Hamburg: an Imperial City at the Imperial Diet of 1640-'41 a New Diplomatic
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Hamburg: an Imperial City at the Imperial Diet of 1640-‘41 a New Diplomatic History Master thesis F.A. Quartero, BA S1075438 Houtstraat 3 2311 TE Leiden Supervisor: Dr. M.A. Ebben Doelensteeg 16 2311 VL Leiden Room number 2.62b 23.082 words 2 Table of contents Introduction 4 Chapter I: The Empire, Hamburg and the Duke of Holstein 12 Hamburg’s government 13 ‘Streitiger Elbsachen’: Hamburg and the Duke of Holstein 19 The Empire: Hamburg’s far friend 22 Chapter II: Hamburg’s political ambitions and diplomatic means 26 Goals 27 1. Commerce 27 2. Territory 31 3. Contributions 32 Means 33 1. Gratification 33 2. Publicising 36 3. Diplomatic support 38 4. Law enforcement 40 Hamburg’s diplomacy 43 Chapter III: Much to declare: Barthold Moller’s Regensburg accounts 45 Revenue 47 Expenses 51 1. Representation 51 2. NeGotiation 54 3. Information 54 4. Affiliation 60 Hamburg’s Imperial politics 69 Conclusion 72 Bibliography 76 3 Figure 1: ‘Niedersachsen and Bremen, 1580’, at: Martin Knauer, Sven Tode (ed.), Der Krieg vor den Toren: Hamburg im Dreißigjährigen Krieg 1618-1648, (HamburG 2000), 150-151. 4 Hamburg An Imperial City at the Imperial Diet of 1640-‘41 Over time, the Holy Roman Empire has been subjected to many revaluations. Nineteenth century historians considered it a weak state, after the German aGGressions of the First and Second World War scholars sought clues for a ‘Sonderweg’ in history that had lead the German proto-nation away from democratic principles and towards totalitarianism, followed by a reappraisal of the Imperial institutions that was sparked by historians in the Bundesrepublik Deutschland of the 1960’s.1 OwinG to this last development in historiography, an influential current of recent scholarship assesses the Empire and its institutions as a framework for political and intellectual interaction, rather than determininG its ‘stateliness’.2 Within this new framework there is room to consider the workinGs of the Empire in terms of multiple ‘layers’ of jurisdiction, overlapping areas of influence and different arenas of communication in which the Emperor, the Imperial institutions and the Imperial Estates enGaGed.3 This perspective is useful in understanding how the Estates of the Holy Roman Empire operated as autonomous political aGents as well, and how they manaGed to pursue their interests throuGh their own independent – yet not sovereiGn – diplomacy. Because also in diplomatic historioGraphy, the political reality of premodern times has lonG been seen throuGh the prism of 19th and 20th-century statehood; nowadays the birth of an international system at the Congress of Westphalia in 1648, based on sovereignty has been challenged.4 1 R.J.W. Evans, Michael Schaich & Peter H. Wilson (ed.), The Holy Roman Empire, 1495-1806 (New York 2011), 3-6. 2 Jason P. Coy, Benjamin Marschke, David Warren Sabean (ed.), The Holy Roman Empire, reconsidered, (New York 2010), 3. For an overview of the historioGraphy on the HRE’s stateliness, compare: Peter H. Wilson,‘Still a Monstrosity? Some Reflections on Early Modern German Statehood’, at: The Historical Journal, 49 No. 2, (2006), 565-576. 3 Compare on the Empire’s leGal system for example: Karl Härter, ‘The Early Modern Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation (1495-1806): a multi-layered leGal system’, at: Jeroen Duindam, Jill Diana Harries, Caroline Humfress, Hirvitz Nirmod (ed.), Law and Empire, Ideas, Practices, Actors, in the series: ‘Rulers&Elites’, Volume 3, (Leiden 2013), 111-131. On institutional protection of and ‘forum shopping’ by the Imperial Cities, compare for example: D. Petry, Konfliktbewaltigung als Medienereignis: Reichsstadt und Reichshofrat in der Frühen Neuzeit, (Leiden 2011). On the Empire as a platform for communication, compare for example: Michael North, ‘Das Reich als kommunikative Einheit’, at: Johannes Burkhardt, Christine Werkstetter (ed.), ’Kommunikation und Medien in der Frühen Neuzeit’, at: Historische Zeitschrift, Band 41, (München 2005), 237-249; Susanne Friedrich, Drehscheibe Regensburg: das Informations- und Kommunikationssystem des Immerwährenden Reichstags um 1700, (Berlin 2007). 