ffffi 35 August 27, 1965

Problems of Strotegy in Guerrillo e& Wor Agoinst Jopon by Mao Tse-tung

The theory of o people's wor expounded in this 4. orticle, which hos been republished in the lotest issue of Hongqi, is todoy of vitol proctico! irnportonce for the Chinese people ond for the people of the whole world in their struggle ogoinst U.S. imperiolism ond its Iockeys ond, in porticulor, for the oppressed notions in Asio, {^ Africo ond Lotin Americo in their struggle for liberotion. ,W U. S. Bacteriological and Chemical Warfiare Exposed S elected Tf/0rks of MAO TSE - TI-]NG Volume I

En glish, Langr.tage Editiort,

This volume contoins seventeen of Comrode Moc Tse-tung's importont writings of the First Revolutionory Civil Wor Period (1924-19?7) ond the Second Revolutionory Civil Wor Period (1927-1937). 348 pages

22,2X75.2 cm. Clath or pliable cardboard. couer u;itlt dust-jacket

The following orticles in this volume ore olso ovoiloble in pomphlet form, in English: Anolysis of the Closses in Chinese Society Report of on lnvestigotion ol the Peosont Movement in Hunon Why ls lt Thot Red Politicsl Power Con Exist in Chinq? On Correcting Mistoken ldeos in the Porty A Single Spcrk Con Stort o Proirie Fire Be Concerned with the Well-Eeing of the Mosses, Poy Attention to Methods ol Work On Toctics Agoinst Joponese lnnperiolism Froblems oI Strotegy in Chins's Revolutionory Wor The Tosks ol the Chinese Camnrunist Pcrty !n the Period cl Resistonce tc Jopcn Gn Proctice Cn Controdiction

I8,5 X 13 ct1'l. Cloth ar papet ccrer

Published by: FGREION IANGUAGES PRESS, Peking, Chino Distributed by: GUOZI SHUDIAN (Chino Publicotions Cenrre), peking, Chino

Order lrom ytur local dealer or writ.e direct to lhe Moil Order Deportrnent, GUOZI SHUDIAN, P.O. Box 399, peking, Chino PEKING THE WEEK REVIEW South Yietnamese Leader ists and their lackeys, they *'iil Writes to Ghairrnan fllao never succeed in subduing tite 14 ,A 4.[^.{k million patriotic south Vietnamese The nation's leading ne\n,spapers people or r.r,eakening their deter- (BEIJING ZHOUBAO) gave frontpage prominence to a let- mination to fight and win. A WEEKLY MAGAZINE OF CHINESE ter from Nguyen Huu Tho, President NEWS AND ViEWS of the Presicii.um of the Central Com- "With the fuil sympaihy and sup- rnittee of the South Viet Nam Na- port of the 650 million great Chinese Augirst 27,1965 \Iol. YIII No. 35 tional Front for Liberation. to people, of tire peopie of olher sociai- Chairman Mao Tse-tung. The south ist countries and of all peace-loving Vietnamese leader sent similar let- peoples of the rvorld, tve south Viet- ters to Chairman Liu Shao-chi, namese people are determined to Chairman Chu Teh and Premier hold our guns lii'miy and fight to CONTENTS Chou En-lai. Ali the letters were the last drop of our blood to drive personally handed to Premier Chou U.S. imperialism out of south Viet onrAugust 12 by Tran Van Thanh, Nam, liberate scurth Viet Nam and TIIE WEEK head of the Front's permanent dele- leunify the fatherlanci by peaceful gation in China. tneans, thereby making oul contribu- ARTICLES & DOCUMENTS tion to the national-liberation Thanking people the Chinese for struggle and to the defence of peace south Problems of Stlategy in their support to the Vietna- in Southeast Asia and the u,or'ld." Guerrilla War Against mese people's struggle against U.S. Japan impcrialist aggression, Presidcnt Another Unmanned U,S. Spy Mao Tse-tung Nguyen Huu Tho in his letter to - Chairman N{ao said: "In their pa- Plane llowned Are Helpfui, Open Polemics triotic and just rvar to resist the Dis- An unmanned U.S. high-altitude They lVlust Not Be U.S. imperialist aggressors and tlieir continued reconnaissance rnilitary plane was running dogs and win national in- shot dolvn by a Chinese Navy air D.N. Aidit ZC people south - dependeuce, the of force unit on August 21 o..,ei: Hainan Chinese and Japanese Viet Nam are infiniteiy inspired by Island in south China. 'Ihis blatant Youth at Peking Ren- the unreserved and invaluable sym- and provocative intrusion follolvs re- dezvous pathy and suppori they have the one on April I u.hen eight U.S. Our Correspondent 24 ceived from the Chinese Communist militaly planes intruded over Hai- - peo- Par:ty and the brotherly Chinese nan Island and one rvas knocked out Strengthen Our Friendship statement of ple. Your historic of the sky by one of iis partners. and Struggle Together August 29, 1963, concerning the south - Renmin Riboo Editorial 25 Viet Nam question is of great signif- Lin Fiao, Vice-Premier and Minis- American Negroes' Nerv icance for the revolutionary cause ter of National Defence, issued an Revolutionary Storm of the south Vietnamese people. It older commending the air force unit Rerunlin Ribao Editorial 26 once again demonstrated the ciose for its victory. The order said that - friendship and militant solidarity this served as a polA'Ierful bloru to Stop the Bloodless Murder between the Chinese and the south the U.S. imperialists rvho were norv by U.S. Imperialism Vietnamese people, and has enhanced expanding their rvar of aggression Renmin Ribao Com- - stiil more ottr great strength to de- in Viet Nam and intensifying their mentator AO feat the U.S. aggressors." reconnaissance activities and prov- ocatious agait-rst Hainan Island. It BOUND THE WOELD 9q Presideirt Nguyen Huu Tho de- called on all commanders and fight- nounced U.S. irnperialism's "Ltncon- .ACROSS THE LAND 31 ers to continue to heightei-r their ditional discussions" swindle aimed vigilance, maintait-l combat readi- at misleading rvor'ld opinion lvhile ness, and strike resolutelY at anY stepping up its aggression in Viet enelny plane that dared to jntrude is belief t1-re south Nam. "It the of into China's air sPace. Vietnan'rese people that in spite of Published every Fridoy by PEKING REVIEW U S'-n-rade Poi VJon Chuong, Peking (37), Chinq the frenzied scheming, deceitlul talk The rvreckage of foul' No.2-922 Post OIfice Registroticn and up-to-date weapons ar:d modern- U-2 planes of the Chiang Kai-shek Cobie Address: Peking 2t10 at the Uliii- Printed in the Pecple's Republic of Chino ized armies of the U.S. imperial- gang is l-Iow oi-r dispiay

August 27, 7965 tary Museum of the Chinese Peo- socialism and expressed the hope betlveen the fraternal peoples of the p).e's Revolution in Peking. Thou- that the fraternal ties between the trvo countries. sands of people, including foreign Chinese and Rumaniau peoples diplomatic envoys and military at- wouid continue to develop. Ghaifman MaO MeetS Zambian laches, have flocked to see the re- GUeStS mains of these American spy planes. RUmanian LibefatiOn AnniVerSary Chairman Ma-o Tse-tung and Chair- mair Liu Shao-chi received Zambian Tibet to Become Autonomout *f,ntff,l""_rj#,t'",TtJ:::".^,t:'tiT Region Minister of Agriculture E.H.K. Teh anci Chou En-lai on August 22 M,-tder-rda and members of the Zam- greetings The establishment of the Auton- sent to Rumanian leaders bian government delegation he led omous Region of Tibct on Septem- Nicolae Ceausescu' Chivu Stoica on August 22. The Chinese leaders ber 1 was decided on at a ple.rury and lon Gheorghe Maurer on the had a cordial talk with their guests, meeting of the state council .^ 21st at-rniversary of Rumania's liber- and gif ts from Zambian President August 23. ation' Kenneth Kaunda were presented to them by Minister Mudenda. The State Council dlscussed at the The Chinesc leaders congratulated people meeting a report on the su'bject by the F,umanian rvho, "under Premier Chou En-lai had met and the Preparatory Committee for the the leadership of the Ruma.nian C.P. feted the distinguished Zambian policy Tibet Autonomous Region. It agreed and Go.,'ernment, ad-here to a guests three days earlier. that the first session of the First of independence and, imbued r'vith great r'vork Pcople's Congress of the Tibet Auton- zeal and unlted as one, The delegation, the first sent by the omous shor-rld take place on industriously and have made big Zambian Govei:nment since Zarrlbia ,Region agricul- proclaimed September 1 and tl-rat the Attton- achie-r,ements in industr;.. independence in October Region of Tibet be foi'n"rally ture. science, curlture and other 1964, arrived in Peking on August omous paid established. This resolution 'tt'ill i:e fields," They also tribute to 18. That evening. Vice-Premier Li Rumanian Socia,list Repr-rb1ic and gave submitted to tl.re Standing Cornmittee the Hsien-nien a banquet in its Rumanian people im- of the National People's Congress for the for their hoi-rour. ratiiication. portant contributions to the cause of opposing the U.S. irnperialist poii- Extending his welcome to the t,isi- Elections al the countY level in cies of aggression and r,l'ar. suppoi't- tors, the Vice-Plemier paid tribute to Tibet have been cotlPleted, anrl ing the liberation struggle of the the Zambian people for their glcrious many counties har;e aiready electecl pecple^s and defending rvorld peacc. tradition in opposing imperialism and deputies to the region's First People's "The Rumanian Communist Party colonialism and their untiring efforts Congress. and Government have made great to eiiminate colonial influence and effolts in upholding the unity of the build up their country. "The Repub- sociaiist and defending the lic of Zambia," he said, "follows a Congratulating Bumanian Leaders camp principles guiding the relations be- foreign policy of non-alignment, op- Re-election 0n Their tween the fraternal Parties and fra- poses imperialism and old and nelv colonialism and upholds African and Chinese lcaders Liu Shro-chi, Chu ternal countries." The Chinese lead- Afro-Asian solidarity. It is especially Teh and Chou En-iai senb a joint ers explessed the conviction that noteworthy that the Zambian people, message on Augttst 23 to Rumanian "the militant friendship between the since their independence, stiil show Stoica and Ion Chinese and Rumanian Parties and leaders Chivu concern for the other peoples who Maurer, congratulating peopies and the lelations of friend- Gheorghe are suffering bitterly from col.onial- them on their re-electiotr as Chait- ship and co-operation between the tlvo countries rr,ill be consolidated ism and racialism," Vice-Premier Li man of the State Council and Chair- reiterated China's consistent stand Ministers and rr,'ill develop day b,y day." man of the Council of in its relations with African coun- respectively. In Peking, Rumanian Ambassador tries, in providing economic and tech- The message desclibed the consii- Durnitru Gheorghiu gave a reception nical aid to foreign countries and tution recently adopted by the Grand on August 23. Tung Pi-rvu, Vice- in supporting the African peoples in National Assembly of Rumania as Chairman of the People's Republic defending national independence. of China; Teng Hsiao-ping, General one lvhich "embodies the achieve- Minister Mudenda said that Zam- ments oI the Rumanian people in Secretary of the Central Committee of the Chinese C.P.; Li Hsien-nien, bia had always striven for friendly their revolution and construction relations with the People's Republic and defines in legal forn'r the teading Vice-Premier; and other Chinese leaders attended. of China. "Our independence move- role of the Rumanian r.l,orking class t:rent in Zambia was greatly encour- and its vanguard the Rumanian Both Ambassador Dumitru aged by the support of the Chinese Communist Party - in state - life.,, Gheorghiu and Vice-Premier Li people." He told the gathering that It wished the Rumanian people still trIsien-nien '*,ho spoke at the recep- Zarrrbia greatly treasured relations greater successes in the building of tion toasted the growing friendship rvith China. He also condemned the

4 Peki,ng Reuieu, No. 35 imperialists for their slaughter of the adva.nce togetl.rer u,itl.r the Chinese Gaston Soumiaiot and his party innocent people. Vietnamese people on the road of revolution." were hcnoureci on the evening of The Aigerian Minister declared theil arrival at a banquet given by Algerian Government Delegation tl-rat his country "holds that onty the President Chang Hsi-jo of the host Arrives in Pekimg Vietnamese people can decide the organization. At the banquet, Chang fate and the ottr7n Hsi-jo paid tribute to the heroic Con- The Algerian government delega- future of their country." IIe said that Algeria's con- golese (L) people's ardeirt of tion led by State Minister Rabah love sistent policy tov",ards all national- freedom and Africa. Thanking the Chinese divert it from its anti-imperialist Sekou Toure and the Guinean peo- people for their support, he said that goal, in order to make it a failure. ple to the Chinese people. He said: both the Congolese and the Chinese We must heighten our vigilance "After several years of sincere co- peoplcs faced a common enemy': im- against this U.S. imperialist plot." operation with China, the Guinean perialism headed by U.S. imperial- The Vice-Premier stressed that ef- people harre been able to value the ism. forts should be made to hold the con- lofty ideas of the Chinese people. the Premier Chou En-iai met Gaston ference at the scheduled time in Chinese Government and Party and Soumialot and his colleagues on He also pointed out that it to value your unconditional support Algiers. August 24 and entertained them at was equally important to ensure its for the truly progressive forces of a banquet. success so as to have it live up to the wor'ld, paiticularly of Asia, the expectations of the more than Africa and Latin America, in fight- Condolences on Gallacher's Deattrt 2,000 million people in Asia and ing against imperialism, old and new Africa. colonialism and their lackeys." The Central Cornmittee of the In his speech, Minister Bitat said: Communist Party of China, in a mes- ( Guests l{elcomed "The most necessary thing for the Gongolese L) sage on August 19, expressed con- African and Asian peoples is their A six-nen'rber delegation of the dclences to the Executive Commitiee solidarity, and we must join our ef- Congolese (L) Supreme Council of of the Communist Party of Great forts to smash the imperialist in- Revolution, headed by Plesident Britain on the death of its ]eader trigues to undermine this solidarity." Gaston Soumialot, is now visiting Wiliiam Galiacher. The messagc He praised the friendship between the China at the invitation of the Chinese reads: Algerian and Chinese peoples and People's Institute of Foleign Affails. "Hat,ingi learnt that Comrade Wii- said: "Their friendly relations s,ere More than a thousand citizens in the liam Gallacher has died of i11ness, forged and consolidated in the dif- capital gave the Congolese guests a we send you oLlr ccndolences atld le- ficult years of revolutionary struggle. hearty welcome at the Peking airport quest you to conveY our sYmPathY The Algerian people wlII always when they arrived on August 19. to Comra.de Gallacher's familY"'

August 27. 1965 Problems of Strstegy in Guerri[[o Wor Agsinst Jqpon

Moy 1938

by Mao Tse-tung

Chairman Mao Tse-tung's famous article "Problems of Strategy in G,rerrilla War Against Japan'n was reprinted in the la.test issue of Hongqi (Red Flag) on August 21. In its editor's note, Hongqi, said:.

