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ucsia Prinsstraat 14 b-2000 Antwerp What about Equality in the 21st Century? A Socio-philosophical Account

François Levrau University of Antwerp

Discussion Paper No. 1601 November 2016

UCSIA Prinsstraat 14 2000 Antwerpen Belgium

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ABSTRACT

What about Equality in the 21st Century? A Socio-philosophical Account

At least since the , ‘equality’ has served as one of the main ideals in Western . Explaining what exactly this amounts to, however, has turned out to be very difficult: different visions have been proposed and consensus has not yet been reached. In this paper we provide a panoramic view of this highly loaded and contested concept. We draw upon insights from , sociology, psychology and discourse analysis to argue why and how equality should still be at the heart of our political attention. As 21st century societies become increasingly unequal, we claim that rhetorical tools are needed for equality to be obtained.

Keywords:

Changing societies, socio-economic inequality, status-related inequality, redistribution, egalitarian ethos-logos-pathos,

Corresponding author:

François Levrau Centre Pieter Gillis University of Antwerp Prinsstraat 13 2000 Antwerp Belgium E-mail: [email protected] What about Equality in the 21st Century? A Socio-philosophical Account

1. Introduction At least since the French Revolution, ‘equality’ has served as one of the main ideals in Western societies. Explaining what this ideal exactly amounts to, however, has turned out to be very difficult: different visions have been proposed and consensus has not yet been reached. In this paper we briefly outline some of the debates that have stirred political philosophy. Why is equality important (if at all) and, often neglected in these discussions, how can the ideal of equality be promoted? Is a certain optimism appropriate and may we hold that equality of some sort can be realized or should we recognize its utopian character, thereby also recognizing that neoliberal dictates and multicultural anxieties will prevail? Is the human selfishness too intractable to reverse societies into more egalitarian ones? Is there an innate distrust towards the other that will prevent people to function as equals in society? In order to draw the picture, we need not only consider what philosophy has brought us, but should also take other insights into account; insights from adjoining disciplines, most prominently from sociology, psychology, and discourse analysis. Although the paper is panoramic in scope, it should be read as a strong defense of the idea(l) of equality in an era where it has been increasingly oppressed by the neoliberal hegemony and all kinds of multicultural anxieties.

This paper contains nine sections, of which this introduction is the first. In the second section, we give a short historical overview. What are the origins of equality and how has it been covered in the (modern) body politic? In the third section we focus on the so-called ‘egalitarian plateau’, which refers to the consensus that all people should be treated with equal respect and concern. Despite the common ground, several positions are taken up when it comes to clarifying what ‘equal respect and concern’ implies. We examine three positions: , redistributive egalitarianism and social egalitarianism. In the fourth section we elaborate on the question why equality is of importance. We consider intrinsic, instrumental and relational arguments. In the fifth section we somewhat change the viewpoint as we list several challenges for the 21st century egalitarian society. In the sixth section we consider the extent to which people and societies are currently inspired by the Enlightened ideal of equality. In the seventh section we demonstrate why equality both needs egalitarian institutions and citizens that are led by an ‘egalitarian ethos’. Here, we anchor philosophical claims with insights from (social) psychology. In the eight section we illustrate how equality can be promoted. By invoking discourse analysis and rhetoric, we hold a plea for an egalitarian triad of logos, pathos and ethos. In section nine, finally, we conclude the paper. All sections together sketch an interdisciplinary, yet not exhaustive, portrayal of a highly loaded and contested concept.

2. Equality, a very short history of an idea(l) The roots of equality are strongly related with the roots of , the idea that there exist a human nature and that society is built or should be built upon a natural order. The Stoics were probably the first to develop a conception of natural as they attributed a unique feature to all adult men that distinguished them from all other living beings, the very fact that they are rational beings (Baldry 1965). As they opposed the Greek tyrants, the idea of a common rational nature was invoked against the arbitrary rules by which they were dominated. In the Middle Ages, Thomas 1 Aquinas division of laws that represented the natural order was influential. For him the natural law (lex naturalis) was a part of the eternal law (lex aeterna). Because all human beings are gifted with an unconscious, they have an objective standard of what is morally and bad. As Aquinas heavily relied on the divine revelation, he assumed that God created man in his own image and hence that all people were equals. In earthly life however, Aquinas justified inequality by the same revelation and thus by the divine creational order. Therefore, he had no problems with slavery or with the idea that women were merely means for reproduction. The of equality only became recognized in the modern period (17th and 18th century) in the tradition of natural law as defined by Hobbes and Locke, and in the theory, first postulated by Rousseau. Hobbes’s principle of equality was mainly a claim about the mental and physical capabilities of all people, while for Locke, equality was a moral claim about rights whereby no person could have a natural right to subordinate any other (Wolff 2016). A next important step was made by the ‘Enlightened’ philosopher who famously postulated the universal human worth by his categorical imperative – the inner moral voice that is present in all people – which states that we should never act in such a way that we treat humanity, whether in ourselves or in others, as a means but always as an end in itself.

As the views on , philosophy, science and religion in the Western world somewhat culminated in the Enlightenment, the underlying emancipatory idea of equality, along with and fraternity, gradually led to established such as (1) the democratic ideal of the state where all people must have an equal say in matters that affect all; (2) the that equally protects people against the power of the state, by ensuring that the government is bound by its own laws; and (3) the with social rights that ensure that all people have to make use of their freedom rights (Maris and Jacobs 2012).

This idea of human equality was taken up formally in all kinds of declarations, charters and modern constitutions, notably the French Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen (1789), the American Declaration of Independence (1776), the US Constitution (1787), the Universal Declaration of (1948), the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU (2000), and was followed in international organizations such as the United Nations, the Council of Europe, the Organization of American States, and the African Union. As the idea of human equality became unquestioned (in Western European and Anglo-American world), at least officially, it has generated a series of political and emancipatory movements designed to contest the lingering presence or enduring effects of older ethnic and racial (i.e. decolonization, African-American civil right movement, ) (Kymlicka 2007). It has also inspired movements to contest all types of hierarchies, such as gender, disability and sexual orientation.

3. The egalitarian plateau As ‘equality’ became an unquestioned ideal, Dworkin (1977) and Kymlicka (2002) could claim with some authority that nearly all contemporary political theories share an ‘egalitarian plateau’, that is a deep commitment to the idea that a just and neutral state should treat its citizens with equal concern and respect. Treating people on equal footing is, to borrow an apt phrase of Dworkin (1977), the sovereign duty of a political community. However many differences characterize people, as citizens they are equal and deserve the same respect and concern. While this moral equality is the axiomatic starting point for nearly all theories, disputes arise when it comes to fleshing out the ideal of ‘treating all citizens with equal concern and respect’. In answering the question what this ideal 2 amounts to, at least three broad positions can be detected: libertarianism, distributive egalitarianism and social egalitarianism.

