between10ctober 1990 and July 1994. It doesnot dealspecifically with aspects of the warfare betweenthe twobelligerents during the periodfrom the transferofthe Interim Government from Kigalito Gitaramaon 11-12April 1994 up to theRPF victoryin July1994.

}i ) The mainissue is to knowwhether the accused persons tan be heldguilty of planningthe genocideagainst the Tutsi~ whichoccurred between April 1994 and mid-July 1994.

It is up to ICTRto determineif the Accusedhave failed to fulfiltheir historical obligationsfollowing the RPF attack against the President’s plane on 6 April1994.

By usingthe termgenoeide, the authoris referringto reasonand not to the legal def’mition.Similarly, by speakingabout widespread killîngs of Hum in thearea controlled by RPF,the authoruses the termmassacre to avoida controversialdiscussion on theirbeing labelledgenocide 2 or not.

Theauthor also insists on the fact that the use of theterms "Hutu" and "Tutsi" does not at aildenote a racistmentality, as Professor Jean Pierre Chrétien is wontto say.He alsorefutes any racistapproach through a simplereferenee ruade to the term"lnyenzi ’’3,the veryfirst organizationof UNARparty royalist militants, who wantedto regainpower by forcein the 1960s. O

Theauthor always uses the terres "Hum" and "Tutsi" ina non-refleetiveform. z On 15 July1995, the German jou~nalist G~nter Krabbe ruade estimation in thedaily, FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINEZEITUNG, whieh leads to the conclusion fiant between 2.5 and 3.5 million people (including Tutsi killed)were missing at the end of July 1994. Therefore, atleast one million Hutu had also disappeared. The reportermanaged toraise the issue with Seth Sendashonga, during a visit to Bonn in 1996, so as to get his views on it.He explained that the said estimation wasbased, inter alitt on the number of people living in Rwanda that he providedon the basis of figuresoommunicated bythe bourgmestres to UNHCR, afler having assumed his responsibilityasMinister ofthe Interior inthe Twagiramungu Government. Thenumber of Hutu refuge.es was knownand only the number of exiles who have returned toRwanda was estimated. Thefirst indication ofthe massacreofthe Hutu population wasgiven in the "Gersony Report" which, unfortunately, hasnever been published. 3 NgurumbeAloys, one ofthe most known "Inyenzi" aetivists, explained inKANGUKA No. 52, of 12February 1992,the origin ofthe terre Inyenzi and his activities afler having been imprisoned inRwanda between 1981 and 1991.(Sec Amaex 2)

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[ DRA~T I \ d~

Finally,the reportgives no exhaustiveexplanation for the 1959 Rwandansocial revolution.This has been donc extensively by other experts.

However,the authorwould like to emphasizethat the monarchywas abolishedthrough a democraticprocess supervised by the UnitedNations in 1961.The populationof Rwandahad theinalienable right to choosethe political substructure of the new independent state. It is truc thatrepresentatives of the former regime rejected the results and went into exile. The Rwandan tragedybegan at thatvery moment.

II. Introduction

The June2002 report of ExpertWitness Alison Des Forgesgives the historicalevents almostwithout taking into consideration thefact that they had occurred in a warsituation. She andother Prosecution expert witnesses seem to haveforgotten that the arraignedofficers were facedwith a historicalresponsibility, hotbecause they planned or wantedto seizepower, but becausethey were victims of a politicalvacuum that resulted from the murderof the most importantrepresentatives of the State of Rwandaand itsarmy, as wellas theHead of Stateof Burundiand two ofhisministers.

AlisonDes Forgestends to minimizethe importanceof the attackon the President’s planeon 6 April1994 which, quite on the contrary,together with the immediateresumption of militaryhostilities by RPF, constitutes the main factor which triggered off anti-Tutsi genocide and widespreadkillings of Hutuin thearea under RPF control.These combined factors fuelled themilitia’s hatred for the Tutsi population and paved the way for the killings.

The authorinsists that the Tutsigenocide was unprecedented,incomparable to other crimesagainst humanity described by SamanthaPower (POWER2000). The Tutsi case uniquein thatit occurredwithin the context of totalpolitical vacuum, contrary to theholocaust whichhad beenplanned and committedunder the supervisionofthe German State.

In Rwanda,hatred for the invaderswas mostprofound among the millionwar-displaced persons,mainly from the Byumbapréfecture, who were,particularly in February1993, packed in makeshiftcamps in the suburbsof Kigali,affer their property had been expropriated by the RPFrebels. Those people nursed no hopeof returningfollowing the resumption of hostilitieson 7 April1994. It is particularlyrevealing toread what Dallaire wrote atter visiting those camps in August1993.

"Andthen, in themiddle of thisrural idyll, we came across a hellishreminder of thelong civilwar. We smelledthe campbefore we saw it, a toxicmixture of feces,urine, vomit and death.A forestof blueplastic tarps, covered an entirehillside where 60,000 displaced persons fromthe demilitarized zone and the RPF sector were tightly packed into a fewsquare kilometres. Whenwe stoppedand gotout of ourvehicles, we wereswarmed by a thickcloud of flies,which stuckto oureyes and mouthsand crawledinto our earsand noses. It was hardhOt to gag with the smell,but breathingthrough the mouthwas difficultwith the flies.A youngBelgian Red

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[ DRAFT ] , ~t/.qqo Crossworker spotted us and interruptedher rounds to guideus throughthe camp. The refugees huddledaround small open fires, a silent,ghostlike throng that followed us listlesslywith their eyesas we pi«kedour way gingerlythrough the filth of the camp.I was deeplyimpressed by the youngBelgian women’s [sic] calm compassion as she gentlyadministered what aid she couldto thesedesperate souls. It was obviousthat she could see through the dirtand despairto their humanity.The scenewas deeplydisturbing, and it was the firsttime I had witnessedsueh sufferingunmediated by the artifice of TV news.’’~

By attackingon 7 April1994, RPF violatedthe peaceagreement concluded with the Governmentof Rwandaon 4 August1993. In so doing,RPF destroyedthe envisagedand partly establishedinstitutional base. Furthermore, RPF madeno effortat ail to negotiatean order which wouldenable the remainingRwandan State to combatthe numerouspeople who were killingthe Tutsi. On thecontrary, the rebels sabotaged any effort to restorelaw and order so as to achievetheir military victory. The situationof Tutsibecame even more problematic, desperate,when the international community and RPF rejectedany intervention to bring help to them.

Withdrawal,on 15 April1994, of the Belgiancontingent of peacekeepersand soldiers fromother powers which intervened to evacuatetheir nationals is one of the factorsthat encouragedthe killers to continuetheir nasty job. Paul Kagame even threatened to considerthe soldiersas enemiesat~er the evacuationof Europeans,as thiswas revealedby the Belgian Minister5 ofForeign Affairs, Willy Claes, in 1997.

Therefore,the issue is to knowwhether those who triedto act as stopgapswere able to maintainorder and peace at thetime when the RPF rebelswere waging an ail-outwar.

Whenthe UnitedNations Security Council decided on 21 April1994 to reduceUNAMIR troopsto theridiculous number of 270,General Dallaire had no possibilityto protect the Tutsi. Theywere let’t to themercy of killerswho felt that the international community had abandoned thecountry to RPF.Ail information available confirms that ail countries that were opposed to a reinforcedpeacekeeping contingent were aware of thethreat looming over the Tutsipopulation. Thisis confirmedby LindaMelvern who hashad theopportunity to readconfidential reports of Security6 Council meetings (Melvern 2000).

Theauthor does not agree with a greatersection of the"international community" on the originand perpetrationof genocide against the Tutsi,namely that they were planned by "Hutu

« Dallaire2003:63/64 s On24 June 1997, Claes stated before the Belgian Senate: "Do you realize that RPF had given us an ultimatum, statingthat if we did not leave on Thursday, itwould attack?! RPFtold us very elearly that it accepted a short-terre humqnit_ar.ia_n operation,butthat we should hot try to transform peacekeeping intopeacemaking, ifnot, it would considerusto be enemies. " (Extract from the report of the "Commission d’enquëte parlementaire concernant les événementsduRwanda" ; Chap. 3.8.4.2. Impact sur le génocide.) 6 Theauthor does not agree with many interpretations ofthe facts as provided byLinda Melvem but feels that this bookis indeed a valuable contribution tothe "fact finding". (SecStrizek 2002)

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IDRAFT I extremists".Rather, he espousesRobin Philpot’s conclusions: "Ça ne s "estpas passécomme ça à Kigali"[It did not happen like that in Kigali]. (Philpot 2003).

KofiAnnan was rightto say on 26 April20047 that the internationalcommunity could haveprevented the butchery in 1994.On the basisof documentsreceived from the author, it was notthe political will that was lacking as Annansaid. Rather, the vast majority ofmembers ofthe SecurityCouncil showed a strongwill to favouran RPFvictory at ailcosts. According to RPF, anyintervention in favour ofthe Tutsi population would have undermined that objective. That is whyits allies prevented any attempt to savethe Tutsi who were under threats.

The authorhowever supports the viewpointof certainProsecution expert witnesses concerningthe performanceof the presentRPF-dominated regime in Kigali.But he doesnot understandwhy, for instance,Alison Des Forges, Filip Reyntjens s and AndréGuichaoua 9 do not reviewtheir stance that the genocide was planned by "Hutuextremists" excluding the fact that it resuitedrather from a situationcreated deliberately by RPF whenit invadedthe countryin October1990. Based on facts,there is no palpablemateria[ that makes it possibleto defendtheir theorythat the genocide was planned by representativesor a groupthat was crushed on 6 April 1994,thereby immediately triggering offthe killings.

RPF has neverbeen a democraticorganization. Today, we knowthat from the outsetthe RPFobjective was to seizepower by forceand not to shareit withothers in a democratic,free and1° fair contest.

III. Internationaleontext of the war

Themain factors which facilitated the Tutsi genocide are the war triggered off by RPFon 10ctober1990 and the destructionofthe Rwandan State on 6 April1994.Both events occurred withinthe contextof instabilityin the worldwhich enhanced them. What was thereforethe majorchange in theworld and whatwere the objectives of sucha change?

(a) The invasionof 1 October1990.

3 The coldwar whichended in 1990had a seriousimpact on the GreatLakes region of Africa.Russia withdrew from Africa and the Westadopted new policiesvis-à-vis its former

7 KofiAnnan, UN Secretary-General, statedon Friday, 26 Match,that the international community "aurait pu arrêterles tueries" in1994, "mais la volonté politique n’existait pas,pas plus que les troupes. " Jean-Pierre Stroobants,LEMONDE, 30 Match2004. 8 Forinstance, inaletter addressed toChief Prosecutor Jallow on 11 January 2005, Reyntjens wrote: "While 1 remaincommitted tothe cause which is at the heart of the mandate ofthe ICTK on ethical grounds I cannot any longerbeinvolved inthis process. I shall, therefore, hotbe able fo co-operate withthe OTP unless and until the first RPFsuspect is indicted"Inan interview granted tothe Belgian daily LE SOIR, he stated on 13 January 2005: "Kagameisthe worst war criminal inoffice today". His critieism ofKagame isalso docurnented inReyntjens 2004. 9 Anexample that should urge Guichaoua tomake this link is his article paying tribute toColonel Cyiza: "Une disparitionannoncée" inCruvellier etal. 2004 on the death of Lt. Col. Augustin Cyiza. 1°Cf.Musabyimana 2003.

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[ DRAFT ] allies.In March1990, the American Minister of ForeignAffairs, James Baker, accompanied by theSecretary of State for Africa, Herman Cohen, visited Nelson Mandela. They made a stopover in Kinshasato secPresident Mobutu. They told him in no uncertainterms that the USA no longerintended to supporthis regime, il He wasrequested to immediatelyrelease Etienne Tshisekedi,the Chairman of theopposition party, UDPS, which Mobutu did. On 24 April1990, Mobuturesigned as Chairmanof the MPR party,the powerbase in Zaire.In unusual consultationswith the USA, President Mitterand made public a newpolicy during the Franco- Africansummit held in LaBaule in June1990. The message from both countries was that allies wouldhenceforth besupported on the sole condition that they open up their regimes and secure greaterpolitical legitimacy. London was observing. President Habyarimana then told President Miterandthat such a processwould encourage the rebelsto seizepower. In essence, Habyarimanatold Mr. Aurillac, the French Minister for Cooperation, from 1986 to 1988:"I am goingto democratize my regime (...) and I willbe assassinatea~’? 2 Inreaction to that, Miterand offereda military guarantee in theevent that such a threatwas real. According to a French joumalist,the feeling of the political class was: "You Africans must democratize your regimes andFrance will see to it thatyour political enemies store away their kalachnikovs in the » cupboards".13 Habyarimanadid what he had promisedto Aurillac.He began the democratizationprocess despite the inherent risks.

Thedemocratization process was announced on 4 July1990 in hisannual speech to commemoratehis accessionto powerin 1973.On 27 September1990, he announcedthe formationof a synthesiscommission expected to makethe necessaryamendments to the Constitution.Subsequently, multiparty system became a reality.

The RPFrebel leaders were afraid of themove to democratizeand wanted to take advantageof theinstability caused by theprocess in othercountries. They wanted to take advantageofthe confusion and excitement generated tostrike.

As a materof fact,they aEacked on 10ctober1990. The RPF objective was to disrupt thedemocratization process. Had the democratization process succeeded, RPF ..... ~tk)llllk,l,.1I.llaY~ .... U~g~’II,_^__ deprivedof thepropaganda argument that Habyarimana’s "dictatorship" provided justification forthe invasion.

Therebels certainly did not take into consideration thecommitment ofFrance to runto theassistance of regimes under threats of beingoverthrown by rebellions against democracy. ButFrance kept its promise. Indeed, French troops helped the Rwandan army contain the

~1 Thevisit was confirmedby HermanCohen in an interviewgranted to the newsagency, Congopolis, on 16 October2002: "I waswith Secretary of StateBaker in Match1990 when he persuadedMobutu to acceptmulti- partypolitics. Mobutu announced this important change on 24 April1990. I thinkthe transition began by Mobutu wouldbave been crowned with success had the politicalclass of Congoshowed more intelligence in its implementation.Theproblem with Mobutu’s uncompleted transition was the general view held by thepolitical class thatthe transitional government was indeed a stagefor competition to control power in Kinshasa." [Unoflïcial translation] 12 SecEric Fottorina, Dans le piège rwandais, Internet file of LeMonde, August 1997. 13 Sec JEUNEAFRIQUE,No. 1747,30.6.94, p. 15.

