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What About Equality in the 21St Century? a Socio-Philosophical Account

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What About Equality in the 21St Century? a Socio-Philosophical Account ucsia Prinsstraat 14 b-2000 Antwerp What about Equality in the 21st Century? A Socio-philosophical Account François Levrau University of Antwerp Discussion Paper No. 1601 November 2016 UCSIA Prinsstraat 14 2000 Antwerpen Belgium Tel.: +32/(0)3/265.45.80 Fax: +32/(0)3/707.09.31 E-mail: [email protected] UCSIA Discussion Papers often represent preliminary work and are circulated to encourage scholarly debate and discussion. Any opinions expressed here are those of the author(s) and not those of the Centre. Research dissiminated by UCSIA may include ethical, moral or policy views which are not necessarily those of the Centre. The University Centre Saint-Ignatius Antwerp (UCSIA) is an independent academic non- profit organization founded in 2002 by members of the Jesuit Order and academics of the former Universitaire Faculteiten Sint-Ignatius Antwerpen (UFSIA), now part of the University of Antwerp (UA). Although rooted in a Christian tradition, UCSIA offers an open, tolerant and interdisciplinary platform for scholarly debate on issues related to religion, culture and society and especially on fundamental issues affecting justice in society. UCSIA is active by (i) offering scholarships for international scholars visiting the University of Antwerp (ii) organising international seminars, lecture series, summer schools and conferences (iii) promoting teaching, research and debate with a cultural, religious, philosophical, ethical or spiritual dimension and (iv) publications. UCSIA Discussion Paper No. 1601 November 2016 ABSTRACT What about Equality in the 21st Century? A Socio-philosophical Account At least since the French Revolution, ‘equality’ has served as one of the main ideals in Western societies. Explaining what exactly this ideal amounts to, however, has turned out to be very difficult: different visions have been proposed and consensus has not yet been reached. In this paper we provide a panoramic view of this highly loaded and contested concept. We draw upon insights from political philosophy, sociology, psychology and discourse analysis to argue why and how equality should still be at the heart of our political attention. As 21st century societies become increasingly unequal, we claim that rhetorical tools are needed for equality to be obtained. Keywords: Social Inequality Social Justice Changing societies, socio-economic inequality, status-related inequality, redistribution, egalitarian ethos-logos-pathos, egalitarianism Corresponding author: François Levrau Centre Pieter Gillis University of Antwerp Prinsstraat 13 2000 Antwerp Belgium E-mail: [email protected] What about Equality in the 21st Century? A Socio-philosophical Account 1. Introduction At least since the French Revolution, ‘equality’ has served as one of the main ideals in Western societies. Explaining what this ideal exactly amounts to, however, has turned out to be very difficult: different visions have been proposed and consensus has not yet been reached. In this paper we briefly outline some of the debates that have stirred political philosophy. Why is equality important (if at all) and, often neglected in these discussions, how can the ideal of equality be promoted? Is a certain optimism appropriate and may we hold that equality of some sort can be realized or should we recognize its utopian character, thereby also recognizing that neoliberal dictates and multicultural anxieties will prevail? Is the human selfishness too intractable to reverse societies into more egalitarian ones? Is there an innate distrust towards the other that will prevent people to function as equals in society? In order to draw the picture, we need not only consider what philosophy has brought us, but should also take other insights into account; insights from adjoining disciplines, most prominently from sociology, psychology, and discourse analysis. Although the paper is panoramic in scope, it should be read as a strong defense of the idea(l) of equality in an era where it has been increasingly oppressed by the neoliberal hegemony and all kinds of multicultural anxieties. This paper contains nine sections, of which this introduction is the first. In the second section, we give a short historical overview. What are the origins of equality and how has it been covered in the (modern) body politic? In the third section we focus on the so-called ‘egalitarian plateau’, which refers to the consensus that all people should be treated with equal respect and concern. Despite the common ground, several positions are taken up when it comes to clarifying what ‘equal respect and concern’ implies. We examine three positions: libertarianism, redistributive egalitarianism and social egalitarianism. In the fourth section we elaborate on the question why equality is of importance. We consider intrinsic, instrumental and relational arguments. In the fifth section we somewhat change the viewpoint as we list several challenges for the 21st century egalitarian society. In the sixth section we consider the extent to which people and societies are currently inspired by the Enlightened ideal of equality. In the seventh section we demonstrate why equality both needs egalitarian institutions and citizens that are led by an ‘egalitarian ethos’. Here, we anchor philosophical claims with insights from (social) psychology. In the eight section we illustrate how equality can be promoted. By invoking discourse analysis and rhetoric, we hold a plea for an egalitarian triad of logos, pathos and ethos. In section nine, finally, we conclude the paper. All sections together sketch an interdisciplinary, yet not exhaustive, portrayal of a highly loaded and contested concept. 