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A abortion, 197–201, 309, 424 acid rain, 276 adoption, 199, 204–205 Afghanistan, 331, 343 Africa, 406–410, 413, 418; Chinese investment in, 294; PLA deployments in, 408; Sino-Soviet competition in, 378See also individual nations African Development Bank, 418 agricultural producers’ cooperatives (APCs), 65, 71, 73, 75 agricultural reform, 9, 62, 65, 146–148, 250–252, 254–256, 298, 306– 307, 438. See also collectivization agriculture: cash crops, 150; collectivization of, 65, 70, 72–73, 79, 230; communes and, 75, 77, 147; decollectivization of, 137; Develop the West Campaign and, 329–331; environmental factors, 270, 272, 323; feminization of, 284; during Great Leap Forward, 72, 82; in imperial China, 22; industry and, 78–79; infrastructure of, 306–307; Mao and, 70–71, 76; modernization of, 145, 147, 249, 333, 343; price reform and, 257; rural industrialization and, 254–256; urban bias and, 305–306See also agricultural reform AIDS. See human immunodeficiency syndrome (HIV) aircraft carriers, 369 air pollution, 275–277; coal and, 275–276 Algeria, 294, 406–407 All-China Environment Federation, 280 American Institute in Taiwan (AIT), 386 Angola, 267, 406, 408 anti-corruption campaigns, 155–156, 162, 167–168, 172, 353. See also corruption antigovernment protests, 430–431. See also separatism; Tiananmen Square protests (1989) Anti-Rightist Campaign, 68–69, 83, 180, 230 Arms Reduction Act (1982), 385 ASEAN Economic Community (AEC), 399 ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), 398, 401 Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum, 416 assimilation, 229–230 Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), 359–360, 398–399, 401, 420 automotive industry, 425 autonomous counties, 141n28 autonomous regions, 63, 119, 124, 141n20, 228–233; economic development in, 232–234, 330; governing of, 127, 130, 133, 135, 179, 230–232; government repression in, 240–243See also Tibet; Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region Autumn Harvest Uprising, 38 B Bandung Conference, 377 Bandung Spirit, 377–378, 394, 409 baojia system, 22 barefoot doctors, 99, 105n80, 314–315 basic medical insurance system, 191 Beida. See Peking University Beijing Spring, 152 Beijing University. See Peking University Belgrade, embassy bombing in, 384–385 Bibles, 239, 247n111 blood-selling schemes, 317–318 Boeing, 419n15 Bolsheviks, 34 Borodin, Mikhail, 34 Bouyei, 14, 228 Boxer Rebellion, 28–29 Bo Yibo, 83 Braun, Otto, 41 Brazil, 268, 283, 415–417, 425, 434 Brunei, 13, 363 Buddhism, Tibetan, 240–241. See also Dalai Lama Burma. See Myanmar C cadre schools, 94–95 Caijing (Finance and Economics) Magazine, 196, 223–224 Cambodia, 344 Campaign to Suppress Counterrevolutionaries, 62 Capital Iron and Steel Company (Shoudu), 168, 263 Catholic church, 23, 52–53, 176, 236, 238–239 cellular economy, 66, 259 center-local relations, 124–130 Central Asia, 401–405, 420n43. See also individual nations Central Commission for Discipline Inspection, 112 Central Committee (of CCP), 108–112, 114, 116, 140n3; in early 20th century, 38–39; economic reform, 249, 259, 280; education and, 210; Hu on, 171; Jiang on, 165; Mao and, 47, 72; military and, 118–119, 151, 175, 355; Politburo and, 115 Central Cultural Revolution Small Group (CCRSG), 88–89, 95 Central Foreign Affairs Leading Small Group (LSG), 374–375 Central Military Commission (CMC), 118–119, 348, 353–356; Deng and, 164, 344; Hua and, 144–145; Hu and, 119, 170–171, 368; Jiang and, 119, 165–166, 170, 346, 354; Mao and, 166 Chen Duxiu, 32, 37, 47 Chennault, Claire L., 379 Chen Shui-bian, 387 Chen Xitong, 167–168, 429 Chen Yun, 82, 83, 146, 148, 160, 164; Long March and, 41; Tiananmen Square and, 160 Chiang Kai-Shek, 3, 34–35, 37–41, 43–47, 55, 56n39; in Taiwan, 67, 92, 380See also Kuomintang (KMT) child abductions, 201 child mortality rates, 310, 315 Chile, 414–415, 