According to libertarians such as Nozick (1974), Friedman (1961) and Hayek (1960), the ideal of equality amounts to equal . Their ideal state is a ‘night-watchman state’, a minimal state that confines itself to the protection of people’s negative rights (i.c. the rights not to be interfered with by others) and the provision of public (e.g. street lightening and defense through the institutions of the military, police and courts). For libertarians, the ‘separateness of people’ – the idea that all people have different talents and attributes – leads to the claim that these talents and attributes belong to them and them alone, and hence may not be used to benefit others without their . Since libertarians advocate strong rights, they defend laissez-faire and, by consequence, reject all kinds of redistribution programs as these are considered to be unjustifiable infringements of the freedom of people. So, if for example the fortunate give to the poor and the weak, they must do so voluntarily, and certainly not because the state forces them to do so (e.g. through a tax system). The upshot is that libertarians have no problems with the inequalities to which the gives rise. On the contrary, for libertarians, the free market with its prices, division of labor, gives rise to a spontaneous order based on the interactions of individuals who are free to do with their talents and attributes as they please. Hayek (1998, 108-109) has famously defined the free market as a catallaxy, the order ‘brought about by the mutual adjustment of many individual economies in a market. A catallaxy is thus the special kind of spontaneous order produced by the market through people acting within the rules of the law of property, tort and contract.’

However, for most political philosophers, treating people with equal concern and respect, is not solely about , voluntary association and the primacy of individual judgment, as they take it for granted that there is something that should be distributed in the name of equality. This vision has led to a so-called ‘currency debate’ that has stretched out far beyond the realm of philosophy, as it has also taken into account insights of the fields of economics, social psychology and public policy (Cohen 1989; Sen 1979). Although proponents of distributive egalitarianism agree that there is something to be distributed, they disagree about a number of things. Fierce and ongoing debates are held on the following questions. (1) What is the correct metric? What is it that needs to be distributed? (2) What counts as a disadvantage that needs to be compensated? Should we address only those disadvantages that derive from brute bad luck? (3) What are the principles that should guide the distribution? Should we distribute according to the principle of strict equality, or to the idea that the worst-off need priority or to an alternative principle such as sufficientarism? (4) What is the scope and level of application of distribution? Whatever currency and principle is chosen, should we focus our attention on the micro-level (e.g. specific actions of people such as those concerning occupational choice) or/and on the meso-level (e.g. the functioning of the welfare state) or on/and the macro-level (e.g. the redistribution across countries, generations and even species). Below we will briefly address the first and third questions, the others are somewhat covered in other sections of this paper.

When it comes to what should be equalized, different equalisanda are put forward. The many different positions can be roughly grouped into three broad categories: welfare theories, resource theories and capability theories (Moss 2014). Welfare theorists claim that we should equalize what is supposed to really matter to individuals, namely their preferences as to how to live one’s life. If it is

3 ensured that everyone’s preference is equally satisfied, it means that everyone has been provided with the same respect towards their different values and choices. Arneson (2000) and Cohen (1989) have outlined two variants of this proposition. Arneson defends the idea of ‘equal opportunity for welfare’ and therefore claims that everyone should be provided with options that are equal when it comes to satisfaction of one’s preferences. Cohen strives for ‘equality of access to advantage’. Both Arneson and Cohen argue that it is highly unfair when people are affected by something that is not their fault and hence was not voluntarily chosen. For Cohen, however, it is not about ‘opportunity’, but about ‘access’ because everyone, regardless of personal characteristics (e.g. strong, weak, talented) can have equal opportunities, while equal ‘access’ is strongly dependent on these characteristics. Moreover ‘advantage’ is a broader term compared to ‘welfare’ as it both includes ‘welfare’ as the resources that are needed for the satisfaction of one’s preferences. Resource theorists push forward a couple of ‘all-purpose means’, a basket that contains a mixture of background conditions such as rights, opportunities and the social basis of self-respect as well as goods such as income and wealth. While welfare theories invoke a subjective currency, resource theories rely on a currency of justice that is ‘objective’ and that focuses on things everybody might want irrespective of their conception of the good. While the resources are ‘objective’ they serve all kinds of ‘subjective’ purposes and are also easier to compare amongst people than the mere degree of satisfaction of preferences. The resourcist response comes in two main forms: Rawls’s (1971) theory on primary goods that should be distributed according to a number of principles that emphasize the values of freedom, equal opportunity and difference and Dworkin’s (2000) modification of Rawls’s approach through a system of social security that redistributes resources according to the principles of ambition-sensitivity and -insensitivity. Other influential resource proposals come from Van Parijs (1995) who has made a strong claim for granting all people a basic income. Yet another resource proposal is the idea of a basic capital as outlined by Ackerman & Alstott (1999). Capability theorists have presented their theories as direct critiques and answers to the theory of justice as outlined by Rawls (1971). The general objection is that Rawls’s theory only considers people within relatively normal ranges of human functionings. However, if one is really interested in (in)equality, then a certain sensitivity should be given to those (e.g. disabled persons) who need a lot of their primary goods in order to achieve the same outcome as others (e.g. the able- bodied). The capability approaches of Nussbaum (2006) and Sen (1979, 2010) do not focus on people’s preferences, nor on goods as such, but on whether a person is equally able to do or be something. Nussbaum (2006) for example has outlined a list of ten capabilities she thinks everyone in society is entitled to. If one does not have these capabilities up to a certain threshold, truly human functioning has not been achieved, and therefore justice has not been done.

What these egalitarian theories share, is the assumption that there is something that should be distributed. This assumption however has been subject to criticism by so-called relational, democratic or social egalitarian philosophers such as Anderson (1999), Scheffler (2003) and Wollf (1998). Redistribution remains important, but its fairness is assessed according to the degree that it reflects egalitarian relationships. So, what counts is whether or not people stand in relations of equality with one another. As the general goal is enabling people to function as equals in society, the main claim can be formulated in a positive and negative way. The positive aim is to ensure that everyone’s culture, status or identity is properly acknowledged and that everyone’s conditions of freedom are secured. The negative aim is that disadvantages that are caused by , sexism or excessive accumulation of wealth are eliminated. As such, relational egalitarianism does not necessarily strive for equality in a strict sense, as it is compatible with sufficientarism (e.g. Frankfurt 4 1987) and prioritarian distributive principles (e.g. Parfit 1997), which respectively refer to the idea that people should have enough of ‘something’ (e.g. wealth) and to the idea that the first concern should go to the worst-off. This can be considered a strength as the current societal platform for ‘equality’ is heavily challenged (see section 5 and 6). After all, why should we care that people have equal amounts of the equalisanda?

4. Why equality? Why equality? Should we not rather guarantee that all people have enough of the things that positively affect their lives? Or should we not instead make sure that those who have least have as much as possible, or that they are prioritized? The many reasons why equality would matter can be put together in three main arguments: equality has an intrinsic , equality relates to other values, and equality has an instrumental value (Moss 2014 & 2015).

