The B-1 Bomber 1

the B-1 Bomber 1

been flying for nearly two years. The three prototype aircraft in the flight test program represent the culmination of about fifteen years of study and evaluation

aimed at defining the requirements for the new manned bomber in the United Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/isec/article-pdf/1/2/78/689958/isec.1.2.78.pdf by guest on 28 September 2021 States strategic deterrent force. Results of extensive studies have affirmed the future role of the penetrating manned bomber. Results of the evaluations have assured that the B-1 can perform that role. A replacement for the high-altitude B-52 bomber was first contemplated in 1961 when the Subsonic, Low-Altitude Bomber (SLAB) was investigated. Studies of an Extended-Range Strategic Aircraft (ERSA) and a Low-Altitude Manned Penetrator (LAMP) followed in 1963. That year studies were begun for procuring an Advanced Manned Penetrator (AMP) and an Advanced Manned Penetrating Strategic System (AMPSS). After these two studies were completed in 1965, further studies, this time for an Advanced Manned Strategic Aircraft (AMSA) were begun. The AMSA studies continued into 1969 and led to the Air Force re- questing contractor bids for the B-1. After nearly seven months of evaluation, Rockwell International was selected over two competitors to develop the B-1 to meet the AMSA specifications. There has been an evolution of the roles and requirements for what is now the B-1 ever since 1961. All the manned bomber studies of the past fifteen years have been considered. Yet despite this systematic and deliberate role formulation, questions about the B-1 still are raised. They are generally of two types : -Why produce a penetrating, manned bomber in the missile age? -If there is a need for such an aircraft, is the B-1 the “correct” bomber? The answers are, in part, related to the broader issues of national security policy and the evolving strategic environment. Therefore, assessments of the B-1 should include a review of America’s current strategic policies and the weapons required to implement such policies. Each element of the Triad has its strengths and weaknesses. The manned bomber force has capabilities that uniquely complement the weaknesses of the Triads two other elements, the land- and sea-based ICBMs.

United States Strategic Forces and the Triad

Amid great controversy in 1974, Secretary of Defense Schlesinger announced a

John F. McCarthy Jr., is Director of Massachusetts Institute of Technology’s Center for Space Research and Professor of Aeronautics and Astronautics. He was Vice-president, Systems Engi- neering, at North American Rockwell, Los Angeles, California, until 1971.

78 The Case for the B-1 Bomber I 79

new doctrine of counterforce targeting. The doctrine, however, has evolved over the years and has been brought to fruition through the enlightened thinking of those who reject the unacceptability of having only a capability for assured destruction, with the repulsive choice of capitulation or annihilation that it implies. While Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/isec/article-pdf/1/2/78/689958/isec.1.2.78.pdf by guest on 28 September 2021 there may be problems in defining exact requirements for weapons to implement such a doctrine, it is apparent that a variety of versatile systems is desirable. These combined weapon systems should survive enemy offensive action and also be effective against all enemy targets. The enemy's perception of American resolve can be enhanced by the evident quality of such weapons-that perception is fundamental ro deterring all levels of nuclear conflict. Our strategic forces-our Triad of weapons-must be viewed as instruments for the conduct of this broader strategic doctrine and assessed accordingly.

Table 1 Current United States Strategic Force

Warheads Type No. Yield Number Total

Land-based ICBMs Minuteman II 1 1-2 MT 450 Minuteman Ill 3 170 KT 550 Titan II 1 5-10 MT 54 1,054

Sea-based SLBMs Polaris A3 3 200 KT 160 Poseidon C3 1O* 50 KT MIRV** 496" 656

Type Payload Number Total

Manned Bombers 6-52D 10,000 pounds of gravity bombs 80t 6-52F (Not flown or operationally None assigned) 6-52G 6 SRAMs + 4 gravity bombs77 173 6-52-H 6 SRAMs + 4 gravity bombst+ 98 FB-111A 6 SRAMs (nominal) 66 417

'Poseidon C3 can carry up to 14 MIRVs over reduced ranges. **27 of the planned 31 Poseidon submarines are completed for a present basing total of 432 bases. t128 6-52Ds are flying, but only 80 are scheduled to have the "Pacer Plank" structural modifications to extend their useful service life. ttNominal payload; the B-52G/H can carry 20 SRAMs - 8 internally plus 12 externally. The nominal load given is used on alert aircraft. International Security I

The Triad of the United States strategic forces consists of three types of weapons, land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), sea-based submarine- launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and manned bombers. There is nothing magic

