On Target Organizing and Executing the Strategic Air Campaign Against Iraq
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THE USAF IN THE PERSIAN GULF WAR On Target Organizing and Executing the Strategic Air Campaign Against Iraq Richard G. Davis Air Force History and Museums Program United States Air Force Washington, D.C., 2002 Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are solely those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the Air Force History and Museums Program, the U.S. Air Force, the Department of Defense, or any other U.S. government agency. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Davis, Richard G. On target : organizing and executing the strategic air campaign against Iraq / Richard G. Davis. p. cm. — (The USAF in the Persian Gulf War) 1. Persian Gulf War, 1991—Aerial operations, American. 2. Persian Gulf War, 1991— Campaigns—Iraq. 3. United States. Air Force—History—Persian Gulf War, 1991. I. Title. II. Series. DS79.744.A47 D39 2002 956.7044'248—dc21 2002015525 Other Publications from the AIR FORCE HISTORY AND MUSEUMS PROGRAM NOTICE: This volume covers only strategic air operations over Iraqi territory. For coverage of air matters in the Kuwaiti Theater of Operations, please read Perry Jamieson’s Lucrative Targets. Richard G. Davis, Roots of Conflict: A Military Perspective on the Middle East and Persian Gulf Crisis, 1993. Perry Jamieson, Lucrative Targets: The U.S. Air Force in the Kuwaiti Theater of Operations, 2001. Steven B. Michael, The Persian Gulf War: An Air Staff Chronology of Desert Shield/Desert Storm, forthcoming. William T. Y’Blood, The Eagle and The Scorpion: The Desert Shield First Phase Deployment, forthcoming. William T. Y’Blood, Sharpening the Eagles Talons: USAF and the Desert Shield Second Phase Deployment, forthcoming. Diane T. Putney, Airpower Advantage: Planning the Gulf War Air Campaign, forthcoming. Foreword The war in the Persian Gulf in 1991 capped an era of USAF modernization and enhanced readiness begun in the late 1970s and that continued through the 1980s. The long lead-time weapons acquisition and training programs, begun a decade or more earlier, came to fruition against a far different opponent and in an unforeseen locale than that envisioned by their creators. The force designed to counter the superpower foe of the Cold War, the USSR, never fought a direct battle against that enemy during the existence of the Soviet Union. Instead, the USAF fought the first war of the so-called New World Order, a war that had as much in common with the colonial wars of the late nineteenth century as it had with the high-technology wars of the late twentieth century. The USAF shouldered the bulk of the fighting for the first thirty-nine of the conflict’s forty-two days. This volume covers the air offensive against strategic military and economic targets within the pre-August 1990 borders of Iraq. The offensive air plan once again displayed the ability of the U.S. military to turn the necessity of improvisation into a virtue when, in mid-August 1990, an element of the Air Staff in the Pentagon wrote the basis of the offensive plan in ten days. The plan was founded upon the precepts of Col. John A. Warden III’s air power theories—centers of gravity, shock effect, and the importance of leadership-relat- ed targets. Once the outline plan reached the arena of operations, the U.S. Central Air Forces (CENTAF), under the able leadership of Lt. Gen. Charles A. Horner, adopted the targeting philosophy of the plan and, after many modifications owing to new targets and an increased force structure, employed it with devastat- ing effect. The author describes not only the outstanding performance of USAF men and machines but also the difficulties and complexities of coordinating the many elements of air and staff operations. Among these were the complex coordination of the fighters with their tankers, the speedy transmission of data from the all- seeing eyes of AWACS and JSTARS aircraft, the multiple bomb runs over chem- ical and biological warfare bunkers, and the shortcomings of certain types of intelligence. All these factors impacted on mission effectiveness. The author also diagrams how outside influences—political pressure from neutrals, such as the Israelis, and from public news media—can affect the direction of the bombing effort. Although this account of the air campaign in the Persian Gulf concentrates on the operational history of a six-week war, it also places that war into its larg- v Foreword er political and military context, especially in its tale of the interplay between the U.S. military and civilian leadership. It illustrates, with reference to actual mis- sions, the operational advantages of stealth fighter bombers as well as their vul- nerabilities. Davis presents the reader with a detailed account of one of the USAF’s most important air operations