The first argument for equality has to do with the assumed intrinsic value. In that case, equality matters for its own sake. But, as Parfitt (1977) has illustrated, this position is difficult to maintain. If equality is indeed valuable for its own sake, then there is nothing wrong with bringing the well-off down to the (financial) level of the poor even if leveling them down would benefit no one. This is somewhat contra-intuitive.

The second argument is that the value of equality is related to other values such as self-respect and fairness. A good way to illustrate this, is the theory of . Rawls’s difference principle can be understood as a defense of the priority view. The principle holds that socio-economic inequalities are permitted only when, and only because these inequalities maximize the long-term holdings of social primary goods for the members of the worst-off groups. This difference principle has been given a lot of attention, but what is somewhat neglected, or at least has not gained the same academic prominence is Ralws’s claim that the most important primary good is self-respect (Zink 2011). The emphasis on self-respect might in fact weigh in favor of strict socio-economic equality (Eyal 2005). After all, it is a common observation that people compare each other’s situation and that their self- respect is largely influenced by their position within the socio-economic . According to the ‘relative deprivation theory’ (Pettigrew 2011), for example, people compare themselves to other people, groups, or to themselves at different points in time to evaluate their current circumstances. If these comparisons lead people to believe that they do not have what they deserve or that others have obtained unfair privileges, they will be upset and resentful. This might also explain why some seemingly affluent individuals do engage in destructive social strategies to cope with feelings of frustration and stigmatization (e.g. the question why even affluent individuals seem susceptible to radicalization and terrorism). Fortunate members of immigrant groups for example identify with the fate of less privileged members of their ‘own’ group and hence take up the ‘responsibility’ to revolt in name of ‘their group’. If this is indeed the case, it would be better to equalize the situation of all people. The objection however might sound that we do not have to give in to feelings of envy, and hence should not defend redistributive egalitarianism as it is prone to a ‘politics of envy’. However, we should not too quickly waive the value of emotions as they might heighten the perception of injustice. Skhlar (1990), for example, has pointed out that while justice is the most debated subject in philosophy, injustice has been rather neglected. If we aim to capture justice, we believe that it can best be conceived in general, theoretical and procedural terms (a bottom up vision), but this might not be the case for injustice. Injustice seems to primarily refer to the voice of the victims or to those 5 who believe that injustice has been brought upon them. This ‘sense of injustice’ has been elaborated upon in the works of Nussbaum (2013) who has outlined a theory in which she explains why and how emotions are important reactions to sensitive issues that are valuable for human life. This is not to say that the unprivileged, the weak, the oppressed are always right when they, for example, complain about the property of the privileged nor is it a ‘carte blanche’ for the arguments the weak invoke. However, the formulated complains need to be considered as signs, for the unprivileged may have a ‘special insight’ into injustice that is probably more difficult to obtain by the privileged who simply take their fortunate situation for granted. When socio-economic inequalities rise, a potential loss of self-respect on the side of the poor may occur, but also a collapse of the social sense of belonging together. After all, in socio-economic unequal societies, the poor have reasons to believe that the government has more attention and respect for the rich and that they are not considered to be an equal part of the community (Dworkin 2000).

Another related argument that backs up the relational plea for equality, stems from social egalitarianism. As equality is defined as a relational ideal, the primary concern is with the kinds of distributions that are consisted with the ideal of a society of equals. Although no preference for any equalisandum is expressed and although it is possible to connect social egalitarianism with the viewpoints of sufficiency and priority (section 3), Gosepath (2015) argues that it is ultimately grounded in what he has called the ‘presumption of equality’. The presumption is that everyone, regardless of individual differences, should have an equal share in the distribution unless certain types of relevant differences justify, on universally acceptable grounds, unequal distribution. This stems from the unquestioned viewpoint of moral equality and hence from the equal standing of people as members of the political community. Treating people with equal respect and concern thus implies strict distributive equality, unless there is an overruling reason (see also Scanlon 2002).

A third argument is that equality would contribute to or would even be necessary for all sorts of valuable outcomes. Here, there is abundant sociological evidence concerning the pernicious effects of living in unequal societies. Wilkinson & Pickett (2010), for example, have illustrated that more inequality goes hand in hand with worse physical health, less educational attainment, social immobility and a heightened sense of insecurity. Levels of trust would also be higher in countries with greater income equality. Furthermore, where there is less trust, people are less willing to cooperate, are more reluctant to volunteer, and generally treat others with less respect (Putnam 2007). In countries and areas with the highest income inequality more mental disorders appear, as well as increasing teenage pregnancies, higher infant mortality, more (both at home and on the street), more crimes and a higher drug and medicine use. The general conclusion seems that people live better, safer, longer, healthier and happier in countries with more equality. Next to the concern that inequality leads to poor biopsychosocial outcomes, there is also the hypothesis that inequality can impede economic growth. This has been brought to the fore by scholars like Atkinson (2015), Piketty (2014), Stiglitz (2012), but also by several recent OESO- and IMF-reports (Cingano 2014; Ostry, Berg and Tsangarides 2014). The overall claim of these scholars and reports is that redistributive progressive taxes on the income and wealth of the rich and all kinds of measures that minimize the income inequality are not necessarily at odds with economic growth.

5. Challenges for equality in the 21st century Although the ‘Enlightened idea(l)’ of equality has been taken up in the Universal Declaration of 6 Human Rights (UDHR) and is affirmed in many human rights documents and treaties as well as in many national policies, and although ‘equality’ has been at the heart of political philosophy since decades, current societies face numerous changes and challenges that result (or might result) in societies that are imbalanced when it comes to both socio-economic and status-related equality. Below we list a few of these challenges and illustrate the extent to which not all people are (or might be) treated with equal respect and concern.

Several scholars (e.g. Atkinson 2015; Piketty 2014; Stiglitz 2012) have illustrated the domestic and international increasing gap between ‘the haves’ and ‘the have nots’. Piketty’s ‘Capital in the twenty- first century’, for example, has gained much academic, public and political prominence. According to Piketty the rate of capital return in developed countries is persistently greater than the rate of economic growth. This will cause wealth inequality to increase in the future. He considers this to be a huge problem, and to address it, he proposes redistribution through a progressive global tax on wealth. It is doubtful if such a tax will be realized as the ‘poor man’ is currently not really in the centre of political attention. Welfare policies, for example, may have been installed for many decades as concrete illustrations of how national and European politicians are occupied with the value of equality, recent research however has illustrated serious flaws when it comes to the protection of vulnerable groups (Cantillon and Van Lancker 2013; Cantillon and Vandenbroucke 2013). Despite the increase in employment rates and continuing high levels of social spending, many welfare states in fact did not succeed in making any further progress in the fight against (relative) income poverty, particularly within the working age population. Cantillon (2010) has observed four trends: (1) a rising employment that is only partially beneficial to workless households; (2) a significant decline in minimum income protection for the working age population without work; (3) an emerge of new Matthew effects in the social protection of new social risks and (4) a decrease of the distributive character of the welfare states. In a sense, we can claim that economical growth is not a way to feed the welfare state, but it has become a (neoliberal) end in itself and yet a way to condone the dismantling of the welfare state.

