Introduction: Hilbert's Axiomatics As 'Symbolic Form'?
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Introduction: Hilbert’s Axiomatics as ‘Symbolic Form’? Rossella Lupacchini University of Bologna According to Ernst Cassirer, symbolic forms “are not different modes in which an independent reality manifests itself to the human spirit but roads which the spirit proceeds towards its objectivization, i.e., its self- revelation” (1923, p. 78). Can Hilbert’s axiomatics be viewed as a symbolic form? The aim of this introductory essay is to frame the question in a ‘map’ and to provide a few signs to orient it. Each of the essays collected in this vol- ume may contribute a different set of instructions to reach an answer. Both Hilbert’s axiomatics and Cassirer’s philosophy of symbolic forms have their roots in Leibniz’s idea of a ‘universal characteristic,’ and grow on Hertz’s ‘principles of mechanics,’ and Dedekind’s ‘foundations of arith- metic’. As Cassirer recalls in the introduction to his Philosophy of Symbolic Forms, it was the discovery of the analysis of inªnity that led Leibniz to fo- cus on “the universal problem inherent in the function of symbolism, and to raise his ‘universal characteristic’ to a truly philosophical plane.” In Leibniz’s view, the logic of ‘things’ cannot be separated from the logic of ‘signs,’ as “the sign is no mere accidental cloak of the idea, but its neces- sary and essential organ.” Every ‘law’ of nature assumes for our thinking the form of a univer- sal ‘formula’—and a formula can be expressed only by a combina- tion of universal and speciªc signs. [. .] The content of the spirit is disclosed only in its manifestations; the ideal form is known only by and in the aggregate of the sensible signs which it uses for its expression. (Cassirer 1923, p. 86) I am grateful to Wilfried Sieg for his detailed remarks on the ªrst draft of this essay. Perspectives on Science 2014, vol. 22, no. 1 ©2014 by The Massachusetts Institute of Technology doi:10.1162/POSC_e_00116 1 Downloaded from http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/POSC_e_00116 by guest on 27 September 2021 2 Hilbert’s Axiomatics as ‘Symbolic Form’? It was by means of a “grammar of the symbolic function” that Leibniz was able to broaden the traditional and historical concept of idealism. “Ideal- ism,” Cassirer observes, “has always aimed at juxtaposing to the mundus sensibilis another cosmos, the mundus intelligibilis, and at deªning the boundary between these two worlds” (Cassirer 1923, p. 87). But for the ‘universal characteristic’ this opposition is no longer irreconcilable and ex- clusive: “the senses and the spirit are now joined in a new form of reciproc- ity and correlation.” The question at issue, in the language of Kantian philosophy, is “the share which thought, on the one hand, and experience, on the other, have in our knowledge.” Hilbert addressed it at Königsberg, in 1930, in order to highlight the core of his scientiªc carrier. He entrusted his answer to the axiomatic method, “a general method for the theoretical treatment of questions in the natural sciences,” and even more: already in daily life methods and concept-formations are used that demand a great measure of abstraction and that can be understood only by the unconscious application of axiomatic methods. For ex- ample, the general process of negation, and in particular the con- cept “inªnite.” (1930, p. 1159) Precisely in the concept of ‘inªnite,’ Hilbert identiªed “an important par- allelism between nature and thought, a fundamental agreement between experience and theory.” The inªnite is not an ‘observable’ of nature; it is nowhere realized, and it is not to be admitted in our thought “without special precautions”. As far as the concept ‘inªnite’ is concerned, we must be clear to ourselves that ‘inªnite’ has no intuitive meaning [anschauliche Bedeutung] and that without more detailed investigation it has abso- lutely no sense. For everywhere there are only ªnite things. [. .] There is absolutely nothing continuous that can be divided inªn- itely often. Even light has atomic structure [. .] inªnity, because it is the negation of a condition that prevails everywhere, is a gigantic abstraction—practicable only through the conscious or unconscious application of the axiomatic method. (1930, p. 1159) It is mathematics that mediates between theory and practice, between thought and observation; it is mathematics that builds the connecting bridges. Hilbert also noticed that even though “the laws of the world can be acquired in no other way than through experience,” conic sections were studied “long before one suspected that our planets or even electrons move in such a course.” This is a very old and eloquent example of “an occur- rence which is virtually an embodiment and realization of mathematical Downloaded from http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/POSC_e_00116 by guest on 27 September 2021 Perspectives on Science 3 thoughts.” Mathematics, however, does not merge with nature, nor