DOCSLIB.ORG

Context and Projected Outcome of the Presidential Coup in Tunisia

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Context and Projected Outcome of the Presidential Coup in Tunisia Situation Assessement | 28 July 2021 Context and Projected Outcome of the Presidential Coup in Tunisia Unit for Political Studies Context and Projected Outcome of the Presidential Coup in Tunisia Series: Situation Assessement 28 July 2021 Unit for Political Studies The Unit for Political Studies is the Center’s department dedicated to the study of the region’s most pressing current affairs. An integral and vital part of the ACRPS’ activities, it offers academically rigorous analysis on issues that are relevant and useful to the public, academics and policy-makers of the Arab region and beyond. The Unit for Political Studie draws on the collaborative efforts of a number of scholars based within and outside the ACRPS. It produces three of the Center’s publication series: Assessment Report, Policy Analysis, and Case Analysis reports. Copyright © 2021 Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies. All Rights Reserved. The Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies is an independent research institute and think tank for the study of history and social sciences, with particular emphasis on the applied social sciences. The Center’s paramount concern is the advancement of Arab societies and states, their cooperation with one another and issues concerning the Arab nation in general. To that end, it seeks to examine and diagnose the situation in the Arab world - states and communities- to analyze social, economic and cultural policies and to provide political analysis, from an Arab perspective. The Center publishes in both Arabic and English in order to make its work accessible to both Arab and non- Arab researchers. The Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies Al-Tarfa Street, Wadi Al Banat Al-Dayaen, Qatar PO Box 10277, Doha +974 4035 4111 www.dohainstitute.org Context and Projected Outcome of the Presidential Coup in Tunisia Series: Situation Assessement Table of Contents 28 July 2021 Background . 1 Unit for Political Studies The Unit for Political Studies is the Center’s department dedicated to the study of the region’s most pressing current Preparations for a presidential coup . 2 affairs. An integral and vital part of the ACRPS’ activities, it offers academically rigorous analysis on issues that are relevant and useful to the public, academics and policy-makers of the Arab region and beyond. The Unit for Political Justifications for the coup . 2 Studie draws on the collaborative efforts of a number of scholars based within and outside the ACRPS. It produces three of the Center’s publication series: Assessment Report, Policy Analysis, and Case Analysis reports. The anti-coup consensus . 3 Challenges to the coup . 4 Copyright © 2021 Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies. All Rights Reserved. Conclusion . 5 The Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies is an independent research institute and think tank for the study of history and social sciences, with particular emphasis on the applied social sciences. The Center’s paramount concern is the advancement of Arab societies and states, their cooperation with one another and issues concerning the Arab nation in general. To that end, it seeks to examine and diagnose the situation in the Arab world - states and communities- to analyze social, economic and cultural policies and to provide political analysis, from an Arab perspective. The Center publishes in both Arabic and English in order to make its work accessible to both Arab and non- Arab researchers. The Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies Al-Tarfa Street, Wadi Al Banat Al-Dayaen, Qatar PO Box 10277, Doha +974 4035 4111 www.dohainstitute.org Context and Projected Outcome of the Presidential Coup in Tunisia On 25 July 2021, Tunisian President Kais Saied dismissed PM Hichem Mechichi, suspended the Assembly, revoked representatives’ parliamentary immunity and assumed executive power himself, pending his direct appointment of a new government. This coup against the constitution followed a day of demonstrations and rioting across Tunisia during which branch HQs belonging to the Ennahda Party were repeatedly targeted. As a result, Saied has been able to present his coup as a move against Ennahda – but in reality, it has far less to do with Ennahda than with Saied’s long struggle with the Assembly over the limited powers of the presidency. Background The measures taken on 25 July are only the most recent salvo in almost two years of constant political crisis. Ever since the elections held in late 2019, which brought Saied to power and gave Ennahda a plurality but not a majority of parliamentary seats, the President has been making energetic efforts to expand the powers of his office at the expense of the Assembly and the government. These efforts intensified after the resignation of former PM Elyes Fakhfakh in July 2020 amid allegations of corruption.