"september 3 this year marks the 20th anmiuersary of China's rictaru in its War of Resistance Against Japan. We hazse specially reprinted in this issue Com- rade. Mso Tse-tung's famaus article 'Problems oJ StrategE in Guerrill,{L War Against Japan'. The idess erpounded in this article played o great guiding role m, Ch,ina's ret;al,utionqrA lt)s.r. In this connection, the Committee for the Publicl.tion of the Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung oJ the Central Committee of the Communtst PtLrty of China has giuen tlte folloroing explanatory note: 'ln the earltl days of the War of Resistance Agcinst Japan, msrllJ people inside and au,tside the PqrtA be- littled the important strategic role of guerrilla uarJare and pinned their hopes on regular uarfa're alone, and particulurlu on the operations of the Ku.omintang forces. Ccmt'ade hLao Tse-dung refuted this uietu and urate this qrticle to sl'tow the cor- rect raad of d.euelopment for anii-Ja"panese guerrilla tuarfare. As a resu,lt, the Eighth, Route At"my qnd the itleu Fourth Armg, uhich hud just ouer 40,000 men u:ir,en the War of Resi,stance began in 7937, greu to a great, army of one million by the time Japan surrend,ered in 1945, established many reuolutionaru base areas, plaged a. greot part in the usur and thus, throughottt this period,, m.qde Chiang Kai,- she!'; aJraid to capitulate to Japan or lqunch a natiott-wide ciuil tuar. ln 1946, u:hen Chiq,ng Kai-shek did launch a nation-uide ciuil '**ar, the People's Liberatiott Army, formed out of the Eighth Route und NetD Fourth Armies, lruas strong enough to deal with his attacks'.

"Todag, it is uery cleq,r timt tbe theorg of a people's LD&r.fotutd in Comrade Mao Tse-tung's article is of uital prectical importwtce for the Chinese peoTtle and, Jor th.e people of the usho'l,e woild, in their stru"ggle against tJ.S. irnperialism and. its lackeys and, in patticular, for the oppressed nations in Asia, AJrica and, Lati,n Americq in their struggle f or liberution".

Peking Reuiew reprints on the foilowing pages a full translation of this ai'ticle by Chairman Mao. - Ed.

Peking Reuiew, No. 35 CHAPTER I point that rrerits our particular attention is that such extensive as well as protracted guerrilia warfare is Why Roise the Question .of Strotegy in quite new in the entire history of war. This is bound Guerrillo Wqr ? i:p with the fact that we are now in the 1i;30s and 1940s and that we now have the Communist Part.1, In the War of Resistance Against Japan, regular. and the Red Army. Herein lies the heart of the warfare is primary and guerrilla rvarfare supple- matter. Our enemy is probably still cherishing fonC mentary. This point has already been coi:rectly dreams of emu.lating the Mongo1 conquest of the settled. Thus, it seems thet.e are only tactical Sung Dynasty, the Manchu conquest of the Ming problems in guerrilla warfar'e. Why then laise the Dynasty, the British occupaticn of North America question of strategy? and India. the Latin occupation of Central ani Soulh America. practicai If China were a small ccuntr;r in which the roje etc. But such dreams have no value in pi:esent-day China because there are certain of guerrilla warfare was only to render direct sup- factors present China today r,vere port over short distances to the campaigns of the in the of which absent those historical instances. and one them regular army, there would, of course, be only tactical in oi guerrilia quite new phen- problems but no strategic cnes. On the other hand, is warfare, rvhich is a omenon. enemy over'looks this fact, he if China were a ccuntry as strong as the Soviet Union If our wili grief. and ihe invading enemy could either be quickly ex- certainl5r come to peiled, or, even though his exptrlsion were tc take Tl-iese are the reasons u'hy our anti-Japanese some time, he could nct occupy extensive areas, then guerrilla \ rarfare, though occupying only a supple- again guerrilla warfare rn'ould, simply play a sup- mentary place in the War of Resistance as a whole, porting role in campaigns, and would naturally in- must nevertheless be examiired {rom 11r" viq\ rpoint volve only tacticai but not strategic p::oblems. of strategy. The question of strategy in guerrilla 'rvar does \\rl-iy not. then, appiy to guerrilla warfare the arise, however, in the case of China, which is neither general strategic principles of the War of Resistance? small nor like the Soviet Union, but which is both The qu.estion of strategy in our anti-Japanese a large and a weak country. This large and weak guerlilia ra,arfare is indeed closely linked with the country is being attackeci by a small and strong question of strategy in the War of Resistance as a ccu.ntry, but the large and weak country is in an era whole, because they have much in common. On the of progress; this is the sour:ce of the whcle problem. other haird, guerrilla rvarfare is different from It is in these circumstances ihat vast areas have regular warfare and has iis own pecuiialitles, and come under enemy occupation and that the war has ccnsequently many peculiar elements are invoived become a protracted one. The enemy is occupying in the question of strategy in guerrilla warfare. \uast areas of this large countr.", of ours, but Japan is Wiihout modification it is impossibie to apply the a small country, she does nct have sufficient soldiers strategic pi'inciples of the War of Resistance in and has to leave many gaps in 11r" esgLr.pied aieais, so genelal to gueriila warfare ',n'ith its owrr peculiari- that our anti-Japanese guerrilla u'arf,are consists ties. primarily not in interior-line operations in support of the campaigns of the regular troops but in inde- pendent operations on exterior lines; furthermore, CHAPTER II China is progressive.. that is to say, she has a staunch !s to Preserve army and broad masses of pecple, both led by the The Bcsic Principle of Wor Communist Party, so that, far from being small- Oneself ond Destroy the EnemY sca1e, our anti-Japanese guerrilla lvarfare is in fact Before discussing the question of strategy in large-scale warfare. Hence the emergence of a guerr-illa warfare in concrete terms, a few word.s are whole series of pioblems, such as the strategic defen- needed on the fundamentai probiem of rvar' sive. the strategic offensive, etc. The protracted na- ture of the war and its attendant ruthlessness have Ali tire guiding plincipies of military operations made it imperative for guerrilla t"arfai:e to under- Erow out of the one basic principie: to strive to the take many unusual tasks; hence such problems as utmcst to preserve on.e's o\1'n sirength and destroy those of the base areas, the development of guerrilia that of the enemy. In a rerroluticnary rvar, this prin- ',varfare into mobile warfare, and sc on. For all pi:inciple is directly linkeC rx,'ith basic political these reasons, China's guerrilla wai:fare against ciples. Fcr instance, the ba.sic poiitical principle of Japan has broken out of the bounds of tactics to China's \\rar of Resistance Against Japan, i'e', its knock at the gates of strategy, and it demancis ex- political aira, is to drirre out Japanese imperialism amination from the viev,rpoint of strategy. The and- buiid an independei:t, free and happy new

August 27, 1965 I China. In terms of military action this principle correct relationship of command. These six items means the use of armed force to defend our mother- ccnstitute the whole of the strategic programme fcr Iand and to drive out the Japanese invaders. To attain guerrilla war against Japan and are the means this end, the operations of the armed units take the necessary for the preservation and expansion of our form of doing their utmost to preserve their own forces, for the destruction and expulsion of the strength on the one hand and destroy the enemy's enemy, for co-ordination with regular warfare and on the other. How then do we justify the encour- the winning of final victory. agement of heroic sacrifice in war? Every war ex- acts a price, sometimes an extremely high one. Is this not in contradiction with "preserving oneself"? )n fact, there is no contradiction at all; to put it ''r,onn,n, more exactly, sacrifice and self-preservation are both rnitiotive, r.,.,;rT;*i: in con- opposite and complementary to each other. For ducting Offensives Within the Defensive, such sacrifice is essential not only for destroying the Bsttles of Quick Decision Within Protrocted preserving partial and enemy but also for oneself Wor, ond Exterior-Line OPerstions Within temporary "non-preservation" (sacrifice,- or paying the price) is necessary for the sake of general and lnterior-Line Operotions permanent preservation. From this basic principle Here the subject may be dealt with under four stems the series of principles guiding military opera- headings: (1) the relationship between the defensive tions, a1i of which from the principles of shooting and the offensive, between protractedness and quick (taking - cover to preserve oneself, and making full decision, and between the interior and exterior lines; usul of fire-power to destroy the enemy) to the prin- (2) the initiative in all operations; (3) flexible em- ciples of strategy permeated with the spirit of ployment of forces; and (4) planning in all operations. this basic principle.-are Al1 technical, tactical and strategic principles represent applications of this basic To start with the first. principle. The principle of preserving oneself and destroying the enemy is the basis of all military If we take the War of Resistance as a whole, principles. the fact that Japan is a strong country and is at- tacking while China is a weak country and is defend- ing herself makes our war strategically a defensive CHAPIER III and protracted war. As far as the operational lines are concerned, the Japanese are operating on ex- Six Specific Probtems of Strotegy in terior and we on interior Iines. This is one aspect of Guerrillo Wor Agoinst Jopon the situation. But there is another aspect which is just the reverse. The enemy forces, though strong Now let us see what policies or principles have (in arms, in certain qualities of their men, and cer- to be adopted in guerrilla operations against Japan tain other fact,ors), are numericaliy small, whereas before we can attain the object of preserving oltr- our forces, though weak (likevzise, in arms, in certain selves and destroying the enemy. Since the guerril- qualities of our men, and certain other factors), are la units in the War of Resistance (and in all other numericaily very large. Added to the fact that the revolutionary wars) generally grow out of nothing enemy is an alien nation invading our country while and expand from a small to a large force, they must we are resisting his invasion on our own soil, this preserve themselves and, moreover, they must ex- determines the following strategy. It is possible and pand. Hence the question is, what policies or prin- necessary to use tactical offensives within the ciples have to be adopted before we can attain the strategic de{ensive, to fight campaigns and battles of object of preserving and expanding ourselves and quick decision within a strategically protracted war destroying the enemy? and to fight campaigns and battles on exterior lines within strategically interior iines. Such is the Generally speaking, the main principles are as strategy to be adopted in the War of Resistance as follows: (1) the use of initiative, flexibility and plan- a who1e. It holds true both for regular and for guer- ning in conducting offensives within the defensive, rilla warfare. Guerrilla warfare is different only in battles of quick decision within protracted war, and degree and form. Offensives in guerrilla warfare exterior-iine operations within interior-Iine opera- generally take the form of surprise attacks. Although tions; (2) co-ordination with regular warfare; (B) surprise attacks can and should be employed in establishment of base areas; (4) the strategic defen- regular warfare too, the degree of surprise is less. sive and the strateg"ic,offensive; (b) the development trn guerrilla warfare, the need to bring operations of guerrilla warfare into mobile warfare; and (6) to a quick decision is very great, and our exterior-

8 Peking Reuieu, I[o. 35 line ring of encirclement of the enemy in campaigns counter-offensive and drive the Japanese invaders and battles is very small. A1l these distinguish it out of China. We must concentrate superior forces from regular warfare. and fight exterior-line operations in every campaign or battle. whether in the stage Thus it can be seen that in their operations guer- of strategic defensive or in that of strategic counter-offensive, r"ilIa units have to concentrate the maximum forces, in order to encircl,-. and destroy the enemy forces, encircling act secretly and srviftly. aitack the enemy by surprise part if not ai1 of them, destroying part and bring battles to a quick decision, and that they if not all of the forces we have encircled, must strictly avoid passive defence, procrastination and inflicting heavy casualties on the encircled forces and the dispersai of forces before engagements. Of if we cannot capture them in large numbers. Only course, guerlilla warfare includes not only the stra- through the cumulative effect of many such battles of annihila- tegic but also the tacticai defensive. The latter em- tion can we change the relative position as between braces. among other things, containing and outpost the enemy and ourselves, thoroughly smash actions during batties; the disposition of forces for his strategic encirclement that is, his scheme ex- resistance at narrow passes. strategic points, rivers or of terior-line operations - and finally, co-ordination villages in order to deplete and exhaust the enemy; in with international forces- and revolutionary and action to cover withdrawai. But the basic prin- the struggles of the Japanese people, surround the Japa- ciple of guerrilla tvarfare must be the offensive, and nese imperialists and deal them the coup grd.ce. guerrilla warfare is more offensive in its character de These results are achieved than regular warfare. The offensive, moreover, must to be mainly through regular warfare, with guerrilla take the form of surprise attacks, and to expose our- warfare making a secondary contribution. common selves by ostentatiously parading our forces is even What is to both, less permissible in guerrilla warfare however, is the accumulation of many minor victories than in regular make warfare. From the fact that the enemy is strong to a major victory. Herein lies the great and strategic guerrilla we are weak it necessarily follows that, in guerrilia role of warfare in the War of Rcsistance. operations in general even more than in regular warfare, battles must be decided quickly, though on Now Iet us discuss initiative, fiexibility and some occasions guerrilla fighting may be kept up for pianning in' guerrilla warfare. several days, as in an assault on a small and isolated enemy force cut off from help. Because of its dis- What is initiative in guerriila warfare? persed character, guerrilla warfare can spread In any everywhere, and in many of its tasks, as in haras- war, the opponents contend for the ini- tiative, sing, containing and disrupting the enemy and in whether on a battlefield, in a battle area, in a war zone or in the mass work, its principle is dispersal of forces; but a whole war, for the initiative means guerriila unit, or a guerrilla formation, must con- freedom of action for an army. Any army which, centrate its main forces when it is engaged in de- losing the initiative, is forced into a passive stroying the enemy, and especially when it is striving position and ceases to have freedom of action, faces to smash an enemy attack. "Concentrate a big force the danger of defeat or extermination. Naturalty. to strike at a small section of the enemy force" gaining the initiative is harder in strategic defen- remains a principle of field operations in guerrilla sive and interior-iine operations and easier in oJfen- warfare. sive exterior-line operations. However, Japanese imperialism has two basic weaknesses, namely, its Thus it can also be seen that, if we take the War shortage of troops and the fact that it is fighting on of Resistance as a whole, we can attain the aim of foreign soi1. Moreover, its underestimation of our strategic defensive and finally defeat Japanese China's strength and the internal contradictions imperialism only through the cumulative effect of among the Japanese militarists have given rise to many offensive campaigns and battles in both regular many mistakes in command, such as piecemeal rein- and guerrilla w-arfare, namely, through the cumu- forcement, lack of strategic co-ordination, occasional lative effect of many victories in offensive actions. absence of a main direction for attack, failure to Only through the cumulative effect of many cam- grasp opportunities in some operations and failure paigns and battles of quick decision, namely, the to wipe out encircled forces, all of which may be cumulative effect of many victories achieved through considered the third weakness of Japanese imperi- quick decision in offenslve campaigns and battles, alism. Thus, despite the advantage of being on the can we attain our goal of strategic protractedness, offensive and operating on exterior lines, the Japa- which means gaining time to increase our capacity to nese militarists are gradually losing the initiative, resist while hastening or awaiting changes in the because of their shortage of troops (their small ter- international situation and the internal collapse of ritory, small population, inadequate resources, feu- the enemy, in order that we can launch a strategic dalistic imperialism, etc.), because of the fact that