4 John Watkins, ‘Towards a New Diplomatic History of Medieval and Early Modern Europe‘, at: Journal of Medieval and Early Modern Studies, 38:1 (2008), 1-14; Maurits Ebben, Louis Sicking, ‘Nieuwe diplomatieke geschiedenis van de premoderne tijd, een inleiding’, at: Tijdschrift voor Geschiedenis 2014, JrG. 127, No. 4, 541-552. On the question of the birth of sovereiGnty, compare also: Andreas Osiander, ‘SovereiGnty, 5 The discipline of New Diplomatic History occupies itself with the diplomatic influence of non-sovereiGn entities, interprets diplomatic practice in its time specific context, and consciously omits teleoloGical backtrackinG of concepts of ‘modern’ diplomacy. It counters the idea of a state monopoly on diplomatic practice and has more reGard for unofficial diplomatic actors and networks, such as the intermediary role of traders, missionaries and spies, and the transnational brokerage of art. Noteworthy examples of non-sovereiGn diplomatic aGents are cities or city-bonds like the Hanseatic LeaGue.5 In line with this developing discipline of New Diplomatic History, this research aims to make a contribution by way of a bottom-up historioGraphy on the Imperial and Hanseatic City of HamburG and its dealinGs at the Imperial Diet of 1640-’41, assessing the city’s external affairs in detail – both within the Empire and outside, both in design and in implementation. A couple of aspects make HamburG in this juncture such an interesting case for diplomatic history. It was one of the Empire’s leadinG cities in terms of commerce and diplomacy.6 Through its wide-spanning trade network, the city’s establishment maintained many foreiGn contacts. HamburG’s financial and armament markets durinG the Thirty Years War (1618-1648) were second only to Amsterdam’s, and – partly because of this feat – HamburG developed into the Empire’s main diplomatic centre. The fact that the Preliminary Treaty of 1641, which settled the date, locations and partakinG powers for the conferences that became the ConGress of Westphalia, was neGotiated in HamburG between 1638 and 1641, underlines the city’s siGnificance as diplomatic locus even on a European scale. Yet despite its eminence in these fields, HamburG’s diplomatic relations have been a problematic subject of study. In part, this is due to the fact that HamburG’s historioGraphy has been subjected to the same changing societal and academic constellations as those that sparked the revaluations of the Holy Roman Empire as a whole.7 But foremost HamburG’s diplomatic historioGraphy is hindered by a severe International relations, and the Westphalian Myth’, at: International Organization, 55 No. 2, (2001), 251- 287. 5 On new views concerninG Hanseatic history, compare: Antje-Katrin Graßmann, ‘NiederGanG oder ÜberGanG? Zur Spätzeit der Hanse im 16. Und 17. Jahrhundert’, at: Quellen und Darstellungen zur Hansischen Geschichte, Band XLIV (1998). 6 Hermann Kellenbenz, ‘HamburG und die französisch-schwedischen Zusammenarbeit im DreißiGjähriGen KrieG’, at: Zeitschrift des Vereins für Hamburgische Geschichte, Band 49/50 (1964), 83. 7 Compare for example: L.G. Gallois, Geschichte der Stadt Hamburg, nach den besten Quellen bearbeitet, (Hamburg 1853), a ‘proud’ 19th-century historioGraphy; Hermann Kellenbenz, Unternehmerkräfte im 6 shortage of source material. Consecutive calamities took a heavy toll on the city of HamburG’s archives, startinG with the Great Fire of 1842, which was particularly destructive, followed by devastations at the hand of Allied air raids in 1943 and a damaGinG flood in 1962.8 Calculations are that about 35% of the archive survived the flames in 1842, excludinG the lion’s share of the records from before 1741.9 This poses a siGnificant handicap to more exhaustive HamburG-based historic research. The imaGe arisinG from most of the literature is one of HamburG’s exceptionality, arriving at different kinds of isolation in typifying the city’s external affairs. If we take a quick overview, the standard work on HamburG’s history inclines to the notion that during the first half of the 17th century HamburG pursued its own interests, being for example less than colleGial to its partners within the Hanseatic LeaGue, and adhered to a reserved attitude in its external relations.10 The city’s main concerns in foreiGn politics at the start of the 17th century are described as its autonomy, neutrality and free navigation, characterised in their execution by a tactic of “diplomatischen Ausweichens und Hinhaltens” – a diplomacy of evadinG and stallinG.11 Some refer to HamburG’s foreiGn policies as ‘Schaukelpolitik’: politics based on the balancing of interests and strategic, unprincipled shifting of partnerships.12 Put more mildly, this preposition can be characterised as ‘particularism’ – politics that serve the own, private good rather than a communal one; a principle often used to characterise the cooperation between the different cities within the Hanseatic League in the late 16th and 17th centuries.13 Historian Stephan Schröder summarises HamburG’s main interests durinG the Thirty Hamburger Portugal- und Spanienhandel 1590-1625, (Hamburg 1954), a 1950’s ‘liberal’ social- and economic history; Gisela Rückleben, Rat und Bürgerschaft in Hamburg 1595-1686: innere Bindungen und Gegensätze, (MarburG 1969), a ‘leftist’ social history; Percy Ernst Schramm, Hamburg: Ein Sonderfall in der Geschichte Deutschlands, (HamburG 1964), a 1960’s antithesis