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El Nuevo Liderazgo En China Eugenio Anguiano

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El Nuevo Liderazgo En China Eugenio Anguiano El nuevo liderazgo en China Eugenio Anguiano CECHIMEX-FACULTAD DE ECONOMÍA-UNAM 6 DE MARZO DE 2013 Comité Permanente del Buró Político del 18° CC del PC, por orden jerárquico Nombre, cargo en el PC y edad Estudios y otros cargos (2012) Xi Jinping 习近平, secretario general y Ingeniero químico y dr., en marxismo. pres., CMC, 59 Pres. RPCH y CMC Li Keqiang 李克强, 57 Abogado y economista. Primer ministro Zhang Dejiang 张德江, 66 Economista. Pres. APN (legislativo) Yu Zhengsheng 俞正声, 66 Ing., balística. Pres. CCPPCH (legislativo-frente unido) Liu Yunshan 刘云山, Srio. Ejecu. 65 Periodista. Jefe de la Escuela Central, PC Wang Qishan 王岐山, srio. CCID 64 Historiador Zhang Gaoli 张高丽, 63 Economista. Vice premier ejecutivo Liderazgo (G7) del 18° Congreso del PCC: Xi Jinping, Li Keqiang, Zhang Dejiang, Yu Zhengsheng, Liu Yunshan, Wang Qishan y Zhang Gaoli Xi Jinping 习近平 (1.06.1953), Beijing (Fuping, Shaanxi, ancestral). Jefe del secretariado general del CC del PC; vicepresidente de la RPCH y de CMC del partido. Hijo de Xi Zhongxun. Ingeniero químico de la Universidad de Tsinghua (清华大学) y doctor en teoría marxista de la escuela de Humanidades y CS de la misma universidad. Jefe de Estado en marzo de 2013. Peng Liyuan, 彭丽媛 (Liyuan significa belleza majestuosa), n. 20/11/1962 en Yuncheng, Shandong. La nueva “primera dama” de China es una famosa cantante vernácula del EPL y tiene grado de mayor-general (general de brigada) en los grupos musicales de las FF AA Li Kejiang 立克疆 (1.07.1955), Dingyuan, Anhui. Vice Primer Ministro (ejecutivo) del CE. Abogado y doctor en economía de la Universidad de Beijing (北京大学).Posible jefe de gobierno en 2013 Zhang Dejiang (张德江), 11.1946 (66 años), Tai’an, Liaoning. Estudió coreano en la Universidad de Yanbian (延边大学), Jilin, y economía en la Kim Il-sung (Pyongyang). Fue secretario del PC en Zhejiang y Guangdong; vicepremier, y actualmente Srio. PC en Chongqing. Posible jefe de la APN (Poder Legislativo) Yu Zhengsheng (俞正声), Shaoxing, Zhejiang, 4.1945; 67 años. Entró al PC el 11.1964. Graduado en ingeniería de misiles, Instituto de Ingeniería Militar de Harbin, Srio. Del PC en Harbin. Posible jefe de la CCPPCH Liu Yunshan, 刘云山, nació el 7.1947(65 años) en Xinzhou, Shanxi. Egresado de la Escuela Central del PC. Trabajó 20 años en Mongolia Interior, BP en 2002. Secretario ejecutivo del secretariado CC y jefe de la escuela Central del PCCH. Wang Qishan (王岐山), 7.1948, 64 años, en Qingdao, Shandong. Historiador de la Universidad del Noroeste (西北大学), Xi’an. Vice Primer Ministro a cargo de asuntos de energía y financiero. Ex gobernador del Banco de Construcción (1994-1997).Representante personal de Hu en el US-China Strategic & Economic Dialogue. Entró al BP en 2007. Nombrado secretario de la CCID Zhang Gaoli (张高丽). Jinjiang, Fujian (11-1946; 65 años). Entró al PC en 12.1973. Graduado en economía (planificación y estadística) en la Universidad de Xiamen. Secretario del PC en Tianjin. fue líder de la zona económica especial de Shenzhen. Posible VPM ejecutivo Los 18 restantes miembros del buró político por orden de trazos Buró político del 18° CC: 3 reelectos y 15 nuevos; 2 mujeres; 2 militares Militares: Sun Chunlan (f) (62), Tianjin Fan Changlong (62) VPCMC Zhang Chunxian (59), Xinjiang Xu Qiliang (65)VPCMC Otros secretarios miembros del CC: Wang Rulin (59), Jilin Zhao Zhengyong (61), Shaanxi Xia Baolong (60), Zhejiang You Quan (58), Fujian Wang Jun, Mongolia Interior Sin otros cargos en el PC (6): Ma Kai (67), [Consejero de Edo.] Funcionales (4): Wang Huning (57) (C de E) Li Zhanshu (62), Oficina General (S-17° CC) Liu Yandong R (f), (67) [Consejera] Zhao Leji (55), Oficina