August 27, 1965 they are fighting on foreign soil (their war is imperial- tions are wrong, it is liable to get into a passive posi- ist and barbarous) and because of their stupidities in tion and consequently faii to smash the converging command. Japan is neither willing nor able to con- enemy attack. This may occur even when the enemy clude the war at present, nor has her strategic offen- is on the defensive and we are on the offensive. For sive yet come to an end, but, as the general trend the initiative results from making a correct appraisal shows, her offensive is confined within certain limits, of the situation (both our own and that of the enemy) which is the inevitable consequence of her three and from making the correct military and political weaknesses; she cannot go on indefinitely till she dispositions. A pessimistic appraisal out of accord swallows the whole of China. Already there are with the objective conditions and the passive dis- signs that Japan will one day find herself in an utter- positions ensuing from it will undoubtedly result in ly passive position. China, on the other hand. was the loss of the initiative and throw one into a passive in a rather passive position at the beginning of the position. Cn the other hand, an over-optimistic ap- war, but, having gained experience, she is now turn- praisal out of accord with the objective conditions ing to the new policy of mobile warfare, the policy and the risky (unjustifiably risky) dispositions ensu- of taking the offensive, seeking quick decisions and ing from it rvill also result in the loss of the initiative operating on exterior lines in campaigns and battles, and eventually land one in a position simiiar to which, together with the policy of developing wide- that of the pessimists. The initiative is not an innate spread guerrilla warfare, is heiping China to build attribute of genius, but is something an intelligent up a position of initiative day by day. Ieader attains through open-minded study and correct appraisal of the objective condj.tions and through The question of the initiatirre is even more vital colrect rnilitary and political dispositions. It foilou,s in guerriila warfare. For most guerrilla units oper- tha"t the initiative is not ready-made but is soilething ate in very Cifficult circumstances, fighting without that requires conscious effort. a rear, with their o\ rn weak forces facing the ene- iely's strong forces, lacking experience (when the When forced into a passive position through units are newly organized), being separated, etc. some incorrect appraisal and disposition or through Nevertheless, it is possible to build up the initiative overwhelming pressure, a gueruilla unit rnust strive in guerrilla warfare, the essentiai condition being to to extricate itself. Hovr this can be done depends seize on the enemy's three weaknesses. Taking on the circumstances. In many cases it is necessary advantage of the enemy's shortage of tloops ({rom to "irove awa,5,'". The ability to move is the dis- the viewpoint of the war as a whole), the guerrilla tinctive feature of a guerrilla unit. To move away units can boidly use vast areas as their fields of is the principai method for getting out of a passive operation; taking advantage of the fact that the position and regaining the initiative. But it is not enemy is an aiien invader and is pursuing a most the sole method. Th,r- moment when the enerny is barbarous poiicy. the guerrilia units can boldly enlist most energetic and we are in the greatest difficulties the support of millions upon miilicns of people; and is often the very moment u,hen things begin to turn taking advantage of the stupidities in the enemy's against him and in our favour. Frequently a favour- command, the guerrilla units can give fuli scope to able situation recurs and the initiative is regained as their resourcefuiness. Whiie the reguiar army must a result of "holding out a little longer". seize on ail these u'eaknesses of the enemy anC turn Next, let us deal rvith flexibility. them to good account in order to defeat him, it is even more impcrtairt for the guerrilla units to do so. Flexibility is a concrete expression of the initi- As for the guerrilla units' own weaknesses, they can ative. The flexibie employrnent of forces is more be gradually reduced in the course of the struggle. essential in guerrilla warfare than in regular rvarfare. It{oreover, these rn,eaknesses sometimes constitute the very condition for gaining the initiative. For ex- A guerrilla commander must understand that ample, it is precisely because the guerrilla units are the flexibie employment of his forces is the most small and weak that they can mysteriously appear important means of changing the situation as be- gaining and disappear in their operations behind enemy 1ines, tween the enemy and ourselves and of the without the erremy's being able to do anything about initiative. The nature of guerrilla warfare is such guerrilla emplo5red them, and thus enjoy a freedom of action such as that forces must be flexibly in massive r:egular armies never can. acccrdance '"vith the task in hand and rvith such cir- cumstances as the state of ihe enemy, the terrain When the enemv is making a converging attack and the local population, and the chief rvays of em- from several directicns, a guerrilla unit can exercise ploying the fcrces are dispersal, concentr:ation ancl initiative only with difficulty and can lose it a1l too shifting of position. In employing his forces, a easily. In sucli a case, if its appraisais and disposi- guerrilia commander is like a fisherman casting his

10 Pekittg Rexie*r, ir-o. :35 net, which he shouid be able to spread wide as well the guerrilla units will have to ta.ke stock of the as drar,v in tight. When casting his net, th,e fisher- situation. If advisabie, they should fight where they man has to ascertain the depth of the water, the are; if not, they should lose no time in shifting else- speed of the curlent and the presence or absence where. Sometimes, in order to crush the enemy of obstructions; similarly, when dispersing his units, units one by one, gueruiila units which have de- a guerrilia commander must take care not to incur stroyed an enemy force in one place rnay immedi- losses through ignorance of the situation or through ately shift to another so as to wipe out a second miscalculated action. Just as the fisherman must enemy force; sometimes, finding it inadvisable to keep a grip on the cord in order to draw his net in fight in one place, they may have to disengage tight, so the guerrilla commander must maintain quickly and fight the enemy elsewhere. If the Iiaison and communication with all his forces and enemy's forces in a certain place present a pariic- keep enough of his main forces at hand. Just a.s a ulariy serious threat, the guerrilla units should not Irequent change of position is necessary in fishing, linger, but should move off rvith lighining speeC. so a frequent shift of position is necess,ary for a In general. shifts of position should be made with guerrilla unit. Dispersal, concentration and shifting secrecy and speed. In order to mislead, decoy and of position are the three ways of flexibly employing con{us,e the enemy, they should constantly use forces in gueruilla. warfare. sti:atagems, such as making a feint to the east but Generally speaking, the dispelsal of guerrilla attacking in the west, appearing norr,, in the south and now and units, or' ''brealiing up the whole into parts'', is em- in the north, hit-and-run attacks, ployed chiefly: (1) rvhen we want to threaten the night actions. enemy with a rvide frontal attack because he is on Flexibility in dispersal, concentration and the defensive, and there is temporarily no chance to shifts of position is a concrete expression of the ini- rnass our forces for action; (2) rx,zhen we '+zant to tiative in guerrilla warfare, whereas rigidness and harass and disrupt the enemy throughout an area inertia inevitably lead to passivity and cause un- where his forces are weak; (3) when we are unabLe to necessary losses. But a commander proves hirnself break through the enemy's encirclement and try to rvise not just by recognition of the importance of slip arvay by making ourselves less conspicuous; employing his forces flexibly but by skili in dis- (4) when we are restricted by terrain or supplies; or persing. concentrating or shifting them in good (5) when we are carrying on mass work over a wide time according to the specific circumstances. This area. But whatever the circumstances, when dis- wisdom in sensing changes and choosing the right persi.ng for action we should pay attention to the moment to act is not easily acquired; it can be following: (1) we should never make an absolutely gained only by those who study with a receptive even dispersal of forces, but should keep a fairly mind and investigat,e and ponder diligently. Pru- large part in an area convenient for manoeuvre, so dent consideration of the circumstances is essential that any possible exigency can be met and there is to pre.rent flexibility from turning into impulsive a centre of gravity for the task being carried out action. in dispersion; and (2) we should assign to the dis- Lastly, we come to planning. persed units clearly defined tasks, fields of opera- tion, time limits for actions, places for reassembly Without planning, victories in guerrilla war- and ways and means of liaison. fare are impossible. Any idea that guerrilia war- fare can be conducted in haphazard fashion indi- the Concentration of forces, or "assembling cates either a flippant attitude or ignorance of guer- parts whole'', is the method usually applied into a rilla '"varfare. Thu- operations in a guerrilla zone as a to destroy an enemy when he is on the offensive whole, or thos,e of a guerrilla unit or formation, and sometimes to destroy soure oI his stationary must be preceded by as thorough plannirrg as pos- forces r,vhen he is on the defensive. Concentration of sible, by preparation in advance for every action. forces does not mean absolute concentration, but the Grasping the situation, setting the tasks, disposing massing of the main forces for use in one important the forces, giving military and political training, se- direction while retaining cr dispatching part of the curing supplies, putting the equipment in good or- forces for use in other directions to contain, halass der, making proper use of the people's he1p, etc. - or disrupt the enerny, or to carry on mass work. all these are part of the rvork of the guerrilla com- Although the flerible dispersal or concentration manders, which they must car'efully consider and of forces according to circumstances is the principal conscientiously perform and check up on' There method in guerrilla war{are, rve musb also know can be no initiative, no flexibiiity, and no o{fensive how to shift (or transfer) our forces flexibly. When unless they do so. True, guerrilla conditions do not the enemy feels seriously threatened by guerrillas, a11ow as high a degree of planning as do those of he will send troops to attack or suppress them. Hence regular warfare, and it r,vould be a misiake to at-

August 27, 1.965 11 tempt very thorough planning in guerrilla warfare. There ale three kinds of co-ordination between But it is necessary to plan as thoroughly as the ob- guerrilla and regular warfare, co-ordination in stra- jective conditions permit, for it should be under- tegy, in campaigns and in battles. stood that fighting the enemy is no joke. Taken as a whole, gueruilla v,aLfare behind the The above points serve to explain the first of enemy lines, which cripples the enemy, pins him the strategic principles of guerriila warfare, the d.own, disrupts his supply iines, inspires the regular principle of using initiative, flexibility and plan- forces and the people throughout the country, i.s co- ning in conducting offensives within the defensive, ordinated with regular warfare in strateg,v. Take battles of quick decision within protracted war, and the case of the guerrilla warfar"- in the three north- exterior-line operations within interior-Iine opera- eastern provinces. Of course, the question of co- tions. It is the key problem in the strategy of ordination did not arise before the nation-wide War guerrilla warfare. The solution of this problem of Resistance, but since the war began the signifi- provides the major guarantee of victory in guerriila cance of such co-ordination has become obyious. warfare so far as military command is concerned. Every enemy soldier the guerrillas ki1l there, every Although a variety of matters have been dealt bullet they make the enemy expend. every enemy with here, they all revolve around the offensive in soldier they stop from advancing south of the Great campaigns and battles. The initiative can be deci- Wall, can be reckoned a contribution to the total sively grasped only after victory in an offensive. strength of the resistance. It is, moreover, clear that Every offensive operation must be organized on our they are having a demoralizing effect on the rvhole initiative and not launched under compulsion. Flexi- enemy army and a1l Japan and a heartening effect bility in the employment of forces revolves around on our whole army and people. Still clearer is the the effort to take the offensive, and planning like- role in strategic co-ordination played by the wise is necessary chiefly in order to ensure success guerrilla warfare along the Peiping-Suiyuan, in offensive operations. Measures of tactical defence Peiping-Hankow, Tientsin-Pukow, Tatung-Puchow, are meaningless if they are divorced from their role Chengting-Taiyuan and Shanghai-Hangchow Rail- of giving either direct or indirect support to an ways. Not only are the guerrilla units performing offensive. Quick decision refers to the tempo of an the function of co-ordination with the regular offensive, and exterior lines refer to its scope. The forces in our present strategic defensive, when the offensive is the only means of destroying the enemy enemy is on the strategic offensive; not only wiil and is also the principal means of self-preservation, they co-ordinate with the regular forces in dislupt- while pure defence and retreat can play only a tem- ing the enemy's hold on the occupied territory, after porary and partial role in self-preservation and are he concludes his strategic offensive and switches to quite useless for destroying the enemy. the safeguarding of his gains; they w,iII also co- ordinate with the regular forces in driving out the The principle stated above is basicaliy the same enemy forces and recovering ali the lost territories, for both regular and guerrilia war; it differs to some when the regular forces launch the strategic counter- degree only in its form of expression. But in offensive. The great role of guerrilla warfare in guerrilla war it is both important and necessary to strategic co-ordination must not be overlooked. The note this difference. It is precisely this difference commanders both of the guerrilla units and of the in form which distinguishes the operational meth- regular forces must clearly understand this role. ods of guerrilla urar from those of regular war. If we confuse the two different forms in which trre In addition, guerrilla warfare performs the principle is expressed, victory in guerrilla war wili function of co-ordination '*'ith regular warfare in be impossible. campaigns. For instance, in the campaign at Hsin- kou, north of Taiyuan, the gueruiilas piayed a re- CHAPTER V markable role in co-ordination both north and south oJ Yenmenkuan by rvrecking the Tatung- Co-ordinotion With Regular Wsrfore Puchow Railway and the motor roads running through Pinghsingkuan and Yangfangkou. Or take The second problem of strategy in guerrilla another instance. After the enemy occupied warfare is its co-ordination with regular warfare. It Fenglingtu, guerri)la warfare, which 'uvas ah'eady is a matter of clarifying the relation between widespread throughout Shansi Province and was guerrilla and regular warfare on the operational conducted mainly by the regular forces, played an level, in the light of the nature of actual guerrilla even greater role through co-ordination with the operations. An understanding of this relation is defensive campaigns west of the Yellow River in very important for effectiveness in defeating the Shensi Province and south of the Yellow River in enemy. Honan Province. Again, when the enemy attacked

12 Peking Reoieus, No. 35 southern Shantung. the guerriila warfare in the five make a front out of the enemy's rear, and force him provinces of northern China contributed a great deal to fight ceaselessly throughout the territory he oc- through co-ordination with th,e campaigns of our cupies. Untii such time as our strategic counter- army. In performing a task of this sort, the leaders offensive is launched and so long as our lost terri- of each guerrilla base behind the enemy Iines, or the tories are not recovered, it will be necessary to commanders of a guerrilla formation temporarily persist in guerrilla warfare in the enemy's rear, dispatched there, must dispose their forces weII and, certainly for a fairly long time, though one cannot by adopting different tactics suited to the time and say definitely for how long. This is why the war place. move energetically against the enemy's most will be a protracted one. And in order to safeguarC vital and vulnerable spots in order to cripple him, pin his gains in the occupied areas, the enemy is bound him down, disrupt his supply lines, inspire our armies to step up his anti-guerrilla measures and, espe- campaigning on the interior lines, and so fulfil their cially after the halting of his strategie offensive, to duty of co-ordinating with the campaign. If each embark on relentless suppression of the guerrillas. guerrilla zone or unit goes it alone without giving With ruthlessness thus added to protractedness, it any attention to co-ordinating with the campaigns wili be impossible to sustain guerr-iiia warfare be- of the regular forces, its role in strategic co-ordina- hind the enemy lines without base areas. tion will lose a great deal of its significance, aithough it r,vili still play some such role in the What, then, are these base areas? They are the general strategy. A11 guerrilla commanders should strategic bases on which the guerrilla forces rely in performing give this point serious attention. To achieve co- their strategic tasks and achieving the ordination in campaigns, it is absoiuteiy necessary object of preserving and expanding themselves and for all larger guerrilla units and guerrilia forma- destroying and driving out the enemy. Without such tions to have radio equipment. strategic bases, there will be nothing to depend on in carrying out any of our strategic tasks or achiev- Finally, co-ordination with the regular forces ing the aim of the war. It is a characteristic of in battles, in actual fighting on the battlefield, is the guerriila warfare behind the enemy lines that it is task of all guerrilla units in the vicinity of an in- fgught without a rear, for the guerrilla forces ale ter:ior-line'battlefield. Of course, this applies only severed frorn the country's general rear. Burt to guerrilla units operating close to the regular guerrilla warfare could not last long or grow without forces or to units of regulars dispatched on temporary base areas. The base areas, indeed. are its rear. guerrilla missions. In such cases, a guerrilla unit has to perform whatever task it is assigned by the History knows many peasant wars of the "rov- commander of the regular forces, r,vhich is usually ing rebel" type, but none of them ever succeeded. to pin down some of the enemy's forces, disrupt his In the present age of advanced communications and supply 1ines, conduct reconnaissance, or act as technology, it would be all the more groundless to guides for the regular forces. Even rru"ithout such an irnagine that one can win victory by fighting in the assignment, the guerrilla unit should carry out these manner of roving rebels. However, this roving-rebel tasks on its own initiative. To sit by idly, neither idea stil} exists among impoverished peasants, and moving nor fighting, or to move about without in the minds of guerrilla commanders it becomes fighting, would be an intolerable attitude for a the view that base areas are neither necessary nor guerrilla unit. important. Therefore, ridding the minds of guerrilla commanders of this idea is a prerequisite for de- ciding on a policy of establishing base areas. The CHAPTER VI question of whether or not to have base areas and The Estoblishment of Bsse Areos of whether or not to regard them as important, in other words, the conflict between the idea of estab- The third problem of strategy in anti-Japanese lishing base areas and that of fighting like roving guerrilla warfare is the establishment of base areas, rebels, arises in all guerrilla warfare, and, to a cer- which is important and essential because of the pro- tain extent, our anti-Japanese guerrilla warfare is tracted nature and ruthlessness of the war. The re- no exception. Therefore the struggle against the covery of our lost territories will have to await the roving-rebei ideology is an inevitable process. Only nation-wide strategic counter-offensive; by then the when this ideology is thoroughly overcome and the enemy's front will have extended deep into central policy of establishing base areas is initiated and ap- China and cut it in tr.vo from north to south, and plied will there be conditions favourable for the a part or even a greater part of our territory will maintenance of guerrilla warfare over a long period. have lailen inio the hands of the enemy and be- come his rear. We shall have to extend guerrilla Now that the necessity and importance of base warfare all over this vast enemy-o,ccupied area, areas have been made clear, let us pass on to the