(1) Having initially tasked Mechichi with forming a government, Saied fell out with his new PM within days and asked the Assembly to deny him the vote of confidence he needed for his cabinet to take office. The reason for this remarkable U-turn was Mechichi’s insistence that he be allowed to exercise his constitutional right to appoint his own choice of ministers – and his unwillingness to serve as a mere ‘first minister’ to Saied. The crisis deepened again in January 2021 when Mechichi carried out a sweeping reshuffle of the cabinet, dismissing all those ministers close to the president. Saied refused to recognise this reshuffle or to invite the new ministers to take the constitutional oath – despite the Assembly having ratified them in a vote of confidence – on the dubious pretext that some of them were suspected of corruption. This was an unconstitutional move on his part: accusations (and not suspicions) of corruption are a matter for the judiciary and not for the president, and the taking of the oath is in any case a ceremonial matter, not a means of rejecting ministers who have already received the confidence of the Assembly. Nonetheless, Saied doubled down on this break with the government by refusing to ratify a bill modifying electoral procedures – which had passed the Assembly with a comfortable majority – and by declaring himself commander-in-chief not only of the army but of the civilian armed forces (police, national guard, customs officers) as well. For most of this period, the parties in the Assembly paid little attention to the steady creep of presidential power at the expense of the other institutions. They were not governing themselves – Mechichi oversees a technocrat cabinet – and were busy with their own internecine disputes. The ridiculous behaviour of the anti-democratic old regime holdovers during parliamentary sessions also contributed to a general impression that the Assembly was completely out of touch with the lives of normal people. Saied has exploited this impression by positioning himself as a populist, a man far above petty political squabbles. 1 See: The Political/Constitutional crisis in Tunisia: Context and Prospects, Situation Assessment, ACRPS, 27/07/2021, accessed on 26/07/2021 at: https://bit.ly/3yc1CLT 1 Situation Assessement | 28 July 2021 Preparations for a presidential coup Against the backdrop of this escalating struggle between president, government and assembly, posts began to appear on social media calling for demonstrations to be held on 25 July (Republic Day). Posters advocated dissolving the Assembly and of the current cabinet, suspending the Constitution, abolishing the current political system and electoral law, punishing politicians – particularly those from Ennahda – and putting military men in charge of the government during a transitional period to be overseen by Saied. Who was behind this social media campaign was unclear, although it received extensive coverage on Emirati and Egyptian satellite TV. But it is notable that none of these posts called for Saied’s removal along with the rest of the ruling establishment. When 25 July came, demonstrations went ahead in front of the Assembly building in Tunis and in other cities across the country, most importantly Sousse, Tozeur, Kairouan, Sfax and Nabeul. Although there were not that many demonstrators in total, several attacks on Ennahda buildings were recorded. In Kairouan and Sousse, party placards were torn down, while in Tozeur rioters stormed and sacked the party’s branch office. In Tunis itself, demonstrators whipped up by Saied’s announcements were only prevented from attacking the main party HQ by the timely intervention of the riot police.(2) It is difficult not to interpret all this as a pre-planned effort to recast the president’s attempts to unconstitutionally transform a parliamentary into a presidential system as a measure against Ennahda. Justifications for the coup After an emergency meeting with senior figures from the security forces and army on the evening of 25 July, Saied announced that ‘having consulted the Prime Minister and the President of the Assembly, the necessary measures are being taken to save the state and society,’. This meant ‘suspending all functions of the Assembly and stripping all its members of their immunity’, ‘taking charge of the Public Prosecutor’s Office’, and ‘taking charge of the executive branch, with the assistance of a government headed by a Prime Minister appointed by the President’. Hichem Mechichi was ‘immediately relieved […] of his duties, and someone else will take over the premiership. This person will be directly responsible to the President, who will personally appoint the members of the government and head the cabinet himself.’ Saied promised that ‘anyone who presumes to defy the state or its symbols, and anyone who fires a single bullet’ would be ‘met with a hail of bullets in return’, accusing his opponents of ‘hypocrisy, treachery and theft’.(3) Shortly after this speech, the presidency published a list of all the measures taken (with the exception of Saied’s assumption of the office of Public Prosecutor), with the additional detail that the Assembly would be suspended for a period of thirty days.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • 2020 World Leaders: a Pronunciation Guide
