Sweet Dreams: Philosophical Obstacles to a Science of Consciousness Pdf

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FREE SWEET DREAMS: PHILOSOPHICAL OBSTACLES TO A SCIENCE OF CONSCIOUSNESS PDF

See what's new with book lending at the Internet Archive. Uploaded by station Search icon An illustration of a magnifying glass. User icon An illustration of a person's head and chest. Sign up Log in. Web icon An illustration of a computer application window Wayback Machine Texts icon An illustration of an open book. Books Video icon An illustration of two cells of a film strip. Video Audio icon An illustration of an audio speaker. Audio Software icon An illustration of a 3. Software Images icon An illustration of two photographs. Images Donate icon An illustration of a heart shape Sweet Dreams: Philosophical Obstacles to a Science of Consciousness Ellipses icon An illustration of text ellipses. Sweet dreams : philosophical obstacles to a science of consciousness Item Preview. EMBED for wordpress. Want more? Advanced embedding details, examples, and help! Drawing on psychology, cognitive neuroscience, and artificial intelligence, he asserted that human consciousness is essentially the mental software that reorganizes the functional architecture of the brain. In Sweet Dreams, he recasts the Multiple Drafts Model as the "fame in the brain" model, as a background against which to examine the philosophical issues that "continue to bedevil the field. There are no reviews yet. Be the first one to write a review. Books for People with Print Disabilities. Internet Archive Books. Sweet Dreams (Dennett book) - Wikipedia

Goodreads helps you keep track of books you want to read. Want to Read saving…. Want to Read Currently Reading Read. Other editions. Enlarge cover. Error rating book. Refresh and try again. Open Preview See a Problem? Details if other :. Thanks for telling us about the problem. Return to Book Page. Preview — Sweet Dreams by Daniel C. In the years since Daniel Dennett's influential Consciousness Explained was published inscientific research on consciousness has been a hotly contested battleground of rival theories--so rambunctious, Dennett observes, that several people are writing books just about the tumult. With Sweet DreamsDennett returns to the subject for revision and renewal of his theory In the years since Daniel Dennett's influential Consciousness Explained was published inscientific research on consciousness has been a hotly contested battleground of rival theories--so rambunctious, Dennett observes, that several people are writing books just about the tumult. With Sweet DreamsDennett returns to the subject for revision and renewal of his theory of consciousness, taking into account major empirical advances in the field since as well as recent theoretical challenges. In Consciousness ExplainedDennett proposed to replace the ubiquitous but bankrupt Cartesian Theater model which posits a privileged place in the brain where it all comes together for the magic show of consciousness with the Multiple Drafts Model. Drawing on psychology, cognitive neuroscience, and artificial intelligence, he asserted that human consciousness is essentially the mental software that reorganizes the functional architecture of the brain. In Sweet Dreamshe recasts the Multiple Drafts Model as the fame in the brain model, as a background against which to examine the philosophical issues that continue to bedevil the field. With his usual clarity and brio, Dennett enlivens his arguments with a variety of vivid examples. He isolates the Zombic Hunch that distorts much of the theorizing of both philosophers and scientists, and defends heterophenomenology, his third-person approach to the science of consciousness, against persistent misinterpretations and objections. The Sweet Dreams: Philosophical Obstacles to a Science of Consciousness challenge of Frank Jackson's thought experiment about Mary the color scientist is given a new rebuttal in the form of RoboMary, while his discussion of a famous card trick, The Tuned Deck, is designed to show that David Chalmers's Hard Problem is probably just a figment of theorists' misexploited imagination. In the final essay, the intrinsic nature of qualia is compared with the naively imagined intrinsic value of a dollar in Consciousness--How Much is That Sweet Dreams: Philosophical Obstacles to a Science of Consciousness Real Money? Get A Copy. Paperbackpages. Published September 8th by Bradford Book first published More Details Original Title. Jean Nicod Lectures. Other Editions Friend Reviews. To see what your friends thought of this book, please sign up. To ask other readers questions about Sweet Dreamsplease sign up. Can this book be read on its own, or do I have to read Consciousness Explained first? See 1 question about Sweet Dreams…. Lists with This Book. Community Reviews. Showing Average rating 3. Rating details. More filters. Sort order. Aug 28, Greg rated it liked it Shelves: mind-and-brain. Something has been bugging me more and more about Dennett recently. The more I read about consciousness, whether it be from the perspective of neuroscience, philosophy, or psychology, the more I think there is a real question that needs to be answered about qualia. Qualia, the character of subjective experience. The redness of red. The smell of a rose. The feeling Sweet Dreams: Philosophical Obstacles to a Science of Consciousness anger or love, and the experience of pain. Chalmers dubbed this the "hard problem of consciousness", referring to the problem of e Something has been bugging me more and more about Dennett recently. Chalmers dubbed this the "hard problem of consciousness", referring to the problem of explaining why we have qualitative phenomenal experiences. And many brilliant philosophers have expended much energy trying to explain or explain away these qualia states in terms of the underlying nuerological processes. Dennett thinks there is no conversation to be had. Qualia do not exist. He spends a lot of time criticizing different views of