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The B-1 Bomber 1 the B-1 Bomber 1 been flying for nearly two years. The three prototype aircraft in the flight test pro- gram represent the culmination of about fifteen years of study and evaluation aimed at defining the requirements for the new manned bomber in the United Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/isec/article-pdf/1/2/78/689958/isec.1.2.78.pdf by guest on 28 September 2021 States strategic deterrent force. Results of extensive studies have affirmed the future role of the penetrating manned bomber. Results of the evaluations have assured that the B-1 can perform that role. A replacement for the high-altitude B-52 bomber was first contemplated in 1961 when the Subsonic, Low-Altitude Bomber (SLAB) was investigated. Studies of an Extended-Range Strategic Aircraft (ERSA) and a Low-Altitude Manned Penetrator (LAMP) followed in 1963. That year studies were begun for procuring an Advanced Manned Penetrator (AMP) and an Advanced Manned Penetrating Strategic System (AMPSS). After these two studies were completed in 1965, further studies, this time for an Advanced Manned Strategic Aircraft (AMSA) were begun. The AMSA studies continued into 1969 and led to the Air Force re- questing contractor bids for the B-1. After nearly seven months of evaluation, Rockwell International was selected over two competitors to develop the B-1 to meet the AMSA specifications. There has been an evolution of the roles and requirements for what is now the B-1 ever since 1961. All the manned bomber studies of the past fifteen years have been considered. Yet despite this systematic and deliberate role formulation, questions about the B-1 still are raised. They are generally of two types : -Why produce a penetrating, manned bomber in the missile age? -If there is a need for such an aircraft, is the B-1 the “correct” bomber? The answers are, in part, related to the broader issues of national security policy and the evolving strategic environment. Therefore, assessments of the B-1 should include a review of America’s current strategic policies and the weapons required to implement such policies. Each element of the Triad has its strengths and weak- nesses. The manned bomber force has capabilities that uniquely complement the weaknesses of the Triads two other elements, the land- and sea-based ICBMs. United States Strategic Forces and the Triad Amid great controversy in 1974, Secretary of Defense Schlesinger announced a John F. McCarthy Jr., is Director of Massachusetts Institute of Technology’s Center for Space Research and Professor of Aeronautics and Astronautics. He was Vice-president, Systems Engi- neering, at North American Rockwell, Los Angeles, California, until 1971. 78 The Case for the B-1 Bomber I 79 new doctrine of counterforce targeting. The doctrine, however, has evolved over the years and has been brought to fruition through the enlightened thinking of those who reject the unacceptability of having only a capability for assured destruc- tion, with the repulsive choice of capitulation or annihilation that it implies. While Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/isec/article-pdf/1/2/78/689958/isec.1.2.78.pdf by guest on 28 September 2021 there may be problems in defining exact requirements for weapons to implement such a doctrine, it is apparent that a variety of versatile systems is desirable. These combined weapon systems should survive enemy offensive action and also be effective against all enemy targets. The enemy's perception of American resolve can be enhanced by the evident quality of such weapons-that perception is funda- mental ro deterring all levels of nuclear conflict. Our strategic forces-our Triad of weapons-must be viewed as instruments for the conduct of this broader strate- gic doctrine and assessed accordingly. Table 1 Current United States Strategic Force Warheads Type No. Yield Number Total Land-based ICBMs Minuteman II 1 1-2 MT 450 Minuteman Ill 3 170 KT 550 Titan II 1 5-10 MT 54 1,054 Sea-based SLBMs Polaris A3 3 200 KT 160 Poseidon C3 1O* 50 KT MIRV** 496" 656 Type Payload Number Total Manned Bombers 6-52D 10,000 pounds of gravity bombs 80t 6-52F (Not flown or operationally None assigned) 6-52G 6 SRAMs + 4 gravity bombs77 173 6-52-H 6 SRAMs + 4 gravity bombst+ 98 FB-111A 6 SRAMs (nominal) 66 417 'Poseidon C3 can carry up to 14 MIRVs over reduced ranges. **27 of the planned 31 Poseidon submarines are completed for a present basing total of 432 bases. t128 6-52Ds are flying, but only 80 are scheduled to have the "Pacer Plank" structural modifica- tions to extend their useful service life. ttNominal payload; the B-52G/H can carry 20 SRAMs - 8 internally plus 12 externally. The no- minal load given is used on alert