It is not a coincidence that while welfare states are in decline, meritocratic narratives have become popular and thus the conviction that people are responsible for the situation in which they are. Luck egalitarians such as Arneson (2008) argue that market-based and other inequalities are legitimate when they derive from personal choices, but must be corrected when they do not. This claim is common in public discussion about the allocation of government funding. But, this ‘responsibility- sensitivity egalitarianism’ is based on a rather grey distinction between ‘choice’ and ‘chance’. If luck and merit are indeed central notions, why bother with individuals who were foolish to lose all their resources or health? Can the ‘deserving poor’ still formulate justice-based claims to assistance? According to Wolff (1998) ‘luck egalitarianism’ promotes a wrong kind of ethos as it encourages the state to view the disadvantaged with distrust and as potential cheaters. According to some, the welfare system indeed is too much spoiling and is even maintaining the ‘underclass’ (see e.g. Dalrymple 2001). The result may be that those belonging to the underclasses because of bad luck and those who are unwilling to work are lumped together and are confronted with all sorts of condescending stereotypes. Owen (2011), for example, has illustrated how the poor working classes are not any longer considered to be the ‘salt of the earth’, but the ‘scum of the earth’. Another example is the ‘refugee crisis’ where some believe that refugees are only out to take advantage of

7 the welfare state and therefore are not entitled to its benefits. In order to overcome this distrust, it is believed that the disadvantaged should engage in what Wolff (1998) has called ‘shameful revelation’. This means that they have to prove that they suffer from involuntary disadvantage. But, as Wolff (1998) claims, this can only erode the bonds of solidarity and mutual concern between citizens. The appeal to responsibility becomes also apparent in discussions about global and environmental justice (e.g. Pogge and Mehta 2016; Miller 2007). What do we owe people with whom we might not have a direct relation, but who certainly suffer (in)directly because of our actions (e.g. carbon emission rights)? This becomes even more significant if we take into account Beck’s (1986) influential analysis of the risk society. The climate change, the refugee crisis, the threat of terrorism and the banking crisis are only a few of the problems for which national institutes cannot provide adequate solutions. Therefore, mondial solutions are necessary and hence a global form of egalitarianism. In fact, those who favor redistribution have a strong case when arguing that it is morally arbitrarily not to extent the redistribution scope to the level of the globe and relational egalitarians can also forcefully argue that the kinds of relations that they consider necessary are also present on a global scale.

However, it is not only the enduring economic inequality gaps, the global spread of risks and the social unrest to which these lead, but also the rise of super-diverse societies (Vertovec 2007; Castles, De Haas and Miller 2014) that challenge nowadays perceptions of and considerations on (in)equality. When it comes to the increase of diversity due to migration, the challenges for equality are at least threefold. First, several studies indicate that redistributive attitudes would be difficult to maintain when societies become more diverse. This is the so-called ‘heterogeneity-redistribution trade-off’ (Banting and Kymlicka 2006). Goodhart (2004) and Pearce (2004) refer to what they call a ‘progressive dilemma’ between diversity and redistribution. The idea is that the more different we are from one another, and hence the more diverse our ways of living and our religious and ethnic backgrounds are, the less we share a moral consensus or a sense of fellow feeling, the less happy we will be in the long run and the less we will support a generous welfare state. According to Putnam (2007) diversity brings out the turtle in all of us. In modern super-diverse era, people are more afraid of each other and therefore they hunker down. According to Bauböck (2016) there is no dilemma, but a trilemma between openness for immigration, multicultural inclusion and social redistribution. How is it possible to achieve social solidarity in culturally diverse states with fairly open borders? Second, other studies argue that policies that recognize the ethnocultural diversity by means of diversity accommodating and multicultural policies are detrimental for redistribution attitudes. This is the so-called ‘recognition-redistribution trade-off’. The claim here is that recognition policies emphasize too much what is different and therefore undermine the shared sense of belonging together as a condition for feelings of solidarity and redistribution attitudes (Fraser 1995; Koopman 2010). Or, as Barry (2001, 8) argues, ‘A politics of multiculturalism undermines a politics of redistribution.’ Third, large parts of European societies are now what Habermas (2008) has called ‘post-secular societies’ as they witness the persistence or resurgence of religious beliefs and practices. Parekh (2008) has coined the term ‘Muslim question’, saying that Islam has become ‘the religion of the pariahs’, which may destabilize the common ground for inclusive societies built upon a shared sense of belonging together. This has become even more apparent since the rise of Islamic terrorism. While the relation between social cohesion and diversity is a difficult one, there is no need to be fatalistic as research has shown that heterogeneity and multiculturalism do not necessarily lead to feelings of hunkering down and to a decline in solidarity (Levrau & Loobuyck, 2013a; Schaeffer 2014).

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Yet another reason why it is necessary to deeply reflect on the concept of (in)equality, is that the grounds and sources of solidarity have drastically changed in the 21st century. Solidarity gained impact in the 19th century as a powerful answer to the social insecurities, political instabilities and economic transformations associated with the long transition from feudalism to capitalist industrialization and modernity. Along with notions of citizenship, it provided the secular social foundation for the organization and ordering of modern, industrial societies, including in a political sense (Marshall 1950; Sternø 2004). In terms of its institutionalization and embodiment, it chose national territories as its preferred spatial framework. As the labor movement, which is arguably the pre-dominant social carrier of the modern idea of solidarity, progressively subordinated its internationalism to a commitment to national political agendas, solidarities materialized in national territories (i.e. bounded spaces) rather than through networks stretching across boundaries (Ferrera 2009). However, over the last decades this secularized and nationalized notion of solidarity has been challenged by several related developments. There is, above all, the economic and political globalization which has made it more difficult to sustain solidarity mechanisms at the national level. The modern welfare state for example was built as a solution to the growing conflict between labour and capital on a national territory, but capital accumulation and competition have increasingly become international phenomena, difficult to regulate and adjust by national political institutions. While notions of solidarity and social justice materialized in redistribution based on national income taxes and national agreements, these mechanisms are increasingly challenged and dismantled because firms are now often multinational (or at least geographically mobile) and profits accrue accordingly. Another challenge has to do with the numerous and rapid successive technological advances that have dramatically changed societies. The evidence and the speed with which these changes take place, have made some jobs endangered, especially low-skilled jobs that can be taken over by all sorts of technology driven equipment (Golden and Katz 2008). However, also some highly skilled jobs are endangered, especially those with cognitive and manual routine tasks that can be executed by computers. Nevertheless, the technological developments also provide opportunities for the creation of new jobs. These new jobs will increasingly rely on specific profiles and on the so-called ‘21st century skills’ (Voogt and Pareja Roblin 2012). However, all kinds of institutional factors, such as rigidities in the labor market, the insufficient influx of students (especially those with a migrational background) to higher or the use of ‘non-adapted curricula’ (where, e.g. routine skills are taught and creativity is not encouraged), make some countries and individuals in greater or lesser degree able to compensate for the loss of certain jobs and to match the fast creation of jobs which arise precisely because of innovation. The emergence of ‘knowledge-based societies’ that rely on the knowledge of their citizens to drive the innovation, entrepreneurship and dynamism of society’s economy, bears the risk of creating new social and economic division between those that are sufficiently ‘adapted’ and those that have ‘anachronistic profiles’ (due to e.g. the unadjusted curricula or the mere lack of talent to acquire the wanted skills).

