And Financial Implications of Unmanned

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Disruptive Innovation and Naval Power: Strategic and Financial Implications of Unmanned Underwater Vehicles (UUVs) and Long-term Underwater Power Sources MASSACHUsf TTT IMef0hrE OF TECHNOLOGY by Richard Winston Larson MAY 0 8 201

S.B. Engineering LIBRARIES Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2012

Submitted to the Department of Mechanical Engineering in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

Master of Science in Mechanical Engineering

at the

MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY

February 2014

Author Dep.atment of Mechanical Engineering nuaryL5.,3014 Certified by.... Y Douglas P. Hart Professor of Mechanical Engineering Tbesis Supervisor

A ccepted by ...... David E. Hardt Ralph E. and Eloise F. Cross Professor of Mechanical Engineering 2 Disruptive Innovation and Naval Power: Strategic and Financial Implications of Unmanned Underwater Vehicles (UUVs) and Long-term Underwater Power Sources by Richard Winston Larson

Submitted to the Department of Mechanical Engineering on January 15, 2014, in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Science in Mechanical Engineering

Abstract The naval warfare environment is rapidly changing. The U.S. Navy is adapting by continuing its blue-water dominance while simultaneously building brown-water capabilities. Unmanned systems, such as unmanned airborne drones, are proving piv- otal in facing new battlefield challenges. Unmanned underwater vehicles (UUVs) are emerging as the Navy's seaborne equivalent of the Air Force's drones. Representing a low-end disruptive technology relative to traditional shipborne operations, UUVs are becoming capable of taking on increasingly complex roles, tipping the scales of battlefield entropy. They improve mission outcomes and operate for a fraction of the cost of traditional operations. Furthermore, long-term underwater power sources at currently under development at MIT will extend UUV range and operational endurance by an order of magnitude. Installing these systems will not only allow UUVs to complete new, previously impossible missions, but will also radically decrease costs. I explore the financial and strategic implications of UUVs and long-term underwater power sources to the Navy and its future operations. By examining current naval operations and the ways in which UUVs could complement or replace divers and ships, I identify ways to use UUV technology to reduce risk to human life, decrease costs, and leverage the technology learning curve. I conclude that significant cost savings are immediately available with the widespread use of UUVs, and current research investment levels are inadequate in comparison with the risks and rewards of UUV programs.

Thesis Supervisor: Douglas P. Hart Title: Professor of Mechanical Engineering

3 4 Acknowledgments

I am deeply indebted to the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and the profound impact it has had on my life. My more than five years at the Institute have been a for- mative and defining time. I thank those in the Department of Mechanical Engineering who taught and inspired me on my journey at MIT. Professor Douglas Hart has been the perfect mentor. He has pushed me to employ my strengths, improve my weaknesses, and pursue my academic interests. My thesis is a reflection of his academic leadership ability. Without his insight, hard work, and friendship, I would not have had the opportunity to chase my dreams.

My friends and family made my work possible. I thank Professor Roger Porter, Brandon Hopkins, Nathaniel Coughran, Jonathan Sue Ho, and Tom Milnes for their friendship and wisdom. I thank my parents, Gordon and Allison Larson, for their generosity and love. Finally, I thank my wife, Sarah, for being the best thing that ever happened to me.

5 6 Executive Summary

As the U.S. Military maintains readiness to wage war with traditional nation-states as well as with terrorist groups, unmanned and autonomous systems are revolutionizing warfare. Aerial drones have been wildly successful, and unmanned underwater vehicles (UUVs) are an opportunity for the U.S. Navy to increase its capability and effectiveness in a similar way under the sea. For more information, see Section 1.1.

Unmanned Underwater Vehicles

Unmanned underwater vehicles are used in a variety of military, scientific, and industrial settings. There are three classes of UUVs: autonomous underwater vehicles (AUVs), remotely operated vehicles (ROVs), and underwater gliders. The diversity of vehicle types and sizes offers flexibility in application and deployment, a key benefit to using UUVs. For more information, see Section 1.2.1. Long-term power sources will drastically improve the usefulness of the UUV technologies. An aluminum-based power source being developed at MIT under the direc- tion of Professor Doug Hart is projected to offer an energy density of 8000 MJ/L, a 1000% improvement over current energy storage technologies. The improved range and power capabilities of UUVs equipped with such a power source will be a strategic advantage. For more information, see Section 1.2.2.

7 Disruptive Innovation and Battlefield Entropy

Disruptive innovations are those which improve a product along new performance metrics. Disruptive technologies improve through sustaining innovation (improvement along existing performance metrics) to displace existing technologies. Disruptive innovation plays an important role in maintaining combat superiority. Submarines, aerial drones, and cruise missiles are all examples of disruptive military innovations. There is significant first-mover advantage in adopting and skillfully managing disruptive innovation. For more information, see Section 2.1. Unmanned underwater vehicles are disrupting manned sea platforms. Though they are in many ways not as capable as ships or divers, they offer improved performance in cost, difficulty of detection, and flexibility. Not only are UUVs an opportunity, but they are also a threat. Other navies are also investing in UUVs, including Russia, China, and Thailand, as well as drug cartels and terrorist groups. For more information, see Section 2.2. Battlefield entropy measures the difference between an entity's ideal fighting force and its actual combat effectiveness. Even if a combat entity possesses superior force, or is not experiencing attrition, its combat effectiveness will decrease as the entropy it experiences increases. Weapon systems (broadly defined as any element providing force) decrease battlefield entropy for the user and increase entropy for the opponent. Given a more effective weapon, a greater change in entropy will be experienced. Disruptive military innovations represent characteristic improvements in battlefield entropy, and UUVs offer a unique opportunity for the Navy to change battlefield entropy in its favor. For more information, see Section 2.3. Disruptive innovation must be skillfully managed to realize its full potential. Four theories (jobs-to-be-done theory, market/application identification, discovery-driven planning, and resource-process-value theory) provide best practices for identifying, adopting, and applying disruptive innovations well. For more information, see Section 2.4.

8 UUV Mission Cost Analysis and Comparison

To demonstrate the disruptive power of UUVs, I analyzed the costs of missions that can be completed using current UUV technology. I examined the mission scenarios, the cost of completing the mission using manned systems, and the cost of completing the mission using UUVs. I compared the costs and analyzed the advantages of using UUV technologies. In the table below, I present the percent cost savings experienced by using UUV technologies rather than manned systems. In general, UUV systems are roughly an order of magnitude (90% cost savings) less expensive than manned systems. For more information, see Chapter 3.

Mission Percent Savings CBNRE 93% Water Column Profiling 99% High Definition 76% Mapping (High Definition) Medium Definition 93% Low Definition 93% Harbor Monitoring 98% Array Deployment 88% Mine-hunting 92% Hold-at-risk 96% ASW Training 81% Attached Materials 54% Hull Inspection (Panamax) In-ater Sury In-water Survey 67% Undersea Infrastructure 86%

Implications of UUV Adoption

In conclusion, I offer several observations on UUVs and their disruptive potential to naval operations:

" UUVs offer significant cost savings

" Manned platforms are expensive

" Aluminum power sources are an important step forward

9 " UUVs are not one-size-fits-all

" UUVs represent a significant change in battlefield entropy

" Nonconsumption and overshooting offer many immediate UUV applications

" The low costs and disruptive nature of UUVs will make them attractive to other

navies and entities

For more information, see Chapter 4.

Unmanned underwater vehicles will revolutionize naval warfare. Proper innovation management and early, enthusiastic adoption is required to seize their strategic potential and maintain maritime superiority.

10 Contents

1 Introduction 19 1.1 Technology and the Changing Face of Naval Warfare ...... 19 1.2 Technological Advances in Naval Warfare ...... 20 1.2.1 Unmanned Underwater Vehicles ...... 20 1.2.2 Long-term Underwater Aluminum Power Source ...... 24

2 Disruptive Innovation in Naval Technology 27 2.1 A Brief Introduction to Disruptive Innovation ...... 27 2.1.1 Disruptive Innovation Example: RCA, Sony, and the Transistor 29

2.2 Disruptive Innovation in Warfare ...... 30

2.2.1 Disruptive Innovation in the U.S. Military 31

2.2.2 Disruption of Naval Warfare by UUVs . . 32

2.3 Battlefield Entropy ...... 34

2.3.1 Measuring Battlefield Entropy ...... 36

2.3.2 Evaluating Military Innovation in Terms of Battlefield Entropy 39 2.3.3 Battlefield Entropy and UUVs ...... 42

2.4 Managing Disruptive Innovation ...... 44

2.4.1 Military Disruption Case Study: UAVs .. 46

2.4.2 Disruption Lessons Learned ...... 47

2.5 Potential UUV Missions ...... 49

3 Mission Cost Analyses 51

3.1 CBNRE Detection and Localization ...... 51

11 3.1.1 Mission Description ...... 51 3.1.2 Manned System CONOPs and Costs 52 3.1.3 UUV CONOPs and Costs 52 3.2 Near-land and Harbor Monitoring 53 3.2.1 Mission Description ...... 53 3.2.2 Manned System CONOPs and Costs 53 3.2.3 UUV CONOPs and Costs . . 54 3.3 Array Deployment ...... 54 3.3.1 Mission Description ...... 54 3.3.2 Manned System CONOPs and Costs 55 3.3.3 UUV CONOPs and Costs .. 55 3.4 Oceanography and Bathymetry . .. 55 3.4.1 Mission Description ...... 55 3.4.2 Manned System CONOPs and Costs 56 3.4.3 UUV CONOPs and Costs .... . 56 3.5 Mine detection, classification, identification, and neutralization 57 3.5.1 Mission Description ...... 57 3.5.2 Manned System CONOPs and Costs 57 3.5.3 UUV CONOPs and Costs ..... 58 3.6 Hold-at-risk ...... 58 3.6.1 Mission Description ...... 58 3.6.2 Manned System CONOPs and Costs 58 3.6.3 UUV CONOPs and Costs ..... 59 3.7 ASW Training ...... 59 3.7.1 Mission Description ...... 59 3.7.2 Manned System CONOPs and Costs 60 3.7.3 UUV CONOPs and Costs ..... 60

3.8 In-water Survey and Hull Inspection ... 60 3.8.1 Mission Description ...... 60 3.8.2 Manned System CONOPs and Costs ...... 61

12 3.8.3 UUV CONOPs and Costs ...... 61 3.9 Monitoring Undersea Infrastructure ...... 62 3.9.1 M ission Description ...... 62 3.9.2 Manned System CONOPs and Costs ...... 62 3.9.3 UUV CONOPs and Costs ...... 63

4 Implications of UUV Adoption 67 4.1 UUVs offer significant cost savings ...... 67 4.2 Ships are expensive ...... 68 4.3 Aluminum power sources are an important step forward ...... 68 4.4 UUVs are not one-size-fits-all ...... 69 4.5 Nonconsumption and overshooting offer many immediate UUV applications ...... 70 4.6 Low costs and disruptive nature of UUVs will make them attractive to other navies ...... 71 4.7 Conclusions ...... 71

A Technology 73 A.1 Unmanned Underwater Vehicle Technology ...... 73 A.1.1 Technology State-of-the-Art and Research Focus ...... 73 A.2 Strategic Use of UUVs ...... 74 A.2.1 US Navy 2004 UUV Master Plan ...... 75 A.3 Evaluated Mission Selection ...... 77

B Naval System Cost Calculations 79 B .1 Ships ...... 79 B.1.1 Ship Life-cycle Costs as Calculated by the Congressional Bud- get O ffice ...... 79 B.1.2 Other Ship Life-cycle Costs ...... 80 B.1.3 Hourly Ship Costs ...... 85 B .2 U U V s ...... 85

13 B.2.1 Energy Costs ...... 86 B.2.2 Ship Utilization Rate ...... 88 B.2.3 Man-portable Class ...... 89 B.2.4 Light-weight Class ...... 89 B.2.5 Heavy-weight Class ...... 89 B.2.6 Large Class ...... 90 B.2.7 Z-Ray Glider ...... 90 B.2.8 Spray Glider ...... 91 B.3 Other Mission Resource Costs .. ... 91 B.3.1 Diving Teams ...... 91 B.3.2 AUV and ROV Operators ... 92 B.3.3 Navy SEAL Operators ..... 92 B.3.4 Navy Marine Mammal Program 93

C Mission Cost Calculations 95 C.1 Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) ...... 95

C.1.1 CBNRE Detection and Localization ...... 95 C.1.2 Water Column Profiling ...... 96 C.1.3 Near-land and Harbor Monitoring ...... 97 C.1.4 Array Deployment ...... 99 C.1.5 Bathymetry ...... 100

C.1.6 Mine Detection, Classification, Identification, and Neutralization 102 C.2 Anti-submarine Warfare (ASW) ...... 103 C.2.1 Hold-at-risk ...... 103 C.2.2 ASW Training ...... 105 C.3 Inspection and Identification (I&I) ...... 106

C.3.1 In-water Survey and Hull Inspection ...... 106

C.3.2 Monitoring undersea infrastructure ...... 109

14 List of Figures

1-1 Hydroid REMUS 100 AUV [1] 21 1-2 Hydroid REMUS 600-S AUV [2] 21 1-3 Bluefin 21 AUV [3] ...... 22 1-4 Boeing Echo Ranger AUV [4] . 22 1-5 Oceaneering Magnum Plus ROV [5] 23 1-6 Spray Glider [6] ...... 24 1-7 Z-Ray Glider [7] ...... 24

2-1 Technology improvement and disruption [8] ...... 27

2-2 Battlefield entropy as a measure of weapon effectiveness . 36

15 16 List of Tables

2.1 Analyzed M issions ...... 49

3.1 Mission costs comparison between manned systems and UUVs . . 64 3.2 Mission costs comparison between aluminum and non-aluminum power system s ...... 65

B.1 CBO-calculated Life-cycle Ship Costs ...... 81 B.2 CBO-calculated Life-cycle Ship Costs ...... 82 B.3 Ship Costs per Hour ...... 86 B.4 Unmanned Underwater Vehicle Characteristics and Costs ...... 87 B.5 UUV Hourly Costs and Ship Utilization Rates ...... 88 B.6 Other Mission Resource Costs per Hour ...... 91

17 18 Chapter 1

Introduction

1.1 Technology and the Changing Face of Naval Warfare

As the only global superpower, the United States of America faces unique challenges in preparing for and waging war. While it must be prepared to fight nation-states with

well-developed military and industrial strength, the U.S. military must also confront

threats from terrorists and guerrillas using unconventional tactics. Maintaining broad

readiness is undeniably difficult.

Technology has always been a key to superior war fighting ability. Technology

not only improves current weaponry (faster aircraft, more powerful explosives, and

improved survivability). It also revolutionizes the way war is fought (RADAR, aircraft

carriers, cruise missiles). While technology has enabled U.S. Armed Forces to save

lives, protect the homeland, and extend military reach, it has also presented soldiers

with new threats, such as improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and cyber warfare,

that allow small numbers of operatives to inflict widespread damage. As the enemy

becomes more dangerous, the U.S. Military must adapt, finding and effectively using

new technologies to wage war.

The U.S. Navy enables the United States to project military influence around the

world. Aircraft carriers, submarines, destroyers, and other vessels allow for immediate

19 strikes against targets globally. The Navy's capabilities also provide humanitarian relief, scientific data, and the protection of U.S. maritime and trade interests. During the Cold War, the Navy built a blue-water fleet intended to combat the capabilities of the Soviet Union. Since the fall of the Berlin Wall, the Navy has continued its blue-water dominance in response to ascendant threats from other nations desiring maritime superiority. Simultaneously, the Navy has had to adapt to brown-water operations in the shallow coastal areas and riverine environments of the Middle East and the Horn of Africa to combat terrorism.

1.2 Technological Advances in Naval Warfare

Even as budgets are cut, the types of missions the Navy has needed to fulfill have multiplied as threats have increased. As in the past, technology again presents the solution. The advent of unmanned underwater vehicles (UUVs) has accompanied advances in autonomy, energy storage, and surface vehicle technology. Robotics is revolutionizing the ways by which war is pursued.

1.2.1 Unmanned Underwater Vehicles

Unmanned underwater vehicles (UUVs) are the drones of the sea: remotely operated or autonomous underwater vessels capable of completing missions in place of humans, as well as missions impossible with manned platforms. They are in use by the Navy in oceanography, surveillance, and mine hunting roles [9]. Commercial applications include a variety of oil installation tasks, pipeline inspection, and survey, salvage, and recovery operations [10]. Scientists use AUVs for bathymetry, to explore deep sea geologic formations, and to interact with wildlife [11]. There are three types of

UUVs: remotely operated vehicles (ROVs), autonomous underwater vehicles (AUVs), and underwater gliders.

