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Turkey in Trouble at the Council of Europe Turkey’s contempt for human rights and the rule of law is threatening to make it only the second country ever to face infringement proceedings at the Council of Europe (CoE). On September 17, the CoE’s Committee of Ministers agreed to initiate the infringement process—a powerful tool to impose sanctions against member states who defy the CoE’s rules—against Turkey in December unless the country releases political prisoner Osman Kavala. A prominent civil society leader, Kavala has been unjustly jailed for almost four years despite a 2019 ruling by the CoE’s judicial body, the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), ordering his release. Should Turkey face infringement proceedings, it could not only lose its voting rights—or even its membership—at the CoE, but also suffer tremendous damage to its reputation and relations with other European institutions. The Kavala case captures the fundamental issues plaguing Turkey’s relationship with and image in Europe, namely the government’s ongoing human rights abuses and defiance of international law. Kavala, an Istanbul philanthropist widely revered for his role in advancing human rights and tolerance through the arts, was arrested in 2017 for allegedly committing Turkey’s most serious crimes: threatening the government, state, and constitutional order. Specifically, authorities accuse him of sponsoring and organizing mass anti-government protests in 2013 and aiding a 2016 coup attempt by committing espionage for the plotters, whom Turkey has deemed a terrorist group. The United States, European governments, and Turkish and international NGOs have all denounced the charges as ludicrous and the two indictments as devoid of evidence. Yet Kavala remains locked up in solitary confinement, facing a life sentence. Critically, Kavala’s continued detention violates both Turkish and international law. As a member of the CoE and a signatory to the European Convention of Human Rights, Turkey is bound by its own laws to implement the ECHR’s verdicts. In December 2019, the ECHR completed its review of Kavala’s case and, finding no evidence of wrongdoing, ordered Turkey to release him immediately. Turkey’s failure to do so is a blatant violation of the ECHR’s ruling and its own obligations as a CoE member. Turkish human rights groups have long been calling on the CoE to start infringement proceedings against Turkey because of the Kavala case. Despite the pressure, Turkish courts have shown no interest in letting Kavala go. Kavala is a political prisoner, detained at the behest of President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan himself, and the subservient Turkish judiciary is unlikely to defy the president’s wishes. Just last month, a court merged Kavala’s case with an even larger case concerning the 2013 mass protests, expanding the scope of his prosecution and extending his trial. These moves indicate that Kavala could remain behind bars far past the CoE’s December deadline. Yet infringement would bear high costs for Turkey. The CoE is one of Europe’s most important multilateral institutions, and Turkey has been a member since 1950. Ankara values this membership greatly, especially in light of its awkward relationship with the EU after its failed accession process and uncertain relationship with Germany, its largest trading partner, as Berlin goes to elections. Infringement proceedings would threaten one of the key links Turkey has to Europe and further tarnish its international image. So far, Azerbaijan is the only country to have faced infringement at the CoE, also for defying an ECHR order, in 2017. Azerbaijan ultimately complied with the ruling, and the CoE dropped the proceedings in 2020. Turkey had also faced the threat of infringement back in 2003, though it ultimately complied with the ECHR order and escaped punishment. Freeing Kavala before December could help Erdoğan avoid the worst outcome at the CoE. Indeed, releasing Kavala would not only end the years-long gross injustice he and his family have faced but also signal to the CoE and other global partners that Turkey respects its international responsibilities. In the long run, however, freeing Kavala alone will not be enough to normalize Turkey’s relationship with the CoE or change its global image as a serial violator of human rights. Notably, the CoE’s September 17 warning also urged Turkey to comply with another recent ECHR ruling to immediately free Kurdish opposition leader Selahattin Demirtaş of the Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP), who has been unjustly imprisoned since 2016. As long as Turkey, with its thousands of other political detainees and disregard for the rule of law, remains among the ECHR’s top offenders, its fraught relationship with the CoE and tarnished global image will both be here to stay. Merve Tahiroğlu is POMED’s Turkey Program Coordinator. Find her on Twitter @MerveTahiroglu. Photo Credit: European Parliament on Flickr Report – Back to