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18N3 Acid Rain 180, 181 Afghanistan 179, 213 Aid EBRD Index 'accommodationists' 18n3 Australia 197, 214 acid rain 180, 181 authoritarian regimes I 06, 207 Afghanistan 179, 213 aid Bangkok Agreement 152 EBRD criteria for 3 I Bangladesh 161 n37 policy for 57, 149 Bao Tong 47n47 receipt of 36, 180 Barchevsky, Charlene 165n84 supplyof 57,64nl9,194nl8 Belarus 202,203, 217nll aircraft, military 172, 177, 193n I0 Belgium 65n30 Alagappa, M. 252 Belgrade incident 57, 125, 126, 183 Albright, Madeleine 239 Bhutan 161 n37 Algeria 221, 225 biological weapons 229 Amnesty International 32 Biological Weapons Convention Annan, Kofi 40 (BWC) 34, 221, 226, Antarctic model 21 0 Bogor Declaration 81 Antarctic Treaty 221 Bolsheviks 253 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty 143, border protection 161n41, 173, 174, 192,243-244 CIS states 75, 171-172, 178--179 Arendt, Hannah 258 hostile incursions 94, 99n9 arms control joint agreements for 120 Clinton administration report on ocean borders 181 15-16,236--241 cooperation in 34, 35, 36--37, 38, 57 Russian Far East 171-172, 174, export controls 233-236 175-176, 193n9 policies for 219-236, 241-244, 261 Bosnia-Herzegovina 143, 144, 173 pre-Reform period 26 BoYibo 84 Arms Control in the Middle East Brazil 31 (ACME) 229 Bretton Woods Institutions 26, 28 arms proliferation (see arms control) Bull, Hedley 4, 19n 13, 22, 23 Art ofWar, The (Sun Tzu) 63nll on Cold War 4, 24, 29-30, 257 Asian Development Bank (ADB) 141, Burma 120 145, 146, 147 Bush, George W. 66n35 Asian economic crisis 41, 55, 64n 19 Bush (George W.) administration Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation 177, 183-184 (APEC) 55,141,145,173,174,200,210 Association for Relations across Cambodia 26, 55, 197 Taiwan Strait 20 I Catholicism 94 Association of Southeast Asian Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Nations (ASEAN) 55, 141, 143, 151 179,232,235,237 294 Index Central Military Commission (CMC) energy resources 177, 190, 191 10, 84, 88, 109-110, 113-114, 118 PRC and 178-180, 185 Chechnya 178 Russia and 179-180 Chemical Weapons Convention Clinton, William 34, 38, 46n32, 224, 239 (CWC) 34, 221, 226-228 Clinton administration, arms control Chen Shuibian 125, 197 15,20nl8,66n35, 185,243,244 Chen Xitong I04n71 'Club of One' 14, 136, ISO Chen Yun 86 coastal economic areas 89 Chernomyrdin, Victor 174 Collective Security Treaty 179 Chiang Kai-shek 254 Commission for Science, Technology, Chi Haotian 71 and Industry for National Defence China, Republic of (ROC) (see Taiwan) (COSTIND) 80 China Democracy Party 94 Commission for the Comprehensive China International Law Society 148 Management of Public Order China Nuclear Energy Industry (CCMPO) 94 Corporation (CNEIC) 232-233, 235 Committee against Torture 32 Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Committee on Freedom of CMC 10,84,88,109-110, 113-114, Association (CFA) 143 118 Commonwealth of Independent Constitution 87-88, 92, I 03n58 States (see also CIS) 168 democratisation policy 95-98 communism (see Chinese factions 9-1 0, 82, 90, 97-98 Communist Party; ideology) Falun Gong in 76 Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty foreign investment sanctioned by 79 (CTBT) PLAand 10-11,85,106-107,110, international recognition of 63- 111-112, 115, 127 64nl7, 136,168,224 political power 82-86, 87, 88, PRC adherence to 34, 181, 222 101n41 PRC signatory to 34, 35, 54, 182, reformation of 71, 92-93 221,222 Reform period legitimacy 76 Conference on Disarmament (CD) role of 2, 254, 262 132, 143, ISO, 151,221,222 weakening of power 9, 37, 39, 97-98 confidence building measures (CBMs) White Papers 57, 64n28, 65n29, 228 171 Chinese National Petroleum 'congagement' 59, 66n34, 66-67n35 Corporation (CNPC) 190 Constitution of the Chinese Chinese Tapei 160n3 I Communist Party 87-88, 92, I 03n58 Chongqing 89 constrainment strategy 2 Chou En-lai (see Zhou Enlai) consumption, domestic 76-79 Christopher, Warren 225 containment strategy 2, 18n5, 253, 255 CIS states Convention Against Torture 141 border protection 75, I 71-1 72, corruption 93, I 04n71, I 04n73, I 13, 178-179 263 295 Power and Responsibility in Chinese Foreign Policy Council for Security Cooperation in on security agenda 264 the Asia Pacific 55 sovereignty policy 120, 21 I Cox Report 183,237-238 in war 260 crime, international 189 Diaoyu (Senkaku) Islands 181, 187, 209 Cuba 141 dingwei, concept of 52, 53, 63nl 0 cultural relativism 40-41, 49, 51, 56, diplomacy 60, 152 post-Revolutionary period 28-29, Cultural Revolution (see also 168-193 revolution) PRC:Taiwan recognition 57, 204 diplomacy during 26 Revolutionary period 24-28, 257 domestic turmoil 70, 76, 82, 85, 132 disarmament (see arms control) foreign policy during 254-255 Donnelly, Jack 30 PLA image during I 13 drugs trafficking 171, 179 currency crises 82 Dulles, John Foster 44n I 0 Dagestan 178 East Asia Monetary