BACKGROUNDER No. 2643 | March 26, 2012

A Threat to the West: The Rise of Islamist Insurgency in the Northern and ’s Inadequate Response Ariel Cohen, Ph.D.

Abstract ussia’s Northern Caucasus is The Islamist insurgency in Russia’s Rturning into one of the most vol- Talking Points Northern Caucasus threatens to turn atile, lawless regions in the world and the region into a haven for internation- a hotbed for international terrorist ■■ Russia’s Northern Caucasus is one al terrorism and to destabilize the en- activity in spite of decades of Russian of the most volatile, lawless regions tire region, which is a critical hub of oil military operations and repeated in the world and a hotbed of inter- national terrorism. and gas pipelines located at Europe’s assurances from the Russian govern- doorstep. Neither Russia’s excessive ment that peace has been achieved. ■■ The region’s economic and social use of military force nor its massive As Russia continues to lose control prospects remain grim due to the ongoing crisis caused by Russia’s economic aid to the region appear to of the region, it is becoming a signifi- heavy-handed security policy have helped. The U.S. and its friends cant base for Islamist terrorist orga- and pervasive corruption and and allies should keep a close watch on nizations and organized crime and mismanagement. the region. In the meantime, the U.S. may ignite an even greater terrorist ■■ The United States and its allies and should work with neighboring coun- campaign inside Russia and beyond. partners have a strong interest in tries to improve their border security. Islamist terrorists from the self- reducing the Islamist threat and to The U.S. should also encourage and proclaimed have keep the insurgency isolated from work with Middle Eastern countries already attacked energy infrastruc- the global Islamist movement. to stop the flow of cash to the Islamist ture, trains, planes, theaters, and hos- ■■ Security and intelligence coop- terrorist organizations. pitals. They are increasingly involved eration, economic and technical in terrorist activities in Western assistance, and public diplomacy Europe and Central Asia, including can help to address this regional Afghanistan. The challenge. Islamist insurgency is part of the ■■ Washington should (1) counter the global radical Islamist movement, Russian blame game with targeted which is deeply and implacably inimi- public diplomacy; (2) reinvigorate cal to the West and the United States. security relations with This paper, in its entirety, can be found at and Azerbaijan to strengthen http://report.heritage.org/bg2643 Russian counterinsurgency pro- border controls and train local Produced by the Douglas and Sarah Allison grams have partially failed, marred Center for Foreign Policy Studies intelligence and law enforcement by excessive use of force and repeat- forces; (3) pressure Middle East- The Heritage Foundation ed human rights violations. The 214 Massachusetts Avenue, NE ern states to stop their nationals Washington, DC 20002–4999 Russian civilian and military leader- from funding and training terror- (202) 546-4400 | heritage.org ship tends to overemphasize coun- ists; and (4) engage European Nothing written here is to be construed as necessarily terterrorist operations, while largely states in bilateral anti-terrorism reflecting the views of The Heritage Foundation or cooperation. as an attempt to aid or hinder the passage of any bill ignoring the broader counterinsur- before Congress. gency perspective.1 BACKGROUNDER | NO. 2643 March 26, 2012

UKRAINE KAZAKHSTAN

21

Sea of 28 21 Azov D

28 21 T 28 27 RUSSIA A 2 2 21 T Caspian 16 Sea 3 A 26 21

a R 4 26 26 23 4 R R 25 D R 23 15 0 miles 100 a R I R 1 19 14 a R a 25 G 5 7 R 19 R GEORGIA 8 Black O 9 22 5 Sea 19 O 12 R Tbilisi 6 Z 7 11 R 27 a R 10 13 16 17 22 R MAP 1 R R L L K Ethnolinguistic Groups 22 Baku in the Caucasus Region ARMENIA AZERBAIJAN R R T K Yerevan Caucasian Peoples Indo-European Peoples 18 16 T a 22 ABKHAZ 1 Abkhaz ARMENIAN 16 Armenian (a)

CIRCASSIAN 2 Adygey (A) GREEK 17 Greek T a 3 Cherkess 18 a 4 Kabardin IRANIAN 18 Kurd (K) T R 22 19 Ossetian (O) GEORGIAN 5 Georgian (G) 20 Talysh AZERBAIJAN Z T DAGESTANI 6 Agul SLAVIC 21 Russian (R) Z 7 Avar TURKEY 8 Dargin (D) 22 9 Lak (l) Altaic Peoples IRAN 10 Lezgin (L) TURKIC 22 Azeri (Z) 11 Rutul 23 Balkar 20 12 Tabasaran 24 Karachay a 22 13 Tsakhur 25 Kumyk 26 Nogay 18 VAINAKH14 Chechen 27 Turkmen (T) 15 Ingush Sparsely populated or uninhabited areas are shown in white. MONGOL 28 Kalmyk Note: Other Source: Central Intelligence Agency, “Ethnolinguistic Groups in the Caucasus Region,” 1995, at http://hdl.loc.gov/loc.gmd/g7121e.ct002881 (February 27, 2012). B2643 heritage.org

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To alleviate the hostilities, the centers, and hubs of organized crime. logistical support for operations in Russian government has implement- This should be a cause for concern for Afghanistan. ed many economic and developmen- the United States. Second, the North Caucasus poses tal programs and provided billions of a global threat as a potential terror- dollars in aid to the North Caucasus The Dangers of North ist base in close proximity to U.S. in the past few years. Russian offi- Caucasian Instability European allies. Some terrorists are cials have invested to curb the appeal The danger from North Caucasian already operating in the European of radical Islam among the youth, instability is threefold. Union (EU), as the recent discovery but the area’s overall economic and First, the presence of such and arrest of a Jamaat Shariat cell social prospects remain grim due to an ungovernable enclave in in the Czech Republic illustrates.4 the ongoing security crisis caused Southeastern Europe compromises For now, such incidents are rare by heavy-handed security policy the border stability of U.S. friends and minor, but the massive North and the pervasive corruption and and allies, such as Georgia and Caucasus diaspora in Russia and mismanagement of the Russian Azerbaijan. Unrest in the North Europe will likely become a grow- government. Caucasus increases the security ing security concern for European Thus, Russia’s entire counterin- threats to the two countries, where authorities. Due to Russian pressure surgency strategy is in question. Its border security is already prob- on the North Caucasus insurgency,5 primary goal is “to make the local lematic due to the Georgia–Russia local terrorist groups are too preoc- population less afraid of the law and Azerbaijan–Armenia conflicts. cupied to pose an immediate threat enforcement than the insurgents,”2 Poorly guarded borders increase to the U.S. and Europe. Some experts but the overly violent Russian the risk of cross-border terror- have assessed terrorist activity in the approach has often produced the ist activities. For example, region as a “minor global threat.”6 polar opposite. Since the dissolution Gorge in Georgia served as a staging Third, destabilization in the of the in 1991, the North area for Chechen insurgents dur- Northern Caucasus threatens not Caucasus has experienced two major ing the and just Russia, but also the security wars and numerous skirmishes, provided “a vital link to the outside of the whole Caucasus, including resulting in hundreds of thousands world which was not under the direct Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan. of casualties and internally displaced control of Russia.”3 Porous borders The region is a principal north–south persons, while the fear of terrorism also provide a convenient route for and east–west hub. Oil and gas has spread throughout Russia. illegal trafficking in drugs, weapons, pipelines linking the Caspian Sea Spreading ungovernability in the people, and even nuclear materials. to Western Europe pass through Northern Caucasus facilitates the Such activities may negatively influ- Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey. The emergence of Islamist safe havens, ence America’s relations with Russia, large oil and natural gas reserves in complete with terrorist training the states of the South Caucasus, and the Caspian basin supply a signifi- facilities, religious indoctrination Europe, and they could disrupt U.S. cant share of Europe’s energy needs

1. Andrew C. Kuchins, Gordon M. Hahn, and Robert W. Schaefer, “Getting the Caucasus Emirate Right: Global in Russia’s North Caucasus,” audio recording, Center for Strategic and International Studies, September 19, 2011, at http://csis.org/multimedia/audio-getting-caucasus-emirate-right-global-jihadism- -north-caucasus (October 26, 2011). 2. Ibid. 3. C. W. Blandy, “North Caucasus: Border Security,” Advanced Research and Assessment Group, Defence Academy of the United Kingdom, March 2008, at http://www.da.mod.uk/colleges/arag/document-listings/caucasus/08%2810%29CWB.pdf (December 27, 2011). 4. RT (Moscow), “Czech Police Detain North Caucasus Terror Suspects,” May 3, 2011, at http://rt.com/politics/north-caucasus-czech-republic/ (October 26, 2011). 5. Alexey Malashenko, “What the North Caucasus Means to Russia,” French Institute of International Relations (Paris), July 2011, at http://www.ifri.org/ downloads/ifricaucasianimpactmalashenkoengmai2011.pdf (October 26, 2011). 6. Kuchins et al., “Getting the Caucasus Emirate Right.”