about the number three, but the three present strategic systems work in concert to Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/isec/article-pdf/1/2/78/689958/isec.1.2.78.pdf by guest on 28 September 2021 minimize their individual weaknesses and to maximize their individual strengths. This synergistic effect is one of the bases for having more than one type of system. The manned bomber force, for example, greatly complicates an enemy's attack timing. The B-1 especially accentuates this time problem. Because it can operate from shorter, narrower, and softer runways than the B-52 (or than the proposed transport-type missile launchers), the B-1 can be dispersed in times of crisis to many more air bases. The B-1's quicker reaction and faster getaway discourage a patterned enemy attack on its air bases-the enemy simply cannot prevent the escape of a large number of aircraft. Furthermore, far too many enemy warheads would be required in a patterned attack around an airbase to assure the destruction of a single escaping B-1. It is planned that each element of the Triad, such as the bomber force, will be updated as technological and doctrinal advances warrant. For example, the next generation of ICBMs-the MX-is now being studied because of concern for the survivability of our land-based missile force. Primary efforts in the MX study have been directed toward guidance and propulsion systems for the missile that at first would be deployed in modified Minuteman silos. Alternative basing options in- volving air and ground mobility are also being studied. The sea-based deterrent is also being improved. The follow-on SLBM under development is the Trident I, which extends the 2,500-nautical mile range of Polaris/Poseidon to about 4,000 nautical miles. It is planned that these missiles will be deployed in ten Poseidon submarines, while the more advanced Trident 11's will require their own twenty-four-tube submarines. The B-52 bomber fleet of G and H models, for its part, is being modified to extend its useful life by adding equipment for short-range attack missiles (SRAM), an electro-optical viewing system, the phase 6 electronic countermeasure (ECM) package, and cartridge starters for quick engine starts. Electronic equipment changes are also being made to the small FB-111A fleet to improve its effectiveness. The follow-on bomber is the B-1. The most obvious benefit of the interaction of these three types of weapons in the Triad is in the dilemma they present to an attacking enemy. As Secretary of the Air Force Reed has said, "Its diversity poses an insoluble targeting problem to any aggressor. Any attack that might seriously cripple one leg of the Triad The Case for the B-1 Bomber I 81

constitutes a clear and unambiguous warning to the other two. There is no known way to attack all three simultaneously.”’ Each type of weapon system relies on a different technique for survival from enemy attack-the ICBMs are in hardened holes, the SLBMs are hidden in the seas, and the bombers can take off Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/isec/article-pdf/1/2/78/689958/isec.1.2.78.pdf by guest on 28 September 2021 within minutes of warning of attack on their bases. The ability of the aircraft itself to survive attack is all the more important because the United States has minimal active defenses. The weapon types present different targeting and defense problems to enemy forces. ICBMs come hurtling in at some 14,000 miles per hour surrounded by their cloud of decoys and other confusing penetration aids. SLBMs can attack from any direction and their launch points are unknown. Bombers thwart high- altitude air defenses by penetrating at low altitudes beneath the cover of line-of- sight radars that direct interceptors and missiles and by using a selection of ECM to confuse those defenses that might detect them.

EFFECTIVENESS OF THE TRIAD Each element of the Triad provides different techniques for destruction of targets. The overall kill probability of a given warhead against a given target is a function of the yield of the warhead, the accuracy with which it is delivered, and the hardness of the target. The present yield of the Minuteman I1 warheads (170 KT) requires greater accuracy than that currently attainable to destroy extremely hard targets. While our fifty-four Titan ICBMs have large-yield (5 to 10 MT) warheads, their accuracy is not as good as that of the Minuteman. Polaris/Poseidon accuracy is also significantly poorer than that of Minuteman. Poseidon, with its low-yield (50 KT) MIRVs is suitable only for soft targets. The present United States bomber force, however, carries over one-half of our strategic force power, measured in megatons. As demonstrated in Figure 1, which shows single-shot probability of kill over the range of yields for the elements of the triad, the bombers weapons have a large range of yields and their delivery accuracy is sufficient to destroy the hardest of targets. Laydown bombing accuracy also permits target destruction with minimal collateral damage. Reasons other than the probabilities of survival and target kill enter into the selection of weapons in our deterrent force. Contrary to popular belief, ballistic reentry vehicles are not invulnerable as shown by continuing efforts to improve

1. Thomas C. Reed, Remarks at Air Force Association Symposium, April 29, 1976. International Security I 82

Figure 1 Composition of United States Strategic Forces

1 .a i Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/isec/article-pdf/1/2/78/689958/isec.1.2.78.pdf by guest on 28 September 2021 / il 4 I I

Single Shot Probability I of Kill II/i I (PKss) 'I /I

0 Bombers

Target 10,000 PSI Hardness 1,000 PSI

their maneuverability. Antiballistic missile systems are known to work; limits on their deployment to date are solely political and economic. Such vulnerability must be considered when questioning the need for an effective bomber force. ICBMs have known, fixed trajectories, while the other two systems can approach from different directions, the bombers having the advantage of the least predictable approach. Because of their fixed launch points and defined trajectories, ICBMs might overfly countries that are not targeted (overflying the Soviet Union to strike the Peoples' Republic of China is an example of a highly undesirable case). Command, control, and communications with the undersea fleet of SLBMs presents problems, and retargeting is slow for both SLBMs and ICBMs. The Minuteman 111, however, is being modified with a command data buffer which permits retargeting of a single mission in about thirty-six minutes. This is a con- siderable improvement over the previous retargeting time that has been, according The Case for the B-2 Bomber I 83