qualia, stating that the fact that there is no clear consensus in regards to what philosophers mean by qualia is a huge problem for the debate rightly so. He provides thought experiment after thought experiment that showcase the many errors in logic that go into Sweet Dreams: Philosophical Obstacles to a Science of Consciousness normal conception of what qualia is. These are all valid criticisms, but criticizing the logic behind various conceptions of qualia does not change the fact that I have subjective experience, and right now neither philosophy nor neuroscience can explain how this subjective experience is substantiated by neuronal firing. This is Sweet Dreams: Philosophical Obstacles to a Science of Consciousness important question, one which we may never have an answer to for all I know. But denying that there is a question in the first place doesn't make any sense to me. One example that Dennett uses is an experiment where a series of alternating pictures are presented to subjects. The pictures are identical accept for one small part which is changed in color. Subjects are asked to push a button when they become aware of the difference in pictures which takes people a long time. He then asks if before you were aware of the difference, if your color qualia was changing as the image that falls on your retina, and sent to your visual Sweet Dreams: Philosophical Obstacles to a Science of Consciousness is obviously changing. He then proceeds to outline all sorts of problems with whatever answer you give. I'm as strong a materialist as Dennett is I guess until Chalmers convinces me otherwiseso to me, I have an even more vested interest in thinking that there needs to be an explanation for how and why qualia exists. Explaining how our neurophysiology substantiates experience, meaning, and a unified conscious experience is to me the holy grain of consciousness research. Am I missing something? Dennett is great about pointing out logical fallacies in regards to all sorts of theories of consciousness, but seems to be quite content to Sweet Dreams: Philosophical Obstacles to a Science of Consciousness all sorts of vague holes in his theories. View all 8 comments. Selon les critiques Chalmers, Nagel, Levine Il soutient : non. Jan 09, Leo Horovitz rated it really liked it Shelves: philosophyphilosophy- of-mindmindconsciousnessnon-fictionscience. After finishing Consciousness Explained recently and liking it very much, feeling convinced Dennett tackles the issues in the appropriate way, I felt a need to read this one next. Here, Dennett elaborates on his ideas that in order to understand consciousness, we need to take empirical findings seriously and if we do, we realize that there is no room for any center of consciousness in the brain. Rather, we find that activities are spread out over different areas having different functional roles After finishing Consciousness Explained recently and liking it very much, feeling convinced Dennett tackles the issues in the appropriate way, I felt a need to read this one next. Rather, we find that activities are spread out over different areas having different functional roles, somehow adding up to conscious experiences. He sketches a theory of how and why certain activities result in conscious awareness, Sweet Dreams: Philosophical Obstacles to a Science of Consciousness his earlier attempts through the multiple drafts model and fame models of consciousness, into the fantasy echo theory, according to which our consciousness is explained in terms of our ability to recall experiences which results in episodic memories being possible. As I understand Dennett here, he calls attention to an important difference between lower forms of attention, such as that exhibited by lower forms of life who we agree do not enjoy consciousness, at least not of our kind, and higher forms of attention that requires the ability to form experiences of episodes. It is just this ability to experience not just simple inclinations towards reacting in certain ways in response to perceptions, but complete episodes that can be memorized and recalled that explains our conscious experiences. An important aspect of the theory is that any conscious experience consists simply in a multitude of lower, unconscious states in the mind which come together to form the experience and that there is no one moment in which something enters into consciousness but that there is competition at any moment between different sets of lower brain states to rise in activity. The different models come together more or less, and can be seen as elaborations on each other. In the multiple drafts model, Dennett made the analogy to academic articles. There are often no one canonical version Sweet Dreams: Philosophical Obstacles to a Science of Consciousness the article, it can be in circulation as one or several different drafts, be published in a conference proceedings and then in a slightly different version in a journal and so on. There simply is no answer to the question of when the article is officially published and Dennett suggested, by his multiple drafts model, that there similarly is no answer to the question of when a something first enters into consciousness. It is a gradual process of many lower brain states being activated together yielding conscious experiences that arise as "drafts" that get revised multiple times. The fame model describes the situation in other terms: different conscious experiences have a potential at any moment to arise from the activity of the brain, with these potential experiences competing for the "fame" Sweet Dreams: Philosophical Obstacles to a Science of Consciousness attention. In the fantasy echo model, Dennett seems to focus on another aspect of this. With the previous models, he attempted to explain how there is no one moment when something reaches a point of awareness, that there's an ongoing process by which conscious experiences shifts and changes Sweet Dreams: Philosophical Obstacles to a Science of Consciousness. Now, he lays down a theory of how conscious