CollisionCollision ofof EurocityEurocity traintrain No.No. 108108 withwith anan obstacleobstacle (fallen(fallen bridgebridge structure)structure) inin StudenkaStudenka stationstation
Ing. Hana Pechačová Ing. Michal Miklenda The Rail Safety Inspection Office AccidentAccident basicbasic datadata
Date and time: 8th August 2008, 10:30:27 Grade: serious accident Location: Studenka station, track No. 101, km 243,576 Bohumin – Prerov main track max. track speed for the EC train: 140 km/h
Occurrence description: A road bridge above the station collapsed just in front of approaching Eurocity train No. 108. The train collided with the ruins of the bridge and derailed. 4 derailed carriages consequently collided with a stationary goods train, causing derailment of 3 wagons of the goods train.
AccidentAccident sitesite
Prague
Studénka
AccidentAccident sitesite
Direction Ostrava
accident site km 243.576 approaching train EC 108
Direction Praha
AccidentAccident sitesite
Direction Ostrava
approaching train EC 108 accident site km 243.576
Direction Praha
ConsequencesConsequences Fatality: 7 + 1 passengers (1died after 30 days) Injuries: 84 passengers 4 staff (engine driver + 3 train crew)
Damage: CZK 62 458 840,11 (2 500 000 EUR) Totally destroyed: locomotive (class 151) 3 carriages (classes Bpee and Bee) 3 wagons (class Faccp) Damaged: 1 carriage (class Bee) 2 wagons (class Faccp) 288 m of track (tracks No. 101-105) 982 m catenary (tracks No. 101-105) steel concrete bridge construction
ECEC 108108 „Comenius“„Comenius“
locomotive 151.018-9 10 passenger carriages with the passengers (classes: Bpee, Bee, WRm, Ampz) length 266 m mass 539 t cca 400 passengers from Kraków (Poland) to Praha hl. n. (Czech Republic)
RoadRoad bridgebridge
above the tracks the bridge was under the reconstruction should be replaced steel concrete bridge construction weighing 500 t
SituationSituation beforebefore thethe accidentaccident
K
m
Direction 2 Direction
4
Přerov, Praha 3 Studénka, Ostrava
,
5
7
6
104 EC 108 102 Loc 1 2 3 4 5 6 101
103
105b goods train No. 60230
Loc: Locomotive (151 018-9) 1 – 6: first 6 carriages behind the locomotive
ChronologyChronology ofof thethe accidentaccident –– 10:30:0810:30:08
Direction Direction Přerov, Praha Studénka, Ostrava
104 EC 108 102 Loc 1 2 3 4 5 6 101
103
105b goods train No. 60230
bridge construction falls down EC train is 638 m from the bridge at speed of 134 km/h time to collision is 19s the engine driver notices the bridge structure falling down
ChronologyChronology ofof thethe accidentaccident –– 10:30:1310:30:13
Direction Direction Přerov, Praha Studénka, Ostrava
104 EC 108 102 Loc 1 2 3 4 5 6 101
103
105b goods train No. 60230
emergency brake was applied EC train is 452 m from the bridge at speed of 133 km/h time to collision is 14s the engine driver escapes to the engine room
ChronologyChronology ofof thethe accidentaccident –– 10:30:2710:30:27
Direction Direction Přerov, Praha Studénka, Ostrava
104 EC 108 102
101 Loc 1 2 3 4 5 6
103
105b goods train No. 60230
moment of the collision impact speed is 90 km/h the train pushes the construction ahead for 33 m
DynamicDynamic processprocess ofof thethe accidentaccident
Direction Direction Přerov, Praha Studénka, Ostrava
Loc 1 2 3 4 5
the locomotive pushes the bridge construction ahead bridge construction collides with rear part of goods train
DynamicDynamic processprocess ofof thethe accidentaccident
Direction Direction Přerov, Praha Studénka, Ostrava
1 Loc 2 3 4 5 6 7
the locomotive continues over the bridge construction
DynamicDynamic processprocess ofof thethe accidentaccident
Direction Direction Přerov, Praha Studénka, Ostrava
1 Loc 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
carriages jumped over the bridge construction carriage No. 2 collided with 2 wagons of goods train
RSIORSIO responseresponse
Accident occurred at 10:30 RSIO was informed at 10:49 (19 min after the accident) RSIO arrived at the accident site at 11:30 2 investigators of RI Ostrava Director of RI Ostrava Inspector General
Parties at the accident site: IM + RUs RSIO Emergency services (Police, firemen, air rescue service, psychologist...)