to SAC, nine hours. In the case where only one or a few targets are to be struck, the Poseidon with its ten to fourteen warheads, and the Minuteman I11 or Polaris with three each, might be inappropriate. The larger yields of the Minuteman I1 and Titan could rule them out for discrete strikes. The bombers cover the gaps in weapon/tar- Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/isec/article-pdf/1/2/78/689958/isec.1.2.78.pdf by guest on 28 September 2021 get relationship that may exist in the ballistic missile forces. All systems rely on satellites to some extent for such operations as warning, navigation, communications, targeting information, and bomb damage assess- ment. Because the Soviets have an on-going program for a killer-satellite (Cosmos 723, 724, and 785 were launched last year in continuing tests of the system), the dependent forces could be degraded due to satellite vulnerability. With regard to warning, only the bombers can be launched with just the word from the com- mander of SAC-the others require National Command Authority (NCA). Once launched, the bombers are relatively safe, but will not complete their attack without orders from the NCA (the President, the Secretary of Defense, or their des- ignated replacements). In the case of a Soviet counterforce attack against the United States, retaliation against the Soviet urban industrial complexes would be inappropriate since Ameri- can cities would not have been attacked and civil damage would have been minimized. Deterrence against a counterforce attack therefore requires weapons that are both secure from attack themselves and that also have the ability to respond by destroying the remaining enemy forces. This response notably includes the ability to discern which of these forces have been used ‘or moved. Strategic weapon numbers are limited by SALT and their yields are also limited by testing agreements, material scarcity, and severe budgetary restrictions. Therefore, precise delivery accuracy is crucial, particularly for hard targets; collateral casualties are also minimized. SALT restraints on silo size deny the United States the hard target kill potential of the huge Soviet ICBMs, such as the SS-9 and the SS-18. Until new, economical, super-accurate ballistic missile guidance systems are developed and deployed, the penetrating manned bomber alone provides the desired accuracy capabilities. Additionally, only manned bombers can sight potential targets directly. The three elements of the Triad thus not only assure each other’s survival, but also augment one another and cover weaknesses. As Secretary Reed has said, “. . . the Triad provides options as well as a hedge against technological breakthroughs that could temporarily endanger any one system.”2

2. Reed, Remarks, April 29,1976. lnternational Security I 84

RELATED SOVIET CAPABILITIES While the Soviet Union's long-range bomber force is small in comparison to that of the United States, the two forces could become equal in the 1980s if we con-

sider the continued deployment of the Backfire and the lack of American air de- Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/isec/article-pdf/1/2/78/689958/isec.1.2.78.pdf by guest on 28 September 2021 fenses. The Backfire was not included in the Vladivostok Accords, but appears to be capable of striking the United States. Its unrefueled range is estimated to be sufficient for one-way missions with recovery in Cuba, while aerial refueling would permit round-trip missions from northern Soviet air bases. As the Soviet offensive forces grow, so do their defenses. Not only are their air defense interceptor and SAM forces being continuously updated and expanded, but additional passive defensive measures are being employed. Since the SALT I agreements, 150 new super-hard silos have been constructed, ostensibly for command centers. The Soviet civil defense organization has about 50,000 full-time staff members. The population is being trained in evacuation procedures; medical and veterinary aid; shelter construction and damage repair; and the health factors associated with varying degrees of radiation contamination levels in food, crops, animals, and humans. Approximately three-fourths of new Soviet industry is dispersed to small- and medium-sized towns. Such activities as hardening control sites and missile silos add to the hard target list for United States strategic forces, while civil defense plans and the dispersion of industry make soft targeting more difficult or less effective. The Soviet Union passed the United States in military-associated research and development efforts in 1971. In 1975, their R&D efforts were one-quarter to one- half more than ours. At such a rate, the Soviet Union will eventually lead the United States in nearly any defense field that they choose-they already have the initiative in ABM technology and they are investing heavily in high-energy lasers. Furthermore, their long-range strategic doctrine includes the possibility of "revolutionary weapons" giving them an unexpected advantage over their enemies.

The Necessity for the Bomber Force

Manned bombers offer features that are not matched by those of ballistic missiles. For example, survivability from surprise attack on air bases is assured by quick reaction to warning. The policy of launch-on-warning for ballistic missiles could very well be the first giant escalation spasm toward total holocaust. Bombers, on the contrary, can be flushed by SAC but are able to return to base if not given attack orders by the NCA. SAC cannot even arm its nuclear warheads without The Case for the B-1 Bomber I 85

Table 2 Current Soviet Strategic Force

Warheads

Type No. Yield Number Total Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/isec/article-pdf/1/2/78/689958/isec.1.2.78.pdf by guest on 28 September 2021

ICBMs ss-7 1 5 MT 190 SS-8 1 5 MT 19 ss-9 1 18-25 MT or (3) 4-5 MT 288 ss-11 1 1-2 MT or (3) < 1 MT 99 1 SS-13 1 1 MT 60 SS-17 4 < 1 MT 10 SS-18 1 18-25 MT or (5-8) > 1 MT 10 ss-19 6 < 1 MT 50 1,618

Yield of Tv pe Tubes/Submarines Warhead Number

SLBMs SS-N-4 3/9 G-I-class > 1 MT 27* SS-N-5 3/11 G-l I-class > 1 MT 33" SS-N-5 318 H-class > 1 MT 24 SS-N-6 16/34 Y-class > 1 MT 544 SS-N-8 12/12 D-class > 1 MT 156 784

Payload (Pounds) Number

Long-range bombers Tu-95 (BEAR) 40,000 100 Mya-4 (BISON) 20,000 35 TU-? (BACKFIRE B) 20,000 50 185

*Diesel submarines - not included in Interim SALT Agreement. lnternational Security I 86

NCA permission. Such positive control not only assures the bombers’ viability, but also provides time for rational decisions to be made prior to the final word to proceed to their targets.