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and may provide an even greater The North Caucasus’s same time, radical Islam is becoming share in the near future as projects Bloody History more popular among young people, such as the Nabucco natural gas pipe- Warfare between Russians and which has allowed Islamist groups line come online.7 The importance of the peoples of the North Caucasus to expand their educational, recruit- pipelines and their vulnerability to has a bloody history that stretches ment, and terrorist activities in the sabotage make them preferred tar- back more than two centuries. The region.9 Extremism is also spreading gets of local insurgents. Russian Empire conquered and from the North Caucasus to the rest U.S. policymakers should be colonized the North Caucasus in the of Russia, creating the potential to concerned that the North Caucasus second half of the 18th century and radicalize other Muslim groups, such may devolve into an anarchic haven continued warfare there for almost as the Tatars and Bashkirs. From the for Islamist terrorism and criminal- 100 years. Rebellions also occurred indigenous populations’ perspec- ity. Security of America’s friends and under Soviet rule.8 In the past decade, tive, Islam has always been the ban- allies, prevention of a terrorist safe however, radical Islam has trans- ner of the war against the Russian haven in the ungovernable North formed the conflict from primarily a Orthodox Christians and unbeliev- Caucasus, and ensuring the free flow struggle for independence to a the- ing Communists. of energy resources are high priori- ater of operation in the broader glob- Islam has deep roots in the ties for the U.S. in this volatile region. al Islamist onslaught, determined region. Arab invaders introduced Such a threat should not be allowed to use terrorism to turn Russia’s Islam into the Caucasus in the 8th to develop. Northern Caucasus into a Caucasus century. Shortly thereafter, most The interests of the United Emirate. If successful, the North people in the North Caucasus had States and its allies could suffer Caucasus will become a bridgehead converted to Islam, while peoples to from Russia’s failure to respond for further Islamist expansion in the the south, including the Georgians appropriately to Islamist extrem- region. and Armenians, remained loyal to ism. Washington needs to develop Orthodox Christianity.10 In the late a strategy to respond to potential WARFARE BETWEEN RUSSIANS 18th century to early 19th century “spillover” from Islamist insurgency AND THE PEOPLES OF THE NORTH while the region was under the influ- in the North Caucasus. The U.S. and ence of the Persian and Ottoman its allies need to monitor the region CAUCASUS HAS A BLOODY HISTORY Empires, the Russian empire made for early signs of danger in order to THAT STRETCHES BACK MORE THAN major inroads into the region.11 respond appropriately. A modest TWO CENTURIES. Despite fierce resistance, the Czar’s investment in intelligence, diplo- forces ultimately conquered the macy, and capacity-building with As a result of these wars, inter- region in the Caucasian War, led by U.S. friends and allies could help to ethnic strife in Russia is on the rise. generals who used scorched earth mitigate the rising Islamist threat Many Russians contemptuously tactics to achieve their goals.12 Since and the effects of misguided Russian view North Caucasus Muslim ethnic the conquest, North Caucasians’ policies. groups as inferior to the rest of the Muslim religious observance and dis- Slavic, Orthodox population. At the tance from Russian authority made

7. Ariel Cohen, “Rethinking Reset: Re-Examining the Obama Administration Russia Policy,” testimony before the Committee on Foreign Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives, July 7, 2011, at http://www.heritage.org/Research/Testimony/2011/07/Rethinking-Reset-Re-Examining-the-Obama-Administration-Russia-Policy. 8. Julie Wilhelmsen, “Between a Rock and a Hard Place: The Islamisation of the Chechen Separatist Movement,” Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 57, No. 1 (January 2005), pp. 35–59, at http://werzit.com/intel/classes/amu/classes/lc514/LC514_Week_08_The_Islamization_of_the_Chechen_Separatist_Movement.pdf (June 23, 2011). 9. Luke Harding, “Russia Ends Anti-Terrorism Operations in ,” The Guardian, April 16, 2009, at http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/apr/16/russia- chechnya-anti-terrorism (May 11, 2011). 10. Paul B. Henze, Islam in the North Caucasus (Washington, D.C.: RAND Corporation, 1995), p. 2. 11. Ibid. 12. John Russel, Chechnya—Russia’s War on Terror (New York: Routledge, 2007), p. 31.

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it easy for these peoples to maintain from the newly independent Russian The Second Chechen War their distinct Islamic identity, which Federation,15 arguing that if Soviet By 1999, the character of the mostly follow Sufi orders. republics were given independence, Russian–Chechen conflict changed North Caucasian Muslims saw Chechnya should also be indepen- dramatically, with radical Sunni the collapse of the Czarist empire dent. In 1994, President Yeltsin Islamism becoming a significant and the Bolshevik revolution as an authorized the Russian military and motivating factor in the Chechen opportunity to end a century of occu- security services to launch what insurgency. In addition, the Chechen pation, but the Red Army mercilessly was intended to be a short operation national leadership changed from crushed them, using chemical weap- to suppress the separatist unrest. nationalist former Soviet mili- ons and air power. In 1944, Stalin Russian Defense Minister Pavel tary officers to violent Islamists. deported hundreds of thousands Grachev promised “to Prominent foreign figures emerged of Chechen and Ingush from their take with a paratroop regi- for the first time. Al-Moganned and North Caucasus homeland to Central ment in four hours.”16 Ibn Al Khattab, Saudi-born emissar- Asia,13 even though thousands of The ensuing hostilities were ies of al-Qaeda, further radicalized their people had died fighting the brutal. Thousands of Russian troops the Chechen movement.19 Islamists Nazis in the Red Army. Stalin feared and insurgents died. Over 70,000 viewed the North Caucasus as “infi- that peoples in this region would civilians died, and hundreds became del-occupied territories” and their effectively resist his plans for secu- internally displaced persons. The struggle as defensive (holy war). lar Russification. Nikita Khrushchev, Chechen rebels eventually defeated In the summer of 1999, Shamil the Soviet leader from 1953 to 1964, Russian forces, which withdrew from Basayev, the amir (military leader) allowed and Ingush to Chechnya and signed the Khasavyurt of the Chechen Islamists, attacked return home in 1956. Nevertheless, Accord in 1996, which recognized the neighboring . The Second relocation and secularization pushed de facto independence of Chechnya. Chechen War began as Vladimir Islam to the margins of society. After the victory, the local economy Putin became prime minister under Additionally, in the late Soviet era the collapsed, unemployment rose, and President Yeltsin. In 2000, Russia lack of educated, moderate imams the indigenous government became recaptured Grozny, reestablished led them to import extremist preach- ineffective. Local gangs and radical its control over the area, and ended ers and terrorist emissaries, who groups exploited this power vacu- Chechnya’s de facto independence. helped to introduce radical Islam to a um to impose law in certain Although the traditional Sufi poor and desperate population, espe- areas, engage in slave trade, and Naqshbandi sect of Islam remained cially to the youth.14 attack and plunder Russian villages. dominant in everyday life among In 1991, , a Criminal activity became rampant.17 senior Chechen governmental offi- former Soviet air force general, was As a result, Chechnya found its new cials and throughout much of the elected the president of Chechnya. autonomy compromised by the North Caucasus, militants tend to After the fall of the Soviet Union, he emerging Islamist terrorist rule.18 follow the more radical Salafi sect, declared Chechnya’s independence recently imported from the Middle

13. Alexander Janda, Norbert Leitner, and Mathias Vogl, Chechens in the European Union (Vienna: Austrian Integration Fund, 2008), p. 29. 14. Ibid., p. 13. 15. Ibid., p. 31. 16. “Grachev Opravdyvaetsya,” Argumenty i Fakty, May 5, 2000, at http://www.flb.ru/?path=3&info_id=5111&text_version=10(August 8, 2011). 17. Sergei Markedonov, “Radical Islam in the North Caucasus,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, November 2010, pp. 3–4, at http://csis.org/files/ publication/101122_Markedonov_RadicalIslam_Web.pdf (May 16, 2011). 18. Leon Aron, “Chechnya: New Dimensions of the Old Crisis,” American Enterprise Institute, February 2003, at http://www.aei.org/outlook/15848 (May 16, 2011). 19. Svante E. Cornell, “The War Against Terrorism and the Conflict in Chechnya,”The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs, Vol. 27, No. 2 (Summer/Fall 2003), p. 171, at http://fletcher.tufts.edu/forum/archives/pdfs/27-2pdfs/cornell.pdf (May 16, 2011).

