The Knowledge That Mclear Submarines Emitted High Noise
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National Library Bibiiitheque nationale 1+1 of Canada du Canada Acquisitions and Acquisitions et Bibliographie Services services bibliographiques 395 Wellington Street 395. rwWdlülgton OnawaON KIAOFU OaawaON KlAW Canada Canada The author has granted a non- L'auteur a accordé une licence non exclusive licence allowing the exclusive permettant à la National Library of Canada to Bibliothèque nationale du Canada de reproduce, loan, distribute or seli reproduire, prêter, distribuer ou copies of this thesis in microfom, vendre des copies de cette thèse sous paper or electronic formats. la forme de rnicrofiche/film, de reproduction sur papier ou sur format électronique. The author retains ownership of the L'auteur conserve la propriété du copyright in this thesis. Neither the droit d'auteur qui protège cette thèse. thesis nor substantial extracts fkom it Ni la thèse ni des extraits substantiels may be printed or otherwise de celle-ci ne doivent être imprimés reproduced without the author's ou autrement reproduits sans son permission. autorisation. Supervisor: Dr. David Zimmerrnan ABSTRACT The Canadian hydrofoil warship programme of 1959-1971 represented a triumph of naval architecture, design, and technology. Launched in respouse to the perceived threat posed to Canadian security by new Soviet submarine designs, the Fast Hydrofoil Escort Bras d'Or was designed to regain the lost tactical advantage for Canadian and NATO anti-submarïne &are (ASW) forces. In the end, Canada's hydrofoil programme produced a largely successiil and potentiaiiy effective warship after decades of research, millions of dollars and person-hours, and the mprecedented application of state-of-the-art technology . However, three main tàctors contributed to the uitimate tàilure of the project. First, the project failed because of its inescient management by a convoluted bureaucratie system. As an experimentai programme with military applications, the FHE-400 project was managed simultaneously by three separate governmental agencies, resulting in duplication of effort and wastage of resources. Second, the Iack of a clearly stated operational requirement for the ship during its early development impeded the progress of the programme and, more importantly, greatly limited the federal government 's willingness to support the project. Final1y, the practical requirement for the hydrofoil design becarne increasingly dubious as other effective, and more conventional, ASW systems were developed and successfùlly proven during the 1960s. Tabk of Contents Page .- Abmt Il Table of Contents Acknowledgement Dedication List of Abbreviatioas htroduction and Historiographie Review Chapter One: Ongins of the Design Chapter Two: The Navy's Decision to Build Chapter The:Construction and Evaluation Conclusion Appendix A: The Hydrofoil Concept Appendix B: Rash of the Royal Canadian Navy Appendix C : Illustrations Bibliography 1 wish to thank Dr. David Zimmeman for his guidance and support in helping me prepare this thesis. I sincerely appreciate Dr. Zimmeman's unwavering support of my shidies at the University of Victoria despite my other profesJional comrnitments which competed for my time and effort. I would also like to extend my appreciation to Judy Nixon of the History Department for keeping me on track administratively since my dvalon campus in 1997. For Hal, dose support was instrumental in the completion of this undertaking- I can only hope that this worlc at lem prtially fblfills his expectations. vii List of Abbrwiations Nos(A&W) Assistant Chief of Naval Staff(Air & Warfiue) AK-Ns (Pl Assistant Chief of Naval Staff (Plans) Ais Anti-submarine ASW Anti-submarine Mare CNS Chief ofNaval Staff ms Chief of Naval Technical Services cwc Canadian Westinghouse Company DDP Department of Defence Production Dm Directorate of Hydrofoil Development DGFE Director General Fighting Equipment DG Ships Director General Ships DM Deputy Minister Dm Deparcment of National Defence DNOR Duector Naval Operational Requirements DREA Defence Research Establisinnent Atlantic DRE3 Defence Research Board FHE Fast Hydrofoil Escort MIL Marine industries Limited MND Minister of National Defence NATO North Atlantic Treaty Orwtion NiCoMo Nickel Cobalt Molytidenum NRE Navd Research Establishment NSHQ Naval Service Headquarters RCN Royal Canadian Navy RN Royat Navy SNCNS Scientific Advisor to the Chief of Naval Staff USN United States Navy VCDS Vice Chief of the Navai Staff VDS Variable Depth Sonar The Anti-Submarine Hvdrofoil Concept The mounting threat from advanceci Soviet submarines during the 1950s. combined with chronic manning shorîages within the Royal Canadian Navy (RCN) and the massive expense associated with modem destroyer