    PRIMER Published September 17, 2020 • Updated February 9, 2021 • 12 minute read 2020 World Leaders: A Pronunciation Guide Pat Shilo Executive Coordinator @Pat_Shilo This guide lists the names, titles, and pronunciations of a wide range of foreign leaders from around the world. This is not a comprehensive list; it particularly includes countries that are critically important to US national security and foreign policy. The names and titles are from the CIA World Fact Book and recent media sources. Foreign leaders for each country are listed in descending order of potential engagement with US policymakers. Pronunciations are based primarily on Voice of America’s pronunciation guide. Upcoming election information has also been included for positions with scheduled elections. Africa Algeria Head of State: President Abdelmadjid Tebboune @TebbouneAmadjid (ab-dahl-mah-JEED teh-BOON) Since: December 12, 2019 Democratic Republic of Congo Head of State: President Felix Tshisekedi (fee-LIKS chee-seh-KEH-dee) Since: January 25, 2019 Next Election: December 2023 Djibouti Head of State: President Ismail Omar Guelleh @IsmailOguelleh (HIHS-mah-ihl OH-mahr GEH-leh) Since: May 8, 1999 Next Election: April 2021 Head of Government: Prime Minister Abdoulkader Kamil Mohamed (Ab-dool-kaw-der Kah-meel moh-HAH-mehd) Since: April 1, 2013 Appointed by the president Egypt Head of State: President Abdel Fattah el-sisi @AlsisiOcial (AHB-dehl FAH-tah ah-SEE-see) Since: June 8, 2014 Next Election: March 2024 Head of Government: Prime Minister Dr. Mostafa Madbouly (mohs-tah-fah
    [Show full text]
  • COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS of MENA SUBNATIONAL GOVERNANCE Governance Integration for Stabilization and Resilience in the Middle East and North Africa (GISR MENA)
    COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF MENA SUBNATIONAL GOVERNANCE Governance Integration for Stabilization and Resilience in the Middle East and North Africa (GISR MENA) REVISED DECEMBER 9, 2020 This publication was produced by Lynn Carter, Rhys Payne and Robert Springborg for review by the United States Agency for International Development. It was prepared by Management Systems International (MSI), A Tetra Tech Company. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF MENA SUBNATIONAL GOVERNANCE Governance Integration for Stabilization and Resilience in the Middle East and North Africa (GISR MENA) Contracted under GS00Q14OADU138 / 7200AA18M00014 Governance Integration for Stabilization and Resilience in MENA Submitted to: The United States Agency for International Development – Bureau for the Middle East Office of Technical Support (ME/TS) Prepared by: Management Systems International Corporate Offices 200 12th Street, South Arlington, VA 22202 USA Tel: + 1 703 979 7100 DISCLAIMER The authors’ views expressed in this report do not necessarily reflect the views of the United States Agency for International Development or the United States Government. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS This report was prepared by Management Systems International, including Dr. Lynn Carter, Technical Director; Paul Turner, GISR Chief of Party/Technical Director; Melissa Lloyd, GISR Deputy Chief of Party/Technical Manager, Dr. Perin Arkun, Senior Project Manager; Brian Felix, Project Manager; Adam Bloom, Graphic Designer; and regional experts Dr. Robert Springborg and Dr. Rhys Payne Finally, this report would
    [Show full text]
  • The Roots of Tunisia's Current Political Crisis | the Washington Institute
    MENU Policy Analysis / Fikra Forum The Roots of Tunisia’s Current Political Crisis by Oussama Boudhrioua Jul 30, 2021 Also available in Arabic ABOUT THE AUTHORS Oussama Boudhrioua Oussama Boudhrioua has a bachelors degree in communication sciences and previously worked at the Tunisian Agency of External Affairs. He specializes in political communication and formulating communication policies. He is a contributor to Fikra Forum. Brief Analysis As Tunisia’s political crisis continues, it is crucial to understand how the disputes between the President and legislative branch have unfolded over the past few months, contributing to Tunisia’s economic and public health emergencies. ince the parliamentary and presidential elections of 2019, Tunisia has experienced unprecedented political S turmoil and fundamental divisions due to the weakened state of the Tunisian parliament and the political struggles between ruling institutions. These factors have dominated the overall scene and upset the priorities of those in power who were already in conflict, especially the power struggle between the two leaders of the executive authority—which has most recently expanded as president Kaïs Saïed removed the prime minister and suspended parliament. This is the public unfolding of a behind-the-scenes war between the prime minister, the president, and parliament— one which has disrupted attempts at economic reform and revitalization to prepare for the post-COVID-19 phase and identify the country’s basic problems with regards to driving growth, providing job opportunities, and improving the purchasing power of citizens. Hichem Mechichi and the Circumstances Surrounding his Mandate From the outset, Mechichi’s government reflected the ongoing challenges within Tunisian democracy by becoming the ninth government in the decade since the 2011 uprising that overthrew President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, with Tunisia now averaging almost one government per year.