20 Autonomous Underwater Vehicles

Autonomous underwater vehicles require minimal human intervention, possessing dif- fering levels of autonomy dependent upon mission use. AUV's are generally deployed from surface ships and then complete missions lasting from eight to 72 hours. Typical sensor packages include side scan and synthetic aperture sonar, still and video cameras, and environmental monitoring packages [11]. AUV's are employed in entering denied areas due to their low risk of detection, low cost in comparison to manned systems, and ability to collect high-quality information [9]. There are four classes of AUVs:

1. Man-portable class (REMUS 100 [12], Fig. 1-1) Diameter: 0.19 m Average speed: 3 kts

Figure 1-1: Hydroid REMUS 100 AUV [1]

2. Light-weight class (REMUS 600 [13], Fig. 1-2) Diameter: 0.32 m Average speed: 3 kts

Figure 1-2: Hydroid REMUS 600-S AUV [2]

21 3. Heavy-weight class (Bluefin 21 [3], Fig. 1-3) Diameter: 0.53 m Average speed: 3 kts

L0I A

Figure 1-3: Bluefin 21 AUV [3]

4. Large class (LDUUV [4], Fig. 1-4) Diameter: 1.27 m Average speed: 3 kts

Figure 1-4: Boeing Echo Ranger AUV [4]

Remotely Operated Vehicles

Remotely operated vehicles are human controlled and connected to the surface by tether. The tether provides communications (generally by a fiber optic connection) and, in most cases, power to the ROV. They are able to remain at depth and on task for extended periods of time. Used extensively in the oil industry, salvage, and scientific operations to work at extreme depths, ROVs come in all shapes, sizes, and deployment platforms, including on-shore, oil-rigs, and ships [10]. Remotely operated

22 vehicles are used in situations where constant human supervision is convenient (such as on an oil rig) or necessary (such as for retrieval missions, where current auton- only abilities are not sufficient). Vehicles are typically equipped with still and video cameras and robotic manipulators. An inspection ROV is pictured in Fig. 1-5.

Figure 1-5: Oceaneering Magnum Plus ROV [5]

Gliders

Whereas AUVs and ROVs move via powered propulsion systems, gliders depend on underwater wings and changes in buoyancy to propel themselves through the water. They move in a telltale sawtooth pattern through the water, going up and down as they move forward [14]. Since they do not have powered propulsion, gliders are slower and more difficult to control than other UUV types. While slow (approximately 0.5 kt [6]), gliders consume little energy and are capable of staying at sea for extended periods of time. A series of glider experiments have lasted six months and even in excess of a year, with one glider successfully crossing the Atlantic over the course of 221 days [15].

9 Glider (Spray [6], Fig. 1-6) Length: 2.1 m Average speed: 0.5 kts

23 Figure 1-6: Spray Glider [6]

* Liberdade Glider (Z-Ray [16], Fig. 1-7) Wingspan: 6.1 m Average speed: 2 kts

Figure 1-7: Z-Ray Glider [7]

1.2.2 Long-term Underwater Aluminum Power Source

Professor Doug Hart at MIT is leading a research group developing aluminum-based underwater power sources for long-term UUV deployment. Aluminum is an ideal power source due to its high energy density. Aluminum is highly reactive with water, releasing heat and hydrogen in a vigorous reaction:

2A + 6H 20 - 3H 2 + 2A (OH) 3 + Q. (1.1)

24 Unfortunately, that energy is difficult to access due to the passivation layer that forms in nanoseconds and coats all aluminum exposed to oxygen. Other aluminum power sources developed in the past have met limited success, such as one attempting to burn aluminum [17].

The MIT team is taking a new approach, mixing aluminum with gallium to strip off the passivation layer and prevent its formation. Using this phenomenon as the basis to produce fuel for a hydrogen-based fuel cell, MIT has achieved promising success and has developed a successful prototype system.

In another exciting development, the MIT team is developing an electrochemical solution based on an oxidation reaction of aluminum, permanganate, and water:

Al + 40H- - Al (OH)4 + 3e-(-2.3 vs. SHE) (Anode) (1.2a)

MnO- + 2H 20 + 3e- -+ 40H- + MnO 2 (0.6 vs. SHE) (Cathode) (1.2b)

Al + MnO- + 2H 20 -a Al (OH) 4 + MnO 2 (Overall) (1.2c)

Currently, the team (MIT researchers working with spin-off company Open Water

Power) has developed a water-based cell and has designed an encapsulation and con- tainment system for the REMUS 600. An aluminum-permanganate cell will have an energy density of 2.3 MJ/L and power density of 5.3 W/L, comparing favorably with current Li-ion technologies (0.6 MJ/L and 1.4 W/L). Current development concepts are designed to provide 75 W over five days at a depth of 100 ft [18].

25 26 Chapter 2

Disruptive Innovation in Naval Technology

2.1 A Brief Introduction to Disruptive Innovation

The material in this brief overview draws heavily from the works of Professor Clayton M. Christensen at Harvard Business School, particularly The Innovator's Dilemma [8] and The Innovator's Solution [19]. Please see these and other publications by Christensen and his colleagues (such as Seeing What's Next [20]) for more information about disruptive innovation and the role it plays in business and government.

- Convenience \g\O *Price

Cu, oer tqeeds

o\O~ *Reliability

Time

Figure 2-1: Technology improvement and disruption [8]

27 Disruptive innovation is the process by which technologies dominating a market are displaced by emerging technologies that are initially low-end or enter from adjacent markets. The basics of the theory of disruptive innovation are summarized in Fig. 2-1. The red line represents the needs of customers in a given market (though represented as a single line, customers demand a distribution of technology needs from low to high), which increase over time. When first introduced, technologies are not advanced enough to meet the needs of customers. In this situation, products compete based on their features and reliability, and customers will pay a premium for improved performance or increased reliability. Integrated product architectures are best suited to providing the required performance (due to the complexity of component interdependencies). Technologies improve through sustaining innovation, or innovations which enhance a product in its existing market and value network. A value network (sometimes called a value chain) is the web of value-adding steps that produce and market a product, ending with the user (for example: steel producer, engine manufacturer, auto maker, and dealer are all parts of the car value network). Once the technology is advanced enough that it exceeds the customers' requirements, the customers are overshot and will choose products based on convenience and price. Modular product architectures become dominant because component interdependencies are well defined. Because the marginal utility derived from an incremental improvement in technology performance has vanished, the marginal price increase for technological improvement falls to zero, and products become commoditized. The performance shortfall (and the value focus) moves to an adjacent position in the value network. When customers in a given market are overshot, or the products available have features that are more advanced than the customers need, that market is ripe for disruption. A product that is technologically inferior, but cheaper and good enough to accomplish the required task, will be attractive to those customers at the low end of the market. Alternatively, a technology that is used to complete a task that is not being completed currently (in other words, it competes against nonconsumption) can move into an adjacent market and displace the dominant technology as it improves

28 (through sustaining innovation) and is creatively used and applied. In both cases, customers evaluate and value the new product using performance metrics different from those used in evaluating the dominant products. Whereas sustaining innovations improve existing technologies and products inside an existing value network and product architecture for a given market, disruptive innovations create new value networks and markets, and use distinct product architectures to satisfy new, distinct performance metrics. Sustaining innovations are generally technology-based to satisfy market needs, and disruptive innovations tend to be new market applications of existing technologies that do not fit the market in a traditional way. High-end suppliers and customers will ignore disruptive innovations because those products do not have the more advanced features that they require, and pursuing the high-end of the market is best practice. Ignorance continues until the disrupting technology has become advanced enough to replace the once-dominant product, and the market has changed completely. There is significant first-mover advantage in fielding disruptive innovations due to experience and learning curves with the innovation. However, disruptive innovations cannot be "stuffed" into existing markets. Because they demand new value networks and compete based on different features, disruptive innovations cannot compete head-to-head with established products in established markets with established value networks.

2.1.1 Disruptive Innovation Example: RCA, Sony, and the

Transistor

Disruption is best understood through examples. A classic example of a disruptive innovation in business related by Christensen is the development and market application of the transistor in the 1960s [19]. RCA dominated the home electronics market, selling TVs and radios equipped with vacuum tubes. Appliance stores sold these products, making money off of vacuum tube repairs. The transistor was invented by Bell Labs in 1947, but it was not powerful enough to replace vacuum tubes. Nonethe-

29 less, seeing its revolutionary potential, RCA invested heavily in transistor research to boost power and use it in their TVs and radios. Sony took a different approach, introducing the first portable transistor radio in 1955. Sony used the same attributes that RCA saw as weaknesses (small size, low power) as strengths in their product.

Sound quality on transistor radios was inferior to vacuum tube radios, but they were portable and cheap, allowing people to listen to music in places they could not take a table-top radio and were not able have music before. The customers buying transistor radios were not those who bought the larger, "better" vacuum tube radios. The new radios could not be sold in appliance stores, as there were no vacuum tubes to repair, but were instead sold in discount stores, thereby establishing a new value network.

Initially, RCA ignored Sony's radio, as it did not compete directly with their product and functioned in a different value network. Sony was essentially building its own new market. And RCA wasn't ignoring the technology: they were working on transistor technologies. Sony continued to improve its transistor-based products and gain experience in its new market and value network, introducing better radios and portable TVs, selling them to people who could not afford the higher quality products or had unique use cases. Eventually Sony began producing large appliances using transistors that could compete directly with RCA's vacuum tube products, but at a much lower price and more conveniently. RCA, despite its investment in transistor technology, lost its market by failing to use the new technology disruptively by using its attributes as strengths. Instead, they attempted to improve the technology and use it in the existing appliance market, where distributors and customers did not want it anyway.

2.2 Disruptive Innovation in Warfare

The way war is waged has been revolutionized many times by the introduction of new weapons and new defense systems. Artillery, tanks, aircraft, radar, electronic warfare, atomic weaponry, and submarines are only a small handful of examples of the effects of technology on warfare. Understanding how to maximize innovation application is

30 an important strategic ability in pursuing victory.

2.2.1 Disruptive Innovation in the U.S. Military

The United States Armed Forces has a first-rate track record in pursuing innovation. Aircraft carriers, radar, nuclear warships, electronic warfare, and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) are examples of how the U.S. has relentlessly pursued new technology as a means to protect America. The term "disruptive innovation" has taken on a slightly different meaning in the military, where is denotes a new technology that makes an old capability obsolete [21]. For example, electromagnetic rail guns promise to make existing cruise missiles obsolete [22]. The military's definition differs from the academic definition of a disruptive innovation [21], which is a product that is evaluated using new performance metrics and eventually displaces previously dominant technologies that overshot cus- tomer needs [23] (the definition I will continue to use). To denote that which the military traditionally terms as disruptive, I will use "revolutionary". According to this definition, a rail gun, though undoubtedly revolutionary, is a sustaining innovation. It provides greater capability based on traditional performance metrics (i.e. more firepower, at a higher rate, with improved range and accuracy). An example of a disruptive innovation in the military is UAVs. While they are slower, less maneu- verable, and carry less than manned aircraft, UAVs are cheaper, broadly available, and keep pilots out of harm's way. The military values these new capabilities, and since their introduction, UAVs have become more capable, replacing manned aircraft in a variety of important missions [24]. I will cover unmanned aircraft in more detail in Section 2.4.1. The U.S. Armed Forces must pursue both types of innovation to maintain its dominance [23]. It must maintain its conventional war fighting ability by building better and faster weapons and improving soldier lethality in order to fight conventional wars. The military must also pursue disruptive innovations for a variety of reasons, keeping in mind that first-mover advantage is significant in deploying disruptive innovation. First, disruptive innovations are useful in fighting both traditional and nontradi-

31 tional enemies. Unmanned aircraft, for example, are useful in fighting terrorists, and would also be useful in fighting a nation-state. Although disruptive innovations may not be absolutely necessary to win battles, they decrease casualties and speed victory. Radar solved the nonconsumption of battlefield awareness during World War II. The Allies would have likely won without radar, it was an important invention that saved lives and accelerated victory. Second, by gaining experience with disruptive innovation, the military will be able to successfully counter similar technologies used by the enemy. Continuing with UAVs, the experience the U.S. military is gaining with these aircraft will enable it to better fight against UAVs deployed by other parties in future conflicts. In World War I, Britain was challenged by U-boats because of their lack of experience with that type of disruptive innovation [24]. Third, the advantages gained by deploying disruptive innovations almost always shorten conflict and ultimately save both civilian and military lives. Disruptive innovations are also useful for peaceful purposes. Radar, developed for the military, is now used in many ways, including weather forecasting and civilian aviation.

2.2.2 Disruption of Naval Warfare by UUVs

Naval warfare is currently undergoing disruption by way of UUVs. These unmanned vehicles promise to be highly effective force multipliers. They are disruptive because they do not perform well along traditional metrics of maritime warfare (multi-mission capabilities, time-critical strike weaponry, long deployments, and speed). They are, however, highly desirable and advanced along metrics that are becoming important to the Navy, including limited human interaction and risk, decreased cost, and clandestine operation. In many instances, manned vessels overshoot mission requirements, attempting to be all-purpose ships. They are large, integrated systems that must be carefully planned and built. Ships are expensive, requiring massive manufacturing facilities as well as extensive shipbuilding, construction, and weaponry ability. Entities desiring to build naval vessels, even of moderate complexity, face steep barriers to entry and high

32 fixed costs. Unmanned underwater vehicles, on the other hand, can be constructed from off-the-shelf parts. While more advanced UUVs capable of great depths are more difficult to design and construct, simple UUVs designed for depths of less than 100 m and simple missions are inexpensive and require minimal engineering ability. Thailand, for example, has a successful UUV program, producing vehicles for anti- submarine warfare training [25]. Costing less than $50,000, these vehicles, while of simple construction and capable of depths of only 30 m, cost a small fraction of the similarly-sized REMUS 600, which costs $2.8 million [26]. Individual systems are themselves modular, as well as mission systems. Different types of UUVs can be used to accomplish different mission objectives, and several types can be used in pursuit of a single mission. The migration of naval weaponry from complex, integrated systems to simpler, modular systems that accomplish specific jobs signals that disruption at work. It is vitally important to maintain a force of the best warships able to maintain global superpower position, justifying the continued construction of large vessels. However, it is just as important to utilize disruptive innovations to save lives and resources. Unmanned underwater vehicles are a means to reduce costs and risk to human life and valuable equipment. The modular approach of UUV systems to mission comple- tion is important. In Chapter 3, I demonstrate the significant cost savings available through using UUVs instead of manned systems. As force multipliers, UUVs provide clear roads to improved capabilities at lower costs, a point particularly relevant when budgets are tight. The U.S. Navy recognizes the revolutionary nature of UUVs and has invested in UUV research over many years. Other navies have also invested in UUVs because of their low cost and unique attributes and capabilities. Thailand and Malaysia are interested in inexpensive UUVs for anti-submarine warfare training [25] and reconnaissance [27]. China is also pursuing its own unmanned underwater vehicle program [28] with their own research facility modeled on MIT's Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution [29]. Other nations pursuing UUV programs include Russia, India, Singa- pore, France, Norway, Germany, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and Israel [30]. Other

33 groups are also pursuing unmanned underwater vehicles development, including drug cartels [31]. Terrorists could use UUVs to attack undersea oil platforms, network infrastructure, and maritime commerce [32]. The low costs and simple, modular designs of UUVs are attractive attributes to countries and other groups lacking funding. As they build UUVs and gain experience, they will become increasingly adept at using UUVs to further their causes, creating force asymmetries. The United States must continue to invest in UUV research if it is to remain at the head of the pack in developing unmanned maritime technology. Otherwise, other nations and entities will outpace the U.S. Navy in unmanned development, a risky proposition for future armed conflict. Unmanned underwater vehicles are disruptive to manned surface and subsurface vessels. Though they are not currently capable of competing with ships and submarines in many aspects (payload size, speed), they are rapidly improving. At the same time, their strengths target the weaknesses of manned vessels. They move silently and are difficult to detect. They can be launched and perform missions from shore, surface, and submarine platforms at sizable standoff distances and from depth. Advanced sensor suites allow them to perform reconnaissance with better results than manned platforms [33]. Advances in autonomy, energy systems, and underwater communications will further drive UUVs toward high-end applications, most importantly through weaponization. While there will always be missions that require the use of large manned vessels, UUVs will increasingly displace as well as threaten them. The lack of risk to personnel and high-value equipment in using UUVs will give them advantages in engagements with manned vessels. Unmanned underwater vehicles will soon become absolutely necessary in maintaining maritime superiority.

2.3 Battlefield Entropy

Entropy, in its most general sense, measures disorder [34]. While it is defined in many ways, one relevant definition is that entropy S is the difference between the energy E

34 in a system and the amount of that energy Q that is available to do work [35]:

S= E- Q. (2.1)

In other words, not all energy in a system can be used effectively. Some of it will be lost due to disorder in the system, which can be measured by entropy.

A similar measure of disorder can be used to characterize the situation of a battlefield entity. Battlefield entropy may be defined as the difference between an entity's ideal fighting potential and its actual combat effectiveness. Even if a combat entity possesses superior force, or is not experiencing attrition, its combat effectiveness will decrease as the entropy it experiences increases. For example, laying a minefield raises battlefield entropy against a fleet of ships. Even if the ships are state-of-the-art vessels and no ship is damaged during transit, a minefield will inevitably slow the fleet's progress and prevent the use of its full capabilities. The higher entropy experienced by the fleet hinders the use of its full effectiveness against an enemy.

All effective weapons increase battlefield entropy for the opposing party. In describing battlefield entropy, I take a general definition of weapons and weapon systems to be any use of force, including:

" manpower

" platforms, vehicles, and vessels

" munitions

" defense systems

" electronic and psychological warfare

" information

" tactical movements in time and space.

35 2.3.1 Measuring Battlefield Entropy

The three dynamics of combat are space, time, and force [36]. Battlefield entropy finds its roots in these three principles, and may be raised along three interdependent axes:

1. Geography (space)

2. Availability (time)

3. Difficulty (force).

Weapons technologies may be evaluated for their effectiveness based on the manner in and degree to which they increase battlefield entropy for the opposing party. Any effective weapon technology will excel along one of these axes, as shown in Fig. 2-2. The most effective and useful weapons and systems excel in all three, as represented by the red cube furthest from the origin in Fig. 2-2.