The length of time for flight from base to the turnaround point of H-hour Con- Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/isec/article-pdf/1/2/78/689958/isec.1.2.78.pdf by guest on 28 September 2021 trol Line (the point at which bombers are picked-up by enemy radar) and on to the bomber’s target can also have advantage for arms control. Manned bombers are not good nuclear first-strike weapons. This important stabilizing feature is not found in the missile systems. Escaping from initial air base attack is only half the survivability battle-the bomber must penetrate enemy defenses to reach its targets. Against the antiair- craft guns of World War 11, higher was better-a philosophy that led to the requirements for the first intercontinental strategic bombers : the B-36 and B-52. Soviet surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) were developed to counter such subsonic high-altitude threats. But the Mach 2 B-58 and the Mach 3 8-70 posed new threats; improved SAMs were designed and deployed by the Soviets to counter them. High-altitude SAM coverage forced the bombers down, although use of ECM by B-52s against the massive employment of older SA-2 SAMs in North Vietnam proved highly effective. (In the 729 B-52 sorties flown during the “Line- backer 11” bombing operations against Hanoi/Haiphong during 18-29 December 1972, only fifteen bombers were lost to the densest air defenses ever deployed- just 2 percent, which compares with the overall loss rate of 1.8 percent for all Allied heavy bombers during World War 11.) By designing, or in the case of the B-52, modifying, bombers to fly at very low altitudes-just a few hundred feet above the terrain-survival penetration against ground-based defenses is greatly enhanced. Line of sight is an irrevocable fact and defense sites are limited by what they can see. Higher speed aircraft further improve bomber survival by giving the defenses less time to detect, identify, track, fire, intercept, and kill. Penetration survival of a low-flying bomber such as the B-1 is assured through: -heplanning to avoid as many known defense sites as possible by flying under their line-of-sight coverage. -Flying as fast as possible when passing those sites. -Confusing defenses with ECM designed to counter each specific kind of defense. Bombers offer a size and selection of payloads not found in missiles. In the United States, even our largest ballistic missile-the Titan 11-has a payload that is only a fraction of the weight that can be carried by a large bomber. From bomb- lets, conventional bombs, mines, guided bombs, and missiles, through small laydown nuclear bombs and short-range attack missiles, to advanced air-launched The Case for the B-1 Bomber I 87

cruise or ballistic missiles, the bomber's payload can be selected for a particular target and be delivered with an appropriate accuracy. Limitation of unwanted collateral damage and casualties is a requirement that bombers can provide. By Hanoi's own figures, the "Linebacker 11" operation Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/isec/article-pdf/1/2/78/689958/isec.1.2.78.pdf by guest on 28 September 2021 caused less than two civilian casualties per sortie while destroying military target^.^ As new weapons are developed, bombers can be adapted to accommodate and deliver them. Some weapons can never be efficiently delivered by ballistic missiles which once used are gone forever-the bomber can be reloaded. Such a recycling capability could also prove useful in a quid-pro-quo nuclear exchange for wartime suppression of escalation and to force rapid cessation at a low level of hostilities. Penetrating bombers permit man to be at the scene of the target. Sensors allow sighting of hidden or mobile targets such as SAM sites, troop installations, and naval or shipping fleets. New or unknown targets can be struck by bombers even if only their general location is known-target mobility or unexpected hostilities with an "nth nation" might necessitate such operations. Bombers fulfill functions which missiles cannot. Their viability, controllability, versatility, and effectiveness are necessary to our strategic deterrent forces. The United States can ,only achieve its policy of essential equivalence if bomber payloads are included in our strategic forces.

The B-1 Bomber

DESCRIPTION The B-1 is described as a medium gross-weight bomber with intercontinental range. It is about two-thirds the size of the B-52, yet it carries nearly twice the internal payload of the B-52. Four engines in the 30,000-pound thrust class drive it at nearly the speed of sound at tree-top heights in the dense air of sea level- it has been flight tested at Mach 0.85 (approximately 650 mph) at 200 feet or so above terrain. The thrust of its engines is sufficient to give it a takeoff distance that is comparable to those of small commercial transports such as the Douglas DC-9 and Boeing 737. Such performance gives it small-field capability for dis- persal operations. Supersonic speed is essentially just an added benefit from the thrust required for low-level flight and short takeoff distance. The B-1 is designed for and has been flown at speeds greater than Mach 2 (approximately 1,320 mph) at 50,000