in the last half of the twentieth century. In the decade after the conclusion of the Gulf War, the pattern of strategic air operations against Iraq became the template for USAF operations over Bosnia and during the air war over Serbia and, most recently, in Afghanistan as well. In planning for air operations in the Balkans, USAF officers were strongly influ- enced by John A. Warden’s methodology and ideology with its emphasis on cen- ters of gravity and strikes on leadership targets. Stealth air combat operations, inaugurated en masse in the Gulf War, became even more prevalent with the introduction of the B–2 bomber. Likewise, the use of precision weapons grew. The aversion of western democracies to both military and civilian casualties and their effect on targeting, tactics, and strategy first encountered over Iraq became more pronounced in subsequent conflicts—as did the continuing challenge in matching accurate intelligence to precision weapons. Because of these enduring trends, study of the Persian Gulf War will con- tinue to offer members of the service and the public valuable insights and inform- ation applicable to current military affairs. RICHARD P. HALLION The Air Force Historian vi Author’s Note This work is focused on the “offensive air campaign against Iraq,” a term implying that the strategic phase of the air campaign that attacked military and economic targets in Iraq proper was part of a larger overall air operation. The author also uses the term “strategic air campaign” sometimes interchangeably with “offensive air campaign” to refer to the strategic phase of the campaign, not the overall campaign. No air operation occurs in a vacuum, especially one involving the vast geographic distances of the theater of operations and the numerous military units supplied by the Coalition partners. The author, therefore, has made a thorough effort to place the Persian Gulf War in its larger political and military context to explain the motivations behind the Coalition’s conduct of the campaign. The professionalism of the USAF also profoundly affected the conduct of operations. It is important to understand that the unprecedentedly high morale, discipline, and training of U.S. servicemen and women, which rested to some extent upon honoring local customs and the strictures of Islam and to a greater extent on the all-volunteer military, had a positive affect on operations. The extraordinary air plan, hastily developed for the strategic phase of the campaign by the Air Staff, provided the linchpin for this narrative. The underly- ing targeting philosophy of the plan, not necessarily all its details, drove the final prewar preparations and directed much of the first ten days of the war, as well as heavily influenced air operations to the conflict’s end. The plan’s goals and objectives, drawn up by airmen and approved by the national leadership, provide a ready-made yardstick for judging the USAF’s performance in the strategic air phases of operations against Iraq. Neither in the light of operations in the Balkans nor those in Afghanistan in the decade since this work’s creation has the author found reason to change his original conclusions as expressed here. Many people assisted me in the research and preparation of this volume. The support of my wife, Lois, my daughter, Erin, and my sons, Owen and Colin, enabled me to spend many long hours away from home at the classified word processor in my office and at Langley and Shaw AFBs and Hurlburt Field. Several members of the Air Force History Field Program gave freely of their time, supplying useful advice and directing me through valuable records in their custody. In particular, I would like to thank Grant M. Hales, George W. Bradley III, James M. George, CMSgt. Gerald Wright, Jeffery S. Underwood, David L. Rosmer, Barry R. Barlow, Patrick E. Murray, Herbert A. Mason, Jr., and SSgt. Randy G. Bergeron. Dr. Wayne Thompson, assigned to the Center for Air Force vii Author’s Note History, served as the Checkmate historian from early August 1990 through June 1991 and as then as Senior Historical Advisor to the Gulf War Air Power Survey. Historians owe a permanent debt to him for the documentation he collected and preserved. He generously shared his unique knowledge of wartime planning and personnel with all members of the History Support Office Desert Shield/Storm writing team. The reviewers of the first draft of the manuscript, Gen. Charles A. Horner, Lt. Gen. Buster C. Glosson, Col. John A. Warden III, Col. George K. Williams, Lt. Col. David A. Deptula, Lt. Col. Bernard E. Harvey, and Herman Wolk, earned the author’s gratitude for their painstaking and honest work, which revealed new insights into wartime operations. I would further also like to thank my colleagues in the Air Force History Support Office—especially Dr. Perry D. Jamieson, Dr. Diane T. Putney, and William T.