comûuction, fordCanadian naval planwn to examine alternative wanhip designs. One such design was for a very fast, open-ocean anti-submarine warfare (ASW)hydrofoil cmcapable of detecting and attacking the fastest Soviet submarines.' With its origins in the work of Alexander Graham Bell and a score of other designers and naval architects over a fim-year the Canadian experimental hydrofoil programme of the 1950s and 1960s offered a possible solution to the threat poseà by fast Soviet nuclear submarines. indeafter decades of research and millions of dollars, the Canadian hydrofoil warship programme of 1959- 197 1 evenNally represented a triumph of naval architecture, design, and technology. While a technical success in that Bras d 'Or conclusively established the hydrofoil's trernendous speed advantage over conventional surface ship designs, three main façtors contributed to the ultimate failure of the project First, the lack of a timely and clearly stated operational requirement for the ship by naval planners complicated the programme's development an4 more importantly, greatly limited the fedeml government's ability and willingness to support the project. Esxntially rnanaged as an expenmental research project by the Defence Research Board (DRB),the extremely 1 For an overview of hydrofoil theory, including a gddescription of the FHE JO0 design, sec Appendix A experirnental nature of the project made it more prone to inconsistent finaacial and political support than more conventiooal defence procurement programmes such as the DDH-280destroyer project of 1965- 1973. Second, the project failed because of inefficient management by a convoluted and cumbersome bureaucratie system. As an experirnental programme with militiuy applications, the FHE 400 project was managed sirndtaneously by three separate agencies: the Royal Canadian Navy (Maritime Command afier 1968), the Deparmient of Defence Production, and the Defence Research Board. The vague and often confîkt- ridden nature of this management system was fbrther complicated by the prime contractor, DeHavilland Aircraf? of Cm&, king granted exceptional independent autonomy over the design and construction of the vesseL3 Final1y, the pnictical requirement for the hydrofoil design beaune increasingly unclear as other effective, and more conventional, ASW systems were successflilly developed. The hel icopter-destroyer team, for example, was developed concurrentl y wi th the hydrofoil programme and proved to be an excellent ASW system both in simulations and actual operations.' As more information becarne available regarding the capabilities and limitations of Soviet submarines, it became increasingly apparent to Canadian naval planners that other existing systems could effectively fulfill the Navy's ASW requi rements. Canada' s hydrofoil programme eventually produced a success ful and potentiall y effective warship afier decades of research, millions of dollars and person-hours, and the J. Jordan, Modem Destrov- (ïandoa: Prenticc Hall Press, 1986), 25. ' "RCNIASW Hydrofoil Project" DG Ships to SNCNS, 30 Mafch 1962 (RG 24 Acc 1983-84/167 Vol. 18), 1. 4 C.Dalley, "The Marritige of the Small Ship and Large Helicopter", Meritme Warfme Builetin, 1985 ed. unprecedented developmeat and application of stateof-the-art techoology, consûuction rnatenals, and propulsion ~~sterns.~Yet, despite performance tbat exceeded design expectations and enormous potential in tenns of naval applications, the above factors combined to ensure its ultimate cancel Mon in 1971. Historical Background Canada's postwar navy was, in large! part, a proàuct of its Second World War experience. In response to the threat posed by Gexman U-bats to the Atlantic sea lines of communication, the Royal Canadian Navy (RCN)grew nom a flotilla of sixteen ships in 1939 to the world's third largest fleet by war's end? in contrast to the Ra's pre-war fleet of a few heavii y-armed destroyers manned by a very mal1 core of professionals, the North Atlantic campaign of 193%1945 was fou& largeiy by inexperienced "amateurs" in small and poorly-equipped corvettes. Despite mounting Ailied shipping losses to the German subrnarine threat, Canada's professional (or "big-ship") navy initially viewed the submarine assault on Allied shipping as secondary to preparations for major engagements against the capital ships of the Gennan ~rei~smarine.' To this end, Raplanners comrnitted significant resources and personnel during the war to the construction of Tribal-class fleet destroyers, designed for escorting fleet task groups and other fleet-oriented work. Whiie fundamentally misguided in view of the pressing need for smaller escorts and the resources to support their gruelling cycle of operations, this ambitious construction programme reflected the continued dominance of ' -'Bras d'Or Skipper Sees Many