Another threat to the egalitarian society is caused by the belief in what is called ‘Big Society’, a political developed in the early 21st century that aims for strengthening initiatives of citizens and their associations, reforming public services and addressing the power of local networks in order to deal with the economic, democratic and social crisis (Scott 2011). Formal British Prime Minister David Cameron (2010) for example has argued ‘The Big Society is about a huge culture change where people, in their everyday lives, in their homes, in their neighborhoods, in their workplace don’t always

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turn to officials, local authorities or central government for answers to the problems they face but instead feel both free and powerful enough to help themselves and their own communities.’ Citizens must be empowered to play a more active role in society. Therefore the government pulls back and leaves more space for citizens and professionals, while highlighting the responsibility of people rather than their weaknesses. While the idea of enforcing people and the stimulation of working together in close networks might seem a promising strategy to foster solidarity and tackle inequality, the government in fact retreats and delegates responsibility to the people. However, social divisions may occur between those who are willing and capable to empower themselves both on the individual and communal level and those who are not. Furthermore, in vulnerable neighborhoods, the need for citizens’ initiatives clearly is the largest, but it are frequently those residents who are not always able to absorb the effects of a receding government (Engbersen, Snel and ‘t Hart 2015). The Big Society responsibilities relate well with the contemporary focus on civic integration for newcomers. While multicultural policies are thought to pamper newcomers, civic integration would provide newcomers with the necessary opportunities to find their own way in society. If newcomers fail to integrate, it is easier to assert that it is their own fault as they were ostensibly given the necessary tools. The rigor with which Big Society and civic integration policies are implemented, is, at least in our view, a good illustration of the meritocratic ideal that can be increasingly detected in current societies (see above).

6. Towards a new societal platform for equality? The above mentioned challenges and the current state of inequality has stirred the emotions of those who are committed to questions and realities of inequality. In the wake of the financial and economic crisis, for example, a lot of public and political debate has arisen about the legitimacy of the 1% richest, about the feasibility and desirability of the global tax on wealth, the need for international redistribution, the (mis)management of the financial sector that has led to the financial crisis, the ‘bonus culture’ in private and in public companies, the most desirable wage pressures in companies, minimum wages and social minima, etc. Also the ‘common man’ has expressed his concerns. The ‘Occupy Wall Street’ protests, for example, have inspired a wide international response. These movements were organized as non-violent protest actions against social and economic inequalities. People expressed their anger and disappointment about how inequality is on the rise. One of the slogans that was frequently chanted and that has obtained symbolic power was ‘We are the 99%!’ referring to the top 1% wealthiest people that have a disproportional amount of capital, political influence and . The word that probably has best captured their frustrated mood and their spirit of resistance is ‘Wutbürger’. ‘Wutbürger’, crowned in 2010 as the German word of the year, means ‘enraged citizen’.

Here, one can be optimistic and see the rise of the Wutbürger as a new phenomenon in favor of equality. All sorts of citizens who would never meet or know each other, demonstrate and strike together, hence the traditional forms of protest, but they also group together in deliberative platforms and work out own proposals for public issues. Judt (2010) however is more pessimistic. He agrees that people are bound together on these rallys and marches by a shared interest, but, the effort to convert these interests into real collective or egalitarian goals is undetermined by the fragmented of their concerns. ‘Laudable goals – fighting climate change, opposing war, advocating public healthcare or penalizing bankers – are united by nothing more than the expression

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of emotion. In our political as in our economic lives, we have become consumers: choosing from a broad gamut o competing objectives, we find it hard to imagine ways or reasons to combine these into a coherent whole’ (Judt 2010, 135). One could however argue that the seeds are present and that sooner or later the collective will become a more conscious authority so that the transition will continue on a larger scale. But, as we will see in section 8 this will need to be stimulated and supported by a specific kind of politics flanked by a specific rhetoric.

While there seems to be a general support for the principle that the state should reduce (income related) inequality, there is a hardening of attitudes towards specific recipients, including the unemployed, single mothers and, especially, immigrants (Banting & Kymlicka, 2015). So, although the public is inclined to think that the rich do not deserve their good fortune, and should be taxed, it has started to believe that the disadvantaged deserve their bad fortune, and so is less keen to support them. Furthermore, as we have seen, in modern ‘liquid times’ (Bauman 2010), there is growing individualism, increasing feelings of uncertainty, labor mobility and migration which have likewise challenged ingrained notions and practices of solidarity. Specifically, migration and the increasingly multicultural social fabric resulting from it have come into conflict with the traditional idea that solidarity is necessarily embedded in a rather abstract homogeneous cultural community. Feelings of social belonging, reciprocity and exchange between equals are challenged by ‘social imaginaries’ that construct rigid boundaries between specific social groups. Although the frequently heard expressions of a ‘backlash against multiculturalism’ or even the ‘dead of multiculturalism’ are somewhat exaggerated (Kymlicka 2012), it is certainly true that multicultural policies cannot rely on the full support of the population. Therefore, if equality is to be installed in an anxious and neoliberal age, egalitarian policies will need to be backed-up by specific communication strategies in order to counter what Nussbaum (2012) has called the ‘politics of fear’. Before we elaborate on this in section 8, we make the point that fair institutions need fair people.

7. Fair institutions and the need of an egalitarian ethos The most influential political philosophical theory of our time is undoubtedly the one of John Rawls (1971). According to Rawls a just society should only put the basic structure with its laws, institutions and social systems under scrutiny, for it distributes fundamental rights and duties and determine the division of advantages from social cooperation. Although Rawls agrees that the attitudes and dispositions of persons, and persons themselves are often called just and unjust, he does not consider this to be a subject of justice. Cohen (1997) however was one of the first to point that most formal institutions will only work if they are accompanied by informal norms that people internalize and respect. Cohen has made the claim that citizens must be motivated by an ethos so that they act in their daily activities and in their choices in accordance with the principles that ensure that society is characterized by equality. ‘(…) principles of (…) apply (…) to the choices that people make within the legally coercive structures to which (…) principles of justice (also) apply’ (Cohen 1997: 3). In Rawls’s ideal theory, society would be governed by the difference principle, meaning that all people would know that any economic inequality that exists does so because it contributes to the well-being of the least advantaged. However, Cohen has argued that the talented can blackmail society and especially the worst-off by asking incentives so that they will be more productive and hence can maximize the total amount that can be redistributed to the worst-off. But, if the talented can be more productive with incentives, why should they get the incentives in the first

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place? In other words, according to Cohen, incentives are only necessary if and only if it can be proven that they are necessary to increase the total pie to be distributed. Critics of Cohen, however, have argued that if the difference principle is to be the pole star for the individual life, this would unjustifiably curtail citizen’s liberty as all citizens would be obliged to find a job that maximizes the income and hence the amount that can be redistributed in the advantage of the worst-off (e.g. Williams 1998; Titelbaum 2008).