3. Speech by General Meyer, USAF, SINCSAC. Air Force press release, March 21, 1973. lnternational Security I 88

feet, but this high-speed capability is not central to the bomber’s role. A 16 percent savings could have been realized, in items such as engine inlet, if this somewhat superfluous supersonic mission had been deleted at contract award. But it is im- possible to achieve such savings at this stage of development. Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/isec/article-pdf/1/2/78/689958/isec.1.2.78.pdf by guest on 28 September 2021 While the B-52 had a 42 percent gain in maximum speed at high level over that of its predecessor, the B-36, the B-1’s improvement over the B-52 is more than 120 percent. The B-52‘s gain in maximum sea-level speed over that of the B-36 was 32 percent, whereas the B-1’s gain over the B-52 is more than 50 percent. Such improvements result in significantly increased survival for the B-1. To accommodate the speeds and aerodynamic loads that result from its diverse performance characteristics, the B-1’s design incorporates a swing-wing. The wing is fully extended for slow flight requiring high lift and severely swept back for speeds and altitudes that develop high dynamic pressures-pressures that are 100 percent greater than those encountered by any American jet airliner. The B-1‘s structure is designed to take the pounding of low-altitude, high-speed flight in turbulent air. A structural mode control system is included to maintain crew proficiency during long, low-level runs. This system maintains a smooth ride at the crew compartment while permitting the aircraft structure to flex with buffet- ing loads as they are applied, reversed, and re-applied. The B-1 is also the first aircraft to be designed to meet the Air Force’s new fracture mechanics requirement^.^ Such requirements mean that the B-1 will have a long operational life, despite the severity of its flight envelope. The B-1 is the first manned system to have requirements for resistance to nuclear effects imposed and designed into it. Its structure is hardened to withstand the impact of overpressures resulting from nuclear blasts to a greater degree than that of its predecessors. Its exterior is protected from nuclear thermal effects and its systems are designed to withstand electromagnetic pulse (EMF’) and transient radiation effects on electronics. Crew protection from nuclear flash is also provided.

4. Until the late 1960s, safe-service-life limits for aircraft structures were determined by fatigue analysis and tests. Test specimens and full-scale airframes were subjected to loads representative of those encountered in service. However, because of wide scatter in the experimental data and inaccuracies in the calculations, “scatter factors” were adopted ranging from two to four times the calculated life of the aircraft. Recently, due to structural problems on service aircraft (ex., C-5A, B-52D, F-111, KC-135, F-4), the Air Force has established structural service life through fracture mechanics. The amount and size of cracks are determined by crack-growth calculations based on material-property data and stress levels. In the case of the 8-1, raw material must meet minimum fracture toughness requirements and structural designs must pass severe tests. Air Force specification for the B-1 structural life is 13,500 hours. The Case for the B-1 Bomber I 89

Figure 2 B-1 Specifications

r'- 7 Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/isec/article-pdf/1/2/78/689958/isec.1.2.78.pdf by guest on 28 September 2021

TOGW: LENGTH: SPAN: HEIGHT PAY LOAD: 24SRAM'S OR 75,000 LB (INTERNAL) r:=ik? RANGE: \- <=A, . ''.

Nuclear explosion-induced EMP that could negate the entire current bomber fleer would not prevent the B-1s from carrying out their missions. The B-1's rapid reaction time (measured in seconds) and high escape-speed, combined with its nuclear hardness, enable it to respond to alert and survive a surprise nuclear attack on its air base. Such escape is even possible when the attacking force comprises depressed-trajectory SLBMs which halve missile flight time- a threat the Soviets have yet to develop. Survival during penetration takes advantage of all these techniques : avoidance; low-level, high-speed flight; and ECM. The B-1's small radar cross section, which is a tiny fraction of that of the B-52, permits more effective use of ECM. Because less power is required to "hide"the B-1, either more ECM can be carried or the range and effectiveness of the measures on board can be increased. International Security I

The B-1 can also fight its way to the target if necessary. Its internal payload of twenty-four SRAMs can be used for defense suppression as well as target destruction. The SRAM, which weighs about 2,000 pounds, has a 360" homing capability, is supersonic, and has a range of about 100 miles. The twenty-four SRAMs can be Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/isec/article-pdf/1/2/78/689958/isec.1.2.78.pdf by guest on 28 September 2021 replaced with 75,000 pounds of nuclear or conventional bombs, missiles, mines, or other weapons. The B-1's offensive systems provide for a delivery accuracy sufficient to permit the selection of a weapon appropriate to destroy any given target while minimizing unwanted collateral damage. The B-1 is designed for operational economy. Its Central Integrated Test System (CITS) permits in-flight diagnosis of potential trouble so that ground maintenance time is minimized. The B-1 is the only aircraft that has this system which can be compared to the diagnosis plug in the new Volkswagens. Maintenance can be easily accomplished at the field level. The operation of the B-1 fleet saves money compared with the operating costs for the B-52. Operation and maintenance of a force of 210 unit equipment (UE) B-1s would cost $420 million per year in 1976 dollars compared with $740 million per year for 330 UE B-52s. The annual savings is $320 million. Although unrelated to readiness or economy, training mission planning has not neglected environmental impacts-supersonic flghts which cause sonic booms are restrained to a few minutes per crew per year and are to be flown only over unpopulated areas or over water. Because supersonic flight of the B-1 is usually lower than in the stratosphere, there will be no resultant ozone depletion. Air base noise will be limited to existing SAC bases. The total toxic emissions of the B-1 are less than those of the B-52-they amount to about the same per mile as those of 3.6 automobiles and the B-1 fleet will use less than one-quarter of the fuel currently being used by the B-52s.

