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Counter-Rocket Artillery Mortar Futures Wherever We’Re Needed

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Counter-Rocket Artillery Mortar Futures Wherever We’Re Needed Counter-Rocket Artillery Mortar futures wherever we’re needed. Dr Carlo Kopp Counter – Rocket Artillery Mortar (C-RAM) weapons fill a capability need that has evolved since the end of the Cold War. These weapons are intended to shoot down incoming rocket, artillery and mortar rounds. Technologies proposed and developed for this purpose include rapid-fire guns, short range missiles and Directed Energy Weapons (DEW). The impetus for the development of C-RAM land warfare conference capabilities was the long running harassment campaign conducted by Palestinian militants against the Israeli civilian population in Israel’s border regions. They used a range of unguided rocket munitions, from truck launched ‘katyusha’ style artillery rockets down to man-portable rockets and mortar rounds. Indiscriminate and intended to incite fear in civilians, the campaign produced From reducing surgery waiting lists to a range of reactions from the Israelis. The 1982 invasion of Southern Lebanon, intended to drive supplying complete medical the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO) from Lebanon, was directly motivated by the PLO’s use of that geographical area to launch artillery rockets facilities in remote locations, Aspen Medical and artillery fire into Northern Israel. In more recent times harassment attacks using a range of has the people, equipment and innovation to provide mostly man-portable rockets have continued by the Iranian backed and funded Hezbollah in Lebanon and Hamas in the Palestinian territories. The much world class health solutions. publicised series of Israeli attacks on militant leaders and cells, using UAVs or AH-64 Apache helicopters to launch guided weapons, has been C-RAM Phalanx is a land based derivative of the naval CIWS. another visible response. The problems of such attacks are not confined to Israel alone. Operations in Afghanistan and underway in Russian thinking about technological little practical difference between the Russian especially Iraq since 911 have encountered strategy, driven by an entirely different imperative. C-PGM role requirement and the Western C-RAM repeatedly the use of mortars and man portable In Russia, considerable development effort has role requirement. Both are centred in the idea rockets in attacks on Western military installations. been invested since 1992 to develop Counter of killing inbound projectile fire as a means of While not particularly effective, and indeed much Precision Guided Munition (C-PGM) weapon protecting fixed or mobile assets in a theatre of less effective than suicide bombers with explosive systems. The imperative was the observation in operations. vests. The harassment attacks are also damaging 1991 of how the Iraqi air defence system, largely The Russian requirement offers greater latitude to morale and elicit disproportionate responses supplied by the Soviets, was fatally crippled in in the ‘cost per shot’ parameter, as the PGMs from media observers, many of whom play the a matter of hours and wholly annihilated in a to be killed are in the unit cost range between ‘ambulance chasing’ game in war zones or areas matter of days by a deluge of US and British US$10,000 up to US$2,000,000, compared to the with insurgent activity. Precision Guided Weapons. In subsequent air hundreds-of-dollars cost of an insurgent unguided a campaigns, including the NATO effort against rocket. However, the idea of measuring cost Russia’s traditional ally Serbia, vast damage was per shot in defeating an incoming weapon is a rapidly inflicted against key assets by the massed classical Lanchester’s Linear/Square Law measure .... in a protracted attrition based delivery of smart weapons. The latter included centred in attrition warfare between opposing peer conflict, all else being equal, guided bombs, anti-radiation missiles, tactical competitor industrialised opponents. What it says is So whatever the healthcare issue, the side that can produce and missiles and cruise missiles. that in a protracted attrition based conflict, all else deliver more munitions cheaper During the 1990s Russian operational analysts being equal, the side that can produce and deliver argued that the best approach to dealing with more munitions cheaper is the side that will prevail. wherever the location, is the side that will prevail. incoming Western PGMs was to shoot them In this symmetrical model, it’s assumed that two down using short range SAM-fire or gunfire. The shots need to be fired by a C-PGM system to Aspen Medical can deliver. intent was to evolve and adapt existing Russian kill an incoming PGM with high confidence. The point defence weapons for this purpose. More break-even point is when neither side has an While Western thinking in this area is driven than a decade later Russian industry is offering advantage: when the ‘cost per shot’ of the C-PGM mostly by the imperative of protecting military two specific products optimised for exactly this system is less than half the cost of the PGM