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East.20 The messages of egalitari- stronger in the region than ever the Islamic Jihad Group, the Islamic anism, struggle against corruption, before.22 After Russian forces neu- Movement of Uzbekistan, and the and injustices inflicted by the local tralized Basayev in 2006, Doku Riuadus-Salikhin Reconnaissance Chechen government made Salafism Umarov, the new leader, strength- and Sabotage Battalion of Chechen increasingly popular among the ened ties with local radical Salafi Martyrs, which is responsible for youth and those affected by war. Islamic communities ( jamaats) and many high-profile attacks in Russia.25 proclaimed the Caucasus Emirate The U.S. government has designated North Caucasian Terrorist (Imarat Kavkaz), a pan-Caucasus Umarov26 and Caucasus Emirate as Activities Since 1999 terrorist group with the objective of being involved in terrorism and sup- Despite Russia reestablishing con- establishing an Islamic emirate con- porting “terrorists, terrorist organi- trol of Chechnya, terrorist activity in sisting of all North Caucasus repub- zations or acts of terrorism.”27 the Russian hinterland has increased lics, including Dagestan, , Basayev’s attacks were mostly significantly. According to the Global and Kabardino-Balkaria.23 guerilla operations designed to tar- Terrorism database, Russia ranked get Russian civilians to pressure the seventh in the world in the number MILITANTS TEND TO FOLLOW Russian government to withdraw of suicide attacks between 1991 and THE MORE RADICAL SALAFI SECT, from the Northern Caucasus. This 2008. The more than 1,100 terrorist was the motivation behind the 2002 attacks resulted in more than 3,100 RECENTLY IMPORTED FROM THE Dubrovka Theatre hostage crisis, deaths and 5,100 injuries.21 MIDDLE EAST. which left 170 dead in Moscow, and Basayev was the main culprit the 2004 Beslan hostage crisis and behind the major terrorist attacks The U.S. government has real- massacre in North Ossetia, which in Russia between 1999 and 2006, ized the danger that Umarov poses. left 331 people dead, including 186 most notably the attack in 2002 on Since May 2011, the U.S. government children.28 Dubrovka Theater in Moscow and has offered a $5 million reward for To resist this onslaught of ter- the Beslan school hostage takings information leading to his capture. rorism, the Russian military and and massacres in 2004. However, in In June 2011, Forbes magazine listed security forces continued opera- both attacks, the majority of casu- Umarov as one of the world’s 10 tions in the region. After Basayev’s alties were caused by poorly exe- most wanted fugitives.24 On March death in 2006, Umarov increased the cuted Russian government rescue 10, 2011, the U.N. Security Council intensity and frequency of attacks on operations. determined that Umarov is associat- security forces, government facili- Under Basayev’s leadership, the ed with “Al-Qaeda, Usama bin Laden ties, and high-value civilian targets. Salafi/Wahabbi ideology became or the ” through his ties to These attacks include bombings of

20. Ariel Cohen, “U.S.–Russian Security Cooperation After Beslan,” Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 1809, October 25, 2004, at http://www.heritage.org/ Research/Reports/2004/10/US-Russian-Security-Cooperation-After-Beslan. 21. National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, “Suicide Attack at Moscow Airport,” Background Report, January 24, 2011, at http://www.start.umd.edu/start/publications/br/Background_Report_2011_January_Moscow_Airport.pdf (April 8, 2011). 22. Cohen, “U.S.–Russian Security Cooperation After Beslan.” 23. Dokka Umarov, “The Official Version of Amir Dokka’s Statement of Declaration of the Caucasus Emirate,” , November 22, 2007, at http://www. kavkazcenter.com/eng/content/2007/11/22/9107.shtml (January 17, 2012). 24. “The World’s 10 Most Wanted Fugitives,” Forbes, June 14, 2011, at http://www.forbes.com/2011/06/14/most-wanted-fugitives_slide_11.html (June 15, 2011). 25. U.N. Security Council Committee, “QI.U.290.11. Doku Khamatovich Umarov,” March 10, 2011, at http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1267/NSQI29011E.shtml (July 11, 2011). 26. Press release, “Designation of Caucasus Emirates Leader Doku Umarov,” U.S. Department of State, June 23, 2010, at http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/other/ des/143564.htm (March 18, 2011). 27. Press release, “Designation of Caucasus Emirate,” U.S. Department of State, May 26, 2011, at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2011/05/164312.htm (July 22, 2011). 28. BBC News, “Chechen Rebels’ Hostage History,” September 1, 2004, at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/2357109.stm (August 8, 2011), and Peter Finn, “One Year Later, Beslan’s School Tragedy Still Haunts,” Boston.com, September 2, 2005, at http://www.boston.com/news/world/europe/articles/2005/09/02/one_ year_later_beslans_school_tragedy_still_haunts/ (January 6, 2012).

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the Nevsky Express (Moscow–St. Saudi-born al-Qaeda member who example, AQAP translated al-Qaeda’s Petersburg) trains in 2007 and 2009, arrived in Chechnya in 1999, and online journal Inspire into Russian the Moscow Metro double suicide Abdulla Kurd, al-Qaeda’s interna- to attract extremists in the North bombing in 2010, and the suicide tional coordinator of terrorist cells. Caucasus and other Muslim areas bombing at Domodedovo Airport in Moganned was a leader of Arab and in Russia.34 In addition, evidence January 2011.29 Although Umarov is foreign fighters in the Caucasus and indicates that terrorists who were the mastermind behind most ter- one of the leaders of the Chechen trained in the North Caucasus have rorist attacks in Russia, the broader insurgency. Both Moganned and joined al-Qaeda and other operations Islamist terrorist movement main- Kurd were killed by Russian special in Waziristan in Pakistan.35 tains much of its strength through forces in April 2011.31 Furthermore, Doku Umarov made the many local radical Islamic clear that the Caucasus is an integral jamaats. These groups have an inde- AL-QAEDA AND OTHER FOREIGN part of the global jihad: “after expel- pendent capacity for terrorist activ- EXTREMIST ORGANIZATIONS IN THE ling the kuffar we must reconquer ity. Therefore, eliminating Umarov all historical lands of Muslims, and will not solve the problem of Islamic MIDDLE EAST AND CENTRAL ASIA these borders are beyond the bound- terrorism. Nor would his death dra- HAVE INCREASED THEIR FINANCIAL aries of Caucasus,” and “Everyone matically change the level of terrorist AND MORAL SUPPORT OF THE who attacked Muslims wherever they activity or the structure of terrorist RADICAL ISLAMIST MOVEMENT IN are are our enemies, common ene- organizations in the region.30 mies.”36 Umarov recently reaffirmed THE CAUCASUS. his commitment to jihad, stating that Northern Caucasus’s although “many of the emirs and Ties with the Global The Caucasus has been on al- leaders” have been killed, “Jihad did Islamist Movement Qaeda’s radar screen for a decade not stop, but vice versa, it expanded One ominous development has and a half. Ayman al-Zawahiri, the and strengthened” and that “the been that al-Qaeda and other for- current leader of al-Qaeda, visited death of the leaders of the jihad can- eign extremist organizations in the region in the mid-1990s and was not stop the process of the revival of the Middle East and Central Asia even temporarily in Russian cus- Islam.”37 have increased their financial and tody.32 Al-Zawahiri has referred to moral support of the radical Islamist the Caucasus as one of three primary The Kadyrov Solution movement in the Caucasus. The fronts in the war against the West.33 Since the , the most important connections to the Recently, Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Russian government has believed global terrorist movement have Peninsula (AQAP), the most active that the best way to resolve the been through Yusuf Muhammad and dangerous al-Qaeda affiliate, has security and economic problems in al’Emirati (“Moganned”), a been expanding its global reach. For the North Caucasus is to subsidize

