The contribution of Ash`arism to the development of Maliki discourses on sincere belief and good behavior: Ibn Rushd al-Jadd’s (d. Cordoba 1126 C.E.) doctrine on taklīf

Delfina Serrano PhD Tenured Researcher ILC, CCHS-CSIC, Madrid (Spain) ([email protected]) http://digital.csic.es/cris/rp/rp10183

"The contribution of Ash`arism to the development of Maliki discourses on sincere belief and good behavior: Ibn Rushd al-Jadd’s (d. Cordoba 1126 C.E.) doctrine on taklīf " by Delfina Serrano-Ruano is licensed under a Creative Commons Reconocimiento-NoComercial 4.0 Internacional License.

The interplay between Islamic law and theology is well known and does not need to be further stressed or argued here. Yet we still need to know better how this relationship was constructed and justified in specific cases and moments in history which no doubt will lead us also to gain a more accurate understanding of the development of each separate discipline.

The concept of taklīf on which I have decided to focus my contribution to the theme of this conference, has the double advantage of being a common place from which to explore the relationship between Islamic law and ethics but also that of Islamic law and theology in a historical context in which those bonds were not taken for granted. Once more, the protagonist of my presentation is the Cordoban Maliki jurist

Ibn Rushd al-Jadd, not to be confused with his famous grandson, the physician, philosopher and legal scholar Ibn Rushd al-Ḥafīd better known in the Latin West as

Averroes. The grandfather, to whose seminal and voluminous writings I have been paying attention in the last years, was one of the most influential Maliki scholars of all times whom only recently we have started to discover as an Ash`ari theologian as well, an extremely interesting and original one indeed, so that the jurist in him cannot be studied without also having the theologian into account.

The factors having contributed to shape Ibn Rushd’s independent and innovative thinking, which in many respects anticipate the genius of his grandson, are not easy to ascertain. Ibn Rushd attributes his thorough training in uṣūl al-din wa-l-fiqh to his master Abu Ja`far Ibn Rizq, though this ascription is problematic for a number of reasons there is no time to detail here right now. What we know for certain is the relevance of the political and intellectual context in which Ibn Rushd’s career evolved, namely 1) the rule of the Almoravids, for whom he performed as chief qadi of Cordoba,

2) the spread of Ash`arism -mostly thanks to the activity previously carried out by Abu l-

Walid al-Baji- and of which Ibn Rushd himself would become the main agent in his time-, 3) the quest for new forms of religious authority sparked by the spread of Sufism, to which Ibn Rushd would react by proposing a combination of asceticism with a Maliki-

Ash`ari inspired mastery of the fundamentals of religion and law, 4) wariness when not open rejection of Ghazali’s doctrines, very specially as they were presented in the latter’s Iḥyā’ `ulūm al-dīn, and 5) the challenge posed by Ibn Tūmart’s preaching and the rise of the Almohad movement which would eventually put an end to Almoravid rule in al-Andalus and the Maghrib by the middle of the 12TH century C.E.

My presentation on Ibn Rushd’s concept of taklīf draws on his al-Muqaddimāt al-mummahidāt which consists in a commentary to the Mudawwana of Saḥnūn b. Sa`īd al-Tanūkhī, a most influential representative of early Maliki doctrine. The complete title of the commentary is telling about Ibn Rushd’s concern for the fundamentals underlying the obligation to obey the prescriptions of the sharī`a. This concern was central in Ibn

Rushd’s scholarly endeavour leading him to undertake a comprehensive translation of the contents of early compilations of Maliki doctrine into the language and the methodology of the discipline of uṣūl al-dīn wa-l-fiqh.

The sections from Ibn Rushd’s Muqadimmat relevant to the definition of taklīf are taken from the first part of the first chapter of the book, dedicated to wuḍū’ or ablution. Before tackling with this specific issue, Ibn Rushd strives to provide a series of