    [Show full text]
  • Tunisia: a Hero? Another Coup? Or a Return to Authoritarianism? Commentary by Christel Haidar1 August , 2021| 10 Min Read
    Tunisia: A Hero? Another Coup? Or a Return to Authoritarianism? Commentary by Christel Haidar1 August , 2021| 10 min read Introduction: Creating the spark in the regional fire following the 2010 Arab Uprising, Tunisia was the first Arab country to depose its dictator. The first story of success, as widely considered, as its people managed to make reversal from dictatorship as early as 2011. Yet, Tunisian experience with democracy has been somewhat turbulent. Since the second President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali fled the country in January 2011, the country has seen 9 different governments. The latest government formed by Hichem Mechichi, a “bureaucrat” with clean history in various state positions at various echelons, took oath following 6 months Elyes Fakhfakh government that had to depart due to a corruption scandal. The Tunisians’ disenchantment in political elites and their handling of governance is nothing new. Since the country’s first free election in October 2011, where the Islamist party “Ennahda” won most of the seats in the parliament, the economy is going downhill. The citizens are unpleased with high rate of unemployment and rising inflation. It is the same disenchantment that pushed Tunisians make a detour in their preference for the new president after death of former President Beji Caid Essebsi. In October 2019, Kais Saied, a constitutional law professor that does not come from political background was elected president with 72.71% of the votes in the second round. One of the main reasons behind popular support to the newly elect President was his rhetoric “putting the people first” in the political debates.
    [Show full text]
  • Tracking Conflict Worldwide
    CRISISWATCH Tracking Conflict Worldwide CrisisWatch is our global conict tracker, a tool designed to help decision-makers prevent deadly violence by keeping them up-to-date with developments in over 70 conicts and crises, identifying trends and alerting them to risks of escalation and opportunities to advance peace. Learn more about CrisisWatch July 2021 Global Overview JULY 2021 Trends for Last Month July 2021 Outlook for This Month DETERIORATED SITUATIONS August 2021 Ethiopia, South Africa, Zambia, CONFLICT RISK ALERTS Afghanistan, Bosnia And Herzegovina, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Ukraine, Ethiopia, Zambia, Armenia, Azerbaijan Cuba, Haiti, Syria, Tunisia RESOLUTION OPPORTUNITIES IMPROVED SITUATIONS None Central African Republic, Côte d’Ivoire CrisisWatch warns of three conict risks in August. Ethiopia’s spreading Tigray war is spiraling into a dangerous new phase, which will likely lead to more deadly violence and far greater instability countrywide. Fighting along the state border between Armenia and Azerbaijan, the deadliest since the Autumn 2020 war, could escalate further. More violence could surge in Zambia as tensions between ruling party and opposition supporters are running high ahead of the 12 August general elections. Our monthly conict tracker highlights deteriorations in thirteen countries in July. The Taliban continued its major offensive in Afghanistan, seizing more international border crossings and launching its rst assault on Kandahar city since 2001. South Africa faced its most violent unrest since apartheid ended in 1991, leaving over 300 dead. The killing of President Jovenel Moïse in murky circumstances plunged Haiti into political turmoil. Tunisia’s months-long political crisis escalated when President Kaïs Saïed dismissed Prime Minister Hichem Mechichi and suspended parliament.
