Ontario, then down the St. Lawrence to Montreal. All three forces combined at Montreal on August 29th and began the siege of the city, which surrendered on September 9th, ending the hostilities in Canada. In 1761 Britain was forced to open peace negotiations because of the great cost of the war, and these were concluded in 1762 by the Treaty of Paris, proclaimed in March of the following year. One of the prizes to fall to Britain, one which could hardly be for- saken in view of Wolfe’s death and his subsequent adoration by the populace, was Canada. However, not everyone approved of this. One criticism, which was to prove justified, was the observation of John Russell, the Fourth Duke of Bedford, who was Britain’s chief negotiator, that it was only the American colonists’ fear of the French in Canada that made them susceptible to any measure of control, and that once the threat was removed, the chances of a revolt by the colonists would increase.1 THE KITTANNING EXPEDITION As has been shown, in the spring of 1754 the immediate consequence of Washington’s attack on the French at Great Meadows had been the capture of the Ohio Company’s fort, which had been renamed Fort Duquesne. From this post the French commandant of the Fort pro- posed an expedition against Fort Necessity, and here he called the leaders of bands of Hurons, Abenakis, Iroquois, Nipissings, Algonquins, Ottawas, and Delawares to assist him in this venture. The Delawares in particular had real cause to hate the English, having been driven from their homes in eastern Pennsylvania short- ly before. The following year, which saw the failure of the Duke of Cumberland’s strategic plan for North America, the Delawares, under their leaders Shingas and Captain Jacobs, aided and incited by the French, began a series of raids on the settlements of west- ern Pennsylvania during the fall. In the winter of 1755-56, four forts were built and garrisoned for the defense of these settle- ments. These were Forts George, sometimes called Patterson’s Fort, Granville, Shirley, and Lyttleton. During the new year the attacks were resumed and garrisons were placed at McDowell’s Mill and at a fort at Carlisle. Matters came to a head in July, with the destruction of Fort Granville. A band of some sixty Indians appeared before the fort and called on the defenders to come out and give battle; a week later they returned with Captain Jacobs and fifteen Frenchmen, and on the 30th the fort was captured. Lieutenant Edward Armstrong, temporarily in command, was killed, as was one other soldier. Twenty-two others, together with a few civilians, were captured, and the fort was set alight.2 As a result of this attack it became clear that it was necessary to strengthen the defenses of western Pennsylvania and also to launch a punitive expedition against the Indians in order to raise the morale of the province and to deflate that of the In- dians. This task was given to Lieutenant Colonel John Armstrong. Armstrong had been appointed to the command of the Second Battal- ion of the Provincial Pennsylvania Regiment on May llth of that year. This battalion, sometimes called the Western Battalion, was made up of the garrisons of the posts of western Pennsylvania, and comprised seven companies.’ These were his own at Carlisle, those of Captains Ward and George Armstrong at Fort George, Cap- tain Mercer’s at Fort Shirley, Captain Hamilton’s at Fort Lyttle- ton, and those of Captains Potter and Steel at McDowell’s Mill. The nominal strength of each company was three officers - a cap- tain, lieutenant, and ensign - and fifty men, though they were not all up to strength. With the approval and consent of Robert Hunter Morris~ the Governor of the Province until August 19, when he was succeeded by William Deny, Colonel Armstrong planned his attack on the Delawares. With the assistance of people who had escaped from the Indians, the Colonel learned that Shingas and Captain Jacobs were encamped at Kittanning on the Alleghany River. He was assisted in particular by one John Baker, who was to serve as a volunteer in the expedition in Captain Mercer’s company, and who was killed in the attack.3 It was planned that Colonel Armstrong would take five companies on the expedition. These were his own and those of Captains Ward, Mercer, Hamilton, and Potter. It was also planned that he should engage what volunteers he could to make up the strength of the force. In fact it is clear from the casualty list appended to his official report of the expedition, and from other sources, that men from all seven companies accompanied him on the expedi- tion. The order was given for the force to rendezvous at Fort Shirley, and each company or detachment made its own way there between August 20 and August 29. Forts George and Shirley were abandoned, though small garrisons were left behind at Forts Lyttleton and Morris, and at Carlisle and McDowell’s Mill. There is no list or muster of the names of the soldiers and volunteers who accompanied Armstrong on the expedition, but all accounts agree that they numbered about three hundred officers and men.4 The main force got under way on Monday, August 30, but they were preceded by a small party with whom they joined up at Beaver Dams, a few miles from Franks Town on the north branch of the Juniata. The precise date is not clear; there are discrepancies among the accounts, but it was probably on September 3. Before leaving Fort Shirley, Armstrong ordered the removal of the gates from the fort since the inhabitants of the valley for whose protection it had been built had all abandoned their settlements. By Sunday evening (September 5) the battalion was within fifty miles of the Indian village, having followed an old trail used by Indian tra- ders, which came out on the Alleghany River near Kittanningo On the 6th it was decided that someone should be sent to reconnoiter the village. Accordingly, an officer, two soldiers, and a scout or "pilot," as they were then called, were dispatched to see what they could discover~ That day the column apparently marched about twenty ~iles, and the next morning it met up with the returning scouts.~ Their efforts appear to have been of little value as the Colonel was to report: "The Day following We met them on their Return & they i~form’d us that the Roads were entirely clear of the Enemy and that they had the greatest Reason to believe they were not discover’d But from the rest of the Intelligence they gave it appear’d that they had not been nigh enough the Town either to perceive the true Situation of it, the Number of the Enemy, or what Way it might be most advantageously attack’d."6 That day the column continued its march towards the village, in- tending to get as near to it as possible so that the attack could be made at dawn the following morning. However, at about nine or ten o’clock that evening, while they were, so they believed, about six miles from the village, one of the scouts came in with a report that two or three Indians were encamped on the road a few perchese away, w~ereupon the Colonel ordered a general retreat for about one hundred perches. The scout went back to have ~Editor’s Note: a variable unit of measurment, usually a rod (16 I/2 feet). 8 another look and returned and confirmed the accuracy of his first report. In fact it was hopelessly incorrect, and his mistake was to have a tragic consequence. It was decided that it was not advisable to attack the group, nor wait until they had fallen asleep before passing them.7 In his report the Colonel observed: "... it was propos’d that we shou’d immediately set and cut them off, but this was thought too hazardous if but one of the Enemy had escap’d It wou’d have been a Means of discovering the whole Design; and the Light of the Moon on which depended our advantageously posting our Men and attacking the T~n wou’d not admit of staying until the Indians fell asleep; ...,, 8 It was decided, therefore, that a small group should be left behind to watch the Indians and attack them at daybreak. Lieu- tenant James Hogg of Captain Armstrong’s company was detailed for this duty together with twelve men, and also the scouts who had discovered the group. During the morning the battalion had pla- ced the bulk of its stores on scaffolds out of sight and reach of animals. Now they left the horses and other unnecessary im- pedimenta with the lieutenant and left the road to avoid the dan- ger of giving a warning of their presence to the Indians. They headed across country for the village and were guided by the noise of the village, rather than by their scouts. In this way, after crossing several hills and valleys, the front of the column came ~ithin one hundred perches of the southern end of the vil- lage. The time was about three in the morning and the advanced members of the column settled down for the remainder of the night. The advanced companies had made the descent from the last hill over- looking the village, but the rear three were still coming up. At the south end of the village the Colonel was alarmed by a piercing whistle from a warrior in the corn field on the east bank of the river flanking the village.