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CLMPS 2011 Volume of Abstracts Division of Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science of the International Union of History and Philosophy of Science Congress Secretariat (Eds.) Volume of Abstracts CLMPS 2011 Special Topic Logic and Science Facing the New Technologies 14th International Congress of Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science Nancy, July 19–26, 2011 (France) Contents Editorial Notev Official Program2 I – Plenary Lectures3 II – Special Sessions7 Special Session 1.............................9 Special Session 2............................. 11 Special Session 3............................. 13 III – IUHPS – Joint Commission Symposium 15 IV – Ordinary Sessions 25 A. Logic...................................... 27 A1. Mathematical Logic........................ 29 A1. Invited Lectures..................... 29 A1. Contributed Papers.................. 34 A2. Philosophical Logic........................ 39 A2. Invited Lectures..................... 39 A2. Contributed Papers.................. 42 A2. Contributed Symposia................. 66 A3. Logic and Computation...................... 81 A3. Invited Lectures..................... 81 A3. Contributed Papers.................. 84 A3. Contributed Symposia................. 87 B. General Philosophy of Science....................... 91 B1. Methodology and Scientific Reasoning............. 93 B1. Invited Lectures..................... 93 B1. Contributed Papers................... 98 B1. Contributed Symposia................. 136 B2. Ethical Issues in the Philosophy of Science.......... 144 B2. Invited Lectures..................... 144 B2. Contributed Papers................... 146 B3. Historical Aspects in the Philosophy of Science........ 149 B3. Invited Lectures..................... 149 B3. Contributed Papers................... 150 B3. Contributed Symposia................. 162 C. Methodological and Philosophical Issues of Particular Sciences... 177 C1. Logic, Mathematics and Computer Science.......... 179 C1. Invited Lectures..................... 179 iii iv CONTENTS C1. Contributed Papers................... 181 C1. Contributed Symposia................. 192 C2. Cognitive Science......................... 199 C2. Invited Lectures..................... 199 C2. Contributed Papers................... 201 C3. Biology................................ 214 C3. Invited Lectures..................... 214 C3. Contributed Papers................... 215 C3. Contributed Symposia................. 226 C4. Chemistry.............................. 231 C4. Invited Lectures..................... 231 C4. Contributed Papers................... 232 C5. Physics................................ 234 C5. Invited Lectures..................... 234 C5. Contributed Papers................... 236 C5. Contributed Symposia................ 252 C6. Medicine............................... 255 C6. Invited Lectures..................... 255 C6. Contributed Papers................... 258 C7. Environmental Sciences...................... 261 C7. Invited Lectures..................... 261 C7. Contributed Papers................... 262 C8. Economics and Social Sciences.................. 264 C8. Invited Lectures..................... 264 C8. Contributed Papers................... 266 C8. Contributed Symposia................. 270 D. Methodological and Philosophical Issues in Technology........ 277 D. Invited Lectures..................... 279 D. Contributed Papers................... 281 D. Contributed Symposia.................. 287 Affiliated Program 295 Symposium “Conférences Pierre Duhem”.............. 295 Beth Fundation Symposium..................... 295 APMP Symposium........................... 297 LOCI Symposium........................... 299 LogICCC Symposium......................... 300 Société de Philosophie des Sciences Symposium.......... 302 LORIA Symposium.......................... 303 IIFIHPS Symposium.......................... 304 Methodological Problems of Technoscience............ 306 N.O.T. Symposium........................... 307 AIPS Symposium............................ 309 Ontology Symposium......................... 309 IMLA Symposium........................... 