Geography

Figure 2-2: Battlefield entropy as a measure of weapon effectiveness

Each axis is characterized by three metrics that define superiority along that axis. Improving in these metrics increases battlefield entropy.

36 Geography Geography denotes the distribution of weaponry on the battlefield.

1. Distance - The standoff distance offered by the weapon between the user and

target. For example, a cruise missile offers significant standoff distance between

the launching vehicle and the target, making engagement difficult for the target.

2. Area - The distance between weapon systems. The broader the area across

which the weapons are spread, the more difficult it is to engage and neutralize

them. Scattered resources and operatives has made it difficult to dismantle

terrorist organizations.

3. Precision - The weapon's ability to strike a narrow target area with accuracy

and minimal collateral damage. Laser-guided weapons are significantly more

effective than wide-area bombing. Snipers are valued for similar capabilities.

Availability Availability denotes the distribution of weaponry dependent on deployment constraints.

1. Cost - The cost involved in using the weapon, including the monetary cost of

production and deployment, as well as any political costs. The AK-47 has been

widely used due to its low cost. Nuclear weapons were not only expensive to

develop, but the political costs are so high that they have been used only twice.

2. Rate - The rate at which the weapon can be used, limited by weapon produc-

tion, transport, or deployment rates. For example, only two atomic bombs had

been built in August 1945, and another strike would have had to wait several

months for another bomb to be built. Also, systems travel at different speeds

and have varying loiter times.

3. Flexibility - The amount of variance and flexibility in the weapons systems

deployed. There are, for example, myriad types of sea mines. They can be

intermingled with one another, making them even more difficult to disarm. The

use of multi-mission vehicles (such as destroyers, which can hunt submarines,

37 launch cruise missiles, and perform other missions) also increases the battlefield entropy experienced by an enemy.

Difficulty Difficulty denotes the amount of force the weapon system unleashes, and the difficulty the target experiences in countering the effects of the weapon.

1. Detection - The difficulty experienced in detecting and identifying the weapon system. The more difficult it is to detect a weapon, the harder it is to defend against it. For example, stealth aircraft offer significant advantages in battle over traditional, easily detected aircraft. Jungle warfare is difficult because it is easy to conceal weapons.

2. Indefensibility - The difficulty experienced in preventing the weapon from striking its target. Anti-tank barriers are very effective in protecting against tank action, but are useless against air defenses. The SR-71 was designed to evade air defense systems deployed by the USSR.

3. Destructiveness - The difficulty experienced in minimizing the damage caused by the weapon. Large bunker-busting bombs are effective because their destructive power is difficult to deflect.

Decreasing Battlefield Entropy Battlefield entropy is conserved among opposing forces. Weapons that increase the entropy experienced by an opponent corre- spondingly decrease the entropy experienced by the user. It follows that an opposing force may deploy its own weapons or defensive systems to decrease the effects of its opponent's weapons and decrease the battlefield entropy it experiences. An effective defense will affect metrics to decrease entropy to a point where an opponent's weapon loses its effectiveness. Using weapons arid innovations that increase the likelihood of detection, decrease a weapons destructive effects, or prevent a weapon from reaching its target are all ways to decrease battlefield entropy. For example, UAVs have proven effective in killing terrorists and their leaders by raising battlefield entropy over previous systems by improving along several metrics

38 on each characteristic axis. Unmanned aerial vehicles are more difficult to detect, precise, low (monetary) cost, and (due to long loiter times) offer near immediate strike capability. Terrorists are able to decrease the entropy they experience, and have thereby raised the entropy the U.S. Military experiences in pursuing them, by improving their own systems on metrics along each characteristic axis. Terrorists defend against UAV strikes by hiding in bunkers to decrease destructiveness, increasing political costs by using human shields, and spreading their operations over large areas.

Innovations that decrease battlefield entropy abound. Electronic warfare has been effective in decreasing battlefield entropy because it increases weapon precision and the likelihood of detecting enemy weapons. Missile defense systems aim to prevent nuclear warheads from ever reaching their targets. Bunkers and bomb shelters reduce the (lestructiveness of a bomb. Unmanned aerial vehicles increase the standoff distance (the pilot is halfway around the world), decreasing the value of air defenses. Any useful defensive technology or innovation will represent a negative change along the characteristic axes of battlefield entropy for the user of that innovation.

2.3.2 Evaluating Military Innovation in Terms of Battlefield

Entropy

Weapons technologies may be evaluated in their effectiveness by measuring the degree to which they increase the battlefield entropy experienced by the opposing combatant group. The higher the battlefield entropy induced by the weapon, the harder it is for the opponent to counter its effects, resulting in a decrease in the effectiveness of the opponents own weaponry. The most effective and broadly used weapons will have high scores along all three axes. For example, terrorist attacks using IEDs are so effective because the entropy presented is debilitatingly high for the party trying to prevent the attack. Terrorist attacks can be effective against a wide range of targets, are destructive to property and morale, and present a low cost to terrorist groups. Weapon systems can be compared to each other based on the entropy they can

39 produce on the battlefield. The greater a weapon's distance from the origin, the more effective and useful the technology, and the greater its merit for investment in its development. There is no absolute measure for distance along the axes; rather, the metrics should act as guides, and comparisons are relative. It is also possible to rate the value of marginal investment into the weapon based on the marginal improvement in increasing the battlefield entropy experienced by an opponent. Mature technologies will see their marginal changes in battlefield entropy approach zero per unit of investment, signaling an opportunity for disruptive military innovation. Disruptive innovation in a component of a weapons system can represent a significant change in the entropy produced by that weapons system. Such an innovation, on which subsequent innovation and significant changes in battlefield entropy hinges, is a keystone innovation. Nuclear weapons, at first glance, appear to be the most effective weapons in any arsenal. However, through the lenses of battlefield entropy, their true effectiveness can be ascertained over time. When first developed, nuclear weapons were seen as highly destructive weapons that worked over large areas. They were prohibitively expensive to develop and difficult to build. Subsequent research lowered monetary costs, increased production capabilities, and improved the reliability of delivery. Re- search was also important in countering their indefensibility: by mutually assured destruction, the possession of a nuclear arsenal prevents their use by another entity. However, the political costs associated with nuclear warfare are so high that they have never been used since WWII. In fact, other weapon systems developed in that time have proven to be much more effective, and see much broader use today. The theory of battlefield entropy shows that while nuclear weapons are necessary as a deterrent, research is (and has been) better invested elsewhere. The marginal change in battlefield entropy per dollar of research in nuclear weapons is nearly zero (one can destroy the earth and humanity only once). Submarines were disruptive when first widely deployed in WWI. Though slow and lacking significant firepower, they were difficult to detect and defend against. By WWII, their firepower and range had improved, as well as their survivability.

40 Submarines were maturing as a technology until the disruptive use of nuclear power.

Nuclear reactors, expensive yet long-enduring, catapulted submarines along the sustaining innovation curve. It was a keystone innovation. Subsequent research enabled by use of nuclear power (such as the use of cruise missiles) appreciated a significant marginal change in battlefield entropy, with further improvements in destructiveness, indefensibility, and difficulty of detection, as well as range and flexibility. A disruptive innovation provided for a cascade of sustaining and disruptive innovations within the submarine space, providing for significant changes in battlefield entropy.

Battlefield Entropy and Disruptive Innovation Any disruptive military innovation will represent an improvement in a metric on one of these axes while (at least temporarily) seeing decreased performance in a different metric in which an existing platform excels. For example, UAVs, a disruptive military technology, improved along the metrics of distance, cost, rate, and detection. However, they have been less superior than the manned aircraft they have displaced in terms of flexibility and destructiveness.

Disruptive products improve through sustaining innovation until they displace the existing products that once dominated the market. From the standpoint of battlefield entropy, sustaining innovation can improve performance along the metrics in which the product already excels. For example, UAVs will become more difficult to detect and have longer loiter times. Sustaining innovation can also improve performance along the metrics in which the product is lacking in comparison to existing solutions.

For example, UAVs will continue to be equipped with more powerful munitions, increasing their destructiveness. In either case, sustaining innovation increases the battlefield entropy experienced by an opponent.

Evaluating a potentially disruptive innovation in terms of battlefield entropy can identify new performance metrics that will demonstrate the value of the innovation in combat. As mentioned, disruptive innovations often represent changes in market application rather than technological improvement. New applications of innovations in war fighting can be evaluated using battlefield entropy as a measure. New appli-

41 cations could be identified that would otherwise be missed. The theory of battlefield entropy lends urgency to the adoption and skilled management of disruptive innovation. In the realm of disruptive innovation, even small research and application wins can represent significant changes in the battlefield entropy that the entity will experience. Being a first mover in disruptive innovations provides significant advantages on the battlefield in increasing combat effectiveness and changing entropy. A larger power that only sees a smaller immediate change in its battlefield entropy is still motivated to prevent smaller powers from using a disruptive innovation to see a significant change in the smaller power's battlefield entropy. Such a large change in relation to current battlefield entropy levels can upset tactical balance and dynamics.

2.3.3 Battlefield Entropy and UUVs

The theory of battlefield entropy demonstrates the disruptive nature of UUVs, and also highlights their potential as an effective weapon. Unmanned underwater vehicles are an opportunity for the U.S. Navy to decrease the entropy it experiences while simultaneously increasing the entropy it projects on to its opponents. Unmanned underwater vehicles represent improvements in a metric along all three characteristic axes. They increase standoff distances and the area over which forces are spread; they are low cost, they are easy to produce, and it is easy to design varying types of UUVs for different mission types; and UUVs are more difficult to detect and protect against. The vehicles also assist in detecting threats (reconnaissance missions), provide means to deactivate other weapons (mine hunting), increase precision (higher quality oceanographic data). Unmanned underwater vehicles both increase entropy for the opposing party and decrease entropy for the launching party. Subse- quent sustaining innovations promise to enhance the performance of UUVs along the characteristic axes of battlefield entropy.

While they excel along some metrics (offering superiority over existing solutions), UUVs are not as capable along other metrics. They are slow, offer almost no destructive power, and are not multi-mission vehicles (taking a different approach to offering

42 flexibility, which is their modular architecture). Unmanned underwater vehicles are a disruptive innovation, and sustaining innovations will improve the performance of

UUVs along the aforementioned metrics.

Unmanned underwater vehicles are a new technology, but their original features and effect on battlefield entropy promise high returns on research investment. For a marginal unit of research investment, the marginal change in battlefield entropy will be high. There are few opportunities available where a little can go so far in increasing combat effectiveness.

Long-term power sources for UUVs, are a keystone innovation. The advent of nuclear power in submarines launched a cascade of innovation that accelerated the battlefield entropy capability of submarines. Developing long-endurance power sources for UUVs, such as the aluminum power source being researched and built at MIT, will precede a similar flood of sustaining innovation that will see the effectiveness of

UUVs multiplied. The relatively small investment in long-term energy source research will be rewarded with a significant change in battlefield entropy due to not only the use of the long-term power source, but the subsequent applications for which it provides. Longer UUV missions offering more power for vehicle subsystems will further increase the distance and area a UUV can cover, improve its flexibility, and make them more difficult to defend against. Other technologies and missions that cannot be currently envisioned will also be developed to take advantage of UUVs powered by long-term power sources. Such innovations will produce significant changes in battlefield entropy.

The U.S. Military is not the only group that will realize and invest in the potential of UUVs to change battlefield entropy. While early changes in battlefield entropy provided by UUVs may seem small, they will represent an investment in the significant changes that will follow. The changes in battlefield entropy will also represent a greater change than that which is available from investing in sustaining innovations for other, more mature technologies. Furthermore, early investment in UUV research and effective management of this innovation prevents the first mover advantage from going to other groups that will see a significant change in their battlefield entropy

43 from small research investments and successes.

2.4 Managing Disruptive Innovation

The disruption of manned naval operations by UUVs presents an opportunity inside of a problem. While they will undoubtedly prove a threat to the U.S. Navy in future conflicts, UUVs will also provide solutions to new threats and adapting enemies, including the use of UUVs against the United States. Adept management of this disruptive innovation will ensure the U.S. Navy's dominance of the seas. War tends to accelerate the process of pursuing and adopting disruptive innovations, as the desper- ation and values (solutions trump proceedure) that come with war are conducive to disruptive innovation. Effective management of disruptive innovation during peace seems to be more difficult. However, it can pay off drastically when major armed conflict arises. Limited involvement in smaller conflicts (such as police actions) often provides opportunity to test and refine disruptive military technologies. For example, the German army tested Panzer tanks and fighter aircraft in the Spanish Civil War in the 1930s before their devastating deployment in WWII [37, 38]. The United States utilized UAVs in Kosovo before their use in Iraq and Afghanistan [39].

In addition to describing the problems established firms encounter in confronting disruptive innovations, Christensen and others have used the theory to develop methods of harnessing disruptive innovation successfully (most notably in The Innovator's

Solution [8] and The Innovator's Guide to Growth [40]). There are four sets of theories and best-practices that guide organizations in managing disruptive innovation to their advantage.

1. Jobs-to-be-done Theory

Jobs-to-be-done theory is best summarized as, "People don't need quarter-inch

drills. They need quarter-inch holes." The theory suggests that when designing

product features, it is best to use a use-case scenario as a guide. Disruptive

innovations are particularly difficult to direct and manage since they are new

and their market applications categorically unknown. Rather than building a

44 one-size-fits-all product, it is better to determine what job or task needs to be done, and how the product can be optimized for that task. Focusing on a job that needs to be done will establish performance metrics that will highlight the abilities of the disruptive innovation. Jobs do indeed change over time, but this theory is critical in limiting feature creep and building a product that will be useful immediately (starting at the low end and then beginning to move toward higher performance).

2. Market/Application Identification When identifying applications or "customers" of products, it is important to identify situations in which the current solution is overkill. For example, a powerful desktop computer is not needed to surf the internet. A tablet can do that job just as well, but more conveniently and for a fraction of the cost. Alternatively, it is important to look for problems to which there is no practical solution (i.e. where nonconsumption prevails). For example, there was no practical way to have music-on-demand until the phonograph was invented. Remember that disruptive innovations are almost always market application problems, not technology problems.

3. Discovery-driven Planning Disruptive innovations compete in poorly defined markets, and the best designs and market applications are not readily known at the beginning. Innovators must quickly build products, test them, and learn from their experiments, applying their new knowledge to make better products and discover the most ready customers. Minimum viable products (MVPs), which have only the most basic core functionality that offers the disruptive value-adding feature, are the best path forward, rather than building the perfect product that is completely ready for global use [41]. Even in the military, where hierarchy and processes are necessary and effective, getting experience quickly and seizing the first-mover advantage is critical in capitalizing on disruptive innovations [42]. Solutions to technology problems present themselves as experience is gained and sustaining

45 innovations completed.

4. Resource-Process-Value Theory Resources include assets, cash, intellectual property, brands, and people. Pro- cesses are the organization's established ways of doing things, such as how project funding decisions are made. Values are the priorities that inform the processes. To effectively implement disruptive innovations, organizations must have resources, processes, and values that can take advantage of disruptive products. In almost all cases, established organizations have processes inadver- tently designed to snuff out disruptive innovation (since disruptive innovations are not necessarily part of a core competency and their markets are not well understood). It is best to create an independent subsidiary that has its own resources, processes, and values that are suited to the disruptive innovation.

2.4.1 Military Disruption Case Study: UAVs

The aforementioned theories can be easy to understand, but difficult to apply in practice. I will give a case study of UAVs to show how a disruptive innovation was well managed by the military over the course of several decades, leading to their current success as a key part of the War on Terror. Unmanned aerial vehicles had their beginning in camera-equipped balloons in the Spanish-American War, and remotely-operated airplanes were tested during WWI [43]. Before and during WWII, unmanned aircraft saw use as practice targets, and Germany developed the V-1, the precursor to the modern cruise missile. The use of UAVs for reconnaissance began in the 1960s, and thousands of flight hours were logged over Vietnam [43]. Reconnaissance was an ideal first application, as using manned aircraft was overkill. In addition, reconnaissance valued the strengths of

UAVs, even while UAVs were not ready for full combat. They were inexpensive, reduced risk to pilots, were difficult to shoot down, and could provide persistent intelligence. During the Yom Kippur War, Israel used American Ryan Firebees by tricking Egypt into firing all of its anti-aircraft missiles at the UAVs, allowing Israeli

46 pilots to fly uninhibited [43]. A perfect application of jobs-to-be-done theory, Israel creatively found an offensive use for an unarmed, relatively incapable UAV by seeing that it filled a job perfectly: depleting air-defense systems without endangering pilots.

As the military gained experience with UAVs, the systems themselves became

more advanced, capable of carrying larger payloads at greater speeds. Rather than de-

signing complete solutions (armed unmanned aircraft that are multi-mission), UAVs

were designed with single missions in mind, and designed to fulfill the most basic re-

quirements to accomplish the job. Through experimentation and creative use, UAVs

were developed organically, culminating in the development of the Predator drone in the mid-1990s [43].