“introductory explanations (muqadimāt) about those beliefs God imposed upon the legally responsible (al-mukallifīn) among his servants ... on the grounds of the clear indications (bi-l-dalā’il al-ẓāhira) and the radiant miracles (mu`jizāt) displayed by God the Almighty… in a series of univocal (muḥkam) verses of His book”... “since it is not sound to delve into the [practical] derivations of both religion and law (al-dīn wa-l-fiqh) without knowing their principles” (uṣūl), God being the principle of all principles. Central to Ibn Rushd’s discussion of taklîf is the status of the intellect (al-`aql) and its role together with faith, actions and other outer expressions of faith -to which he refers generically as islām-, in defining the kind of knowledge (`ilm, ma`rifa) that leads faith to perfection and grants salvation in the afterlife. Ibn Rushd’s treatment of these questions is innovative in that he establishes that the legally responsible is obliged to learn (tafaqquh) the prescriptions of the sharī`a regarding belief in God and consequent behaviour, but also to reflect [on the grounds rendering them obligatory and to search for indications (al-naẓar wa-l-istidlāl) of all that in the sacred book. After making this important statement, Ibn Rushd addresses the prerequisites of taklīf, which are headed by cognitive intelligence (`aql) followed by the believer’s coming of age and the advent of the Prophet’s preaching (bulūgh da`wat al-rasūl), so that only those endowed with intellectual capacity are addressed by the obligation to learn, reflect and find indications about God and His law. Ibn Rushd follows Malik’s identification of the heart with the seat of intelligence and defines the latter as “necessary knowledge” like “knowing that two is more than one, that two bodies cannot occupy the same place at the same time, that the sky is above us, that the earth is beneath us and that a camel cannot pass through the eye of the needle; the kind of things, in sum, that use to be known by those who have understanding”.

After having established the relevance of learning and acquiring knowledge in the definition of taklīf, Ibn Rushd focuses the concept of faith. He establishes a distinction between imān and islām. The first is described as the inner conviction [that something is true] (al-taṣdīq al-ḥāṣil fī l-qalb), while islām consists in the outer manifestation of faith and its proclamation resulting from the act of submitting that constitutes obedience. Every believer is thus a Muslim while the contrary is not always the case. This corresponds with the legal conception of faith, though linguistically, in as much as the outer manifestation of faith is an indication of inner conviction, the Muslim may be identified with the believer. Yet, Ibn Rushd feels the need to stress that only those ritual acts performed out of sincere belief can qualify as obedience and nearness to God (qurba) in accordance with the Sunnis’ claim that faith is assertion with the tongue, fidelity from the heart and action with the limbs. The relationship between faith and deeds is illustrated further by reference to the famous hadith according to which he who commits zinà or theft does not do so while being on a state of belief. According to Ibn Rushd it is not correct to understand it in the sense that the disobedient believer is stripped of the condition of believer. Acts of disobedience do not necessarily entail eternal condemnation for this occurs only in the absence of repentance. Conversely, good deeds do not produce an increase in the essence of faith but in the degree of its certainty (al-yaqīn fī l-imān) and remoteness from the possibility that doubts may enter into it. “Faith is more excellent”, he declares, “when it is accompanied by certainty and strength.

Apart from rejecting the equation between sins and unbelief, the ultimate goal of

Ibn Rushd’s discussion of the relationship between actions and faith is to facilitate the transition from the Maliki to the Ash`ari view on the issue. The relevant position of Malik b. Anas was well known, namely that only the possibility that the quality of faith be improved through good deeds is mentioned in the Coran, contrary to decrease or deterioration as a result of sins. Consequently, only the first possibility needs to be given credit by the believer.1 To solve the contradiction between Mālik and the

Ash`aris, Ibn Rushd quotes an alternative tradition reporting that, in his deathbed, Mālik was asked the question a last time and that, on such a transcendental moment, he declared that after having thoroughly reflected on the issue, he had to conclude that everything liable to increase is subject to decrease as well, the implication being that if

Coran mentions that faith increases with good deeds, it must be assumed that the contrary –i.e. decrease as a result of sins- is also true.

Notwithstanding the relevance of knowledge in his position regarding faith and taklīf, Ibn Rushd admits that certainty about God’s existence and the need to obey His commands can be reached without intellectual knowledge whereby knowledge is not a

1 Ash`arīs are normally grouped among those holding in favour of the decrease/increase position, together with the Mu’tazilīs and contrary to the adherents of the Ḥanafī and the Māturīdī schools of law and theology respectively. See Bicer, “The Place of External

Knowledge”, 8. On the role of deeds in the definition of faith also see Goldziher, Introduction,

76, note 24 and Wensinck, The Muslim creed, 45, 47, 48-49 and ff., 148 and ff., 230. necessary precondition for the validity (ṣiḥḥa) of faith, though the faith of he/she who combines true belief in God with knowledge about Him (martabat man āmana bi-Llāh wa-`alima-hu), he declares, is better (arfa`) than that of he/she lacking that knowledge.

