The Banality of Fraud: Re-Situating the Inside Counsel As Gatekeeper
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Fordham Law Review Volume 74 Issue 3 Article 3 2005 The Banality of Fraud: Re-Situating the Inside Counsel as Gatekeeper Sung Hui Kim Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr Digital Par t of the Law Commons Commons Network Recommended Citation Logo Sung Hui Kim, The Banality of Fraud: Re-Situating the Inside Counsel as Gatekeeper, 74 Fordham L. Rev. 983 (2005). Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr/vol74/iss3/3 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. It has been accepted for inclusion in Fordham Law Review by an authorized editor of FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more information, please contact [email protected]. The Banality of Fraud: Re-Situating the Inside Counsel as Gatekeeper Cover Page Footnote Associate Professor of Law, Southwestern University School of Law. Please send comments and reactions to [email protected]. Special thanks to Mitu Gulati, Mitt Regan, and David Wilkins for their generous time, thoughtful comments, and advice. Thanks to the following people for their valuable comments: Rick Abel, Max Bazerman, Bill Bratton, Joseph Dodge, Frank Gevurtz, Jerry Kang, Kim Krawiec, Don Langevoort, Jeff Rachlinski, Robert Rosen, and Bill Widen. Thanks to Bruce Green for additional assistance. Thanks also to Lucian Pera and the Association of Corporate Counsel for providing me with important copyrighted research. Thanks to Peter Barton Hutt, Kimberly Kirkland, Diane Rosenfeld, and Marsha Wertzberger for their inspiration and encouragement. Thanks to Nicole Charney, Kyndra Casper, and the Leigh H. Taylor Southwestern University Law Library for research assistance. Finally, I dedicate this piece to Jerry and Taera Kang. Of course, all errors are entirely my own. This article is available in Fordham Law Review: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr/vol74/iss3/3 THE BANALITY OF FRAUD: RE-SITUATING THE INSIDE COUNSEL AS GATEKEEPER* Sung Hui Kim** IN TRO D UCTIO N .......................................................................................... 984 I. Two MODELS OF FRAUD ................................................................ 988 A . The Venality Hypothesis.......................................................... 988 B. The Banality Hypothesis ......................................................... 992 C. Focusing on Inside Counsel .................................................... 997 II. THE ETHICAL ECOLOGY OF INSIDE LAWYERS ............................. 1001 A . The Situation ......................................................................... 100 1 1. M ere Em ployee ............................................................... 1001 a. Obedience Pressures................................................. 1001 b. ThreatenedSelf-Interest ............................................ 1005 2. Faithful A gent ................................................................. 1008 a. Alignment Pressures.................................................. 1008 b. Role Ideology ............................................................. 1012 3. T eam Player .................................................................... 10 19 a. Conformity Pressures................................................ 1019 b. OrganizationalSilence .............................................. 1024 B . The Cognition ........................................................................ 1026 1. Self-Serving B ias ............................................................ 1027 2. M otivated Reasoning ...................................................... 1029 III. RECENT REFORM: MISUNDERSTANDING THE ETHICAL E CO LO G Y ..................................................................................... 1034 A . B ackground ........................................................................... 1034 * This title is adapted from Hannah Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil (Revised and Enlarged ed., Penguin Books 1994) (1963). ** Associate Professor of Law, Southwestern University School of Law. Please send comments and reactions to [email protected]. Special thanks to Mitu Gulati, Mitt Regan, and David Wilkins for their generous time, thoughtful comments, and advice. Thanks to the following people for their valuable comments: Rick Abel, Max Bazerman, Bill Bratton, Joseph Dodge, Frank Gevurtz, Jerry Kang, Kim Krawiec, Don Langevoort, Jeff Rachlinski, Robert Rosen, and Bill Widen. Thanks to Bruce Green for additional assistance. Thanks also to Lucian Pera and the Association of Corporate Counsel for providing me with important copyrighted research. Thanks to Peter Barton Hutt, Kimberly Kirkland, Diane Rosenfeld, and Marsha Wertzberger for their inspiration and encouragement. Thanks to Nicole Charney, Kyndra Casper, and the Leigh H. Taylor Southwestern University Law Library for research assistance. Finally, I dedicate this piece to Jerry and Taera Kang. Of course, all errors are entirely my own. 984 FORDHAM LAWREVIEW [Vol. 74 1. Sarbanes-Oxley Section 307 ........................................... 