American Psychologist Public Skepticism of Psychology: Why Many People Perceive the Study of Human Behavior as Unscientific Scott O. Lilienfeld Online First Publication, June 13, 2011. doi: 10.1037/a0023963 CITATION Lilienfeld, S. O. (2011, June 13). Public Skepticism of Psychology: Why Many People Perceive the Study of Human Behavior as Unscientific. American Psychologist. Advance online publication. doi: 10.1037/a0023963 Public Skepticism of Psychology Why Many People Perceive the Study of Human Behavior as Unscientific Scott O. Lilienfeld Emory University Data indicate that large percentages of the general public and allied trends (see Redding & O’Donohue, 2009, and regard psychology’s scientific status with considerable Tierney, 2011, for recent discussions) have retarded the skepticism. I examine 6 criticisms commonly directed at the growth of scientific psychology. Others (e.g., Dawes, 1994; scientific basis of psychology (e.g., psychology is merely Lilienfeld, Lynn, & Lohr, 2003; Thyer & Pignotti, in press) common sense, psychology does not use scientific methods, have assailed the scientific status of large swaths of clinical psychology is not useful to society) and offer 6 rebuttals. I psychology, counseling psychology, and allied mental then address 8 potential sources of public skepticism to- health disciplines, contending that these fields have been ward psychology and argue that although some of these overly permissive of poorly supported practices. Still oth- sources reflect cognitive errors (e.g., hindsight bias) or ers (e.g., S. Koch, 1969; Meehl, 1978) have bemoaned the misunderstandings of psychological science (e.g., failure to at times painfully slow pace of progress of psychology, distinguish basic from applied research), others (e.g., psy- especially in the “softer” domains of social, personality, chology’s failure to police itself, psychology’s problematic clinical, and counseling psychology. public face) reflect the failure of professional psychology to Such criticisms have been ego bruising to many of us get its own house in order. I offer several individual and in psychology. At the same time, they have been valuable institutional recommendations for enhancing psychology’s and have spurred the field toward much needed reforms, image and contend that public skepticism toward psychol- such as greater emphasis on effect sizes and confidence ogy may, paradoxically, be one of our field’s strongest intervals in addition to (or in lieu of) tests of statistical allies. significance (Cohen, 1994; Meehl, 1978) and the develop- Keywords: psychology, skepticism, bias, psychotherapy, ment of criteria for, and lists of, evidence-based psycho- misconceptions, self-help logical interventions (Chambless & Hollon, 1998). Yet with the exception of criticisms of mental health practice, henever we psychologists dare to venture out- most of the concerns voiced by insiders probably overlap side of the hallowed halls of academia or our only minimally with those of outsiders. therapy offices to that foreign land called the Whatever the sources of the public’s skepticism of W psychology’s scientific status, it is clear that such doubts “real world,” we are likely at some point to encounter a puzzling and, for us, troubling phenomenon. Specifically, are not new (Benjamin, 2006)—nor is our field’s deep- most of us will inevitably hear the assertion from layper- seated insecurity about how outsiders view it. As Coon sons that psychology—which those of us within the pro- (1992) remarked when explaining psychology’s conspicu- fession generally regard as the scientific study of behavior, ous omission from Auguste Comte’s mid-19th-century hi- broadly construed—is in actuality not a science. Some erarchy of the sciences, outsiders go further, insinuating or insisting that much of It is well-known that whereas sociology sat at the peak of the modern psychology is pseudoscientific. Keith Stanovich Comtian hierarchy, psychology was not even on the pyramid, (2009) dubbed psychology the “Rodney Dangerfield of the having been deemed incapable of becoming a science because its sciences” (p. 175) in reference to the late comedian famous subject matter was unquantifiable and its methods mired in a for joking that “I don’t get no respect.” As Stanovich metaphysical morass. Psychology has never quite lived this down observed, “Most judgments about the field and its accom- and, as psychologists themselves like to say, has never recovered plishments are resoundingly negative” (p. 175). from its adolescent physics envy. (p. 143) Ironically, some of the harshest criticisms of contem- porary psychology’s scientific status have come from within the ranks of psychology itself (see Gergen, 1973; I thank Robin Cautin, David Baker, Steven Jay Lynn, William S. C. Hayes, 2004; Lilienfeld, 2010; Lykken, 1968, 1991; O’Donohue, and Rachel Winograd for their helpful comments on a draft G. A. Miller, 2004; Skinner, 1987). Specifically, many of this article and Rhea Farberman, Anthony Pratkanis, and Jim Clark for scholars within psychology have rued the extent to which sharing useful resources. Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Scott (a) excessive reliance on statistical significance testing, (b) O. Lilienfeld, Department of Psychology, Emory University, Room 473, the propensity of psychologists to posit vague theoretical Psychology and Interdisciplinary Sciences Building, 36 Eagle Row, At- entities that are difficult to test, and (c) political correctness lanta, GA 30322. E-mail: [email protected] Month 2011 ● American Psychologist 1 © 2011 American Psychological Association 0003-066X/11/$12.00 Vol. ●●, No. ●, 000–000 DOI: 10.1037/a0023963 ence (APS), and other professional organizations are right to rebut such misunderstandings when they arise. Yet, with the exception of the APA Science Directorate pamphlet, such efforts are usually reactive rather than proactive. Moreover, these efforts may meet with mixed and at best short-term success, because they largely neglect to appre- ciate the underlying reasons for policymakers’ skepticism. Understanding why many nonpsychologists are skep- tical of psychology is important for four reasons. First, such knowledge can forearm psychologists not only when field- ing questions from skeptical relatives at holiday dinners (“But isn’t what you’re studying pretty obvious?”) but, more crucially, when encountering resistance about psy- chological findings from students, therapy clients, and lay- persons. In this way, such knowledge can equip psycholo- gists with intellectual ammunition against misguided criticisms of their field. Second, such knowledge may allow psychologists to anticipate commonplace objections to psy- chological research from policymakers and help psycholo- gists explain the pragmatic and theoretical significance of Scott O. their research to outsiders. Third, such knowledge is valu- Lilienfeld able in its own right, because it sheds light on the psycho- logical sources of resistance to the scientific study of hu- man nature (see also Bloom & Weisberg, 2007, for a discussion of developmental precursors of resistance to Nevertheless, as a field, we have been reluctant to science). In this respect, it may help us to grasp why so examine the reasons for the widespread and longstanding many educated individuals find psychology to be unscien- public skepticism of psychology (but see Benjamin, 1986, tific. Fourth, such knowledge may aid psychologists in for a useful historical analysis), perhaps because we see crafting recommendations for counteracting public and little merit in these reasons. Nor have we invested much policymakers’ misunderstandings of psychology. effort in generating potential solutions for enhancing our In this article, I pose two overarching questions: (a) field’s public image. Are the negative views of psychology’s scientific status Yet we ignore negative lay perceptions of psychology held by many outsiders warranted? (b) What are the prin- at our peril. Public skepticism of psychology may render cipal sources of these views? I place primary emphasis on would-be mental health consumers reluctant to seek out our the psychological and sociological reasons for the public’s potentially valuable clinical services. Public skepticism skepticism of psychology’s scientific status. Nevertheless, I may have also contributed indirectly to psychology’s no- acknowledge that these negative attitudes have deep his- ticeable absence from some funding agencies’ lists of Sci- torical roots, including early 20th-century psychologists’ ence, Technology, Engineering, and Mathematics (STEM) entanglements with the paranormal and spiritualism, which disciplines (Price, 2011). As a consequence of this lack of probably contributed to psychology’s less than glowing recognition, “Psychologists are often not eligible for tar- public image (Benjamin, 2006; Coon, 1992). I conclude by geted funding for education, professional training, and re- proposing several individual and institutional recommen- search that could contribute substantially to achieving dations for diminishing the widespread public skepticism STEM goals” (American Psychological Association [APA] of psychology as a scientific discipline. Before doing so, I 2009 Presidential Task Force Report on the Future of canvass data on the prevalence of the public’s skeptical Psychology as a STEM Discipline, 2010, p. 6), such as attitudes toward psychology’s scientific status, as such data programs for boosting psychology students’ science and offer us a glimpse of the magnitude