Curtailing Illicit and Terrorist Activity in Algeria's Tamanrasset

AUGUST 2008 . VOL 1 . ISSUE 9 Curtailing Illicit and Nevertheless (or maybe because of this), where it is a visible symbol of the state. Algiers’ presence in Tamanrasset is very It has also recently opened a youth Terrorist Activity in palpable. In some ways, Tamanrasset center in the middle of town. Brand Algeria’s Tamanrasset has always been tied to the state. Unlike new housing blocks that now ring the Timbuktu or Kano, Tamanrasset is not a town are destined for current residents By Geoff D. Porter historic desert city. In the 19th century, of the unregulated shantytowns that it was a small but critical bastion in have been built during the last several although algerian terrorist groups France’s attempts to pacify the Algerian decades. Two-family units with small mostly undertake attacks against the desert. Following the pacification gardens in front, the projects are laid government in the north of the country, that lasted through the early 1920s, out on street grids with asphalt roads it is widely recognized that they have Tamanrasset was a trans-Saharan trade and electric street lights. exploited southern Algeria’s vast desert waypoint. Even then, it was more of to train and raise money.1 Apart from a large village than a small town. It Even more basic infrastructure is further several opportunistic kidnappings still had only between 4,000-5,000 reminder of Algiers’ hand in (and over) and murders during the last several residents in the 1960s. Today, the town Tamanrasset’s affairs. The state recently years, there has been little terrorism has grown to more than 100,000 people finished repaving the highway that proper in southern Algeria. Instead, and it has become an important regional connects Tamanrasset to the cities to the there is ample illicit activity. Some of commercial hub, an entrepot for people north and Mali and Niger to the south. these activities—gun-running, drug and goods transiting from sub-Saharan The soon to be completed water pipeline smuggling and human trafficking— Africa to the Mediterranean coast and from In Salah will bring Tamanrasset’s circumvent the state because they are from the coast to south of the Sahara. most fundamental commodity into the illegal.2 Others, such as contraband, For many sub-Saharans, it has even state’s remit and displace the private sidestep the state because taxes, tariffs, become a destination in its own right. water sellers. Recently, the state even and kickbacks erode profits. Because manifested itself in person. In January Islamist terrorist groups in the north of The most obvious indication of the state 2008, President Abdelaziz Bouteflika the country, such as the Salafist Group presence in current-day Tamanrasset is and his powerful interior minister, for Preaching and Combat (GSPC) the military. The 6th Division, which is Nourredine Zerhouni, paid an official and al-Qa`ida in the Islamic Maghreb responsible for patrolling the country’s visit to Tamanrasset. (AQIM), have historically profited from deep south and policing Algeria’s the south’s illicit activities, curtailing borders with Niger, Mali and Libya, is Tamanrasset’s Importance to the State them is a top priority of President based there. Troops are not conspicuous There are a lot of possible explanations Abdelaziz Bouteflika’s government. off the base and throughout town, why the state is so heavily invested in Increasingly easy access to the Sahara but the barracks on both sides of the Tamanrasset. The state’s rationale is and navigation through it, however, riverbed that cuts through town make that it is simply ensuring its citizens’ makes Bouteflika’s goal of expanding the military almost omnipresent. Its welfare and well-being. With record state control and choking the flow of presence is amplified (and enshrouded hard currency reserves (estimated at illicit funds to the north especially in mystery) by the half-finished military more than $150 billion, by far the most challenging. base next to Tamanrasset’s airport. in Africa, surpassing Egypt and South Africa combined), there is no shortage Algiers in Tamanrasset Algiers augments its projection of hard of money to build new infrastructure Some have observed that Algiers is closer power with a comprehensive soft power and expand public institutions.3 There to London than it is to Tamanrasset. campaign. In particular, it is building a are also more political explanations. Although technically untrue, it clearly large mosque complex on Tamanrasset’s Algiers is willing to devote significant conveys the sense of how far Tamanrasset highest point. The mosque succinctly resources to ensure that the south’s is from Algiers and how different the conveys the state’s intention to exercise Taoureg population remains loyal to the two cities are, not just geographically, influence, if not outright control, over Algerian state and does not seek common