The Predator solved the nonconsumption of persistent aircraft battlefield surveil-

lance. Predators were used in various policing actions, but saw their first widespread

use over Afghanistan and Iraq [43]. Due to difficulties in taking advantage of UAVs

through traditional organizational structures [44], and recognizing their unique at-

tributes and abilities, the Army established Task Force Odin to oversee and direct

the use of surveillance drones [45]. The task force has allowed combatants to develop

new tactics and methods for using UAVs by providing space for experimentation

and improvement, protected from procedures that could deter innovation. As their

capabilities improved, UAVs were armed with Hellfire missiles, and they have now

successfully completed tens of thousands of sorties [46].

UAVs are still not perfect. They are slow, have limited weaponry, and are unable

to fly in rough weather. They are, however, well suited to providing persistent surveil-

lance and strike capabilities. Their continued use and expanded experimentation will

continue to allow them to move to higher-end missions, freeing manned aircraft to

complete more difficult, higher-value missions.

2.4.2 Disruption Lessons Learned

From the UAV disruptive innovation case study and the disruptive innovation theories

and best practices, I summarize several key lessons learned.

47 1. Find jobs that need to be done and build products that are capable of completing those specific jobs. Use the job to establish new performance metrics for new products that are distinct from traditional solutions. Fighter jets needed to be fast and survivable. The job demanded a craft that is easily replaceable with long mission durations, things that UAVs are good at.

2. One type of application ready for a disruptive innovation is a case where the current solution is much more complex and expensive than it needs to be. Manned aircraft were not needed to do battlefield surveillance. Though UAVs were much simpler, they were also less expensive and did the job satisfactorily.

3. Experimenting and gaining experience with iterations of the product was successful. If the military had waited for a full-blown remote-control fighter jet, it still would not be using UAVs, and would not have experienced the successes it has seen thus far. The experimentation has accelerated sustaining innovation to make UAVs better. When first developing UAVs, it is unlikely that their current use-case was envisioned.

4. Forming a separate task force responsible for new processes and values accelerated, and even facilitated, the UAV system as it is now known. Experimenta- tion and organic growth need space. Classic Air Force chain of command and budget allocation strategies would have dismissed tactics developed for UAVs as inferior. A disruptive innovation needs independence and protection from traditional products to reach its full potential.

5. Modularity is a key advantage of disruptive innovations. The modularity of UAV systems, and the breadth of UAV types used to accomplish different missions, is one of their strengths, and has helped current capabilities to grow organically. A one-size-fits-all UAV would be inappropriate, and modularity allows the focus to remain on the job to be done, lowering costs and increasing the likelihood of mission success.

48 2.5 Potential UUV Missions

Based on jobs-to-be-done theory, and searching for technology application potential in missions that are overshot or not currently accomplished, I identified nine missions

(listed in Table 2.1) that are ideal for UUVs. I present these missions as possible using current technologies. I relied heavily on the Navy's 2004 UUV Masterplan [9] and

Rand's Survey of Missions for Umanned Undersea Vehicles [47] (for more detail, see

Appendix A). In keeping with the classification system used in these publications, I have grouped them according to mission type, though there is overlap between types of missions. Further, I want to encourage cross-mission thinking in UUV use and application.

Table 2.1: Analyzed Missions

Category Mission CBNRE detection SOF support) ISR Near-land and harbor monitoring (including Array deployment Oceanography and Bathymetry MCM Mine detection, classification, identification, and neutralization

ASW Hold-at-risk ASW training

hull inspection I&I In-water survey and Monitoring undersea infrastructure

Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR)

1. Chemical, Biological, Nuclear, Radiological, and Explosive (CBNRE)

Detection

Identifying and mapping contaminant plumes using UUVs as platforms for un-

derwater mass spectrometers.

2. Near-land and Harbor Monitoring

49 Gathering battle-space intelligence, including harbor activity and conditions, possible landing sites, and identifying threats of detection.

3. Array Deployment Clandestine deployment of surveillance sensors and sensor arrays for long-term reconnaissance.

4. Oceanography and Bathymetry Battle-space intelligence gathering, including ocean conditions and bathymetry.

Mine Countermeasures

5. Mine Hunting Detecting, identifying, classifying, and mapping mines for clearance.

Anti-submarine Warfare

6. Hold-at-risk Monitoring submarine choke points, such as harbor entrances, for submerged submarine activity and taking action when necessary.

7. ASW Training Mimicking enemy submarine sound signatures and maneuvers to train crews in ASW.

Inspection and Identification

8. In-water Survey and Hull Inspection Performing inspections for attached drug containers and limpet mines. Also performing routine maintenance inspections.

9. Monitoring Undersea Infrastructure Inspecting cables and pipelines critical to global naval operations.

50 Chapter 3

Mission Cost Analyses

To demonstrate the impact of disruptive innovation on costs and mission risk, I com- pare current ship-based and UUV concepts of operation (CONOPs) and costs. I describe how using UUVs is advantageous and takes advantage of their unique strengths along new performance metrics. Some UUV CONOPs discussed are presently carried out by UUVs, while others are possible using currently available technology. In this chapter, I describe total costs from a high level. For cost calculations and more specific CONOP information, see Appendix B. The cost advantages of using UUVs are summarized in Table 3.1. I present the costs of traditional manned system CONOPs, UUV CONOPs (battery-powered and, where appropriate, aluminum-powered), and the cost savings available using UUVs

(as if the UUV price was a sale discount on manned systems costs). I also present the cost savings of aluminum-powered UUVs over manned systems and battery-powered UUVs for appropriate missions in Table 3.2.

3.1 CBNRE Detection and Localization

3.1.1 Mission Description

Underwater mass spectrometers (UWMSs) have been demonstrated that are capable of detecting CBNRE materials under water [48, 49]. Unmanned underwater vehicles

51 equipped with UWMSs could detect, localize, and track plumes in littoral, harbor, and open-ocean conditions. These missions would contribute to Homeland Security, maritime ecological research, and environmental disaster response efforts. Compared to larger research vessels and buoy networks, UUVs offer higher sampling rates, char- acterization at a variety of depths, the ability to focus on a region of interest, and greater mobility. Unmanned underwater vehicles could also be employed in places where environmental monitoring is critical but difficult.

3.1.2 Manned System CONOPs and Costs

To collect CBNRE data on the high seas, a UWMS would be towed behind a T-AGOS vessel [48]. The equipment would be able to take one series of measurement profiles per mission, and ship utilization for that mission would be high. For a representative plume detection and localization mission lasting 14 days (gathering 3,360 data profiles), the total mission cost would be $3,842,000. The cost per profile would be $1,100.

3.1.3 UUV CONOPs and Costs

A REMUS 600 vehicle equipped with a similar UWMS would be deployed from the same type of T-AGOS ship. Three UUVs could be simultaneously deployed, and the ship could compete other missions while the UUVs operated. Over the fourteen days, 9,960 profiles would be collected. If the UUVs run on batteries, the total mission cost would be $791,000, or $79 per profile, which is 93% cost savings over ship-based CONOPs. If the UUVs run on an aluminum power source, the total mission cost would be $287,000, or $28 per profile. The cost savings are 98% over those with a ship-based CONOP, and 64% savings over those with a battery-powered UUV CONOP.

52 3.2 Near-land and Harbor Monitoring

3.2.1 Mission Description

Tracking UUVs is difficult, making them well suited to clandestine reconnaissance missions. For this reason, they are ideal for monitoring harbors and other shallow-water targets in denied areas. They are able to monitor harbor traffic, as well as provide information on mine-laying operations, other defense preparations, and oceanographic information on the region. One particular mission is in completing these activities in support of SOF operations [47]. Unmanned underwater vehicles would identify areas with low activity, warn SOF operants of threats of detection, and monitor SOF supply caches, as well as survey the area before action. Support of SOF missions was demonstrated during Exercise Giant Shadow using a Navy Seahorse UUV [50].

3.2.2 Manned System CONOPs and Costs

Navy SEAL operators are frequently called upon to perform clandestine monitoring of high-value targets. Traveling in small submersibles called swimmer delivery vehicles (SDVs) launched from submerged attack submarines [51], they transit for up to eight hours to reach their area of interest [52] and then loiter for several hours, completing their mission before returning to their host platform. Aircraft carriers and backup SEAL teams provide mission support [51]. The total mission cost for four hours at the target is $2,374,000, or $594,000 per loiter-hour. To achieve a total loiter time of 24 hours, six missions would be required, costing $14,244,000. In the case of a long-term monitoring operation lasting 14 days, a mission requiring insertion and recovery of a SEAL team, total costs would be $6,089,000, or $18,000 per loiter-hour. As is the case with most missions requiring the use of special operations forces, mission risks and threat to human life are very high. These missions are (and should be) only performed in the most demanding, high-value situations.

53 3.2.3 UUV CONOPs and Costs

A UUV can be (and has been [50]) used to accomplish similar missions. Launched from a ship or submarine, the UUV could travel to the monitoring area and remain on- location for long periods with low risk of detection. Using a battery-powered REMUS

600, the total cost for four loiter hours would be $212,000, or $53,000 per loiter-hour, which is 91% cost savings over using manned systems. A mission requiring 24 hours at the target would cost $216,000 ($9,000 per loiter hour), which is 98% cost savings over using manned systems. For the long-term, 14-day deployment, a REMUS 600 equipped with an aluminum power source could be used. The mission would cost $266,000, or $791 per loiter-hour. The cost savings over manned systems would be 95%. In both instances, not only are operational costs far lower, but human lives are not put at risk. Mission failure would be the loss of a $2.8 million submarine, a small price compared to the loss of highly trained SEAL operators. In addition, UUVs are difficult to track and present a much lower risk of detection by enemy combatants, further lowering mission risk, especially for clandestine reconnaissance missions.

3.3 Array Deployment

3.3.1 Mission Description

While UUVs are a mobile reconnaissance force, the Navy also uses stationary sensor arrays to detect and track submarines, surface ships, and mine laying in a given area. Deployment of these arrays in denied areas is currently achieved by using manned systems, in many instances by SEAL forces and the SEAL Delivery Vehicle (SDV) [51]. Unmanned underwater vehicles would be able to complete the same mission in a simpler manner with less risk to human life and decreased chance of detection. The Advanced Distributed System (ADS), previously under development by Lockheed Martin, was deployed in tests using an UUV [47].

54 3.3.2 Manned System CONOPs and Costs

In 2003, teams of four Navy SEALs completed a series of missions deploying cameras in Somalia to track terrorist training [51]. Similar to harbor monitoring CONOPs, SEALs travel in SDVs for long periods to reach the target area, deploy the sensors, and then return to the submerged submarine from which they were launched [521. An aircraft carrier and backup SEAL team provided support [51]. The average time on location was three hours [51], and the total mission costs were $2,233,000, or $744,000 per hour at the target.

3.3.3 UUV CONOPs and Costs

To avoid risking human lives, the LDUUV (or other, UUVs) could perform a similar sensor deployment mission in its current configuration. The LDUUV would be launched from a submarine and travel to its target before deploying the array and returning to be retrieved [47]. Total mission costs would be $271,000 ($271,000 per installation hour), which is 88% cost savings over manned systems CONOPs.

3.4 Oceanography and Bathymetry

3.4.1 Mission Description

The Navy depends on complete, accurate, and precise oceanographic data when planning operations. Data such as temperature gradients, gravity measurements, and salinity are important to communications and weapons use. Surveys of the ocean floor (bathymetry) are also vital, as accurate charts are needed for safe navigation at and below the surface. Unmanned underwater vehicles are capable of providing frequent and accurate oceanographic data points on demand across large areas and at varying depths [53]. Because of their ability to operate untethered at depth, UUVs provide more accurate, higher-resolution maps of the ocean floor, and can make maps more efficiently by using tighter scan patterns and multiple vehicles [54]. Numerous UUVs have been demonstrated as effective oceanographic platforms, including gliders

55 and AUVs [53, 55]

3.4.2 Manned System CONOPs and Costs

In the case of water column profiling, an excellent case study is the Navy's 2005 Ex- ercise SHAREM 150. During this exercise, T-AGOS ocean surveillance ships and helicopter-deployed systems (launched from aircraft carriers) captured 386 traces over 22 days [47, 53]. The total mission cost for providing oceanographic data was $4,780,000, or $12,000 per profile.

For a bathymetric mission, a T-AGOS ship would tow an Orion side scan sonar tow fish at low speed. Swath width depends on the required resolution: 300 m for torpedo-sized objects (high-resolution), 1,800 m for aircraft debris fields (medium- resolution), and 3,000 m for bathymetry (low-resolution) [56]. For high-resolution scans over a representative 20 km2 [33], mapping takes 25 hours and the total costs are $317,000 ($16,000 per kM2 ). For medium-resolution scans over a representative 6000 km 2 [57], mapping takes 1,100 hours (46 days) and the total costs are $14,324,000 ($2,387 per kM2 ). For low-resolution scans over a representative area of 17,000 km 2

[57], mapping takes 1,900 hours (66 days) and total costs are $24,330,000 ($1,431 per kin 2 ).

3.4.3 UUV CONOPs and Costs

During the aforementioned Exercise SHAREM 150 in 2005, a team of four Slocum gliders were used to gather oceanographic data. The gliders took 4,782 profiles over the 22-day exercise. The total glider mission cost was $190,000, or $40 per profile.

Cost savings were 98% over manned systems.

Bathymetry was one of the earliest applications of UUVs. Three REMUS 600 vehicles could be launched from a T-AGOS vessel and map the same representative areas. For battery-powered REMUS vehicles, the high resolution scans take 27 hours and total costs are $76,000 ($3,787 per km 2 ), which is 76% cost savings over manned systems. Medium resolution scans take 456 hours (19 days) and total costs

56 are $1,070,000 ($178 per km 2 ), which is 93% cost savings over manned systems. Low resolution scans take 772 hours (32 days) and total costs are $1,813,000 ($107 per kin2 ), which is 93% cost savings over manned systems.

For aluminum-powered REMUS vehicles, the medium resolution scans take 411 hours (17 days) and total costs are $352,000 ($59 per km2 ), which is 98% cost savings over manned systems and 67% savings over battery-powered REMUS vehicles. Low resolution scans take 709 hours (30 days) and total costs are $517,000 ($30 per km2)1 which is 98% cost savings over manned systems and 71% cost savings over battery- powered REMUS vehicles.

3.5 Mine detection, classification, identification, and neutralization

3.5.1 Mission Description

Systems such as the REMUS 100 have already begun service as mine hunters, replacing divers and marine mammals in mapping minefields during the 2003 invasion of Iraq [55]. While wide-area minesweeping is not currently within reach, UUVs are highly capable in mine hunting, i.e. identifying mines, determining their position, and removing them. Though slow, mine hunting is the most reliable mine clearance method. The ATLAS Seafox is a German mine identification and neutralization vehicle. Easily deployed from a minesweeper, the Seafox can find, identify, and then destroy mines [58]. Current mine hunting UUVs target floating and moored mines. The Knifefish is an AUV capable of detecting, identifying, classifying, and mapping bottom mines hidden on the seafloor [59].

3.5.2 Manned System CONOPs and Costs

For mine hunting, mine countermeasure vessels deploy teams of explosive ordinance disposal (EOD) divers and specially trained dolphins. It takes 2.5 man-hours to detect, classify, and identify a mine, and the total cost per mine is $6,500.

57 3.5.3 UUV CONOPs and Costs

An LCS equipped with a MCM mission package will use the Knifefish to hunt mines.

Each mine requires 0.2 UUV-hours for detection, for a total cost of $529 per mine, which is 92% cost savings over manned systems.

3.6 Hold-at-risk

3.6.1 Mission Description

Diesel-electric submarines are an attractive option to many nation-states in relation to larger, more expensive nuclear-powered submarines. Diesel-electric submarines pose a significant risk to carrier and expeditionary strike groups due to their silent operation and small footprint [60]. Crucial to ASW is knowing the location and movement of enemy submarine vessels. Unmanned underwater vehicles will be able to loiter at the openings of ports and at choke-points through which submarines must pass [61], and critical systems tests for hold-at-risk missions have already been completed [62]. When submarine activity is detected, the UUV may begin to track and follow the enemy submarine until other systems can be mobilized. In addition to tracking abilities, the threat of detection could potentially limit and frustrate enemy submarine activity [9].

3.6.2 Manned System CONOPs and Costs

To effectively monitor a choke-point for a hold-at-risk mission, an attack submarine would need to loiter in the area. For a representative mission of 28 days, the total cost would be $20,917,000 ($31,000 per loiter hour). The high costs of using attack submarines in hold-at-risk missions, and the limited availability of attack submarines, make hold-at-risk missions impractical with manned systems.

58 3.6.3 UUV CONOPs and Costs

UUVs present a solution to the current nonconsumption of this mission. Unmanned vehicles could be launched by a T-AGOS ship at a standoff distance and travel to the choke-point. A team of three REMUS 600 vehicles could monitor the choke point.

Battery-powered UUVs would need to return frequently for recharging, and total mission costs would be $1,896,000 (2,800 per loiter-hour), which is 91% cost savings over manned systems. Aluminum-powered UUVs would return less frequently, and total mission costs would be $867,000 ($1,334 per loiter-hour), which is 96% cost savings over manned systems and 54% cost savings over battery-powered REMUS vehicles.