August 27, 1965 73 following problems which must be undet'stood and circumstances lequire, as for iustance, from the solved when it comes to establishing the base areas. Hopei Plain to the Wutai and Taihang Mountains, These problems are the types of base aleas, the or from the Shantung Plain to Taishan l\{ountain guerrilla zones and the base al"eas, the conditions for and the Shantung Feninsula in the east. But in the establishing base areas, their ccnsolidation and ex- circumstances of our national \\,ar it is not impos- pansion, and the forms in tvhich we and the etrenry sible for numerous small guerrilla units to keep encircle one another. going in various counties over the vast piains and adopt a fluid lvay of fighting, i.e., by shifting their: 1. The Types cf Bcse Aress bases frcm place to p1ace. It is definitely po-.sib1e to cor-rduct seasonal guerrilla warfare by- taking Base areas in anti-Japanese guerriila wallare adrrantage of the "green curtain" of tall crops in are mainly of three types, those in the mountains, summer and of the frozen ril,els iir rvintei:. As the those on the piains and thcse in the river'-lake- enemy has no strength to spare now and wili nevet' estualy regions. be abie to attend to evei'ything even when he has strength to spar-e, it is absoi,.rtely necessat'1r 1ot' The advar-itage of settir-r.{ up base areas in Illotlll- the us decide policv, for the pt'esent, of spread- tainous regions is obrrious, and those rvhich have to on the ing guerrilla warfare and rvide and setting up been, are being or wiil be eslablished in the Chang- far the pleins and. Ior the pai,1 Wutai,? Taih4ng,3 Taishan.a Yenshans and ten-rporai'y base areas in future, preparing keep r-rp guerrilla rn,arfare Maoshan6 Mountains ali belong to this type. The;, of to and of creating ale all pltrces where anti-Japanese guerri.lla rvar- by -*mall units, if only seasonally. base areas are not fixed. {are can be maintained {cr the longest time and are which important stroirgholds for the War oI Resistance. Cbjectively speaking, the possibiiities of We must develop guerrilia rt'arfare and set r"rp base developing guerrilla u.arfare and establishing krase areas in all the ,nountaincus legions behind the aleas ai e gleater in the rir;er-lake-estuarlr regions enenry lii-res. than in the plains, though less than in the moun- tains. The dran-ratic battles fought b'v and Of course, the plains at'e lcss suitable than ihe "pirates" our history is and the monntains, but it is by no rneans impossible to devel- "water-bandits", of rvhich fulI. guerriila \var"fare round the Hunghu Lake kept up op guelrilla warfare or establish an5t base areas sevci'al ir-r Red Army period. tes- there. Indced, the rvidesplead guerrilla warfare in fcr ),ears the both possibility develcping guerrilla the plains of Hopei ar-rd of t'iorthei'n and north- tify to the of rvar- westeln Shantung ploves that it is possible to devel- fare and of establishing base ar-eas in the river-iake- estuary regions. So however, the poiitical par- op guerrilla lvarfare in the plair-rs. \Vhile there is as far. yet no er.idence on the possibility of setting up ties and the masses who are resisting Japan have given possibility base areas thele and maintaining them fcr: Iong. it this little attention. Though the has been proved that the setting up of ternporary subjective conciitions are as ;'et lacking, r,l,e should possibility base areas is possible, and it should be possibie to undoubtediy turn our attention to this and start u,orking on As one aspect in the derzel- set up base areas for smail units or for seasonal it. opment nation-w,ide guerriila use. On tire one l'rand. the enen:y does not have of our warfare. we should gueri'illa enough troops at his disposal and is pursuing a effectively organize warfare in the policy of unpalalleled brutality, and on the other Hungtse Lake region north of the Yangtse Rirrer, in hand, Chir-ra has a vast telritoi:y ar-rd vast numbers the Taihu Lake region south of the Yangtse, and in river-lake-estr-rar';r of people rvho are resisting Japan; the objective cor]- ail regions in the enemy-occu- pied ditions for spreading guerlilla rvar.fare and setting areas along the rivers and on the seacoast, and up temporary base areas in the plains are therefore rve should create permanent base areas in and near fulfilled. Given competent military command, it such places. By overlooking this aspect we are ',rir- should of coulse be possible to establish bases for tually providing the enemy with rvater trai-rsport gap plan the srnall guerrilla units there. bases which ale long-term {acilities: this is a in cur strategic for must be good but not fixed.T Broadly speaking. u,her-r the strategic War of Resistance which filled in offensive of the enerny is brought to a halt and he time. enters the stage of safeguarding his occupied areas, 2. Guerrillo Zones and Bose Areos he n,il1 undoubtedly launch savage attacks or-r all the guerrilla ba.se areas, a.nd tirose in the plains wiil In guerrilla i\rarfaLe behind the enemy iines, naturally be the first to bear the brunt. The large there is a difference between guerrilla zones and guerrilla formations opei.aiing on the plains rn,ill base areas. Areas rvhich are surrounded by the be unable to keep on fighting tl-iere for long and r,,.-i11 enemy but rvho-qe central parts are not occupied or graduall;,- l-rave to move Lrp into ihe mountains as the have beer-r recovered, iike sonre counties in the

14 Peking Rexiew, N.o. 35 Wutai mountain region (i.e., the Shansi-Chahar- along the. railwa;,. lines, in the neighbourhood of Hopei border area) and also sorre places in the big cities and in certain areas in the plains. Taihang and Taishan mountain regions, are ready- made bases Ior the convenient use of guet'rilla units As {or the big cities. the rail'"vay stops and the in developing guerrilla warfare. But elsewhere in areas in the plains which are strongly garrisoned these areas the situation is different, as for instance by the enemy, guerrilla warfare can only extend to in the eastern and northern sections of the Wutai the fringes and not right into these places which mountain region, which inciude parts of western have ru-latively stable pr-rppet regimes. This is Hopei and southern Chahar, and in many places east anoihe.r kind of situation. of Paoting and rvest of Tsangchovr. When guelrilla Nlistakes in our leadership or strong enemy r,varfare began, the guelrillas could not compietely pressure may caLrse a rel,ersal of the state of affair.s occupy these places could make frequent but only described above. i.e., a guerrilla base may turn into raids; they are areas which held by the guerriilas are a guerrilla zone, and a guerrilla zone may turn into when they are the puppet regime there and by an area under relatively stable enemy occupation. when they gone, and therefore are are not ,vet Such changes are possible, and they deserve special guerlilla bases but only be called guerrilla what may vigilance on the part of guerrilla commanders. zones. Such guerrilla zones will be transformed into base areas lvhen they have gone through the Therefore, as a result of guerrilla warfare and necessary processes of guerrilla warfare, that is. the struggle betr,veen us and the enemy, the entire when large numbels of enemy trocps have been enemy-occupied territory rvill fall into the follow- annihilated or defeated there, the puppet regime ing three categories: first. anti-Japanese bases held has been destroyed, the masses have been roused by our guerilla units and our organs of politicai to activity, anti-Japanese mass organizations have power; second, areas held by Japanese imperialism been formed, people's local armed forces have b.een and its puppet regimes; and thir.d, intermediate developed, and anti-Japanese political power has zones contested by both sides. namely, guerrilla been established. By the expansion of our base areas zones. Guerrilla commanders have the duty to ex- we mean the addition of areas such as these to the pand the first and third categories to the maximum bases already established. and to reduce the second cateqory to the minimr-rm. This is the strategic task of gurer-rilla In some places. for example, eastern Hopei. the ',varlar-e. guerrilla operations has been a whole area oi 3. Condiiions for Estoblishing Base Areor guerrilla zone lrom the very- beginning. The puppet regime is of long standing there, and from the begin- The fundamer-rtal conditions for establishing a ning the whoie area of operations has been a base area are that there should be anti-Japanese guelrilla zone both for the people's armed forces armed forces, that these armed forces should be em- that have grown out of local uprisings and for the ployed to inflict defeats on the enemy and that they guerrilla detachments clispatched from the \,Vutai shor-rld arollse the people to action. Thus the estab- N{ountains. At the outset of their activities, all lishment of a base errea is first and foremost a mat- they could do w-as to choose some fairlv good spots ter of building an almecl for"ce. Leaclers in guerrilla ,,',,ar there as temporar'5, I'ear or base at'eas. Sr-tch places must devote their energy to building one or rvill not be transfortned from guerrilla zones ittto nrore guerriila unirs. and mr-rst gradually develop gu.errilla i'eiatively stabl-^ base areas until the enemy forces them in the ccnrse of struggie into forma- tions oi: even and forr-nations regular ar-e destroyed ar-rd the rvork of arousing tire people into units of is in full srving. troops. The builcl.ir-rg up of an arlned force is the ke;r'to estabiishing a base area;if there is no armed Thus the tlansforrnation ol a guerrilla zotle folce or if the ai'med force is weak, nothing can be into a base area is an arduous creative process, and done. This constitutes the first condition. its acc<-rmplishment depends on the extent to n'llich the enemy is cieslroyed and the niasses are arottsed. The second indispensable condition for estab- lishing a base area is that the artned forces should be l\''Iany regions rvi1l remain gr,reu'illa zones for a used in co-ordination with the people to defeat tire long ti,'::e. In these regions the enemv will not be enemv. A11 piaces tindei enemy control are enem.v' abie to set up stable puppet regimes, hor,vever much and not guerrilla, base areas, and obviously ca-n- he tries to maintain control, rvhile \tre, on our part, not be transformed inio guerrilla base areas unless wili not be able to achieve the aim of establishing' the enemy is defeated. Unless rn'e repulse the anti-Japanese poiitical power. how-ever much lve enemy's attacks and clefeat hirn. even places held by develop guerriila lvarfare. Examples of this kin

AtLsust 27, 1965 IJ The third indispensable condition for establish- sibility of waging guerrilla warfare is concerned. and ing a base area is the use of all our strength, includ- small countries like Belgium which lack this condi* ing our armed forces, to arouse the masses for strug- tion have few or no such possibilities.B In China. this gle against Japan. In the course of this struggle we condition is not something which has to be striven must arm the people, i.€., organize self-defence for, nor does it present a problem; it is there physi- corps and guerrilla units. In the cout:se of this cally, waiting only to be exploited. struggle, we must form mass organizations, we must So fal as thcir physical setting is concerined, the organize the workers, peasants, youth, vromen, chil- economic conditions resemble the geographical dren, merchants and professional people according conditions. For nolv we are discussing the establish- to the degree of their political consciousness- and ment of base areas not in a desert, where no enemy fighting enthusiasm into the various mass or:gan- is to be found, but behind the enemy lines; every izations rlecessary for- the struggle against Japanese place the enemy can penetrate already has its Chi- aggression, and we must gradually expand them. nese inhabitants and an economic basis for subsist- Without organization, the people cannot give effect ence, so that the question of choice of economic to their anti-Japanese strength. In the course of conditions in establishing base areas simply does this struggle, we must weed out the open and the not arise. Irrespective of the economic conditions, hidden traitors, a task which can be accomplished we should do cur utmost develop guerrilla war- only by relying on the strength of the people. In to fare and set up permanent or temporary base areas this struggle, it is particularly important to arouse in all places where Chinese inhabitants and enemy the people to establish, or to consolidate, th'eir local forces are to b,e found. In a political sense, however, organs of anti-Japanese political power. V/here the the economic conditions present problem, a original Chinese organs of poiitical power have nct do a problem of economic policy which is of irRmense been destroyed by the enemy. we must reorganize importance to the establishment of base areas. The and strengthen them w'itn' the support of the broad economic pclicy of the guerrilla base areas must masses, and rvhere they have been destroyed by the follow the principles of the Anti-Japanese National enemy, we sliould rebuild them by the efforts .of United Front by equitably distributing finaircial the masses. They are organs of political power for the protecting carrying out the policy of the Anti-Japanese Na- burden and cornmerce. Neithei' the local organs poiitical power guerrilla tional United Front and should unite all thc forces of nor the ur-iits must violate these principles, or otherwise the estab- of the people to fight against our sole enemy. Japan- Iishment base ese imperialism, and its jackals, the traitors and of areas and the maintenance of guerrilla $,arfare be adversely The reactionarics. would affected. equitable distribution of the financial burden means A base area for guerrilla war can be truly es- that "those with money should contribute ffione;l"r tablished only rvith the gradual fulfilment of the while the peasants should supply the guerrilla units three basic conditions, t.€,, only after the anti- with grain within certain limits. The protection of Japanese armed forces are buiit up, the enemy has commerce means that the guerrilla units should be suffered defeats and the people are aroused. highly disciplined and that the confiscation of shops, except those owned by proved traitors, also made geographical and Mention must be of should be strictly prohibited. This is no easy mat- economic conditions. As lor the former, we hatre ter, but the policy is set and must be put into already discussed three different categories in the effect. earlier section on the types of base areas, and here we need only mention one major requirement, 4, The Consolidotion cnd Exponsion of namely. that the area must be extensive. In places Bose Areos surrounded by the enemy on all sides, or on three sides, the mountainous regions naturally offer the In order to confine the enemy invaders to a best conditions for setting up base areas which can few strongholds, that is, to the big cities and along hold out for a long time, but the main thing is that the main communication lines, the guerriilas must there must be enough room for the guerrillas to do aI1 they can to extend guerrilla warfare from manoeuvre, namely, the areas have to be extensive. their base areas as widely as pcssible and hem in Given an extensive area, guerrilla warfare can be ali the enemy's strongholds, thus threatening his developed and sustained even in the plains, not to existence and shaking his morale while expanding mention the river-lake-estuary regions. By and the base areas. This is essential. In this context, large, the vastness of China's territory and the we must oppose conservatism in guerrilla warfare. enemy's shortage of troops provide guerrilla war- Whether originating in the desire for an easy life Iare in China with this condition. This is an im- or in overestimation of the enemy's strength, con- portant, even a primary condition, as far as the pos- servatism can only bring losses in the War of Resis-