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[ DRAFT ] invasion.By theend of October1990, the RPF combatants were driven back to Ugandafrom wherethey had come. President Museveni was obliged to helpthem once again, contrary to his initialplans.

As ProfessorMahmood Mamdani (Mamdani 2001) described it, the situation Rwandansin Ugandawas complicated. They had installed Museveni as President.Hence they couldenjoy the fruit of theirvictory. But then they were under pressure from Ugandans who enviedsome of their posts. The situation worsened when certain exiles requested plots to finally settledown in Uganda.In sucha situation,the Rwandan "Young Turks" resolved to regain powerthat their parents had lost during the 1959-1960 period. Museveni’s position was then summarized,as Mamdani described, almost as follows:"Take my weapons,but do nottry again to retumto Uganda".This situation was absolutely uncomfortable andthis partly explains the aggressivenessof their new organization, RPF. RPFfeared that implementation of the Rwandan-Ugandan bilateral agreement on a ) ) peacefulsolution to the problem ofRwandan refugees, signed on 31July 1990 TM in Kigaliunder theauspices of HCRand OAU, would destroy the argument that the Government ofRwanda was preventingexiles from returning.

Thatargument had eamed fantastic international support for the rebels since the 1988 WashingtonConference) 5 To avoidlosing this trump card, RPF had every interest to seethat themeeting scheduled in Kigali, on 24 September1990, to hammerout the remaining obstacles, didnot take place. RPF had gone as faras openlyinciting the refugees in Ugandato boycott phaseone ofthe Accords which requested a census ofthe exiled population in order to knowthe magnitudeof theproblem. The census had to providereliable data on thenumber of those who wishedto retumto Rwanda,those who wanted to takeup Ugandan nationality, as well as those whowanted to maintaintheir Rwandan nationality, while obtaining a permit for permanent residencein Uganda.

Itbecame increasingly clearthat Habyarimana, whohad ,,’e,’,’,,".,*°a on~,,.,~.,..w ,,,,,~,.~.,,.l,,;"»" thatunconditional and mass retum of refugeescould cause serious problems to Rwanda, increasinglyshowed signs of flexibility, particularly, atter Pope John Paul II visited Rwanda at » thebeginning of September1990.

A meetingplanned in Kigali on 24 September1990 was cancelled. Infact, a weeklater, theRPF rebels invaded Rwanda, and the refugee problem could never be resolved peacefully.

~4 Cf.Musabyimana 2003: 37/38. On 21 April1991, Habyarimana mentioned the Accordsbefore the CND:"The problemof refugees,particularly, those in Uganda,caused by theInyenzi-lnkotanyi, hadbeen finally resolved duringnegotiations which brought together delegates from Ugandc~ Rwanda, the OA U andUN HighCommissioner forRefugees" (Quotation from Gasana 2002: 72) ~s Thisconferenee was organized by RogerWinter, then Chairman ofthe US Committeefor Refugees. Winter who currentlyworks for USAID was and continues tobe one ofKagame’s foremost promoters.

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[ DRAFT ] ~qa#3G The10ctober 1990 invasion cannot therefore be justifiedby theproblem of exiles,since, as the VicePrime Minister of Uganda,Eriya Kategaya, confirmed on 30ctoberbefore the ConseilNational de Resistance(the Parliament), the problem was aboutto be solved:"I would liketo repeatthe positionof the Movementand Governmentto thatwe ail alongwe havebeen workingwith the RwandeseGovernment to finda politicalsolution to the hugepopulation of RwandeseRefugees who havestayed in his countryfor over30 years.The lastmeeting which washeld at Kigalifrom 27 th to 30th 1990,16had come up withpromising ways of solvingthis long outstandingpolitical problem. "l z

At the timeof the invasion,the USA agreedwith the approachof FrenchPresident FrançoisMitterand to supportthe regimein powerin orderto preventthe Tutsiexiles from overthrowingit. However,by the end of 1993,President Clinton’s Government changed its position.Clinton, running away from the Somaliannightmare at the beginningof October1993, promisednever to sendtroops to Africa.But soonaffer, a sectionof thatsame Government realizedthat the USAcould not attainits objectives of topplingthe fundamentalistregime in Khartoumwithout soldiers. The author has developed in a seriesof publications,18 his findings on the strategyapplied since then by the USA in Africawhich can be termedas the "Sudanese syndrome"(The Rapporteur reproduces in Attachment2, partof a recentpublication [Strizek 2004]in whichhe discussesthis issue).

The war againstthe Khartoumregime required new alliesand, consequently, it was necessaryto tonedown clamours for democratizationin English-speaking countries.

Thus,in October1993, at the UnitedNations Security Council, Ms MadeleineAlbright renegedon Americancommitment to offermilitary protection to the politicaltransition in Rwanda.That commitmentwhich was made a few weeks earlieron when the ArushaAccords were signed on 4 August 1993, with assistancefrom David Rawson and a few German colleaguesof the "PrayerBreakfast Movement". 19 AmadouToumani Touré, current President of Mali,stated in 1994:"At the La BauleConference in dune1990, it wasalmost announced to us thatgood governance was goingtobe required of AfricanSluies. in 1993,ihe ionechu,~;ed. ’Democracyis good, but what is important is efficiency,.2o

1«Kategaya refers to the Ugandan-Rwandan Summitwhich took place in Kigali and which discussed therefugee issue.On 11 September 1990, a tripartitesummit (Zaire-Uganda-Rwanda) heldin Kampala discussed theproblem ina tenseatmosphere since Rwanda accused Uganda of not preventing RPFfrom preparing war. (Cf. Musabyimana 2003:37/38). 17Cf. Ministry ofExternal Affairs and International Cooperation, Données sur l’implication de1’ Ouganda dans l’agressioncontre le Rwanda, p.14, unpublished, Kigali 1990 (Quotation inS.J. Barahinyura, Rwanda. Trente deux ansaprès la révolution sociale de1959. Franfurt/Main, 1992,p. 9). 18Cf. the list of publications bythe author attached tohis CV. 19 DavidRawson who beeame US AmbassadortoKigali in December 1993, evacuated the American Embassy on 10April 1994, returned toRwanda after the RPF victory and finally left Rwanda in January 1996. Concerning the Germanchapter ofthe Prayer Breakfast Network, its long-standing Director, Rudolf Decker, has published three paperbacksinwhich he described itsactivities before, during and after the Arnsha talks. (The first book published in1995 was not signed by him). 20JEUNE AFRIQUE, Supplement toNo. 1753/54, August 1994.

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[ DRAFT ] .2~~f36 (b) Theattack on thePresident’s plane on 6 April1994 and P~F resumption of the war

Theprocess described by Tourégave rise to uneasyrelations between the West and Africancountries. Democracy was no longerthat important. The Balkan conflict resumed and theUSA diverted its interests tothat region.

We do notknow exactly when the decision to supportthe RPF military victory was taken in Washingtonbut, on theother hand, we do knowwhen that decision was implemented. It was on 21 April1994. When the war resumed and the anti-Tutsi genocide was at itspeak, the USA andGreat Britain decided not to interfereinRwanda to protect the Tutsi. The publication, on5 May1994, of "Presidential Decision Directive" (PDD 25) 21 soughtto create a freshobstacle to deterany person likely to yield to the temptation ofa militaryintervention infavour ofthe Tutsi populationthat was in danger.

) In thepresent report, the author does not belabour the issue of responsibility forthe 6 3 April1994 attack on Habyarimana’splane. But there is no doubtthat RPF is responsible. The indiciaare so glaring(testimonies of Hourigan, Jean Pierre Mugabe, Christophe Hakizabera, DeusKagiraneza, Abdul Ruzibiza, Aloys Ruyenzi, the report of theFrench Judge Bruguière, as wellas thebook written by CharlesOnana and the RPF dissident,Deo Mushayidi)22that it wouldbe easy for any court (including ICTR) to reachthe same conclusion. Theproblem arises solelyfrom the fact that ail efforts are made by interested parties to ensure that such a process does23 not happen.

France,the only State on theSecurity Council that attempted to opposethe policy implementedby the RPF and its allies, is accused of having facilitated theTutsi genocide. Yet, thefacts do not demonstrate that. Militarily, France was not in Rwandawhen the war resumed.

As confirmedby the former French Prime Minister, President Mitterand had accepted his adviceto significantlycutdown m ilitaryassistanceto1-, ~.**,~,,~,, ..... ,.1.24a~ ¢.^-- ...... t’,~4-~k~. 100"/ "lD ..... wassupposed to maintainits troops in Rwandauntil the broad-based transitional government (BBTG)was formed. But then the French soldiers lefi Rwanda in December1993 at theheat a politicalchaos and the transitional government wasnever formed. So there was no indisputable govemmentin placewhen the President was killed and when the Rwandan army was decapitated

21 ThatDirective prevents the American President from committing American troops in conflietswhich do hot affectAmerican "national interest". 22 Onanaand Mushayidi2001. 23 Theauthor’s belief that the sophisticated attack on tworegional Presidents and an important section of thetop brassof theRwandan Armed Forces, ail conveyed in a singleplane, would have been more or lessunthinkable withoutassistance from a fewsecret services outside the region, eannot be definitivelyproved without a few secret archivesreleasing their "treasures". Aspreviously stated, it wouldbe necessary to conduct a neutral international investigationintothat attack but, unfortunately, thishas been obstructed bythe United States and Great Britain. 24 "Whenthe massacresbegan in Kigalion the nightof 6 April1994 afler the planecarrying President Habyarimanawas shot down, the French military presence then comprised of onlysome 30 menor so,since we had substantiallydisengaged out troops in October1993." (Balladur, Le Figaro, August 2004).

DI05-0039(E) 8 [ DRAFT ] on the nightof 6 April1994. Before then, the USA and GreatBritain had donceverything to erodeUNAMIR ability as describedin the bookswritten by GeneralDallaire and Colonel Marchal(Dallaire 2003; Marchal 2001). After the 6 April1994 attack which destroyed the State apparatus,the departureof ail Europeanson 15 Apriland the UnitedNations Security Council decisionto reduceUNAMIR to a tokenstrength, all was readyultimately to ensurean RPF militaryvictory.

IV. Planningof the genocide?

Oneof themajor factors which led to thegenocide was the schism of politicalparties in Rwandawhich ensued after RPF violatedthe cease-fireon 8 February1993. Even ifthe Arusha Accordswere signedon 4 August1993, the forcesready to acceptacompromise and thus implementthem were seriously weakened by the RPF militaristposture. The partiesbroke up intotwo groups:the one favouredcooperation with RPF in orderto overthrowHabyarimana and the otherdid not wantto hearanything about overthrowing Habyarimana and replacing him with ) RPF.The latter was later called "Hutu Power".

The February1993 offensive had beenplanned in a verysophisticated manner. It was backed by an unprecedentedmedia campaign.As James Gasana25 underscoresit, RPF succeededin usingRwanda human rights organizations toits advantage. In January1993, an "IntemationalCommission of Inquiry"came to Rwanda.After staying in the countryfor three weeks, some of its membersaccused Dismas Nsengiyaremye’sCoalition Government of planninggenocide. In fact,in the finalreport published on 8 March1993 (AFRICA WATCH 1993),that accusation appeared less articulated, for the January statements had already diverted internationalpublic opinion from the 8 February1993 offensive. Belgium and othercountries usedthe report as a pretextto blocktheir cooperation with Habyarimana and his Government.

Thefinal report also mentioned, without the least irrefutable evidence, the existence of "deathsquads". This assertion came mainly from the testimony of an amateurjournalist called JanvierAfrika. Melvi quotesn26 him extensive uut ,,~,,,,,,,,,,~ ly ~" ...... ,~....,t.~ «~^..t.~~.....~,,,,,, ...k...... :~ prison - ..."*,, ,I.o.~ timewhen he madethe saidtestimony. 27 He has neverexplained :s clearlyhow JeanCarbonare who,at thatmoment was alreadymember of the pro-RPFlobby, could conduct an interviewwith

25He quotes a letter from an "RPF personality atthe ISIBO newspaper of26 December 1992, in which he told the publisherthat RPF was not going to attack before the report of the International Commission waspublished" (Gasana2002: 183). 26Melvern 2004, German version, p .42. 27Shimamungu wrote: "What the report does not state is that false testimony wasextracted from Janvier Afrika duringhis imprisonment inKigali for fraud He received a promise that pressure would be exerted onthe Rwandan courtto get him out of prison, lnfact, Amnes¢y International ofwhich Professor Reyntjens wascorrespondent for theGreat Lakes region, intervened inthis regard, alleging that Janvier Afrika was detained because hewas a journalistwhereas the acts levelled against him had nothing todo with his profession ÇUmurava Magazine No. 17)."(Shimamungu 2004: 300). 2sHowever, there are indications thatPresident Habyarimana hadreportedly instructed hisservices toaUow the Commissiontogo wherever itwished without being accompanied.

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[ DRAFT ] someonewho was behind bars. 29 It seemsthat Janvier was lured into believing that if he revealedthe existence ofdeath squads, he could receive recompense.

Thisreport is, undoubtedly, one of thebest examples providing justification for Kagame’sstatement: "We have waged the war of communicationand informationbetter than anybody’’3°or forthe system of misinformationdescribed by Professor Johan Pottier (Pottier 2002).

TheFebruary 1993 offensive highlighted one additional point: the weakness of the Rwandanarmy. Without support from France, RPF would have probably reached Kigali. The controversialdiscussion within the Rwandan society on self-defence aroused fresh interest. The objectivewas to replace the weakness of thenational army with war against the more organized andbetter equipped RPF guerrilla.