417 Chimerica, 389 China, map of, 5 China Development Bank, 407 China Export-Import (Exim) Bank, 407–408 China First Aviation Corporation (AVIC), 349, 351 China National Nuclear Corporation (CNNC), 349, 351 China National Offshore Oil Company (CNOOC), 268, 390, 406 China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC), 267, 404, 416 China Poly Group, 354 China’s Center for Disease Control, 193, 319 China Securities Regulation Commission (CSRC), 286–287 China-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Assistance, 342, 376–377, 410 China-Vietnam border war (1979), 344 China Xinxing Corporation, 354 Chinese Communist Party (CCP), 3–4, 16, 107–114, 130, 139–140, 434; alliance with KMT, 33–34, 37, 44, 46, 53–54; capitalists within the party, 2, 6, 169–170; civil war with KMT, 38–41, 46, 54, 62; corruption and, 158, 167, 429–430; criticism of, 68–69, 154, 220; Cultural Revolution and, 87–90, 93–94, 143, 151; democracy and, 139, 173, 436–437; Deng and, 103; early political campaigns of, 62–66, 71, 77, 79–80; economic reform and, 285; education and, 207; entrepreneurs and, 114, 176, 434– 435; ethnic minorities and, 229–231; foreign policy and, 374– 376; founding of, 33; founding of PRC by, 59–61; future of, 139, 431, 433–435; General Secretary of, 108–109, 111–112, 119, 146, 355; Great Leap Forward and, 83; Hu, 156, 170; Hua and, 144–145; Internet and, 224–225; Jiang and, 165–168, 346; judicial process and, 180–181; legal reform and, 178, 180, 183; Lin Biao and, 100; local People's Congresses and, 133; Mao and, 37, 42–43, 47–48, 51, 70; National Party Congress of, 108–110, 187n56, 343; National People's Congress and, 130–132; PLA and, 118–120, 340–342, 347, 355–356; political reform and, 144, 151, 173–177, 184; primacy of, 140n1, 153, 172, 236, 435; propaganda and, 218–219, 221–222, 224; recruitment and, 113– 114; relationship with Soviet Communists, 41–42, 59–60, 67, 107, 140n4; religious movements and, 52, 237–238; rural government and, 138–139; SARS outbreak and, 196; Seventeenth Party Congress of, 114–118; State Council and, 122; Tiananmen Square Protest and, 161–162, 163; Yan'an era, 41–43See also Central Committee (of CCP); Party Congresses; Politburo Chinese Ministry of Trade, 416 Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), 60–61, 155 Chinese Provinces, populations of, 126 Chongqing, 103n3 cinema, 96, 218–220, 244; counterfeiting of, 295 Civilization and Courtesy Educational Movement, 155 class struggle, 51–53, 102, 146, 152, 169, 178; foreign policy and, 377 climate change, 276–277, 385, 413 coal, 266–268, 299, 300n32, 424; air pollution and, 275–276 collectivization, 59, 65–67, 70, 72, 77, 79, 230, 250, 306, 438; criticism of, 88; decollectivization and, 137 Comintern, 34, 37, 39, 41, 48, 118, 410 commercial sex industry, 38, 317–319; campaigns against, 63–64 communes, 72–80, 82, 84, 190, 250, 269, 306; agricultural reform and, 251; dismantling of, 323; health care in, 100 Communist International. See Comintern Communist Youth League (CYL), 113 Compulsory Education Law, 210, 235, 311 Confucianism, 17–21, 55n6, 153, 205; education and, 205–206 Confucius, 17–18, 54, 91, 205 constitutions, Chinese, 109–110, 115–117, 120–122, 135, 141n21, 155, 174–178, 187n55, 327; autonomous regions and, 230–232; Communist Party and, 55, 60, 63, 100; in early 20th century, 36, 56n18; Mao Zedong and, 54, 70, 115; modern reforms to, 171, 187n56; People's Congresses and, 130–132; rights and, 4, 21, 151–154, 179, 220, 230, 235–237, 247n99; Three Represents and, 168 consumerism, 217, 243–244, 267, 424–427, 428, 438 Cooperative Medical System (CMS), 314 corporatization, 262–263 corruption, 150, 167–168, 185, 424, 428–430; campaigns against, 155– 156, 167–168, 172; capital punishment and, 184; Chinese Communist Party and, 114–115, 117, 157, 166; democracy and, 437; foreign aid and, 46; in imperial China, 16, 23–25, 28, 373; military and, 353–354; opium trade and, 26; protests against, 4, 157–159, 162, 254, 328, 334; in rural government, 137, 254– 255, 429; stock market and, 285 Criminal Procedure Law, 181–183 criminal process, 180–181 Cultural Revolution, 87–95, 100–101, 109, 119, 143–145, 157, 342– 343; arts and, 95–96, 219; criticism of, 151–152, 178, 219; education and, 96–99, 208–210, 213, 313; end of, 103, 144; environment and, 269–270, 275; foreign policy and, 378–379, 392, 410; health care and, 99–100; judicial system and, 178–179; legal system and, 175. 