    [Show full text]
  • MENA Daily Fixed Income Report – 3 May 2021 Kuwait Financial Centre “Markaz”
    MENA Daily Fixed Income Report – 3 May 2021 Kuwait Financial Centre “Markaz” News Updates GCC Sovereign Yields Sovereign Ratings Price ∆ Price ∆ Moody's changes Bahrain's outlook to negative, affirms B2 ratings – Sovereigns Maturity Yield % Sovereigns Maturity Yield % (YTD %) (YTD %) Moody’s S&P Fitch Moody's Investors Service ("Moody's") has today changed the outlook on Abu Dhabi 2025 0.94 -1.10 KSA 2025 1.39 -1.33 Kuwait A1 AA- AA the Government of Bahrain to negative from stable and has affirmed its Abu Dhabi 2030 2.08 -4.26 KSA 2030 2.52 -4.18 KSA A1 A-u A B2 long-term issuer and senior unsecured ratings. The change of outlook Abu Dhabi 2050 3.25 -9.02 KSA 2050 3.80 -8.61 to negative reflects increased downside risks to Bahrain's ratings UAE Aa2 NR AA- Bahrain 2026 3.35 -1.07 Oman 2025 3.34 2.57 Abu Aa2 AA AA stemming from a larger than earlier expected weakening in fiscal metrics Dhabi Bahrain 2030 5.45 -4.98 Oman 2029 4.97 2.78 and ongoing uncertainty around the timing and the size of the Qatar Aa3 AA- AA- Bahrain 2047 6.98 -10.14 Oman 2048 6.73 0.20 augmentation of the financial support package for Bahrain from the fellow Dubai 2029 2.66 -1.42 Qatar 2025 1.02 -1.29 Bahrain B2 B+ B+ Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) sovereigns. The very large fiscal Kuwait 2022 0.13 -0.80 Qatar 2030 2.20 -4.86 Oman Ba3 B+ BB- deterioration during 2020 will make a path toward stabilizing the government's debt burden at a sustainable level significantly more Kuwait 2027 1.50 -2.84 Qatar 2050 3.47 -10.91 Egypt B2 B B+ challenging than Moody's had previously expected.
    [Show full text]
  • Designing a Roadmap to Recovery in MENA
    H Designing a Roadmap to Recovery in MENA 1 April 2021 13:00 – 16:00 (CEST) Register Here The OECD processes personal data in accordance with its Personal Data Protection Rules: See Data Protection Rules The OECD’s configuration of the Zoom service reflects the following measures: • Pre-registration, passwords, and the “waiting room” functions are enabled to prevent unauthorised access to the conference. • Specific identity format (country, name) for remote participants for easy control of each attendee in the Waiting Room before admitting them into the meeting. • Only the host (OECD) or co-hosts can enable a recording on their local computers. • If the conference is recorded, a notice will show on the screen. • No chats can be saved, and no private chats are permitted, except with the host or co- hosts. • Participants enter the conference call muted and without video showing, unless and until they enable these features themselves. • Avoid discussing any highly-sensitive matters. Do NOT share your personal invitation link MENA-OECD 2021 Ministerial CONFERENCE Designing a Roadmap to Recovery in MENA 1 April, 13:00-16:00 (CEST) 13:00 – 13:10 Opening Remarks Master of Ceremony: Ms. Adelina VESTEMEAN, Executive Coordinator, OECD H.E. Mr. Hichem MECHICHI, Head of Government, Republic of Tunisia Mr. Angel GURRÍA, OECD Secretary General 13:10 – 13:20 Keynote Address H.E. Mr. Luigi DI MAIO, Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, Republic of Italy SESSION 1 - A new growth model for the post- 13:20 – 14:15 COVID-19 recovery: governing the investments of tomorrow in MENA Moderator: Mr.