29. RT, “Chechen Terrorist Claims Responsibility for Domodedovo Airport Bombing,” February 8, 2011, at http://rt.com/news/umarov-domodedovo-blast- responsibility/ (March 9, 2011). 30. RT, “Russia’s Most Wanted Reportedly Killed in Air Strikes,” March 31, 2011, at http://rt.com/news/russias-wanted-killed-air/ (April 1, 2011). 31. RT, “Top Al-Qaeda Envoy Killed in Chechnya,” May 4, 2011, at http://rt.com/news/qaeda-terrorism-killed-chechnya/ (May 5, 2011). 32. Aron, “Chechnya.” 33. Chris Harnisch and Charlie Szrom, “Al Qaeda’s Global Reach,” National Review, May 12, 2010, at http://www.nationalreview.com/articles/229742/al-qaedas- global-reach/charlie-szrom (December 28, 2011). 34. Thomas Grove, “Al Qaeda Online Magazine Translated into Russian,” Reuters, May 18, 2011, at http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/05/18/us-russia-qaeda- magazine-idUSTRE74H39R20110518 (May 19, 2011). 35. Bill Roggio, “Turkish Jihadist Commander Executed by the Taliban in Waziristan,” The Long War Journal, July 2, 2011, at http://www.longwarjournal.org/ archives/2011/07/turkish_jihadist_com.php (July 12, 2011). 36. Umarov, “The Official Version of Amir Dokka’s Statement of Declaration of the Caucasus Emirate.” 37. Kavkaz Center, “Emir Dokku Abu Usman About Bin Laden, the Caucasus Emirate and Casualties Among ,” May 17, 2011, at http://www.kavkazcenter. com/eng/content/2011/05/17/14313.shtml (May 17, 2011).

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the economy and to maintain a sanctioned an essay contest on in war crimes, the assassinations of brutal police state. Sheikh Akhmad the topic of Ramzan’s “heroic per- some of his political opponents and Kadyrov was the pro-Kremlin presi- sonality.”40 Many have criticized critics, including the 2006 killing of dent of the Chechen Republic after these grandiose schemes, believ- journalist Anna Politkovskaya and the Second Chechen War. He fought ing they represent a Kadyrov cult of 2009 killing of human rights activist for the rebels in the First Chechen personality. Natalya Estemirova, have raised sus- War, but defected to the Russian During their reigns, both Akhmad picions among Russian and Western side because of the rising influence and used bru- human rights advocates.45 of among the Chechen tal, oppressive measures against In response, Kadyrov has lam- insurgents. He was assassinated on both terrorist groups and the civil- basted the U.S. as an enemy of May 9, 2004, in Grozny by a large ian population.41 After the Second Russia and Chechnya, accusing it of bomb during a parade marking the Chechen War, Akhmad and Ramzan supporting terrorism in the North Soviet Union’s victory in World War Kadyrov integrated former rebels Caucasus.46 In fact, anti-Western II.38 In 2007, appoint- into their state security force, which rhetoric has become common in ed Ramzan Kadyrov, Akhmad’s son, many have accused of kidnapping Kadyrov’s speeches, providing con- the president of Chechnya. Since the and torture. A U.N. special rappor- sistent and intentional disinforma- start of Ramzan Kadyrov’s first term, teur stated that “the government- tion about the conflict in the region. Grozny has been rebuilt. supported forces use largely the For example, in a September 2009 Despite this apparent success, same methods as the terrorists… interview, he ranted: Kadyrov has attracted international terrorizing the civilian popula- scrutiny. To increase his popular- tion.”42 The Organization for Security All of it [the regional conflict] ity among the faithful, he legalized and Co-operation in Europe has is handiwork of the West. The polygamy in violation of Russian law. condemned Ramzan Kadyrov for Muslim world doesn’t help them He also built the largest mosque in war crimes in Chechnya,43 and the [the insurgents]. … They are Europe, which he claims is a sym- U.S. Commission on International not “freedom fighters,” these are bol for a peaceful Chechen Islamic Religious Freedom has recommend- extremely well-trained terrorists. identity.39 In addition, he declared ed imposing a visa ban on him and We are at war with American the anniversary of his father’s death freezing his bank assets.44 Although and British Special Forces. They as a day of national mourning and no direct evidence implicates him fight neither against Kadyrov,

38. Charles Gurin, “ Is Assassinated,” Eurasia Daily Monitor, May 9, 2004, at http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews[tt_ news]=26479 (July 12, 2011). 39. Radio Free Europe, “Grozny Opens Europe’s Biggest Mosque,” October 17, 2008, at http://www.rferl.org/content/Grozny_To_Open_Europes_Biggest_ Mosque/1330690.html (March 29, 2011). 40. Miriam Lanskoy, “Human Rights in the North Caucasus,” testimony before the Tom Lantos Human Rights Commission, U.S. House of Representatives, April 15, 2011, p. 3, at http://tlhrc.house.gov/docs/transcripts/2011_04_15_North_Caucasus/Lanskoy_Testimony.pdf (April 18, 2011), and RIA Novosti, “Essay Contest Dedicated to Heroic Leader Kadyrov Announced in Russia’s Chechnya,” March 3, 2011, at http://en.rian.ru/russia/20110303/162848676.html (March 9, 2011). 41. Lawrence Uzzell, “Ramzan Kadyrov Embraces Collective Punishment,” North Caucasus Analysis, June 15, 2004, at http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_ cache=1&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=29958 (July 12, 2011). 42. Martin Scheinin, testimony before the Tom Lantos Human Rights Commission, U.S. House of Representatives, April 15, 2011, p. 5, at http://tlhrc.house.gov/ docs/transcripts/2011_04_15_North_Caucasus/Scheinin_Testimony.pdf (May 17, 2011). 43. Press release, “OSCE Media Freedom Official Criticizes Criminal Charges Against Russian Rights Defender,” Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, October 28, 2009, at http://www.osce.org/fom/51504 (March 15, 2011). 44. U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom, Annual Report 2011, May 2011, p. 298, at http://www.uscirf.gov/images/book%20with%20cover%20for%20 web.pdf (May 2, 2011). 45. Tom Parfitt, “The Islamic Republic of Chechnya,”Foreign Policy, March 15, 2011, at http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/03/15/the_islamic_republic_of_ chechnya (May 17, 2011). 46. Nadezhda Kevorkova, “The US Should Leave the Caucasus Alone—Chechen Leader,” RT, January 27, 2011, at http://rt.com/news/kadyrov-chechen-negative- image/ (March 24, 2011).

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nor against traditional Islam, criticism of Russia’s heavy-handed to have reduced public sympathy for they fight against the sovereign tactics in the North Caucasus. the Islamists. Russian state.47 While Kadyrov and the Kremlin boast about the improving situation Economic Morass Kadyrov did not invent this in Chechnya, neighboring republics, One factor contributing to the rhetoric. In a 2008 speech, Putin especially Dagestan, have seen an North Caucasus insurgency is the commented on the conflict in the increase in terrorist activity, largely grave local economic situation. For North Caucasus, “Here we have because the militants left Chechnya years, Moscow has poured billions of encountered open instigation of due to Kadyrov’s crackdown. In reac- dollars into the republics, but much the separatists by outside forces tion, neighbors have responded by has been dissipated by rampant cor- interested in weakening and pos- replicating the “Kadyrov solution,”50 ruption, nepotism, and waste, and sibly ruining Russia.”48 While the but using the Kadyrov methods in the North Caucasus economy has Kremlin does not officially endorse these areas seems to have fomented remained stagnant. As a result, peo- Kadyrov’s more extreme posi- more hatred, unrest, and escalat- ple, especially the youth, are more tion, it has tacitly consented to his ing violence. Dagestan President willing to join terrorist organizations words and actions, which are evi- Magomedsalam Magomedov has than ever before because Islamists dently derived from Putin’s official acknowledged that the situation pay their fighters relatively steady statements. Other members of the remains dire, with the terrorists salaries. Russian leadership adopt the anti- seemingly able to replenish their Private investors have been American rhetoric more explicitly. numbers with ease regardless of reluctant to invest in the region For example, in 2004, Duma Deputy how many the security forces kill because of widespread violence, Nikolai Leonov attempted to blame or detain.51 In fact, Chechnya has poverty, bureaucratic inefficien- the U.S. for the Russians’ assassina- witnessed a reemergence of warfare cy, and government corruption.53 tion of , a between Russian forces and terror- Since the dissolution of the Soviet former Chechen leader and a North ist groups and an increasing death Union, the Caucasian republics have Caucasus Islamist ideologue49 to toll. The Chechen government has received 60 percent to 80 percent avoid international criticism of the responded with increased use of of their budgets as subsidies from Russian government’s extrajudicial intimidation tactics, such as burn- the federal government, creating a actions. Shifting the blame to the ing down the homes of relatives of dependency on the federal govern- U.S. and the West has become a com- suspected rebels.52 Such government- ment. Unsurprisingly, unemploy- mon tactic to rebuff international sponsored violence does not appear ment remains high, especially in the