being and civilian personnel and facilities from often purpose. killed. If the PGM is a smart bomb, the Russian primitive unguided weapons, a parallel evolution is From a technological strategy perspective, there is model is viable at a cost-per-shot” of around 36 - DefenceToday aspenmedical.com.au DT_OCT2010_LODfinal.indd 36 m1/11/10 4:15 PM Russian 96K6 Pantsyr S-1E C-PGM SPAAGM system. Russian 9A331MK Tor M2E C-PGM SAM system. The Chinese LD-2000 SPAAGM, base on the Dutch 30 US$5000, whereas if the PGM is a top-end cruise down to guided artillery shells, mortar rounds and mm Goalkeeper, has considerable but yet to be fully developed potential as a C-RAM/C-PGM system. The LD- missile, it would still be viable at a cost-per-shot of rockets at the bottom end. Any nation with the 2000 has been integrated with a cloned Chinese TPQ-36 US$1,000,000. cash will be able to procure any quantity of guided Counter Battery Radar. The symmetrical model for C-PGM operations munitions in a globalised market. has a built-in assumption, which is that the asset The disquiet that erupted recently when the being defended justifies the procurement cost of a Hezbollah insurgents employed a Chinese-built rather than the traditional pair of 1,000 lb or 2,000 C-PGM system to defend it, and that the recurring Iranian supplied guided anti-shipping missile lb smart bombs. maintenance, operating and expended munitions launched off the back of a commercial 4WD against This evolutionary trend will inevitably drive Russian costs are justified to defend the asset. Multimillion an Israeli gunboat is a significant development. industry toward solutions and designs with minimal land warfare conference dollar military installations, radar systems, long Cave-dwelling AKM armed insurgents are not cost per shot, as has been observed in Western range SAM batteries, airfields hosting hundreds expected to shoot sophisticated high technology C-RAM evolution. of millions of dollars in parked aircraft, military PGMs like anti-shipping missiles, yet they did. At some point the Western C-RAM and Russian depots, warehouses, storage yards and ports are In a long term globalised weapons market it will C-PGM models will converge, as the requirements all targets that easily justify the cost of deploying a be impossible to prevent insurgents acquiring will drive designs into a similar cost per shot and C-PGM or C-RAM system. terminally guided mortar rounds and artillery target acquisition and tracking capability brackets. In counter-insurgency operations, which are rockets. With high accuracy these will become the The subject of target acquisition and tracking inherently asymmetrical in nature, the Lanchestrian weapon of choice for insurgents intent on standoff capabilities in C-RAM versus C-PGM systems is attrition economy logic often collapses, since it is harassment attacks. also relevant. exceedingly difficult to match the delivery cost of Western C-RAM systems will inevitably have to For a typical C-RAM system the target is a subsonic an opponent who gets much of his capability in the evolve to become equally effective against these or supersonic unguided projectile flying a simple form of unpaid volunteer time, and foreign military PGMs, as they are effective against unguided ballistic trajectory. It is a relatively low signature aid from nations like Iran. The logic is then centred munitions. target in the infrared and upper microwave radar on the risk model, and this means in the simplest The flipside of this evolutionary process is the bands. More than often only small numbers or of terms “what is the damage I suffer if I do not declining cost and increasing capability of PGMs, single shots will be fired allowing reattack by the defend this asset?” For unguided low-damage- especially Western weapons which are being made C-RAM weapon if the first attempt fails. The target effect man-portable projectiles, where the damage smaller, smarter and more lethal, to permit single is relatively slow and predictable in flightpath but effect is often more psychological than material, delivery systems to attack more aimpoints in physically small, making it hard to track accurately even an objective and measurable assessment of a single delivery. Good examples are artillery and hard to hit. damage can be difficult. rockets or cluster bombs dispensing multiple smart For a typical C-PGM system, the target is a subsonic The only way in which the Lanchestrian attrition terminally guided submunitions, or fighter aircraft or supersonic guided projectile apt to be flying a economy logic can be made to work for C-RAM dropping eight GBU-39/B Small Diameter Bombs complex guided trajectory, possibly designed to in a COIN environment is when the cost per shot can be driven down to hundreds of dollars or less. That consideration has ended up becoming a driver in Western reasoning behind C-RAM system development, and the reason why electrically pumped High Energy Lasers (HEL) have become the favoured technology, as the recurring component of the cost per shot is the cost of the diesel fuel or aviation grade kerosene consumed to power the weapon system through the engagement.
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