    [Show full text]
  • Tunisia Forms a Cabinet Under Shadow of Power Struggle
    UK £2 Issue 245, Year 5 February 23, 2020 EU €2.50 www.thearabweekly.com Germany’s Interview Algeria’s xenophobia Amr Moussa ‘Hirak’ enters problem second year Pages 4,6 Page 13 Page 3 Tunisia forms Hardliners lead in Iran’s a cabinet under ‘sham’ vote Thomas Seibert shadow of Istanbul ardliners were heading for a major victory against power struggle reformists as early results H from Iran’s parliamentary Lamine Ghanmi pointees include legal expert Imed elections signalled a possible nation- Hazgui, a former head of the national wide landslide for conservatives. institution ensuring open access to In a development that could fur- Tunis information, as defence minister; ther rattle the legitimacy of the and Hichem Mechichi, a former legal regime, turnout was estimated at unisian Prime Minister-desig- adviser to the president, as interior much lower than the more than nate Elyes Fakhfakh has an- minister. Noureddine Erray, Tunisian 60% of 2016 when reformists won nounced a coalition govern- ambassador to Muscat, was named all 30 seats for Tehran, their biggest T ment, averting the risk of early foreign minister. stronghold. elections, four months after a long cy- Abdellatif Mekki, Ghannouchi’s This time a list of candidates af- cle of presidential and parliamentary most critical figure inside Ennahda, filiated with Iran’s Islamic Revolu- polls. was named public health minister. tionary Guard Corps was leading the The government lineup is expected Lotfi Zitoun, a former Ghannouchi ad- race for seats representing the capital to be approved by the parliament dur- viser, was selected to be minister of lo- in the 290-member assembly, Fars ing a confidence vote February 26.
    [Show full text]
  • Mofa Issues Advisory for Qatari Citizens Travelling Abroad
    www.thepeninsula.qa Tuesday 28 July 2020 Volume 25 | Number 8332 7 Dhul-Hijja - 1441 2 Riyals BUSINESS | 15 PENMAG | 19 SPORT | 24 Qatar takes part in Classifieds Andy Murray Arab Ministerial and Services ‘mentally’ Council for section planning for Electricity meeting included US Open Do it online now. Change or upgrade your Upgrade Shahry plan from home! Amir honours outgoing German envoy Amir sends MoFA issues cable of condolences advisory for to President Qatari citizens of Tanzania QNA — DOHA Amir H H Sheikh Tamim bin travelling abroad Hamad Al Thani and Deputy Amir H H Sheikh Abdullah bin QNA — DOHA “Keep official documents Hamad Al Thani sent yesterday such as passports, airline tickets cables of condolences to H E The Consular Affairs and valuable personal holdings President of the United Department at the Ministry of in safe places. Avoid providing Republic of Tanzania Dr. John Foreign Affairs (MoFA) issued the passport or ID card as a Pombe Joseph Magufuli on the a set of guidelines and advices guarantee to any party in any death of the country’s former to Qatari citizens wishing to way. If non-Qatari workers and president Benjamin William travel abroad in order to facil- non-Qatari helpers are trav- Mkapa. itate their travel and stay and elling, the sponsor must inquire Prime Minister and Min- protect them from any diffi- about the visas and procedures ister of Interior H E Sheikh culties or obstacles they may followed in this regard, The Khalid bin Khalifa bin Amir H H Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani met at the Amiri Diwan yesterday with the Ambassador encounter during their travel.
