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Rise of Islamist Insurgency in Russia's Northern Caucasus

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Rise of Islamist Insurgency in Russia's Northern Caucasus BACKGROUNDER No. 2643 | MarcH 26, 2012 A Threat to the West: The Rise of Islamist Insurgency in the Northern Caucasus and Russia’s Inadequate Response Ariel Cohen, Ph.D. Abstract ussia’s Northern Caucasus is The Islamist insurgency in Russia’s Rturning into one of the most vol- Talking Points Northern Caucasus threatens to turn atile, lawless regions in the world and the region into a haven for internation- a hotbed for international terrorist ■■ Russia’s Northern Caucasus is one al terrorism and to destabilize the en- activity in spite of decades of Russian of the most volatile, lawless regions tire region, which is a critical hub of oil military operations and repeated in the world and a hotbed of inter- national terrorism. and gas pipelines located at Europe’s assurances from the Russian govern- doorstep. Neither Russia’s excessive ment that peace has been achieved. ■■ The region’s economic and social use of military force nor its massive As Russia continues to lose control prospects remain grim due to the ongoing crisis caused by Russia’s economic aid to the region appear to of the region, it is becoming a signifi- heavy-handed security policy have helped. The U.S. and its friends cant base for Islamist terrorist orga- and pervasive corruption and and allies should keep a close watch on nizations and organized crime and mismanagement. the region. In the meantime, the U.S. may ignite an even greater terrorist ■■ The United States and its allies and should work with neighboring coun- campaign inside Russia and beyond. partners have a strong interest in tries to improve their border security. Islamist terrorists from the self- reducing the Islamist threat and to The U.S. should also encourage and proclaimed Caucasus Emirate have keep the insurgency isolated from work with Middle Eastern countries already attacked energy infrastruc- the global Islamist movement. to stop the flow of cash to the Islamist ture, trains, planes, theaters, and hos- ■■ Security and intelligence coop- terrorist organizations. pitals. They are increasingly involved eration, economic and technical in terrorist activities in Western assistance, and public diplomacy Europe and Central Asia, including can help to address this regional Afghanistan. The North Caucasus challenge. Islamist insurgency is part of the ■■ Washington should (1) counter the global radical Islamist movement, Russian blame game with targeted which is deeply and implacably inimi- public diplomacy; (2) reinvigorate cal to the West and the United States. security relations with Georgia This paper, in its entirety, can be found at and Azerbaijan to strengthen http://report.heritage.org/bg2643 Russian counterinsurgency pro- border controls and train local Produced by the Douglas and Sarah Allison grams have partially failed, marred Center for Foreign Policy Studies intelligence and law enforcement by excessive use of force and repeat- forces; (3) pressure Middle East- The Heritage Foundation ed human rights violations. The 214 Massachusetts Avenue, NE ern states to stop their nationals Washington, DC 20002–4999 Russian civilian and military leader- from funding and training terror- (202) 546-4400 | heritage.org ship tends to overemphasize coun- ists; and (4) engage European Nothing written here is to be construed as necessarily terterrorist operations, while largely states in bilateral anti-terrorism reflecting the views of The Heritage Foundation or cooperation. as an attempt to aid or hinder the passage of any bill ignoring the broader counterinsur- before Congress. gency perspective.1 BACKGROUNDER | NO. 2643 MarcH 26, 2012 UKRAINE KAZAKHSTAN 21 Sea of 28 21 Azov D 28 21 T 28 27 RUSSIA A 2 2 21 T Caspian 16 Sea 3 A 26 21 a R 4 26 26 23 4 R R 25 D R 23 15 0 miles 100 a R I R 1 19 14 a R a 25 G 5 7 R 19 R GEORGIA 8 Black O 9 22 5 Sea 19 O 12 R Tbilisi 6 Z 7 11 R 27 a R 10 13 16 17 22 R MAP 1 R R L L K Ethnolinguistic Groups 22 Baku in the Caucasus Region ARMENIA AZERBAIJAN R R T K Yerevan Caucasian Peoples Indo-European Peoples 18 16 T a 22 ABKHAZ 1 Abkhaz ARMENIAN 16 Armenian (a) CIRCASSIAN 2 Adygey (A) GREEK 17 Greek T a 3 Cherkess 18 a 4 Kabardin IRANIAN 18 Kurd (K) T R 22 19 Ossetian (O) GEORGIAN 5 Georgian (G) 20 Talysh AZERBAIJAN Z T DAGESTANI 6 Agul SLAVIC 21 Russian (R) Z 7 Avar TURKEY 8 Dargin (D) 22 9 Lak (l) Altaic Peoples IRAN 10 Lezgin (L) TURKIC 22 Azeri (Z) 11 Rutul 23 Balkar 20 12 Tabasaran 24 Karachay a 22 13 Tsakhur 25 Kumyk 26 Nogay 18 VAINAKH14 Chechen 27 Turkmen (T) 15 Ingush Sparsely populated or uninhabited areas are shown in white. MONGOL 28 Kalmyk Note: Other Source: Central Intelligence Agency, “Ethnolinguistic Groups in the Caucasus Region,” 1995, at http://hdl.loc.gov/loc.gmd/g7121e.ct002881 (February 27, 2012). B2643 heritage.org 2 BACKGROUNDER | NO. 2643 MarcH 26, 2012 To alleviate the hostilities, the centers, and hubs of organized crime. logistical support for operations in Russian