16 Peking Ret:iero, No. 35 tance and is harmful to guerrilla rvarfare ar-rd to have surrounded the Tatung-Puchow Railwav on the base areas thernselves. At the same time, we must three sides (the east and west flanks and the south: not forget the consolidation of the base areas, the ern end) and the city of Taiyuan on ai1 sides; and chief task being to arouse and organize the masses there are many similar instances in Hopei and and to train guerrilla units and local armed forces. Shantung Provinces. This is the second form of our Such consolidation is needed for maintaining pro- encirclement of the enemy. Thus there are two tracted warfare and also for expansion, and in its forms of encirclement by the enemy forces and two absence energetic expansion is impossible. If we at- forms of encirclement by our own rather like a tend only to expansion and forget about consolida- game of u:eichi.e Campaigns and battles- fought by tion in our guerri.lla warfare, we shall be unabie to the two sides resemble the capturing of each other's withstand the enemy's attacks, and consequently not pieces, and the establishment of stror-rgholds by the only forfeit the possibility of expansion but also enemy and of guerrilla base areas by us resembles endanger the very existence of the base areas. The moves to dominate spaces on tl-re board. It is in correct principle is expansion rvith consolidation, the matter of "dominating the spaces" that the which is a good method and allows us to take the great strategic role of guerrilla base areas in the offensive or the defensive as we choose. Given a rear of the enemy is revealed. We are raising this protracted war, the problem of consolidating and ex- question in the War of Resistance in order that the panding base areas constantly arises for every guer- nation's military authorities and the guerrilla com- rilla unit. The concrete solution depends, of course, manders in all areas shouid place on the agenda the on the circumstances. At one time, the emphasis development of guerrilla rvar-fare behind the enemy may be on expansioyt, ?..e., on expanding the guerrilla lines and the establishment of base areas wherever zones and increasing the number of guerrillas. At possible, and carry this out as a strategic task. If another, the emphasis may be on consolidation, i.e., on the international p)ane we can create an anti- on organizing the riasses and training the troops. Japanese region, as As expansion and consolidation differ in nature, and front in the Pacific with China one as the military dispositions and other tasks wili differ strategic unit, and the Soviet Union and other join accordingly, an effective solution of the problem is countries which may it as other strategic units, possible only if we alternate the ernphasis according we shall then have one more form of encirclement to time and circumstances. against the enemy than he has against us and brinq about exterior-line operalions in the Pacific region by which to encircle and destroy fascist Japan. To 5. Forms in Which We ond the Enemy be sure, this is of little practical sigr-rificance at pres- Encircle One Another ent, but such a prospect is not impossible. Taking the War of Resistance as a whole, there is no doubt that we are strategicaily encircled by the enemy, because he is on the strategic offensive CHAPTER ViI and operating on exterior lines while we are on is The Strotegic Defensive ond the Strotegic the strategic deiensive and are operating on interior lines, This is the first form of enemy encirclement. Offensive in Guerrills Wqr We on our part encircle each of the enemy columns The fourth problem of strategy in guerrilia war advancing on us along separate routes, because we concerns the strategic defensive and the strategic apply the policy of the offensive and of exterior- offensive. This is the problem of how 1;he policy line operations in campaigns and battles by using of offensive warfare, which we mentioned in our numerically preponderairt forces against these ene- discussion of the first problem, is to be carried out my columns advancing on us from exterior 1ines. in practice, when we are on the defensive and when This is the {irst form of our encirclement of the we are on the offensive in our guerrilia rvarfare guerrilla enemy. Next, if we consider the base against Japan. areas in the enemy's rear, each area taken singly is surrounded bv the enemy on all sides, like the Wutai Within the nation-rvide strategic defensive or rrlountain region, or on three sides, Iike the north- strategic offensive (to be more t'ract. the strategic western Shansi area. This is the second form of counter-offensive), smal1-scale strategic delensives enemy encirclement. However, if one considers all and offensives take place in and around each guer- the guerriila base areas together and in their rela- rilla base area. By strategic deiensive v/e mean tion to the battle fronts of the regular forces, one our strategic situation and policy r','iren tlle enemy can see that vze in turn surround a great manv is on the offensive and we al'e on the rJcfe'r-,sive; by enemy forces. In Shansi Province, for instance, we strategic offensive we mean our siraiegic situation

August 27, 1965 17 and policy when the enemy is on the defensive and to r,vithdraw, and we should encircle these tor,luns, we are on the offensive. cutting off his grain supply and serrering his com- munications. so that when he cannot hold out and 1. The Strotegic Defensive in Guerrillo Wor begins to retreat, we can seize the opportunity to pursue and attack him. After smashing one column, After guerrilla warfare has broken out and r,r,e should shift our forces to smash another, and, grown to a considerabLe extent, the enemy will by smashing them one by one, shatter the converg- inevitably attack the guerriila base areas. especially ing attack. in tl-re period when his strategic offensive against the country as a whole is brought to an end and A big base area iike the Wutai mountain region or he adopts the policy oI safeguarding his occupied forms a militaly area, which is divided into four areas. It is essential to recognize the inevitability five, or even more, military sub-areas, each with its By of such attacks, for otherlvise the guerrilla com- own armed forces operating independentl5.,. manders lvill be caught u,holly unprepared, and in employing the tactics described above, these for:ces the face of heavy enemy attacks the5z rvill un- have often smashed the enemy's attacks simulta- doubtedly become alarmed and confused and their neously or successively. forces wili be routed. In our plan of operations against a converging attack generally To wipe out the guerrillas and their base areas, by the enemy, we place our main the enemy frequently resorts to converging attacks. force on interior lines. But when we have the For instance, in each of the four or five "punitive strenglh to spare, we should use oLlr secondary ,the expeditions" directed against the Wutai mountain forces (such as the county or district guerrilla region, the enemy made a planned advance in three, units, or even detachments oI the main force) on four or even six or seven columns simultaneously. exterior lines to disrupt the enemy's communica- tions and The larger the scale of the guerrilla fighting, the pin down his reinforcements. Should the enemy stay put in our base area, we may reverse more important the position of the base areas, and the tactics, namely, leave some our forces the the greater the threat to the enelny's strategic of in base area to invest the enemy while err-rplcying the centres and vital cotnmunication lines, the fiercer main force to attack the region r,vhence he has come will be the enemy's attacks. Therefore, the fiercer and to step up our activities there, in order to induce the enemy's attacks on a guerrilla area, the greater him to withdl'ar,v and attack our main force; this the indication that the guerrilla warfare there is is the tactic of "relieving the state of Chao by be- successfuL and is being effectively co-ordinated with sieging the state of Wei".10 the regular fighting. In the course of operations against a converging When the enem5,' launches a converginq attacli attack. the local anti-Japanese sel.f-defence corps in several columns, the gu.errilla policy should be to a.nd all the mass organizations should mobilize for smash it by cortnter-attack. can be easily smashed It action and in every r,vay help onr troops to fighi the if each advancing enemy column consists oI only enemy. In fighting the enemv, it is important both cne unit, whether big sma1l, or has no follow-up to enforce local maltial lau, and, as far as possible, uniis and is unable to station troops along route the to "strengthen our defence 'nvorks and clear the of advance, construct blockhouses motor or buiid fields". The purpose of the former is to suppress roads. When the enemy launches a converging traitors and prevent the enemy from getting infor- attack, he is on the offensive and operating on ex- mation. and of the latter to assist ouu owlt ope;:ations terior Iines, while we are on the defensive and (by strengthening' or-rr clefence works) and prevent operating on interior lines. As for our dispositions, the enemy from getting food (by clearing the fields). we should use our secondary forces to pin down "Clearing the fieids" means harvesting the crops as several enelt-tr. columns, while our nain Iorce should soon as they are ripe. launch surprise attacks (chiefly ir-r. the form of ambushes) in a ca,ilpaign cr batile against a single When the enemy retreats, he often burns down enemy column, striking it when it is orr the mor.e. the houses in the cities and torvns he has occupied The enemv, though strong, will be u,eakened by and razes the vi1la,ges along his rclrte, with the pur- repeated sulprise attacks and u,ill olten wiihdrarv pose of destroying the guerrilia base areas; but in when he is haifi,vay; the guerriila units can then so doing he deprives himself of shelter and fcod in make n:ore surpri-ce attacks during the pui.suit and his next offensi.re, and the damage recoils upon his weaken him still Jui.ther. The enemy generaily orvn head. This is a concrete iLlustration of vrhat occnpies the county towns or other towns in our lve mean by one and the same thing having trvo base areas before he stops his offensive or begins contradictory aspects. I8 Pel;ing Rexieu, Ido. .35 A guerrilla commander sl-rould not think of tasks are under way, we can expand our new areas abandoning his base area and shifting to another, stili further and attack weakly garrisoned cities and unless it proves impossible, after repeated opera- communication iines and hold them for as long as tions, to smash the enemy's heavy conver-ging circumstances permit. . I'hese are aII tasks of the attacks. In these circumstances he must guard stra"tegic offensive, and the purpose is to take ad- against pessimism. So loi-rg as the leaders cio not vantage of the fact that the enemy is on the defensive blunder in matters of principle, it is generally pos- so that we may effectively build up our own mili- sible to smash the converging attacl

20 Peking Reuieto, No. 35 formation. In the matter of discipline, it is imper- plex to concert their operations against the guer_ ative to raise the leve1 so that uniform standards are rillas. Consequently, the problem arises of setting observed, every order is executed without fail and up a unified or centralized command in such guer_ all slackness is eliminated. To accomplish a1I these rilla zones or base ar.eas. tasks requires a prolonged effort, and it cannot be done overnight; but that is the direction in which Hence, as opposed both to absolute centraliza- tion and we must develop. Only thus can a main force be to absolute decentralization, the principle command built up in each guerrilla base area and mobile war- of in guerrilla war shoutd be centralized strategic fare emerge for more effective attacks on the enemy. cr:mmand and decentralized command in campaigns Where detachments or cadres have been sent in by and battles. the regular forces, goal the can be achieved more Centralized strategic command includes the easily. Hence all the regular forces have re- the planning and direction of guerriila warfare as a sponsibility of helping guerrilla the units to develop whole by the state, the co-ordination of guerrilla into reguiar units. warfaru- with regular warfare in each war zone, and the unified direction of all the anti-Japanese armed forces in each guerrilla zone or base area. Here CHAPTER IX lack of harmony, unity and centralization is harmful, and every effort must be rnade to ensure all three. The Relotionship of Commond In general matters, that is, matters of strategy, the lower levels The last problem of strategy in guerrilla war shouid report to the higher and follow their instructions against Japan concerns the relationship of command. so as to ensure concerted action. Centralization, however, A correct solution of this problem is one of the prere- stops at this point, and it would quisites for the unhampered development of guer- likewise be harmful to go beyond it and in- riila warfare. terfere with the lower levels in matters of detail like the specific dispositions for a campaign or battle. Since guerrilla units are a lower level of armed For such details must be settled in the light of specif- organization characterized by dispersed operat.ions, ic conditions, which change from time to time and the n,ethods of command in guerrilla warfare do from place to place and are quite beyond the knowl- not allow as high a degree of centralization as in edge of the distant higher levels of command. This regular warfare. If any attempt is made to apply is u,hat is meant by the principle of decentralized the methods of command in regular warfare to guer- command in campaigns and battles. The same prin- rilla warfare, its great flexibility will inevitably be ciple generally applies in regular operations, espe- restricted and its vitality sapped. A highly central- cially when communications are inadequate. In ;l ized command is in direct contradiction to the great word, it means guerrilla warfare waged independent- flexibility of guerrilla warfare and must not and ly and with the initiative in our hands within the cannot be applied to it. framework of a unified strategy.

However, guerrilla warfare cannot be success- Where a guerrilla base area constitutes a militar5r fully developed without some centralized command. area divided into sub-areas, each co nprising several When extensive regular warfare and extensive guer- counties, each of which is again divided into dis- rilla warfare are going on at the same time, their tricts. the relationship between the various leveis. operations must be properly co-ordinated; hence the from the headquarters of the military area and sub- need for a command co-ordinating the two, i,.e., for areas down to the county and district governments, a unified strategic command by the national general is one of consecutive subordination, and every armecl staff and the war-zone commanders. L-r a guerrilla force must, according to its nature, be under the zone or guerrilla base area with many guerrilla units, direct command of one of these. On the principle there are usually one or more guerrilla formations that has been enunciated, in the relationship of com- (sometimes together with regular formations) which mand at these levels matters of general policy shor-i1d constitute the main force, a number of other guer- be centralized in the higher levels, while actri'al rilla units, big and small, which represent the operations should be carried out in the light of the supplementary force, and many armed units com- specific circumstances by the lower: levels, which posed of people not withdrawn from produciion; should have the right of independent action' If a the enemy forces there usually form a unified com- higher level has something to say about the actual