Proposed Alternatives to the B-1

The B-1's requirements were established to define a replacement for a bomber which essentially reflects the technology of the 1940s and early 1950s. Analyses and tests have proven that the B-1's characteristics meet the future requirements of the strategic deterrent force. Critics of the B-1 offer substitute programs, all of which fail on one or more counts to fulfill the requirements of the strategic force : they are technologically unproven or do not address the realities of aircraft and missile design; they are as costly as or more costly than the B-1 or cannot equal its effectiveness; and they delay the initial operational capability (IOC) date of the new system while the The Case for the B-1 Bomber I 91

comparative strength ratio of American to Soviet forces continues to move in the Soviets' favor. Four of the more popular alternatives to the B-1 are: 1. No manned penetrating bombers at all. Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/isec/article-pdf/1/2/78/689958/isec.1.2.78.pdf by guest on 28 September 2021 2. Modified B-52s. 3. Stretched FB-111s. 4. Transport-type nonpenetrating aircraft with long-range, standoff missiles. The proposals to delete the manned penetrating bomber fleet from our strategic deterrent forces fail to recognize the utility of such bombers as discussed earlier. Reliance on an all-ballistic-missile force poses dangerous instabilities and would be, at best, an additional constraint on our national security policy. The no- bomber option is not acceptable for our future strategic force. Modification of the B-52G and H models has been proposed to extend their operational lives. The B-521 would be re-engined with four large turbofans and could meet the range-payload requirements of the required strategic missions. The extensive Department of Defense Joint Strategic Bomber Study (JSBS), analyses supported by over 6,000 hours of computer simulation time, indicates deficiencies in both initial and penetration survival for the B-521. It would be less capable than the B-1 in quick reaction time, flyaway speed, hardness to nuclear effects, and ability to operate from a large number of dispersed fields, all of which are fundamental to initial survival from surprise attack 'on air bases. Survivability of the B-521 during the penetration of enemy defenses would be inferior to that of the B-1 because the B-1 not only flies lower and faster, but also has greater ECM effectiveness due to its lower radar cross section. (The present B-52s are limited to less than 400 knots at low level and can be overtaken by most Soviet interceptors, while the B-1's speed of over 600 mph prevents this.) The JSBS concluded that the B-521 would be expected to sustain greater overall attrition and would be less cost-effective than would the B-1. Further, more extensive modifications to the B-52s have been proposed-not 'only new engines, but also new airfoils, an extended bomb bay, improved avionics, low-level ride control, and facilities for a four-man crew. Such time- consuming modifications, which would be tantamount to rebuilding the aircraft from the ground up, would cost over half as much as the procurement of new B-1s. This ignores the sunk costs of both. The resulting fleet of 270 twenty-five year old modified/rebuilt B-52s would not have the force capability or the longevity of the smaller, more cost-effective B-1 fleet. The FB-111 is more limited in range and payload, but does relatively well in initial survivability, although its time to safe-escape distance is one-fourth again International Security I 92

that of the B-1. The aircraft was initially designed as a fighter-bomber-its physical dimensions are about half those of the B-1 and it weighs about a third as much. Modifications to “stretch’ the FB-111 do not overcome its fundamental range-payload shortcomings. The resultant stretched FB-111G cannot carry suff i- Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/isec/article-pdf/1/2/78/689958/isec.1.2.78.pdf by guest on 28 September 2021 cient fuel or weapons to give adequate target coverage, according to the JSBS. A new “stretched-stretched’ version, dubbed the FB-111H, has been proposed to overcome such inadequacy. Analyses show that the FB-111H can carry a maximum load that is only one-half that of the B-1, over lesser distances. The FB-111H is completely dependent on tankers to cross the Atlantic, and lacks the space in its small airframe to carry sufficient avionics and ECM to neutralize projected enemy defenses. In the JSBS, the FB-111G was shown to be the least cost-effective alternative to the B-1; the FB-111H would not be materially more effective. Modified FB-llls, therefore, are not a realistic substitute for the B-1 fleet. The development of a wide-bodied transport-type aircraft, loaded with new standoff missiles, is popular among many B-1 critics. Such a concept is usually es- poused as a backup to ICBMs and SLBMs, with a minimum force based on the assured destruction retaliatory mission. Disregarding the lack of foresight in such a doctrine as has been discussed previously, the transport-with-missile concept lacks some of the basic necessities belonging to a credible and viable deterrent system. Furthermore, the realities of aircraft and missile design are often ignored by pro- ponents of the transport method. The initial survival of the transport is in question, as is its survivability while launching its missiles near hostile territory. Both penetration survival and effectiveness of an Air-Launched Cruise Missile (ALCM) have yet to be proven. (Dis- cussion here is limited to cruise missiles, rather than long-range air-launched ballistic missiles.) Large transport aircraft, such as the Boeing 747, Douglas DC-10, or Lockheed 1011, are difficult to harden against nuclear effects, have engines that are difficult to start rapidly, and have slower escape speeds than does the B-1. These draw- backs, combined with the possibility of a patterned attack by SLBMs, mean that initial survival could be low. The feasibility and effectiveness of such a patterned attack against the transports’ air bases is increased by the fewer numbers of lucrative targets that the transport-ALCM fleet presents to the enemy-up to one hundred ALCMs are proposed to be carried per aircraft. Putting the aircraft on airborne alert is an expensive answer to attack vulnerability, to say nothing of reduced airframe life resulting from greatly increased flying hours. The ALCM as envisioned would have a range of no more than 1,500 nautical miles. Projected Soviet defenses could attack the transport some 500 nautical miles The Case for the B-1 Bomber I 93

