Algeria–Mali Trade: the Normality of Informality

Algeria–Mali Trade: The Normality of Informality Sami Bensassi Anne Brockmeyer Mathieu Pellerin Gaël Raballand1 Abstract This paper estimates the volume of informal trade between Algeria and Mali and analyzes its determinants and mechanisms, using a multi-pronged methodology. First, we discuss how subsidy policies and the legal framework create incentives for informal trade across the Sahara. Second, we provide evidence of the importance of informal trade, drawing on satellite images and surveys with informal traders in Mali and Algeria. We estimate that the weekly turnover of informal trade fell from approximately US$ 2 million in 2011 to US$ 0.74 million in 2014, but continues to play a crucial role in the economies of northern Mali and southern Algeria. We also show that official trade statistics are meaningless in this context, as they capture less than 3% of total trade. Profit margins of 20-30% on informal trade contribute to explaining the relative prosperity of northern Mali. Informal trade probably plays a strong role in poverty reduction, especially in Kidal region. Finally, we provide qualitative evidence on informal trade actors and the governance and social impacts of informal trade in North Mali and South Algeria. JEL classification codes: F14, H26, J46. Keywords: informal trade, Algeria, Mali, fuel, customs. 1 The authors would like to thank Mehdi Benyagoub for his help on this study, Olivier François and Laurent Layrol for his work on satellite images, Nancy Benjamin, Thomas Cantens, Mombert Hoppe, Raju Singh and Olivier Walther and the participants of the presentation in the CREAD in Algiers on Jan. 25th 2015 for their comments and Sabra Ledent for editing. This work was supported by DFID funds under the Support to West Africa Regional Integration Program (SWARIP) window of the Multi Donor Trust Fund for Trade and Development phase II supported by Finland, Norway, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. The views expressed here are the authors’ and do not necessarily reflect those of the World Bank, their Executive Directors, or the countries they represent or those of DFID. All errors are our responsibility. 1 Introduction Informal trade is said to be essential to survival of the Saharan region. Among others, Scheele (2012) described with an anthropology approach, the channels of informal trade between Southern Algeria and Mali. Even if the border possesses a cartographic, administrative, and economic reality, familial and tribal links continue, making this region an environment particularly conducive to cross-border trade. For decades, informal trade has been largely tolerated on both sides of the border since, like in other regions of the world, it has enabled local populations, remote from capitals, to benefit from income generation and employment. However, the decades-old implicit consensus was broken down some years ago due to the reemergence of armed conflicts in Mali and the subsequent events in Algeria, such as In Amenas. The official closure of the Mali-Algeria border has created an unstable equilibrium. Therefore, studying informal trade enables to better understand the social and economic risks in Northern Mali. It is even more interesting that most studies on this topic do not generate data and therefore do not necessarily explain the potential losses of revenues for Mali, the extent of subsidies from Algeria to Mali and the potential poverty impact. 2 Therefore, this study seeks to evaluate informal trade between Algeria and Mali and its impact on economic development and governance in northern Mali. In this study, informal trade is defined as the flow of goods not reported or inadequately reported to customs authorities. Thus it encompasses two practices: first, the trade in goods through border posts for which false statements are made about the types or quantities of goods and, second, the smuggling of goods (i.e., when goods are passed unknown to customs authorities through or outside of border posts).2 From a methodological perspective, we used several approaches: mirror statistics, interviews of the various actors and the use of satellite images. This study was based on interviews during the spring 2014 in the sub-region and satellite pictures taken in March 2014. Contrary to other studies in this area, for security reasons, we have not been able to study smuggling at the Algeria-Mali border. Because the statistics on seizures by security services provide only a partial view of these practices, we began by seeking to identify the relevant products; to understand the economic, geographic, and social circuits that carry them; and to gain insight into the strategies of actors operating on both sides of the borders. To this end, we conducted interviews with different population groups: economic agents, administrative managers, and local traders practicing barter or smuggling. We collected information from institutional