2. Equality, a very short history of an idea(l) The roots of equality are strongly related with the roots of natural law, the idea that there exist a human nature and that society is built or should be built upon a natural order. The Stoics were probably the first to develop a conception of natural rights as they attributed a unique feature to all adult men that distinguished them from all other living beings, the very fact that they are rational beings (Baldry 1965). As they opposed the Greek tyrants, the idea of a common rational nature was invoked against the arbitrary rules by which they were dominated. In the Middle Ages, Thomas 1 Aquinas division of laws that represented the natural order was influential. For him the natural law (lex naturalis) was a part of the eternal law (lex aeterna). Because all human beings are gifted with an unconscious, they have an objective standard of what is morally good and bad. As Aquinas heavily relied on the divine revelation, he assumed that God created man in his own image and hence that all people were equals. In earthly life however, Aquinas justified inequality by the same revelation and thus by the divine creational order. Therefore, he had no problems with slavery or with the idea that women were merely means for reproduction. The principle of equality only became recognized in the modern period (17th and 18th century) in the tradition of natural law as defined by Hobbes and Locke, and in the social contract theory, first postulated by Rousseau. Hobbes’s principle of equality was mainly a claim about the mental and physical capabilities of all people, while for Locke, equality was a moral claim about rights whereby no person could have a natural right to subordinate any other (Wolff 2016). A next important step was made by the ‘Enlightened’ philosopher Immanuel Kant who famously postulated the universal human worth by his categorical imperative – the inner moral voice that is present in all people – which states that we should never act in such a way that we treat humanity, whether in ourselves or in others, as a means but always as an end in itself. As the views on politics, philosophy, science and religion in the Western world somewhat culminated in the Enlightenment, the underlying emancipatory idea of equality, along with freedom and fraternity, gradually led to established principles such as (1) the democratic ideal of the state where all people must have an equal say in matters that affect all; (2) the rule of law that equally protects people against the power of the state, by ensuring that the government is bound by its own laws; and (3) the welfare state with social rights that ensure that all people have equal opportunity to make use of their freedom rights (Maris and Jacobs 2012). This idea of human equality was taken up formally in all kinds of declarations, charters and modern constitutions, notably the French Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen (1789), the American Declaration of Independence (1776), the US Constitution (1787), the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU (2000), and was followed in international organizations such as the United Nations, the Council of Europe, the Organization of American States, and the African Union. As the idea of human equality became unquestioned (in Western European and Anglo-American world), at least officially, it has generated a series of political and emancipatory movements designed to contest the lingering presence or enduring effects of older ethnic and racial hierarchies (i.e. decolonization, African-American civil right movement, multiculturalism) (Kymlicka 2007). It has also inspired movements to contest all types of hierarchies, such as gender, disability and sexual orientation. 3. The egalitarian plateau As ‘equality’ became an unquestioned ideal, Dworkin (1977) and Kymlicka (2002) could claim with some authority that nearly all contemporary political theories share an ‘egalitarian plateau’, that is a deep commitment to the idea that a just and neutral state should treat its citizens with equal concern and respect. Treating people on equal footing is, to borrow an apt phrase of Dworkin (1977), the sovereign duty of a political community. However many differences characterize people, as citizens they are equal and deserve the same respect and concern. While this moral equality is the axiomatic starting point for nearly all theories, disputes arise when it comes to fleshing out the ideal of ‘treating all citizens with equal concern and respect’.
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