with thought. As Hilbert explained: We can understand this agreement between nature and thought, between experience and theory, only if we take into account both the formal element and the mechanism that is connected with it; and we must do this both for nature and for our understanding. (1930, p. 1160; my emphasis) 1. The ‘Mechanism’ of Physical Knowledge The axiomatic design, brought about by mathematical constructions, also reveals an underlying connecting structure between various disciplines.1 This helps clarify why “the most important bearers of mathematical thought have always...cultivated the relations to the neighbouring sciences, especially to the great empires of physics and epistemology” (Hilbert 1918, p. 1107). This helps clarify in what way the most rigorous treatment of a problem, speciªc to one science, can extract beneªts from results and concepts that originate from neighbouring sciences. In Hilbert’s vision, rigor goes hand in hand with open-mindedness. While insisting on rigour as a requirement for a perfect solution of a problem, I should like [. .] to oppose the opinion that only the concepts of analysis, or even those of arithmetic alone, are suscepti- ble of a fully rigorous treatment [. .] Such a one-sided interpreta- tion of the requirement of rigour would soon lead to the ignoring of all concepts arising from geometry, mechanics, and physics, to a stoppage of the ºow of new material from the outside world, and ªnally, indeed, as a last consequence, to the rejection of the ideas of the continuum and of the irrational number. But what an impor- tant nerve, vital to mathematical science, would be cut by the extir- pation of geometry and mathematical physics! (Hilbert 1900b, p. 1100) But unlike Hilbert, who saw in mathematics the key to understanding na- ture and considered the link between mathematics, geometry, and physics as vital, important bearers of physical thought at the end of the 19th cen- tury concerned themselves instead with keeping physics separate from mathematics. In the 1880s, the ‘atomist’ Boltzmann was accused of substituting mathematical deduction for physical thought, of reducing the physical science to an empty game of abstract symbols and monstrous algorithms. 1. Along this lines, Marletto and Rasetti’s essay in this volume is an eloquent develop- ment of Hilbert’s view. Downloaded from http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/POSC_e_00116 by guest on 27 September 2021 4 Hilbert’s Axiomatics as ‘Symbolic Form’? The accuser was Peter G. Tait, co-author with Lord Kelvin of the Treatise on Natural Philosophy (1867) one of the most inºuential works of the 19th century. Located in the tradition of Newtonian empiricism, the Trea- tise supports energetics in the ‘atomistics vs. energetics’ dispute, which fu- eled the epistemological debate. The ‘crisis’ of atomism was claimed at the 1895 Lübeck meeting of the German Association of Scientists and Physicians,2 and corroborated by Ernst Mach’s phenomenalism. According to Mach, the variety of natural processes and phenomena is already an ar- gument against the primacy of mechanistic atomism. He admits that our efforts to mirror the world in thought would be futile if we were not able to grasp something stable in the ºow of experience. Yet, when we separate an object from its changeable environment, what we really do is isolate a group of sensations to which we ascribe a greater stability than to the oth- ers. On this basic group of sensations, we ªx our thoughts. Since the ob- ject does not lose its identity, while single elements are extracted from the group, we are led to consider that, after removing all the elements, some- thing still remains. Here comes the illusion of a ‘substance’ distinct from its attributes, a Ding-an-sich, and the useless attempt to reduce all phe- nomena to the motion of atoms. The physical model, proposed as an alter- native to classical mechanistic philosophy, is that which results from the collection of our sensory representations of physical data, mathematically organized according to a “principle of economy.” All of the conceptual in- struments involved in the cognitive process are regarded as devices for the economy of thought. But the advantage of logical-scientiªc thought, notices Husserl con- temporaneously, lies in the capacity of going beyond the limits of what is given in intuition. Logic ought to come before any economy of thought; hence founding the former on the latter would be nonsense (1900, Prole- gomena to Pure Logic IX). Husserl underlines a fundamental difference be- tween natural and logical theories: what makes a theory “logical” is an ideal nexus of necessity which prevails within it, whereas any properly theoretical component remains foreign to a “natural” theory. Thus, in the frame of phenomenalism, a physical theory is viewed as a natural theory. It was for mathematical reasons that Boltzmann intervened in the dis- pute between the physics of atoms and the physics of energy, or the phys- ics of the continuum.