August 27, 1965 21 /'The operations undertaken at a lower leve1, it can and Taishan Mountain is one of the chief peaks of shouid advance its views as "instructions" but must the Tai-Yi mounl:rin range in central Shantung. In the winter of 1937 the guerrilla forces led by the Communist more not issue hard and fast "commands". The ex- Party started building the central Shantung anti-Japanese tensive the area, the more compl.ex the situation and base area with the Tai-Yi mountain region as its centre. the greater the distance between the higher and th: 5 The'Yenshan mountain range is situated on the border lor,ver levels, the more advisable it becomes to ailolv of Hopei and u'hat was then Jehol Province. In the greater independence to the lower le.rels in their summer of 1938 the Eighth Route Army started builCing .,r,ith actual operations and thus give those operations a the eastern Hopei anti-Japanese base atea the Yen- shan mountain regior-r as its centre. character conforming more closely to the 1oca1 re- ti quirements. so that the lower levels ai-id the local Ihe Maoshan Mcuntains are in southern I{iangsu. In Jrrnr: 1938 the New Fourth Ar:my led by the Communist indepenC- personnel ma;z develop the ability to work Partir stat'ted building the southern Kiangsu anti-Japanese ently, cope u,'ith complicated sitr;ations, ttnd success- base alea rryith the Maoshan mountaln region as its centrs. ful1y expiind guerril).a warfare. For an armed tinit ; Experience gained in the War of Resistance proved or bigger formation rvhich is engaged in a concen- that it r,.'as possible to establish long-term and, in many trated operation. the principle to be applied is one of places, s1ab1e base areas in the plains. This was due to their and big populations, the correctness ol the centralization in its internal relationship of command, ',.astness CommrLnist Palt1,'s policies, the extensive mobilization of since the situation is clear to the higher commanC; the people and the €nemy's shortage of troops. Comrade but the moment this unit or formation breaks up for Mao Tse-tung affirmed this possibiiity more definil;ely in dispersed action, the principle of centralization in later directives. general matters and of d.ecentralization in details I Ever since the end of Wcr'ld lVar II, the national anC should be applied, for then the specific situation detrroclat.ic revolutionary movement has been surging cannot be clear to the higher command. fcrrvard in Asia, Airica ar-rd Latin America. In many countries the people, 1ed by their orvn revolutionary and Absence of centraiization where it is needed proglessivc forces, have calried on sustained armed nleans negligence by the higher levels ol usurpation struggles to overthrow the dark lule of imperialism and reaction. demonstrates new authority by the lower levels, neither of which This that in the of historical circumstances !i,]1sn the socialist camp, the between higher - can be tolerated in the relationship revolutionary forces of the people in the colonial coun- and lorver levels, especially in the military sphere. tries and the forces of the people striving for democracy If decentralization is not effected where it should be, and progress in all countries are tahing giant strides that means monopolization of power by the higher forrvald. when the wor:id capitalist system is lveakening levels and lack of initiative on the part of the lower sti1l fulther, and rvhen the colonial rule of imperialism is heading for disintegration the conditions under which levels, neither of whlch can be tolerated in the rela- the people of various cor.urtries- conduct guerrilia warfare higher and lower levels. especially tionship between today need not be quite the same as those which r,'u'ere in the command of guerrilla rvarfare. The above necessar)' in the da1,s of the guerrilla u'arfare waged by principles constitute the only correct policy for solv- the Chinese people against Japan. In other u'ords, guerrilla ing the problem of the relationship of command. war can be victoriously uraged in a countly rvhich is not large in territorl', as for instance, in Cuba, Algeria, Laos and sonthern Viet Nam. eweichi Notes is an old Chinese game, in nhich the tu,o players try to encilcle each other.'s pieces on the boat'd. When a player's pieces are encircled, they are counted as l The Changpai mountain range is situated on the (captured). But there is a sulficient number of northeastern border of China. After the Japanese inva- "dead" if blank spaces among pieces, sion on September 1& 1931, the region became a base area the encircled then the latter are (not {or the anti-Japanese guerrillas led by t1-re Chinese Com- still "alive" captured). munist Part1,. 10 In 353 B.C. the state of Wei laid siege to Hantan. 2 The \,Vutai mountain range is si'iuated on the bor.ders capital of the state of Chao. The Iiing of the staie of Chi, generals betrveen Shansi, Hopei, and what rvas then Chahar prov- an ally of Chao, ordered his Tien Chi ancl Sun Pin to aid Chao r,r,ith their troops. Knoq,ing that ihe ince. In October 1937 the Eighth Route Armv 1ed by the crack forces of Wei had entered Chao ar-rd left their ov;n Chinese Cornmunist Party started building the Shansi- teruitoly weakly garrisoned, General Sun Pin attacked the Cirahar-Hopei anti-Japanese base area with the Wutai mr-rt;ntain region as its centre. state of Wei nhose troops withdrew to defend their ou,n countrl'. Taking advantage of their exhaustion, the tloops 3 The Taihang mountain range is situated on the bor- of Chi engaged and routed them at l(ueiling (northeast of clels between Shansi, Hopei anci Honan provinces. In the present Hotse County in Shantung). The siege ol November 1937 the Eighth Route Army startecl building Hantan, capital of Chao, was thus lifted. Since then Chi- the southeastern Shansi anti-Japanese base area r,l.ith the nese strategists have referred to similar tactics as "reliev- Taihang mountain region as its centre. ing the state of Chao b:.' besieging the state of W-^i".

22 Peking Reuieu, No. 35 lnternationql Communist Movement Open Polemics Are Helpful, They Must Not Be Discontinued - D.N. Aidit on Current lnternctionc! Prob!ems - D.N. Aidit, Chairman, of the lnd,onesian Com- adopts a correct attitude towards them. This is the rnunist Party (P.K.I.) and Vice-Chairman of tlte In- experience of the P.K.I. Even to this day. the p.K.I. done sian Pr ouisional P e ople' s C onsul,tatiu e C angre ss, on, Central Committee and mlrseif aI.e still repeatedly August 16 met 50 Afro-Asian and Latin Anterican ttrging P.K.I. members to sturdy the documerrts oJ the, journalists utho usere uisiting Djakarta. Follouing are C.P.S.LT., the C.P.C. and al1 other Parties in connec- his anstaers to a number oJ qrLestians put to him by tion rvith th,e polemics." the risiting newsmen uhich were releasecl bA lhe P.K.I. Inforntation Bureau. Ec|. P.K.l. ls for Creotive Morxism-Leninism - In reply to a question about rvhat the P.K.L. rvhich Concerning the Question of Open Polemics in in reality had become an inseperable part of tl.re In- The lnternotionol Cornmunist Movement donesian i\iASAKOM (naiionalists-religicus beiievers- In reply to a question about the P.K.I.'s attitude Ccmmunists), thoughi of the unit ersal theory of Marx- to*,ards the open polemics in the international com- isn-r-Leninism, Aidit explained that there u,ere trvo munist movement, Aidit said that he had gone to ]\{os- kinds of Malxists in the tvor.ld: the creative Marxists corv and Peking trvo years ago to,propose to the Cen- and. the dogmatic Marxists. "The P.K.I. belcngs to the tral Ccmmittee of the Communist Party of the Soviet former and is creative. As creative Marxists. the In- Union and the Central Committee of the Communist donesian Ccmmunists apply Marxism-Leninism to the Party of China to stop open pclemics and restore the concrete conditions in Ind,onesia, inclurding the exis- unity between the trvo Parties. "Horvever, in July tence cf the concept of NASAKOM. 1963, when I was stil1 in Moscow, the C.P.S.U. Central "In conneetion rvith the concept oi NASAKOM, Committee published an open letter to its Party mern- President Sukal'no has never called on the Communists bers attacking the C.P.C. and its leaders. When I ar- to become religious belierrels or nationalists, the reli- rived in Pekirrg, I learnt from the leaders cf the C.P.C. gicus believers to become nationalists or Commuirists. that they rvculd answer: this open letter of the C.P.S.U. and the nationalists to become religious believers or "In vierv of the fact that open polemics will con- Commu-nists. In his writings in 1962, Bung Karno enr- tinu-e, I issued a statement on my return to Djakarta phatically declared that r:,,hat was needed was co-orrera- two years ago, asking the members of P.K.L to regard tion, nct the mei'ger of thc three groupings." the open polen:rics as a course of study in Marxism- Leninism ancl urging them to study the polemics of ail U.S. Aggressors Must Get Out of Viet F{cm Farties and use their judgment to decide rvhich is right In reply to a qlr.esticn about the settlement of the and which is wrong. A Communist cannot be a good Viet Nam question, Aidit said that this deper-rc1ed above Communist if he does not use his own judgment. all on the road taken by the Vietnamese peoptre. "Nor. lndonesian Communists have benefited "At present, the Vietnamese people are being at- frcm the open polemics, and think that it would be a tacked by two categories of rvea-^ons: bon-rbs anC s<-r- pity if the polemies were diseontinued. From the open called 'peaceful settlement.' The attack by the second polernies the Cor"nmunists cf Indonesia have come to category very iikely represents a greater danger, if the realize what modern revisionism actually is and, as r:errclutionaries are not on the alert. trVhat is most a result, have deetrlened their understanding of genuine heartening is that the Vietnamese people and their Marxism-Leninism. To read the documents of the Ieaders are on the alert for this 'peace offensive.' polenrics is obviously the most effective way of study. "The Vietnamese people are resourceful and brave Had it not been for the open polemics, we might to fighters. They rvill defeat the U.S. aggressors li,ith ol this day still fail to really untlerstand what modern r,vithout outside aid-. Therefore, it is not right for thcse revisicnism is and eonsequently have no understand- who have extended assistanee to Viet Nam to publicize ing of genuine Marxism-Leninism. And rvhat is more, how enormous that assistance was. What they are re- if the open polernics had not taken place, we might quired to do is to go on increasing their assistance to have become revisionists g-'ithout ourselves knorving Viet Narn. The5r should at all times bear in mind ihat it. their assistance. however enormous, cannot possibl,y "During my recent visit to Moscor,v and Peking, I match the assistairce which the Vietnamese people did not make any plcposal fcr the cessation of the extend- to those who have assisied them. open polemicr. I do not think it is necessary or of any "Ehe Vietnamese people are rendering greal.er use to stop it. Open pclemics are not harmful; on the assistance to the struggle against the enemy of the peo- contlary, they are ver';, helpfr-rl if a Con-rmunist Party ple of the world, namel;r, U.S. imperialism, than the

August 27, 1965 assistance they have received from any people at any a good thing, and to a certain extent a victory for In- time. By their blood and their very lives, they are donesia's policy of confrontation. "This confrontation enemy of the people of the wcrld U.S. is obviously a blow to the imperialists and has forced fighting the - imperialisrr. This is definitely gleater than the assis- them to change theil tactics. Ilorvever, we must re- tance, whether political, moral or material, any peo- main on the alert under all circumstances, because the ple has rendered the Vietnamese people. United States and Britain have resorted and will "I am of the opinion that the Viet Nam question inevitably resort to various manoeuvres. Indonesia's can be settled only when the United States gets out confrontation is not directed at the name 'Malaysia' of Viet Nam." but at the imperialist military bases in Malaya, Singa- pore and North Kalimantan. Indonesia's confrontation Concerning Singopore's Withdrowo! From will continue as long as the military bases aimed at "Moloysio" hindering the Indonesian revolution remain on these In reply to a question concerning Singapore's territories." rvithdralval from "Malavsia," Aidit said that this was (Boldface emphases are ours.)

Friendship Festivol Chinese cnd .!oponese Youth At Peking RendezYous [)EKING'S youth are in a singing mood, humming young Japanese guests would be staying have mastered I the years-old Japanese song Tokyo-Peking, rehears- the art of Japanese cuisine. Many colJ.ege students who ing the latest Chinese hit Youth of Chi,na and Japan, were on their summer vacation returned to Peking Unite, or, like the young rvorkers of the No. 2 Cotton weeks earlier in order to attend the festival. Mill, composing one themselves with the words: This end of summer event is something new in re- Iations between the youth of China and Japan. Jointly Welcome, Friends Japan! from sponsored by the China-Japan Friendship Association, You uin the applause of ottr loonts; the All-China Youth Federation and All-China Stu- Yon can hear fine cotton sing a song to you. Blossoms oJ Friendship are found eueryuhere in our mill. ... The youth of Peking have been busy getting ready for the China-Japan Yotrth Friendship Festival. With young artists in other parts of the countty, they have designed an cmblem a.nd flag for the festival as well as huge, colourful and eye-catching posiers. Young stamp designers and printers have seen to it that special commemorative stamps were on sale on the festival's eve so that, as they put it, "our: Japanese friends rvi.ll be able to write home rvith these stamps lvhen they arrive." In various endeavours, Peking's young men and women have been pitching in to make the festival a loaring success. Those ',r'orking in the manufacture of fireworks have joined in: "We certainly can entertain our Japanese friends with our traditional fireworks." And so an infinite variety were ready for the open-air party at Zhongshan Park scheduled on the festival's varied agei-rda, Young ballerinas tehearsed intensively for their two performances to be presented to the visi- tors from Japan-one on a contemporary Chinese revolutionary theme and the other a ciassic. No less enthusiastic were older people in the tracles whose serv- ices are required by the festival. For example, bus drivers, some of them youth thernselves, spent hours polishing and getting their vehicles in tip-top shape ivhile the cooks at the Nationalities Hotel where the Japanese youth cheeretl at the Peking Raillvay Station

24 Peking Reuiew, No. 35 Strengthen Our Friendship and Struggle Together llfl ORE than 200 youth from various parts of Japan friendship and the common struggle that firmly bind IVI arrivecl in Peking yesterday for the China-Japan them together. Of course, the U.S. imperialists and the Youth Friendship Festival Lvhich will soon begln. To rabid reactionaries in Japan do not like this friend- all the young Japanese friends who broke through the ship. Whenever there is any progress in economic and Japanese Government's unwarranted obstructions to cultural ties and friendly exchanges between China come to China for the festival, we extend a hearty and Japan, they do all they can to obstruct and welcome and ',te u.ish the friendship festival complete sabotage such developments. But Sino-Japanese friend_ success. ship has developed into a mighty historic current and This is the first time ever that a friendship no force whatsoever can check its advance. We are festival of such great magnitude is to be held in the convinced that, by relying on the persistent struggles history of fliendly exchanges between the Chinese and of our two peoples and their steady and untlring ef- Japanese peoples and their youths. The people of forts, the day u,ill come lvhen all man-made obstacles China regard the China-Japan Youth Friendship u,ili be swept aside and Sino-Japanese friendship will Festival as a gala occasion. From the minute the burst into bloom et,en more radianfly and bear still Japanese youth delegates set foot on Chinese soil, the richer fruit. youth of China have received their friends with In the struggle to develop Sino-Japanese friend- flowers, songs of friendship and brotherly affection. ship, oppose U.S. imperialism and safeguard peace, The China-Japan Youth Friendship Festival marks a the youth of China and Japan shoulder a heavy respon- new development in friendly relations between the sibility. Today, the broad masses of youth in Japan youth and people of the two countries. Through their have become an active force in the Japanese people's joint efforts, the Chinese and Japanese peoples have struggle for independence, democracy and peace. To- in recent years overcome all klnds of dlfficulties, de- gether with their fathers and brothers, they have veloped economic and cultural ties and friendly ex- Iaunched q,idespread movements to oppose U.S. im- changes betrveen our two countries and steadily peria).ism's control and enslavement of Japan and U.S. strengthened the friendship and unity between oul' imperiaiism's aggression against Viet Nam as well as two peoples. The holding of the festival will add its expanding of the r,r'ar in Indo-China. The youth fresh impetus to their friendly relations. We hope and people of Japan will never permit the revival of that through the festival's rich and varied activities Japanese militarism, nol allow the U.S.-Japanese the young friends of the two countries will inclease reactionarles to force them to tvage war against the their mutual understanding and deepen their friend- people o.[ China, Korea or any olher country. The ship. This is undoubtedly of great significance in heroic and indomitable spirit displayed by the youth bringing about the further development of Sino- of Japan in their patriotic anti-U.S. struggle is some- Japanese friendship. thing the youth of China should learn from. China's To promote friendly relations betrveen China and youth are determined to unite closely with the youth Japan is the fervent common deSire of the Chinese of Japan to struggle to the end to defeat U.S. imperial- and Japanese peoples. The time-honoured friendship ism, the common eriemy of the two peoples, and de- betrveen the tr,l'o peoples dates bacli to well over 2,000 fend Asian and r,r'orld peace so that the Chinese and years. foday they arb engaged in the common struggle' Japanese peoples will live in friendship from genera- to oppose U.S. imperialism and safeguard Asian and tion to generation. world peace. It is precisely these traditlonal, ties of ("Renmin Ribao" editoriat, August 24, 1965.)

