Wonder and Scepticism in the Long Twelfth Century
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Wonder and Scepticism in the Long Twelfth Century Keagan Brewer Centre for Medieval and Early Modern Studies Te University of Sydney A thesis submitted in fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. (December, 2016) Please consider the environment before printing this document. Contents Acknowledgements 4 Introduction 5 Chapter 1: Te Forms of Evidence in Marvels Stories 42 1.1 Credibility of the Reporter 44 1.2 Gestures and Manner 57 1.3 Wide Reporting of a Single Event 62 1.4 Similarity to Other Events 68 1.5 Te Post-Factum Viewing of Physical Evidence 74 1.6 Deference to Written Authority 77 1.7 Deference to God’s Omnipotence 83 Chapter 2: Te Role of the Senses in the Experience of Wonder 93 2.1 Te Teological Backlash against Sensory Epistemology 96 2.2 Sensory Experience in Marvels Tales 104 I - Journeys to See Marvels 105 II - Interrogation 110 III - Experiments 113 2.3 Travel and the Senses 119 Chapter 3: Te Effect of Entertainment on the Perception of Truth 140 3.1 Te Entertainment Claim 143 3.2 Pseudo-Fiction 148 3.3 Individual Attitudes to Entertainment 161 Chapter 4: Wonder, Didacticism, and Inductive Reasoning 174 4.1 Local Wonders, Global Morals 179 4.2 Induction and Confirmation Bias 187 4.3 Didacticism and Scepticism 200 Chapter 5: Wonder, Knowledge, and Christianity 214 5.1 Wonder and Knowledge 217 5.2 Disbelief and the Senses 222 5.3 Wonder, Certainty, and Faith 248 Conclusion 261 Bibliography 271 Page #4 of #319 Acknowledgements I would like to thank my supervisors, for their hard work and dedication throughout this project. I would like to thank my markers, whose close criticism and high standards have encourged me to work hard, through which I have improved greatly as a writer and thinker. Troughout my candidature, I have received funding from an Australian Postgraduate Award, and a top-up scholarship from the Australian Research Council’s Centre of Excellence for the History of the Emotions, both of which stem ultimately from Australia’s taxpayers. Without this financial support, I would have been unable to complete these studies, and I am therefore grateful for having been born and raised in such a generous country. I would like to thank the sta" at Fisher Library, for their help in tracking down the many obscure works I have used. Tere are a number of people whose close criticism of my ideas has made them much better by the end, so thank you also to my dear friends David Ong, James Kane, and Giovanni Frischman. I would also like to thank my partner, family, and friends for their endless support and love. Page #5 of #319 Introduction Tis dissertation proposes that wonder is an initial emotional reaction to a novel phenomenon, and that scepticism, a form of cognition, necessarily follows when the phenomenon is su$ciently bizarre, or out of coherence with one’s prior experience. One may then mitigate one’s doubts by either checking facts or suspending disbelief for a variety of reasons: didacticism, apathy, entertainment value, or acknowledgement of an inability to determine truth or falsehood either at the individual, event-specific level or more broadly as a sort of epistemic defeatism.1 Wonder therefore demands thought, and is merely an epistemological starting point. Tis process is embedded in the texts that record medieval responses to marvels, as shown throughout this dissertation. Following the suspension of disbelief or the checking of facts, medieval audiences had the option to communicate the story or not, and the tendency for medieval writers to only record those stories they believed were true (as will be shown) permits the hypothesis that there were a great many other marvels stories that existed in the oral domain that never made it to the written. Although medievalists have long recognised the existence of evidentiary tropes in tales of marvels, miracles, and the supernatural, the present dissertation is original in a number of ways. First, it distinguishes wonder as the emotional starting point to a cognitive process that ultimately results in a judgment about truth or falsehood, a judgment which is termed here subjective learning (learning that the individual believes to be true, but is not 1 Robert Pasnau, “Snatching Hope from the Jaws of Epistemic Defeat”, Journal of the American Philosophical Association, vol. 1 (2015), pp. 257-75. Page #6 of #319 necessarily objectively true).2 Second, it contributes to scholarship by taxonomising the sorts of evidence regarded well or poorly in the long twelfth century. Tird, it argues that this sceptical epistemological process could create anxiety because it was fundamentally at odds with the idea of faith, thereby contributing to an undercurrent of dissatisfaction with Christian explanations of the world, of which medievalists are increasingly aware.3 Fourth, it adapts approaches from modern physical and social sciences, and historical emotionology, to inform its analysis of the Middle Ages. Most of the texts under examination here have been known to scholars specialising in medieval marvels