizes the Secretary-General to establish a Special Fund into which contributions shall be paid, which will be administered as a separate account;

6. Authorizes the Secretary-General to expend the funds received under paragraphs 3 and 4 of the present resolutions;

7. Instructs the Secretary-General, in consultation with the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions, to establish regulations for the administration and supervision of the Fund;

324 8. Requests the Secretary-General to take all necessary steps to extend aid to Palestine refugees and to establish such administrative organization as may be required for this purpose, inviting the assistance of the appropriate agencies of the several Governments, the specialized agencies of the United Nations, the United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund, the International Committee of the Red Cross, the League of Red Cross Societies and other voluntary agencies, it being recognized that the participation of voluntary organizations in the relief plan would in no way derogate from the principle of impartiality on the basis of which the assistance of these organizations is being solicited;

9. Requests the Secretary-General to Appoint a Director of United Nations Relief for Palestine Refugees, to whom he may delegate such responsibility as he may consider appropriate for the overall planning and implementation of the relief programme; 10. Agrees to the convoking, at the discretion of the Secretary-General, on an ad hoc advisory committee of seven members to be selected by the President of the General Assembly to which the Secretary-General may submit any matter of principle or policy upon which he would like the benefit of the committee's advice;

11. Requests the Secretary-General to continue and to extend the implementation of the present relief programme until the machinery provided for by the present resolution is set up;

12. Urges the World Health Organization, the Food and Agriculture Organization, the International Refugee Organization, the United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund and other appropriate organizations and agencies, acting within the framework of the relief programme herein established, promptly to contribute supplies, specialized personnel and other services permitted by their constitutions and their financial resources, to relieve the desperate plight of Palestine refugees of all communities;

13. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the General Assembly, at the next regular session, on the action taken as a result of this resolution.

1/ See Official Records of the third session of the General Assembly, Supplement No. 11, page 52, V 2/ Ibid., page 52, V, 2. 3/ See document A/689, paragraph 4. 4/ Ibid., paragraph 8.

Source: http://www.alzaytouna.net/arabic

325 APPENDIX A (iii)

UN RESOLUTION 194 (December 111948) UN Resolution 194: Palestinian Refugees 1948 194 (III). Palestine -- Progress Report of the United Nations Mediator

The General Assembly, Having considered further the situation in Palestine, 1. Expresses its deep appreciation of the progress achieved through the good offices of the late United Nations Mediator in promoting a peaceful adjustment of the future situation of Palestine, for which cause he sacrificed his life; and Extends its thanks to the Acting Mediator and his staff for their continued efforts and devotion to duty in Palestine; 2. Establishes a Conciliation Commission consisting of three States members of the United Nations which shall have the following functions:

(a) To assume, in so far as it considers necessary in existing circumstances, the functions given to the United Nations Mediator on Palestine by resolution 186 (S-2) of the General Assembly of 14 May 1948;

(b) To carry out the specific functions and directives given to it by the present resolution and such additional functions and directives as may be given to it by the General Assembly or by the Security Council;

(c) To undertake, upon the request of the Security Council, any of the functions now assigned to the United Nations Mediator on Palestine or to the United Nations Truce Commission by resolutions of the Security Council; upon such request to the Conciliation Commission by the Security Council with respect to all the remaining functions of the United Nations Mediator on Palestine under Security Council resolutions, the office of the Mediator shall be terminated;

3. Decides that a Committee of the Assembly, consisting of China, France, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom and the United States of America, shall present, before the end of the first part of the present session of the General Assembly, for the approval of the Assembly, a proposal concerning the names of the three States which will constitute the Conciliation Commission;

4. Requests the Commission to begin its functions at once, with a view to the establishment of contact between the parties themselves and the Commission at the earliest possible date;

5. Calls upon the Governments and authorities concerned to extend the scope of the negotiations provided for in the Security Council's resolution of 16 November 1948 1/ and to seek agreement by negotiations conducted either with the Conciliation Commission or directly, with a view to the final settlement of all questions outstanding between them;

6. Instructs the Conciliation Commission to take steps to assist the Governments and authorities concerned to achieve a final settlement of all questions outstanding between them;

7. Resolves that the Holy Places - including Nazareth - religious buildings and sites in Palestine should be protected and free access to them assured, in accordance with existing rights and historical practice; that arrangements to this end should be under effective United Nations supervision; that the United Nations Conciliation Commission, in presenting to the fourth regular session of the General Assembly its detailed

326 proposals for a permanent international regime for the territory of Jerusalem, should include recommendations concerning the Holy Places in that territory; that with regard to the Holy Places in the rest of Palestine the Commission should call upon the political authorities of the areas concerned to give appropriate formal guarantees as to the protection of the Holy Places and access to them; and that these undertakings should be presented to the General Assembly for approval;

8. Resolves that, in view of its association with three world religions, the Jerusalem area, including the present municipality of Jerusalem plus the surrounding villages and towns, the most eastern of which shall be Abu Dis; the most southern, Bethlehem; the most western, Ein Karim (including also the built-up area of Motsa); and the most northern, Shu'fat, should be accorded special and separate treatment from the rest of Palestine and should be placed under effective United Nations control; Requests the Security Council to take further steps to ensure the demilitarization of Jerusalem at the earliest possible date;

Instructs the Conciliation Commission to present to the fourth regular session of the General Assembly detailed proposals for a permanent international regime for the Jerusalem area which will provide for the maximum local autonomy for distinctive groups consistent with the special international status of the Jerusalem area; The Conciliation Commission is authorized to appoint a United Nations representative, who shall co-operate with the local authorities with respect to the interim administration of the Jerusalem area;

9. Resolves that, pending agreement on more detailed arrangements among the Governments and authorities concerned, the freest possible access to Jerusalem by road, rail or air should be accorded to all inhabitants of Palestine;

Instructs the Conciliation Commission to report immediately to the Security Council, for appropriate action by that organ, any attempt by any party to impede such access;

