The Salamis Sea Battle for the Western Values Theodosios P. Tasios • Which options did the Athenians have, against the Persian threat? – To align and conform with Persians (and successively save the day at the expense of their newly established Democracy…)*? – To resist, and be unavoidably destroyed? 2 (*) “… though we well know that it would be beneficial to ally with the Persian than to fight him …” [Herodotus, 9.7α] «… ἐπιστάμενοί τε ὅτι κερδαλεώτερόν ἐστι ὁμολογέειν τῷ Πέρση μᾶλλον ἤ περ πολεμέειν·» 3 “… yet the yearning for freedom urges us to face him with all the strength we possess …” [Herodotus, 8.143] «… ἀλλ᾽ ὅμως ἐλευθερίης γλιχόμενοι ἀμυνεύμεθα οὕτω ὅκως ἂν καὶ δυνώμεθα.» 4 In what anti - populist belief, did the people of Athens waive the dividend from the big profits of Lavrion mines And The Polis (state) builds two hundred (*) triremes? (*) or one hundred ? [Herodotus. 7, 144] 5 How did the Greeks leave their pettiness and erect the national unity in the Congress of the Isthmus, in 481BC ? 6 • 31 City-States participated • Ostracized citizens returned! • Athenians accepted the chief command of Sparta (incredible... ) • All City-States committed themselves to specific military force contributions. An amazing historical moment... (1½ century later, King Philip would convene the National Conference once again at the Isthmus,..) 7 • The two contradictory (rather posteriorly generated) oracle prophecies … [Herodotus 7, 140-142] • The evacuation of Athens 8 By what mental and physical strength would 30,000 Athenians (±) abandon everything they had, in order to get in the ships and sail to Troezen, Aegina, Salamis ? 9 Well, if Sociologists and Biologists are not arguing in vain by indicating the potentiality of EXAMPLE or Paradigm, then this boring lecture may be of some significance ... 10 Brief review of naval operations at Artemision Cape • Sea " support " of Thermopylae pass • Verification of enemy capabilities • Training of Greek crews • Attempt to influence Greeks from Thrace and Caria who co-campaigned with Persian King Xerxes 11 Sea Battle of Artemision Cape Hellenic (Greek) Fleet Courses Persian Fleet Courses Artemision Thermopylae Figure 1 12 1st phase of the Sea Battle of Artemision Hellenic Fleet Persian Fleet “the bows heading out and sterns in” (τας πρώρας μέν έξω, τας πρύμνας δέ έσω) Figure 2 13 [and the night storm…] 2nd phase of the Sea Battle of Artemision Hellenic Fleet Persian Fleet Direct successful attack of the Greek Fleet! Figure 3 14 3rd phase of the Sea Battle of Artemision Hellenic Fleet Persian Fleet The inconclusive phase of the Sea Battle Figure 4 15 • Eventually, the Persian fleet didn’t pass through the straits of Euboea. • Persians lost about three hundred triremes. • Successful battle “rehearsal” of the Greeks: Experience, Discipline, Morale. • Back to Salamis… 16 – Movement of Xerxes’ forces after Thermopylae battle towards Athens – Athens was burnt and destroyed. – The Persian Fleet anchored in Faliron (the sea borders of Athens/Piraeus) 17 Tempi Pass Thermopylae Pass Persian Empire Isthmus Pass Salamis Island Corinth State Sparta State Figure 5 18 • The two defense tasks for the Greek forces (after Tempi and Thermopylae) a) Isthmus : - Started building a 6km wall to fortificate the area - Intended to take advantage of the narrow pass in land (the Salamis principle…) 19 • The two defense tasks for the Greek forces (after Tempi and Thermopylae) b) Salamis : – The narrow sea strait = neutralization of the numerical superiority of the enemy – Protection of the Athenian refugee population in the Saronic Bay – Safe base for supervision of operations at Isthmus 20 Why the Greeks finally chose to fight in Salamis • The obsessions of the Peloponnesians, (concerning their homeland security). • Decision of councils-of-war • The arguments, tricks and threats of General Themistocles and • The controversial episode of Sikinnos* *(The teacher of Themistocles’ children) 21 Why did Xerxes accept to fight in Salamis? a) Desired a victory prior winter b) Strategic Opportunity: Greeks were “trapped” on their own in the Salamis straits. c) The land advance to Isthmus was facing difficulties : – Skironides passage was blocked (Kakia Skala), – Megara City State was fortified down to the sea (Nisaia the sea port of Megara) 22 d) How could Xerxes split his fleet? - Partly to monitor Greeks in Salamis - Partly to support the advance of his Army on land (besides he ignored which ports could be used by Persian ships in the Saronic Bay) e) Priority was to get rid of the Greek Fleet so as to move freely. f) The ambition and the grandiosity of : - Xerxes allies (except the female “Admiral” Artemisia who advised against the action) - King Xerxes himself, [Herodotus 8, 69] 23 “THE MOST DECISIVE AND