Theassassination of Emmanuel Gapyisi by RPFon 18 May1993 provided the starting pointof a newpolicy implemented by the rebels, following the failed attack of 8 February 1993.31 Gapyisi,who was considered to be oneof themost respected politicians of the new generation,was assassinated because he refusedto jointhe pro-RPF wing ofthe MDR party. He couldhave successfully organized democratic resistance against the invader. Consequently, RPF consideredhim dangerous. Gapyisi had written, inter alia: "Today in Rwandathe slogan is clear:no morepower imposed by force,lf needbe, the population of Rwanda must be readyto organizecivil resistance against anyone who might attempt to imposehimself by force.One millionRwandans have fled in theface of RPFadvance. Should two, three, four million Rwandansbe displacedbefore self-defence is organized? The possibility of installing or maintainingpower by forceis dreadedby themajority of Rwandans.It wouldbe a deplorable set-backfor the democratization process begun three years ago ». 32

29Extract fromthe preliminary reportofth¢ z2 Mard~Luu-, ....sessioï, c,î"L,,,~ ...... ,~~,,,,,,,,~~,,,,,,,"’~,-»,~,,~,~"’" ,~,,o.r,.,,,,~"" ...... ~,~,,,, le véritésur !’implication française dans le génocidedes tutsi au Rwanda" which took place in Paris."It should be recalledthat at thebeginning of 1993,Jean Carbonare brought back many-hours video-recordings of Janvier 3 Afrika’sconfession, andthat he transmittedthat document to BrunoDelaye, the offîcial in chargeof theAfrican 3 deskat theElysée." (http:/www.enquête-citoyenne-rwanda.org). 30Cf. Reyntjens 1999: 64. 31 Contraryto RPF assertionthat Emmanuel Gapyisi and FélicienGatabazi were allegedly killed by "Hutu extremists",André Guichaoua found that RPF was responsible for their deaths. Stephen Smith wrote in Le Monde of 7 May2004: "The Minister of Worksand Energy in theopposition-led government, Félicien Gatabazi, Founder andChairman of theParti social-démocrate (PDS), had distanced himself, by theend of 1993,from both President Habyarimanaand RPF, Paul Kagame’s rebel movement. His party did hOtwant to be "thelackey" of eitherof them,he explainedat a meetingheld in February1994. A fewdays later, on Monday21 February,on leavingan oppositionmeeting at the Meridien Hotel in KigalLthe opponent was killed in hiscar on the flyover going up to his residenceat about 1 O. 55 p.m.According totestimonies received by theInternational Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR)and Judge Bruguière, and confirmed to AndréGuichaoua, two RPFsoldiers reportedly committed that crime:Lieutenant Godf~ey Kiyago Ntukayajemo, whois servinga life sentence for other crimes, and Sergeant Eric MakwandiHabumugisha, who had allegedly’covered’ the death of anotheropposition leader, Emmanuel GapyisL in May1993. " 32 Shimamungu2004:314/315

DI05-0039(E) 10

[ DRAFT ] 9J4q-3:Z

The nextstage of thisnew strategy was the assassination on 21 October1993 of Melchior Ndadaye,the newPresident of Burundi,who was democraticallyelected a littleearlier on. The worldwas not inordinatelydismayed and the loomingdisaster was not halted.(It was rumoured thatKagame was in Bujumburaon the day of thatassassination33). After that murder, the confidencethat certain Hutu circles had put in theArusha Accords was shaken.

The laststage of thatstrategy before the attack against the President’s plane was the assassinationon 22 February1994 of FélicienGatabazi, the charismatic leader of thePSD party. He had signedhis deathwarrant one weekearlier when he statedin Butare:"Our party has neveraccepted to be underthe thumbof the MRNDparty; it shallnever also be underthe supervisionof RPF". AndréGuichaoua revealed that it was RPF that killedGapyisi and Gatabazi.

The followingsection deals with some pointsthat are o~en raisedas evidenceof planningof the genocideby "Humextremists", a term used withouta cleardefinition to designateeveryone in Rwandawho challengedthe justificationof the RPF’sarmed struggle againstthe "dictatorship". People have formed the habit of designatingail suchopposition as "Hutupower".

(a) Democratizationand genocide(Evaluation of4Anatole Nsengiyumva’s document titled:"Le ventde l’Estdu 22 mai1990"; WS-02-27)

In variousinstances, the questionis askedwhether the democratizationimposed by the UnitedSates and France after the endofthe Cold War was not thecause ofthe instability in the CentralAfrican region. Indeed, we may wonderwhether the democratizationprocess did not contributein fanningthe ethnic rivalries that had been contained by militaryregimes. However, it is clearthat the ethnic problems could not justify the perpetuation of such regimes. The time was ripefor change affer the end ofthe Cold War. The democraticaspirations ofthe people were voicedthroughout Africa.

Againstthis backdrop, the 1990paper by AnatoleNsengiyumva 35 shouldnot be used,as ¯ somepeople are doing, to provethat every critical debate on democratizationis already a proof of planningofthe genocide. »

33 Shimamungu2004:316 34That document waschosen as a keyexample. Theauthor asserts that he did not find anything racist anywhere in thedocuments heconsulted regarding Anatole Nsengiyumva’s activities. "liais also applies tothe 27 July 1992 note mentionedbyAlison Des Forges in ber Expert Report in The Prosecutor v.Bizimungu etal. Des Forges asserts that AnatoleNsengiyumva suggested that, "the population would fise up and kill tutsi" (p. 14). That is not correct. simplywarned that that could happen. Toavoid sueh a situation,hereeommended that,"To this end, the demoeratic processmust be kept on course and, whenever necessary, shown to the world to prove that, in spite of our current difficulties,weare still committed todemocraey or,rather, tothe democratic process." Heproposes that the difficultiesereated bythe Arusha negotiations should be discussed withRwanda’s allies: "Diplomatie action, beit informal,istherefore a matter of absolute necessity." Thatrecommendation isnot ineitement toacts of violence againsttheTutsi. »5It is worth noting that Dallaire, whois very severe towards the leaders ofthe Rwandan Armed Forces, does not mentionthe name of Anatole Nsengiyumva inhis book.

DI05-0039(E) 11

IDRAFT I a¯

Nsengiyumvareveals in his paperthat in Burundi,President Buyoya, representing the Bururi clanof the Hima-Tutsi,had statedthat, "there was no ethnicproblem in Burundiand thatthe situationwill remain as suchfor as longas he is inpower". However, atter the 1988 revoit in the northerncommunes of Ntegaand Marangara,which resultedin a blood bath,Buyoya had admittedthat there was a Hutu-Tutsiproblem in spiteofhis military regime.

To furthercomplicate the situationin Burundi,the Government"of NationalUnity" put in placeafter the eventsin Ntegaand Marangara clearly indicated the number of ministerialposts grantedto the Hutuand the Tutsi.The Govemmenttherefore could not ignorethe Hutu-Tutsi question.

It is thereforelegitimate for Nsengiyumva to say that in spiteof PresidentBuyoya’s efforts to consolidatenational unity, he was facinga strongopposition in hisown Tutsicamp that was erodingits privilegesin favourof the Hutuelite. Even within the UPRONAparty, discordant voiceswere heard opposing such a policy. )

Consequently,even the militaryregime in Burundicould no longerguarantee "national unity".

In Rwanda,Habyarimana’s one-party system and his versionof "nationalunity" became the targetof critics.Anatole Nsengiyumva, regardless of Habyarimana’sfears that democratization wouldreawaken the ethnicdemons, pointed out thatdemocratization was inevitable.He stated thateven in Tanzania,President Mwinyi had alreadyquestioned the existenceof theone-party systemand JuliusNyerere himself, who was stillthe chairmanof thesaid party, had admitted that"the one-party era was over".

Regardingthe threat posed by Rwandanrefugees, he predicteda political conflagration that hasindeed occurred. As an intelligenceagent, was it nothis duty to makesuch an analysis?

AnatoleNsengiyumva to a certainextent regrets the disappearance of the Eastern Block and thevictory ofthe capitalist system over the socialist/communist system. He deploresthe fact that whitepeople now have total control over Africa and its raw materials.

However,since the one-partysystem was inherited from the EasternBlock and couldnot be maintainedatter the disappearance of the latter, he adviseshis president: "It is a matterof time and all dependson the processadopted by eachcountry to initiatethe inevitableprocess of change".

Whilecondemning the democratizationprocess as beingan impositionof thewhite man, he clearlypoints out that Africa has no choicebut to yield to thewinds of change.

12 Inspite of hisrather "leftist" position, his analysis of the changes that are bound to occurin Africais quiteaccurate: "Our country will certainly be affectedby thewinds of changethat are at ourdoor". He evenpredicts that the current problems of regionalism,the refugee problem and theweakness ofthe institutions will be thrust to the fore by thosewho will call for change.

In sayingthat "the ethnic problems risk being maliciously exploited by thosewho will try to provokethe downfallof the Govemmentor prematurechanges", Anatole Nsengiyumva was merelycalling for responsible changes. He is notopposed to change.

Regardingthe refugeeproblem, he evenunderestimated the dangerof a retumby forceof armsthat could be posedby theexiles in Uganda:"Each time, I concludedthat they could not returnby forceof armsin thenear future, but I addedthat in themeantime, they were capable of causingharm". Just rive months later, the historic events proved him wrong, as theRPF invasion startedon 1 October1990.

The conclusiondrawn by the authoris veryclear. In his analysisof May 1990,Anatole Nsengiyumvadescribes -even thoughthe authordoes not entirelyshare his ideological reasoning,-the real dangers and proposes a pragmatic solution.

Whenhe saidthat ¯ "Inmy opinion,the east wind is blowinginstead from the west and it will havefar-reaching and diverse consequences" and we "willhave to initiatethem without waiting forthe wina~’, he waspredicting what was going to happenat the La Baulesummit of June1990.

In thatdocument, Anatole Nsengiyumva opts for a cautiousapproach without overlooking the dangersinherent in thedemocratization process. He doesnot suggest at anyrime to oppose thechange.

Duringthe period he spentat theGerman ministry ofcooperation in Bonn, the author tried in vainto convincethe political class of thedangers posed by the ethnicproblem in Burundiat~er thegenocide against the Hum eiite in Burundiin î 972.

He alsounderscored that the situationfollowing the events of Ntegaand Marangaraand the influxof Rwandanrefugees could have very serious consequences in a countrywhere the Hutu- Tutsiproblem was less virulent for the time being.

Franceopposed sanctions against the Bururiregime in Burundiwhich it had supportedsince 1972.As a matterof fact,such a pro-Tutsiattitude in Burundiproves that France has never applieda pro-Hutupolicy in Rwanda.French Govemments on bothsides of the politicaldivide havealways supported relative stability premised on the preservationof the statusquo in Rwandaand Burundi.

(b)Self-defence andthe guerilla strategy

DI05-0039(E) 13 I DRAFTI Thesituation changed dramatically in Rwanda following the RPF invasion of 10ctober 1990.It wasinevitable that the ethnic problem would resurface since the RPF rebels were viewedas thearmed wing of theTutsi exiles of Burundiand Uganda. The rebels came from the Tutsidiaspora. Everyone knew very well that the Tutsi within the country could be the target of ethnichatred. Any claim that the ethnic problem and the war could be separatedis most surprising.

TheRwandan Government nevertheless succeeded in circumscribingthedanger up to the assassinationof President Habyarimana, even though it becamemore virulent atter the RPF offensiveof 8 February1993 and the massive influx of displacedpersons fleeing the war. That doesnot mean either that there were no incidents. Thefact of the matter is that they were brought underconEol as longas Habyarimanawasalive.

Theethnic problem was aggravated when Paul Kagame opted for guerilla warfare in early 1991.Historically, theresponse tosuch a strategyhas always been the formation ofsome kind of self-defencemechanism. InRwanda, it wasobvious that guerilla warfare, which was resorted to duringthe one-day occupation of Ruhengeri town in January 1991, was going to give rise to the "syndromeofthe fifth column", against the Tutsi population within the country.

Consequently,itwas no expression of ethnic hatred when a fewofficers, whose duty it was to determinewho the enemy was, declared in a documentthat the Tutsi collaborating with the mainenemy, that is RPF,had become the enemy, by extrapolation. Theynever said that ail the Tutsi,regardless oftheir position vis-à-vis RPF, were enemies. Similarly, they never said that all moderateHutu were enemies. The document defining the enemy makes the distinction between theHutu/Tutsi who want to changethe Government by democratic means and those who want to overthrowthe Government by force.

WhenHabyarimana showed signs of willingnessto negotiate a ceasefire so as to avoida bloodbath, RPF did nothing orvery little. Quite on the contrary, itviolated ceasefire agreements ~~_D.~~-.~~., ...... A..¯ .....,;o,o -atleast three times- ---’---~«,~t~ "if ...... ~a~, L_..L_t,at ~,,u » ..... l, vv ...... j .....~ ...... a lasting peacesettlement.

Guerillawarfare followed a specific tradition in Rwanda.As describedin an interview grantedby AloysNgurumbe in 1961(see Annex 1), the UNAR monarchical party established militias,later known as 1NYENZ1, which left no stone unturned toarbitrarily killail Hutu leaders whodemanded democratic change in thecountry. That strategy did not work. However, when theHutu applied the same strategy in1963 after the invasion of the forces of themonarchy, they succeeded.Indeed, aRer the death of some10,000 Tutsi in thecountry, UNAR and its army stoppedthe invasion. UNAR did not want to sacrificethe Tutsi population that had remained in thecountry.

It wasrumoured that RPF leaders did not inform UNAR representatives of their plans to invadethe country in October 1990, for fear that the latter would oppose such plans to avoid anti-Tutsireprisais. The RPF leaders were determined to go aheadwith the war even when they realizedthat a largenumber of Tutsi would be killed.