10. Instructs the Conciliation Commission to seek arrangements among the Governments and authorities concerned which will facilitate the economic development of the area, including arrangements for access to ports and airfields and the use of transportation and communication facilities;

11. Resolves that the refugees wishing to return to their homes and live at peace with their neighbours should be permitted to do so at the earliest practicable date, and that compensation should be paid for the property of those choosing not to return and for loss of or damage to property which, under principles of international law or in equity, should be made good by the Governments or authorities responsible;

Instructs the Conciliation Commission to facilitate the repatriation, resettlement and economic and social rehabilitation of the refugees and the payment of compensation, and to maintain close relations with the Director of the United Nations Relief for Palestine Refugees and, through him, with the appropriate organs and agencies of the United Nations;

12. Authorizes the Conciliation Commission to appoint such subsidiary bodies and to employ such technical experts, acting under its authority, as it may find necessary for the effective discharge of its functions and responsibilities under the present resolution;

The Conciliation Commission will have its official headquarters at Jerusalem. The authorities responsible for maintaining order in Jerusalem will be responsible for taking all measures necessary to ensure the security of the Commission. The Secretary-

327 General will provide a limited number of guards to the protection of the staff and premises of the Commission;

13. Instructs the Conciliation Commission to render progress reports periodically to the Secretary-General for transmission to the Security Council and to the Members of the United Nations;

14. Calls upon all Governments and authorities concerned to co-operate with the Conciliation Commission and to take all possible steps to assist in the implementation of the present resolution; 15. Requests the Secretary-General to provide the necessary staff and facilities and to make appropriate arrangements to provide the necessary funds required in carrying out the terms of the present resolution. *** At the 186th plenary meeting on 11 December 1948, a committee of the Assembly consisting of the five States designated in paragraph 3 of the above resolution proposed that the following three States should constitute the Conciliation Commission:

France, Turkey, United States of America. The proposal of the Committee having been adopted by the General Assembly at the same meeting, the Conciliation Commission is therefore composed of the above- mentioned three States.

1/ See Official Records of the Security Council, Third Year, No. 126

Source: http://www.alzaytouna.net/arabic

328 APPENDIX A (iv)

UN RESOLUTION 302 (December 8 1949) UN Resolution 302: Establishment of UNRWA 302 (IV). Assistance to Palestine Refugees 1/

The General Assembly, Recalling its resolutions 212 (III) 2/ of 19 November 1948 and 194 (III) 3/ of 11 December 1948, affirming in particular the provisions of paragraph 11 of the latter resolutions,

Having examined with appreciation the first interim report 4/ of the United Nations Economic Survey Mission for the Middle East and the report 5/ of the Secretary- General on assistance to Palestine refugees,

1. Expresses its appreciation to the Governments which have generously responded to the appeal embodied in its resolution 212 (III), and to the appeal of the Secretary- General, to contribute in kind or in funds to the alleviation of the conditions of starvation and distress among the Palestine refugees;

2. Expresses also its gratitude to the International Committee of the Red Cross, to the League of Red Cross Societies and to the American Friends Service Committee for the contribution they have made to this humanitarian cause by discharging, in the face of great difficulties, the responsibility they voluntarily assumed for the distribution of relief supplies and the general care of the refugees; and welcomes the assurance they have given the Secretary-General that they will continue their co-operation with the United Nations until the end of March 1950 on a mutually acceptable basis;

3. Commends the United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund for the important contribution which it has made towards the United Nations programme of assistance; and commends those specialized agencies which have rendered assistance in their respective fields, in particular the World Health Organization, the United nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization and the International Refugee Organization;

4. Expresses its thanks to the numerous religious, charitable and humanitarian organizations which have materially assisted in bringing relief to Palestine refugees;

5. Recognizes that, without prejudice to the provisions of paragraph 11 of General Assembly resolution 194 (III) of 11 December 1948, continued assistance for the relief of the Palestine refugees is necessary to prevent conditions of starvation and distress among them and to further conditions of peace and stability, and that constructive measures should be undertaken at an early date with a view to the termination of international assistance for relief;

6. Considers that, subject to the provisions of paragraph 9(d) of the present resolution, the equivalent of approximately $33,700,000 will be required for direct relief and works programmes for the period 1 January to 31 December 1950 of which the equivalent of $20,200,000 is required for direct relief and $13,500,000 for works programmes; that the equivalent of approximately $21,200,000 will be required for works programmes from 1 January to 30 June 1951, all inclusive of administrative expenses; and that direct relief should be terminated not later than 31 December 1950 unless otherwise determined by the General Assembly at its fifth regular session;

7. Establishes the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East:

329 (a) To carry out in collaboration with local governments the direct relief and works programmes as recommended by the Economic Survey Mission;

(b) To consult with the interested Near Eastern Governments concerning measures to be taken by them preparatory to the time when international assistance for relief and works projects is no longer available; 8. Establishes an Advisory Commission consisting of representatives of France, Turkey, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America, with power to add not more than three additional members from contributing Governments, to advise and assist the Director of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East in the execution of the programme; the Director and the Advisory Commission shall consult with each near Eastern Government concerned in the selection, planning and execution of projects; 9. Requests the Secretary-General to appoint the Director of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East in consultation with the Governments represented on the Advisory Commission; (a) The Director shall be the chief executive officer of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East responsible to the General Assembly for the operation of the programme;

(b) The Director shall select and appoint his staff in accordance with general arrangements made in agreement with the Secretary-General, including such of the staff rules and regulations of the United Nations as the Director and the Secretary- General shall agree are applicable, and to the extent possible utilize the facilities and assistance of the Secretary-General;

(c) The Director shall, in consultation with the Secretary-General and the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions, establish financial regulations for the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East;

(d) Subject to the financial regulations established pursuant to clause (c) of the present paragraph, the Director, in consultation with the Advisory Commission, shall apportion available funds between direct relief and works projects in their discretion, in the event that the estimates in paragraph 6 require revision;