47. “Kavkaz—Strategicheskii Rubezh Rossii” (Caucasus—Russia’s strategic frontier), September 24, 2009, at http://chechnya.gov.ru/page.php?r=28&id=87 (October 24, 2011). 48. MangoInvest, “Vystuplenie prezidenta Rossijskoj Federatsii V.V. Putina na rashirennom zasedanii Gosudarstevnnogo Soveta ‘O Strategii razvitia Rossii do 2020 goda’” (Presentation of Russian President V.V. Putin at the expanded State Council “on Russian development strategy until 2020”), February 29, 2008, at http://mangoinvest.net/001/vystuplenie-prezidenta-rossiiskoi-federatsii-v-v-putina-na-rasshirennom-zasedanii-gosudarstvenno (October 26, 2011). 49. Andrew McGregor, “The Assassination of Zelimkhan Yandarbiyev: Implications for the War on Terrorism,” Jamestown Foundation, July 14, 2004, at http:// www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=30107 (October 26, 2011). 50. Caucasian Knot, “‘Black Hawks’ in Kabardino-Balkaria Go on Threatening Gunmen and Their Accomplices with Punishment,” March 8, 2011, at http://www.eng. kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/16339/ (March 9, 2011). 51. RT, “Improved Standard of Living Key to Preventing Terrorist Recruitment—Dagestani President,” April 21, 2011, at http://rt.com/programs/interview/militants- dagestan-new-life/ (April 24, 2011). 52. Mairbek Vatchagaev, “July Becomes a Hot Month for Moscow in Chechnya,” Eurasia Daily Monitor, July 21, 2011, at http://www.jamestown.org/programs/edm/ single/?tx_ttnews[tt_news]=38204&cHash=ab724efd8e5c75b5c4b205c64ab6baf5 (December 29, 2011). 53. ITAR-TASS, “Kremlin Envoy Briefs Premier on North Caucasus Development Plans,” April 23, 2011.

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terrorist hotspots of Ingushetia (53 create around 400,000 jobs in the region’s mountainous geography.58 percent unemployment), Chechnya coming years. However, achieving However, this goal is optimistic given (42 percent), and Dagestan (17.2 per- these objectives will be difficult with- that the national economy grew by cent).54 Furthermore, many people in out addressing root causes of extrem- only 4 percent in 2010.59 Russia, the Middle East, and Islamic ism and corruption. The in communities around the world nearby Sochi might cause an eco- pay religious charitable donations THE 2014 WINTER OLYMPICS IN nomic boom, but the Winter Games (zakat). Some of these funds are ulti- NEARBY SOCHI MIGHT CAUSE AN could also become a target of North mately funneled to terrorist hands, Caucasus terrorism.60 Given the making zakat one of the most impor- ECONOMIC BOOM, BUT THE WINTER proximity of the terrorist bases to tant sources of financial support for GAMES COULD ALSO BECOME A Sochi, Russia faces security dilem- terrorist networks, including in the TARGET OF NORTH CAUCASUS mas unprecedented among past host 55 North Caucasus. TERRORISM. countries. To increase economic control of the region, President Dmitry Demographic Trends: Medvedev announced in early 2010 Unlike many other regions in Time Is Not on Russia’s Side the creation of the North Caucasus Russia, the North Caucasus region is The Muslim population in the Federal District (NCFD), an admin- not rich in natural resources, except Russian North Caucasus is growing, istrative unit that consolidates the oil in Chechnya, and does not have and the regional economy is becom- seven republics of the Northern a developed industry. Alexander ing less able to support the growing Caucasus. Prime Minister Putin Khloponin, the presidential envoy to population. The North Caucasus simultaneously launched the the NCFD, unveiled a long-term mul- Federal District is home to an esti- Commission for the Socio-Economic tilayer development plan through mated 9.5 million people, a 6.3 per- Development of the North Caucasus 2025.57 The plan sets a near-term cent increase over the population in Federal District to oversee govern- annual growth target of 10 percent 2002. 61 The Russian Federation has ment programs in the region.56 for the NCFD. To help achieve these an annual birth rate of 11.05 births Medvedev and Putin hope that the objectives, two of the five major gov- per 1,000 citizens and a death rate reorganization will successfully ernment programs will try to develop of 16.04 deaths per 1,000 citizens, overhaul the regional economy and the tourist industry by exploiting the indicating that the population is in

54. Vestnik Kavkaza, “The Strategy of Socio-Economic Development of the North Caucasus Federal District Until 2025,” at http://vestnikkavkaza.net/analysis/ society/6671.html (April 18, 2011). 55. Jean-Charles Brisard, “Terrorism Financing: Roots and Trends of Saudi Terrorism Financing,” JCB Consulting, December 19, 2002, p. 9, at http://www. investigativeproject.org/documents/testimony/22.pdf (April 26, 2011). 56. Government of the Russian Federation, transcript of meeting of the Government Commission on the Socio-Economic Development of the North Caucasus Federal District, January 21, 2011, at http://www.premier.gov.ru/eng/events/news/13920/ (April 7, 2011). 57. Vestnik Kavkaza, “The Strategy of Socio-Economic Development of the North Caucasus Federal District.” 58. Andrew C. Kuchins, Matthew Malarkey, and Sergei Markedonov, “The North Caucasus: Russia’s Volatile Frontier,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, March 2011, at http://csis.org/files/publication/110321_Kuchins_NorthCaucasus_WEB.pdf (December 29, 2011). 59. RIA Novosti, “Putin Outlines New Strategy for North Caucasus,” July 6, 2010, at http://en.rian.ru/russia/20100706/159712764.html (April 7, 2011). 60. Steve Rosenberg, “Sochi 2014: Russia’s Olympic Security Concerns,” BBC News, February 21, 2011, at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-12507067 (March 30, 2011). 61. Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, “Russia Challenged by Coming Muslim Majority, Expert Says,” March 6, 2006, at http://www.rferl.org/content/ pressrelease/1105864.html (March 17, 2011). These statistics are disputed: Valery Dzutsev, “North Caucasus Demographics Show the Regional Administrations’ Power to Skew Figures,” Jamestown Foundation, Eurasia Daily Monitor, April 6, 2011, at http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_ news%5D=37756&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=512 (December 29, 2011).

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decline. In 2010, the NCFD had a percentage rose sharply to 82 per- States has a record of cooperation birth rate of 17.4 and a death rate of cent and remained around this level with Russia in its counterterrorist 8.7, indicated that the population is after the Domodedovo Airport attack efforts. While the U.S. needs to do growing rapidly. 62 in January 2011.65 In 2009 and 2010 more to make the Russians aware Youth compose a large portion of polling, only about half of Russians that America is on their side, the the growing North Caucasian popu- thought that the government could Russian government needs to face lation, compounding the unemploy- defend them from terrorists. In 2011, the reality and stop blaming the U.S. ment problem. Many will likely join only 35 percent believed that terror- for its 200-year-old North Caucasus radical Islamic groups.63 Data from ism can be defeated.66 insurgency. the 2002 census suggest a profile of This general lack of faith has a person who is highly vulnerable spurred much xenophobic and anti- Drawbacks of the to recruitment by radical Islamist Muslim sentiment in Russia. In Russian Response groups: an unemployed, unmarried December 2010 and January 2011, The most common Russian Muslim man in his mid-to-late twen- ultranationalists staged violent anti- response to the insurgency in the ties with a university education. Such immigration protests in Moscow’s North Caucasus is a military, coun- a person would be at least familiar Manezh Square, resulting in mass terterrorist, or law enforcement with radical Islamist philosophies arrests.67 In April 2011, hundreds operation, which have been plagued and would be a prime recruiting more marched in Moscow to pro- with corruption, extra-judicial kill- target of Islamist terrorist groups. 64 test against the billions of dollars in ings, and administrative detentions. In the North Caucasus, an alarming subsidies that help to maintain the Additionally, due to poor doctrine, number of individuals fit this profile. fragile economic situation in the tactics, and training, these opera- Time is working against Moscow. southern borderlands of Russia.68 tions are characterized by a “desire Without an effective response to However, the blame is misdirect- to substitute firepower for infantry,” radical Islam or a successful econom- ed. In a 2009 Russian public opin- “indiscriminant use of firepower,” ic development program, Russia will ion survey, 26 percent identified the and excessive violence and collat- lose the Northern Caucasus to the United States as the largest terrorist eral damage.70 The local tradition radicals in the long run, if not sooner. threat, while 38 percent blamed the of “blood revenge” (vendetta or According to polling before the Chechen terrorists.69 Such misguid- krovnaya mest’) magnifies the vio- March 2010 Moscow subway attack, ed sentiment among the Russian lence into a self-perpetuating cycle. 61 percent of Russians were afraid population could further damage the As Gordon Hahn writes, “There are of being a victim of terrorism. This U.S.–Russia relationship. The United inevitably cases when local MVD