Fund lSI Dai Xianglong IS I, 164n75 East Asian economic crisis 41, 55, Dalai Lama 75 64nl9 Declaration on Fundamental East China Sea 187, 209-21 0 Principles and Rights at Work 141-142 EastTimor 55, 144, 161-162n44, defence (see foreign policy; People's 162n47, 197, 209 Liberation Army) Economic Exclusion Zones ((EEZs) democracy 182, 187 armed forces in I 06 economic internationalisation 81-82 evolution to 42, 72,95-98 (see also globalisation) increasing global acceptance 30-32, economic reform 258 political effects of 70-82, 99n 12, interdependence and 139 99-100nl3 sovereignty in 207, 212 post-Revolutionary period 261- Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) 265,271n44 196,198,213 science and technology 79-80, democratisation, Chinese 95-98 101n33 Deng Xiaoping Economist 69 death 86 energy production 77-79 on domestic policies 28-29, 54, 70, energy resources 89,264 Asia's requirements 169-170 foreign policies 70, 123, 175 PRC strategy 180-181, 185, 189- Hong Kong policy 210 191, 195n34 NIEO ISO engagement strategy 2-3,59,66- PLA 108-109, Ill, 125 67n35 political power of 84, 86 environment rule of law 85 acid rain 180, 181 296 Index global rehabilitation 29, 34, 152 federalism in 89-90 PRC policies for 34, 36, 57 political structure 83-88, 92-94, ethics 5-6, 140 104n70 ethno-nationalism 74, 179, 265 pre-1949 legacy 84-85 European Bank for Reconstruction prognosis 9-10 and Development 3 I public order and 71, 74-76, 94-95, European Union (EU) 204, 214, 215 99n9 reform necessity 90-92 Falun Gong regionalism in 88-89 emergence of 76, 94, 97 rule of law 39, 47n43, 85 suppression of 76, 88, 94, IOI- grain market 72, 99n 13 102n42, 122, 183 Great Britain (see Britain; United fisheries agreements 187 Kingdom) Five Principles of Peaceful Great Powers Coexistence 137, 149, 150, 164n66 Bull's definition 23 foreign policies 122-128, 184-185, entry requirements 29 197, 267n2 (see also People's PRC inclusion 14, 22, 27, 44n 15, 196 Liberation Army) PRC irresponsibility 237 France 19n 13, 24, 198, 222 responsibilities of 4-5 freedom of speech 96, I 04n71 Russia as 174 status of 4 G8 (formerly G7) 4, 168, 173 US:USSR arms negotiations 27 gemeinschafi: 33 war prone 259 General Agreement on Tariffs and gross domestic product (GDP) 69, Trade (GATT) 217nl4 70, 78, 81, 88 Geneva Conference on Disarmament gross national product (GNP) 25, 80 221 Guatemala 61 Germany 2, 19n 13, 151, 202, 203, 204 GulfWar 59 gesellschafi: 33 'gunboat diplomacy' 40, 59 Giddens,Anthony 259 Guomindang (GMD) 27, I 19 glasnost 72, 95, 171 globalisation (see also international Hainan Island 57, 89 society) Haiti 61, 143, 144 impact of domestic policies 197 Han ethnic group 74-75, 142 PRC and 67n39, 135, 155-157 Helms, Jesse 232,237,243 Third World economies and 163n58 Helsinki Accords 39 WTO as carrier 153 Henkin, L. 149 Gorbachev, Mikhail 95, 170, 171, 174 Hertz, F.O. 212 governance, PRC domestic hijackers 210-21 I absence of ideology 82-83, 97 Ho Chi Minh 24 achievements 41, 47n47 Hong Kong 57, 89, 120, 196, 200, 20 I, democratisation 39, 95-98 210 297 Power and Responsibility in Chinese Foreign Policy housing privatisation 142, 160- India 161n35 border dispute I 19, 120, 130n26 humanitarian aid by PLA I 13 CTBT 63nl7 humanitarian intervention 144 defence procurement I 77 human rights foreign relations IS I , 177, 23 I cultural relativism 40-41, 152 GATT membership 217nl4 EastTimor 144, 161-162n44, IMFand 147, 161n37 162n47 missiles 231 economic challenges to 33 nuclear capability 54, 64n 18, 177, international recognition 29, 30, 224 40,208,209 Indo-China, Geneva Conference on NGO's participation 32 44nl5 obligations 20n 18 Indonesia 31, 73, 82, 144, 209 PRC compliance 39, 152-153, 265 Inhuman Weapons Convention 221 PRC recognition of 37, 38-39, 57, Institute of Political Science 96, I04n72 58, 178 intellectual property rights 35, 79, 80, sovereignty and 40, 138, 144, 152- 154 153,208-209 INTERFET 144 Human Rights Committee 32 inter-governmental organisations Hungary 31 (IGOs) 56, 133, 158n4 International Atomic Energy Agency identity construction 16, 17, 266-267 (IAEA) 143, 221, 224, 225, 232 ideology (see also Chinese International Bank for Reconstruction Communist Party) and Development (IBRD) (see World absence of 82-83, 87, 92-94, 97 Bank) 'Chinese' 52 International Convention on Nuclear Confucian influences 63n I0, 63n I I Safety 223 contemporary PRC 69, 115, 136, International Court of Justice (ICJ) 256-257 57, 142, 161n36 enforcing bodies 84, I 00-1 0 In42 International Covenant of Civil and federalism 89-90 Political Rights 31, 39, 47n42, 58, Italian fascism 92 65n30 Japanese war guilt 181 International Covenant on Economic, Jiang on conflict with Taiwan 124 Social and Cultural Rights 39, 47n42, Marxism 136, 139, 140, 260 58,65n30 military forces driven by I06 International Development pluralism 93 Association (IDA) 146
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