10. Requests the Director to convene the Advisory Commission at the earliest practicable date for the purpose of developing plans for the organization and administration of the programme, and of adopting rules of procedure;

11. Continues the United Nations Relief for Palestine Refugees as established under General Assembly resolution 212 (III) until 1 April 1950, or until such date thereafter as the transfer referred to in paragraph 12 is affected, and requests the Secretary-General in consultation with the operating agencies to continue the endeavour to reduce the numbers of rations by progressive stages in the light of the findings and recommendations of the Economic Survey Mission;

12. Instructs the Secretary-General to transfer to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East the assets and liabilities of the United Nations Relief for Palestine Refugees by 1 April 1950, or at such date as may be agreed by him and the Director of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East;

13. Urges all Members of the United Nations and non-members to make voluntary contributions in funds or in kind to ensure that the amount of supplies and funds required is obtained for each period of the programme as set out in paragraph 6;

330 contributions in funds may be made in currencies other than the United States dollar in so far as the programme can be carried out in such currencies;

14. Authorizes the Secretary-General, in consultation with the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions, to advance funds deemed to be available for this purpose and not exceeding $5,000,000 from the Working Capital Fund to finance operations pursuant to the present resolution, such sum to be repaid not later than 31 December 1950 from the voluntary governmental contributions requested under paragraph 13 above;

15. Authorizes the Secretary-General, in consultation with the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions, to negotiate with the International Refugee Organization for an interest-free loan in an amount not to exceed the equivalent of $2,800,000 to finance the programme subject to mutually satisfactory conditions for repayment;

16. Authorizes the Secretary-General to continue the Special Fund established under General Assembly resolution 212 (III) and to make withdrawals therefrom for the operation of the United Nations Relief for Palestine Refugees and, uponä the request of the Director, for the operations of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East;

17. Calls upon the Governments concerned to accord to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East the privileges, immunities, exemptions and facilities which have been granted to the United Nations Relief for Palestine Refugees, together with all other privileges, immunities, exemptions and facilities necessary for the fulfilment of its functions;

18. Urges the United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund, the International Refugee Organization, the World Health Organization, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, the Food and Agriculture Organization and other appropriate agencies and private groups and organizations, in consultation with the Director of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, to furnish assistance within the framework of the programme;

19. Requests the Director of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East:

(a) To appoint a representative to attend the meeting of the Technical Assistance Board as observer so that the technical assistance activities of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East may be co-ordinated with the technical assistance programmes of the United Nations and specialized agencies referred to in Economic and Social Council resolution 222 (IX) A 6/ of 15 August 1949;

(b) To place at the disposal of the Technical Assistance Board full information concerning any technical assistance work which may be done by the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, in order that it may be included in the reports submitted by the Technical Assistance Board to the Technical Assistance committee of the Economic and Social Council;

20. Directs the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East to consult with the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine in the best interests of their respective tasks, with particular reference to paragraph 11 of General Assembly resolution 194 (III) of 11 December 1948;

331 21. Requests the Director to submit to the General Assembly of the United Nations an annual report on the work of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, including an audit of funds, and invites him to submit to the Secretary-General such other reports as the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East may wish to bring to the attention of Members of the United Nations, or its appropriate organs;

22. Instructs the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine to transmit the final report of the Economic Survey Mission, with such comments as it may wish to make, to the Secretary-General for transmission to the Members of the United Nations and to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East. ______1/ See Official Records of the third session of the General Assembly, Part II, Resolutions, page 19. 2/ Ibid., Part I, Resolutions, page 66. 3/ Ibid., page 21. 4/ See Official Records of the fourth session of the General Assembly, Annex to the Ad Hoc Political Committee, document A/1106. 5/ Ibid., documents A/1060 and A/1060/Add.1. 6/ See Official Records of the Economic

Source: http://www.alzaytouna.net/arabic

332 APPENDIX A (v)

UN RESOLUTION 242 (1967) Resolution 242 (1967) of 22 November 1967

The Security Council,

Expressing its continuing concern with the grave situation in the Middle East,

Emphasizing the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war and the need to work for a just and lasting peace in which every State in the area can live in security,

Emphasizing further that all Member States in their acceptance of the Charter of the United Nations have undertaken a commitment to act in accordance with Article 2 of the Charter,

1. Affirms that the fulfilment of Charter principles requires the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East which should include the application of both the following principles:

(i) Withdrawal of Israel armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict;

(ii) Termination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect for and acknowledgment of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every State in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force;

2. Affirms further the necessity

(a) For guaranteeing freedom of navigation through international waterways in the area;

(b) For achieving a just settlement of the refugee problem;

(c) For guaranteeing the territorial inviolability and political independence of every State in the area, through measures including the establishment of demilitarized zones;

3. Requests the Secretary-General to designate a Special Representative to proceed to the Middle East to establish and maintain contacts with the States concerned in order to promote agreement and assist efforts to achieve a peaceful and accepted settlement in accordance with the provisions and principles in this resolution;

4. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council on the progress of the efforts of the Special Representative as soon as possible.

Adopted unanimously at the 1382nd meeting.

Source: http://www.alzaytouna.net/arabic

333 APPENDIX A (vi)

UN RESOLUTION 338 (October 22 1973)

U.N. Security Council Resolution 338

The Security Council,

Calls upon all parties to present fighting to cease all firing and terminate all military activity immediately, no later than 12 hours after the moment of the adoption of this decision, in the positions after the moment of the adoption of this decision, in the positions they now occupy;

Calls upon all parties concerned to start immediately after the cease-fire the implementation of Security Council Resolution 242 (1967) in all of its parts;

Decides that, immediately and concurrently with the cease-fire, negotiations start between the parties concerned under appropriate auspices aimed at establishing a just and durable peace in the Middle.

