Situation Assessement | 28 July 2021 Context and Projected Outcome of the Presidential Coup in Tunisia Unit for Political Studies Context and Projected Outcome of the Presidential Coup in Tunisia Series: Situation Assessement 28 July 2021 Unit for Political Studies The Unit for Political Studies is the Center’s department dedicated to the study of the region’s most pressing current affairs. An integral and vital part of the ACRPS’ activities, it offers academically rigorous analysis on issues that are relevant and useful to the public, academics and policy-makers of the Arab region and beyond. The Unit for Political Studie draws on the collaborative efforts of a number of scholars based within and outside the ACRPS. It produces three of the Center’s publication series: Assessment Report, Policy Analysis, and Case Analysis reports. Copyright © 2021 Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies. All Rights Reserved. The Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies is an independent research institute and think tank for the study of history and social sciences, with particular emphasis on the applied social sciences. The Center’s paramount concern is the advancement of Arab societies and states, their cooperation with one another and issues concerning the Arab nation in general. To that end, it seeks to examine and diagnose the situation in the Arab world - states and communities- to analyze social, economic and cultural policies and to provide political analysis, from an Arab perspective. The Center publishes in both Arabic and English in order to make its work accessible to both Arab and non- Arab researchers. The Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies Al-Tarfa Street, Wadi Al Banat Al-Dayaen, Qatar PO Box 10277, Doha +974 4035 4111 www.dohainstitute.org Context and Projected Outcome of the Presidential Coup in Tunisia Series: Situation Assessement Table of Contents 28 July 2021 Background . 1 Unit for Political Studies The Unit for Political Studies is the Center’s department dedicated to the study of the region’s most pressing current Preparations for a presidential coup . 2 affairs. An integral and vital part of the ACRPS’ activities, it offers academically rigorous analysis on issues that are relevant and useful to the public, academics and policy-makers of the Arab region and beyond. The Unit for Political Justifications for the coup . 2 Studie draws on the collaborative efforts of a number of scholars based within and outside the ACRPS. It produces three of the Center’s publication series: Assessment Report, Policy Analysis, and Case Analysis reports. The anti-coup consensus . 3 Challenges to the coup . 4 Copyright © 2021 Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies. All Rights Reserved. Conclusion . 5 The Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies is an independent research institute and think tank for the study of history and social sciences, with particular emphasis on the applied social sciences. The Center’s paramount concern is the advancement of Arab societies and states, their cooperation with one another and issues concerning the Arab nation in general. To that end, it seeks to examine and diagnose the situation in the Arab world - states and communities- to analyze social, economic and cultural policies and to provide political analysis, from an Arab perspective. The Center publishes in both Arabic and English in order to make its work accessible to both Arab and non- Arab researchers. The Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies Al-Tarfa Street, Wadi Al Banat Al-Dayaen, Qatar PO Box 10277, Doha +974 4035 4111 www.dohainstitute.org Context and Projected Outcome of the Presidential Coup in Tunisia On 25 July 2021, Tunisian President Kais Saied dismissed PM Hichem Mechichi, suspended the Assembly, revoked representatives’ parliamentary immunity and assumed executive power himself, pending his direct appointment of a new government. This coup against the constitution followed a day of demonstrations and rioting across Tunisia during which branch HQs belonging to the Ennahda Party were repeatedly targeted. As a result, Saied has been able to present his coup as a move against Ennahda – but in reality, it has far less to do with Ennahda than with Saied’s long struggle with the Assembly over the limited powers of the presidency. Background The measures taken on 25 July are only the most recent salvo in almost two years of constant political crisis. Ever since the elections held in late 2019, which brought Saied to power and gave Ennahda a plurality but not a majority of parliamentary seats, the President has been making energetic efforts to expand the powers of his office at the expense of the Assembly and the government. These efforts intensified after the resignation of former PM Elyes Fakhfakh in July 2020 amid allegations of corruption.