Another concern is that people cannot know how and what others will decide when it comes to their personal choices. Williams (1998), for example, argues that justice must be seen in order to be done. This is why he agrees with Rawls’s assertion that the primary subject of justice is the basis structure since it goes along with a public notion of justice. This means that all individuals have a shared knowledge of the general applicability of the rules, institutions and laws, their requirements and the extent to which others conform with them (since people who do not live up to these laws, rules and institutions will be penalized). The upshot is that the nonpublic strategies and maxims that individuals apply in making individual choices need not be assessed as just or unjust by means of Rawlsian principles.

A third critique might be that Cohen has been too idealistic by assuming that people should lead their personal life in accordance with the difference principle. As Swift (1999) argues, what people actually think and what they can reasonably be expected to come to think on distributive matters is an important factor that needs to be taken into account for reasons of legitimacy, or feasibility, or both. Furthermore, what also needs to be considered is the weight and significance that people accord to their views on justice. Thinking about ideal theories for ‘ethical superhumans’ is an interesting and even necessary thing to be done by philosophers (because these theories can formulate the direction into which the society should evolve), but when it is about the hic et nunc, these theories do not always provide us with clues about what can and should be done (Robeyns 2008). Theories like the one of Rawls, for example, start from a thought experiment in which people are expected not to know anything about their actual situation (c.q. Rawls’s famous ‘veil of ignorance’ argument and Dworkin’s parable of shipwreck-survivors). However, as all current matters of justice are in media res, one should not all too quickly bracket what we already know well about human psychology (see e.g. Sabbagh and Schmitt 2016), about the specific contextual factors (see section 5) and about the simple fact that people have all sorts of factual experiences, vulnerabilities and dependencies. This means that the proposed theories should be tested by their correspondence with people’s everyday beliefs about justice as these might provide clues about their intuitions, and yet about the way people’s attitudes, cognitions, behaviors and convictions can be changed (see section 8). After all, policies will not be successful if the relevant agents do not comply with them.

Although the mentioned concerns about liberty (the rich can become slaves of the poor), about the lack of publicity (we don’t know what others think), and about the needed ‘ethical superhumans’ (it is highly questionable if people can/will actually live up to Rawls’s difference principle), raise interesting points, they should not be detrimental for the need and value of an egalitarian ethos. Asserting that our choices must not be strictly regulated by the difference principle, does not preclude the possibility and need for people to take the difference principle as a lighthouse as it tells in which direction they should be moving to reach a just society. Carens (2015), for example, has made the point that the ethos needs to be understood and defended as a set of informal social

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norms that can function as a social mechanism. As such it would refer to the sort of behavior that is expected of people and the willingness of people to act so. These ‘informal social norms’ can regulate the social behavior of people in a society, even if not every individual accepts them or adapts them in his/her behavior. As it is not a duty, but more a normative principle, it would amongst others imply that all citizens should be stimulated to make use of their talents, rather than to be obliged to maximize their talents. This in fact is not an impossible claim as in current societies the expectation is already present that all members of society who can actively contribute have a moral obligation to work. The egalitarian ethos would only add the social that people need to exercise a job that is sufficiently in line with their talents. So, the ethos would imply the duty to make good use of one’s productive capacities so long as it entails no disproportionate burden to the talented (Carens 2015). If we look at the egalitarian ethos as a social mechanism, the concerns about liberty, publicity and superhumanity can be mitigated. The liberty-critique is refuted as the ethos is a social mechanism that might stimulate people to act in an egalitarian way, but there is no duty to maximize the occupational choices. As is the case with all social norms, they may limit the liberty, but they are in most of the times not experienced as hard constraints. Take the example of being silent in a library or the expectation that young people get up to offer their seat to older people. The ‘publicity-critique’ is tackled by the fact that social norms are by definition public as they go along with a form of social and more horizontal control of the fellow citizens. The ‘superhumanity-critique’ is softened since people are not expected to live their life in full accordance with the difference principle. People are not expected to do the impossible, but they are gently moved in the direction of the justice that goes along with egalitarian principles. If they act differently they do not face punishments like in the case they would not abide by the law, but will ‘only’ be confronted with a sort of moral repudiation of the group.

So far we have mainly considered the ethos from the distributive side of equality. When it comes to the social egalitarian side (see section 3), the social norms might be connected to the ideas of good citizenship with such as the willingness to compromise, the respect for minorities, the importance of being polite and the willingness to listen to others, or the public of explaining and justifying political decisions in ways compatible with the idea of equal citizenship (see e.g. Laegaard 2011; Mason 2012). Take the two following examples. A man gets on the train. There are two seats available next to another passenger. Either he can sit next to a person wearing a headscarf or next to a woman without a headscarf. Our man prefers not to sit next to the woman with the headscarf, because he believes that people with headscarves cannot be trusted. This bias has arisen in him since IS-terrorists have attacked his country in the name of Allah. Here the man fails to treat the woman as an equal because of false generalizations. Clearly, not all Muslims are terrorists or have bad intentions. Another example is the well known Pygmalion effect whereby the high expectations of a teacher lead to an increase of the performance of the students. Its counterpart, the Golem effect, is that low expectations decrease the performance of the students (Babad, Inbar and Rosenthal 1982). If a teacher is convinced that a student is a good/bad one, he might influence his results in a self-fulfilling way. Although the teacher might not always be aware of his impact, it is clear that he is not treating all students with equal concern and respect.

In the first example, the behavior of the man is morally disrespectful, but not necessarily unjust. After all, he was free to choose where to sit. However, in a society led by the egalitarian ethos, people would treat each other without and hence the man would not mind sitting next to a

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veiled woman. If a lot of people were to act in a similar way as our man, society would become most unpleasant. Even if each individual performed acts that were not entirely unjust in and of themselves, the end result might still be an unjust society. Anderson (2010), for example, has illustrated, that the primary cause of racial injustice is a reality of spatial segregation. Things are somewhat different in the case of the teacher, as students are given less opportunities for educational and consequently professional success. Although the teacher may not always be aware of his impact, it should be clear that what he is doing is not only morally incorrect, but also unjust in a direct way. Educational structures therefore should be set-up in such a way that the Golem effect has no chance of affecting students to begin with. Certain students (e.g. students with a migration background) may not fail and drop out or leave school early because of the (unconscious) impact of a teacher.