Source: mideastweb.org

334 APPENDIX A (vii)

UN RESOLUTION 3236 (November 22 1974)

3236 (XXIX). Question of Palestine The General Assembly, Having considered the question of Palestine,

Having heard the statement of the Palestine Liberation Organization, the representative of the Palestinian people,1/

Having also heard other statements made during the debate,

Deeply concerned that no just solution to the problem of Palestine has yet been achieved and recognizing that the problem of Palestine continues to endanger international peace and security,

Recognizing that the Palestinian people is entitled to self-determination in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations,

Expressing its grave concern that the Palestinian people has been prevented from enjoying its inalienable rights, in particular its right to self-determination,

Guided by the purposes and principles of the Charter,

Recalling its relevant resolutions which affirm the right of the Palestinian people to self- determination,

1. Reaffirms the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people in Palestine, including:

(a) The right to self-determination without external interference;

(b) The right to national independence and sovereignty;

2. Reaffirms also the inalienable right of the Palestinians to return to their homes and property from which they have been displaced and uprooted, and calls for their return;

3. Emphasizes that full respect for and the realization of these inalienable rights of the Palestinian people are indispensable for the solution of the question of Palestine;

4. Recognizes that the Palestinian people is a principal party in the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East;

5. Further recognizes the right of the Palestinian people to regain its rights by all means in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations;

6. Appeals to all States and international organizations to extend their support to the Palestinian people in its struggle to restore its rights, in accordance with the Charter;

7. Requests the Secretary-General to establish contacts with the Palestine Liberation Organization on all matters concerning the question of Palestine;

8. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the General Assembly at its thirtieth session on the implementation of the present resolution;

9. Decides to include the item entitled "Question of Palestine" in the provisional agenda of its thirtieth session.

Source: mideastweb.org

335 APPENDIX A (viii)

UN RESOLUTION 1397 (12 March 2002) S/RES/1397 (2002)

Security Council

Distr.: General

Resolution 1397 (2002)

Adopted by the Security Council at its 4489th meeting, on 12 March 2002

The Security Council,

Recalling all its previous relevant resolutions, in particular resolutions 242 (1967) and 338 (1973),

Affirming a vision of a region where two States, Israel and Palestine, live side by side within secure and recognized borders,

Expressing its grave concern at the continuation of the tragic and violent events that have taken place since September 2000, especially the recent attacks and the increased number of casualties,

Stressing the need for all concerned to ensure the safety of civilians,

Stressing also the need to respect the universally accepted norms of international humanitarian law,

Welcoming and encouraging the diplomatic efforts of special envoys from the United States of America, the Russian Federation, the European Union and the United Nations Special Coordinator and others, to bring about a comprehensive, just and lasting peace in the Middle East,

Welcoming the contribution of Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah,

1. Demands immediate cessation of all acts of violence, including all acts of terror, provocation, incitement and destruction;

2. Calls upon the Israeli and Palestinian sides and their leaders to cooperate in the implementation of the Tenet work plan and Mitchell Report recommendations with the aim of resuming negotiations on a political settlement;

1. Expresses support for the efforts of the Secretary-General and others to assist the parties to halt the violence and to resume the peace process; 4. Decides to remain seized of the matter.

Source: mideastweb.org

336 APPENDIX A (ix)

UN RESOLUTION on Israeli Wall (October 2003) UN GA Resolution on Israeli Wall

Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland: draft resolution

Illegal Israeli actions in Occupied East Jerusalem and the rest of the Occupied Palestinian Territory

The General Assembly,

Recalling its relevant resolutions, including resolutions of the tenth emergency special session,

Recalling Security Council resolutions 242 (1967) of 22 November 1967, 267 (1969) of 3 July 1969, 298 (1971) of 25 September 1971, 446 (1979) of 22 March 1979, 452 (1979) of 20 July 1979, 465 (1980) of 1 March 1980, 476 (1980) of 30 June 1980, 478 (1980) of 20 August 1980, 904 (1994) of 18 March 1994, 1073 (1996) of 28 September 1996 and 1397 (2002) of 12 March 2002,

Reaffirming the principle of the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by force,

Reaffirming its vision of a region where two States, Israel and Palestine, live side by side within secure and recognized borders,

Condemning all acts of violence, terrorism and destruction.

Condemning in particular the suicide bombings and their recent intensification with the attack in Haifa,

Condemning also the bomb attack in the Gaza Strip which resulted in the death of three American security officers,

Deploring the extrajudicial killings and their recent intensification, in particular the attack yesterday in Gaza,

Stressing the urgency of ending the current violent situation on the ground, the need to end the occupation that began in 1967, and the need to achieve peace based on the vision of two States mentioned above,

Particularly concerned that the route marked out for the wall under construction by Israel, the occupying Power, in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including in and around East Jerusalem, could prejudge future negotiations and make the two-State solution physically impossible to implement and would cause further humanitarian hardship to the Palestinians,

Reiterating its call upon Israel, the occupying Power, to fully and effectively respect the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949,

Reiterating its opposition to settlement activities in the Occupied Territories and to any activities involving the confiscation of land, disruption of the livelihood of protected persons and the de facto annexation of land,

1. Demands that Israel stop and reverse the construction of the wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including in and around East Jerusalem, which is in departure of

337 the Armistice Line of 1949 and is in contradiction to relevant provisions of international law;

2. Calls on both Parties to fulfil their obligations under relevant provisions of the Road Map; the Palestinian Authority to undertake visible efforts on the ground to arrest, disrupt, and restrain individuals and groups conducting and planning violent attacks; the Government of Israel to take no actions undermining trust, including deportations and attacks on civilians and extrajudicial killings;

3. Requests the Secretary-General to report on compliance with this resolution periodically with the first report on compliance with operative paragraph 1 to be submitted within one month and upon receipt of which further actions should be considered, if necessary, within the United Nations system;

4. Decides to adjourn the tenth emergency special session temporarily and to authorize the current President of the General Assembly to resume its meeting upon request from Member States.