GLORIOUS SEA BATTLE THAT DETERMINED THE FATE OF THE WHOLE WORLD FOR EVER” L. JOFFRIN, 2005 24 How many were the Forces? (based on Herodotus, Aeschylus and contemporary calculations) Persian Fleet • Initial Expeditionary Force ~ 1.200 • Military contributions from North Aegean allies +130 Subtotal :~ 1.330 • Remaining fleet after Artemision Sea Battle 950 • Minus the Egyptian Squadron that was observing the escape from Megara straits (not all of them in Salamis straits) TOTAL ~ 800 (?) Hellenic Fleet • Remaining fleet after Artemision Sea Battle, plus last minute reinforcements TOTAL ~ 310 25 The example of the four ships from Serifos, Sifnos and Milos islands that didn’t obey to the orders of their political authorities (which were forced to become Persians allies) is remarkable. “They disobeyed their commanders’ orders” («αλογήσαντες των εντολέων…») [Herodotus.8, 46-48] 26 The Phoenician Triremes in Comparison with the Greek ones were: – Larger – Faster – Higher (and subsequently more unstable) – Having an armed deck with 40 marines and archers (versus only 14 hoplites on board Athenian Triremes). Advantages…?? 27 Xerxes’ misleading strategic move: • An Army Corps (of 30.000?) advanced to Eleusis and Megara, indicating misleading intention to reach Isthmus. • Psychological pressure to the Peloponnesian crews of triremes • (But : the Greeks interpreted the cloud of dust and the loud voices as a divine sign against the invaders …) [alert Intelligence Service!] 28 Figure 7 29 The Persian Strategic Plan • Egyptian task group blocks the west passing through Megara straits. • Psyttaleia was captured by 3.000 Persian troops (island that controls the south exit of the straits) • Night silent advance of the Persian fleet from Faliron, in order to be deployed in North East area of Psyttaleia by the first morning light. • Objective: to trap the Greek fleet in anchorages around Paloukia and Ambelakia 30 areas (modern names of the two bays). The Persian Plan was revealed: • By Aristides: He arrived the very last night from Aegina island, having monitored the tactics of the Persians. • By a defector from the fleet of Xerxes: A Greek Trierarch with his crew from the island of Tinos, named Panaitios, appeared during that night. …As a result the Greek fleet was already at sea, in battle formation, before dawn ! 31 Who surprised whom! At first light, Persians realized that Greek fleet : – Had not partly escaped – Not at anchor – and in battle formation !! 32 Schematic Layouts of Forces St George Island Kinosoura peninsula 33 Speculated Principles of the Greek Tactics 1) By deploying the fleet in the limited waters between Agios Georgios island and Kinosoura they : – were triple protected from left, right and astern – limited down the number of the Persian triremes that could be involved to 220. 2) The morning swell in the straits would limit the accuracy of the enemy archers and would increase their side aspect 34 Let’s verify how many triremes could line up between Agios Georgios island and Kinosoura 3300m / 15m ~ 220 triremes lined up Figure 6 35 (2.5 m distance between each trireme) Principles of the Greek Tactics (continued) 3) They pretended initially to back up the ships, so as: – to create a false impression to the Persians that they were afraid – to increase the distance between the fleets so as to have space and time to row at full speed and ram the Persians 36 Principles of the Greek Tactics (continued) 4) Sail Through (“Diekplous”) Concentrated attack in a narrow front line - to row triremes at full speed. - to pass close and smash opponents’ oars, and create disorder in the opposing line up. - to turn right, fall back slightly, ram again and smash the enemy trireme by the side! 37 Principles of the Greek Tactics (continued) 5) “No Boarding operations” - The number of enemy marines and archers on board posed a danger in such an action. - Delay of the wider task of creating rapid confusion in the Persian formation. Conclusion: Basic battle concept was to destroy the enemy fleet by ramming - and boarding hoplites only in special occasions. 38 Schematic Layouts of Forces St George Island Kinosoura peninsula 39 Figure 7 40 An emotional parenthesis a) Prayers and Divine Interventions: - An Earthquake took place (the day before) - Divine icons arrived at the camp (Aiakides) - The divine dust-cloud and Eleusis voices (it was anticipated as divine intervention, instead of realizing the Persian advance towards Eleusis and Isthmus …) [Herodotus 8.65] 41 An emotional parenthesis b) Imagine the emotion : - Thousands of Athenian refugees temporary located in outdoor facilities at Paloukia and Ampelakia bays and - 310 Greek triremes being lined up in the Salamis straits, in front of the refugees! 42 At a later time, Persian sources