A team of seven Z-Ray gliders could cover a choke-point for the entire mission duration and a mission cost of $782,000 ($1,164 per loiter-hour), which is 96% cost savings over manned systems, 59% cost savings over battery-powered REMUS vehicles, and 10% cost savings over aluminum-powered REMUS vehicles. Z-Ray gliders also have the advantage of being capable of even longer deployment times, making mission extension simple and further decreasing per-hour loiter costs.

3.7 ASW Training

3.7.1 Mission Description

Realizing the risk of submarines to other submarines and to surface vessels, ASW training is an important part of preparing combat readiness. United States nuclear- powered submarines are high-value assets and their availability for ASW training situations is limited and expensive [47]. Joint exercises with (as well as renting submarines from) foreign navies is an alternative, but nevertheless not a perfect solution.

Costs are high, and availability for training is limited. Unmanned underwater vehicles act as submarines for a subset of ASW training exercises. The MK 39 Expendable

Mobile ASW Training Target (EMATT) is used to mimic a diesel-electric submarine by operating at various speeds, depths, and headings and emitting acoustic signa-

59 tures [63]. They provide essential experience both in on-range training and in the open ocean.

3.7.2 Manned System CONOPs and Costs

In 2005, the United States leased a Gotland class diesel-electric submarine and her crew from Sweden for training exercises. The training was successful and demonstrated vulnerability of Navy vessels to attack from diesel-electric submarines. For a two-day training mission with the Gotland, the total cost the exercise would be $527,000. Training with a SSN-774 for two days would cost $1,992,000.

3.7.3 UUV CONOPs and Costs

While use of actual vessels is effective and occasionally necessary, it is costly and impractical. Unmanned vessels can mimic various submarines and provide training for ASW crews. Using the MK-39 EMATT launched from the training vessel, two days of training would require 7 EMATT units and costs would be $158,000, which is 70% cost savings over training with the Gotland and 92% cost savings over training with a SSN-774. Outfitted with the appropriate equipment, a REMUS 600 could also serve as an ASW training target launched from the training vessel. Total costs would be $102,000, which is 81% cost savings over training with the Gotland, 95% cost savings over training with a SSN-774, and 35% cost savings over using EMATTs.

3.8 In-water Survey and Hull Inspection

3.8.1 Mission Description

Countless cargo container ships enter U.S. territorial waters every day. The immensity of the traffic makes it difficult to inspect every ship, creating a risk to national security. Various items, including limpet mines and narcotics, can be attached to ship hulls without the knowledge of the crew [64]. Divers currently do this dangerous, dirty work

60 with great difficulty due to currents and other vessels [65]. Unmanned underwater vehicles could search the hulls of incoming ships to locate such threats, decreasing risk to divers and increasing the number of inspections performed. In addition, their ability to remain close to the ship increases the likelihood that they will be able to detect a radiological source inside the hull, thereby further mitigating threats [471. Inspections of commercial and naval ship bottoms must be carried out regularly to ensure safety. Every five years, two surveys must performed to identify damage, corrosion, and other potential problems. These surveys must be completed in controlled conditions by certified divers under inspector supervision [66]. Unmanned underwater vehicles are currently under development that can quickly complete ship bottom inspections in any condition, including murky water and the open ocean. These inspections can also identify foreign objects such as limpet mines. The use of UUVs could greatly increase the rate of hull inspection, decreasing the amount of time away from sea. Using UUVs will also increase safety and compliance with international regulations and decrease inspection and repair costs.

3.8.2 Manned System CONOPs and Costs

As representative inspection subjects, I chose a Panamax and a DDG-51, and included ship opportunity costs. Inspecting a ship hull for attached drug containers or limpet mines takes about two hours for a team of six divers. Total costs for a Panamax vessel are $17,000, and for a DDG-51 are $70,000. A full inspection team of 17 divers inspect ships by swimming back and forth in a row to cover the entire hull. Inspecting a Panamax vessel takes 5 hours and costs $64,000. Inspecting a DDG-51 takes 3 hours and costs $112,000.

3.8.3 UUV CONOPs and Costs

Many police forces use ROVs to randomly inspect ship hulls for drugs and other irregularities, greatly simplifying the inspection process and reducing risk to divers. Inspecting a vessel takes about an hour [67]. Total costs for a Panamax are $8,000,

61 which is 54% cost savings over manned systems. Total costs for a DDG-51 are $34,000, which is 51% cost savings over manned systems.

Bluefin's hovering AUV (HAUV) is designed to autonomously perform in-water surveys on ship hulls. Inspecting a Panamax using two HAUVs takes three hours and costs $21,000, which is a cost savings of 67% over using manned systems. Inspecting a DDG-51 takes 1.5 hours and costs $51,000, a cost savings of 54% over manned systems.

3.9 Monitoring Undersea Infrastructure

3.9.1 Mission Description

The U.S. Navy has invested heavily in undersea infrastructure to support is operations, including an extensive network of undersea monitoring stations and thousands of miles of cabling [47]. Inspection and monitoring is important to maintain combat readiness, especially as systems age. Limited inspections are conducted by diver teams and shipborne systems, leaving the rest of these critical systems un-inspected and subject to damage from animals, fouling, weather, and enemy disturbances (for example, divers cut Egyptian telecom cables in March 2013 [68]). A series of UUVs have been used in industry to inspect underwater cabling and pipelines [69]. Their roles can be expanded to include the extensive systems used by the Navy to monitor their infrastructure. Unmanned underwater vehicles could persistently monitor undersea systems and alert personnel to damage or threats.

3.9.2 Manned System CONOPs and Costs

Undersea cables and pipelines are inspected using T-AGOS ships towing inspection ROVs at low speeds. Mapping a representative distance of 400 km (a distance mapped in 2000 by the Aqua Explorer 2000 AUV, a specialized cable inspection AUV [70]) takes 54 hours and total costs are $730,000 ($1,800 per km). A longer representative distance (for example 4065 km, the distance from Nova Scotia to Ireland) would take

62 55 hours and cost $7,077,000 ($1,800 per km).

3.9.3 UUV CONOPs and Costs

UUVs such as the Aqua Explorer 2000 have previously inspected cables over long distances. Total mission time would be 86 hours and total costs $102,000 ($254 per km), which is 86% cost savings over manned systems. To inspect the longer distance, an aluminum-powered REMUS 600 could be used. Total mission time would be 765 hours and the total cost would be $218,000 ($54 per km), which is 97% cost savings over manned systems.

63 Type Mission Metric Ship UUV Savings CBNRE Cost per profile $1,143 $79 93% Water Column Profiling Cost per profile $20,858 $40 99% High Definition Cost per km 2 $15,837 $3,787 76% ISR Mapping Medium Definition Cost per km 2 $2,387 $178 93% Low Definition Cost per km2 $1,431 $107 93% Harbor Monitoring Cost per loiter hour $593,509 $8,985 98% Array Deployment Cost per deployment $2,233,074 $270,716 88% MCM Mine-hunting Cost per mine $6,450 $529 92% c-c

ASW Hold-at-risk Cost per loiter hour $20,916,651 $782,384 96% ASW Training Cost per training hour $10,974 $2,135 81%

2 54% Hull Inspection Attached Materials Cost per m inspected $16,797 $7,695 IullIn-water Survey Cost per m2 inspected $6 $2 67% Undersea Infrastructure Cost per km inspected $1,799 $254 86%

Table 3.1: Mission costs comparison between manned systems and UUVs Metric Ship UUV Aluminum Savings Mission Battery Aluminum vs. Ship vs. Batteries CBNRE Cost per profile $1,143 $79 $28 98% 64% Medium Resolution Cost per km2 $2,387 $178 $59 98% 67% 2 01 Bathymetry Low Resolution Cost per km $1,431 $107 $30 98% 71% Long-term Harbor Monitoring Cost per loiter hour $18,123 N/A $791 96% N/A Hold-at-risk Cost per loiter hour $31,126 $2,822 $1,334 96% 53% Undersea Infrastructure Cost per km $1,799 $254 $54 97% 79%

Table 3.2: Mission costs comparison between aluminum and non-aluminum power systems 66 Chapter 4

Implications of UUV Adoption

My analysis of manned system and UUV CONOPs and costs revealed several in- teresting observations about the implementation and use of UUVs, particularly in a disruptive manner.

4.1 UUVs offer significant cost savings

Chapter 3 highlights the extensive cost savings UUV CONOPs offer over manned system CONOPs. In examining the cost savings based on the meaningful metric for each mission (for example, cost per km2 mapped), I found that the average cost savings was 88%. In other words, UUV operations are an order of magnitude less expensive than completing the same missions using manned systems. In many instances, these savings per mission are on the order of millions of dollars. Unmanned systems are often just as capable, if not better suited, to missions than are manned systems, removing operational risk and protecting valuable human and naval assets. For example, UUVs are ideal for mine hunting operations due to their greater operational endurance and reduced ship exposure [55]. Unmanned systems offer better resolution for bathymetry, and with their small profiles and low cost, are ideal for reconnaissance. Significant cost savings are immediately available with current technology by expanding UUV programs. There are many missions where UUVs could be used, but they are not used due to

67 lack of vehicular experience or interest. Disruptive innovation is an organic process, and allowing independent development and creativity is an important part of that

process. War speeds the process of disruptive innovation in a military setting because

process rigidity is secondary to victory and success. The flexibility fosters creativity

and allows those who are working on missions every day to find better solutions to

problems. Creating a similar atmosphere of flexibility and creativity is critical during

peacetime to ensure technological dominance.

4.2 Ships are expensive

As is clearly demonstrated in Appendix C, the most expensive part of nearly any

mission is ship use, both for manned system and UUV CONOPs. Ships are large, integrated, and expensive equipment. As such, they are highly valuable assets, and

should be used in high-value missions. If there are cheaper alternatives that do the job nearly as well, the cost savings justify those alternatives. Because they require

much less ship interaction, UUVs offer significant cost savings and are quintessential

force multipliers.

4.3 Aluminum power sources are an important step forward

Aluminum-powered UUVs become attractive for several reasons. Because of the high

costs of using ships in completing missions, any measure that will decrease the use of

ships during UUV missions represents a significant improvement in costs. Using an

aluminum power source decreases ship interaction with UUVs by nearly an order of

magnitude, and thus the costs of operating the UUVs decreases drastically. Though

aluminum power sources are themselves expensive, estimated to represent a significant

portion of the UUV's capital costs, those higher fixed costs are minuscule compared

to the money saved using the UUV as a force multiplier for a ship.

High energy-density power sources are a technology development priority for UUV

68 research [9]. Aluminum power sources solve that difficult problem, and as such also offer new capabilities to UUVs, accelerating their ability to disrupt naval operations.

Aluminum power would allow UUVs to stay on station for extended periods (up to 28

days in the case of the REMUS 600), making them useful for hold-at-risk missions, extended reconnaissance, and long-range inspection and bathymetry missions. During these periods, the UUVs would need no ship interaction. Without aluminum power, for example, hold-at-risk missions are impractical, but the addition of an aluminum

power source and the accompanying independence from human and ship interaction makes the mission possible and highly valuable. Aluminum power is a significant step

forward in using UUVs as force multipliers and using them as a disruption to current

naval operations. Other new, disruptive, and currently unimagined mission applica-

tions will become possible through aluminum power sources and their applications.

4.4 UUVs are not one-size-fits-all

There are a variety of sizes and types of UUVs available for completing missions, and

that variety is an important strength of UUV systems. Due to their low cost and

modular designs (especially using currently and commonly available technologies), UUVs can be used immediately to solve many problems and save money. A single

UUV cannot, and should not, be able to complete bathymetry, mine-hunting, recon-

naissance, array deployment, and oceanography. Developing such a UUV would be

cost prohibitive and would encourage overshooting using UUVs themselves. Why use

a large, multimillion dollar UUV to do a job that a glider does just as well for a frac-

tion of the cost? Unmanned underwater vehicles offer flexibility, and that flexibility

is a key to their disruptive and revolutionary power.

The variety of UUVs available, and their different strengths in completing mis-

sions, encourages their use now, rather than waiting for better, all-in-one technologies

to arrive. The experience gained and the experimentation completed will be essential

to rapidly developing UUV technologies. Focusing on jobs that need to be done, and

designing vehicles to accomplish those jobs, is key to implementing UUVs effectively.

69 A variety of types and uses will encourage their widespread adoption.

4.5 Nonconsumption and overshooting offer many immediate UUV applications

The quantity and variety of sample missions I analyzed demonstrates the number of missions that are currently being completed with manned systems that are too capable, or are not being completed at all due to the difficulty of using manned systems. Manned systems, especially ships, are expensive and suited to high-value, difficult missions. Unmanned systems offer cost-effective alternatives that are better suited to the type and size of the problem. Using a glider to gather oceanographic data is far less expensive and additionally a better data source than a large, expensive ship that could potentially be used to monitor diesel-electric submarine mobilizations using sophisticated technologies [71]. Hold-at-risk missions cannot be pursued because of the high cost and limited availability of attack submarines. Overshooting and nonconsumption offer many ways to use UUVs to improve naval operations without threatening the strategic significance of large, multi-mission ships.

There exists a plethora of opportunities to use UUV technologies immediately.

Taking advantage of these opportunities with available technology will encourage creative use and innovation in not only technology, but also use-cases. The experience gained will be important in maintaining a first-mover advantage over other groups developing UUVs. Overshooting and nonconsumption ensure that UUV applications will entail significant cost savings, improve strategic ability, and disruption will accelerate.

70 4.6 Low costs and disruptive nature of UUVs will make them attractive to other navies

My analysis shows that UUVs can be used to augment or replace ships for a variety of important mission types. While the U.S. Navy has the luxury of having various capable vessels, many navies do not, and are searching for ways to expand their capabilities using inexpensive means. Unmanned vehicles offer the solution. Their low costs, modular system and vehicle architectures, and low operating overheads make them an attractive naval solution to navies and other groups around the world.

Because they have nowhere else to turn, they will begin to use UUVs extensively, finding disruptive solutions to complex problems and threatening the U.S. Navy's dominance.

4.7 Conclusions

Unmanned underwater vehicles promise to revolutionize naval warfare through the mechanisms of disruptive innovation. Skillful innovation management and UUV adoption will be critical to maintaining naval superiority in the future. Unmanned vehicles must see widespread adoption through organic, creative growth to realize significant

cost savings and strategic value.

71 72 Appendix A

Technology

A.1 Unmanned Underwater Vehicle Technology

Unmanned underwater vehicles come in a variety of shapes, sizes, and human involvement, making each type attractive for different missions. The Navy is evaluating UUV technology for intelligent research investment and development.

A.1.1 Technology State-of-the-Art and Research Focus

The Navy has identified areas of technological need for UUVs to provide the operational abilities desired for a variety of high-value missions [9]. These technology foci include:

* autonomy,

" energy,

" sensors and sensor processing,

* communications and networking, and

* engagement and intervention.

73 The Navy plans to invest in research to improve these technologies and make them available on the battlefield. In addition, the Navy has identified the following engineering implementation challenges as unresolved [9], but attainable:

* energy source selection,

" launch and recovery,

" shipboard certification,

" simulation and virtualization, and

" ForceNet interoperability.

The Navy must be able to reach its technology goals in order to successfully execute the missions it has designed, as well as to integrate them into its current war fighting systems.

A.2 Strategic Use of UUVs

The face of naval warfare has changed drastically since the end of the Cold War. As a key participant in every modern conflict, the US Navy has accordingly adjusted its strategy to match the demands to the solutions of the 21st century. The result is SeaPower 21, which outlines the goals and means for the Navy as it confronts new enemies in its mission to protect America [72]. SeaPower 21 enumerates four pillars of naval power:

1. Sea Strike: Projecting Precise and Persistent Offensive Power

2. Sea Shield: Projecting Global Defensive Assurance

3. Sea Basing: Projecting Joint Operational Independence

4. ForceNet: Networking Sea Strike, Sea Shield, and Sea Basing

74 A.2.1 US Navy 2004 UUV Master Plan

In developing its underwater robotic abilities, the Navy has developed a series of unmanned systems master plans. UUVs are envisioned as a means to improve the Navy's current mission abilities, as well as a way to complete missions that are currently impossible or very difficult to complete using current technology. The Navy Unmanned Undersea Vehicle Master Plan 2004 identifies nine mission types for UUVs and gives them priority in terms of strategic significance [9]. In general, UUVs are expected to complete missions in otherwise inaccessible areas, reduce operating costs, operate as a force multiplier for existing naval vessels, and allow those vessels to focus on higher priority missions. These missions are listed in order below, along with brief explanations.

1. Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR)

The goal of ISR missions is to improve the tactical and strategic intelligence available to warriors at every stage of conflict. As such, it encompasses a wide range of information-gathering activities. Examples include oceanography, port and harbor monitoring, object detection and localization, and persistent and tactical collection of signal, electronic, or imaging intelligence.

2. Mine Countermeasures (MCM)

Mines represent a class of unusually inexpensive and easy-to-use weapons that otherwise handicapped warfighting parties can use to frustrate naval operations at any depth. Safe paths through minefields must be created before any operation proceeds. It is envisioned that UUVs will be used for mine hunting, specifically detection, classification, identification, and neutralization. Several UUVs are currently used for MCM operations by the U.S. and other navies, and more advanced UUVs are under development.

75 3. Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW)

Three mission types constitute ASW roles. In a hold-at-risk scenario, a UUV will patrol a barrier zone close to an enemy port or other choke-point through which a submarine must pass. When the UUV detects a submarine mobilization, it will alert its operator and then begin to track the enemy submarine until further action can be taken. The other two mission types, maritime shield and protected passage, use UUVs to keep carrier and expeditionary strike groups free of enemy submarine activity.