dents' Fedel:atlon, the proposed festival was warmly Japanese-Chinese Youth Festival." They belonged to welcomed by various youth organizations and public the delegation of the Council of the A1l-Japan Dock bodies in Japan. Many Japanese youngsters were de- Workers' Union, who made the banner with their termined to attend, in spite of the many obstacles in own handkerchiefs while en route to the capital on the their rvay. The first group of youth representatives Canton-Peking Express. arrived in Canton in mid August. They lvere followed The tumuituous welcome reached a climax in the by many more in the next fe-az days, and a1I had a big square olltside the railway station where the Japa- wonderful time together \,vith the youth of that city nese friends were engulfed in a sea of Chinese rvell- before they came to Peking. wishers. More than 300 young artists presented a On Ar-rgust 23, some 2,000 young people of Peking number of traditional Chinese dances for their hon- ) representing the city's one milllcn youih were on hand oured guests. A group of Japanese youngsters in fu11 at the railway station to meet their Japanese friends, make-Lrp and costume reciprocated with a fishermen's 271 youngsters belonging to 23 delegations of various dance to the accompaniment of a drum and flutes. Col.- Japanese youth organizations. Amcng them were work- ourful bailoons were released into the clear bltre sky. ers, peasants, students, artists, journalists and While in Peking the Japanese visitors \.vill see jurists. Many rvho joined their hosts in singing friend: the sights, watch Chinese theatrical performances and ship songs were members of the Japanese Singing take part in an assortment of other activities. In ad- Movement Delegation. llhere were a number of youth dition to Peking, the festival will be held in 14 other carrying a banner with the characters "Long Live the cities. _OUR CORRESPONDENT

August 27, 1965 25 Americon NeEroes'New R.eYolutiono ry Storm rFHE new storm of the Negro people's struggle against of this daily growing movement, the U.S. ruling circles I racial discrimination and persecution in the United have cunningly resorted to counter-revolutionary dual States has risen to unprecedented h,eights. The Ne- tactics in their attempi to hold back and undermine groes in Los Angeles staunchly resisted bloody suppres- the struggle. Facls have proved that all the "prom- sion by 20,000 troops and police; they wrote an epic ises," "bi1ls" and t'programmes" of Kennedy, John- page in the annals of the American Negro movement. son and their like about improving the status of the In Chicago, too, their struggle against tyranny has Negroes are all swindles. Ruthless persecution and developed on an unparalleled scale. In Nelv York, suppression have not diminished but greatly increased. Springfield and other cities, Negro demonstrations With the hypocritical features of the Johnson Ad- against lacial discrimination are surging foru'ard. The ministration being daily more exposed, the masses of angry fiames of their fight against t5zrsnn, are spread- the American Negr:oes have become increasingly ing to more and more cities. TIle Arnerican Negroes' resclute in abandoning the road of "non-violence" of struggle for freedom and democratic rights has entered the Right-rving leadership in the Negro movetnent and a nerv stage. ta"king to the road of struggle in "meeting violence This unparalleled upsurge in their struggle shows rvith violenc,e." Not long ago the American Negro that the American Negro masses, suffering both racial leader Robert Wiliian-rs expressed the rvill of the broad and class oppression, are experiencing a new awaken- masses of the American Negroes when he said: "...let ing. The aim of their struggle has become clearer; us not be so naive as to believe that -ffe can conduct a their will to struggle has grown more r'esolute, and revolution without violence. Let us not be so asinine their methods of struggle har.e become sharper. The as to believe that we can appeal to the conscience of 20 rniilion American Negroes, whose level of political a brutal oppressor to the exteni that he will volun- conseiousness is being enhanced every day, liave be- tarily release oui: peopie from almost 400 yeai's of corne an important revolutionary force in the United shackles and the dark dungeon of slavery and misery." States, a force that cannot he overlooked. Their The recent frenzied and brutal suppression ol the unyieldirrg struggle has dealt evex more powerful blows Negro people in Los Angeles by the U.S. aui.horities at the reactionary rule of U.S. moriopony capital and once again proves the truth of this. h*s shaken the very foundation of U.S. irnperiaXism. Unity With World Revolutionory Struggle Oppose Counter-Revolutionory Violence With Revolutionory Violence The American Negroes are linking up their strug- gle for freedom and equal rights rnore closely with the important awakening A most feature of this new revolutionary struggles of the oppressed nations ancl of the American Negroes is that more and more of pecples of the world against U.S. imperialist aggres- thern have come to realize through their experience in sion. This is anoi;her important characteristic of the n:rust oppose struggle that they counter-revolutionary nerv alvakening of the American Negroes. They are Negro viclence with revolutionary violence. In the coming to see more and more clearI), that the U.S. mov,ement States, perse- in the United barbarous racist imperialism which oppresses them is the same U.S. cution and brutal suppression by the authorities are imperialism which carries out aggression in every part being n-ret with coll.ective, eelf-defence and counier- of the world. The fascist policies rvhich the U.S. ruling attack. This is a nerv trerid. The Negroes in Los circles carry out at home are closely linked with their Angeles, nct hesitating shed and ready to their blood policies of aggression and war abroad. Som,e advanced rna-ke any sacrifice, advanced .rave to wave upon iir American Negro leaders have already raissd the clarion their heroic struggle against reactionary the troops and ca]l {or struggle: Build a new rvorld free of colonial- police. They grorving showed the militant spirit of the ism, racism, imperialism, exploitation and naticnal .American Negroes. oppression! Since the beginning of this year, the For one hundred years the Ai-nerican Negroes have American Negroes, while carrying on the struggle to on ecuntless occasions petitioneC and protested. and win and safeguard their orvn rights, have at the same hatre tried in aiI kinds of v,,ays to oppose racial dis- time taken an active part in the r,videspread st;:uggle climination and vrin equality and freedom. But, dis_ in the United States to oppcse the U.S. Governinent's crimj.nated against, oppressed and exploited, there has aggressior against Viet Nam. The Chicago Negroes been no alleviation of their misery and suffering. Grim in their recent struggle against t}rranny expllcitly pro- reality has taught the broad masses of the Negroes. claimed: "Aft,er years of frame-ups, brutalities and Ti-rey have started to cast aside iilusions and to go out intiinidations, th,e Elack people are throwing off con- .wage into the str:eets and resoh_rte sti:uggies, In face tr'o1 of -the same rulers who are rnaking \\zar on peopl,e at) Peki,ng Ret:ieu, l(o. 35 throughout the world in Viet Nam, the Dominican the world. - Our American Negro brothers rnho are Republic and tl-re Congo." This important development shedding their blcod in the streets of Los Angeles are in the American Negro movement marks a big advaric,e standing on the same battlefront as and are closely re- in th,e revolutionary leve1 of their struggie for libera- lated to the scuth Vietnamese people who are fighting in tion. the Mekong Delta and the Congolese (L) patriots who are Chairman l}Ia-o Tse-tung, in his staternent support- steadfastly carrying on tire armeC struggle in th,e jur-rgles ing the American Negroes' just struggle trvo years ago, of the Congo (L). Every biow dealt and every vic- said: "The fascist atrocities cornrnitted by the U.S. tory scored by the American Negroes is a blow that imperialists against the Negro people have laid bare weakens U.S. imp,erialism and a powerful support for the true nature of the so-called democracy ancl freedom the revoluticnary struggles of the people in other in the United States and revealed the inner link be- parts of the vrorld. The revolutionary people of the -.vorld tween the reactionary policies pursued by the U,S. ."vhcle stand firmiy by the American Negro,es. Governrnent at hotne and its potricies of aggression The bor:ds which link them in their colrrlnol,r struggle abroad." More and more facts have proveci the correct- will be strengthened as the Negro movement grorvs in ness of tieis thesis. the United States. U.S. imperialism has ahvays styled itself the Finol Victory ls Assured defender of "democracy and freedom" and "law and orcler." But the misery to which the American N,egroes The Johnson Administration is sending large irave been condemned clearly shows what kind of numb.ers of troops and police to biooCiiy suppress the "clemocracy and freedom" U.S. imperialisrn rvants to Negroes' anti-tyranny struggles in Los Angeles, Chicago defend and what kind of "law and order" lt wants to and other cities. Johnson has raved repeatediy about establish throughout th,e world. How can anybody "relentless" suppression of Negro "vio1ence." Th'e imagine that the U.S. ruling circles r,vhich relentlessiy utier brutality of the Johnson Adrninistration reveals persecute and suppress the 20 miliion Negroes at home its extreme weakness. It had to dispatch tens of can possibly follow a peaceful foreign policy of cc- thousands of troops to oppose the Negroes' struggle operation with oth,er countries on an equal footing? against tyranny in Los .A.ngeles. Should the revolu- Horv can anybody imagine that the implacable enemy tionary storm of the American Negroes spread fiercely of the American Negroes can be the true friend of the throughout the whole of the United States, how many people in Africa? more troops has it at its disposal to use as weapons to suppress the revolution? As the Chinese saying goes: Frovocotion Agcinst Feople of Africo and the World "The roof leaks and the rain pours dcwn day and night without end!" With its poiicy of aggression abroa'd It is ciear that just as it practises racial discrim- suffering defeat after defeat, the badly harassed John- ination and oppression at home, U.S. imperialism son Administration is living through increasingly pursues a policy of aggression against other countries difficr-rit days. and of enslavement of other nations. Is it not the The ruling circlqs in the United States control the same Johnson Administration which bloodily suppres- military machine and can use the most brutal methods sed the Negro pecple in Los Angeles and carried out of terror to suppress tl-re Negroes' struggle. They may arm,ed aggression against the Congo (Leopo1dville) and gain the upper hand for a time, but they can never subversive and sabotage activities against the Congo subdu,e the awakened Negroes. On the contrary, their (Brazzaville)? Facts prove that the United States is ruthless suppression can only further awaken the the chief buhvark of racial discrimination, and that masses of the Negro people. Conrrade Mao Tse-tung U.S. imp,erialism is the ringleader in the brutal per- pointed out long ago: "All reactionaries attempt to secution of Negroes and in pursuing policies of na- stamp out revolution by mass murder and think that tional oppression and aggression ev.erylvhere in the the rnore people they rnassacre, the weaker the revolu- world. The American Negroes and the people of the tion u'ill becorne. But, contlary to this reactionary urorld face the same corimon enem'y'. The Johnson wishful thinking, the fact is that the more people the Administration's victimization and killing of American reactionaries massacre, the greater becomes the Negroes is not only a provocation against the 20 sttength of the revolution and the nearer the reaction- rniliicn American Negroes but also a provocation aries come to their doorc. This is an irresistible law." against the 300 million Africans, against all oppressed The Chinese saying aptly puts it: "Fire cannot kitl the nations, and against the people of the world as a rvhole. prairie grass which will grow again when the spring The African people and all tlte people of the r.vorld breeze bIows." The tide of the r'evolutionary siruggl'e who cherish peace and uphold justic.e must stand of the American Negroes for emancipation cannot be firmly with the American Negro,es and the other dammed. The road of their struggle may be a-rduous Americans who oppose racial discrimination, and fight and tortuous and beset with difficulties and obstacles, to the end against the U.S. imperialist poticies of racial but, so long as they strength,en their unity and persist oppression, aggression and rva-r. in the struggle, they r'vill overcome all difficutties and The American Negroes' struggle against racial emerge viciorious in the struggle for complete eman- discrimination is an inseparable part of the revolution- cipation. ary struggle of th,e oppressed peoples and nations of ("Renmin Ribao" editorial, An'gust 19,1165')

Augt151 27, 1965 27 Stop the B lood less Murder bv U.S. Imperislism

by COMMENTATOB

T IE Liaison Mission of the Viet Nam People's Army namese battlefield, but is also using Viet Nam as a r High Command has denounced strongly the setting testing ground for chemical and biological warfare. up of a U.S. research institute for bacteriological Throughout the postr,var years U.S. imperialisrn has and chemical warfare il-t south Viet Nam. In its August been working hard on research and development of 21 m,essage to the International Commission, the Dem- chemical and bacteriological weapons. This has long ocratic Republic of Viet Nam exposed U.S. imperial- since ceased to be a secret. Some military and ad- ism and charged it rvith this atrocious crime. The ministrative bigwigs in Washington don't even bother Chinese people are outraged by this new villainy of to conceal their criminal intentions; they have publicly the Johnson Administration. discussed how the use of chemical and bacteriological Washington's establishnrent of a bacteriological weapons is the most inexpensive rvay to fight an ag- u,arfare unit in south Viet Nam was revealed in gressive war. As eariy as April 15, 1960, the Neu-r the foreign press quite a rvhile ago. The Japanese York Post disclosed the viervs held by U.S. Army u,eeklies Sankei. and Gendai recently reported that a circles with regard to this type of weapons. They "mobile research unit" of the "Medical Laboratory 406 thought, the paper wrote: "It's cheap, it's simple, it of the U.S. Army Medical Corps" in Kanagawa, Japan, covers more ground, it kills more people than bombs, had been sent to south Viet Nam where it "moves from it does the job silently, it defies detection, it permits place to place with the field combat forces to carry almost immediate invasion after use whereas nuclear out its activities." This shows that the U.S. aggressors radiation from competing products causes delays. are using ever more barbarous methods in kiiling the Where can anyone interested in extermination find a Vietnamese people. better buy?" It is these calculations rvhich recent years have U.S. imperialism has committed a long list of in rrrotivated that steep rise U.S. government shocking crimes in Viet Nam, and especially in south in expendi- ture to develop chemical and bacteriological weapons, Viet Nam. In recent it has used the most sav- 5;ears 1950, appropriations purpose agely destructive lveapons against villages, destroyed In for this totalled 6.5 million U.S. dollars. Now, almost 20 much, crops and vegetation, dropped napalm, sprayed times as 125 million toxic chemicals and even used poison gas to slaughter cr U.S. dollars are being spent each year for this purpose. The Americatl press has rerrealed the people of Viet Nam. As early as April 1961, the that U.S. aggressors began launching so-called "chemical the United States, while developing these rveapons in mopping-up operations" in south Viet Nam. From a big way at home with Eort Detrick, Maryland, August 1961 to May 1964, U.S. aircraft carried out as the centre, has set up many organizations abroad same purpose. more than 200 missions to spray toxic chemicals over for the "Medical Laboratoly 406 of the U.S. Army Medical rnany regions, poisoning 20,000 people, many of whom Corps" in Japan is one of such organizations. group died as a result; killing tens of thousands of livestock This crirainal already played its part in the aggressive against Korea, and domestic animals, and destroying over 300,000 war Now it has once again hectares of crops. Last June, U.S.-puppet troops sprayed stretched out its murderous tentacles this time to south This criminal toxic chemicals in Dr-ryen Hai and Cau Ngang Viet Nam. move by- U.S. imperialism flagrant Districts of Tra Vinh Province, poisoned more than is in violation of international Iaw and human ethics; 30,000 people and destroyed over 30 square kilometres it is not only an atrocity against the Yietnamese people, but also a grave of crops in some ten days. These monstrous crimes m€nace to people all over the world. From this it can demonstrate that U.S. imperialism is the most savage be seen still more clearly that U.S. imperialism is the and brutal aggressor in human history, far surpassing srvorn enemy of world peace. the Hitlerite bandits. The Johnson Administration has now taken a step further and is going to use bacterio_ This ultimate savagery of chemical and bacterio- logical weapons in its attempt to avert defeat in its logical warfare, however, will not enable the U.S. ag- gressors u,ar of aggression against Viet Nam. This means that to achieve what they have failed to get by other means. U.S. imperialism will stop at nothing to realize its Neither an arsenal of toxic chemicals, aggressive aims. venomous liquids and poison gas, nor an army of fleas, rodents and scorpions can help them stave off defeat. It must be noted that, in flagranily using all kir-rds The bpstial crimes committed by the U.S. imperialists of chemical weapons and even sending bacteriological will arouse still greater hatred among the Vietnamese people ll,arfare units to south Viet Nam, U.S. imperialism is who rvill hit and punish them still more severely. not only trying save to itself from defeat on the Viet_ (Abrtdged "Renmin Ribao" article, August 24, 1965.) 28 Peking Reoieu, No. 35 Indonesia sees the world divided inlo ROUND THE WORLD only lwo camps, the revolutionary new emerling forces on the one hand and the reactionary otd-established forces on the other."