1034 2. 2003 Amendments to the Model Rules ........................... 1039 B . Critique .................................................................................104 1 1. M ere Employee ............................................................... 104 1 2. Faithful A gent ................................................................. 1044 3. M otivated Reasoning ...................................................... 1048 IV. ALTERNATIVE REFORM: TRANSFORMING THE ETHICAL E CO LO G Y ...................................................................................... 1053 A . Structure................................................................................ 1054 B. Whistle-Blower Protection.................................................... 1064 C . Com pensation ....................................................................... 107 1 D . Ethical N orms ....................................................................... 1073 C ON CLU SIO N ........................................................................................... 1075 White-collar offenders are generally better educated and more sophisticated than most criminals. They commit their crimes not in a fit of passion, but with cold, careful calculation. Accordingly, they are the most rational offenders and are more likely than most to weigh the risks of possible courses of action against the anticipated rewards of criminal behavior. 1 A situation exerts an important press on the individual .... [I]t is not so much the kind of person a man is, as the kind of situation in which he is 2 placed, that determines his action. INTRODUCTION One thing we learned from the recent wave of corporate scandals is that lawyers behaved badly. 3 More specifically, inside lawyers 4 behaved badly. 1. Penalties for White Collar Offenses: Are We Really Getting Tough on Crime? Hearing Before the S. Subcomm. On Crime and Drugs of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. (2002) (statement of the Honorable James B. Cormey, Jr., United States Attorney, Southern District of New York), available at http://judiciary.senate.gov/testimony.cfm?id=280&witid=650. 2. Stanley Milgram, Some Conditions of Obedience and Disobedience to Authority, 18 Hum. Rel. 57, 72 (1965). 3. See, e.g., Final Report of Neal Batson, Court-Appointed Examiner, app. C, at 1, In re Enron Corp., No. 01-16034 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Nov. 4, 2003) Role of Enron's Attorneys), available at http://www.enron.com/corp/por/examinerfinal.html [hereinafter Batson Report Appendix C] ("[T]here is sufficient evidence from which a fact-finder could conclude that certain of Enron's attorneys involved in its [special purpose entity] transactions (i) committed legal malpractice based on Texas Rule 1.12, (ii) committed legal malpractice based on negligence or (iii) aided and abetted the Enron officers' breaches of fiduciary duty."); Stephen M. Cutler, Div. of Enforcement, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Remarks at the University of Michigan Law School (Nov. 1, 2002), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch604.htm ("Yet, as of late, many inadequate or even fraudulent disclosure documents have reached the public, almost certainly after having been scrutinized by experienced corporate counsel."). 2005] THE BANALITY OF FRAUD Bankruptcy Examiner Neal Batson's Final Report on Enron's collapse depicts an uninformed, hands-off, delegating, and detached Chief Legal Officer: Enron's General Counsel James Derrick "rarely provided legal advice to Enron's Board even when significant issues.., came to his attention" and when he did advise the Enron Board, he "failed to educate himself adequately on the underlying facts or the applicable law to enable him to carry out his responsibilities as legal advisor." 5 But Derrick, and his legal department,6 are not alone. The list of ethically challenged inside attorneys include those at Arthur Andersen, Tyco, Rite Aid, Symbol Technologies, Inso, Warnaco, Gemstar-TV Guide, Computer Associates 7 International, and Google. Recognizing that many of these lawyers facilitated illegal transactions or failed to act to protect the organizational client, Congress passed a statute singling out inside counsel, for the first time in U.S. history, for special treatment in the fight against securities fraud. It enacted section 307 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,8 which-among other things-designates the Chief Legal Officer