DI05-0039(E) 14 [ DRAFT [ 2/~ q~t ~t

The factthat after the attackof 6 April1994, the Interahamweand RadioRTLM wanted the peopleto believethat the strategyapplied in 1963could succeed once again, is partof the Rwandantragedy. They did not understandor couldnot understand36that RPF was deterrnined to sacrifice37a largenumber of Tutsi,as underscoredRTLMbycalled General on HutuDallaire to stopbefore killing the Chamber Tutsi. the warinIt January2004. It was until25 June 1994that on thatdate that RTLM propagandists realized that RPF was not willingto stop wass’ only the contrary, tbe death of Tutsi just, fied. the.Rt~.F _P,,~s

Sucha crueldialectic was the resultof thepolitical vacuum created by thedowning of the president’splane and the settingup of a powerlessGovernment to whichneither RPF nor the internationalcommunity gave the opportunity to restorepeace and publicorder and to stopthe killings.The author was reliably informed that during one of est the therounds credibilityof negotiationsof the Interimheld in ._,:.... ,,f French,American, represen~auw~" Kampala,RPF ¯ refusedeven a five-dayceasefire to t Govemment-The requesthad beenruade to it jointlyby of PresidentMusevem. Britishand Tanzanian diplomatie missions in the presence Stillon the subjectof civildefence, it tanbe asserted-as Bernard Lugan bas donc(Lugan 2004)39- thatthe discussions held within a politicaland military framework cannot in anyway be consideredas a systematicpreparation to killing"the secondary enemy". In his recently publishedbook, Bernard Lugan indeed states that civil defence is a normaltactic used in a difficultmilitary situation. AI’ter the Rwandan Army fled in 1993,it wasclear to anyobserver thatthe army could no longercontain the RPF rebels. As stressedby Lugan,the civil defence strategy is akinto the classicalapproach used by Frenchmilitary academies. The objective of the"policy of ’popularself-defence’ or ’civil self- defence’was, according to us,hot the genocide of theTutsis, but rather the Operational Defence of theTerritory (DOT) as taughtby theFrench to theRwandan General Staff, hot to mentionthe officers,like Colonel Bagosora, who learned about that doctrine during their stay at theParis

36me eo lethink, following the tesumomes ofRuzlbtza. . arato r~ri ...... anteeinganti-Tutsi propaganda that attracted international sympY killedTutsi because they vièW° to Pgeùà~ of the partiSocial-Démocrate 0aSD) drafted hithertonotbeen definitely proven for want of relevant materials. CharlesKaremano who, prior to 6 April1994, was one ofthe leaders thethoughtfatal RPFdialectic was sensitive that dominatedto the fate theof events: Tutsi and"The would Interahamwe, halt its conquests. theHutu militiamen,The logic of terror was, therefore, as follows:massacres ofTutsi civilians justified RPFattacks; such attacks encouraged killings ofTutsi." (Karemano Gahigisaid: "In orderlnkontanyi. forpeace toYour be restored neighour - isas the 2003:3sFor 34)instance, inan RTLM broadcast of25 June 1994, Gaspard Mr.Jean Kambanda once said, and rightly so- youmust know your adversaries, notyour adversary, simply because Ofstophe iseverywhere. this or that Asforother us, way.we must(--.) ensureIf the thatFrench no corneone is tovictimized help us we beeausemust make of acts" (Quotedfrom para. 419 of the Media Trial verdict of outcontribution. Thekillings must hisappearance orregional origin, butrather for his ¯ inanY event endorse his skeptical positionsdynasty, hiss pathiesfor the Nyinginya royal ~ooo~~o~~00~,39The anthor points out~~:; that ô~~~~~~~~~o«~:~~~~,oTw~~~:while quoting ¯ Bernard Lugan, he does hot ~o_,~o~~o~~~~,~~~,« - " " " " stunnlngnnuinb onthe democratization pr BernardLugan is hot su p 15 DI05-0039CE) 2qq~9 War College.That ’popular self-defence’ intended to organisea resistancein caseRPF crossed FAR lines."(LUGAN 2004: 183)

Regardingmilitias, the authorcannot add anythingto whatBernard Lugan has already said. Hence,with good reason, I willcite him yet again. "Because militias were created in 1992,can we say,as Prunierwrites, that the genocide was beingplanned since that date? l’Ve cannot, becauseall of the partieshad thesetypes of back-upforces whose original purpose was to maintainorder during public rallies (...) and evenparties totally foreign to the genocidal ideologyand Hutu ’ethno-Hutunationalism’, such as PSD, had their own militia,the Abakombozi(Liberators). " (Lugan 2004: 182/183)

We can simplyadd thatthe MRNDparty was not the firstto createa militia,contrary to widelyaccepted opinion. Its militia was created in reactionto theMDR party. In thatregard, in a 5 December2000 Internet posting on the "Cerclesolidaire" [solidarity circle] website, Eugène Shimamunguwrote: "The former Prime Minister Dismas Nsengiyaremye created the firstmilitia ) knownas the "Inkuba ", or "lightning",contrary to principle 4 of the political charter ,,«o (..) reactionto thatviolence the Interahamwe would be createdupon the idea of AnastaseGasana, a politicaladviser in chargeof MRNDstrategy, (..) a supporterof a strongleague for the MRND youthwing. "

In his recentbook, Eugène Shimamungu 41 statesthat the founderof the lnterahamwewas noneother than Anastase Gasana who, later on, wouldjoin the MDRparty. Gasana was Minister of ForeignAffairs in the UwilingiyimanaGovernment and was evenbrought back by the RPF Government.It is quitepossible that he wasan RPFinfiltrator, first within the MRND party and then in MDR, afferhe firstmade contactwith the RPF ideologist,Professor Alexandre Kimenyi.42

In a letterto KofiAnnan dated 5 May 2001,Félicien Kanyamibwa, the generalcoordinator of OPJDR(Organization for Peace,Justice, and Developmentin Rwanda)even asked the United Nationsto deny AnastaseGasana tttSt;lt;UltttttUllaS tu~ r~watluallpïe ïesentativetothe United Nations,43 due to hispolitical past which leff much to be desired.

9 40The Report from the "National Synthesis Commission" clearly stated: "Peaceful coexistence among the different componentsofRwandan society iscrucial. Accordingly, political parties may only engage intheir activities through peacefulmeans. They ma)/hOt create militias orother similar organisations, asmaintaining lawand order and securityisa taskincumbent uponthe State. Anadvisory body for defence andsecurity must be set up. " 4JShimamungu 2004: 309. 42Alexandre Kimenyi isa Rwandanroyalist who became a professorat Caiifornia State University, Saeramento, in theUnited States. Hewas the organizer ofthe Washington Conference in1988. In the meantime hebas split with PaulKagamé and is the author of a famousanti-Hutu (practically racist) poern praising Fred Rwigyema aller his deathin October 1990. 43Excerpt from an OPJDR letter: "It is with great shock that the Organization forPeace, Justice, and Development inRwanda, Inc. (OPJDR) learned that Mr. Anastase Gasana was accredited asthe new Rwandan Ambassador tothe UnitedNations Organization. Infact, Anastase Gasana is the founder ofthe notorious Interahamwe, aecused of genocideinRwanda 1994. Besides, hewas one ofthe prominent officiais and leaders ofthe Rwandan Government duringthe massacres of morethan two hundred thousand Rwandan Refugees in EasternCongo and tens of thousandsofRwandan civilians inside Rwanda since 1994." DI05-0039(E) 16

I DRAFT [ Thesefacts should be consideredin thelight oftestimony given by AbdulRuzibiza (Ruzibiza 2004)and AloysRuyenzi (Ruyenzi 2004), who statethat RPF did not opposethe militias, ratherused them.Affer Filip Reyntjens denounced Paul Kagaméas a war criminal,Aloys Ruyenzigave an additionalaccount in January2005, entitled "President Kagame is indeeda war criminal",which contains a series of shockingrevelations (see text in Annex3).

As mentionedpreviously, even someone like Emmanuel Gapyisi, who couldbe consideredas non-alignedwithin the Rwandanpolitical configuration, and who cannotbe suspectedof having anygenocidal tendencies, launched the idea of a civiliandefence in 1993.It is alsoimportant to pointout thateven in Uganda,where RPF was bornand developed, the concept of civildefence existedin theform ofthe "Local Defence Force".

(e) The ’qnformant"Jean Pierre Turatsinze and Dallaire’scoded telegram of 11 January ) 1994. Dallaire’scoded telegram of 11 January1994 has becomethe comerstoneof the theorythat thegenocide was planned.

It is interestingto note that this telegram from Dallaire was not usedwhen Filip Reyntjens publishedit in itsentirety in his1995 book titled "Rwanda: trois jours qui ont fait basculer l’histoire"(Reyntjens 1995). It was simplyaccepted as the mostsignificant evidence that the genocidewas plannedwhen it wasgiven by importantofficiais in theAmerican administration to Gourevitch(Gourevitch 1998) who, in turn,based the argumentsfor his"bestseller" on it. The Carlssonreport (UNO; Carlsson 1999) did exactlythe same thing. 44 Carlssonrefers specifically to the telegramto accuseKofi Annan for failing to reacttoit appropriately. That caused Annan to publiclyexpress his regret over the lack of responsefrom DKPO, which he headedat thetime.

Doesthe contentof that telegramactually prove there were peoplewithin MRND who plannedsystematic massacres, or wasii. a uap, ~t~t.pmmu~ ,iimseh wondered. If-as the author stronglybelieve- informant Jean Pierre Turatsinze was an RPF agent,-perhaps even a double agent-one pieceof evidencesaying that groups of peoplewithin MRND were in the processof planningthe genocidefalls by the wayside.Since other documents tendered into evidence have remainedanonymous, the theorythat the genocidewas plannedis seriouslycalled into questioned.

Whatevidence is therethat Jean Pierre was sentto UNAMIRby RPF?Descriptions of his professionalbackground are troubling.We leamedthat he claimsto haveundergone military training,either in Egyptor in Israel.To our knowledge,the IsraeliState never cooperated militarilywith MRND. On the otherhand, it is knownthat RPF has alwayshad goodrelations withIsrael. Similarly, if Egyptprovided the RwandanArmy with some military supplies, there stillis no evidencethat even a singleInterahamwe militia member was trained by theEgyptians.

44For more information, seePhilipot 2003.

DI05-0039(E) 17 I DRAVTI Thereis no doubtthat Jean Pierre Turatsinze worked for a longtime as a driver,for the Governmentand the MRND Party-State.45 He introducedhimself as a member of the PresidentialGuard (Melvern 2000: 91). That has neverbeen proved. He seemedto havesecret dutieswithin the securitysystem at theMRND party headquarters, and in thatcapacity he was allegedlyinvolved in settingup the Interahamwe.However, to the bestof his knowledge,the authorbelieves that Jean Pierre Turatsinze never held a specificpost within the lnterahamwe hierarchy.It is not unlikelythat Turatsinze was alreadyworking in the shadowsof RPF. Informationavailable to us showsthat the then new SecretaryGeneral of MRND,Joseph Nzirorera,46 expressed concern with Jean Pierre and asked that he be dismissed.

RPF thentook advantage of Turatsinze’sdifficulties with his superiorsto implementa strategyof "sparkingthings off", just as the planto assassinatePresident Habyarimana was becomingclearer and as it mulledover the consequencesof the plan. It wasclear that United Nationsheadquarters were going to refuseto supportsearches for weaponscaches when General Dallairewould ask for authorizationto conductthem. Therefore, actual evidence of the ) informationallegedly provided by JeanPierre cannot be produced.The "trap"worked like a charm.After 6 April1994, the coded telegram was used, just as planned,to makebelieve that the Habyarimanaregime had plannedthe genocide.

The factthat Jean-Pierre Turatsinze could access the MRNDpalace on 1 January1994 and show a certainnumber of weapons47 to SenegaleseCaptain Amadou Deme 4s shouldnot be exaggerated.In fact, the guards knew him. Moreover, it is not surprisingthat weapons could be foundthere, since the building belonged to the NationalGendarmerie. (Dallaire 2003:150)

Thereare indicationsthat the informantused the RPF’sabove-mentioned strategy, which wasto frightenthe so-called "moderates". By suggesting that the Akazu was their biggest threat, they had achievedtheir goal of creatingenemies against Habyarimana. From the RPF perspective,the "moderates"were extremely dangerous because of theirreputation both within and outsidethe country.Had theybeen able to convincethe intemationalcommunity that they werein a pu~luoni.u ~unuluutctu punu~a~uucut~v pca~,~luJ,y, RPF would no longerhave had a pretextto takepower on itsown. To reducethat risk, RPF waged a campaignto tellthose people thatthe Akazusought to eliminatethem. In so doing,RPF hopedthat they would flee the

45In May 1997, Faustin Twagiramungu appeared before a Commission ofthe Belgian Senate: "Jean-Pierre wasa driver,and worked for MRND in thatcapacity. He wasdismissed by MRNDbut remained a member of the Interahamwe.Unless there is another Jean-Pierre. Thosetypes of people try to gain advantages thatcorne to them eitherby se!ling information orby lying. They boast with a certainswagger they ofien do not possess. Hewas a Tutsi(...) Those people worked with the Interahamwe, evenif they were not decision-makers." Citation from document:"ICTR detainees", Arusha, January 2000. 46In a documenttitled "ICTR detainees" Arusha, January 2000, a specificdate was given: "That informant (...) workedat MRND national party headquarters asa driver up to the time he was fired in November 1993." It is possiblehowever that the decision hadnot yet been carried out in January 1994. 4~The figures differ in range from "dozens ofKalashnikov Rifles" OEeyntjens, 18.2.1998 inVoice of America), over "atleast fifty assault rifles" (Dallaire 2003: 150) to "137 Kalashnikov assanlt rifles" (Melvern 2000: 95). 4sMarcha, 2001: 172/173: « ...Captain Amadouh Deme, who is Senegalese andhas the right skin colour, has seen a largenumber of Kalaehnikov andG3 dfles with ammunition (...) What more tan we ask for? Someone who ean enterMRND headquarters sonaturally andwalk around as ifhe owns the place is certainly nodogsbody".

DI05-0039(E) 18

[ DRAFT I ,2a~,z6t country.Those moderates who did not wantto go wouldbe killed,not by thoseRPF saidwould killthem, but by RPF itself.