4. Inspection and Identification (I&I)

Harbor patrol and ship inspection have become important duties since September 11. Inspecting piers and ships using divers is expensive and time consuming. UUV systems (both autonomous and human operated) are beginning to be used to inspect ship hulls for explosives, drugs, corrosion, and fouling. They will enable more inspections to be performed at lower cost.

5. Oceanography

During wartime, accurate and precise oceanographic data is key for any number of naval operations. Maps of the ocean floor, salinity, temperature profiles, and ocean currents are examples of the data that is needed. Oceanographic UUVs have been used for years to complement existing manned and surface systems, and they are particularly useful in gathering data in hard-to-reach locations.

6. Communications and Navigation Network Nodes (CN3)

Undersea communications is a largely unsolved, non-trivial problem. Electromagnetic communication is limited, and acoustic methods are best for underwater communications. Underwater vehicles could provide nodes in an underwater communications network, and provide a link to the surface for submerged submarines and other in- strumentation. Unmanned underwater vehicles could also assist in special operations

76 force (SOF) operations and other littoral combat situations.

7. Payload Delivery

Large UUVs could act as underwater trucks, depositing a wide range of payloads into sensitive locations where traditional transportation is impossible. Payloads could include underwater sensor arrays, supply and weapons caches for SOF operations, smaller UUVs, weapons, or communications transponders.

8. Information Operations (10)

The goal of 10 missions is to deceive, deter, and disrupt the enemy. Unmanned underwater vehicles could complete a variety of missions. For example, UUVs have acted as ASW decoys for some time, with the aim of causing the enemy to dilute their ASW resources and change tactics. Vehicles could also jam nodes and inject false information into enemy networks in denied areas.

9. Time Critical Strike (TCS)

The ultimate application of UUVs is like unto their aerial drone brethren, i.e. as integral members of the kill chain with sensor to shooter closure measured in seconds. Doing so would help keep sailors out of harms way and draw attention away from high value manned vessels. While autonomy is rapidly improving, man-in-loop operations will still be required for weapons deployment.

A.3 Evaluated Mission Selection

In its Master Plan, the Navy ranked the missions dependent upon strategic needs and operational requirements and current technological capabilities. In 2009, the RAND Corporation undertook a study of the strategic and technological implications involved in the 2004 Master Plan. RAND evaluated the missions based on CONOPs envisioned by the authors of the Navy itself, as well as technologies currently available in UUV systems [47]. RAND concluded that not all of the CONOPs envisioned by

77 the Navy were technologically possible or strategically advisable [47]. Among the problems with mission expectations identified by RAND were those associated with technologies currently unavailable (as noted previously in Section A.1.1):

* a general lack of autonomy for many mission types:

- SIGINT, ELINT, MASINT, and IMINT;

- IO missions to jam communication and inject false information;

* radical increase in power and energy needs for high transit speeds;

" lack of reliability for SOF missions;

" mast height requirements that compromise secrecy near the surface;

" no need for many CN3 missions, including network node and on-demand lane marker;

" violation of international treaties in weaponizing UUVs with cruise missiles.

Their analysis recommended a new prioritization of UUV missions in relation to technology readiness and strategic needs based on more specific and accurate CONOPs [47]. The missions outlined in Table 2.1 are those which I analyze based on cost and financial upside, as well as disruptive potential.

78 Appendix B

Naval System Cost Calculations

Cost summaries are presented in 2013 U.S. dollars. Where appropriate, I accounted for inflation to 2013 dollars using the CPI from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics

[73]. I give original costs designated by their respective fiscal year in parentheses. Totals may not add due to rounding.

B.1 Ships

B.1.1 Ship Life-cycle Costs as Calculated by the Congres- sional Budget Office

I based ship lifecycle costs on calculations outlined in a letter to Senator Jeff Sessions

from the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) for the full life-cycle costs of five ships

[74]. The CBO calculated life-cycle costs based on DoD Selected Acquisition Reports

(SARs), data from the Navy's Visibility and Management of Operating and Support

Costs (VAMOSC) system, and from other DoD and CBO sources and analyses. The

costs they considered were procurement, research and development (R&D), personnel,

fuel, other operations and support (O&S), and disposal. The cost of Navy base

support, personnel relocations, etc. were not included. The letter noted a report

suggesting that the DoD underestimates the fully burdened cost of fuel by 45%. New

guidance to DoD service acquisition executives suggests these recommendations were

79 being adopted in August 2012 [75]. Accordingly, I adjusted the fuel costs presented in the letter to reflect the 45% misalignment. The CBO calculated annual costs by dividing the total life-cycle cost by the expected service life.

In addition to the aforementioned cost data, the CBO provided the displacement, crew (officers and enlisted men), and the number of vessels built of each class. The CBO calculated life-cycle costs for five ship programs:

1. MCM-1 Avenger class mine countermeasures ship

2. FFG-7 Oliver Hazard Perry class guided missile frigates

3. DDG-51 Flight IIA Arleigh Burke class guided missile destroyers

4. CG-47 Ticonderoga class guided missile cruisers

5. LCS-1 Freedom class littoral combat ships

A summary of the data and costs in millions of 2013 dollars is presented in Table B.1.

B.1.2 Other Ship Life-cycle Costs

The CBO did not analyze the life-cycle costs of all ships needed for my analysis. Based on their methodology and calculations, I calculated the life-cycle costs of six additional classes:

1. SSN-774 Virginia class nuclear-powered fast attack submarine

2. LHA(R) America class amphibious assault ship

3. T-AGOS Impeccable class ocean surveillance ship

4. Swedish Gotland class diesel-electric submarine

5. Shallow Water Combat Submersible (SWCS)

6. Rigid Hull Inflatable Boat (11m length) (RHIB)

80 Table B.1: CBO-calculated Life-cycle Ship Costs

Class MCM-1 FFG-7 DDG-51 CG-47 LCS-1 Ship Characteristics Displacement (tonnes) 1,300 3,700 8,600 9,100 2,800 Officers 8 11 24 24 11 Enlisted 76 170 254 340 43 Number of ships 14 30 34 22 1 Expected service life 30 30 35 35 25 Ship Costs R&D 3 2 77 9 21 Procurement 293 708 1588 2155 728 Personnel 260 546 960 1237 172 Fuel 12 194 514 566 123 Other O&S 110 215 276 523 95 Disposal 0 0 1 1 0 Total 697 1,665 3,415 4,490 1,139 Annual 23 56 98 128 46

I calculated lifecycle costs to match the analysis of the CBO as best as possible. For each vessel type, I found or approximated the displacement, crew, expected service life, total R&D budget, number of boats, and procurement cost. To calculate personnel costs, I calculated the average annual crew cost for the CBO vessels, then performed a multiple linear regression to determine the annual cost per officer ($246,000 per year) and enlisted man ($87,000 per year). I then multiplied the new vessel's crew compliment by the respective costs per year and the expected service life. I calculated fuel costs by taking a linear regression of annual fuel costs vs. displacement of the CBO vessels (0.0016 per year), taking into account speed where appropriate in subsequent calculations. I multiplied the result by the displacement and expected service life of the new vessel. I calculated other O&S costs for new vessels by taking a linear regression of the annual O&S costs vs. procurement costs of the CBO vessels (0.0064 per year). I

81 Table B.2: CBO-calculated Life-cycle Ship Costs

Class SSN-774 LHA(R) T-AGOS Gotland SWCS RHIB Ship Characteristics Displacement (tonnes) 7,900 45,700 5,500 1,500 30 8 Officers 15 65 10 19 0 3 Enlisted 117 994 35 11 0 0 Number of ships 10 3 1 3 50 200 Expected service life 33 35 30 30 25 20 Ship Costs R&D 143 127 60 17 10 0 Procurement 2,700 3,263 748 392 60 1 Personnel 548 4,292 198 203 0 18 Fuel 0 2,758 93 77 0 3 Other O&S 618 792 156 82 10 0 Disposal 1 1 1 1 1 0 Total 4,010 11,232 1,256 964 82 22 Annual 122 321 42 32 3 1

multiplied the result by the new vessel's procurement cost and expected service life. For disposal, I estimated $1 million for each large vessel, based on the CBO's own estimates [74]. I present the results of my new ship analyses in Table B.2. The specifics of each calculation follow. Costs are in millions of 2013 dollars.

SSN-774 Virginia Class Nuclear-powered Fast Attack Submarine

The USS Virginia represents the latest generation of nuclear attack submarines, designed to replace the aging Los Angeles class attack submarines. Designed for a variety of missions, she displaces 7,900 tonnes with a crew of 14 officers and 127 enlisted men [76]. Currently, the Navy has ordered 10 vessels at a cost of $2.7 billion each [77]. They will not need to be refueled during their expected 33 years at sea, and the initial fueling is included in procurement costs [78]. I determined total research and development costs from the total expected program cost ($85.3 billion, $67.0

82 billion FY2003) divided over 30 total expected vessels, minus the procurement cost

[79]. I calculated personnel, other O&S, and disposal costs as I described previously.

LHA(R) America Class Amphibious Assault Ship

The America class is the latest generation of flattop amphibious assault ships, carrying marines, aircraft, and equipment for sea-based land operations. The USS America displaces 45,700 tonnes and is crewed by 65 officers and 994 enlisted sailors [80]. Three ships have been procured at a cost of $3.3 billion each and research costs totaling $380 million [81]. I estimated expected service life based on other ship lives, and personnel, fuel, other O&S, and disposal costs as I explained previously.

T-AGOS-23 Impeccable Class Ocean Surveillance Ship

Ocean surveillance ships complete a wide variety of missions, including oceanography, bathymetry, anti-submarine warfare, and salvage operations. The catamaran-hulled USNS Impeccable displaces 5,500 tonnes [82]. She has a crew of 20 mariners, 5 techni- cians, and up to 20 other Navy personnel, leading me to estimate a crew composition of 10 officers and 35 enlisted men [82]. My estimate of the procurement cost is pro- portional by displacement to the cost ($471.32 million, $249.6 million FY1989) [83] of the smaller T-AGOS-19 USNS Victorious (3,400 tonnes) [82]. My research cost and service life estimates are based on the figures for a frigate, a ship of slightly smaller size and comparable complexity. Personnel, other O&S, and disposal costs were calculated as explained previously. Fuel costs were estimated as explained previously, but then multiplied by 0.33 due to her typically slow operating speed (10 knots), especially when towing (3 knots) [82], in accordance with calculations made by the CBO in determining MCM and LCS fuel costs [74].

Swedish Gotland Class Diesel-electric Submarine

The U.S. Navy exclusively operates nuclear-powered submarines, a vessel designed for deep submergence for long periods at high speeds. Diesel-electric submarines are a less-expensive option popular with many nation-states, offering improved littoral

83 operability and posing a significant threat to the U.S. fleet. The U.S. leased a Gotland class diesel-electric submarine from Sweden for two years for use in a variety of exercises [84]. HMS Gotland displaces 1660 tonnes [85] and is crewed by 19 officers and 11 enlisted sailors [86]. There are three ships in the class [84], costing $392 million ($365 million FY2010) each [87]. I estimated service life according to other similar vessels, and R&D costs from those of the frigate class (the frigate is larger, but the Swedes spent significant research effort in developing the advanced Stirling-based propulsion system). I calculated personnel, fuel, other O&S, and disposal costs as previously explained. The total sum was multiplied by 1.25 to represent a lease rate (I present the total per year lease cost, i.e. the cost to the United States).

Shallow Water Combat Submersible

The Mark 8 Mod 1 Swimmer Delivery Vehicle offers Navy SEALs a clandestine mode of transport from submerged submarine to operational area. The SWCS is an updated version of the SDV under development, providing an estimate for current and future SEAL vehicle operations. Assessing the larger and cancelled Advanced SEAL Delivery System (ASDS) (displacement of 60 tonnes [88], original cost $102 million, $80 million FY2003 [89]), I estimated the SWCS displacement to be 30 tonnes and cost to be $60 million. The vehicle runs on battery charged by its host submarine (therefore no calculated fuel costs) and is used by six SEALs, all of whom are part of the fighting team (hence no crew costs). The Navy plans to build 50 submersibles, and the current research budget is $509 million [90]. I estimated the service life from the current SDV, which has been in operation since the 1980s (with an upgrade) [91]. I calculated other O&S and disposal costs as explained previously.

Rigid Hull Inflatable Boat

Rigid Hull Inflatable Boats are the vessel of choice for many operations based on shore or off larger vessels. Their speed makes them desirable for missions including diving, smuggling inspections, mine countermeasures, and SEAL operations [92]. The current 11m long RHIB in use by the U.S. Navy displaces 7.8 tonnes and is manned

84 by three officers and transports a SEAL team [93]. I estimated total R&D costs to be $7.3 million ($7.0 million FY2011), as this is the development budget for the new combat craft, medium (CCM), which is slated to replace the current RHIB [94] as it reaches the end of its 20-year service life [92]. Including support equipment, procurement costs are $1.3 million each ($1.1 million FY2005) [95], and noting their wide-spread use in special forces operations, I estimated a 200 unit production run [92]. I calculated personnel and other O&S costs as explained previously. I calculated fuel as explained, and then added a multiplier of 10 due to the inefficiency of small engines and the high sustained speeds of the RHIB [93]. Because of their small size, I estimated disposal costs to be $10,000 [93].

B.1.3 Hourly Ship Costs

To determine the cost of a ship during a mission, I calculated the daily and then the hourly cost of each ship. The Navy deploys its ships for approximately 6 months every two years [96]. Including other training and non-deployment operations, I estimated that a Navy ship is in use for approximately 1/3 of a year, or 122 days. To find the daily operating cost, I divided the annual life-cycle cost by 122 days. To find the hourly rate, I divided the daily cost by 24 hours, since during deployment ships operate 24 hours per day. I present the hourly cost of the ships in 2013 dollars in Table B.3.

B.2 UUVs

I calculated the hourly costs of class-representative UUVs using their capital costs, research costs, maintenance costs, and energy use. I also calculated ship utilization rates to determine the cost of ship time in using UUVs. I completed these calculations for battery-powered and aluminum-powered UUVs. Unmanned underwater vehicle characteristics and costs are presented in thousands of 2013 dollars in Table B.4. Hourly costs in 2013 dollars and utilization rates for each UUV class are presented in Table B.5.

85 Table B.3: Ship Costs per Hour

Vessel Class Cost per Hour MCM-1 7,800 FFG-7 19,000 DDG-51 33,300 CG-47 43,800 LCS-1 15,600 SSN-774 41,500 LHA(R) 109,600 T-AGOS 14,300 Gotland 11,000 SWCS 1,100 RHIB 400

B.2.1 Energy Costs

Batteries

Batteries are charged from the ship's power grid, with electricity generated from the ship's boilers, which operate at approximately 70% efficiency and run on gasoline [97]. I found the cost per liter of gasoline using oil costs of $94 per barrel [98], and the Navy's gasoline multiplier of 3.2 [74]. I then calculated the number of liters needed per UUV recharge based on the energy density of gasoline (30 MJ/L [99]), the boiler's efficiency, and the UUV battery capacity. I calculated the cost of fuel per recharge and then the energy cost per day based on the number of recharges per day for the UUV (mission duration divided by 24 hours). I found hourly fuel costs by dividing the daily fuel cost by 24 hours, and the annual fuel cost by the expected annual service time of 120 days [96].

Aluminum

The aluminum-based power system is refueled using a prepackaged fuel source placed in the body of the UUV. Using industrial aluminum bb's weighing 0.3 g each and costing $29 per 2500 [100], and the energy density of aluminum (83.8 MJ/L) and

86 Table B.4: Unmanned Underwater Vehicle Characteristics and Costs Class Man-portable Light-weight Heavy-weight Large Glider Vehicle REMUS 100 REMUS 600 Bluefin 21 LDUUV Z-Ray Spray UUV Characteristics Diameter (m) 0.19 0.32 0.53 1.27 N/A 0.20 Battery capacity (kWh) 1 11.3 13.5 48.7 1.7 4.9 Battery 22 70 25 28 4320 7920 Mission duration (hr) Aluminum 218 685 247 279 N/A N/A Number of units 100 100 48 35 5 50 20 20 20 20 00 Expected service life (yrs) 20 20 UUV Costs Procurement 1,218 2,800 2,543 8,229 1,500 32 R&D 800 800 3,125 11,657 4,000 100 Maintenance 621 1,428 1,297 3,456 765 17 Battery 1 4 13 43 0 74 Energy Aluminum 1,047 1,168 1,562 2,801 N/A N/A Battery 2,640 5,032 6,978 23,354 6,265 227 Total Aluminum 3,686 6,196 8,526 26,143 N/A N/A Battery 132 252 349 1,169 313 11 Annual Aluminum 184 310 426 1,307 N/A N/A Table B.5: UUV Hourly Costs and Ship Utilization Rates UUV Cost per hour Utilization Tship Battery Aluminum REMUS 100 46 23% 2% REMUS 600 87 7% 1% Bluefin 21 121 20% 2% LDUUV 404 18% 1% Z-Ray 48 0.1% N/A Spray 1 0.1% N/A

density of aluminum (2.7 kg/L) I found the cost of the volume of aluminum needed to power the UUV to 10 times its battery-powered mission duration (one recharge). I assumed a final conversion efficiency of 25% (a fuel cell-based solution with 50% efficiency, using hydrogen, which accounts for 50% of the output of the aluminum- water reaction [101]). I also assumed an additional capital cost of $1.0 million for the aluminum power system. I found the daily recharge cost from the number of recharges per day (new mission endurance divided by 24 hours), and the hourly cost by dividing daily costs by 24 hours. The annual cost I found by multiplying the daily fuel cost by 120 days, the expected annual service time [96].