62. Russian Federation, Federal State Statistics Service, “Koeffitsienty Rozhdaemosti, Smertnosti, Estestvennogo Prirosta, Brakov, Razvodov za yanvar’–dekabr’ 2010 goda” (Indices of birth, death, natural growth, marriages, and divorces for January–December 2010), at http://www.gks.ru/free_doc/2010/demo/tab041-3. xls (July 22, 2011). 63. The Pew Forum, The Future of Global Muslim Population: Projections 2010–2030, January 2011, pp. 128–129, at http://pewforum.org/The-Future-of-the-Global- Muslim-Population.aspx (March 8, 2011). 64. Judith Twigg, “Differential Demographics: Russia’s Muslim and Slavic Populations,” George Washington University, Program on New Approaches to Russian Security Policy Memo No. 388, December 2005, at http://www.gwu.edu/~ieresgwu/assets/docs/ponars/pm_0388.pdf (March 17, 2011). 65. Russian Public Opinion Research Center, “Terrorism Against Russia: Public Assessment 2010,” April 20, 2010. 66. Russian Public Opinion Research Center, “Terrorism Against Russia: Public Assessment 2011,” February 11, 2011. 67. Anna Arutunyan, “Playing Cat and Mouse with Russia’s Nationalists,” The Moscow News, January 13, 2011, at http://www.themoscownews.com/ politics/20110113/188333190.html (December 29, 2011). 68. Agence France-Presse, “Hundreds Join Moscow Anti-Muslim Rally,” Google News, April 23, 2011, at http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ ALeqM5jUj2zNdUE8KWJD2T_oPlVmGQOZsg?docId=CNG.1162cc65f46ade8c93d4c3d8b3d59307.6a1 (June 21, 2011). 69. Russian Public Opinion Research Center, “Terrorism Against Russia: Public Assessment 2009,” September 2, 2009. 70. Yuri M. Zhukov, “Counterinsurgency in a Non-Democratic State: the Russian Example,” August 31, 2010, at http://scholar.harvard.edu/zhukov/files/Zhukov_ Routledge_Chapter.pdf (October 26, 2011).

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[Ministry of Internal Affairs agents] Watch, and three of the largest and a meeting place with interna- exact revenge against mujahedeen Russian human rights organizations tional extremist leaders.75 The U.S. family members not on orders from decried “the nearly absolute impu- has provided Georgian forces with Moscow, Grozny, or Makhachkala nity for egregious human rights vio- counterterrorism training to address but in accordance with this [blood lations, such as abductions, enforced this issue. Recently, Sunni fight- feud] tradition.”71 disappearances, torture, and extra- ers from Azerbaijan are reportedly Moscow’s official stance on the judicial killings—by members of the participating in the North Caucasus issue does not help. The common offi- local law enforcement and security insurgency.76 cial designation for North Caucasian agencies.”74 At the same time, both countries insurgents and terrorists is “ban- are U.S. strategic partners in the dits,”72 which presupposes a police SINCE THE LATE 1990S, PUTIN HAS region, and their central govern- response, instead of counterterror- USED INSTABILITY IN THE REGION AS ments strongly oppose the insur- ism and counterinsurgency response. gency. Georgia’s current govern- This faulty designation neglects AN EXCUSE “TO CURTAIL POLITICAL ment is resolutely pro-Western, and both the ethnic and religious roots RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS AND PUT Azerbaijan’s secular and moderate of the ongoing insurgency. Moreover, PRESSURE ON THE MASS MEDIA.” leadership is ideologically opposed it lacks any form of due process for to the Sunni/Salafi extremists from finding and eliminating the bandits, the North Caucasus as well as pro- opening the way for corruption and Regional Implications of the Iranian Shi’a extremists. Overall, wanton violence against innocent North Caucasus Insurgency “the Azeris and Georgians are more civilians. The insurgency is affecting neigh- fearful of the Chechen rebels than Since the late 1990s, Putin has boring countries and being influ- they are of the Russian army.”77 Both used instability in the region as an enced by them. countries participate in NATO’s excuse “to curtail political rights and Georgia, Azerbaijan, and the Partnership for Peace program and freedoms and put pressure on the North Caucasus. Georgia and have contributed significantly to U.S. mass media.”73 As a result, accusa- Azerbaijan share their northern bor- efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan78— tions of terrorism have become a tool ders with Russia’s North Caucasus commensurate with their size and of convenience. Russian and inter- and are therefore exposed to violence capabilities.79 national human rights organiza- spilling across the border. For exam- In recent years, President tions continue to criticize Moscow’s ple, during the Second Chechen War, Obama’s “reset” with Russia has low- approach. In an April 20, 2011 joint the Pankisi Gorge in Georgia served ered the profile of American involve- letter to Medvedev, Human Rights as a shelter for Chechen terrorists ment in the region to the dismay of

71. Gordon M. Hahn, “Getting the Caucasus Emirate Right,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, August 2011, at http://csis.org/files/publication/110930_ Hahn_GettingCaucasusEmirateRt_Web.pdf (December 31, 2011). 72. Andrew Osborn, “Troops Crush Chechen ‘Bandits’ as Putin Promises No Mercy,” The Independent, October 15, 2005. 73. Malashenko, “What the North Caucasus Means to Russia.” 74. Moscow Helsinki Group, Committee Against Torture, Human Rights Watch, Human Rights Centre , and Civic Assistance Committee, “Joint Letter to President Medvedev Regarding Human Rights Situation in the North Caucasus,” April 20, 2011, at http://www.hrw.org/news/2011/04/20/russia-joint-letter- president-medvedev-regarding-human-rights-situation-north-caucas (October 26, 2011). 75. Jean-Christophe Peuch, “Situation in Pankisi Gorge Raises Tension, Speculation,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, February 20, 2002, at http://www.rferl.org/ content/article/1098867.html (October 27, 2011). 76. Mairbek Vatchagaev, “An Azeri Jamaat or a Jamaat in Azerbaijan?” Eurasia Daily Monitor, October 9, 2009, at http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_ cache=1&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=35601 (October 26, 2011). 77. Ibid. 78. Mikheil Saakashvili, “Why Georgia Sends Troops to Afghanistan,” The Telegraph, December 14, 2009, at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/ georgia/6809222/Why-Georgia-sends-troops-to-Afghanistan.html (October 27, 2011). 79. Ariel Cohen, “Azerbaijan’s Afghan Contribution,” Heritage Foundation Commentary, July 29, 2011, at http://www.heritage.org/research/commentary/2011/07/ azerbaijans-afghan-contribution.