Ibn Rushd's stress on intellectual knowledge dissuades us from considering his favourable attitude towards good deeds’ capacity to improve faith as being compatible with the claim -attributed to certain Sufis- that performing good deeds and supererogatory rituals is more decisive to reach nearness to God than exerting the intellect. Yet he refuses to give the question a categorical answer. In his opinion, it all depends on the particular believer’s circumstances and the aim of either performing ritual obligations or acquiring knowledge.

Moreover, in a fatwà previously issued by our jurist he had vehemently rejected the claim of certain self-appointed Ash`aris that faith is not complete without the study of uṣūl al-dīn wa-l-fiqh, that learning uṣūl al-dīn wa-l-fiqh was mandatory for both lay and learned believers, and that those failing to perform such a duty were to be declared infidels. At that moment Ibn Rushd had refused to acknowledge the said obligations as having been required by any Ash`ari authority. However, in the Muqaddimāt he identifies the well known Ash`ari theologian and Maliki jurist al-Bāqillānī as the possible source of the position likening the ignorant or the uninformed to the kuffār. From among

Ibn Rushd’s contemporaries, the latter view, i.e. likening the ignorant to the kuffār, was being advocated by Ibn Tūmart, whose doctrines inspired the Almohad political movement. This was indeed the basis of the accusations of immorality, corruption and dire legalism Ibn Tūmart levelled to discredit the ruling Almoravids and the scholars under their sway. Ibn Rushd's decision to take up the matter in his Muqaddimāt may thus be understood as a response to the persistence of the same problem reflected by the fatwà, but with a slightly different methodology, this time more focused on avoiding that al-Bāqillānī's authority be co-opted by Ibn Tūmart and his followers to justify their stance. The Muqaddimāt reflect then the second round of Ibn Rushd's refutation of Ibn

Tūmart, one that seems to have evolved as our jurist progressed in his reading al-

Bāqillānī’s works or news of his doctrines were arriving in al-Andalus. In the origin of the position equating ignorance with kufr seems to be the idea that believing in God amounts to knowing Him. This idea, according to Ibn Rushd, would have been asserted by al-Bāqillānī probably drawing on the authority of al-

Bukhārī. In his refutation, Ibn Rushd starts by observing that the equivalence between faith in God and knowledge about Him is not evident since it is possible to reach certainty about God through taqlīd or through a primary appraisal of the import of the

Coran. Second, he reports another relevant and more nuanced dictum by al-Bāqillānī according to which knowledge is not the equivalent of faith but rather, a necessary step in the path to reaching faith, inner certainty about God being incompatible with ignorance, for certainty cannot exist without knowledge, something which is also denied by Ibn Rushd. Yet he has to concede that Baqillani’s opinion was considered valid by some fuqahā’ having dealt with the issue, hence the need to demonstrate its inaccuracy.

All these questions are discussed by Ibn Rushd not only with the intention to rebuke Ibn Tūmart but also with that to stand out with respect to his most important

Maliki-Ash`ari precedessor in al-Andalus, Abū l-Walīd al-Bājī (1013-1081 C.E.).

According to Ibn Rushd, al-Baji had refused to hold explicitly for obligation to reflect and find indications (al-naẓar wa-l-istidlāl) on the grounds that this meant imposing upon certain believers something that was beyond their capacities. In a remarkable exercise of self-assertion of his singular position and contribution to Ash`arism, Ibn

Rushd showed that he was ready to overcome al-Bājī's conformism, allowing himself to correct his arguments but also those of al-Simnānī (d. 444/1052), a disciple of al- Bāqillānī whom al-Bājī had met in Mosul, but without reaching Ibn Tūmart’s extremes.

For the textual history of Ash`arism in al-Andalus, this specific part of Ibn

Rushd’s treatment of taklīf has the added value to preserve a record of doctrines that would otherwise have been lost for us since al-Bājī’s works on kalām are not extant.

In the remaining time, I would like to provide some detail about the specific points on which Ibn Rushd disagreed with al-Bājī. In general, it can be said that Ibn

Rushd was more optimistic in the efficiency of learning than his eminent predecessor and I wonder whether one could characterize Ibn Rushd’s attitude as a form of Humanism. Like al-Bājī, and as it has already been mentioned, Ibn Rushd accepted that taṣdīq or the inner conviction that God exists and that it is compulsory for the

Muslim to obey and worship Him may occur without knowledge (ma`rifa) so that the latter is not a prerequisite for the validity of faith. Yet and contrary to al-Bājī, Ibn Rushd considered that as long as the possibility to reach certainty about God through taqlīd or without knowledge is admitted, the opinion according to which reflecting and finding indications is mandatory or even pre-eminent, must be considered correct as well.