Source: UNISPAL

338 APPENDIX A (x)

UN RESOLUTION 1515 (2003)

United Nations S/RES/1515 (2003)

Security Council

Distr.: General 1 9 November, 2003

Resolution 1515 (2003)

The Security Council,

Recalling all its previous relevant resolutions, in particular resolutions 242 (1967), 338 (1973), 1397 (2002) and the Madrid principles,

Expressing its grave concern at the continuation of the tragic and violent events in the Middle East,

Reiterating the demand for an immediate cessation of all acts of violence, including all acts of terrorism, provocation, incitement and destruction,

Reaffirming its vision of a region where two States, Israel and Palestine, live side by side within secure and recognized borders,

Emphasizing the need to achieve a comprehensive, just and lasting peace in the Middle East, including the Israeli-Syrian and Israeli-Lebanese tracks,

Welcoming and encouraging the diplomatic efforts of the international Quartet and others,

1. Endorses the Quartet Performance-based Roadmap to a Permanent Two-State Solution to the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict (S/2003/529);

2. Calls on the parties to fulfil their obligations under the Roadmap in cooperation with the Quartet and to achieve the vision of two States living side by side in peace and security;

3. Decides to remain seized of the matter."

Source: mideastweb.org 339 APPENDIX B

The Balfour Declaration

Foreign Office

November 2nd, 1917 Dear Lord Rothschild,

I have much pleasure in conveying to you, on behalf of His Majesty's Government, the following declaration of sympathy with Jewish Zionist aspirations which has been submitted to, and approved by, the Cabinet.

"His Majesty's Government view with favour the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, and will use their best endeavours to facilitate the achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country."

I should be grateful if you would bring this declaration to the knowledge of the Zionist Federation.

Yours sincerely,

Arthur James Balfour

Source: http://www.mideastweb.org/mebalfour.htm

340 APPENDIX C

The Palestine Mandate (1922) The Council of the League of Nations:

Whereas the Principal Allied Powers have agreed, for the purpose of giving effect to the provisions of Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, to entrust to a Mandatory selected by the said Powers the administration of the territory of Palestine, which formerly belonged to the Turkish Empire, within such boundaries as may be fixed by them; and

Whereas the Principal Allied Powers have also agreed that the Mandatory should be responsible for putting into effect the declaration originally made on November 2nd, 1917, by the Government of His Britannic Majesty, and adopted by the said Powers, in favor of the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, it being clearly understood that nothing should be done which might prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country; and

Whereas recognition has thereby been given to the historical connection of the Jewish people with Palestine and to the grounds for reconstituting their national home in that country; and

Whereas the Principal Allied Powers have selected His Britannic Majesty as the Mandatory for Palestine; and

Whereas the mandate in respect of Palestine has been formulated in the following terms and submitted to the Council of the League for approval; and Whereas His Britannic Majesty has accepted the mandate in respect of Palestine and undertaken to exercise it on behalf of the League of Nations in conformity with the following provisions; and

Whereas by the aforementioned Article 22 (paragraph 8), it is provided that the degree of authority, control or administration to be exercised by the Mandatory, not having been previously agreed upon by the Members of the League, shall be explicitly defined by the Council of the League Of Nations; confirming the said Mandate, defines its terms as follows:

ARTICLE 1. The Mandatory shall have full powers of legislation and of administration, save as they may be limited by the terms of this mandate.

ARTICLE 2. The Mandatory shall be responsible for placing the country under such political, administrative and economic conditions as will secure the establishment of the Jewish national home, as laid down in the preamble, and the development of self- governing institutions, and also for safeguarding the civil and religious rights of all the inhabitants of Palestine, irrespective of race and religion.

ARTICLE 3. The Mandatory shall, so far as circumstances permit, encourage local autonomy.

ARTICLE 4. An appropriate Jewish agency shall be recognised as a public body for the purpose of advising and cooperating with the Administration of Palestine in such economic, social and other matters as may affect the establishment of the Jewish national home and the interests of the Jewish population in Palestine, and, subject

341 always to the control of the Administration to assist and take part in the development of the country.

The Zionist organization, so long as its organization and constitution are in the opinion of the Mandatory appropriate, shall be recognised as such agency. It shall take steps in consultation with His Britannic Majesty's Government to secure the cooperation of all Jews who are willing to assist in the establishment of the Jewish national home.

ARTICLE 5. The Mandatory shall be responsible for seeing that no Palestine territory shall be ceded or leased to, or in any way placed under the control of the Government of any foreign Power.

ARTICLE 6. The Administration of Palestine, while ensuring that the rights and position of other sections of the population are not prejudiced, shall facilitate Jewish immigration under suitable conditions and shall encourage, in cooperation with the Jewish agency referred to in Article 4, close settlement by Jews on the land, including State lands and waste lands not required for public purposes.

ARTICLE 7. The Administration of Palestine shall be responsible for enacting a nationality law. There shall be included in this law provisions framed so as to facilitate the acquisition of Palestinian citizenship by Jews who take up their permanent residence in Palestine.

ARTICLE 8. The privileges and immunities of foreigners, including the benefits of consular jurisdiction and protection as formerly enjoyed by Capitulation or usage in the Ottoman Empire, shall not be applicable in Palestine.

Unless the Powers whose nationals enjoyed the aforementioned privileges and immunities on August 1st, 1914, shall have previously renounced the right to their re- establishment, or shall have agreed to their nonapplication for a specified period, these privileges and immunities shall, at the expiration of the mandate, be immediately reestablished in their entirety or with such modifications as may have been agreed upon between the Powers concerned.

ARTICLE 9. The Mandatory shall be responsible for seeing that the judicial system established in Palestine shall assure to foreigners, as well as to natives, a complete guarantee of their rights.

Respect for the personal status of the various peoples and communities and for their religious interests shall be fully guaranteed. In particular, the control and administration of Wakfs shall be exercised in accordance with religious law and the dispositions of the founders.