B.2.2 Ship Utilization Rate

For simplicity, I calculated the UUV rate of ship use Tship as

trecharge (B.1) tendurance where trecharge is the average recharging time of five hours [102] and tendurance is UUV mission endurance. When calculating mission costs, if the expected mission length was less than the UUV's capabilities, I used the mission length rather than the full UUV endurance. I estimated recharge time to be five hours for all classes and for both power systems (battery and aluminum).

When more than one UUV is used in a mission, I multiplied the usage rate by m,

88 where m = I (B.2) n k=1 and n is the number of UUVs in use by the ship, up to 100% ship utilization.

B.2.3 Man-portable Class

The REMUS 100, at 7.5 inches in diameter, is perhaps the most common UUV in use with the U.S. Navy, with 22 hours of endurance from a 1 kWh battery [12]. Expected annual usage is 33% [96]. Costing $1.2 million (FY2007 $1.1 million) each [103] and expected to serve 20 years, maintenance was estimated to be 51% of procurement costs [104], and research was estimated to be $80 million for over 100 vehicles.

B.2.4 Light-weight Class

The 12-inch diameter REMUS 600 is a general purpose AUV with a 70-hour mission endurance [13] on a 11.3 kWh battery [105]. The REMUS 600 has an expected service life of 20 years [104], with estimated research costs of $80.0 million for over 100 vehicles and procurement costs of $2.8 million each [26]. The REMUS 600 has maintenance costs of 51% of capital costs ($1.4 million) and a 33% usage rate [96].

B.2.5 Heavy-weight Class

The Bluefin 21 is a 21-inch diameter AUV. The Knifefish, a variant of the Bluefin 21, is a joint project between General Dynamics and Bluefin that will enter service in 2017 at a capital cost of $2.5 million [106] with a lifespan of 20 years [104]. Research funding for an expected 48 units has been $150 million [107], and maintenance costs are estimated to be 51% of capital costs, at $1.3 million [104]. The Bluefin 21 has 13.5 kWh batteries [3] to power it on 25-hour missions [3] with an annual usage rate of 33% [96].

89 B.2.6 Large Class

Boeing's Echo Ranger is a large, 50-inch diameter UUV, representative of the new large diameter UUV (LDUUV) requirement for a long-endurance, large payload UUV. The Navy projects that when deployed, the LDUUV budget will total $1.2 billion with 35 units [104]. Procurement costs will be 24%, at $8.2 million each, and a total of $408 million is going to research and development [104]. Maintenance will be 42% of procurement costs at $3.5 million and the expected service life will be 20 years [104]. The Echo Ranger currently has a 28-hour mission endurance [4] from 26.0 kWh batteries. I estimated the battery capacity as the sum of propulsive power, hotel load, and sensor power times the vehicle endurance. I calculated propulsive power Pp as

PP= 2 C (B.3) where p is the density of water (1027 kg/M 3), A is the reference area (in this case, the cross-sectional area of the vehicle, as given by A = rd 2/4), p is the propulsive efficiency (estimated to be 0.87), v is the vehicle's velocity (the LDUUV travels at an average of 3 kts [4]) and Cd is the drag coefficient (estimated to be 0.13) [47]. I calculated hotel load from the estimated REMUS 600 hotel load of 30W [101], scaled by displacement (0.33 tonnes REMUS 600 [13], 5.3 tonnes Echo Ranger [4]). Sensor power is estimated to be 150 W [108] and operative 66% of the mission time. The LDUUV expected usage rate is 33% [96].

B.2.7 Z-Ray Glider

The Z-Ray glider, also known as the Liberdade glider, is an advanced, flying-wing- shaped ocean glider with a significantly greater lift-to-drag ratio than other glider designs (allowing also for greater speeds), with research funding estimated to be a total of $20 million over 5 units [7]. Estimated to cost $1.5 million, the Z-Ray can stay at sea for six months with an annual utilization of 75% [16] and an expected service life of 20 years [104]. Maintenance costs are 51% of procurement costs at $765,000 [104], and battery capacity is 1.7 kWh [47, 109].

90 Table B.6: Other Mission Resource Costs per Hour

Resource Cost per Hour Inspection Team 1,657 In-water Survey Team 5,715 AUV or ROV Operator 72 Navy SEAL 586 Dolphin 314

B.2.8 Spray Glider

The Spray glider (7.9-inch diameter) is manufactured by Bluefin Robotics and costs $32,000 (FY2002 $25,000) [110], with over 50 units estimated to be in use. Using a 4.9 kWh battery [6], the Spray can operate for 330 days [110], with an expected service life of 20 years [104] and annual utilization of 95% [96, 110]. Each recharge costs $3,700 (FY2002 $2,850) [110], maintenance is 51% of procurement costs at $17,000 [104], and research costs were estimated to be $5 million.

B.3 Other Mission Resource Costs

Hourly costs for diving teams, Navy SEAL operators, and Navy dolphins are presented in 2013 dollars in Table B.6

B.3.1 Diving Teams

I calculated diver hourly costs and equipment costs using Oceaneering's (an oil industry underwater service company) standard rate book [5]. For drug and limpet mine inspection divers, I used the onshore NDT inspection air diver daily cost of $797 (FY2012 $784) and divided by eight hours to find the hourly cost. In addition to a team of five divers, inspections require a dive leader, whose hourly cost I estimated as that of a diving supervisor at $814 (FY2012 $800) divided by eight hours. For equipment costs, I used the shallow air equipment package cost of $651 (FY2012 $640) and divided by eight hours. To calculate the total cost per hour

91 per diver, I added the diver hourly costs to the equipment hourly costs (for each of the six divers). Finally, I estimated a surface-based inspection chief hourly cost from the $1,556 (FY2012 $1,530) daily cost of a project manager, divided by eight hours. The total hourly team cost (five divers, a diving leader, and an inspection chief, and a RHIB [111]) is $1,657.

For in-water survey ship inspection divers, the Navy employs a team of 15 divers, two diving supervisors, two inspection supervisors, one operations officer, and one supply officer [112]. To find the diver costs, I used the offshore NDT inspection air diver daily cost of $1,195 (FY2012 $1,175) and divided by eight hours. I estimated the two diving supervisors hourly costs from that of offshore air diving supervisors at $1,246 (FY2012 $1,225) and divided by eight hours. I found the hourly costs for the inspection supervisors based on the offshore project managers daily cost of $2,342 (FY2012 $2,303) and divided by eight hours. I found the hourly costs of the operating officer from the daily cost of an offshore superintendent at $2,114 (FY2012 $2,078) and divided by eight hours. To find the supply officer's hourly cost, I took the offshore non-diving supervisor daily cost of $1,451 (FY2012 $1,426) and divided by eight hours. For equipment costs, I used the shallow air equipment package cost of $651 (FY2012 $640) and divided by eight hours for all diving personnel. To calculate the total cost per hour per diver, I added the diver hourly costs to the equipment hourly costs. The total team cost per hour (21 personnel and two RHIB) is $5,715.

B.3.2 AUV and ROV Operators

Using Oceaneering's rate books, I estimated the cost of an AUV or ROV operator to be $880 per day (FY2012 $865), or $73 per hour over a 12-hour day [5]. I used one operator per AUV or ROV in my calculations.

B.3.3 Navy SEAL Operators

For Navy SEAL operators, I used the offshore saturation diver daily cost of $3,727 (FY2012 $3,664) (to account for their diver training and opportunity cost) and divided

92 by 12 hours. To account for equipment costs (including diving equipment, weaponry, etc.), I used the saturation equipment daily cost of $3,054 (FY2012 $3,002) and divided by 12 hours. I also included the $544,000 (FY2009 $500,000) cost of training a SEAL [113] spread over their six-year service commitment [114]. To calculate the total cost per hour per diver, I added the diver hourly costs to the equipment hourly costs. To arrive at Navy SEAL costs per hour of $586, I summed diver hourly costs, equipment hourly costs, and training hourly cost.

B.3.4 Navy Marine Mammal Program

Since its inception in the 1950s, the Navy's $29.1 million (FY2011 $28 million) per year Marine Mammal Program has trained dolphins and sea lions for a variety of missions, including harbor protection and swimmer interception, object retrieval from the seafloor, and mine countermeasures missions [115]. The Navy currently uses 75 dolphins and 35 sea lions in its program [116]. I calculated the division of costs to each animal type based on weight. Dolphins average 500 kg [117] and sea lions average 140 kg [118], resulting in an annual cost of $344,000 per year per dolphin.

I calculated the daily cost per dolphin for use in mine countermeasure missions by using a 25% utilization factor [96] over a 365-day year and calculated hourly costs of $314 by dividing by 12 hours.

93 94 Appendix C

Mission Cost Calculations

C.1 Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR)

C.1.1 CBNRE Detection and Localization

Manned System Operational Costs

Standard CBNRE missions employ T-AGOS ocean surveillance ships to measure water quality, track plumes, and assess the extent of contamination, costing $14,000 per hour. Over a representative deployment of 14 days, a T-AGOS ship will gather 10 water column profiles per hour using a towed underwater mass spectrometer [481, at

an estimated ship utilization of 80% (as the ship can tow other instruments simultaneously, but other missions are difficult to accomplish while towing). The total mission cost is $3,842,000. A total of 3,360 profiles are made over the course of the

mission, for a cost of $1,100 per profile.

UUV Operational Costs

REMUS 600 - Batteries The REMUS 600 (costing $80 per hour, with an AUV

operator costing $73 per hour) could be used as a platform (launched from a T-AGOS

ship) for an underwater mass spectrometer taking 10 water profiles per hour [48] over

95 the same 14-day period. With three vehicles deployed, the T-AGOS ship (costing $14,300 per hour) utilization would be 13%. The ship is able to use the rest of its availability to complete other missions. A total of 9,960 profiles would be collected, for a cost of $79 per profile, which is 7% of the ship-based cost per profile. The total mission cost would be $791,000, which is 21% of ship-based operational costs. Of the total, the ship accounts for 80% of the costs, while the REMUS vehicles account for 20% of the cost.

REMUS 600 - Aluminum Using REMUS 600 vehicles in the same circumstances outlined above, but with aluminum power sources (costing $107 per hour), I calculated a ship utilization rate of 2%. The total cost of the mission would then be $287,000, which is 7% of ship-based mission costs, and 36% of mission costs using battery- powered REMUS 600 vehicles. Ship costs account for 37% of the mission, and the REMUS vehicles account for 63%. The cost per profile falls to $28, which is 2% of ship-based costs per profile.

C.1.2 Water Column Profiling

Manned System Operational Costs

Profiling the water column for battle-space preparation and intelligence falls to T- AGOS ships using CTD (conductivity, temperature, depth) casts and helicopter- deployed XBTs (expendable bathythermographs). During Exercise SHAREM 150, a 2005 U.S. Navy exercise, 19 CTD and 367 XBT traces were taken over 22 days [47, 53]. I estimated T-AGOS ($14,000 per hour) utilization to be 25% over that time period, and aircraft carrier ($2,893,000 per hour) utilization to be 5% (for helicopter use). The total mission cost was $4,780,000, or $12,000 per profile.

UUV Operational Costs

During the aforementioned Exercise SHAREM 150, ocean gliders were used to supple- ment shipboard operations and test autonomous systems. Over the 22-day exercise

96 (the gliders were not serviced during that time), a team of four gliders (costing $1 per hour, plus $73 per hour each for AUV operators) took 4,782 profiles at varying depths [53]. The gliders were launched from a T-AGOS ship costing $14,000 per hour with a total utilization of 2%. In total, the mission cost $190,000, which is 2% of ship-based costs. Of the total, 78% of costs came from ship costs, and 22% came from glider costs. Each profile cost $40, or 0.2% of the cost per profile of ship-based operations.

C.1.3 Near-land and Harbor Monitoring

Manned System Operational Costs

Clandestine monitoring of high-value targets is accomplished using a team of six Navy SEAL operators (each costing $586 per hour) [91] traveling using a SWCS ($1,100 per hour) launched from an SSN-774 ($42,000 per hour) [51]. I assumed eight hours of travel each way [52] at a speed of 5 kts [119] over a standoff distance of 40 nm. A loiter time at the target of four hours [51] gives a total mission time of 20 hours (stretching the limits of human endurance). To direct the mission and ensure the safety and recoverability of the prosecuting SEAL team, an aircraft carrier (costing $110,000 per hour) providing air support and a backup rescue SEAL team waits offshore. I

assumed 90% utilization of the submarine and 70% utilization of the aircraft carrier, as human lives are at stake in a high-risk mission. The total mission cost is $2,374,000, with 96% of costs accounted for by ship use. The cost per loiter-hour at the target is $594,000. To achieve a loiter time at the target of 24 hours (representative of detailed intelligence on a target), six missions would be required, for a total cost of $14,244,000. For a hypothetical long-term monitoring operation of 14 days, a mission requiring insertion and recovery of the SEAL team, the total cost would be $6,089,000. The $3,515 per hour six-man SEAL team would be inserted through a six-hour mission

(requiring 90% of a $110,000 per hour aircraft carrier) and would require 10% carrier utilization during their 14-day mission for oversight and possible mission abortion

97 and recovery. The cost per loiter-hour in this instance would be $18,000, with high risk to human life and mission failure. Such a mission would be difficult to complete with current resources.

UUV Operational Costs

REMUS 600 - Batteries An REMUS 600 vehicle (costing $87 per hour, plus $73 per hour for an operator) launched from a SSN-774 (costing $42,000 per hour) can accomplish similar intelligence-gathering missions (battle-space preparation for insertion and landing, port conditions, etc.). For a loiter time of four hours, the total mission length is 31 hours, and submarine utilization is 16%. Total mission cost is $212,000, which is 9% of the cost of completing the mission using Navy SEAL operators, and with no risk to human life. Of the total cost, 98% goes toward ship use, and 2% to REMUS operation. The cost per loiter-hour is $53,000, which is 9% of the original cost per loiter-hour. For a full intelligence gathering mission requiring 24 hours of loiter time, the mission length would be 51 hours, submarine utilization would fall to 10%, and the total cost would be $216,000, which is 2% of the cost of completing the same 24 hours of loiter time using Navy SEAL teams. The cost per loiter-hour would be $9,000. Of the total cost, ship use would account for 96% of costs, and 4% would be accounted for by the REMUS vehicle.

REMUS 600 - Aluminum Completing the hypothetical long-term, 14-day intelligence operation would require a REMUS 600 equipped with an aluminum power source (costing $107 per hour, plus $73 per hour for an operator). Total mission length would be 363 hours, submarine utilization would be 1%, and total mission cost would be $266,000, which is 5% of the cost of the long-term monitoring operation using an inserted Navy SEAL team (and 2% of the cost of a 24-hour loiter operation using SEALs). Of the total cost, 78% is for ship use, and 22% is for REMUS operation. No human lives would be put at risk, and mission failure would result simply in the loss of a replaceable $2.8 million vehicle. Cost per loiter-hour would be $791, which

98 is 0.1% of the original cost per loiter-hour.

C.1.4 Array Deployment

Manned System Operational Costs

In 2003, teams of four Navy SEALs completed a series of missions deploying cameras in Somalia for intelligence purposes [51]. The SEALs (each costing $586 per hour)

[91] traveled using an SDV (similar to a SWCS and costing $1,100 per hour) launched from an SSN-774 ($42,000 per hour) [51]. They travelled eight hours each way [52] at a speed of 5 kts [119] over a standoff distance of approximately 40 nm. Their average time at the target deploying the cameras was three hours [51] giving a total mission time of 19 hours. To direct the mission and ensure the safety and recoverability of the prosecuting SEAL team, an aircraft carrier (costing $110,000 per hour) providing air support and a backup rescue SEAL team awaited offshore. I assumed 90% utilization of the submarine and 70% utilization of the aircraft carrier, as human lives are at stake in a high-risk mission. I calculated the total mission cost to be $2,233,000, with

97% of costs accounted for by ship use. I found the cost per installation hour at the target to be $744,000.

UUV Operational Costs

The U.S. Navy envisions using the LDUUV to deploy sensor arrays for battle-space preparation to lighten the load on special forces operators [47]. An LDUUV (costing

$404 per hour, plus $73 per hour for an operator) would travel at 3 kts to its target and loiter for an estimated one hour for array installation (automated arrays would deploy rapidly). The total mission time would be 28 hours, the current limit of

LDUUV endurance, and ship utilization would be 18%. I calculated that the total mission cost would be $271,000, which is 12% of Navy SEAL operations, and with no risk to human life. Ship usage is 77% of the total costs, and LDUUV operation is

23%. The cost per installation hour would be $270,000, which is 36% of that of Navy

SEAL operations.