Organización Li Yuanchao R (62) Liu Qibao (59), Propaganda Wang Yang R (57) Meng Jianzhu (65), Asuntos Políticos y Li Jianguo (66) Jutídicos Secretarios provinciales (6): Guo Jinlong (65), Beijing Han Zheng (58), Shanghai Sun Chengzai (49), Chonqing Hu Chunhua (Guangdong) Secretariado del 18° Comité Central del PCC Cuadros (BP) de la 5ª y 6ª generaciones de los más viejos a los más jóvenes Nombre, año de nacimiento y otros datos Posición en el partido y otros Liu Qibao, 1953, Susong, Anhui, historia y NBP; jefe de propaganda admon. NBP Zhang Chunxian, 1953, administración-ing. NBP; Srio. Xinjiang Yang Jing, mongol, 1953, estudios Univ. CC, presidente Com. Estatal Mongolia Interior y ECP Asuntos Étnicos Han Zheng, 1954, economista NBP, Srio. Shanghai Wang Huning, 1955, política internacional NBP, secretario del C de E Fudan Wang Yang, 1955, ingeniero RBP (ex srio Guangdong) Zhao Leji, 1955, filosofía, Universidad de NBP, jefe departamento de Beijing organización Sun Zhengcai, 1963, doctor en agricultura NBP; Srio. Chongqing Hu Chunhua, 1963, estudió en Beida y ECPC NPB; Srio. Gunagdong Zhang Chunxian (1953); Lu Hao (1945) srio de la LJC, Sun Zhengcai (1963), Wang Hunning (1955), graduado en la Universidad de Fudan en el departamento de política y economía. Xi Jinping. Li Keqiang, Zhang Dejiang, Yu Shengsheng, Liu Yunshan, Wang Qishan y Zhang Gaoli. Liu Qibao, Zhao Leji, Li Zhanshu, Ma Kai , Hu Chunhua, Wang Yang y Sun Zhengcai. Yang Jin, Han Zheng, Comisión Militar Central del 18° CC del PC “Administración social”, eufemismo para referirse al control de la disidencia y para minimizar los retos al régimen político. Xi Jinping avanzó en sus primeros 100 días de liderazgo en consolidar el control sobre la comisión de asuntos jurídicos y políticos del CC, la cual ya no quedó en el CPBP, en el control de la policía popular armada y en el de los altos mandos de la FF AA. El viaje de Xi a Shenzhen (reminiscencia del viaje de Deng al sur) y su discurso de diciembre de 2012 sobre el imperio de la ley despertaron ilusiones entre los liberales, pero las acciones no se compadecen. Los nuevos secretarios de Shanghai (Han Sheng BP), Jilin (Wang Ruilin), Shaanxi (Zhao Zhengyong) y Zhejiang (Xia Baolong) fueron gobernadores o alcaldes en las mismas jurisdicciones. Los gobernadores designados de Guizhou (Chen Min’er, 62), Zhejiang (Li Qiang), Shaanxi (Lou Qinjian), Shanxi (Li Xiaopeng) y jilin (Bayin Chaolu) también trabajaron en las mismas provincias en posiciones importantes. Este grupo de secretario del PC y funcionarios gubernamentales tiene una clara trayectoria de trabajo en los comités político-legales provinciales encargados del control y la estabilidad política. Política exterior nacionalista , asertiva y expansionista El nuevo liderazgo asume mandos y muestra sus inclinaciones a los más de 100 días del 18° Congreso del PC Existe una hoja de ruta básica que lega Hu Jintao y el liderazgo saliente (4ª generación). En lo político consolidar la estabilidad y continuar con la modernización del sistema establecido (dictadura democrática popular), el combate a la corrupción dentro del partido y la transferencia de mando a una 5ª generación (que se completaría en 2017). En lo económico entrar a una era de crecimiento “maduro” ; consolidación de las industrias de punta; desarrollo del sector servicios; consumo interno como principal fuerza motriz (menos dependencia de exportaciones y altas tasas de inversión); fuerza laboral más calificada y mejor pagada; innovación tecnológica y de organización como insumo estratégico; reducción de la polarización económica (entre personas, entre ciudad y campo, entre provincias y entre sectores productivos). Objetivo: En 2030 alcanzar una sociedad de alto ingreso, moderna, armoniosa y creativa. .
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