ARTICLE 10. Pending the making of special extradition agreements relating to Palestine, the extradition treaties in force between the Mandatory and other foreign Powers shall apply to Palestine.

ARTICLE 11. The Administration of Palestine shall take all necessary measures to safeguard the interests of the community in connection with the development of the country, and, subject to any international obligations accepted by the Mandatory, shall have full power to provide for public ownership or control of any of the natural resources of the country or of the public works, services and utilities established or to be established therein. It shall introduce a land system appropriate to the needs of the country, having regard, among other things, to the desirability of promoting the close settlement and intensive cultivation of the land.

342 The Administration may arrange with the Jewish agency mentioned in Article 4 to construct or operate, upon fair and equitable terms, any public works, services and utilities, and to develop any of the natural resources of the country, in so far as these matters are not directly undertaken by the Administration. Any such arrangements shall provide that no profits distributed by such agency, directly or indirectly, shall exceed a reasonable rate of interest on the capital, and any further profits shall be utilised by it for the benefit of the country in a manner approved by the Administration.

ARTICLE 12. The Mandatory shall be entrusted with the control of the foreign relations of Palestine and the right to issue exequaturs to consuls appointed by foreign Powers. He shall also be entitled to afford diplomatic and consular protection to citizens of Palestine when outside its territorial limits.

ARTICLE 13. All responsibility in connection with the Holy Places and religious buildings or sites in Palestine, including that of preserving existing rights and of securing free access to the Holy Places, religious buildings and sites and the free exercise of worship, while ensuring the requirements of public order and decorum, is assumed by the Mandatory, who shall be responsible solely to the League of Nations in all matters connected herewith, provided that nothing in this article shall prevent the Mandatory from entering into such arrangements as he may deem reasonable with the Administration for the purpose of carrying the provisions of this article into effect; and provided also that nothing in this mandate shall be construed as conferring upon the Mandatory authority to interfere with the fabric or the management of purely Moslem sacred shrines, the immunities of which are guaranteed.

ARTICLE 14. A special commission shall be appointed by the Mandatory to study, define and determine the rights and claims in connection with the Holy Places and the rights and claims relating to the different religious communities in Palestine. The method of nomination, the composition and the functions of this Commission shall be submitted to the Council of the League for its approval, and the Commission shall not be appointed or enter upon its functions without the approval of the Council.

ARTICLE 15. The Mandatory shall see that complete freedom of conscience and the free exercise of all forms of worship, subject only to the maintenance of public order and morals, are ensured to all. No discrimination of any kind shall be made between the inhabitants of Palestine on the ground of race, religion or language. No person shall be excluded from Palestine on the sole ground of his religious belief.

The right of each community to maintain its own schools for the education of its own members in its own language, while conforming to such educational requirements of a general nature as the Administration may impose, shall not be denied or impaired.

ARTICLE 16. The Mandatory shall be responsible for exercising such supervision over religious or eleemosynary bodies of all faiths in Palestine as may be required for the maintenance of public order and good government. Subject to such supervision, no measures shall be taken in Palestine to obstruct or interfere with the enterprise of such bodies or to discriminate against any representative or member of them on the ground of his religion or nationality.

ARTICLE 17. The Administration of Palestine may organist on a voluntary basis the forces necessary for the preservation of peace and order, and also for the defence of the country, subject, however, to the supervision of the Mandatory, but shall not use them for purposes other than those above specified save with the consent of the Mandatory. Except for such purposes, no military, naval or air forces shall be raised or maintained by the Administration of Palestine.

343 Nothing in this article shall preclude the Administration of Palestine from contributing to the cost of the maintenance of the forces of the Mandatory in Palestine.

The Mandatory shall be entitled at all times to use the roads, railways and ports of Palestine for the movement of armed forces and the carriage of fuel and supplies.

ARTICLE 18. The Mandatory shall see that there is no discrimination in Palestine against the nationals of any State Member of the League of Nations (including companies incorporated under its laws) as compared with those of the Mandatory or of any foreign State in matters concerning taxation, commerce or navigation, the exercise of industries or professions, or in the treatment of merchant vessels or civil aircraft. Similarly, there shall be no discrimination in Palestine against goods originating in or destined for any of the said States, and there shall be freedom of transit under equitable conditions across the mandated area.

Subject as aforesaid and to the other provisions of this mandate, the Administration of Palestine may, on the advice of the Mandatory, impose such taxes and customs duties as it may consider necessary, and take such steps as it may think best to promote the development of the natural resources of the country and to safeguard the interests of the population. It may also, on the advice of the Mandatory, conclude a special customs agreement with any State the territory of which in 1914 was wholly included in Asiatic Turkey or Arabia.

ARTICLE 19. The Mandatory shall adhere on behalf of the Administration of Palestine to any general international conventions already existing, or which may be concluded hereafter with the approval of the League of Nations, respecting the slave traffic, the traffic in arms and ammunition, or the traffic in drugs, or relating to commercial equality, freedom of transit and navigation, aerial navigation and postal, telegraphic and wireless communication or literary, artistic or industrial property.

ARTICLE 20. The Mandatory shall cooperate on behalf of the Administration of Palestine, so far as religious, social and other conditions may permit, in the execution of any common policy adopted by the League of Nations for preventing and combating disease, including diseases of plants and animals.

ARTICLE 21. The Mandatory shall secure the enactment within twelve months from this date, and shall ensure the execution of a Law of Antiquities based on the following rules. This law shall ensure equality of treatment in the matter of excavations and archaeological research to the nationals of all States Members of the League of Nations.

(1) "Antiquity" means any construction or any product of human activity earlier than the year 1700 A. D.

(2) The law for the protection of antiquities shall proceed by encouragement rather than by threat.

Any person who, having discovered an antiquity without being furnished with the authorization referred to in paragraph 5, reports the same to an official of the competent Department, shall be rewarded according to the value of the discovery. (3) No antiquity may be disposed of except to the competent Department, unless this Department renounces the acquisition of any such antiquity.