311 Index 312 Editorial Note The Volume of Abstracts contains the abstracts of plenary and invited lec- tures, special symposia, as well as contributed papers and symposia of regulary regristered participants of the Congress, such as they were submitted by the authors. We apologize in advance for errors which could have occured while converting the files in LATEX. For practical reasons we chose to include only short abstracts. Longer ones can be found on the Congress Website: http://www.clmps2011.org/en/editorial.html and on the provided CD. Official Program I – Plenary Lectures DLMPS—Tarski’s vision and ours Tue. 19/07 Wilfrid Hodges 2:00 – 5:00 pm Okehampton (UK) [email protected] The first International Congress of Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Sci- ence took place in 1960. So this present Congress in Nancy is an occasion for us to review the first fifty years of DLMPS Congresses and cast an eye forwards to the Division’s second fifty years. The form of DLMPS was the result of several influences. In the aftermath of the Second World War, the International Council of Scientific Unions (ICSU) gave itself the task of setting up and coordinating In- ternational Scientific Unions; the administrative form of DLMPS comes mainly from its ICSU connection. The Division’s sphere of interest was the result of a tug of war between philosophers of science (notably Ferdinand Gonseth) and logicians (notably Evert W. Beth and Alfred Tarski). The historians report that the logicians had the better of the fight, largely through Tarski’s dominance. Today we should ask whether our administrative form still makes good use of the possibilities, and whether our inherited sphere of interest is appropriate for the present situation in logic and philosophy of science. Retrocausality—what would it take? Thu. 21/07 Huw Price 8:30 – 10:00 am Centre for Time, University of Sydney (Australia) [email protected] Some writers argue that retrocausality offers an attractive loophole in Bell’s Theorem, allowing an explanation of EPR-Bell correlations without “spooky action-at-a-distance.” This idea originated more than a decade before Bell’s famous result, when de Broglie’s student, Olivier Costa de Beauregard, first proposed that retrocausality plays a role in EPR contexts. The proposal is difficult to assess, because there has been little work on the general question of what a world with retrocausality would “look like”—what kinds of considerations, if any, would properly lead physicists to conclude that we do live in such a world, and what that would mean, in terms of the structure and use of physical models. In this talk I begin with a brief discussion of these general issues, with the aim of bringing the more specific question as to whether 3 Plenary Lectures quantum theory implies retrocausality into sharper focus than has hitherto been possible. Against this background, I then consider the suggestion (made by Costa de Beauregard himself, amongst others) that time-symmetry counts in favour of retrocausality in the quantum case. I show that this is true under some assumptions about quantum ontology but not others. In the remaining cases, the most that can be said is that it remains an open question whether the quantum world is retrocausal, even if we assume time-symmetry. Contrary to conventional wisdom, however, there seems to be little justification for the standard assumption that the quantum world is not retrocausal. At present, this assumption seems to be dogma, not science. Engineering technical artefacts Sat. 23/07 and scientific instruments 8:30 – 10:00 am Marco de Baar FOM-Institute for Plasma Physics Rijnhuizen, Nieuwegein (The Netherlands) [email protected] In this paper a comparison is made between engineering and scientific ap- proaches to the design and construction of artefacts. The paper aims to show that the engineering of artefacts involves a separate body of knowledge, thus undermining the idea of engineering as being just applied natural science. This will be discussed on the basis of a case study, the test fusion reactor ITER that is currently being built in France. Magnetohydrodynamics (MHD) is the science of conducting magnetized flu- ids. The theory combines Maxwell’s equations with the gas dynamics equa- tions for the evolution of density and pressure. MHD allows physicists to understand elements of solar physics, the development of the earth magnetic field and the behaviour of fully ionised gasses (a.k.a. plasmas). In nuclear fusion research hot plasmas are confined by magnetic fields. MHD explains that in fusion plasmas at specific locations resistive instabilities (tearing modes) can develop. These modes are important from both a scientific and a reactor performance perspective. The key notions of magnetohydrodynamics (MHD) will be explained. Then two instruments for MHD research will be compared. Both instruments are based on 140 GHz electro-cyclotron (EC) waves. The 2D ECE system is de- signed and built for scientific research in resistive MHD modes. The in-line ECE is a prototype of a real time control system for these modes, and designed and built for operational purposes (the suppress these modes and to increase the fusion power). The requirements and design of, and implementation of these systems on the small German tokamak TEXTOR will be discussed. If we were to bring these instruments to maturity for installation on ITER additional re- quirements emerge, associated
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