99 C.1.5 Bathymetry

Manned System Operational Costs

Bathymetric surveys are completed using T-AGOS ships (costing $14,000 per hour) towing Orion side scan sonar tow fish at a speed of 2 knots [56]. The tow fish takes two hours for deployment and recovery [33]. I estimated ship usage to be 90%, and

I assumed a 20% penalty for turning between tracklines. Swath widths depend on the resolution required: 300 m for torpedo-sized objects (high-resolution), 1,800 m for aircraft debris fields (medium-resolution), and 3,000 m for bathymetry [56] (low- resolution). I analyzed mission costs for each of the three resolution situations, and in each situation, the cost of the ship represented 100% of mission costs.

For the high-resolution bathymetry mission mapping a representative area of 20

2 km [33], the floor mapping rate is 1 km 2 per hour, the total mission time is 25 hours, and the total costs are $317,000, or $16,000 per km 2 mapped.

For the medium-resolution bathymetry mission mapping a representative area of

6000 km2 [57], the floor mapping rate is 6.5 km 2 per hour, the total mission time is

1,100 hours (46 days), and the total mission costs are $14,324,000, or $2,387 per km 2 mapped.

For the low-resolution bathymetry mission mapping a representative area of 17,000 km 2 [57], the floor mapping rate is 11 km 2 per hour, the total mission time is 1,900 hours (66 days), and the total mission costs are $24,330,000, or $1,431 per km 2 mapped.

UUV Operational Costs

For each of the resolution situations, the swath of the AUV was assumed to be half that of the tow fish, based on a high-resolution swath width of 150 m for the MBARI

Dorado vessel [33]. REMUS 600 vehicles are launched from T-AGOS vessels (costing

$14,000 per hour), travel at 3 kts, require two hours for ascent and descent [33], and require AUV operators costing $73 per hour. Total mission time was calculated as the time needed to map the area, plus two hours for initial ascent and descent, plus seven

100 hours for each recharge cycle needed during the mission (five hours for recharging, two hours for ascent and descent).

REMUS 600 - Batteries A battery-powered REMUS 600 costs $87 per hour with a 70-hour endurance.

For the high-resolution bathymetry mission, ship usage is 19%, line spacing is 150 m [33], and the floor mapping rate is 0.8 km 2 per hour. The total mission time is 27 hours and the total mission costs are $76,000, or $3,787 per km 2 mapped. The costs are 24% of the cost of ship-based operations. Of the total mission costs, ship usage

accounts for 94%, and UUV operation accounts for 6%.

For the medium-resolution bathymetry mission, ship usage is 13%, line spacing is

900 m, and the floor mapping rate is 5 km 2 per hour. The total mission time is 456

hours (19 days) and the total mission costs are $1,070,000, or $178 per km 2 mapped.

The costs are 7% of the cost of ship-based operations. Of the total mission costs, ship

usage accounts for 80%, and UUV operation accounts for 20%.

For the low-resolution bathymetry mission, ship usage is 13%, line spacing is 1,500

m, and the floor mapping rate is 8 km 2 per hour. The total mission time is 772 hours

(32 days) and the total mission costs are $1,813,000, or $107 per km 2 mapped. The

costs are 7% of the cost of ship-based operations. Of the total mission costs, ship

usage accounts for 80%, and UUV operation accounts for 20%.

REMUS 600 - Aluminum An aluminum-powered REMUS 600 costs $107 per

hour with a 685-hour endurance. In the medium and low-resolution situations, ship

usage is 2%, and accounts for 37% of mission costs, while UUV operation accounts

for 63% of mission costs. Due to the short mission time demanded by the high-res

mission's representative area, the aluminum-powered REMUS was not analyzed for

that situation.

For the medium-resolution bathymetry situation, total mission time is 411 hours

and total mission costs are $352,000, or $59 per km 2 mapped. Costs are 2% of ship-

based operations, and 33% of missions using battery-powered REMUS vehicles.

101 For the low-resolution bathymetry situation, total mission time is 709 hours and total mission costs are $517,000, or $30 per km 2 mapped. Mission costs are 2% of ship-based operations, and 29% of missions using battery-powered REMUS vehicles.

C.1.6 Mine Detection, Classification, Identification, and Neu- tralization

REMUS 100 vehicles were used during the 2003 invasion of Iraq to hunt mines in key ports. In one such exercise, an AUV hunted 100 mines in 16 hours [120], completing the work of 16 divers [55]. Assuming 12 hours per diving work day, it would take 256 hours to hunt 100 mines, yielding 2.5 man-hours per mine, versus 0.2 UUV-hours per mine.

Manned System Operational Costs

An MCM vessel (costing $8,000 per hour, and assuming 90% utilization) serves as a base of operations for a team of four [121] Navy SEAL divers (costing $586 per hour) performing mine-hunting operations using an MCM trained dolphin (costing $314 per hour) and a RHIB (costing $374 per hour). The cost per man-hour is $2,500, and it costs $6,500 to detect, classify, and identify a mine.

UUV Operational Costs

An LCS (costing $16,000 per hour, with a 20% utilization rate) will use the Knifefish

(costing $121 per hour, plus $73 per hour for an operator) to hunt mines at a total cost of $3,300 per hour. A mine will cost $529 to detect, classify, and identify, which is 8% of the mission cost using a diving team.

102 C.2 Anti-submarine Warfare (ASW)

C.2.1 Hold-at-risk

Manned System Operational Costs

For a representative mission duration of 28 days, using an attack submarine (costing

$45,000 per hour with an estimated utilization of 75%) to monitor an enemy port or a submarine choke-point of any size would cost a total of $20,917,000, or $31,000 per loiter-hour.

UUV Operational Costs

To determine the number of underwater vehicles needed to patrol a choke-point to guarantee submerged submarine detection, I first calculated the probability of detection Pdetection as

Pdetection ttarget/tbarrier- (C.1)

The time the target is in the barrier ttarget is

ttarget - 'Wbarrier (C.2)

where Wbarrier is the width of the barrier (twice the detection range of the AUV) in nautical miles and Vsub is the speed of the exiting submarine (assumed to be 5 kts

[47]). The time taken by the AUV to cover the barrier tbarrier is

t arrier 1 barrier (C.3) 60Vauv where lbarrier is the length of the barrier and Vauv is the speed of the patrolling AUV

[47]. If the probability of detection was less than 100%, I found the number of UUVs needed to ensure barrier coverage and a 100% probability of exiting submarine detection [471. As a representative barrier, I took lbarrier to be 5 nm and Vsub to be 5 kts

103 [47]. I assumed a stand-off distance of the UUV-launching ship to be 50 nm (the distance the USNS Impeccable was from Hainan Island in the South China Sea when an incident occurred with Chinese naval and civilian vessels [122]).

REMUS 600 - Batteries For REMUS 600 vehicles (costing $87 per hour, plus

$73 per hour for an operator for each vehicle), I estimated Vau, to be 3 kts [13] and the detection range to be 2 nm (yielding a Wbarrier of 4 nm) [123]. My calculations yielded a Pdetection of 48%, requiring three vehicles for full coverage. If the REMUS 600 is launched from a $14,000 per hour T-AGOS vessel (a ship commonly used for anti-submarine activities [71]), I calculated the transit time to and from the barrier location to be 33 hours, resulting in a 37 hour loiter time. Ship utilization would be 14%. Monitoring the barrier for 28 days requires 19 trips by the three-vehicle team. The total mission cost would be $1,896,000, which is 9% of the cost of submarine- based hold-at-risk missions. Of the total cost, the ship accounts for 66% and the

UUVs account for 34%. I calculated that the cost per loiter-hour would be $2,800, which is 9% of the per loiter-hour cost using a submarine.

REMUS 600 - Aluminum Using the same speed, team size, stand-off distance, and detection range assumptions as in the battery-powered REMUS 600 case, I calculated that for REMUS 600 vehicles using aluminum power (costing $107 per hour, plus $73 per hour for an operator for each vehicle), loiter time would be 652 hours, and a team of three vessels would need to make only two trips for the entire 28-day monitoring period. I calculated a ship utilization rate of 1%, resulting in a total mission cost of $867,000, of which 15% come from ship use and 85% come from the REMUS 600 vessels. The mission costs would be 4% of those using a submarine, and 46% of those using battery-powered REMUS 600 vessels. The cost per loiter-hour would be $1,334, 4% of the cost per loiter-hour using a submarine.

Z-Ray Glider The Z-Ray glider (costing $48 per hour, plus $73 for a technician for each glider) was originally designed for use in hold-at-risk type missions. Launched

104 from a T-AGOS ship (costing $14,000 per hour), gliding at Vau of 2 kts [16], and with a detection range of 1 nm (the Z-Ray is a lower power vehicle than the REMUS

600) [123] yield a Wbarrier of 2 nm, I calculated Pdetection to be 16%. Seven gliders would be needed to cover the barrier, and 50 hours would be needed to cover the aforementioned stand-off distance. The team of seven gliders would need to make only one trip (their loiter time being the full 672 hours), and ship utilization would be 2%. The total mission cost would be $782,000, which is 4% of submarine hold- at-risk costs, 41% of battery-powered REMUS costs, and 90% of aluminum-powered REMUS costs. The cost per loiter-hour would be $1,164, which is 4% of the loiter- hour costs of a submarine. Of the total costs, the ship costs would be 22%, and the glider costs would be 78%.

C.2.2 ASW Training

Manned System Operational Costs

I assumed a representative two-day training mission. Using a Gotland-class submarine (costing $11,000 per hour), the total cost of the training exercise is $527,000. Using a SSN-774 (costing $42,000 per hour), the total cost of the training exercise is $1,992,000.

UUV Operational Costs

MK-39 EMATT The MK-39 expendable mobile anti-submarine training target (EMATT) is a common ASW training UUV, costs $3,500 (FY2007 $3,100) per unit [47] (plus $73 per hour for an operator), and provides seven hours of training time, mimicking the motion and sound signature of a potential target submarine [63]. I assumed launch from a frigate ($19,000 per hour), a common ASW vessel [124]. For two days of training, seven EMATT units would be needed, and ship utilization would be 14% (calculated as the one hour estimated preparation and launch time, the seven- hour training period, assuming one EMATT is used at a time). Total mission cost would be $158,000, 30% of the cost of training with a Gotland submarine, and 8%

105 of the cost of training with a SSN-774. Of the total cost, the ship accounts for 82%, and the EMATTs account for 18%.

REMUS 600 - Batteries Outfitted with the appropriate equipment, a REMUS 600 (costing $87 per hour, plus $73 per hour for an operator) could also serve as an ASW training target. Only one REMUS would need to be used, with no recharging needed. Also launched from a frigate ($19,000 per hour), with a ship utilization of 10%, the total cost per mission would be $102,000, which is 19% of the cost of training using a Gotland submarine, 5% of the cost of training using a SSN-774, and 65% of the cost of training using EMATTs. Of the total costs, 93% go toward ship use for the UUV, and 7% go toward UUV operation.

C.3 Inspection and Identification (I&I)

C.3.1 In-water Survey and Hull Inspection

A Panamax ship (the largest ship that can travel through the Panama Canal [125]) can transport 4,000 TEU (twenty-foot equivalent unit, a standard cargo measure) and costs $9 million per year to operate [126]. The cost per TEU on the 35-day London to Singapore route [127] is approximately $1,200 (though per-TEU rates change seasonally) [128]. I assumed 100% annual ship utilization, and found the total Panamax value (operating costs plus freight opportunity costs) per hour to be $6,700. I found the wetted surface area As, or the area which inspection divers must cover during an in-water survey, as the mean of the Froude, Haslar, and Denny-Mumford formulae for As [129]. Taking V as the volume of water displaced, L as ship length, T as ship draft, and B as ship beam (all in meters), Froude finds

As = V2/3 1/3 (C.4)

Haslar finds

As = V 2 / 3 . 3 ) (C.5) (2.09V1/3

106 and Denny-Mumford finds As = L (1.7T + BCb), (C.6) where

C = (C.7) LBT and V = D (C.8) 0.98 where Dw is ship displacement in tonnes. I found the wetted surface area As of Panamax and DDG-51 destroyer as representative vessels to be inspected. For a Panamax vessel, L is 290 m, B is 32 m, T is 12 m, and Dw is 60,000 tonnes [125]. Panamax As is 10,900 m2 . For a DDG-51 destroyer, L is 142 m, B is 18 m, T is 9

2 m, and D, is 8,800 tonnes [130]. DDG-51 destroyer As is 3,000 M .

Manned System Operational Costs

Inspecting a ship hull for attached drug containers or limpet mines takes a total of approximately 2 hours (for inspection, safety checks, etc.) [131] and is accomplished by a team of six divers costing $1,657 per hour. The total cost of the inspection for a Panamax is $17,000, of which 20% is the cost of the dive team, and 80% is the cost of the inspected ship. For a DDG-51 destroyer, the inspection costs $70,000, of which 5% is for the inspection team, and 95% is ship opportunity costs. A full inspection diving team (costing $5,715) will inspect a ship by swimming back and forth in a row to cover the entire hull. I estimated diver swim speed to be 0.25 kt [67], their side-to-side coverage to be 1 m (visibility is poor in harbor situations), and a safety-factor of two (divers essentially have to cover the ship twice to ensure full, safe coverage). The team will cover 3,500 m 2 per hour, and I estimated diving and ship inspection prep time to be 2 hours. A Panamax vessel will take a total of 5 hours to inspect, costing a total of $64,000, or $6 per m 2 inspected. Of the total cost, 54% is ship opportunity costs and 46% is diving team costs. A DDG-51 destroyer will take a total of 3 hours to inspect, costing a total of $112,000, or $37

107 per m2 . Of the total cost, ship opportunity costs account for 85%, and inspection team costs account for 15%.

UUV Operational Costs

A basic ship bottom inspection for attached objects is routinely completed using small ROVs [67]. Such an ROV costs $1,424 (FY2012 $1,200) per day [5], plus an operator costing $73 per hour, a project manager costing $195 per hour, and an RHIB at $374 per hour. The total cost per hour is $953, and each inspection takes approximately an hour [131]. The inspection time is less since few safety precautions must be taken, and the ROV can move quickly and focus more easily on trouble areas than a diver.

The total cost of inspection is $8,000, which is 46% of diver-based inspection costs.

Of the total cost, 88% is attributed to ship opportunity cost, and 12% is for ROV operation. For a DDG-51 destroyer, the total cost is $34,000, which is 49% of a diver- based inspection. Of the total cost for a destroyer inspection using an ROV, 3% is for ROV operation, and 97% is for ship opportunity costs.

The Bluefin HAUV (hovering AUV) is designed for autonomous in-water surveys, and is estimated to cost approximately the same per hour as a Bluefin 21 UUV ($121 per hour), plus two operators for each HAUV [132] at $73 per hour per operator and a project manager at $195 per hour. The HAUV can scan ship hulls at a rate of

50 m 2/min [133], and I assumed that two robots are in use at once and inspection preparation time is one hour [134], for a total cost per hour of $823. Two HAUVs can inspect a Panamax in three hours with a total cost of $21,000, which is 33% of the cost of using a diving team. Of the total cost, 88% represents ship opportunity costs, and 12% represents HAUV use. Cost per m 2 inspected is $2. Inspecting a DDG-51 destroyer takes 1.5 hours with a total cost of $51,000, which is 46% of the cost of a diver inspection. The ship opportunity cost is 97% of the total cost, and HAUV operation is 3%. The cost per m 2 is $17.

108 C.3.2 Monitoring undersea infrastructure

Manned System Operational Costs

Cables are inspected by towing inspection ROVs behind T-AGOS equivalent ships

(costing $14,000 per hour). The ROV (and thus the accompanying ship) is limited to a speed of 4 knots during inspection [135]. Mapping a representative distance of 400 km (a distance mapped by the Aqua Explorer 2000 AUV [70]) takes 54 hours.

It takes about an hour for the vehicle to reach the seafloor where inspections are to take place [33] and an hour to return to the surface, resulting in a total mission time of 56 hours. A ship utilization of 90% results in total mission costs of $730,000, or

$1,800 per kilometer of cable inspected. ROV operation costs were not considered.

If a longer representative distance of 4065 km is to be inspected (the distance from

Nova Scotia to Ireland), the total mission time is 550 hours, and the total mission cost is $7,077,000, or $1,741 per kilometer.

UUV Operational Costs

REMUS 600 - Batteries A battery-powered REMUS 600 vehicle (costing $87 per hour, plus $73 per hour for an operator), launched from a $14,000 per hour T-

AGOS type ship [136], could map the 400 km distance in 74 hours moving at 3 knots.

The Aqua Explorer 2000 demonstrated such a capability in 2000 [70]. With an ascent and descent time totaling two hours [33], and accounting for a recharge during the mission, the total mission time would be 86 hours, and the ship utilization 7%. The mission cost would total $102,000, which is 14% of ship-based costs. Of the total cost, the ship accounts for 86%, and the AUV accounts for 14%. Per kilometer costs would be $254, or 14% of ship-based per kilometer inspection costs.

REMUS 600 - Aluminum When using an aluminum-powered REMUS 600 vehicle ($107 per hour, plus $73 per hour for an operator), much longer distances can be inspected (such as the aforementioned stretch from Nova Scotia to Ireland) at even lower costs. A single AUV would need a recharge during the mission, for a total

109 mission time of 765 hours and ship utilization of 1%. The mission cost would total $218,000, which is 3% of the cost for ship-based inspections (and 20% of a similar mission completed using a battery-powered REMUS vehicle). Of the mission costs, the ship accounts for 37% and the REMUS 63%. The cost per kilometer inspected is $54, which is 3% of the cost per kilometer inspect by a ship with an ROV.

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