Thatintimidation strategy was used againstJames Gasana, Emmanuel Gapyisi, Félicien Gatabaziand others. 49 Thethree above-mentioned people were considered as thevoice of reason. RegardingJames Gasana, the strategyworked like a charmand he indeedleft the countryafter being intimidatedby a "secretorganisation" called AMASASU. It is unlikelythat the organisationwas created by the "Hutuextremists". That strange document, on thecontrary, is a perfectexample of theRPF’s scheme to fabricate"evidence" that could be usedat a laterstage afferPresident Habyarimana’s death. Regarding Gapyisi and Gatabazi,those threats were carried out.Recently, thanks to researchconducted by AndréGuichaoua, the truthwas establishedthat RPF shouldbe heldaccountable for thoseassasinations, but RPF triedto blamethem on the Akazu.

It is notsurprising that Jean-Pierre Turatsinze "vanished from history" shortly at~er his visit to Luc Marchalon 10 January1994. On thatissue, Roméo Dallaire’s comments are rather disturbing:"Jean-Pierre disappeared near the end of January.Whether he had engineeredan escapeon hisown or wasuncovered and executed, I have never been able to findout. The more troublingpossibility is that he simplymelted back into the Interahamwe, angry and disillusioned at our vacillationand ineffectiveness,and becamea génocidaire." (Dallaire). 2003:151 Accordingto rumours,he was assassinatedby RPF agents in 2002.At anyrate, it seemsstrange thatthere is no accessto credibleinformation regarding the location of thatcrucial "witness" on thegenocide planning theory. What that means is thatthe circumstances under which Jean-Pierre transmittedthe information referred to in Dallaire’stelegram, are so murkythat no oneshould reasonablyaccept the informationas evidencethat the Habyarimanaregime planned the genocide.As mentionedabove, even the formerPrime Minister Twagiramungu, who introduced Jean-Pierreto UNAMIR, does not rule out thepossibility of manipulation.

td)~~AMASaSU"

As regardsthe so-calledgroup AMASASU, as indicatedabove, it is verylikely that it was 0 inventedby RPF to suitits own interest.The tractsigned by « CommandantTango Mike » _3 provesthat RPF was awareto the mostminute detail of whatwas goingon withinMRND and theRwandan army. Its content was so gravethat Minister James Gasana saw it as a seriousthreat to hissecurity and that of hisfamily. As suggestedabove, it wasindeed a threat,but not issued by his rivaiswithin MRND. The AMASASUtract has no probativevalue and AlisonDes Forges’submission that "It seemslikely" that Commandant Mike "is eitherCol. Théoneste Bagosoraor someoneworking closely with him"is not at ail founded.Why wouldBagosora takesuch a riskwhilst, as statedby thesame expert, he wasa memberof theAkazu inner circle?

49In another example, theauthor isalmost certain that that saine strategy wasused. Turatsinze passed a message toa high-rankingfigure saying that the Hum extremists could kill him. However, for security reasons, the author does notwish to reveal his source. DI05-0039(13) 19

[ DRAFT He couldhave resorted to othermeans to makethe Defence Minister, James Gasana, resign if thathad been his intention.

(e)The "Moderates"’ letter to Dallaire

Theletter sent by theso-called "Moderates" to Dallaire on 3 December1993 had the same objectiveas the famous coded telegram from Dallaire. Bearing in mind"the collateral damages" whichwill arise following the assassination of Habyarimana, RPFstood to gainby fabricating theexistence ofa "MachiavellianPlan"to be attributed to "Hutu" extremists. Itwas obvious that theannouncement ofthe assasssination would lead to totalchaos. It should be notedonce again thatthis document bears no signaturefor it tobe authenticated.It is anonymous and does not proveanything.

09Political party militias setup to kill Tutsi? ) Comingback to theissue of militiasin additionto thearguments already advanced by 3 BernardLugan in relation to the problem of civilself-defence, itshould be underscoredthat the factthat Robert Kajuga was the son of a well-knownTutsi family is veryimportant. In that regard,one would not expect him to be appointedto head an organizationwhich planned to kill Tutsi.On the contrary,he was chosento showthat the 1NTERAHAMIYEof MRNDwere not directedagainst the Tutsi.

Butgiven the infiltrations within the MRND system itself, one cannot completely exclude thathe hadlinks with RPF. Being Tutsi would have been an excellentway to hidehis real intentions.

(g)Distribution ofweapons

Thosewho were given weapons were those who were involved in combatingthe RPF army i._:_=, .... :^_.v....,t...... aiid:--111 L/I~"-- II~IIL~’-’ .....a~alll~L " LII~.,.... IIIIIII,ItQLIUII~.I UlHI~I~’tlII~.JI~~,,thebulk ofthe weapons were distributed as partof the operational defence of the territory asmentioned earlier on. This explains why the distributionof firearms started in areas situated at thenorthem border of the country such as Byumba,Ruhengeri and Gisenyi. If theobjective had been to kill the Tutsi, there would have beena country-widedistribution ofweapons.

V. TheRwandan army after the attack of 6 April1994.

Wehave already stated that, in light of the various testimonies andreports available, the responsibilityofRPF and its allies in the attack against the presidential plane on 6 April1994 couldbe considered as a fact.We will now deal with the issue of whether,in a powervacuum, theremainder of theRwandan armed forces could have limited the propagation of large scale killings.

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[ DRAFT ] Themissile attack against the presidential plane and the ensuing chaos indicate that an elaborateplan to execute this attack had been put in place.As RPFpredicted, the Presidential Guardvented its fury, much to thedetriment of the Hutu community. In fact, all those who were responsibleforthe restoration oflaw and order and security died in a veryshort space of time. Sincethe Army Chief of Staffwas dead and boththe Minister of Defenceand the Head of MilitaryIntelligence were on officialmission in Cameroonand their Interior counterpart in Tanzania,the power vacuum became a realitywhich was not created by Bagosoraand the others, as submittedby Alison Des Forges. The responsibility forrestoring law and order fell in the handsof a groupof officerswho happened to be presentat Kigali.These men formed a crisis committeewhich the Prosecutor has shown so muchinterest in. It shouldalso be stated that even thePresidential Guard had no leadership asa resultof the attack on the presidential plane and its commanderwas not present in Kigali.

Therest of thestory is publicknowledge. Dallaire and Marchal submit that there are no indicationsthat the military hierarchy attempted tostage a coupd’état. In thisregard, Lugan concludes:"A.Des Forges et al therefore systematically interpret measures taken in responseto a miiitarysituation asevidence ofgenocidal intentions, which, naturally, isa misinterpretation." (Lugan2004: 163)

(a)The role of the army in the installation ofthe lnterim Government

TheCrisis Committee assigned Col. Bagosora with the task of contactingthepolitical parties witha viewto settingup a civiliangovemment in a situationwhere the Prime Minister had no reasonto considerhimself as Interim Head of Statesince he was appointed only on the basis of theConstitution applicable as at 10 June 1991. It wouldappear that Mrs. Agathe Uwilingiyimana herselfhad never aspired to occupysuch a position.She was not prepared togo to the studios of theNational Radio station to addressthe Nation when the blue helmets came to fetchher. She wasin dangerwhen, against the wishes ofthe Crisis Committee, Gen. Dallaire insisted on having herinstalled asInterim President.

ThePeace Accord of 4 August1993 had put in placea newConstitution which would have allowedfor such an interpretation.However, this Constitution wasnull and void as oneof the signatoriesviolates itby attacking theother party. This was the case when the mediator, Dallaire, .3 failedto convinceRPF to particpatein setting up a govemmentas provided for in theArusha PeaceAccord.

Thefollowing two days were dominated by effortsby thesoldiers to installalegitimate civiliangovernment. The appointment of Dr. Sindikubwabo is proof that the Crisis Committee andthe political parties gave priority tolegality andnot to political considerations.

Sindikubwabowasa manwho had no realpolitical influence. It soon became obvious that he couldnot influence the tum of eventsin any significant manner. The famous speech at Butare certainlytook place at the wrong time and was misinterpreted, butit doesnot per se, prove that

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L DRAFT J tflerewas a plan,more so as it wasdelivered by an inexperiencedInterim Head of State.We musttake it that he was overwhelmed by the surrounding chaos.

Thestarting point of the"non-govemment" situation was remarkable. When it wasswom in on 9 April1994, General Dallaire went to Hôteldes Diplomates to meet members of thenewly installedGovernment. "At the hotel, I encountereda number of ministersand their families packingtheir suitcases and belongings into vehicles. No one wanted to stopto talk to me, since theywere concentrating on getting out of town. l foundout later that they were heading for safetyin Gitarama,which was about sixty kilometres west of the capital The scene reminded me moreof thefall of Saigon than of thesupposed installation of a government determined totake controlof thecountry." (Dallaire 2003: 277). Therefore, even if theGovemment existed paper,it shouldrather be seenas a groupof personsdisplaced from within who found refuge intially5° atGitarama, then Gisenyi, before finally escaping toBukavu in Congo/Zaire.

Thosewho planned the attack against the presidential plane were objectively notinterested in havingto dealwith a strongand organized govemment. Consequently, they did ail that was possibleto makesure that the Interim Govemment did not become a strongand organized institution.

In thesecircumstances, theofficers who stayed in Kigali organised the defence of a country devoidof an efficientgoveming structure. The replacement of Gen. Marcel Gatsinzi by General AugustinBizimungu as InterimChief of Staff,on 16 April1994, could be consideredas unfortunateandits interpretation could mean mere speculation. Inany event, this replacement doesnot buttress, inany manner whatsoever, thetheory that there was a plan.

RPFwas able to win the war because it didnot have to dealwith a structuredentity which couldresist. The genocide against the Tutsi was essentially theresult of themassive group of displacedpersons who had to fleewhen RPF invaded their camps. The militiamen mingled with someofthese fleeing persons and army deserters assisted them with fatal consequencies. Inthese circumstancc~,m~,a llit~lalll ¯ ,. , .L Government wasunable to controlthe situation. Nevertheless, aswe havementioned before, the most important factor behind the excesses was the attitude of the internationalcommunity.

Ço)The conduct of the war afier 6 April1994

"On8 April1994, France decides to putan embargoon thesale of weaponsto Rwanda.In actualfact, the last autorisation forthe export of warequipment, which was already limited to thesale of pistolsand parachutes, wasdelivered on 6 April1994. (...) On 17 May1994, the

5°Inher report prepared for the Casimir Bizimungu et al trial,Alison Des Forges submits that the fact that the InterimGovemment conducted "business as usual"is evidencethat it couldbe qualifiedas a government functioningnormally. However, Ministers coming together does hOt prove that the Government could eontrol the country.

DI05-0039(E) 22

[ DRAFT I o

SecurityCouncil (...)finally imposed an arms embargo,that is a monthand a half aflerFrance didso. ,,51

As a result, the war was lost on 8 April 1994 when France imposed a unilateralarms embargoagainst the Rwandanarmy whilstthe UnitedNations waited till 17 May 1994 to do so. Thus, between8 April and 18 May 1994, RPF could be suppliedwith weaponsin all legality whilst there was a total embargoon deliveryof weaponsto the Rwandanarmy whose greatest supplierup to October1993 was France.52 Most ofthe bank accountsopened abroad in the name of the RwandanNational Bank, essentiallyin London and the United States of America,had been frozen.

The 7 April 1994 offensivehad been plannedwell in advance.The 30 March 1994 meeting between Luc Marchal and General Nsabimana is the most convincingevidence. The General said:"My fear is that RPF will triggerwar in the days to corne.The informationI have leaves unfortunatelyno room for doubt. For several weeks now, it is stocking ammunitionand hardwarein Uganda,along the border.In a nutsheil,ail that is neededto supporta largescale militaryoperation. ,53

5~ EdouardBalladur, French Prime Minister in 1994,LE FIGAROof 24 August2004. 52 Thelast Apartheid regime was also a bigarms supplier, which partly explains why later on NelsonMandela took a pro-RPFstance. Musabyimana wrote : "Indeed,when Belgium took the decision to suspendthe delivery ofall typesof armsto Rwandain October1990, the Habyarimana regime turned to SouthAfrica fo theextent that at the eveof thesigning of the Arusha Accords, this country was by farthe biggest supplier of weaponsto Rwanda.At one stage,the ANC mission in Kampalacomplained through the media. "(Musabyimana 2004 : 42) 53 LueMarchal, at a conferencein Paris, 4 April2003 (contents of textconfirmed to theauthor by LucMarchal himself).Marchal said : "Butcertainly what l considerasthe most significant factor in relation tothe role played by theFront (RPF) before the crash, is a conversationI had exactly seven days earlier with the Chief of Staffof the RwandanArmed Forces (General Déogratias Nsabimama). On that day, 30 March1994, we werein theprocess inspectingvarious tactical postions situated on thenorth of thecapital. Afler the inspection, I asked General ivsabtmanatf J couidmeet him to sharewith him my observations.So at theend of thatday, l foundmyself in the presenceof a manl feltwas deeply preoccupied And I couMunderstand that one should be preoecupiedby the operationalityof that force. What I sawat thetactical positions which are supposed to wardoff the axes of advance towardsthe capital, was, from the military point of view,appalling. In simple terms, the units stationed at these positionsare unable of stopping anybody, certainly hOt the RPF fighters. But that was not the purpose of my visit.I thenstarted discussing with the Chief of Staffabout the shortcomings noted with regards to thelayout in thezones wereweapons were consigned We both agreed on a planto bringthis to standard.Since we hadfinished that topic, we continuedour discussion as if theGeneral wanted to tellme somethingelse. For several minutes we talkedabout nothingin particular,andas thetypical Rwandan he was,he talkedto me aboutcattle. To teliyou that we talked abouteverything under the sun. And then, without warning and in an anxioustone, he toldme: ’Myfear is thatRPF willlaunch the war in thedays fo corne.The information that I haveunfortunately leaves no roomfor doubt. For severalweeks now, it is stockingammunition and hardware in Uganda,along the border, in a nutshell,ail that is neededto supporta large scale military operation’. I replied that it was’unthinkable, thatRPF cannot indulge in sucha moveunder the eyes of theinternational community’. He retorted: ’RPF does not have any need of such considerations.Themistake that you, UNAMII~ are committing is believing that it reasonsthe saine way as youdo. Butthe reality is completelydifferent. TheFront is a revolutionarymovement, and that is howit reasons and fixes ifsown objectives.’ Andin conclusionhe told me: ’If you use the same methods against revolutionaries, youare boundto losealways’. I must say that I wasdeeply shaken by thosewords. Since then, they have been resounding in my earsand hit me withthe same intensity. Unfortunately, events have proven that General Nsabimana was right. "

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°

In an interviewwith a youngBelgian researcher, Marchal stated: "It should also be noted that,following the attack, the military operations started immediately. (...) RPF started its operationsfrom 7 Aprilin the morning and stopped them in mid-July.As a soldier,I know that operationsdonot corne out of the blue, they are planned long before ". 54

Thekillings began in Kigaliat thesame time as thenew RPF offensive. There is no doubt thatit could have been stopped, militarily, even though Alan Kuperman states otherwise. 55His argumentstend to exoneratethe international community. He submits that it wouldhave taken sixweeks to deploytroops capable of defeatingthe lnterahamwe to Rwanda. But that is not wherethe problem lies. As at 12 April1994, there were enough forces stationed in Kigali, Bujumbura,Nairobi and throughout the region which could have reinforced the UNAMIR troops (2500soldiers, unfortunately ill-equipped) toprevent the genocide: ¯ 500Belgian para commandos (Kigali, very well equipped) ¯ 450French para commandos (Kigali, the best equipped) ¯ 80Italian soldiers (well equipped) ¯ 500Belgian para commandos (on standby in Nairobi) ¯ 250 AmericanMarines on "stand-by"in Bujumburafor the evacuationof Americanand European citizens ifthe need arises ¯ 80056 French troops (on standby in theregion)

LindaMelvern does not contradict Marchal who stated that he wasconvinced that the moderateelements of theRwandan army would have sided with those foreign forces to enforcea peacekeepingoperation. 57 Themilitary solution existed. But the Americans and Europeans did notcorne to rescue Tutsi in danger.