actors on the supply modes of the subsidized products in the region of Tamanrasset in southern Algeria. This first step allowed us to identify the links in the distribution network and the quantities traded in the region. These figures were then crosschecked with the information gathered from the interviews conducted with those practicing formal and informal3 cross-border trade in Algeria and Mali in order to understand the networks, the commodity prices, and margins. This approach allowed us to understand fairly accurately the organization of the major cross-border flows. The information gathered from the interviews on smuggling was then compared with official statistics. The official statistics presented a puzzle: according to the Algerian authorities, Algeria showed a trade surplus with Mali, and, according to Malian authorities, Mali showed a trade surplus with Algeria. In addition, it appeared that there was no correspondence between the Malian export flows to Algeria reported by the Malian authorities and the import flows from Mali reported by the Algerian authorities. This puzzle is explained by the fact that official statistics are extremely partial. Based on cross-checks of different sources relying on the estimated volumes, products, and destinations used in different regions of the world (see Raballand and Mjekiqi 2010; Kaminski and Mitra et al. 2012; Ayadi et al. 2014), the weekly turnover of trade in Mali in 2014 has been estimated at about US$0.74 million,4 2 This study does not deal directly with products whose import is illegal in Mali (weapons and drugs because collecting information and data on those products is even more difficult). 3 The traders interviewed were selected using criteria on the credibility of information and degree of involvement in informal trade. 4 All dollar amounts are U.S. dollars unless otherwise indicated. Conversions in this report are made on the basis of US$1 = CFAF 480 in 2014. 3 and thus Malian imports can be estimated conservatively at approximately $30 million a year.5 This amount is about two-thirds lower than in 2011, the peak of trade between Mali and Algeria. In 2011 imports were estimated at more than $85 million from Algeria to Mali, with 120 trucks crossing the border each week6. However, Algerians officially declared $1.02 million in exports and Malians $1.89 million in imports in 2011, representing 1.2 percent and 2.2 percent, respectively, of the estimated volume of informal trade. Today, the margins are about 20 percent (as opposed to 30 percent in 2011). Informal trade is very important in supplying northern Mali and allowing regions in the north to benefit from prices lower than if supplies came from the south of the country. This situation could contribute to explain why the poverty level is so low in northern Mali, especially in Kidal. Informal trade is also one of the main activities in terms of employment, in particular in the extreme north of the country. Economically, even without considering the Algerian subsidies on transport and goods, it is understandable that Kidal, and even Gao, gravitate toward Algeria because transit times are between seven and eight days to Algiers as opposed to at least 17 days to Dakar (Senegal) or via the southern road to Abidjan (Côte d’Ivoire) or Tema (Ghana)see table 1. Moreover, the cost of shipping transport is much lower at ports in North Africa than those in West Africa. Table 1 Comparison of Distances and Average Transit Times from Kidal, Gao, and Bamako to Algiers, Dakar, Abidjan, and Tema Kidal Gao Bamako Distance (km) Algiers (Algeria) 2,297 2,597 4,193 Dakar (Senegal) 2,950 2,650 1,400 Abidjan (Côte 2,400 2,050 1,150 d’Ivoire) Tema (Ghana) 2,250 1,900 2,000 Average transit times (days) Algiers 7 8 20 Dakar 18 17 13 Abidjan 23 22 19 Tema 24 23 22 Source: Comité de liaison de la route Transsaharienne (Liaison Committee for the Trans-Saharan Road 2009). Almost all of the products sold in northern Mali are those subsidized in Algeria pasta products, flour, and semolina products but also fuels (see figure 1). In spite of the official closure of the Algerian border in January 2013, informal trade flows remain significant. 5 Estimations are based on 40 weeks because trade is very low from July to September. 6 On top of this, 60 trucks were crossing in transit to Niger and Nigeria. 4 Figure 1 Breakdown of Trade Flows from Algeria to Mali, 2014 (in estimated values) Appliances Other products 3% Milk powder Flour 11% 27% Sugar 8% Semolina 9% Fuels 7% Pasta 33% Source: Surveys conducted by the authors. 2% for appliances. The three main border crossing points between Algeria and Mali are Bordj Badji Mokhtar in Mali, which has been somewhat superseded since 2012 by Tinzawaten and Timiaouine in Algeria (see map 1). In Bordj Badji Mokhtar, goods are kept in storage before being sent on small trucks or 4×4s to In Khalil, where they are reloaded into new trucks.

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