government has implement- This should be a cause for concern for Afghanistan. ed many economic and developmen- the United States. Second, the North Caucasus poses tal programs and provided billions of a global threat as a potential terror- dollars in aid to the North Caucasus The Dangers of North ist base in close proximity to U.S. in the past few years. Russian offi- Caucasian Instability European allies. Some terrorists are cials have invested to curb the appeal The danger from North Caucasian already operating in the European of radical Islam among the youth, instability is threefold. Union (EU), as the recent discovery but the area’s overall economic and First, the presence of such and arrest of a Jamaat Shariat cell social prospects remain grim due to an ungovernable enclave in in the Czech Republic illustrates.4 the ongoing security crisis caused Southeastern Europe compromises For now, such incidents are rare by heavy-handed security policy the border stability of U.S. friends and minor, but the massive North and the pervasive corruption and and allies, such as Georgia and Caucasus diaspora in Russia and mismanagement of the Russian Azerbaijan. Unrest in the North Europe will likely become a grow- government. Caucasus increases the security ing security concern for European Thus, Russia’s entire counterin- threats to the two countries, where authorities. Due to Russian pressure surgency strategy is in question. Its border security is already prob- on the North Caucasus insurgency,5 primary goal is “to make the local lematic due to the Georgia–Russia local terrorist groups are too preoc- population less afraid of the law and Azerbaijan–Armenia conflicts. cupied to pose an immediate threat enforcement than the insurgents,”2 Poorly guarded borders increase to the U.S. and Europe. Some experts but the overly violent Russian the risk of cross-border terror- have assessed terrorist activity in the approach has often produced the ist activities. For example, Pankisi region as a “minor global threat.”6 polar opposite. Since the dissolution Gorge in Georgia served as a staging Third, destabilization in the of the Soviet Union in 1991, the North area for Chechen insurgents dur- Northern Caucasus threatens not Caucasus has experienced two major ing the Second Chechen War and just Russia, but also the security wars and numerous skirmishes, provided “a vital link to the outside of the whole Caucasus, including resulting in hundreds of thousands world which was not under the direct Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan. of casualties and internally displaced control of Russia.”3 Porous borders The region is a principal north–south persons, while the fear of terrorism also provide a convenient route for and east–west hub. Oil and gas has spread throughout Russia. illegal trafficking in drugs, weapons, pipelines linking the Caspian Sea Spreading ungovernability in the people, and even nuclear materials. to Western Europe pass through Northern Caucasus facilitates the Such activities may negatively influ- Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey. The emergence of Islamist safe havens, ence America’s relations with Russia, large oil and natural gas reserves in complete with terrorist training the states of the South Caucasus, and the Caspian basin supply a signifi- facilities, religious indoctrination Europe, and they could disrupt U.S. cant share of Europe’s energy needs 1. Andrew C. Kuchins, Gordon M. Hahn, and Robert W. Schaefer, “Getting the Caucasus Emirate Right: Global Jihadism in Russia’s North Caucasus,” audio recording, Center for Strategic and International Studies, September 19, 2011, at http://csis.org/multimedia/audio-getting-caucasus-emirate-right-global-jihadism- russias-north-caucasus (October 26, 2011). 2. Ibid. 3. C. W. Blandy, “North Caucasus: Border Security,” Advanced Research and Assessment Group, Defence Academy of the United Kingdom, March 2008, at http://www.da.mod.uk/colleges/arag/document-listings/caucasus/08%2810%29CWB.pdf (December 27, 2011). 4. RT (Moscow), “Czech Police Detain North Caucasus Terror Suspects,” May 3, 2011, at http://rt.com/politics/north-caucasus-czech-republic/ (October 26, 2011). 5. Alexey Malashenko, “What the North Caucasus Means to Russia,” French Institute of International Relations (Paris), July 2011, at http://www.ifri.org/ downloads/ifricaucasianimpactmalashenkoengmai2011.pdf (October 26, 2011). 6. Kuchins et al., “Getting the Caucasus Emirate Right.” 3 BACKGROUNDER | NO. 2643 MarcH 26, 2012 and may provide an even greater The North Caucasus’s same time, radical Islam is becoming share in the near future as projects Bloody History more popular among young people, such as the Nabucco natural gas pipe- Warfare between Russians and which has allowed Islamist groups line come online.7 The importance of the peoples of the North Caucasus to expand their educational, recruit- pipelines and their vulnerability to has a bloody history that stretches ment, and terrorist activities in the sabotage make them preferred tar- back more than two centuries.
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