    [Show full text]
  • Demands for Economic and Environmental Justice
    Farmers shout anti-government slogans on a blocked highway during a protest against new farm laws in December 2020 in Delhi, India. Photo by Yawar Nazir/Getty Images 2021 State of Civil Society Report DEMANDS FOR ECONOMIC AND ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE Economic and environmental climate mobilisations↗ that marked 2019 and that pushed climate action to the top of the political agenda. But people continued to keep up the momentum justice: protest in a pandemic year by protesting whenever and however they could, using their imaginations In a year dominated by the pandemic, people still protested however and offering a range of creative actions, including distanced, solo and online and whenever possible, because the urgency of the issues continued protests. State support to climate-harming industries during the pandemic and to make protest necessary. Many of the year’s protests came as people plans for post-pandemic recovery that seemed to place faith in carbon-fuelled responded to the impacts of emergency measures on their ability to economic growth further motivated people to take urgent action. meet their essential needs. In country after country, the many people left living precariously and in poverty by the pandemic’s impacts on Wherever there was protest there was backlash. The tactics of repression were economic activity demanded better support from their governments. predictably familiar and similar: security force violence against protesters, Often the pandemic was the context, but it was not the whole story. For arrests, detentions and criminalisation, political vilification of those taking some, economic downturn forced a reckoning with deeply flawed economic part, and attempts to repress expression both online and offline.
    [Show full text]
  • QA Returns to Over 50% of Its Pre-COVID-19 Network
    www.thepeninsula.qa Thursday 3 September 2020 Volume 25 | Number 8369 15 Muharram - 1442 2 Riyals BUSINESS | 13 PENMAG | 15 SPORT | 19 MADLSA briefs Classifieds Kvitova, Kerber Qatar Chamber and Services advance to on new expat section third round at laws included US Open Choose the network of heroes Enjoy the Internet QA returns to over 50% of Amir reiterates two-state its pre-COVID-19 network solution for Palestine issue THE PENINSULA — DOHA pandemic, Qatar Airways will have three weekly flights network has never fallen starting September 6. Qatar Airways continues to below 30 destinations with Philadelphia will have three lead the industry in providing continuous services to five weekly flights starting Sep- global connectivity by continents. tember 16 while flights to resuming flights to just over This month, the airline will Sialkot have resumed from half the destinations it resume flights to Houston, September 1 with three weekly operated pre-COVID-19. By Kathmandu, Mogadishu, Phil- flights. mid-September, the national adelphia and Sialkot. Qatar Airways Group Chief carrier of Qatar will operate Houston will have three Executive, H E Akbar Al Baker, over 650 weekly flights to weekly flights, which started said: “We are proud to be the more than 85 destinations, yesterday, with frequency leading global airline con- providing more flexible travel increasing to four weekly from necting passengers with the options to more global desti- September 15. Kathmandu will world, operating one of the nations than any other airline. have one weekly flight starting youngest, most fuel-efficient Since the onset of the September 5 while Mogadishu and sustainable fleets to take people safely to where they need to be.
    [Show full text]
  • Political Crisis in Tunisia: U.S
    سی Policy Analysis / PolicyWatch 3515 Political Crisis in Tunisia: U.S. Response Options by Sarah Feuer / Jul 27, 2021 As the fragile Arab democracy faces its most serious test in nearly a decade, Washington should oppose any unconstitutional centralization of power, urge President Saied to clarify his roadmap for ending the impasse, and consider additional economic and medical assistance. On July 25, following a day of anti-government demonstrations across the country, Tunisian president Kais Saied informed the public that he would be dismissing Prime Minister Hichem Mechichi, freezing parliament for thirty days, stripping its members of their legal immunities, and assuming all executive power alongside a new prime minister of his choosing. According to Saied, these extraordinary measures were required by the country’s dismal situation and were fully in keeping with the constitution. The next day, the military blocked the entrance to parliament. In response, Speaker Rached Ghannouchi—who heads the main Islamist party, Ennahda—joined his fellow legislators outside the building to hold a parliamentary session via online video. Afterward, they announced their complete rejection of Saied’s moves. The president appears undeterred for now, dismissing the interior, justice, and defense ministers and decreeing a cessation of work in all public administrations except the military, security organizations, health services, and schools. The dramatic developments are putting Tunisia’s fragile democracy under enormous strain, and the coming days will likely determine whether the country is headed for a temporary blip in its democratic transition, a deeper consolidation of power, or violence. … Sarah Feuer is the Rosenbloom Family Fellow at The Washington Institute.
    [Show full text]