demographically, or economically, but Islamic activity in the city. Beyond cause with Taoureg groups in Niger and in makeup and outlook. While Algiers the mosque, the state also promotes Mali that have been problematic for is oriented toward Europe and the the activities of Sufi religious orders. those countries. Tamanrasset has also Middle East, Tamanrasset is geared These orders have historically been historically been an FLN stronghold. toward the south. Algiers clings to its politically powerful in the region and With Bouteflika trying to position Arab and Mediterranean identity, but the Tijaniyya in particular has proven to himself for a third presidential term Tamanrasset is Taoureg and Saharan. be a valuable supporter of Bouteflika’s (or an extended second term) and the National Liberation Front (FLN). Near National Democratic Rally making a the center of town, the state built a new resurgence, Bouteflika’s government 1 Information in this article is drawn from the author’s headquarters for the Association of wants to guarantee continued support discussions with current and retired members of the Al- Religious Orders (Jami`at al-Zawaya). for his party. Additionally, ever since gerian administration in Tamanrasset in May 2008 as the 1990s the state has sought to counter well as informal conversations with Tamanrasset resi- Outside the religious sphere, the state indications of increasing Islamist dents. is invested in the city’s secular life, 2 Jean-Luc Marret, “Al-Qaeda in Islamic Maghreb,” having recently finished a sprawling 3 Statistic compiled from Banque d’Algérie, IMF and Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 31:6 (2008): pp. 541-552. public university on the airport road EFG-Hermes. AUGUST 2008 . VOL 1 . ISSUE 9 influence, such as the wider prevalence assigned to Tamanrasset are from the back in. At any point, one can veer off of Islamist dress in Tamanrasset and north of the country and are generally one of Tamanrasset’s paved roads and closer adherence to Islamic rituals. rotated out of the region after only head for the hills and at any point one Lastly, the state is clearly concerned short service periods complicates can come bumping back to Tamanrasset. with illicit activities in and around the problems of personnel shortages. Another resident said that the gauge of Tamanrasset and their potential link to Troops at military checkpoints around local knowledge is never having to use AQIM. the city do not speak Tamahak (the local the same route into town as the one language), are unfamiliar with local used to leave it. Illicit Activities practices, and are intimidated by the Even with the state’s multilayered surrounding terrain. In the hinterland, the land is carved presence in town, the state does not exert with innumerable tracks. The more complete control over Tamanrasset’s Others have put forward more insidious prominent ones have been leveled with activities. Trans-Saharan truckers explanations for the lack of state presence a grader, others run up and down dry camp out under their trailers in the dry outside Tamanrasset, suggesting that riverbeds, and still others are no more riverbed in the center of town until they the local government is in cahoots with than camel paths. In riverbeds, drivers get a full load of goods to take back south smuggling mafias, or worse still with can reach 100 kilometers per hour, across the Sahara to Niger and Mali. Islamist terrorists themselves.5 The while on the camel paths speeds slow Contraband often gets mixed in with to less than 15 km/hr. On average, an legitimate freight. Nigerien and Malian experienced driver can make 40 km/ teenagers ranging around the streets in “Since the 1990s, the state hr in an unmodified diesel 4x4. Some the evening testify to the south’s fluid has sought to counter routes are well-traveled, crisscrossed borders. One security representative with dozens of tire tracks. Others are said that many entered Algeria illegally, indications of increasing not as well-used. At one point, a driver but are largely left alone as long as they Islamist influence, such said a faint set of tracks in a riverbed only stay for six or seven months and do were from his own truck when he last not try to head further north—after all, as the wider prevalence passed that way more than two months Tamanrasset’s state-fueled construction of Islamist dress in before. boom far outpaces the locally available labor and “the Africans” are valued Tamanrasset and closer During the last decade, GPS and satellite as hard workers. Informal banking adherence to Islamic phones have made desert travel easier, also points to the limitations of state but cell phone service has lowered the control. Most Tamanrasset residents rituals.” bar even further. A signal from the turn to storekeepers for their banking privately-owned cell phone service needs rather than the state banks.

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