54 Excerptfrom Christophe Vincelet, La mort des dix casques bleus belges à Kigalile 7 avril1994 ou l’échecde la Belgiquedans la criserwandaise. Masters Thesis at theUniversité de Paris-X Nanterre, History Faculty, June 2003, [~~.105-129. ~~e important portions ofthis Masters Thesis have been published in: Vincelet 2004. Kuperman,Alan J. in INTERNATIONALHERALD TRIBUNE, June 25, 2004: "The lOth anniversaryof Rwanda’sgenocide brought a spate of retrospectivesarguing that the international community could hale prevented if ifwe merely had possessed the’political will ’ tointervene. Butthis is wishful thinking. Bythe time we couldhave deployeda big enough force to Rwanda,most of thetargets of thegenocide wouM have already been killed It’s true thatthe West did lack the will to interveneor call the killing by itsrightful name for many weeks. But this does hOt meanthat more political will by itselfcould have averted the genocide. " »6 Cf.Melvern 2004b: 225. Marchal 2001: 251: "At the end of theoperation to evacuate the expatriates (...), there wasa totalof morethan three thousand troops. " Similarfigures have already been advanced during Reyntjens’ testimony before the Belgian Senate Commission of Enquiryin 1997when he submittedthat from the military point of view,the attacks against file Tutsi population couldbave been avoided: "We had 410 men from KIBAT, 450 men from the para brigade, plus a reserveof 800in NairobL450 French,80 Italiansand 800 men fromthe American Special Forces stationed at Bujumbura,200 Ghanianspresent in thesector, more than 600 reservists andfinally 60 Tunisians(...). In total,we hadsome 2, 500 men."(Chapter 3.8.4.2) 57 Marchal2001:251/252: "Inaddition, it was hOt out of placeto thinkthat if the international community had in the leastindicated its resolve to be involvedin thesituation resulting from the 6 Aprilattack, part of theRAF would certainlyhave participated ina pacification operation, on the condition, of course, that RPF suspends its military offensive."

DI05-0039(E) 24

[ DRAFT ] On 15 April1994, the well-equippedsoldiers who evacuatedthe "Whites"lett Rwanda, leavingbehind Tutsi who were under threat. Following the decision of theSecurity Council of 21 April1994, only a meagrenumber of 270 ill-equippedblue helmets remained behind. That decisionwas taken because of pressureexerted by Mrs.Albright, the then Representative of the UnitedStates of Americaat theUnited Nations, to ensuremilitary victory for the troops of Paul Kagame.Launching an operationto rescuethe Tutsiwould have impeded the powerconquest in Kigali,which, in reality,began on 6 April1994.

Ailavailable sources indicate that RPF did nothing to savethe Tutsi and this is greatly corroboratedby recent testimonies from Ruzibiza and Ruyenzi.As rightlyunderscored by Linda Melvern,even on 3 May 1994,RPF had refusedan interventionby the UnitedNations by arguingthat such an operationwould only benefit the InterimGovernment: 8 The RPF radio station-Radio MUHABURA-diverted the attentionof the internationalcommunity by broadcastingthe followingmessage on 11 Ma)’1994: "The genocide is alreadyfinished’’59whilst it wasstill being perpetrated at that time. Alison Des Forges states that the « Representativesof ) HumanRights Watch and FIDH(...) were shocked by the RPF oppositionto a forcethat couM ,,60 savetutsi lives. EricGillet, one of the authorsof "InternationalCommission", wrote on 2 May 1994to the officialhead of RPF,Col. Kanyarengwe: "We understandvery well the reasons whythe RPF wouldhOt wantto acceptan interventionforce. But we cannotsee an?/legitimate reasonthat the RPF mightinvoke to opposea solutionwhich would bring the necessaryhelp to the civilianpopulation without interfering with ongoing military operations". 61 AlisonDes Forgesadds: "Diplomats at theSecurity Council also exerted pressure on the RPF,but without greatsuccess ".

Ruyenziwrote: "1 cannotforget the painthat general Kagame inflicted to theRwandan tutsiethnic group, his own tribemates. Some were even killed on his orders.Others were deliberatelylefi at themercy of lnterahamwe.He made sure that nobody cornes to theirrescue. Up-to-date,he is stillpursuing his policy by repeatingin Congowhat he did in Rwanda.~ is he busy creatinghatred between Banyamulenge minority and the rest of the Congolese populuiion?1~" it for the interestof tutsis?Even in Rwanda,he doesnot spareanything îo exacerbatetension between ethnic groups, by hispolicy of forcedreconciliation. What he does willinevitably lead to a newwave of ethnicconflict and tutsi will again be themain victims". 62

Dallaireis -surprisinglyin his book-much more explicit: "Kagame wanted ail ofthe country,hOt parts of it.I cameto believehe didn’t wantthe situation to stabilizeuntil he had won.,~3 During his testimonyin Arushain January2004, Dallaire made a sensationalstatement by declaringthat at the beginningof April1994 Paul Kagame had beenwamed by a Rwandan

»8Melvern, 2004 b: 263 "In a letterto the United Nations, RPF objected toa interventionofthe United Nations whiehit saw as a deliberatehoaxaimed at manipulating thepeace process with a viewto protecting andsupporting themurderers ofthe Interim Government." 59Excerpt from Des Forges 1999 : 700 6oDesForges 1999:700 61DesForges 1999:700 62Ruyenzi2004 63Dallaire2003:438

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[ DRAFT ] °

Ministerof theconsequences the resumptionof the war couldhave on theTutsi population and thathe allegedlyreplied: "This was the price to bepaidforvictory ’’64.On 2 April1994, Kagame had somehowconfessed to Dallaireby saying¯ "1 lookedat his faceand it was sombreas l’d everseen him. Something cataclysmic was coming, he said,and onceit started,no one wouldbe ableto control it. ,,6»

As regardsthe strangebehaviour of the AmericanGovernment which on 16 July1994 declaredthat the United States had "taken a leadingrole in the effortsto protectthe Rwandan people", Dallaire’sobservation on this issue is quiterevealing: "Clinton ’sfibbing dumfounded me..66

To concludeon thisissue, the authorwould like to quoteDallaire once more: "The UnitedStates, France and Belgiumhad provenwith their evacuation exercise that this mission couM hOt be reinforced.It was certainlyhOt a lack of meansthat preventedthem from reinforcingmy missionor eventaking my missionunder their command to stopthe killings. ) Laterthat day, I wentto my firstnegotiation with the RPF regardingthe RGFmoderates" offer of unconditionalsurrender. As l’d predicted, Seth and the other politicians dismissed it outright. (...)The RGF insisted on a ceasefireso theycould redeploy forces to stopthe killings. The RPF insistedthat the killings had to stopbefore they would agree to a ceasefire". (Dallaire2003: 294/5).This uncompromising stand by RPF meantthat the RwandanArmed Forces (RAF) the InterimGovemment had no chanceof restoringpeace and order.And thiswas exactlywhat RPF wanted.

RPF wantednothing short of a militaryvictory over RAF. Paul Kagame was not readyto sharepower with anyone. No onecan justify or findexcuses for thekilling of the Tutsi,but, giventhat the Hutucommunity had lost a lotof its leadersfollowing the 6 April1994 shooting downof thepresidential plane, there were no high-rankingpersonalities to explain to thegroup ofkillersthat in so doing,they were playing the game ofthe invaders. In 1991and 1993, when the Hutuwere overwhelmed by the RPF atrocitiesand someof themvented their spleen on the Tut~ir, living inside the country,Habyarimana was able to convincemembers of hisetlhnic ~luu thatthey were falling into the enemy’strap and theyobeyed him. When on 25 June1994 -as indicatedabove 67 -RTLMappealed for a stopto the killingof the Tutsi,the Rwandantragedy wasalready completely out of control.

64Agence Hirondelle wrote on 28 January 2004 :,Kagame had been warned by a governmentminister that ifthe war resumesTutsis will be killed and he allegedly replied that the dead will be considered as"the price to pay ", that is as"a sacrifice", according tothe testimony ofthe Canadian General." 65Dallaire 2003:214 66Dallaire 2003:472 67Cf.footnote §419 ofthe Judgment inthe Media case of 3 December2003.

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[ DRAFT I Vl. Conclusion .~,’~/’/~lOE TheRwandan genocide against the Tutsi began on 11 April1994, 6s in a situationof total absenceof statemachinery structures. A Government had beensworn in on 9 April1994, but it didnot manageto operate.Due to war,it didnot payserious attention to theproblems of the country.The trialof Kambanda,unfortunately, has leitopen several crucial questions, which wouldhave enlightened the world. He carried,as BernardLugan said, "a lot of secretsto life imprisonment" 69

The Armyhad beendecapitated on 6 April1994 by the shootingdown of the presidential plane.Officers who were to assumeresponsibility in such a chaoticsituation had two choices:

¯ Either,to give themselvesin immediately,as the enemywas betterprepared and ) unwillingto acceptany compromisewhatsoever, Or,use the little means at their disposal (since France had, on 7 April1994, unilaterally decreedan armsembargo) 7° and try to gaintime while awaiting the possibleoutcome of thenegotiations.

TheInterim Government opted for thelast choice and coupledit withthe creation of a civildefense force. It had the rightto do that.The onlyquestion was to knowwhether there existedany rationale in thatoption, taking into account the fact that the international community had isolatedthe Government.

Theinternational community was clearly in favourof theRPF’s military victory and had decidedto remaina "bystanderto genocide"(Samantha Power) 71. On 21 April1994, this decisionwas madeknown to the publicby the reductionof UNAMIRforces to some270 Blue Helmets,with a givenmandate of notactively protecting civilians.

Thisgave a bad signalto gangsof criminalyouth basically recruited from poverty strickenareas where they were obliged to live,having been forced from their homes by RPF. J Thebrutality of the RPFmilitary machine had repercussionson the reactionof theHutu people.Some of themwrongly thought that by inflictingheavy death tolls on the Tutsi,they wouldcoerce RPF to stopits hostilities. This, however, does not mean that the author intends to justifythe Hutu strategy. He is simplytrying to explainwhat happened.

68Aceording tothe author, massacres, which preceded those of ETO, are not regarded asgenocide. Prior to that very day,large-scale massacres, which were politically motivated, werecarried out on both sides. 69 Lugan2004:185 70Cf. Balladur, LEFIGARO, 24 August2004. 71Power, Samantha. 2001. Bystanders togenocide. Why the United States Let the Rwandan Tragedy Happen. In: AtlanticMonthly 288 (2): pp.84-108.

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[ DRAFT I Thegenocide would have, undoubtedly, been militarily prevented if therewas a political will.But fromthe timewhen RPF, for strategicreasons, did not wantit to be stopped,any interventionswere deliberately excluded, with the supportof superpowers dominating the SecurityCouncil of the UnitedNations¯ It was not becausehuman resources were insuftïcient. Therewas a conspiracyof handingover the power to RPF at any cost.These same powers have, up to thisjuncture, objected to any seriousinvestigations on the shootingdown of the presidentialplane, which in essence,was the casus belli ofthe genocide.

This,has unfortunately,never been honestly tackled by mostof theexperts, including AlisonDes Forges, and yet it is thekey factorif one reallywants to understandthe Rwandan tragedy.

It is againstany logic to imaginethat people who were not able to knowthe secret plans of the internationalcommunity, sat togetherand plannedgenocide as the Prosecutorasserts. Besides,if Hutuextremists had planned anti-Tutsi genocide, wouldn’t the Prosecutor be able,10 yearsafter, to presentindisputable evidence for that? It is importanthe admitsthat he hasnot 3 beenin a positionto doit.