aircraft. International Security I The Triad of the United States strategic forces consists of three types of weap- ons, land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), sea-based submarine- launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and manned bombers. There is nothing magic about the number three, but the three present strategic systems work in concert to Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/isec/article-pdf/1/2/78/689958/isec.1.2.78.pdf by guest on 28 September 2021 minimize their individual weaknesses and to maximize their individual strengths. This synergistic effect is one of the bases for having more than one type of system. The manned bomber force, for example, greatly complicates an enemy's attack timing. The B-1 especially accentuates this time problem. Because it can operate from shorter, narrower, and softer runways than the B-52 (or than the proposed transport-type missile launchers), the B-1 can be dispersed in times of crisis to many more air bases. The B-1's quicker reaction and faster getaway discourage a patterned enemy attack on its air bases-the enemy simply cannot prevent the escape of a large number of aircraft. Furthermore, far too many enemy warheads would be required in a patterned attack around an airbase to assure the destruc- tion of a single escaping B-1. It is planned that each element of the Triad, such as the bomber force, will be updated as technological and doctrinal advances warrant. For example, the next generation of ICBMs-the MX-is now being studied because of concern for the survivability of our land-based missile force. Primary efforts in the MX study have been directed toward guidance and propulsion systems for the missile that at first would be deployed in modified Minuteman silos. Alternative basing options in- volving air and ground mobility are also being studied. The sea-based deterrent is also being improved. The follow-on SLBM under development is the Trident I, which extends the 2,500-nautical mile range of Polaris/Poseidon to about 4,000 nautical miles. It is planned that these missiles will be deployed in ten Poseidon submarines, while the more advanced Trident 11's will require their own twenty-four-tube submarines. The B-52 bomber fleet of G and H models, for its part, is being modified to ex- tend its useful life by adding equipment for short-range attack missiles (SRAM), an electro-optical viewing system, the phase 6 electronic countermeasure (ECM) package, and cartridge starters for quick engine starts. Electronic equipment changes are also being made to the small FB-111A fleet to improve its effective- ness. The follow-on bomber is the B-1. The most obvious benefit of the interaction of these three types of weapons in the Triad is in the dilemma they present to an attacking enemy. As Secretary of the Air Force Reed has said, "Its diversity poses an insoluble targeting problem to any aggressor. Any attack that might seriously cripple one leg of the Triad The Case for the B-1 Bomber I 81 constitutes a clear and unambiguous warning to the other two. There is no known way to attack all three simultaneously.”’ Each type of weapon system relies on a different technique for survival from enemy attack-the ICBMs are in hardened holes, the SLBMs are hidden in the seas, and the bombers can take off Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/isec/article-pdf/1/2/78/689958/isec.1.2.78.pdf by guest on 28 September 2021 within minutes of warning of attack on their bases. The ability of the aircraft itself to survive attack is all the more important because the United States has minimal active defenses. The weapon types present different targeting and defense problems to enemy forces. ICBMs come hurtling in at some 14,000 miles per hour surrounded by their cloud of decoys and other confusing penetration aids. SLBMs can attack from any direction and their launch points are unknown. Bombers thwart high- altitude air defenses by penetrating at low altitudes beneath the cover of line-of- sight radars that direct interceptors and missiles and by using a selection of ECM to confuse those defenses that might detect them. EFFECTIVENESS OF THE TRIAD Each element of the Triad provides different techniques for destruction of targets. The overall kill probability of a given warhead against a given target is a function of the yield of the warhead, the accuracy with which it is delivered, and the hard- ness of the target. The present yield of the Minuteman I1 warheads (170 KT) re- quires greater accuracy than that currently attainable to destroy extremely hard targets. While our fifty-four Titan ICBMs have large-yield (5 to 10 MT) warheads, their accuracy is not as good as that of the Minuteman.
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