178–179; 1975 constitution and, 174; origins of, 84–87; propaganda and, 218; religion and, 238; youth and, 76 cyber warfare, 370 D Dalai Lama, 230, 234, 240–241; China/West relations and, 241, 388– 389, 412 Daoism, 18, 236–237 death penalty, 183–184, 188n73, 247n98 decision on health reform and development, 191 defense industries, 349, 351–352 deforestation, 14, 269–270, 277 democracy, 139–140, 153, 436; campaigns against, 155; Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and, 108, 115–116, 139, 173; democratic centralism, 49, 108, 110–112, 115– 116, 139, 437; in early 20th century, 29–30, 33, 35, 55; internet and, 225–226; Mao's idea of, 50–51, 60, 178; political reform and, 155–156, 171–172; prospects for future, 431–433, 435–437; protests demanding, 152–154, 158–162, 217; in rural China, 138–139 Democracy Wall Movement, 152–155 democratic centralism, 49, 108, 110–112, 115–116, 139, 437 demographics, 428 Deng Pufang, 91, 104n57 Deng Xiaoping, 3–4, 8, 70, 77, 83, 101–103, 112, 115–117, 143–170, 184, 186n23, 210–211, 232, 343–344; agricultural reform of, 250–252; conflict with Mao, 87, 110, 143; Cultural Revolution and, 84–85, 101; economic reforms of, 3–4, 6, 8, 82, 110, 126, 128, 137, 146–150, 164, 184, 232–233, 249, 258, 265, 280–281, 283, 286, 303, 328–329, 424; educational reforms of, 210–211; foreign policy of, 373–375, 379, 383, 386; Jiang and, 165–166; long march and, 41,
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  • China's Eleventh Five-Year Plan (2006–2010): from “Getting Rich

    China's Eleventh Five-Year Plan (2006–2010): from “Getting Rich

    Fan.fm Page 708 Tuesday, January 9, 2007 10:11 AM China’s Eleventh Five-Year Plan (2006–2010): From “Getting Rich First” to “Common Prosperity” C. Cindy Fan1 Abstract: China’s Eleventh Five-Year Plan, which sets the directions for national develop- ment for the 2006 to 2010 period, has been described as a revolutionary plan. This paper examines the Plan’s goal to build a “harmonious socialist society” by enabling disadvantaged groups and less developed regions to share the fruits of economic growth. It first describes the Plan’s main principles and major quantitative targets for the five-year period. In the second half of the paper, the author argues that the emphasis on “common prosperity” can be explained by the rise in inequality over more than two decades, by a new political administra- tion that seeks to establish its own path while endorsing ideas from past regimes, and by Pres- ident Hu Jintao and Premier Wen Jiabao’s more open and consultative style of leadership. Journal of Economic Literature, Classification Numbers: O20, O53, P21. 1 figure, 2 tables, 58 references. Key words: China, Five-Year Plans, income inequality, regional development, common prosperity, sustainable development. INTRODUCTION n March 14, 2006, the Fourth Plenary Session of China’s Tenth National People’s OCongress formally ratified the country’s Eleventh Five-Year Plan, for the period 2006 to 2010. Since 1953, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has implemented a series of Five- Year Plans that established the blueprint and targets for national economic development.2 In a country where the state continues to exert powerful control over much of the economy, the Five-Year Plans are key indicators of the directions and changes in development philosophy.