Critics may object that there is an intractable human selfishness that will prevent the ethos to prosper, or that those who do act in accordance with the ethos will be exploited by those who follow their selfish impulses. Critics may also point at an innate tendency to show distrust towards ‘the other’. This might be true, but, as Cohen (2009) argues in his plea for , the biggest obstacle is the lack of means to harness the existing human generosity. There are moments when people do relate to each other in a spirit of equality and community, for example on a camping trip. It is only because of the lack of such means, that we rely on the market. Here, we could add that the market systems that have resulted in large socio-economic inequalities will not thrive when the background culture with its social norms places a higher emphasis on values such as equality, generosity, friendship and care. If people believe that the right thing to do is to show solidarity rather than to go for the maximization of individual property, this would certainly have severe impact on the functioning and dominance of the free market. By the same token, if people believe that migrants should be handled with dignity, the chances are higher that a shared sense of belonging together is created. At this very moment, however, we are not living in such a society as it is difficult to ignore the neoliberal hegemony that promotes competition, and a form of hyper-individualism supported by narrow positivism (e.g. the dominance of quantitative measurements) and fierce in a wide range of disciplines and professions (including academia and healthcare) (see e.g. Sennet 2006; Verhaeghe 2014). Likewise, multicultural societies seem to be swamped by all sorts of anxieties and feelings of paranoia. But, following the work of behavioral biologists and evolutionary psychologists such as Boehm (2012), de Waal (2009) and Tomasello (2014), the depiction of man as a ruthless Hobbesian wolf does not in fact match with human nature. What should be put in its place is the image of man as an ultra-social animal. Two fundamental tendencies are typical of every living being: the craving to be part of a greater whole whereby feelings of solidarity and are appealed and at the same time the quest for independence whereby personal and quite often aggressive satisfaction is sought. It is however the societal and cultural environment that determines which tendency, empathy or egotism, is predominant. Here, there is a lot to be learned from social psychology as it has illustrated how cultures become individualistic or collectivistic. Triandis (1995), for example, has argued that there are three key factors that might explain the origin of these orientations. The first is the complexity of a society. In more complex industrialized societies, there are more groups with whom one might identity, which means less loyalty to any one group and hence a greater focus on personal rather than collective goals. The second factor is the affluence of a society. The more people prosper, the more they gain financial independence from each other. And, the more one is financial independent, the more one becomes social independent which in turn leads

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to a focus on personal rather than on collective goals. The third factor is heterogeneity. Societies where members share the same language, religion and all sort of social customs tend to be rather rigid and intolerant of those who are different. Societies that are culturally diverse are more permissive of dissent and hence allow more individual expression and individualistic tendencies. These three elements clearly point in the direction of policies that put the value of equality as well as the creation of a shared sense of belonging together in the centre of its attention. This brings us neatly to the question about how people can be stimulated to nourish egalitarian preferences, ambitions, goals and aspirations.

8. The need for : the egalitarian triad of logos, pathos and ethos If equality is to be valued, and, as we have seen, there are plenty of reasons why it is of fundamental importance, we need not only deeply consider the role, character, and impact of equality, but also examine how equality can be communicated, promoted and sustained. So, what is needed is a toolbox of strategies that are efficient when it comes to form people’s egalitarian beliefs and attitudes. We need to examine the mechanisms by which beliefs are formed and changed and hence investigate how we can motivate people to act on the basis of their convictions.

It should be clear that all sorts of egalitarian (political) projects start from the ‘underdog position’ as they cannot wallow in the luxury of the hegemonic position of the neoliberal paradigm. Furthermore, the socialist parties, yet the parties that claim to have put ‘equality’ in the centre of their political project, are currently wrestling with the ‘revolution-reformation’ conundrum. Heavily inspired by the , the dominant model of social has chosen the way of parliamentarian democracy and the resulting acceptance of the capitalist world order. As this position has incorporated (minimal) forms of the neoliberal logic, the appeal to egalitarianism is diffuse. Therefore it faces fierce resistance by those socialists who disapprove of the capitalist order and want to radically overthrow it (e.g. Badiou 2001; Žižek 2011). Despite the ‘underdog position’ and current struggles between the left parties, the truth is that if more equal societies are to be realized, people will need to be convinced of the value of equality in the first place. This means that all those who feel for the egalitarian ideal, have to reflect on how they can persuade the population.

Critics may object that the government should not interfere with the daily behavior and choices of people, as long as they behave within the lawful playing field. This is correct, as people should remain free to do what they want. However, the government may inform its citizens about the consequences of their behavior and may also present alternatives. Take the example of healthy food. The government cannot forbid people to eat greasy food, but it can ensure that everyone is sufficiently informed through education and prevention campaigns on the detrimental effects of greasy food on their health. People keep their freedom, but can make more conscious choices. The point is not whether a government may or may not moralize or dissuade certain behavior, but how it would do this. The government may, for example, promote the use of condoms because it is concerned with the health of its citizens. The legitimate concern for health, however, would not lead the government to limit nor promote sexuality within the context of a . This would be tantamount to paternalism, as it would not be neutral towards all conceptions of the good life (e.g. promiscuous life). Treating people with equal respect implies that people are given the freedom to lead their own lives. However, treating people with equal concern urges the government to take care

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of the health and equality conditions of its citizens. The upshot is that the government can promote a certain egalitarian ethos, for example by campaigns or by all kinds of nudging strategies. A nudge, as has been described by Thaler and Sunstein (2008) is any aspect of the choice architecture that alters behavior in a predictable way without forbidding any option or significantly changing their economic incentives. A nudge must be easy and cheap to avoid. As we have seen, if we consider the ethos as a social mechanism, people’s freedom is not fundamentally curtailed. People still have the freedom to act as they please, but they would then become aware that there are other and more desirable options.

A good starting point is discourse analysis as it has illustrated the way language does not only represent the social world, but also constitutes subjects (identities) and objects (the things to be known) and gives meaning to social action (e.g. Foucault 1972; Fairclough 1992). During our everyday social interactions, language brings into being, transforms, and reproduces discourses (particular ways of talking and thinking about the world) and (representations of the contemporary and future world). In fact the social world is characterized by different overlapping, contradicting and hence competing discourses that all propose answers to the kind of policies that are needed and the the social roles that are appropriate (Foucault 1972). Sometimes these discourses can reach a state of hegemony, as in the case of , whereby the social understandings and the appropriateness of certain policy options are taken for granted to the extent that they are reproduced unconsciously (Fairclough 1992; Laclau and Mouffe 1985). Žižek (2011, 334) for example, hereby referring to Fredrik Jameson’s quip, has famously stated that it has become ‘much easier to imagine a total catastrophe which ends all life on earth than it is to imagine a real change in capitalist relations.’