off their shores and boundaries, meaning that the ALCM should be launched fram at least that standoff distance. The remaining 1,000 nautical miles of penetration into enemy territory should best be done at low altitude. The low-altitude range of proposed ALCMs has not been verified-range figures quoted usually pertain to Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/isec/article-pdf/1/2/78/689958/isec.1.2.78.pdf by guest on 28 September 2021 a high-altitude, best-cruise flight envelope where the missile is vulnerable to air defenses. One of the ACLM’s major penetration problems is that its tiny airframe may not have room for sophisticated ECM or avionics to guide it around unexpected defense sites. Its average speed is barely faster than a World War I1 V-1 buzz- bomb, and it is expected to incur heavy attrition in attacks against targets protected by low-altitude-capable SAMs. Reliable, precise accuracy is a basic requirement for the ALCM. The guidance system most often proposed uses map-matching of terrain to the selected target- an operational system using such a concept is undergoing continued development. The JSBS found that a force of primarily B-1s will place about twice as many weapons on target as will an equal-cost force using only standoff missiles. An additional drawback of the ALCM is the way that it has been treated in SALT. The Vladivostock Accords are interpreted by the Soviets to include a 600- kilometer (373-nautical mile) range limit on air-launched missiles, be they ballistic or cruise. This missile range limitation would discount transport-type aircraft as launchers-the launcher probably would be required to penetrate part way to the targets. Even with a cruise missile range of 1,500 nautical miles (a very optmistic figure), only those targets within 1,000 nautical miles of the border could be reached by standoff missiles. Furthermore the ALCM would be more effective if carried by a penetrating bomber. While it does not stand by itself as an alternative to the B-1, the ALCM could be used as an additional weapon for the B-1, thereby increasing the bomber’s versatility. The alternatives to the B-1 come off as poor seconds in all cases. To eliminate manned bombers is not a rational option. The modified B-52 is expensive, not as effective as the B-1, and still an old airplane. The stretched FB-111 cannot do the required job. The ALCM concept is only based on optimism and has not been tech- nically validated-transport-type launcher vulnerability and low overall effectiveness are serious additional shortcomings. The comprehensive forty man-year effort of the Joint Strategic Bomber Study showed that the B-1 is the most cost-effective way to modernize the strategic bomber force. Cost-effectiveness, however, should not necessarily be the ‘over- riding criterion for the selection of a strategic weapon. Effectiveness is primary. International Security I 94

Costs of the B-1

It has been said that the most important social service a government can provide

for its citizens is ro keep them alive and free. Other social services are meaningless Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/isec/article-pdf/1/2/78/689958/isec.1.2.78.pdf by guest on 28 September 2021 without such security. What price, then, should be put on such a fundamental service? The United States is planning to spend only 9.1 percent of the fiscal year 1977 defense total obligational authority on strategic forces. This includes the Air Force, Navy, and Army; offensive and defensive forces; all procurement, operations and maintenance, personnel, RDT&E, and military construction. Thus, less than one-tenth of the defense budget is dedicated to the basic issue of deterring nuclear war. The B-1 is called a “$20 billion” program, but that amount needs ro be put in the perspective of the total defense budget requests for the next few years. In fiscal year 1977, the B-1 program is 1.4 percent of the defense budget request; it is

Figure 3 Strategic Systems-Development and Production Cost, 1980 Dollars

$ Billions 50 1 Polaris/Poseidon

Minuteman 40 I

30 I B-52 *------I

B-1 20 I

10 I

0- Actual Costs

1980 Costs i”’t I I Modifications L---J The Case for the B-1 Bomber I 95

Table 3 Inflation’s Effect on the costs of the 8-1

Total Program Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/isec/article-pdf/1/2/78/689958/isec.1.2.78.pdf by guest on 28 September 2021 R&D Procurement Program

