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Constructive Empiricism in the Social Sciences

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Constructive Empiricism in the Social Sciences Constructive empiricism in the social sciences Abstract ‘What problems face the aspirant empiricist today?’ is the question Bas C. van Fraassen asks in his seminal work The Scientific Image (1980). In this thesis, I interpret this question as a challenge to develop constructive empiricism [CE] in a field of scientific inquiry other than the context of physics in which it was conceived. The first part of the thesis expounds CE with reference to classical empiricism, discloses some of its fundamental assumptions, and spells out in detail its account of science. In the second part of the thesis, CE is extended to social science. Since CE was developed in the context of natural science, I take an articulation of the alleged fundamental differences between natural and social science as indicating challenges a CE-outlook on social science must address. I also provide a brief history of the gap between the sciences. Then, in the bulk of this thesis, I argue that CE’s model view accommodates social science, that description, prediction and explanation in the light of CE are proper fruits of inquiry in social science, and that CE is able to make sense of the differences in the concepts used in natural and social science. In the discussion of the feasibility of CE for social science, I show concurrently that contemporary articulations of the differences between the natural and the social sciences pose no insuperable problems for the constructive empiricist. Bram van Dijk | 3691454 History & Philosophy of Science | Utrecht University Daily supervisors | dr. Guido Bacciagaluppi & dr. Ruud Abma Third examiner | dr. J. Bos Acknowledgements I would like to thank dr. Guido Bacciagaluppi and dr. Ruud Abma for their valuable time, comments and help during this thesis project, dr. Jaap Bos for being third examiner, and Willeke Verduijn for support throughout the year. I would also like to thank my family, Albert van Dijk, Leonor Villa, Cristhian Felipe Pinzon, and Teun and Corrie Verduijn, among others, for always supporting me. 2 Contents Introduction ............................................................................................................... 5 Part 1. Empiricism and constructive empiricism .............................................8 Chapter 1. Classical empiricism and constructive empiricism .....................8 1.1 Fundamentals of classical empiricism .................................................................. 8 1.2 Fundamentals of constructive empiricism ......................................................... 10 1.3 Experience and existence ................................................................................... 12 1.4 Scepticism ............................................................................................................ 14 1.5 Truth .................................................................................................................... 15 1.6 Constructive… empiricism? ................................................................................. 17 Chapter 2. Constructive empiricism, a philosophy of science ................... 19 2.1 What is science? .................................................................................................. 19 2.2 The relation between theory and world .............................................................. 19 2.3 Models and empirical adequacy ........................................................................ 20 2.4 Families of models or deductive systems ........................................................... 21 2.5 Theory acceptance: epistemic and pragmatic reasons ...................................... 22 2.6 Explanation ........................................................................................................ 23 2.7 Causation and counterfactuals ........................................................................... 28 2.8 Modality and probability .................................................................................... 30 2.9 Laws .................................................................................................................... 33 Part II. Constructive empiricism in the social sciences. .............................. 36 Chapter 3. A brief history of an old issue ......................................................... 37 Chapter 4. Models ................................................................................................... 41 4.1 The relation theory-world under philosophical scrutiny ................................... 41 4.2 A solution ............................................................................................................ 45 4.3 Mathematical models for the social sciences? .................................................... 49 4.4 A reconstruction .................................................................................................. 52 4.5 Phenomena, appearances and measurement ..................................................... 53 4.6 Data models ........................................................................................................ 55 3 4.7 Surface models .................................................................................................... 56 4.8 Abstract theory.................................................................................................... 57 4.9 Experiments ........................................................................................................ 59 Chapter 5. Primary interests of the two cultures ........................................... 62 5.1 Distinct questions ................................................................................................ 62 5.2 Products of inquiry .............................................................................................. 67 5.3 Prediction ............................................................................................................ 68 5.4 Explanation in natural and social science .......................................................... 77 Chapter 6. Concepts in the natural and social sciences ............................... 82 6.1 Concepts in the natural sciences ......................................................................... 82 6.2 Concepts in the social sciences ........................................................................... 84 6.3 Concepts in constructive empiricism: an implication ........................................ 88 6.4 Two illustrations of pragmatic explanation ....................................................... 95 Conclusion ................................................................................................................ 99 Bibliography ........................................................................................................... 103 4 Introduction ‘What problems face the aspirant empiricist today?’1 is the question Bas C. Van Fraassen asks in the introduction of his seminal work The Scientific Image (1980). Let us pause to draw my interpretation of that question. Someone who aspires to be an empiricist has a particular theory of knowledge, hence, if we maintain that science is humankind’s most systematized and careful attempt to obtain knowledge, that person has a particular epistemological view about science. Someone who aspires to be an empiricist today faces a variety of scientific disciplines that all claim to provide knowledge, so, that person must take a particular epistemological stance towards all of them. Thus, one way to understand the problems the aspirant empiricist faces is the challenge to develop and defend empiricist views in new areas. My way of coming to grips with the initial question proceeds by the following strategy. In part I of this thesis I provide a comprehensive articulation of constructive empiricism. In chapter one, I introduce some classical empiricist tenets and contrast them with the ‘constructive’ flavour of empiricism that is developed in Van Fraassen’s The Scientific Image. In chapter two I discuss constructive empiricism as a philosophy of the aims and structure of science. In part II of this thesis I face the challenge to develop and defend constructive empiricism in the social sciences. I show that a constructive empiricist outlook in the social sciences is both possible and fruitful. Yet, since constructive empiricism was developed in the context of the natural sciences - mainly physics - spelling out a constructive empiricist approach of the social sciences requires that we consider some of the alleged fundamental differences between the natural and the social sciences, and use them as points of departure for the articulation of constructive empiricism in the social sciences. In chapter three I provide a brief history of the gulf between the natural and social sciences. In the remaining chapters, I interpret the explication of the ‘fundamental’ differences between natural and social science in Jerome Kagan’s The Three Cultures. Natural Sciences, Social Sciences, and the Humanities in the 21st Century (2009) as challenges for the articulation of constructive empiricism in the social sciences. In chapter four I first illustrate some amendments Van Fraassen made to his 1 Bas C. van Fraassen, The Scientific Image (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980), 3. 5 ‘early’ model view, and then I show how they pave the way for a constructive empiricist account of phenomena, appearances, measurements, data, models, and empirical adequacy in the social sciences. In chapter
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