OrganisationOrganisation ofof investigationinvestigation processprocess
The accident investigated by team of investigators of RI Ostrava Inspector General established commission of consultants (Directors of RI Brno and RI Praha) Cooperation with NIB Poland External cooperation Technical University of Ostrava, Faculty of Mechanical Engineering (expertise) Škoda výzkum (expertise) Police + criminal police (witnesses)
ScopeScope ofof RSIO'sRSIO's investigationinvestigation
Investigation in the IM area – YES Investigation in the RU area – YES Investigation of causes the bridge collapse – NO (out of the scope of RSIO) Investigation of ensuring safety during the construction works – YES
The RSIO investigated: the causes of a collision of the train with an obstacle (fallen bridge) deficiencies in system ensuring safety during the construction works
d Accidental process
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Unsafe condition Real braking effort 137% Track speed 150 km/h of the bridge construction Reported br. effort 144% not reduced
Construction works in progress
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Czech Railways's position paper: NSA's approach „Clearence gauge mustn't PURE FORMAL be invaded.“
Project documentation doesn't involve: risk assessment, preventative measures, nor description of shifting of the bridge construction
Interaction between construction site and railway (road, aviation, Building Act Building Act water plant) not solved Construction works in progress requires by Building Act using requires the relevant property/land owner's mandatory risk assessment Safety Authority position paper but using the relevant to produce involving their Safety Authority's position paper Risks originating from interaction between railway and ownership rights position paper which may set construction site not mitigated (procedure not defined) only binding conditions CausesCauses
Direct cause (from the railway perspective) Third parties – disruption to clearance gauge of tracks No. 101 – 105b of Studenka station by bridge structure collapsing when EC train No. 108 was approaching
Underlying cause (from the railway perspective) No effective measures eliminating safety risks originating from interaction of reconstruction works and railway traffic were required by results of mandatory procedures performed during preparations of the reconstruction.
RecommendationRecommendation Addressed to the national safety authority
1. It is recommended to ensure that the analysis of interaction of construction works and railway traffic is part of mandatory procedures required for obtaining allowance to start the works. 2. It is recommended to ensure that the allowance to start the works is issued only when effective measures are required in order to eliminate risks identify by the above analysis. 3. It is recommended to require presence of authorized specialist at the site (according to §149 Act No. 183/2006 Coll.) during construction operations identified by the above analysis as operations with higher level of risk; this specialist must be equipped with direct communication connection to person dispatching railway traffic in order to be able to require immediate cancel of traffic in case of emergency. 4. It is recommended to take own measure to ensure implementation of the below recommendation by IM.
RecommendationRecommendation
Addressed to the IM (SZDC, s. o.)
1. It is recommended to ensure that person dispatching railway traffic can immediately take effective measures to ensure railway safety when canceling of railway traffic is requested by authorized specialist via designated communication channel (according to the above recommendation addressed to NSA)
RSIO reserves its right to amend this safety recommendation after identifying the causes of collapse of the bridge structure in order to ensure safe operation of railways and railway traffic.
ConclusionConclusion
Nobody knows exact condition of the bridge structure before the collapse. Thus the investigation of causes of the bridge structure fall can take several years. Question is whether the real causes will be found...
This tragic accident is also called “The fatal eights“ 08. 08. 2008 EC 108
ThankThank youyou forfor youryour attentionattention
AnyAny questions?questions?