No antiquity may leave the country without an export licence from the said Department.

344 (4) Any person who maliciously or negligently destroys or damages an antiquity shall be liable to a penalty to be fixed.

(5) No clearing of ground or digging with the object of finding antiquities shall be permitted, under penalty of fine, except to persons authorised by the competent Department.

(6) Equitable terms shall be fixed for expropriation, temporary or permanent, of lands which might be of historical or archaeological interest.

(7) Authorization to excavate shall only be granted to persons who show sufficient guarantees of archaeological experience. The Administration of Palestine shall not, in granting these authorizations, act in such a way as to exclude scholars of any nation without good grounds.

(8) The proceeds of excavations may be divided between the excavator and the competent Department in a proportion fixed by that Department. If division seems impossible for scientific reasons, the excavator shall receive a fair indemnity in lieu of a part of the find.

ARTICLE 22. English, Arabic and Hebrew shall be the official languages of Palestine. Any statement or inscription in Arabic on stamps or money in Palestine shall be repeated in Hebrew and any statement or inscription in Hebrew shall be repeated in Arabic.

ARTICLE 23. The Administration of Palestine shall recognise the holy days of the respective communities in Palestine as legal days of rest for the members of such communities.

ARTICLE 24. The Mandatory shall make to the Council of the League of Nations an annual report to the satisfaction of the Council as to the measures taken during the year to carry out the provisions of the mandate. Copies of all laws and regulations promulgated or issued during the year shall be communicated with the report.

ARTICLE 25. In the territories lying between the Jordan and the eastern boundary of Palestine as ultimately determined, the Mandatory shall be entitled, with the consent of the Council of the League of Nations, to postpone or withhold application of such provisions of this mandate as he may consider inapplicable to the existing local conditions, and to make such provision for the administration of the territories as he may consider suitable to those conditions, provided that no action shall be taken which is inconsistent with the provisions of Articles 15, 16 and 18.

ARTICLE 26. The Mandatory agrees that, if any dispute whatever should arise between the Mandatory and another member of the League of Nations relating to the interpretation or the application of the provisions of the mandate, such dispute, if it cannot be settled by negotiation, shall be submitted to the Permanent Court of International Justice provided for by Article 14 of the Covenant of the League of Nations.

ARTICLE 27. The consent of the Council of the League of Nations is required for any modification of the terms of this mandate.

ARTICLE 28. In the event of the termination of the mandate hereby conferred upon the Mandatory, the Council of the League of Nations shall make such arrangements as may be deemed necessary for safeguarding in perpetuity, under guarantee of the League, the rights secured by Articles 13 and 14, and shall use its influence for

345 securing, under the guarantee of the League, that the Government of Palestine will fully honour the financial obligations legitimately incurred by the Administration of Palestine during the period of the mandate, including the rights of public servants to pensions or gratuities. The present instrument shall be deposited in original in the archives of the League of Nations and certified copies shall be forwarded by the Secretary General of the League of Nations to all members of the League. Done at London the twenty fourth day of July, one thousand nine hundred and twenty- two. ______

Source: http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/History/Palestine_Mandate.html

346 APPENDIX D

The White Paper of 1922 (the "Churchill White Paper") British White Paper June 1922

The Secretary of State for the Colonies has given renewed consideration to the existing political situation in Palestine, with a very earnest desire to arrive at a settlement of the outstanding questions which have given rise to uncertainty and unrest among certain sections of the population. After consultation with the High Commissioner for Palestine [Sir Herbert Samuel] the following statement has been drawn up. It summarizes the essential parts of the correspondence that has already taken place between the Secretary of State and a delegation from the Moslem Christian Society of Palestine, which has been for some time in England, and it states the further conclusions which have since been reached.

The tension which has prevailed from time to time in Palestine is mainly due to apprehensions, which are entertained both by sections of the Arab and by sections of the Jewish population. These apprehensions, so far as the Arabs are concerned are partly based upon exaggerated interpretations of the meaning of the Balfour Declaration favouring the establishment of a Jewish National Home in Palestine, made on behalf of His Majesty's Government on 2nd November, 1917.

Unauthorized statements have been made to the effect that the purpose in view is to create a wholly Jewish Palestine. Phrases have been used such as that Palestine is to become "as Jewish as England is English." His Majesty's Government regard any such expectation as impracticable and have no such aim in view. Nor have they at any time contemplated, as appears to be feared by the Arab delegation, the disappearance or the subordination of the Arabic population, language, or culture in Palestine. They would draw attention to the fact that the terms of the Declaration referred to do not contemplate that Palestine as a whole should be converted into a Jewish National Home, but that such a Home should be founded `in Palestine.' In this connection it has been observed with satisfaction that at a meeting of the Zionist Congress, the supreme governing body of the Zionist Organization, held at Carlsbad in September, 1921, a resolution was passed expressing as the official statement of Zionist aims "the determination of the Jewish people to live with the Arab people on terms of unity and mutual respect, and together with them to make the common home into a flourishing community, the upbuilding of which may assure to each of its peoples an undisturbed national development."

It is also necessary to point out that the Zionist Commission in Palestine, now termed the Palestine Zionist Executive, has not desired to possess, and does not possess, any share in the general administration of the country. Nor does the special position assigned to the Zionist Organization in Article IV of the Draft Mandate for Palestine imply any such functions. That special position relates to the measures to be taken in Palestine affecting the Jewish population, and contemplates that the organization may assist in the general development of the country, but does not entitle it to share in any degree in its government.

Further, it is contemplated that the status of all citizens of Palestine in the eyes of the law shall be Palestinian, and it has never been intended that they, or any section of them, should possess any other juridical status. So far as the Jewish population of Palestine are concerned it appears that some among them are apprehensive that His Majesty's Government may depart from the policy embodied in the Declaration of 1917. It is necessary, therefore, once more to affirm that these fears are unfounded, and that

347 that Declaration, reaffirmed by the Conference of the Principle Allied Powers at San Remo and again in the Treaty of Sevres, is not susceptible of change.