Business as Usual: President Biden’s First Foreign Affairs Budget for the Middle East and North Africa President Joseph R. Biden’s first international affairs budget is a dramatic reversal from the previous four requests under President Donald Trump. President Biden’s Fiscal Year (FY) 2022 request of $63.9 billion would significantly increase the foreign affairs budget not only from Trump’s paltry FY21 request of $44.1 billion, but also from the $55.5 billion appropriated by Congress in FY21. Similarly, for the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) President Biden’s request of $7.6 billion boosts foreign aid by 17 percent compared to Trump’s FY21 request. True to his word, President Biden’s request would also increase funding for democracy and human rights programs around the world. The FY22 request of $2.8 billion for programming that falls within the Governing Justly and Democratically (GJD) objective is 65 percent higher than the FY21 request by President Trump, 18.3 percent more than Congress’s FY21 appropriation, and 26.8 percent more than the FY20 allocation. In the MENA region, this trend continues. The FY22 request for democracy programs is more than double the FY21 request and 34 percent more than the U.S. government spent in FY20. The budget request is an opportunity for the administration to demonstrate its foreign policy priorities, and it is clear that the administration is committed to increasing funding for foreign aid and democracy programs in particular. Yet while the Biden administration’s request increases support in key areas, it ultimately perpetuates the long-standing trend of securitizing U.S. aid to the MENA region, which despite the funding increases continues to relegate U.S. democracy programs to the margins of policy. READ THE REPORT KEY FINDINGS FOR THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA (MENA): President Biden’s FY22 request for the MENA region would more than double support for democracy and governance programs. The $453.6 million request for the GJD objective is 140 percent more than President Trump’s FY21 request of $189.2 million, the largest democracy and governance funding increase of any region in the world. The total FY22 GJD request for MENA is also, importantly, 34 percent more than the actual allocation of $337.8 million for MENA in FY20, the most recent year data is available. The president’s foreign aid budget request for MENA, despite his stated commitment to democracy programming, does not reflect a significant priority shift from previous administrations, instead perpetuating the preponderance of security assistance to the region. The $5.8 billion requested for security assistance represents 76 percent of the total requested for MENA. In comparison, democracy and human rights programs represent less than 6 percent of the requested funding for the region. In addition, the FY22 request for security assistance for MENA is $340 million (6 percent) more than the Trump administration’s FY21 request of $5.5 billion, which is a larger increase in actual dollars than for democracy assistance. Despite President Biden’s declaration that he would end the “blank checks” for Egypt’s authoritarian regime, the FY22 request seeks the same $1.3 billion in Foreign Military Financing that Egypt has received since 1987. The administration has also explicitly and repeatedly expressed opposition to Congress including human rights conditions on military aid to Egypt in the FY22 appropriations bill. The administration also used a loophole in the FY20 law to obligate $300 million of the $1.3 billion in military aid conditioned on human rights. The FY22 bilateral requests for Iraq, Jordan, and Morocco remained static relative to recent years’ appropriations laws even though citizens in all three countries are increasingly concerned about government corruption and repression. By choosing not to request further funding for democracy programs in these countries, the administration misses an opportunity to reprioritize U.S. assistance to better meet new U.S. objectives and the concerns of the countries’ citizens. While the administration’s request would increase bilateral aid for Lebanon by 22 percent compared to the FY21 appropriations law, all of that increase is for military aid to the Lebanese Armed Forces. The United States has provided more than $370 million in humanitarian assistance in FY21, but the need and demand for additional aid among the Lebanese people is just as great as among the LAF. The FY22 request of $219 million in bilateral assistance for the West Bank and Gaza and re-engagement with the Palestinian Authority is part of a reversal from the Trump administration’s policy toward the Palestinians. In addition, the Biden administration has announced that it would provide more than $360 million in economic, development, security, and humanitarian assistance for Palestinians from held-up prior year funds, including more than $150 million for the United Nations Relief and Works Agency.

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