As stated, discourse analysis might provide a good starting point as it has revealed how language-use might realize the hegemony of a discourse (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985) and how it might have disciplinary effects (Foucault, 1977). However, what most discourse analyses have overlooked, is how these discourses influence the way people think, feel and act. Or, as Higgins and Walker (2012) argue, it is not clear why people accept discourses and alter their thinking and behavior accordingly. Therefore, what needs to be studied is rhetoric, that is the means by which people convince others about a point of view, narrow choices amongst alternatives, reach agreement about the social order, and develop the systems and institutions of private and public life (Higgins and Walker 2012). For Burke (1966), rhetoric is everywhere and includes all sorts of spoken and written discourse as well as less traditional forms of discourse such as sales promotion, courtship, social etiquette, education, ‘impression management’ and non literal language and imagery. Up till now, rhetoric heavily draws on ’s (2007) rhetorical triangle consisting of three distinct, however not separable elements: logos, pathos and ethos. Logos deals with the logic and the appeal to reason and hence with the clarity and integrity of the invoked arguments. It is about argumentation, logic, warrants, justification, claims, data, evidence, examples. Pathos refers to the persuasive effect that is triggered by emotions such as , sadness, satisfaction, pity, friendship, loyalty, hope, well-being, health, sympathy, empathy, fear, solidarity. Metaphors, signifiers and works of arts such as literature and painting are particularly well suited to create an emotional receptivity. Ethos refers to the credibility and trustworthiness of the persona, or projected character of the communicator. What appeals to the ethos includes such analytical categories as similitude, expertise, self-criticism, deference, consistency and ingratiation.

16 These three dimensions provide us with sufficient guidance on how to attract people to accept and handle in accordance to the egalitarian ethos. When it comes to logos, what is needed are, amongst others, curricula that ensure philosophy, ethics, religious literacy, intercultural competencies and citizenship (Loobuyck 2015). People need to be prepared to participate as a citizen in nowadays and future (democratic and multicultural) societies. The implication is that people need to be informed about the ideological roots of society (the Enlightenment), knowledge of the religious other, a reflective capacity to shape the own philosophical quest, and skills to deal with diversity. After all, both natives and newcomers, will have to ‘integrate’ in the diverse societies. Also policies that increase social mix and promote intercultural contacts might be helpful as real-life contact allows the anonymous and/or one-dimensional other to be seen in a new and more accurate light (Levrau & Loobuyck 2013b). The Turkish woman, for example, can be viewed not only as minority-group member who wear headscarves, but also a mother and a neighbor who has a shared interest in good education and safe neighborhoods. The intercultural contacts and the dialogue might temper the innate feelings of distrust and might stimulate feelings of empathy and solidarity that counter (pathos).

As we see it, there is no shortage of proper and concrete policies that aim to make the basic structure more egalitarian, but the ideological embedding, the aligned rhetoric, the inspiring outcry, which gives these policies a deeper sense and motivates people to act in accordance with the egalitarian principles in daily life, seems to be pushed in the background (Carpentier 2011). The strong emphasis on policy instead of on emotions and on a straightforward egalitarian ideology, is probably related to the Cartesian logic (logos) that has captured the whole political system. However, as illustrated by Nussbaum (2013), there is nothing wrong with raw emotions and outrage that stem from a sense of injustice. Speaking about or relying on emotions is often confused with emotional speech and dismissed as . This however is short-sighted, as ‘emotions’ are a fundamental aspect of human life and therefore sensitivity to the fate of others must be encouraged. To put it like this, not only the mind, but also the hearts should be addressed.

Politicians, and in fact, all those who playing an exemplary role, need to ‘walk the talk’ (ethos). As the credibility of politicians is a necessary component, it means that contemporary political culture needs to be critically assessed since it too much in the grip of political marketing, short electoral successes, opportunistic party interests and all kinds of pragmatic concerns that prevent the electorate to make real choices. Furthermore, scandals like the recent Panama Papers are most unacceptable as they might lead to a public aversion to politics.

If creditworthy people invoke ideological clarity and simplicity, yet the basic egalitarian values (ethos), and if they understand and explain current situations by making use of these values, together with ‘facts and figures’ (logos) and if they feed their analyses with authentic emotions (pathos), they might obtain a widely supported platform for egalitarian ideas and for people to live up to the egalitarian ethos. However, as the egalitarian ideology does not necessarily belong to one single political party, it can be defended by a broad and unifying coalition of different stakeholders such as different political parties, educational sector, and all sorts of social and civil movements.

17 9. Conclusion In current societies we can witness an increase of both socio-economic and status-related inequality. This is due to the dominance of money and power that have ‘colonized the life world’ (Habermas 1987) as well as to appeals to multicultural anxieties. Therefore, if 21st centuries are to become more egalitarian, a way has to be found to overcome or at least to counterbalance the predominance of the neoliberal ideology and the ‘multicultural fear’. So far, the justice of the basic structure has gained much attention, while the egalitarian mindset of people has been rather neglected. Fierce debates, for example, have been held on the distributive account of justice, but the role of the ‘ethos’ has not given the proper role it deserves. Studying the impact and precise character of the egalitarian ethos however is important for at least two reasons. The first has to do with the credo of integration as a two way process. For, if we believe it is not unreasonable to expect newcomers to adapt, in some way, to aspects of the national culture, we could, in the same vein, argue that natives should act upon the ethos in their personal attitudes, everyday choices and countless small interactions. If a society is conceived as a fair system of cooperation among free and equal people with diverse aims and values, it will probably be the ethos that will eventually determine whether migrants, as well as natives, share a sense of belonging and whether income differences jeopardize social relations (Scheffler 2007). The second reason has to do with the simple fact that all people, natives and newcomers, will have to learn living together in diversity, with equal respect and concern for each other. Before creating all kinds of policies in order to make the basic structure more just and egalitarian, we believe the primary task should be the stimulation of the egalitarian mind of people. After all, how can people agree with egalitarian policies, laws and institutions, if they are not motivated, in their private life, to accept, or to act on the principles that characterize these policies, laws and institutions? As the functioning of egalitarian institutions depends on what people think and how they behave, the question is not whether informal norms are components of social institutions, neither if justice requires informal norms. What should be in the centre of our attention is which informal norms and thus which kind of ethos are needed for just institutions to work effectively and for justice to become realized (Carens 2015). We should also gain insight in how people can be stimulated to act in accordance with these norms.

In this paper, we have illustrated how discourse analysis and rhetoric might provide guidance to challenge the neoliberal hegemony and to counter the current backlash against diversity. As the egalitarian ideology does not necessarily belong to one single political party, it can be defended by a broad and unifying coalition of different stakeholders such as different political parties, and all sorts of social and civil movements. As the current obsession with the individual at the expense of the other and the community has strongly ignored the fundamental human need for empathy, love and hospitality, the egalitarian rhetoric might have a change to pose an attractive alternative, especially if the message is conveyed by a strong appeal to what we could call the egalitarian triad of logos, pathos and ethos.

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