(1) Having initially tasked Mechichi with forming a government, Saied fell out with his new PM within days and asked the Assembly to deny him the vote of confidence he needed for his cabinet to take office. The reason for this remarkable U-turn was Mechichi’s insistence that he be allowed to exercise his constitutional right to appoint his own choice of ministers – and his unwillingness to serve as a mere ‘first minister’ to Saied. The crisis deepened again in January 2021 when Mechichi carried out a sweeping reshuffle of the cabinet, dismissing all those ministers close to the president. Saied refused to recognise this reshuffle or to invite the new ministers to take the constitutional oath – despite the Assembly having ratified them in a vote of confidence – on the dubious pretext that some of them were suspected of corruption. This was an unconstitutional move on his part: accusations (and not suspicions) of corruption are a matter for the judiciary and not for the president, and the taking of the oath is in any case a ceremonial matter, not a means of rejecting ministers who have already received the confidence of the Assembly. Nonetheless, Saied doubled down on this break with the government by refusing to ratify a bill modifying electoral procedures – which had passed the Assembly with a comfortable majority – and by declaring himself commander-in-chief not only of the army but of the civilian armed forces (police, national guard, customs officers) as well. For most of this period, the parties in the Assembly paid little attention to the steady creep of presidential power at the expense of the other institutions. They were not governing themselves – Mechichi oversees a technocrat cabinet – and were busy with their own internecine disputes. The ridiculous behaviour of the anti-democratic old regime holdovers during parliamentary sessions also contributed to a general impression that the Assembly was completely out of touch with the lives of normal people. Saied has exploited this impression by positioning himself as a populist, a man far above petty political squabbles. 1 See: The Political/Constitutional crisis in Tunisia: Context and Prospects, Situation Assessment, ACRPS, 27/07/2021, accessed on 26/07/2021 at: https://bit.ly/3yc1CLT 1 Situation Assessement | 28 July 2021 Preparations for a presidential coup Against the backdrop of this escalating struggle between president, government and assembly, posts began to appear on social media calling for demonstrations to be held on 25 July (Republic Day). Posters advocated dissolving the Assembly and of the current cabinet, suspending the Constitution, abolishing the current political system and electoral law, punishing politicians – particularly those from Ennahda – and putting military men in charge of the government during a transitional period to be overseen by Saied. Who was behind this social media campaign was unclear, although it received extensive coverage on Emirati and Egyptian satellite TV. But it is notable that none of these posts called for Saied’s removal along with the rest of the ruling establishment. When 25 July came, demonstrations went ahead in front of the Assembly building in Tunis and in other cities across the country, most importantly Sousse, Tozeur, Kairouan, Sfax and Nabeul. Although there were not that many demonstrators in total, several attacks on Ennahda buildings were recorded. In Kairouan and Sousse, party placards were torn down, while in Tozeur rioters stormed and sacked the party’s branch office. In Tunis itself, demonstrators whipped up by Saied’s announcements were only prevented from attacking the main party HQ by the timely intervention of the riot police.(2) It is difficult not to interpret all this as a pre-planned effort to recast the president’s attempts to unconstitutionally transform a parliamentary into a presidential system as a measure against Ennahda. Justifications for the coup After an emergency meeting with senior figures from the security forces and army on the evening of 25 July, Saied announced that ‘having consulted the Prime Minister and the President of the Assembly, the necessary measures are being taken to save the state and society,’. This meant ‘suspending all functions of the Assembly and stripping all its members of their immunity’, ‘taking charge of the Public Prosecutor’s Office’, and ‘taking charge of the executive branch, with the assistance of a government headed by a Prime Minister appointed by the President’. Hichem Mechichi was ‘immediately relieved […] of his duties, and someone else will take over the premiership. This person will be directly responsible to the President, who will personally appoint the members of the government and head the cabinet himself.’ Saied promised that ‘anyone who presumes to defy the state or its symbols, and anyone who fires a single bullet’ would be ‘met with a hail of bullets in return’, accusing his opponents of ‘hypocrisy, treachery and theft’.(3) Shortly after this speech, the presidency published a list of all the measures taken (with the exception of Saied’s assumption of the office of Public Prosecutor), with the additional detail that the Assembly would be suspended for a period of thirty days.