Then-year dollars 3.98 17.58 21.48 1976 dollars 3.78 12.98 16.68

Cost Per Aircraft

~~~ Program Procurement Flyaway

Then-year dollars 87.81111 72.8M 64.3M 1976 dollars 68.OM 53.5M 47.2M

1.7 percent in 1978,2.1 percent in 1979, and 2.6 percent in 1980. Such small per- centages of the defense budget are indeed warranted to validate America’s Triad of deterrent capabilities. The B-1’s costs are not excessive when compared to those of our existing strategic deterrent systems as shown in Figure 3. Development and production costs of these programs include appropriate expenditures for initial spares, ground support equipment, training, data, military construction, submarines, and support ships. If these costs are measured in 1980 dollars (i.e., inflated from the actual then-year dollars), they show that the B-1 program will be slightly less expensive than was the B-52 program. Even more startling is the fact that the Minuteman and Polaris/Poseidon missile programs cost about twice and two-and-a-quarter times as much as will the B-1 program when measured in dollars of constant pur- chasing power. The $20 billion total B-1 program cost figure considers inflation; approximately half the cost when the program is finished a decade from now will be for inflation (in 1986 dollars). B-1 costs are erroneously quoted without appropriate qualifica- tion. For example, it is inappropriate to quote the cost of the B-1 in infllated 1986 dollars when comparing it with today’s weapon systems. Table 3 shows procurement as well as program costs for a B-1 fleet of 244 aircraft (this includes four test plane^).^ Inflation is primarily responsible for the overrun of the B-1’s initial cost pro-

5. In assessing the cost per aircraft, “program” includes all costs including R&D, “procurement” includes B-1 ground support equipment and initial spare parts but not R&D, “flyaway” cost is the B-1’s sticker price which excludes R&D as well as initial spare parts and ground support equipment. International Security 1 96

jection. At the program’s inception in 1970, total real cost was estimated at $9.9 billion and with inflation in the outyears, the cost was placed at $11.2 billion. Start- ing in 1970, without infiation, there was a slight increase in cost in 1973; from that time on, in real terms of 1970 dollars without inflation, the cost has been level. Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/isec/article-pdf/1/2/78/689958/isec.1.2.78.pdf by guest on 28 September 2021 The resultant 2 percent in real growth per year, with no growth since 1973, are the figures by which the B-1 program management should be judged. Inflation distorts the program cost picture.

Operational Effects of B-1 Development

The B-1 will continue to provide the United States strategic forces with the manned bomber’s versatile resources. The B-1 force can be used to deter direct attack on the United States or its allies and can also be used in lesser conflicts while still re- taining its nuclear deterrent capability. As a visible deterrent, the B-1 is unlike the ballistic missile system; its posture can be changed. Preplanned or ad hoc positioning of the bombers can show national resolve in response to crises. Continuing crisis management might call for launching the B-1s to ensure their survival and to position them for immediate attack. The B-1 can carry a larger and more diverse payload than any other strategic system and deliver it with precision. Its sensors can sight directly on the target and assess damage in real-time. The men in the crew can select alternative targets as required, and the bomber can be used repeatedly. The B-1 is intentionally designed with growth potential for avionics, propulsion, and other systems. If unanticipated defensive threats arise, tactics or avionics can be adapted to neutralize them. The B-1 also provides a hedge against possible breakthroughs in Soviet anti-submarine warfare or counterforce ability, and against sudden abrogation of the ABM treaty. The development of the B-1 exploits technology and professional operational expertise which the United States has, unlike the Soviet Union. The United States can build, maintain, and operate a sophisticated weapon system such as the B-1 better than any potential adversary. Through the development and deployment of the B-1, the United States can substantially offset the worsening imbalance in de- liverable megatonnage while materially enhancing our strategic options. The B-1 enjoys two critical technological advantages over the B-52; the enemy’s defenses are challenged by the B-1’s 50 percent greater penetration speed and its 96 percent reduction in radar cross section. To counter the B-1, an enemy must invest in new defenses, thereby diverting funds from offensive systems or from non-military programs. The Case for the B-1 Bomber I 97

It appears that extremely low-level SAM systems are not technologically feasible or economically practical because line-of-sight limitations require great numbers of SAM sites in order to provide an acceptable defense. Therefore, defenses against the B-1 need to be airborne. Such defenses include Airborne Warning and Con- Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/isec/article-pdf/1/2/78/689958/isec.1.2.78.pdf by guest on 28 September 2021 trol System (AWACS) type aircraft and fast interceptors with look-down fire control systems and shoot-down missiles. Not only are such systems expensive and difficult to implement, but they are also vulnerable to appropriately designed ECM and to bomber defense missiles, e.g., an advanced SRAM with air-to-air capability. Because of their relatively few numbers and key role in the enemy’s defense, AWACS aircraft would be lucrative targets for the latter. Defenses against the B-1 need to be modern, highly sophisticated systems; potential enemies other than the Soviet Union, therefore, will probably not have them. This means that the B-1 will be a highly credible deterrent to hostile nth nations and the Peoples’ Republic of China. As a pillar of our strategic forces, the B-1 will help deter all levels of nuclear aggression. The United States has three strategic options : to recapture unquestioned superi- ority in deterrent forces, to retain essential equivalence with the Soviet Union, or to accept inferiority. In our evolving strategic doctrine, we have accepted essential equivalence. Because we have made a conscious decision to be inferior in missiles, the balance must be made up in manned bombers. Additionally, our gaming calls for modulated, flexible response to all types of aggression. The requirements for the manned bomber have been painstakingly developed by over a decade of detailed studies and experience. The €3-1has been designed to meet the national goals and doctrine that deterrence requires, to perform a variety of missions in support of these goals, and to foil all defensive measures should deterrence fail.