I ndon esi an Anniv er s ar y sake of our security collectively, we, the freedom-loving and peace-loving On Domestic Questions. "Indonesia Ever Onword, Never Retreot! nations, must oppose this U.S. aggres- does not rvish to be hypocritical sion, and mtrst give our active sup- about its socialism. Iudonesia states The hearts of many people were port to our brothers in Viet Nam." positively that its revolution is still filled with pride on August L7 as at the national democratic stage. The the red and rvhite flag rvas hoisted "To the Government of the United time will come lvhen Indonesia will in Djaka::ta the same flag that States of America I rvould like to build socialism." give first flew over- the land of the the advice that it acknowledge thousand islands to proclaim Indo- its error and immediately r,r,,ithdraw "The principle of buiiding an nesia's independence tll,'enty years altogether from Vj.et Nam and from economy without foreign monopoly ago. The Indonesians have achieved the whole of Indo-China. It is in capital has become a principle rvhich Democratic is a great deal during this short span vain for it to accuse the not subject to amendment." Repubiic of Viet Nam of 'being un- of history. Their fight against im- "The situation at home is also good perialism to preserve their national rvilling to negotiate,' for if the U.S.A. does not n ithdraw from Viet Nam, and favourable for us revolution- independence commands the respect aries." and admiration of the freedom- everyone can see that it is precisely the U.S.A. r,vhich is not prepared to loving people the rvorld over. Last cannot defend the sovereignty make peaceful "We weel< the Indonesian people cele- a settlernent." of our state without a peopie who, if brated their independence day r.vith necessary, are given arms the peo- The Grave-Diggers of lmperialisn. joy and confidence. President Su- ple including workers, farmers- and trventieth century is the cen- karno, r,vho trvo decades ago, had "The others who wolk in the ploductive turv of the end of imperiaiism. For uttered the stirring lvords "once in- sector but who, necessary, bear too long, imperialism has suppressed if dependent, for ever independent!" arms for a tirne.'l voiced a new slogan: "once self- us. exploited us, enslaved us and the already tolled reliant, for ever self-reliant!" and bells of history have "We should concentrate on the im- par mapped out some nerv tasks for his in the era of building up plementation of the three potent humanica (peace for humanity compatriots. - principles. We have to remember Ed.) r'' that all the three principles have to Addressing almost one million peo- all of us, the proletariat, the be fulfilled: One cannot be divorced ple in Merdeka Square in the Indo- "Norv farmels as well as the other op- from the others. There cannot be nesian capital on independence day, pressed people, the people whom I political sovereignty and cultural President Sukarno backed the Viet- call marhen (poor people Ed.) and identity without economic self- people and denounced U.S. namese att the oppressed nations- of the reliance and vice versa!" aggression in Viet Nam. Highlights world, together, simultaneously, are his speech follow: must cleanse the old culture of the grave-diggers of imperialism." "We of feudalism, and purge the foreign U.S. Aggression in Viet Nam. Pre- "The mistake of the imperialists culture of imperialism. Our culture sident Sukarno said that the and the reactionaries in general is should be revolutionary. We have "reason" given by the United States that they underestimate the com- achieved a lot within these twenty for "escalation" of its u'ar in Indo- mon people, they underestimate the years. We have passed through the China lvas "to prevent Viet Nam from simple people." most important stage in our revolu- cannot yet take becoming communist." "I have never tion. However, we heard Uncle Ho making anY objec- Non-Alignment Nlust Be Anti- a rest, we must not feel satisfied have achieved in the tion to the United States being a Imperialist. "In Indonesia's view, with what we capitalist eountry. Why then should non-alignment must be anti-imperial- past but we have to remain alert'in the United States have any objection ist. If not, then such non-alignment the days ahead; we stiil have to to Viet Nam becoming a communist is in reality already aligned, because march onward, march onward, march country?" it favours imperialism. It is impos- onward to obtain new successes and sible for one to be 'non-bloc' as be- victories." "If we allorv the United States ag- tween imperialism and anti-impe- naY, we m'ust gression against Viet Nam to con- rialism or between the colonizer and "We must continue, maniPolist tinue it will constitute a grave those fighting the colonizer!" further intensifY the danger to the whole order of our in- (political manifesto - Ed.) offensive' ternational life. For the sake of our "Indonesia does not subscribe to our revolutionary offensive. Heavv own security individually and for the 'the theory of the third force'.because and numerous are the tasks ahead of

August 27, 1965 2{) us. Once free, free for ever! Once total 2,0C0 men had been put out of ington's ordbrs. :Fiabbergasted by self-reliant, for ever self-reliant!" acticn. Norv Pak is dutifutlv sending the failure of its July sabotage raids another 15,000 men. But rr',ith his in Brazzavilie rvhich revealed U.S. "trVe have only one slogan: Ever orvn position at home not mr-rch bet- imperialism as the chief culprit, the retreat!'l onv;ard, never ter than that of his Saigoi-r counter'- Johnson Administration added in- parts, his latest traitorous action is sult to injury by charging Brazza- U.S. Search {or Cannan Fodder only adding ancther spark to the ville rvith "serious mistreatrnent" of south Korean tinder box since popular American diplomats. Wcshington Boormerong anger is already seething becau-se of the recent eonclusion of the notorious What Washington calied ill-treat- -,r,as SianAustralia. Prime 1\{inister lVIenzies, Arrrer'ica.n diplctl-rat entered the Con- soutir Viet Nam, Taylor's personally who r.l,as ir, Washington in mid June, gc rvith a visa 'which rvas valid only devised "special warfare" was based has decided to dispaicir anoiher 350 in September. He rvas ordered to on the concept of "Vietnaniese fight- men as a support unit fol the badl;r lerrve. Another was asked to straight- ing Vietnamese." But because of the batteled Australian battalion in en out his expired visa u,'ith the au- rapld disintegration of the hard-hit south Viet Nam. He is also asking thorities. Two Americans vn'ere de- puppet tloops and gro*,ing difficuity for a br.idgeiary inclease of 81 mil- tained and questioned during the pi'essganging more soldiels most July raids when they rvere found in - Iion pounds in miiitary expenses. south Vietnan'rese reluse to fight for Both these moves have aroused trade staying in a small hotel rvithout pern-rits. Yet these were the the hated U.S. oppressors - Washing- union and public protest. The out- entry ton has been attempting to "interna- cry stirred up by a recent Australian three incidents cited by the State tionalize" its rvar in Viet Nam even Associated Press report describing Department as examples of offences n'hile conrpelled 1o throw iu more the Aussies' kiilir-rgs and arson in against tl-re Ur-rited States! and more troops of its orvn. south Viet Nam as punishment the Instead of apologizing for its reporter has been- banned from con- as more n-rore peo- Johnson Nonetheless, and tact rvith the battaiion is an exam- crimes and arrogance, the become aware repulsive pretext ple of the ple of hcrv tI-re people -feel about the Adrninistraticn used a flimsv na{ ule of the U.S. dirty t ar and dirty war. to put pressure on the Congo and, n:cve into action to oppose it, Wash- according to the Neu York Times ingtoir's effcrts to use other natior-rs Japan. U.S. use of Japan as a stag- (August 14, 1965), to selve notice otl to puli its chestnuts out of the fire ing area for its troops and its air other nations that "from no\,v on are beginning to boomerang. bases tl-rere for- the bombing oI south Washington rvill be far less tolerant A number of top-ranking Ameri- Viet Nam is arousing a nationwicie of officiaily inspiled indigniiies movement against the and can officials have been sent to many U.S. imperial- against United States diplornats capitals in what can be called opera- ist war, The mass demonstrations propertS' abroad." But such arrogance rvliich greeted Prime Minisl,er Sato tion "more cannon fodder." But as could not frighten anybody. It when he visited Naha on Augr,rst 19 \Vestern press reports indicate, the melely exposed U.S. imperialist revealed that rvith U.S. tvar-making reception for them has been chiliy. mcntality: to the Yankee overloi'ds, in south Viet Nam becoming bloodier the exception reaction- any ccuntry daring to sland up to With of the and blooclier the Okinarrans are get- ary Menzies governnient of Austral- their builying comrnits an unpardon- ting increasir-rgly tired of Yankee oc- puppet able ci ime. ia and Pak Jung Hi in south cupation and want the American Korea, no one is ready to respond. killers to get out of their homeland. Of late, more and more U.S. of- Canada. Despite a personal letter ficials abroad have become persolta Wi non, grata and U.S. embassies targets from Johnson, Prime Minister Pear- U.S. thdr aw al _F rom Congo_( B) of attack by 1ocal demonstratoi's. This son has declined with a polite no. rising His office, mind{ul of public feeling, Flimsy Pretext, Futile Pressure is a natulal rcflection oI the peopie against has officialiy announced that "there anger of the world's Wirile foreign delegates from U.S. imperialist aggression and jn- is no intention to provide militar)u 6s- \zarious parts of the u'orld \\,eie ar- tervention. As President Massamba- sistance (for the U.S.)" and External riving in mid August to join the Debat noted, the people of Brazza- Affairs Minister Martin declared, "It Congolese in their national day cele- exercised t'estraint. "In lvould be undesirable for Canada to brations, U.S. embassy members in ville had he said, send military forces to Asia." BrazzaviTle rvere humiedly packing. any other country," "the President Massamba-Debat pointed Ameriean emba-"sy rvould be reduced South l{orea. Puppet Pak ashes. One can readily know by Jung Hi to this as ol'le mcte instance of to ah'eady has an "expeditionarv force,2 simply listening to broadcasts around Amclican hosti)ity to the Congo. shedding blood for his U.S. masters the rvorld that Amelicans are on in south Viet Nam. In the six Ircnically enough, these ugly bad terms with everYbodY every- months ending June, 400 out of a Arrericans ',r'ere leat ing on Wash- '6r[61"9.'2

30 Peking Rer:iew, No. 35 had a hand in planting and cultir,,at- ACROSS TH E LAN D ing lvas doing weli. They had helped reclairn 2,700 mu. of land from the desert. Sun-tanned, smiling and sturd.y, they ',vere clearly in love r,vith their Shonghai Youtfis Doing Well v,'ent to visit some of those rvho are new life. ln Sinkiong working in a state reclamation farm In parting, Premier Chou r_rrged in Shih Ho Tze, a new. floutishing them to be rvorthy successors to the A PART [L'om those going to the man-made oasis the desert cause of communism; high 1 r in north- to hold couniryside. an increasing number west of Urumchi, capital of the the banner of Mao Tse-tung's think- of educated youths from the towns Sinkiang Uighur Antonomous Region. ing, study his tvorks. put politics be- and cities is leaving for the border The two leaders rvent to see for them- fore all else and master agricultural regions. They are ansrvering the selves horv the young people are get- science and techniques. and devote Party's call to devote their youth ting along. and to gi:,re them encour- themselves to building up the border to building up the border areas. anC agement and guidance. regions. to steel and prepare themselves to Of the eleven y.oungsters tirey met, become tvorthy sLlccessors to the rev- no',v members of a youth team of Ex-Tibeton Serfs Govern olutionary cause. the No. 6 Brigade on one of the Shih Their Lond Over the past tlvo scme ;-ears, Ho Tze state farms, nine are mem- {,L power in the people,s Repub- 50.000 youths in their late teens and [ bers of the Communist Youth League. fl. lis of China belongs to the peo- early trventies have left their homes in They told the Premier and vice-Pre- ple.,' To implement that constitu_ Shanghai, east China's bustling me- mier that they were part of a group tional provision in Tibet, as else_ tropolis, for life in sparsely populated of 111 1'ounqsters which had arrirred whe'e in China, the Communist Sinkiang in the northr,r,est. They frorn Shanghai last ;'ear. They came party's poiicy is to train revol"rtion_ had volunteered en r.l,hen masse the;' fr-om various backgrounds.- u,as ary cadres from among the r,l.orking there _One 'a,ere told that life and rvork the son oI a ll.e1l-known film actor, people, in tl-ris case. the once povert;- demanding. ',vould be tougli and another of a revolutionary martyr. stricken serls and sliives who had 'Iaught helped soldier-pio- and by lr-hile a third came of a bourgeois suffered the worst oppression and neers of the Sinkiang Produclion and family. Uncier the guidance of the exploitation and rv.ho make up the Constructicn Corps of the P.L.A.. they Party. all are making good progress overr..,.he1ming majority of the pop_ have qr.rickly settled dos"n to become as independent, self-reliant 'uvorking ulatiou in Tibet. able rn,orkers and farmers. Many of closely' linked in thought aud )'outh quelling of the armed re'olt them have been cited for their pro- feering r.vith the .-rhe gress, both political and vocational. pecpl'e.stagedbythereactionar-trcliqtleof"oti;.;'-ffi;";i;; the upper social strata in 1959 and In July this year, Pr:emier Chou The the;, [n,1 helped to sor.v "vheat the carrying or:t of clenrocratic rne- En-lai and Vice-Premier Chen Yi tvas being harvested. The cotton they form have firmiy consolidatecl .lhe people's democratic dictatorship in Tibet. The folmer serfs and slaves ai'e no\v masters of their own destinies. Of the 10.000 Tibetan cadres rriorking at torvnship, county *" ffi ,'j alld higher adrninistrative levels, B%ffi three-quarters are foi"mer serfs or slaves. Some 700 Tibetar-rs have been * elected chairir-ren or vice-chairmen of clistrict or county' people's govern- fr* q &## ,::ffi' ments. Almost all tl-rese s-x-se::[s or slar,'es # v.'ere iiliterate n'hen emancipated. # Iicrv all ha.re acquired the eqllivalent of a prin-rary school education and not a ferv have reached midCle school oi college standard. I\{anY have joined the Cc't::,.t'r^,itt-list Par'ty or the Communist Youth League. People's mle in Tibet 1-ras shorvn its po'nrer in boosiing gra,in anl Iivcslock plocluctiorr. indLrEtrv and trade r.r'ith a conseqLient s'*iit rise in Premier Chou meets Shanghai youths in Sinkii.ng the living siandards of ihe people.

August 27, 196s 3I NOIT'S THE TIME TO THINK OF IT JL .Y. t4 .l !L zz" Come to €&e + a ,tt

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