PerhapsRomeo Dallaire’s reflection after the swearing in ceremonyof theRPF’s leaders on 9 July1994, paved a way forwardfor the truth:’7 wonderedagain about the natureofthis less-than-perfectunilateral ceasefire and victory,and of PaulKagame, so dignifiedas he acceptedhis newoffice. Was he hauntedby the costof hisvictory? He andthe testof theRPF leadershiphad knownwhat was goingon behindthe RPF lines.He and the movementhad been relentlesslyinflexible about any concessionthat might have eased the tension in thecountry, bothbefore the civilwar brokeout and later,when they had the RwandanGovernment Forces (RGF)on the run.He hadbeen reluctant to supportUNAMIR 2, whosespecific duty was to stop the killingand the massdisplacement of the population.Increasingly, we couldsee the immaculatecars of Burundianreturnees or the ox cartsof the UgandanTutsi refugees in the streetof Kigali,as membersof thescattered diaspora took up residencethroughout .~.~.~the,t.~ better partsof thecapital, sometimes even throwing out legtt, m,,,~ owners who z.~.~ ..... and genocide.Kagame seemed to be doinglittle about it. Who exactlyhad beenpulling his stringsthroughout the campaign?I foundmyself thinking about such dire thoughts as whether the campaignand genocidehad beenorchestrated to clearthe way of Rwanda’sreturn to the pre-1959status quo in whichTutsis had calledail the shots.Had the Hutuextremists been biggerdupes than I? Ten years later, I stillcan ’t putthese troubling questions to rest, especially in thelight of whathas happened to the region since. ,z2

Or else,Heracleitus, a Greek philosopher and historian who said, "War is theFather and theKing ofall" would probably be right.

Donein Berlin,in February2005.

72Dallaire 2003:475/6

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Marchal,Luc. 2001. Rwanda: La descenteaux enfers.Témoignage d’un peacekeeper. December 1993-April1994. Brussels: Éditions Labor. ISBN2-8040 1632-3, 335 p.

Melvern,Linda. 2000. A peoplebetrayed. The roleof the Westin Rwanda’sgenocide. London -) ) New York: Zed BooksISBN 1856498301;272 p.

Melvem,Linda 2004 a. Conspiracyto murder."The Rwandagenocide. London; New York: Verso.ISBN 1859845886-358p.

Melvem,Linda. 2004 b. Ruanda,Der V6lkermordund die Beteiligungder westlichenWelt. Diederichs-Verlag,ISBN 3720524868; 384 p.

Musabyimana,Gaspard. 2003. La vraie naturedu FPR/APR.D’Ouganda en Rwanda.Paris: L’Harmattan.ISBN 2-7475-4847-3; 278 p.

Musabyimana,Gaspard 2004. L’APR ET LES RÉFUGIÉS RWANDAIS AU ZAIRE 1996-1997. Un genocidenié, preface of whichis writtenby HelmutStrizek, Paris: L’Harmattan. ISBN 2- 7475-5690-5;225 p.

Onana,Charles und DéogratiasMushayidi. 2001. Les secretsdu génocideRwandais. Enquêtes sur les mystèresd’un Président. Paris: Éditions MINSI. ISBN 2-911150-03-1; 189 p. D

Philpot,Robin. 2003. Ça ne s’estpas passécomme ça à Kigali.Montréal, Québec: Éditions les Intouchables.ISBN 2-89549-097-X; 224 p.

Portier,Johan. 2002. Re-imagining Rwanda: conflict, survival and disinformationin the late twentiethcentury. Cambridge [U.K]; New-York: Cambridge University Press. ISBN 0-521- 81366-2;251 p.

Power,Samantha. 2002. "A Problemfrom Hell". America and the Age of Genocide.New York: BasicBooks (Perseus Books Group). ISBN 0-465,06150-8; 611

DI05-0039(E) 30

[ DRAFT I Reyntjens,Filip. 1999. Rwanda: trois jours qui ont fait basculer l’histoire. Paris: L’Harmattan. ISBN2-7384-3704-4; 150 p.

Reyntjens,Filip. 1999. La guerredes GrandsLacs. Alliancesmouvantes et conflits extraterritoriauxen Afrique centrale. Paris/Montréal: L’Harmattan. ISBN 2-7384-8356-9; 255p.

Reyntjens,Filip. 2004. Rwanda.Ten yearson: From Genocideto dictatorship.AFRICAN AFFAIRS,London 103 (411):pp. 177-210.

Ruyenzi, Aloys. Testimony,July 5, 2004: MAJOR GENERAL PAUL KAGAME BEHIND THE SHOOTING DOWN OF THE LATE HABYARIMANA ’S PLANE RWANDANET, 2004 [available on:http://rwandanet.skynetblogs.be.]

Ruzibiza, Abdul. TESTIMONY AIMING TO DEMONSTRATE HOW THE RWANDAN GOVERNMENT AND THE RPF ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE ERRORS, WHICH MADE ) POSSIBLETHE GENOCIDE.Translated from Kinyarwandaby the RwandanNational Forum (RNF),Washington, D.C., May 31, 2004.

Shimamungu,Eugène. 2004. Juvénal Habyarimana. L "homme assassiné le 6 avril1994. Éditions Sourcedu Nil.ISBN 2-9521712-0-3; 399 p.

Strizek,Heimut. 2002. Linda Melvern is right,but ... Short Analysis of: A peoplebetrayed. The Roleof the Westin Rwanda’sGenocide by LindaMelvem (2000). Internationales Afrikaforum. Weltforum-Verlag,Bonn, Vol. 38 issue4, pp.375-390.

Strizek,Helmut 2004. Central Africa: 15 YearsAfter the End of theCold War. The International InvolvementInternationales Afrikaforum, Weltforum-Verlag, Bonn. Vol. 40, issue3, pp. 273- 288.

¯ "~r~ qnrrz~ yT~r]P~]~.DI~.7tTT~;~,7~T~P¥7LT/-bTTTDTv w TATtT’~ rr~r-1"~ UNO; Carlsson,Ingvar. 1999. REPORTL,IF 11-1~....11¥ JLJJ~,I LI ¥ ~ t../.L£~..l ACTIONS OF THE UNITED NATIONS DURING THE 1994 GENOCIDE IN RWANDA. New York.December 15, 1999.United Nations Organization.

Vincelet,Christophe. 2003. La mortdes dix casquesbleus belges à Kigali.Le belgocentrisme dansla criserwandaise. Paris: L’Harmattan. ISBN 2-7475-4863-5; 250 p.

DI05-0039(E) 31 [ DRAFT J ANNEXE 1 .7»4~// Le contexteinternational de la criseen AfriqueCentrale Extraitde: Strizek,Helmut. 2004. Central Africa: 15 YearsAfter the End of the Cold War. The International Involvement. INTERNATIONALES AFRIKAFORUM, WeltfommverlagBonn Vol.40, No. 3, pp. 273-288.

"In late1993, the democratictrain got derailedsomewhere between Sudan, Somalia, Rwandaand Ouganda.The Somaliadisaster had transformedthe U.S.commitment in Central and EastAfrica. As SidneyBlumenthal put it, Clinton"fled" Africa in October1993: "On October3, 1993(...) gleeful crowds dragged the corpsesof Americansoldiers through the streetsand burnedthem before television cameras. Within days, Clinton announced a U.S. withdrawal.’’73Secretary ofDefense, Leslie Aspin, was heldaccountable for the disaster and was forcedto resignshortly af~erwards. Clinton promised the nationthat he wouldonly send Americansoldiers to Africaif nationalinterests were affected. The decisionto ruleout any militaryintervention had seriousconsequences. For somethe problemwas how the fightcould be wagedagainst the fundamentalist regime led by GeneralOmar al-Bashir and - initially- the philosopherHassan al-Turabi, which had seizedpower in a militarycoup d’état in Khartoumin 1989,if therewas to be no U.S. militaryinvolvement. From that pointonwards, ail the surroundingstates were assessed in termsof theirusefulness in thebattle against the Khartoum govemment.

The Bushadministration had alsobeen interested in Sudan,where oil reserveshad recentlybeen discovered. However, George Bush Sr. hadadopted a differentapproach, since the exploitationof theseresources was conditionalupon peace in the regionand an end to the conflictbetween Northem and SouthemSudan. (...)

Mostpeople expected that Clinton with his "leftist" leanings would pressurize the Bashir- Turabiregime into a processof democratizationin line with the Bush-Mitterrand approach that hadbeen adopted at~er the end ofthe ’-’-’" ,.~uiuWaï. But ,,u,~,L: ...... l.a a:rr ...... ¯ ...... t-,I;~~.... a MadeleineAlbright, the new AmericanAmbassador to the U.N.,considered Sudan to be a "roguestate" and the numberone enemyin CentralAfrica TM. Theytherefore opted for a proxy ,,7s approach("get others to fightyourwar ) , a wellknown strategy that had been applied during the ColdWar.

Mitterrandwas unlikelyto complywith the intended"regime change" in Khartoum.He was apparentlynot informedabout Washington’s Sudan policy and couldnot understandthe effectsthis new policyhad on the Rwandanproblem. Atîer the Somaliadisaster of 30ctober 1993,Madeleine Albright used ail the tricksin thebook to minimizea U.S.contribution to the

73Blumenthal 2003: 61. 74In late 1997, for example, John Prendergast, thenthe National Security Council Director forEastem Africa, stated thatthe government ofSudan was viewed as"the principle threat toU.S. security interests onthe continent ofAfrica today".(Quotation in:Hoile 2000: 18) 7»ibid.: 17.

DI05-0039(E) 32

I DRAFT ] UNAMIRpeace keeping force envisaged in theArusha Agreements. These activities were the firstsigns that the U.S. wished to reduceits commitment infavour of power sharing in Rwanda, helpMuseveni and his friend, Paul Kagame, to winthe Rwandanwar, and find other anti- Khartoumallies.

Afterthe RPFvictory in Rwandain 1994,UN Secretary-GeneralBoutros-Ghali was consideredin Washingtonto be a "Frenchand Sudanese sympathizer". He became a prominent victimof theapproach to Sudan.Richard Clarke reveals a strange deal: "Albright and I anda handfulof others(Michael Sheehan, Jamie Rubin) had entered into a pacttogether in 1996 oustBoutros-Ghali as Secretary-General of the United Nations, a secret plan we hadcalled OperationOrient Express (...). The entire operation had strengthened Albright’s hand in the competitionto be Secretaryof Statein thesecond Clinton administration."(CLARKE 2004: 201/202).This pact was forged affer an attempt- attributed to the Khartoum regime - tokill Egypt’sPresident Mubarak during a conferenceof the Organization forAfrican Unity in Addis Ababain June1995. "Following that event, Egypt and we (joinedby othercountries in the region)sought and obtained the UnitedNations Security Council’s sanctions on Sudan." (CLARKE2004:140) (...)

As explainedabove, the wars that took place in Rwanda,Burundi and Zaire/Congo aRer October1993 were largely the resuit of anattempt to oustthe regime in Khartoum by forcebut withoutAmerican soldiers.

Thefirst allies to understand the significance ofthat strategy were Ougandan President YoweriMuseveni and RPF leader Paul Kagame.

Beforeautumn 1993, the U.S.govemment had favouredpower sharing between the Rwandangovernment and the RPF exile groups that had tried to fighttheir way to powersince thefirst invasion of 1 October1990. The "tricky twins", Museveni and Kagame, were therefore obligedto acceptthe Arusha Agreements in August 1993. But given the obvious weakness ofthe , ,,.~._a .t.~ ~~~~. :.a:~n,; ..... a..A.,.;,,. RwandanArmy afier the RPF ~,Lt~t~k on 8 ~_l[’~UlUl~ft, t...... L~l)./J ~.,ll,ll lh,lll/t~*~O l~.’l~,a¢¢~dL lll~l.8-1t~l,61.1~.Olll..I lllf~.lb~,O~ U~AAaa theArusha negotiations that France wished to extricateitself from the Rwandan bourbier (quagmire)as soonas possible,Museveni and Kagame contacted their Anglophone friends convincethem that a fullRPF victory would be in theirown best interests, too. A newRwanda 9 mightalso be useful in transporting supplies tothe border between Zaire and Sudan in support of JohnGarang’s SPLA. Museveni had offered to helpfight Khartoum on conditionthat his military-controlledsystemof "democracywithout parties" be proteetedfrom democratization. For Museveni,cooperation with the U.S.and U.K.against Khartoum had the additional advantageof presentingthe rebellion of the"Lord’s Resistance Army" in NorthemOuganda as partof theactivities pursued by Khartoum.Lynda Chalker, the long-standing conservative Head of theOverseas Development Administration andMinister for Overseas Development (1986- 1992),had introduced the former Marxist, Yoweri Museveni, to the"good society" at~er his militaryvictory in 1986, which had been achieved with the help of Rwandan mtsi exiles living in Ougandasince the 1960s. Museveni suggested to hisnew allies in Londonand Washington that theyshould help him solve the "tutsi problem". If they would support him in sending his tutsi

DI05-0039(E) 33

I DRAFT J exilesback home to Rwanda,he said,his regimewould be stabilized7~ and in retumhe could concentrateon the "Sudanproblem".

In additionMuseveni and Kagamemanaged to convincetheir partners of the crucialneed to get ridof "Mitterrand’sfriend", Juvenal Habyarimana, who wasthe main obstacle to military victory.The stage was thus set in theautumn of 1993.Decisions were also taken on who should be heldaccountable for the inevitable "collateral damage" that this operation would incur. On 6 April1994, the Rwandan presidential aircraft "fell" from the sky in whatis stillpresented as a "mystery".As a resultPresident Habyarimana, his Burundiancolleague Ntaryamira and the most importantRwandan military leaders were killed. Within a periodofjust six months,therefore, a secondPresident of Burundihad beenkilled following the murderof MelchiorNdadaye on 21 October1993. The elimination of the hutupresidents and thechaos it createdwere regarded as supplementarysecurity measures for the resumptionof the civilwar in Rwanda.Nobody seemed concemedby theseassassinations. They were a consequenceof the longtradition of impunity that’’ had prevailed in Burundisince the 1972 genocide against the hum elite77.

9

76Sec especially Mamdani 2001, Chapter 6’ 77For the genocide against the Hum intelligentsia in1972, which was never officially investigated, secespecially Lemarchand1996, Daniel Kabuto (Kabuto 2003) recently published a short novel describing therate of a victim the1972 events. DI05-0039(E) 34

[ DRAFT I Excerptfrom: "Interview with Aloys Ngurumbe on theorigin of theterm "lnyenzi" (Twaganiriyeha Muzehe Ngurumbe Aloys" byth Rangiraand Kalinganire,Kanguka No. 52, 5 year,12 February1992, translated from Kinyarwanda by EugèneShimamungu, drawn from: RWANDANET,12 July 2004).