experiences are explained by focusing on our ability to recall events, to shape memories and experiences into episodes, which supposedly is meant to Sweet Dreams: Philosophical Obstacles to a Science of Consciousness how we get rich experiences and not merely the primitive responses of unconscious life forms let's take bacteria, for an uncontroversial example of a responsive yet unconscious life form. The other side of this view of conscious experiences is that they are analyzable, at least potentially, in terms of lower, unconscious brain states and this is where Dennett spends a lot of time, I think rightly, to attack the idea of qualia and to show what goes wrong if some intuitions are left unexamined when considering some classic thought experiments meant to prove the existence of qualia. Philosophical zombies and Mary the color scientist are treated at length and the analysis seems to hold, but I'm not going to try to summarize them here now. In conclusion, Dennett is to the point, unimpressed by intuitions, and carefully considerate of scientific results. His models are attempts to account for something beyond that which science can currently investigate fully, but he provides suggestions informed by scientific results for where to look for a theory of consciousness rather than, as Chalmers and others seem to be doing, suggest that consciousness is some sort of fundamental building block in our ontology such that no scientific, third-person, investigation can ever explain it. It's a lovely book further explaining Dennett's views of consciousness, perfect reading for anyone who has already read Consciousness Explained. The only reason I'm giving it only Sweet Dreams: Philosophical Obstacles to a Science of Consciousness stars and I would have given it four and a half if that had been possible is that there are times when Dennett writes tiny dialogues in which he pits his views against those of his opponents. Such passages can be enlightening and interesting as we know from Plato Even though I agree with most of his conclusions and think he does a good job of defending himself against his opponents, I think he does so best when he quotes them and picks apart their arguments one by one. In the dialogues though, he mostly succeeds in creating straw men that are way too easily defeated. I think the qualia people are misguided and confused but, as is shown when Dennett does quote them, their arguments take some time to pick apart and he does not do any of his opponents justice by making them go down so quickly as he does in the dialogues. Thankfully, these passages are few and short so they do not harm the reading experience too much, but it's enough that the rating needs to fall short of the full five stars.

Sweet Dreams: Philosophical Obstacles to a Science of Consciousness is a book by the American philosopher Daniel Dennettbased on the text of the Jean Nicod lectures he gave in Dennett extends his well noted attack on the philosophical notion of qualia by using the metaphor Sweet Dreams: Philosophical Obstacles to a Science of Consciousness philosophical zombies as well as addressing many popular thought experiments. Dennett's conclusion is that there are no qualia and that the mind, and consciousness, can be understood and explained from the Naturalist school of thought. Dennett reposes the question of consciousness addressed in his book Consciousness Explained. In Consciousness ExplainedSweet Dreams: Philosophical Obstacles to a Science of Consciousness established what he called the " multiple drafts model " of consciousness, which suggested that there was no singular space in the conscious mind. In other words, there is no special location in the brain that can be seen as the qualia-containing "consciousness module". Instead, he states that Sweet Dreams: Philosophical Obstacles to a Science of Consciousness is smeared throughout the brain. He extends the model by creating a similar figure that he calls "Fame in the Brain" and suggests that the mind acts, to some degree, as an echo chamberas well as the Sweet Dreams: Philosophical Obstacles to a Science of Consciousness of semi-independent agencies" that he suggested in Consciousness Explained. The main tenet of "Fame in the Brain" is that consciousness, much like fameis not the cause, but the aftermath of certain brain processes. Dennett asks us to imagine an author whose book has yet to be released, but will result in unimaginable fame when it does. On Tuesday, when the book is to come out, he is scheduled to go on The Oprah Winfrey Showto be interviewed on the BBCand likely be nominated for several awards. However, on Monday, an earthquake destroys the entire city of San Francisco. Naturally, all the media hype that would have revolved around this author is drowned in the focus on San Francisco. Dennett asks, can this man be considered "famous"? He says that the man is in fact not famous even though the book that would have made him famous remains unchanged. This is because fame, according to Dennett, is not about the cause of the fame, but about the aftermath: the interviews, the magazine covers, the paparazzietc. Consciousness is the same way. In order for something to be considered "conscious", there must be enough correlating neural events that go with it e. From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia. This article does not cite any sources. Please help improve this article by adding citations to reliable sources. Unsourced material may be challenged and removed. Daniel Dennett. Cartesian theater Greedy reductionism Heterophenomenology Intentional stance Intuition pump Memetics Multiple drafts model. Hidden categories: Articles lacking sources from March All articles lacking sources All stub articles. Namespaces Article Talk. Views Read Edit View history. Help Learn to edit Community portal Recent changes Upload file. Download as PDF Printable version. Cover of the first edition. Daniel C. Breaking the Spell. This article about a philosophy -related book is a stub. You can help Wikipedia by expanding it.