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elites in both countries. While the exploration, and facilitated flotillas without first consulting Washington, Obama Administration continues to of Islamist extremists attempting to Brussels, or European capitals at a give lip service to the U.S. commit- break Israel’s blockade of the Hamas- time when France was engaged in ment to support the two countries’ ruled Gaza Strip. The Turkish negotiating a separate cease-fire territorial integrity and indepen- leadership supports Iranian nuclear between Moscow and Tbilisi. This dence, it clearly prioritizes U.S. rela- ambitions in the bilateral and inter- was an obvious move by Turkey to tions with Russia. In other words, the national arenas even though it is expand its regional influence, and its Administration is close to accepting one of the countries that will lose outstretched hand to Russia clearly Russia’s de facto sphere of influence the most to a nuclear-armed Iran. demonstrated the improved relations in the region, while rhetorically Ankara has consistently opposed or between the two countries. While rejecting such a scenario. The lack abstained on votes on U.N. sanctions Russia has not accepted the propos- of U.S. cooperation and support may designed to stop or delay the Iranian al, such an alliance, if ever formed, jeopardize the two countries’ efforts nuclear program. would minimize the U.S. presence in to control their northern borders, the region and hurt important U.S. which puts them at risk to the North TURKEY’S RECENT ACTIONS SUGGEST energy and geopolitical interests. Caucasian extremists, who are seek- THAT ANKARA IS ATTEMPTING TO Despite cozy relations with Russia, ing transit routes, port access, and Turkey has a sizable and influential criminal business opportunities in PURSUE A POLICY OF REGIONAL diaspora from the North Caucasus, both countries. SUPREMACY. which is sympathetic to the separat- The Turkey Connection. Over ist and insurgent movements in the the past decade, Turkey’s relation- Turkey’s involvement in the region. Russian analysts and media ship with the United States has North Caucasus is also problematic. consistently view Turkey as hostile become more problematic due to In the late 1990s before the Second to Russian interests in the North Prime Minister Erdogan’s on-again, Chechen War, Russia accused Turkey Caucasus, citing financing and har- off-again rapprochement with Iran, of harboring Chechen terrorists. The boring terrorists as well as “impe- confrontation with Israel, and grad- two countries have since come to a rialist ambitions.”82 Recently, three ual Islamization of Turkish politics. rapprochement, which has brought men accused of involvement in the The U.S. Department of State still massive construction contracts, a Moscow Domodedovo Airport bomb- describes the U.S.–Turkey rela- surge in tourism, energy imports ing were found and shot in Istanbul,83 tionship as a “friendship” because supplying 67 percent of Turkish gas suggesting that the North Caucasus Turkey is a NATO ally, but Turkey and vast amounts of oil, and a lucra- terrorists may still seek shelter in has become much more assertive in tive nuclear reactor deal. This shift the country, even if they no longer dealing with its neighbors.80 Turkey has put a stop to active Turkish sup- receive official support. This suggests is also, at least in theory, a prospec- port of Chechen terrorists. a double standard toward terrorism tive EU member. In 2008, during the Russian– when combined with Turkey’s sup- However, Turkey’s recent actions Georgian war, Turkey proposed port for Hamas terrorists and, simul- suggest that Ankara is attempt- a “platform for peace and stabil- taneously, a justified outcry against ing to pursue a policy of regional ity” in the North Caucasus, a secu- Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) supremacy. Turkey has refused to rity framework that would include terrorism. open its border with Armenia, chal- Turkey, Russia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Support from the Middle lenged Cypriot offshore natural gas and Georgia.81 Ankara acted East. Countries in the Middle East

80. U.S. Department of State, “Background Note: Turkey,” May 13, 2011, at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/3432.htm (October 27, 2011). 81. Sergey Markedonov, “Tureckii marsh na Kavkaz” (Turkish march to the Caucasus), Polit.ru, September 25, 2008, at http://www.polit.ru/article/2008/09/25/ tur/ (October 27, 2011). 82. Anna Tsurkan, “Taynaya politika Turtsii: kavkazskiy vektor” (Turkey’s secret policy: The Caucasus vector), Nacionalnaya Bezopasnost (national security), March 14, 2008, at http://www.psj.ru/saver_national/detail.php?ID=9035 (October 27, 2011). 83. Reuters, “Russia Links Chechens Shot in Turkey to Moscow Bombing,” Hurriyet Daily News (Istanbul), October 26, 2011, at http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/n. php?n=russia-links-chechens-shot-in-turkey-to-moscow-bombing-2011-10-26 (October 27, 2011).

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have supported North Caucasus donations totaling $200,000 and arrangements undermine stability insurgents since the First Chechen €195,000 for 2005, which the in the region and U.S. interests in War. The United Arab Emirates insurgent leader considered insuf- the Middle East and the Caucasus (UAE), Qatar, and the Taliban-ruled ficient.88 In a 2008 interview, Vasily and in the worldwide fight against Afghanistan were the only coun- Panchenkov, press spokesman for terrorism. tries to receive delegations from the the Internal Troops of the Russian Failures of U.S.–EU Chechen Republic of Ichkeria, as Ministry of Internal Affairs, sug- Cooperation. It is important to secessionist Chechnya was known gested that the insurgents do not distinguish between bilateral coun- in 1996–2000.84 Arab countries have keep money in banks, but receive it terterrorism cooperation between also given refuge to various Chechen directly from the Arab “mules” who the U.S. and European countries and leaders, including Zelimkhan bring it into the country,89 thereby the unwieldy, overbureaucratized Yandarbiyev, the second presi- avoiding common tracking methods. EU security structures. Washington dent of Ichkeria. In the late 1990s, In 2010, Russian officials recovered and its European allies have coop- before they were banned by the U.N. the insurgents’ financial records, erated extensively in counterter- Security Council,85 Saudi-sponsored which indicate significant contribu- rorism. The European Union and Benevolence International tions from foreign sponsors, includ- its member-states have a particu- Foundation and similar “char- ing some in the UAE.90 lar interest in defeating the insur- ity” organizations based mainly in gency in the North Caucasus. With Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and Kuwait ONGOING FINANCIAL SUPPORT FROM its recent expansion, the EU is now contributed large sums to North THE MIDDLE EAST ENSURES THAT closer than ever to the volatile region. Caucasian Islamists and other ter- Regrettably, while both the U.S. and rorist organizations.86 THE CONFLICT WILL CONTINUE. EU have a common interest in coun- U.S. experts suggest that insur- terterrorism and counterinsurgency gents continue to receive fund- Experts largely agree that there efforts, current levels of cooperation ing from the Middle East,87 mostly is no unified Arab policy toward are insufficient. Intelligence shar- through illegal channels, but with Chechnya and the rest of the North ing, coordination of lists of terror- more difficulty than in the previous Caucasus.91 Nevertheless, the ists and foreign terrorist groups, and decade. Still, recent reports suggest insurgents are to some degree self- cooperation on the extradition of that the North Caucasus Islamists financed through protection money wanted persons need to be expanded. have somewhat restored the flow and zakat extracted from the diaspo- Europe’s leaders at the highest level of money. A 2006 financial record ra. In addition, ongoing financial sup- should work with NATO to launch a recovered by the Russian Federal port from the Middle East ensures thorough public diplomacy effort to Security Service documented that the conflict will continue. Such effectively communicate its mission

84. Markedonov, “Radical Islam in the North Caucasus.” 85. U.N. Security Council, “QE.B.93.02. Benevolence International Foundation,” November 21, 2002, at http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1267/NSQE09302E.shtml (November 3, 2011). 86. K. M. Hanbabaev, “Sushchnost i profilaktika ekstremizma i terrorizma na severnom kavkaze” (The essence of and preventive measures against extremism and terrorism in the North Caucasus), Ekstremizm.ru, November 7, 2010, at http://www.ekstremizm.ru/publikacii/item/571-sushhnost-i-profilaktika-ekstremizma-na- severnom-kavkaze (October 27, 2011). 87. Hahn, “Getting the Caucasus Emirate Right.” 88. Mikhail Falkov, “Voyna na Kavkaze: araby vzryvayut—“vinovat” Izrail” (Caucasus War: Arabs bomb—Israel is blamed), IzRus, August 21, 2009, at http://izrus. co.il/dvuhstoronka/article/2009-08-21/5971.html (October 27, 2011). 89. Ibid. 90. Agence France-Presse, “Turkey, Georgia, UAE Bankroll Caucasus Rebels: Russian Television,” France 24, January 2, 2010, at http://www.france24.com/en/ node/4960931 (October 27, 2011). 91. Igor Yurgens and Sergey Kulik, “Severny Kavkaz: nekotorye voprosy vneshnego vozdejstvia” (North Caucasus: Some external influence issues),Kavkazskiy Uzel, August 8, 2011, at http://www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/190453/ (October 27, 2011).