Mostof youknow the old man Aloys Ngurumbe, who spent 10 yearsand two months in prison.(...) He wasreleased recently on 4 February1992. We wentto sechim at homeand had a longchat with him. He toldus everythingand we evenasked him if he wasnot afraid of havingbeen an lnyenzi.That could be a pretextfor some people to retaliateagainst him. But thatis noteven why he wasput behind bars, for at thetime he waspicked up, the crimes of whichhe wasaccused had been pardoned. ) AloysNgurumbe, the persona. ) He firstintroduced himself. My name is AloysNgurumbe, I am from Byumba, Muvumbacommune and was born in 1933.I attendedprimary school in Rwamagana,secondary schoolat Butare(ex Astrida) High School. I am marriedwith rive children (four boys and girl).They ail live in Toro, Kasese, Uganda. I attended military school in Chinaand Cuba.

Inyenzi:"the lngangurarugo militia fighter whose mission was to be the best".

Howdid the Inyenzi movement start and what was its objective? Aloys Ngurumbe told us he foundedit himselfin 1961in Kizinga,Uganda. He toldus the wordInyenzi is an abbreviationof "the lngangurarugo militia fighter whose mission was to be thebest". We realizedthat the expression "Ingangurarugo yiyemeje kuba ingenzi" was toolong, so we abbreviatedit and someone among us suggestedwe adoptthe terre lnyenzi. Thus, the terre Inyenziwas born. At that time, the Europeans did not want us tobeindependent, they wanted to .1t~ .... 1-...... t~ :, ...... ’..... h,,» exterminate peo ple. O lyil ":--’: hl~dll,I[’~ll.)Ulll~O,.-:L ...... tllll~l .I.J]ttlltllt.:tlt VV~,It’*.¢ ...... , ...... ~ ...... He toldus peoplecould no longerwait for the UNAR leaders, Rwagasana and the others, who hadleft for the UND. We foundit wasappropriate toput up a resistanceand set up a militia whichwould prevent criminals from killing people unfairly. We asked him about the royalty, he J toldus theywere not fighting for the royalty; they simply wanted Eings to changeso as to banishall forms of injustice.

Withregard to the lnyenzi war (1961 - 1968)

We askedhim to tellus brieflythe ups and downs of the Inyenzi war from the beginning in 1961to theend in 1968. He toldus theystarted with 36 people.Before the lnyenzi militia wasfounded, I wasan agriculturaleconomist; we collecteda sum of moneytogether with Kayitare,son of Rukeba,and we boughtsome weapons from Goma, Zaire. We startedwith four riflesand went to learn by ourselveshow to shoot in theforest. When we finishedlearning, we startedthe war with the support ofthe population because ofthe excesses ofthe Europeans.

DI05-0039(E) 35 [ DRAFT I .9,~q,o 7 The11 th battalionstationed in Rumangaboand the Belgian para-commandos based in Kaminaintervened. We started in Gabiro,we killednine Europeans there; we confiscatedfour riflesfrom them. We tooka tripto Musha;there was a Europeanthere who was not nice at ail, we liquidatedhim. We crossedthe border over to Kirundoin Burundi.We askedhim what the Rwandansoldiers were doing. He toldus thatthey (he and his troop) were not afier the Rwandansoldiers but European criminals who were dangerous to them.We continuedour way, he toldus. We wentthrough Bujumbura and Uvira, Bukavu and Goma in Zaire;we wentto the Volcans[volcanoes]. In Kinigi, we attackeda European who was dangerous, we killed him and tookpossession ofhis vehicle.

Wedivided ourselves in groups; each group ought to have someone who could drive, like Kayitareand Mpambara. We tookthe vehicle belonging to theEuropean who was killed in Kinigi.We leftfor Rutongo; there was another European there, he was also killed, but we did nottake his vehicle. We wentthrough Karuruma, took petrol in Kigali,then went through ,) ) Musambira,Gitarama and Butare; we crossedAkanyaru, then retumed to Bujumbura.When we arrivedin Bujumbura,near the Holy Spirit College, we pushed the vehicle into a ravine,and wentto seeRukeba and the others who told us thatthe police was looking for us. They gave us anothervehicle (a pick-uptruck) and we continuedour joumey via Uvira, Bukavu, and Goma andreturned to Uganda.

Theretoo, we werewanted by thepolice. We hadour vehicle kept in Ntungamo.We tooka bus and headedto Tanzania.When we arrivedthere, we werewelcomed by some Rwandansand even some Tanzanians of Hayaethnic group. We wentback to Gomato lookfor ourImpala car that we hadlefi there. We cameback to Murongovia Uganda and retumed to Bugeni,to thehouse of KingRuhinda who had a Rwandanwife. We toldhim we weretrying to go to Bukobain orderto phonesome Rwandans who were in Dar-Es-Salaamso that they could sendus somemoney. ¯ , ,-,_:..... -_,,- ..... : ...... t. _v.... Thatwas in 1962. "’vv’e r~tulll~u î.OLmt~ via xxa~~la, ,. a~m~. w ,,,o~,. weapons.We foundKayumba, Bumbogo chief, there and told him our problem. There was a Belgianplane whichcrashed in Masisi;it wasloaded with weapons most of whichwere Tumson brand. We tookthem. When we arrivedin Tanzania,people were being recruited for studies in socialistD countries(China, USSR, Bulgaria ...)

Kayitareimmediately went to Burundiwhile the others stayed in Tanzania.Numa and Mpambarawere extradited by Tanzaniato Rwanda,they were executed in Ruhengeri.We left forChina, I lettwith Gérard Rwirangira, William Mukurarinda and Jacques Bunyenyezi, who wasa colonelin IdiAmin’s time; he is theelder brother of MajorChryss Bunyenyezi, the lnkotanyiwhom you have heard so ottenabout. We firstwent through Dar-Es-Salaam where therewere nationals of othercountries like Samora Machel from Mozambique, some from South Africaandthe Sudan.

DI05-0039 (E) 36 I DRAlrrI Whilein China,we leamtthe underground and command tactics. During the day, we leamttheories and at night,we didthe practical. Towards the end of 1964,we allretumed to Bujumbura,where we obtainedasylum. We foundKayitare and many others in Gatareforest, in Kirundo.At thattime, the Mulele war had started in Zaire, and we decidedto lendthem a hand, forwe hadtrained people, while they would supply us with weapons in retumand pave the way forus. We went to fight the war called "Chekbala". Those in Cubacame to ourassistance while Tanzaniabrought weapons via Kigoma and we tookthem on ourback to Zaire.

Atonepoint in time,we went up through Rusizi and Cibitoke and established ourbase in Nyungweforest. We attackedBweyeye and Nshiri, from Nyungwe; we spenttwo yearsthere (1966- 1968).We were1,200 men, heavily armed with canons, mortars, machine guns and otherheavy weapons. Meanwhile, I left for studies in Cuba in 1966; I spentsix months there.

We askedwhat grade he hadat thattime. He toldus thatthe commander-in-chief was MayaniSebyatsi while he wasresponsible for coordinating military actions with the Rwandan LiberationFront (RLF).

Withregard to the lnyenzi attack that was stopped in Kanzenze, hetold us that he had left forstudies in China.The attackers were led by Kayitareand his father Rukeba. That was in December1963.

We askedhim questions about Kanyarengwe, who was allegedly shaved with fragments of brokenboules, or drawnon theroad by a jeep;he toldus thatthe Inyenzi never took Kanyarengwe.

Hefought on several fronts.

We askedhim in whichcountries he fought.He answeredthat they were Zaire, Mozambiqueand Rwanda.He toldus thatin Mozambique,he foughtfor SamoraMachel who washis close friend. Museveni and Rwilgcma ~uu~m m u~~tLwai-. vve .,~~~u ,,,, ifthey were together.Hesaid those ones arrived atter he had lett. We asked if hedid not have any children amongthe lnkotanyi, he told us thatwith 10 yearsin prison,he wasnot informed about the lnkotanyi,that he wascredited with many things, that some say that Rwigema was his son, or thatKayitare was his son. Ail ofthose, hesaid, were lies.

He wasarrested in Gomaand sentenced to life imprisonment.

He narratedto us howhe was kidnapped in Zairein 1981.He hadleft Uganda for Zaire lookingfor a pieceof land, for in Uganda, Obote hunted them. When he arrivedin Zaire, he was handedover by a mancalled Ngata, an intelligenceofficer in Goma at theinstigation of Joseph Habiyambere(préfet of Gikongoro).(...)

DI05-0039(lB) 37 [ DRAFT 1 ANNEXE 3

Témoignaged’Aloys RUYENZ1, fait en Norvègele 18/01/2005.(Transmispar Mail." [email protected]) "PRESIDENT PAUL KAGAME IS INDEED A WAR CRIMINAL

He committedsome of his crimesunder the disguiseof INTERAHAMWE.

Recently,press reports, quoting prominent experts ofthe Great Lakes region, raised again the issueof impunityof presidentKagame, with regard to thewar crimesthat he committedor orderedfor. The main point of thispaper is to exposeone of thehitherto unveiled faces of his crimes.Indeed, some of the crimeswhich were indiscriminately attributed to Interahamwewere in actualfacts carried out by noneother than Kagame and his henchmen. In theirsinister plans, they woulddisguise as the notoriousmilitia Interahamwe. This shouldhowever not be misconstruedto mean that the latter did not kill. This is notahearsays, I am readyto produce evidenceand call other people who witnessed the crimes that occurred in thefollowing places:

1. When7th BN was deployedin areasof Rushashi,Tare, Mbogo, and Rurindoin 1998 the directorof schoolsat Rwankuba,the Bourgmestreof communeRushashi as wellas the agricultureofficer of thatcommune were murdered over the samenight. RPF hurriedlyblamed theirdeath on Interahamweinsurgents, yet they had been killed by itsown elements.

2. The sameyear of 1998Kagame planned to killall civilianswho wherewatching the worldcup tournamentin theHotel called "Pensez-Y" and again blame their death on insurgents. Fortunatelythe operations officer of 7thBN,Capt. Kwizera who hadbeen assigned the task,got drunkand failed to properlycoordinate the operation.Indeed, when the soldierswho wereto disguiseas Interahamweinsurgents reached the Hotel,they found many RPF soldiers mixed with the civiliancrowd which was watchingthe world cup toumament.They contactedthe commandingofïïcer, Major Eugène Nkubito, who angrily told them to tellall the soldiers present to reportto theirrespective positions. When some civilians saw that, they suspected a foui piay andalso lefl the Hotel. A fewmoment later, the Hotel was burnt to ashesand so manycivilians who remainedwatching the TV died.After the operation,Radio Rwanda announced that the Interahamwehad burnedthat hotel and killedmany people. Despite the numberof casualties, Kagamewas not happybecause the plandid not go the way it had beenhatched. He summoned himselfCapt. Kwizera in theofficers’ mess, sent his own presidential jeep to collectsticks and beatcaptain Kwizera. The captain was given 100 strokes, demoted to therank of privateand put behindbars till he was dismissedfrom the army.This was doncin publicand manypeople watchedthe scene.

Afterthat action of bumingthe Hotel "Pensez-y" and killingthe civilianswatching the worldcup tournamentthey announced as anticipatedthat, the Interahamwebumt the Hoteland killedso manypeople.

DI05-0039(E) 38 I»~T I _|

~2~q-oS’

3.Another glaring example is thekilling of western tourists inthe Bwindi National Park, whichprominently featured in westernmedia. RPF immediately blamed it on theInterahamwe and so did the westernmedia. Yet, they had beenkilled by RPF soldiersdisguised as Interahamwe.Thedecision to killwestern tourists venturing inthat area had been taken manly fortwo reasons: - Theissue of Interahmwewould be moreinternationalised if they were accused of killinginnocent western tourists. Asa result,RPF would be given a freehand in fighting them theway it wants and wherever they are suspected to be, - RPFsuspected some Europeans of sympathisingwith Interahamwe by disclosingto themthe positions of RPF.Moreover, the presence of foreignersnear an insurgentarea was hinderingRPF atrocities perpetrated under the disguise of counterinsurgents operations. I got astonishedwhen I heardthe then attorney general, Gerald Gahima endeavouring to explain how theInterahamwe killed the tourists. I don’t think that Gerald Gahima knew anything about the planapart from being told what to say. ) 4. Whenthe late Andre Kisasu Ngandu the vice-chairman of the late President Laurent Kabilawas killed, the Governmentof Rwanda,which was fightingaiong side Kabila to overthrowthe Government of Mobutu,announced that Kisasu Ngandu was killed in an ambush by theInterahamwe andthe ex-FAZ (ex-Force Armées Zairoises). Yet, he waskilled by theRPA officersand men who are up-to-date serving in theRPF army.

Hisassassination wasplanned by JamesKabalebe and Jack Nziza under the orders of PaulKagame because Ngandu was opposed to thekilling ofrefugees.

5. A groupof Ougandanswere detained in theformer house of thedirector of special intelligenceSenior Superintendent Gacinya and killed in November2004. This house is oneof theclandestine detention houses, where they keep people incommunicado, until they decide their fate.The house is locatedat Muhimaand is managedby AssistantInspector of PoliceMunana andNshuti. The Ougandan victims were: 1. Rwemihigo,2. Waswa, 3. Richard,4. Katongole,5. Mutume,6. Swaibuand 7. Kato.After their murder, the bodies werc taken ~~ ~~’°^1 ...... NationalPark, burnt and the ashes thrown in theAkagera River. Ail these killings were ordered byGeneral Kagame and his collaborators. Regarding other human rights abuses, nearly 11 years aflerRPF takeover, people are still being killed and tortured inprisons by the security organs especiallyDMIand Special Intelligence using electric wires. I once again appeal to human rights organisationsandthe international community to maketheir own counter investigations and insurethat Kagame is heldaccountable forthose crimes. It is theonly way to putan endto impunityin theGreat Lakes region. Similarly, I call upon Rwandans to comeout boldly and say thetruth because not doing so will boost the impunity ofcriminals".

DI05-0039(E) 39

[ DRAFT j