According to Ibn Rushd, al-Bājī’s defense of the primacy of faith over knowledge drew on the authority of al-Simnānī. The latter blamed the Mu`tazilis who joined the ranks of Ash`arism for establishing the primacy of learning and reflecting over faith on the grounds of reason whereas the Sunnis do not establish the intellect’s capacity to declare things as either forbidden or permitted. In Ibn Rushd’s opinion, al-Simnānī’s argument is not valid because ignoring something is not an excuse to become legally exempt from it. Second, he pointed that al-Simnānī’s point is self-contradictory in as much as establishing faith as the primary requirement of the sacred law addresses those lacking knowledge about the sacred law as well. Therefore, Ibn Rushd contends, those who hold for the primacy of faith and those who hold for the primacy of learning and acquiring knowledge in absolute terms have something in common: they both impose what they conceive as primary obligation upon those who do not know the sacred law.

Subsequently Ibn Rushd mentions al-Bājī’s resort to the generalized consensus about including lay Muslims in the category of believers (mu’minūn). Another interesting argument used by al-Bājī to substantiate his position bears a close connection with his Andalusi political context for, according to Ibn Rushd, he had observed that the infidels might avail themselves of the obligation to reflect and find indications to claim that Muslims must postpone the need to fight them -thus leaving them to their infidelity- until they reflect and search for indications.

In order to reconcile between his position and that of al-Bājī, Ibn Rushd explains that the supporters of the primacy of faith do so in the assumption that inner conviction of the need to fulfil God’s commands is incompatible with ignorance and denial. Be that as it may, he settled the matter by instructing those who preferred to stick to the primacy of faith to also accept the obligatory nature of reflecting and searching for indications that lead to supreme knowledge or knowledge about God Almighty (al- ma`rifa bi-Llāh ta`ālà), for it is an obligation established by God to his servants along with the remaining acts of devotion. Subsequently Ibn Rushd provides textual evidence of all this and elaborates further on the idea of supreme knowledge as well as on the role played by the intellect in defining it and in establishing the validity of faith.

Though Ibn Rushd disagreed with al-Bājī he was not, as pointed out before, unrealistic or lacking pragmatism to the point of imposing the aforementioned obligations in absolute terms. On the one hand he introduced a distinction between two forms of “reflecting and finding indications” (al-naẓar wa-l-istidlāl). The first one consists in being able to find the relevant indications in the Coran, a task Ibn Rushd takes care to make easy for his readers providing them with a detailed list of verses that illustrate, demonstrate or explain that which the believer is instructed to believe. The second one consists in the method to acquire knowledge about God established by the experts in kalām, a method that given its sophistication, he considers not apt for lay believers. For

Ibn Rushd, al-Bājī’s arguments are not compelling since he does not take into account that those who hold in favour of imposing the obligation to practice al-naẓar wa-l-istidlāl do so by reference to the first conception of al-naẓar wa-l-istidlāl; the contrary would mean taking things to the extremes, he claims. At the same time, he preserved intact the possibility to reach faith and certainty about God without any kind of learning or intellectual knowledge. Faith and certainty may “occupy the place of knowledge”. It’s only", he reminds, "that the faith of those who have learning and intellectual knowledge about God ranks higher".

In the sections introducing the issue of ablution of his Muqaddimāt, and I conclude, Ibn Rushd made thus an ambitious and balanced move to introduce learning

(al-tafaqquh) and reflecting about God as mandatory for the mukallaf. In this, he appears to have departed from mainstream Ash`arism, coinciding with the Mu`tazilis and with Ibn Tūmart, though rejecting the harsh consequences the latter wanted to derive from non-compliance with the duty. Holding for the primacy of faith is correct as long as the obligation to learn and reflect is also admitted. Holding for the primacy of knowledge is correct as long as lack of knowledge is not considered to pre-empt the validity of faith and the possibility to reach certainty. Within his legal school, he also facilitated the shift from Malik’s neutral approach to sins towards a doctrine establishing their adverse effect on the assessment of faith and the chances for salvation. And with the Sufis, Ibn Rushd disagreed as to the role of good deeds and supererogatory acts of worship which the former presented as decisive to reach supreme knowledge about God and nearness to Him to the detriment of intellectual effort and scholastic theology.