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and purpose in Afghanistan and else- nations to increase counterterrorism from Russia.”95 These attempts where to the general public. cooperation.94 should be cut at the root. The U.S. Former Heritage analyst Sally should counter Russian officials McNamara has noted: What the U.S. Should Do who spread baseless rumors and The U.S. and its allies are facing a innuendos. The U.S. international The EU–U.S. counterterrorism growing terrorist threat from ungov- broadcasting directed by the relationship has been marked as ernable areas around the world, and Broadcasting Board of Governors much by confrontation as it has the North Caucasus is one such area. and State Department-directed by cooperation. Brussels has long This region has a potential to devolve lectures, publications, and Web opposed key U.S. counterter- into an anarchic haven for Islamist presence should address and rorist programs such as rendi- terrorism and organized crime. The quash these allegations. To boost tions, and under new powers security of U.S. friends is at stake. U.S. media presence in Russia, the granted by the Lisbon Treaty, the The U.S. needs to work with its allies State Department should pres- European Parliament has chal- to monitor the situation to prevent sure Russian officials to allow lenged two vital data-transfer the North Caucasus from becoming Voice of America and Radio Free deals—the SWIFT data-sharing a terrorist safe haven and to ensure Europe to broadcast in Russia on agreement and the EU–U.S. the free flow of energy resources. television and FM and AM radio. Passenger Name Records (PNR) Specifically, the U.S. should: U.S. public diplomacy should also Agreement.92 expose Russian human rights ■■ Counter the Russian blame abuses in the North Caucasus, At the same time, the Europeans game with targeted public which fan the insurgency and blame the U.S. because, allegedly, the diplomacy. Blaming the West to undermine Russia’s counterinsur- “US strategic debate has increasingly justify violent tactics in the North gency strategy. Finally, U.S. public shifted away from counterinsurgen- Caucasus has become a com- diplomacy should counter prolif- cy and stabilization operations.”93 mon tool in Russia’s information eration of extremist propaganda With the European Union focused operations arsenal. The intention- and support moderate Muslims on dealing with Europe’s sovereign al spreading of targeted, officially who wish to stand against radical debt crisis, the U.S. should not expect backed disinformation—basically Islam. The U.S. and its European Brussels to demonstrate more will- anti-European and anti-Ameri- allies should actively seek out ingness or ability to engage positively can propaganda—is no laughing and support moderate North on counterterrorism. Furthermore, matter, even when the conduits, Caucasus Muslim leaders who the EU does not share the U.S.’s such as President Kadyrov, lack oppose terrorism and radical strategic approach to countering credibility. Anti-American state- Islamic ideology.96 terrorism, seeing terrorism as a law ments play a significant role in and order issue, rather than a strate- forming public opinion in Russia ■■ Reinvigorate security relations gic and a systemic issue. Therefore, and neighboring countries, feed- with Georgia and Azerbaijan. the U.S. should focus on bilateral ing a “growing and systemic Considering the ineffectiveness engagement with key European anti-Americanism within and of Russia’s strategy against the

92. Sally McNamara, “The EU–U.S. Counterterrorism Relationship: An Agenda for Cooperation,” Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 2528, March 8, 2011, at http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2011/03/the-eu-us-counterterrorism-relationship-an-agenda-for-cooperation. 93. Richard Gowan, “The Future of EU–US Security and Defence Cooperation: What Lies Ahead?” European Union Institute for Security Studies, September 21, 2011, at http://www.iss.europa.eu/publications/detail_debate/article/q-the-future-of-eu-us-security-and-defence-cooperation-what-lies-ahead/ (October 27, 2011). 94. Sally McNamara, “How President Obama’s EU Policy Undercuts U.S. Interests,” Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 2521, February 16, 2011, at http://www. heritage.org/Research/Reports/2011/02/How-President-Obamas-EU-Policy-Undercuts-US-Interests. 95. Ariel Cohen and Helle Dale, “Russian Anti-Americanism: A Priority Target for U.S. Public Diplomacy,” Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 2373, February 24, 2010, at http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2010/02/russian-anti-americanism-a-priority-target-for-us-public-diplomacy. 96. Ariel Cohen, “War of Ideas,” National Review, March 3, 2003, at http://www.nationalreview.com/articles/206138/war-ideas/ariel-cohen (March 25, 2011).

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North Caucasus insurgency, it timely information to the U.S. U.S. Vice President, Secretary of is in the U.S. interest to boost about North Caucasus terror- State, and Director of National friendly relations with Georgia ist and extremist networks. The Intelligence. The U.S. should also and Azerbaijan and to assist them U.S. should work with Georgian use the Financial Action Task in combating the spillover of and Azeri anti-terrorism and Force to disrupt terrorism fund- illegal activities from the North border guard forces until they ing from wealthy individuals and Caucasus. The U.S. should main- can effectively secure their bor- foundations in the Persian Gulf tain a strong presence in the ders, thus minimizing direct U.S. and charitable contributions to region, reinforcing the friendly involvement. wage war and brainwash youth. If ties with the two countries and private diplomacy fails, the “name extending the necessary political ■■ Obtain Turkey’s cooperation and shame” approach could also and military aid to their anti-ter- in fighting North Caucasus be effective. rorism efforts. terrorism. The U.S. should emphasize Turkey’s obligations ■■ Engage European states ■■ Help Georgia and Azerbaijan as a NATO member and request in bilateral anti-terrorism to strengthen border con- Turkey to provide information cooperation, expand NATO- trols. The porous borders on North Caucasus extremists based cooperation, and con- between Russia and Georgia and and their supporters. Washington tinue negotiations with the EU Azerbaijan are major security should remind Ankara about the members on counterterror- concerns. The U.S. Department of massive U.S. support in fighting ism. Considering the difficulties Homeland Security should assist PKK terrorists. The U.S. should in dealing with the EU’s cum- Georgia and Azerbaijan in mak- specifically request Turkey to pro- bersome system and the lack of ing their border security effec- vide all available intelligence on immediate success in recent nego- tive and transparent; protecting North Caucasus terrorist groups tiations, the U.S. should negotiate energy sources and pipelines; and and their Turkey-based diaspora with interested European states restricting passage of arms, drugs, support networks and to cooper- on further bilateral agreements terrorists, and related goods and ate with Georgia and Azerbaijan on information sharing and coun- information. However, U.S. assis- in defeating terrorist activities. terterrorism. This can achieve tance must not enhance repres- timely cooperation in key areas sive measures against civilian ■■ Pressure Middle Eastern and inspire other member states populations in violation of inter- states to stop their nation- to act as they realize the advan- national law and U.S. standards. als from funding and training tages of such arrangements.97 terrorists. The U.S. needs to European countries are key allies ■■ Cooperate with and train local put significant pressure on the in combating terrorism worldwide intelligence and law enforce- states—especially Qatar, Saudi and need to be involved in devel- ment forces. Building on the Arabia, and the UAE—whose oping the strategies and tactics experience of training Georgian nationals are involved in fund- to deal with the North Caucasus. counterterrorism forces for ing or training insurgents in the The U.S. should continue to make operations in the Pankisi Gorge, North Caucasus to stop the flow clear its commitment to fighting the U.S. should expand anti-ter- of cash to terrorist groups, bank- terrorism and emphasize its com- rorism programs with Azerbaijan rupt the North Caucasian insur- mon interests with the Europe. and Georgia and forge closer ties gency, and prevent its integra- with the local counterterrorism tion into the worldwide Islamic Conclusion and intelligence forces. The local extremist movement. This can be The pattern of Islamist insur- intelligence services, which enjoy pursued through private inter- gency in the North Caucasus is not local knowledge, presence, and ventions at the highest levels by unique. It is a part of a global trend access, can provide useful and U.S. policymakers, including the in which the lack of state sovereignty

97. Maciej Osowski, “EU–US Intelligence Sharing Post 9/11: Predictions for the Future,” e-International Relations (U.K.), March 8, 2011, at http://www.e-ir. info/?p=7510 (November 4, 2011).

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allows violent Islamists, organized and partners, and Russia can meet criminals, and terrorists to control this important regional challenge. certain areas, as is seen in parts —Ariel Cohen, Ph.D., is Senior of Somalia, Yemen, North West Research Fellow in Russian and Pakistan, Afghanistan, and south- Eurasian Studies and International ern Thailand. The North Caucasus is Energy Policy in the Douglas and part of this trend.98 Sarah Allison Center for Foreign While this insurgency is also the Policy Studies, a division of the most serious challenge to Russia’s Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis security and sovereignty since its Institute for International Studies, independence in 1991, the United at The Heritage Foundation. The States and its allies and partners author is grateful to Janos Bako, a have a strong interest in reducing lecturer at the Corvinus University the Islamist threat. One high prior- of Budapest and a research volunteer ity is to keep the insurgency isolated at The Heritage Foundation, and as much as possible from the global to Robert Nicholson and Anatolij Islamist movement. Through securi- Khomenko, members of The Heritage ty and intelligence cooperation, eco- Foundation’s Young Leaders Program, nomic and technical assistance, and for their assistance in preparing this public diplomacy, the U.S., its allies report.

98. Counterterrorism Task Force, “A Counterterrorism Strategy for the ‘Next Wave,’” Heritage Foundation Special Report No. 89, August 24, 2011, at http://www. heritage.org/Research/Reports/2011/08/A-Counterterrorism-Strategy-for-the-Next-Wave.

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