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The contribution of Ash`arism to the development of Maliki discourses on sincere belief and good behavior: Ibn Rushd al-Jadd’s (d. Cordoba 1126 C.E.) doctrine on taklīf Delfina Serrano PhD Tenured Researcher ILC, CCHS-CSIC, Madrid (Spain) ([email protected]) http://digital.csic.es/cris/rp/rp10183 "The contribution of Ash`arism to the development of Maliki discourses on sincere belief and good behavior: Ibn Rushd al-Jadd’s (d. Cordoba 1126 C.E.) doctrine on taklīf " by Delfina Serrano-Ruano is licensed under a Creative Commons Reconocimiento-NoComercial 4.0 Internacional License. The interplay between Islamic law and theology is well known and does not need to be further stressed or argued here. Yet we still need to know better how this relationship was constructed and justified in specific cases and moments in history which no doubt will lead us also to gain a more accurate understanding of the development of each separate discipline. The concept of taklīf on which I have decided to focus my contribution to the theme of this conference, has the double advantage of being a common place from which to explore the relationship between Islamic law and ethics but also that of Islamic law and theology in a historical context in which those bonds were not taken for granted. Once more, the protagonist of my presentation is the Cordoban Maliki jurist Ibn Rushd al-Jadd, not to be confused with his famous grandson, the physician, philosopher and legal scholar Ibn Rushd al-Ḥafīd better known in the Latin West as Averroes. The grandfather, to whose seminal and voluminous writings I have been paying attention in the last years, was one of the most influential Maliki scholars of all times whom only recently we have started to discover as an Ash`ari theologian as well, an extremely interesting and original one indeed, so that the jurist in him cannot be studied without also having the theologian into account. The factors having contributed to shape Ibn Rushd’s independent and innovative thinking, which in many respects anticipate the genius of his grandson, are not easy to ascertain. Ibn Rushd attributes his thorough training in uṣūl al-din wa-l-fiqh to his master Abu Ja`far Ibn Rizq, though this ascription is problematic for a number of reasons there is no time to detail here right now. What we know for certain is the relevance of the political and intellectual context in which Ibn Rushd’s career evolved, namely 1) the rule of the Almoravids, for whom he performed as chief qadi of Cordoba, 2) the spread of Ash`arism -mostly thanks to the activity previously carried out by Abu l- Walid al-Baji- and of which Ibn Rushd himself would become the main agent in his time-, 3) the quest for new forms of religious authority sparked by the spread of Sufism, to which Ibn Rushd would react by proposing a combination of asceticism with a Maliki- Ash`ari inspired mastery of the fundamentals of religion and law, 4) wariness when not open rejection of Ghazali’s doctrines, very specially as they were presented in the latter’s Iḥyā’ `ulūm al-dīn, and 5) the challenge posed by Ibn Tūmart’s preaching and the rise of the Almohad movement which would eventually put an end to Almoravid rule in al-Andalus and the Maghrib by the middle of the 12TH century C.E. My presentation on Ibn Rushd’s concept of taklīf draws on his al-Muqaddimāt al-mummahidāt which consists in a commentary to the Mudawwana of Saḥnūn b. Sa`īd al-Tanūkhī, a most influential representative of early Maliki doctrine. The complete title of the commentary is telling about Ibn Rushd’s concern for the fundamentals underlying the obligation to obey the prescriptions of the sharī`a. This concern was central in Ibn Rushd’s scholarly endeavour leading him to undertake a comprehensive translation of the contents of early compilations of Maliki doctrine into the language and the methodology of the discipline of uṣūl al-dīn wa-l-fiqh. The sections from Ibn Rushd’s Muqadimmat relevant to the definition of taklīf are taken from the first part of the first chapter of the book, dedicated to wuḍū’ or ablution. Before tackling with this specific issue, Ibn Rushd strives to provide a series of “introductory explanations (muqadimāt) about those beliefs God imposed upon the legally responsible (al-mukallifīn) among his servants ... on the grounds of the clear indications (bi-l-dalā’il al-ẓāhira) and the radiant miracles (mu`jizāt) displayed by God the Almighty… in a series of univocal (muḥkam) verses of His book”... “since it is not sound to delve into the [practical] derivations of both religion and law (al-dīn wa-l-fiqh) without knowing their principles” (uṣūl), God being the principle of all principles. Central to Ibn Rushd’s discussion of taklîf is the status of the intellect (al-`aql) and its role together with faith, actions and other outer expressions of faith -to which he refers generically as islām-, in defining the kind of knowledge (`ilm, ma`rifa) that leads faith to perfection and grants salvation in the afterlife. Ibn Rushd’s treatment of these questions is innovative in that he establishes that the legally responsible is obliged to learn (tafaqquh) the prescriptions of the sharī`a regarding belief in God and consequent behaviour, but also to reflect [on the grounds rendering them obligatory and to search for indications (al-naẓar wa-l-istidlāl) of all that in the sacred book. After making this important statement, Ibn Rushd addresses the prerequisites of taklīf, which are headed by cognitive intelligence (`aql) followed by the believer’s coming of age and the advent of the Prophet’s preaching (bulūgh da`wat al-rasūl), so that only those endowed with intellectual capacity are addressed by the obligation to learn, reflect and find indications about God and His law. Ibn Rushd follows Malik’s identification of the heart with the seat of intelligence and defines the latter as “necessary knowledge” like “knowing that two is more than one, that two bodies cannot occupy the same place at the same time, that the sky is above us, that the earth is beneath us and that a camel cannot pass through the eye of the needle; the kind of things, in sum, that use to be known by those who have understanding”. After having established the relevance of learning and acquiring knowledge in the definition of taklīf, Ibn Rushd focuses the concept of faith. He establishes a distinction between imān and islām. The first is described as the inner conviction [that something is true] (al-taṣdīq al-ḥāṣil fī l-qalb), while islām consists in the outer manifestation of faith and its proclamation resulting from the act of submitting that constitutes obedience. Every believer is thus a Muslim while the contrary is not always the case. This corresponds with the legal conception of faith, though linguistically, in as much as the outer manifestation of faith is an indication of inner conviction, the Muslim may be identified with the believer. Yet, Ibn Rushd feels the need to stress that only those ritual acts performed out of sincere belief can qualify as obedience and nearness to God (qurba) in accordance with the Sunnis’ claim that faith is assertion with the tongue, fidelity from the heart and action with the limbs. The relationship between faith and deeds is illustrated further by reference to the famous hadith according to which he who commits zinà or theft does not do so while being on a state of belief. According to Ibn Rushd it is not correct to understand it in the sense that the disobedient believer is stripped of the condition of believer. Acts of disobedience do not necessarily entail eternal condemnation for this occurs only in the absence of repentance. Conversely, good deeds do not produce an increase in the essence of faith but in the degree of its certainty (al-yaqīn fī l-imān) and remoteness from the possibility that doubts may enter into it. “Faith is more excellent”, he declares, “when it is accompanied by certainty and strength. Apart from rejecting the equation between sins and unbelief, the ultimate goal of Ibn Rushd’s discussion of the relationship between actions and faith is to facilitate the transition from the Maliki to the Ash`ari view on the issue. The relevant position of Malik b. Anas was well known, namely that only the possibility that the quality of faith be improved through good deeds is mentioned in the Coran, contrary to decrease or deterioration as a result of sins. Consequently, only the first possibility needs to be given credit by the believer.1 To solve the contradiction between Mālik and the Ash`aris, Ibn Rushd quotes an alternative tradition reporting that, in his deathbed, Mālik was asked the question a last time and that, on such a transcendental moment, he declared that after having thoroughly reflected on the issue, he had to conclude that everything liable to increase is subject to decrease as well, the implication being that if Coran mentions that faith increases with good deeds, it must be assumed that the contrary –i.e. decrease as a result of sins- is also true. Notwithstanding the relevance of knowledge in his position regarding faith and taklīf, Ibn Rushd admits that certainty about God’s existence and the need to obey His commands can be reached without intellectual knowledge whereby knowledge is not a 1 Ash`arīs are normally grouped among those holding in favour of the decrease/increase position, together with the Mu’tazilīs and contrary to the adherents of the Ḥanafī and the Māturīdī schools of law and theology respectively.

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