for some time, but this dissertation uses a unique analytical framework, and pro"ers a novel taxonomy for the epistemological process initiated by wonder, while also exploring its e"ects on key aspects of medieval mentalities. Tis dissertation also proposes that, after wonder initiates doubts, perceptions of the quality of evidence play a key role in one’s ultimate judgment about the wonder’s truth or falsehood. Te vast majority of wonder stories were transmitted with evidentiary support lest they be immediately dismissed as old wives’ tales (aniles fabulas), a term used then as now to 2 Matthew Kempshall, Rhetoric and the Writing of History (Manchester, 2012), especially ch. 4; Christopher Given-Wilson, Chronicles: Te Writing of History in Medieval England (London, 2004), pp. 1-20; Claude Brémond, Jacques le Go", and Jean-Claude Schmitt, L’Exemplum (Turnhout, 1982). 3 Carl Watkins, “Providence, Experience and Doubt in Medieval England”, in Jan-Melissa Schramm, Subha Mukherji and Yota Batsaki (eds), Fictions of Knowledge: Fact, Evidence, Doubt (New York, 2012), pp. 40-60; Watkins, “Religion and Belief ”, in Elisabeth van Houts and Julia Crick (eds.), A Social History of England: 900-1200 (Cambridge, 2011), pp. 265-289; John H. Arnold, “Te Materiality of Unbelief in Late Medieval England”, in Sophie Page (ed.), Te Unorthodox Imagination in Late Medieval Britain (Manchester, 2010), pp. 65-95; Watkins, History and the Supernatural in Medieval England (Cambridge: 2007), pp. 217-31; R.N Swanson, Religion and Devotion in Europe, c.1215-c.1515 (Cambridge, 1995), pp. 329-335; Dorothea Weltecke, “Te Medieval Period”, in Stephen Bullivant (ed.), Te Oxford Handbook of Atheism (Oxford, 2013), pp. 164-178; Arnold, Belief and Unbelief in Medieval Europe (London, 2005); Sabina Flanagan, Doubt in an Age of Faith: Uncertainty in the Long Twelfth Century (Turnhout, 2009); Arnold, “Doomed or Disinterested? Did All Medieval People Believe in God?”, BBC History Magazine (London, January 2009), pp. 38-43; Steven Justice, “Did the Middle Ages Believe in Teir Miracles?”, Representations, vol. 103 (2008), pp. 1-29; M. van Uytanghe, “Scepticisme doctrinal au seuil du moyen âge? Les objections du diacre Pierre dans les Dialogues de Grégoire le Grand”, in Jacques Fontaine, Robert Gillet and Stan Pellistrandi (eds), Grégoire le Grand (Paris, 1986), pp. 315-26. Page #7 of #319 dismiss stories that possessed a veneer of frivolity.4 If the story lacked evidentiary support in its initial telling, responders could actively seek evidence to assist in overcoming doubts, by interviewing locals or participants, travelling to the story’s place of origin, or performing textual research. Wonder therefore provokes an epistemological chain of events ultimately leading to a judgment about truth or falsehood, and a decision about whether to communicate the story, which, for twelfth-century writers, meant a decision about whether or not to record them. Te epistemological process proposed here is presented diagramatically in Figure 1: 4 In one instance, for example, Ralph of Diceto declared an event to be an old wives’ tale, because it was reported without either a date or the name of the king whose reign it had taken place in: Ralph of Diceto, De mirabilibus Britanniae, in his Abbreviationes chronicorum, William Stubbs (ed.), Opera Historica (London, RS, 1876), vol. 1, p. 15: “Res gestae quae nulla regum ac temporum certitudine commendantur non pro hystoria recipiuntur; sed inter aniles fabulas deputantur”. Page #8 of #319 Figure 1: Te Epistemology of Wonders Page #9 of #319 1. PRE-EXISTING PERSON A person exists with a set of individual characteristics, based on their upbringing within a certain cultural milieu. Tis person lacks experience of a certain phenomenon (the wondrous object), or lacks explanation for it. 2. PERCEIVES WONDER Tis person sees, hears, hears of, reads about, hears read, or feels the wondrous object. 3. SOMATIC RESPONSE Te brain rapidly checks the memory before triggering the somatic response for wonder if the object is su$ciently divorced from the individual’s prior experience. Te somatic response may include arresting of breath, increased sensory perception (particularly a widened field of vision), increased heart rate in preparation for the fight or flight response, raised arms, opened palms, raised eyebrows, open mouth, pointing to initiate emotional contagion, or any of a number of related microexpressions. 4. DOUBT Te individual may doubt the truth of the story, especially if the wondrous object is heard second-hand in story form, rather than seen personally. Tese doubts may prompt inquiry and a quest for evidence. Te doubts may concern a detail of the wonder or its entirety. 5. SUSPENSION OF DISBELIEF Te individual may consciously opt out of assessing the truth of the object for a variety of reasons: apathy about its truth, acknowledgment of its entertainment or didactic value Page #10 of #319 (which ostensibly lowers its need for verisimilitude), or acknowledgement of the individual’s fallibility in assessing its truth, which may lead to epistemic defeatism on an individual level or more broadly.