During the last two or three generations the Jews have recreated in Palestine a community, now numbering 80,000, of whom about one fourth are farmers or workers upon the land. This community has its own political organs; an elected assembly for the direction of its domestic concerns; elected councils in the towns; and an organization for the control of its schools. It has its elected Chief Rabbinate and Rabbinical Council for the direction of its religious affairs. Its business is conducted in Hebrew as a vernacular language, and a Hebrew Press serves its needs. It has its distinctive intellectual life and displays considerable economic activity. This community, then, with its town and country population, its political, religious, and social organizations, its own language, its own customs, its own life, has in fact "national" characteristics. When it is asked what is meant by the development of the Jewish National Home in Palestine, it may be answered that it is not the imposition of a Jewish nationality upon the inhabitants of Palestine as a whole, but the further development of the existing Jewish community, with the assistance of Jews in other parts of the world, in order that it may become a centre in which the Jewish people as a whole may take, on grounds of religion and race, an interest and a pride. But in order that this community should have the best prospect of free development and provide a full opportunity for the Jewish people to display its capacities, it is essential that it should know that it is in Palestine as of right and not on the sufferance. That is the reason why it is necessary that the existence of a Jewish National Home in Palestine should be internationally guaranteed, and that it should be formally recognized to rest upon ancient historic connection.

This, then, is the interpretation which His Majesty's Government place upon the Declaration of 1917, and, so understood, the Secretary of State is of opinion that it does not contain or imply anything which need cause either alarm to the Arab population of Palestine or disappointment to the Jews. For the fulfilment of this policy it is necessary that the Jewish community in Palestine should be able to increase its numbers by immigration. This immigration cannot be so great in volume as to exceed whatever may be the economic capacity of the country at the time to absorb new arrivals. It is essential to ensure that the immigrants should not be a burden upon the people of Palestine as a whole, and that they should not deprive any section of the present population of their employment. Hitherto the immigration has fulfilled these conditions. The number of immigrants since the British occupation has been about 25,000.

It is necessary also to ensure that persons who are politically undesirable be excluded from Palestine, and every precaution has been and will be taken by the Administration to that end. It is intended that a special committee should be established in Palestine, consisting entirely of members of the new Legislative Council elected by the people, to confer with the administration upon matters relating to the regulation of immigration. Should any difference of opinion arise between this committee and the Administration, the matter will be referred to His Majesty's Government, who will give it special consideration. In addition, under Article 81 of the draft Palestine Order in Council, any religious community or considerable section of the population of Palestine will have a general right to appeal, through the High Commissioner and the Secretary of State, to the League of Nations on any matter on which they may consider that the terms of the Mandate are not being fulfilled by the Government of Palestine.

With reference to the Constitution which it is now intended to establish in Palestine, the draft of which has already been published, it is desirable to make certain points clear. In the first place, it is not the case, as has been represented by the Arab Delegation, that during the war His Majesty's Government gave an undertaking that an independent

348 national government should be at once established in Palestine. This representation mainly rests upon a letter dated the 24th October, 1915, from Sir Henry McMahon, then His Majesty's High Commissioner in Egypt, to the Sherif of Mecca, now King Hussein of the Kingdom of the Hejaz. That letter is quoted as conveying the promise to the Sherif of Mecca to recognise and support the independence of the Arabs within the territories proposed by him. But this promise was given subject to a reservation made in the same letter, which excluded from its scope, among other territories, the portions of Syria lying to the west of the District of Damascus. This reservation has always been regarded by His Majesty's Government as covering the vilayet of Beirut and the independent Sanjak of Jerusalem. The whole of Palestine west of the Jordan was thus excluded from Sir. Henry McMahon's pledge.

Nevertheless, it is the intention of His Majesty's government to foster the establishment of a full measure of self government in Palestine. But they are of the opinion that, in the special circumstances of that country, this should be accomplished by gradual stages and not suddenly. The first step was taken when, on the institution of a Civil Administration, the nominated Advisory Council, which now exists, was established. It was stated at the time by the High Commissioner that this was the first step in the development of self governing institutions, and it is now proposed to take a second step by the establishment of a Legislative Council containing a large proportion of members elected on a wide franchise. It was proposed in the published draft that three of the members of this Council should be non official persons nominated by the High Commissioner, but representations having been made in opposition to this provision, based on cogent considerations, the Secretary of State is prepared to omit it. The legislative Council would then consist of the High Commissioner as President and twelve elected and ten official members. The Secretary of State is of the opinion that before a further measure of self government is extended to Palestine and the Assembly placed in control over the Executive, it would be wise to allow some time to elapse. During this period the institutions of the country will have become well established; its financial credit will be based on firm foundations, and the Palestinian officials will have been enabled to gain experience of sound methods of government. After a few years the situation will be again reviewed, and if the experience of the working of the constitution now to be established so warranted, a larger share of authority would then be extended to the elected representatives of the people.

The Secretary of State would point out that already the present administration has transferred to a Supreme Council elected by the Moslem community of Palestine the entire control of Moslem Religious endowments (Waqfs), and of the Moslem religious Courts. To this Council the Administration has also voluntarily restored considerable revenues derived from ancient endowments which have been sequestrated by the Turkish Government. The Education Department is also advised by a committee representative of all sections of the population, and the Department of Commerce and Industry has the benefit of the cooperation of the Chambers of Commerce which have been established in the principal centres. It is the intention of the Administration to associate in an increased degree similar representative committees with the various Departments of the Government.

The Secretary of State believes that a policy upon these lines, coupled with the maintenance of the fullest religious liberty in Palestine and with scrupulous regard for the rights of each community with reference to its Holy Places, cannot but commend itself to the various sections of the population, and that upon this basis may be built up that a spirit of cooperation upon which the future progress and prosperity of the Holy Land must largely depend. Source: http://www.mideastweb.org/1922wp.htm

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