AMPHIBIOUS OPERAT I ONS DURING THE PERIOD

AUGUST TO DECEMBER 1943

CONINCH P- 001

Title taken from "Amphibious operations, excluding Marshall Islands," Cominch P- 004 , p . 6-12 . r SECRET DN11ED STATES 1~~ET HEADQUARTERS OF THE COMMANDER l:N CHIEF NAVY DEPARTMENT, WAS.HmGTON, D. C.

22 April 1944

This publication, "Amphibious Operations", is a continuation of the series entitled "Notes on Amphibious War­ fare No, 1 and No, 2" , It promulgates material originating from reliable sources and arranged according to operations and the areas in which they took place. It contains comments and expr essions of opinion concerning war experience that were available at the time the operation under discussion was com­ pleted.

This publication is classified as secret, non­ registered. It shall be handled as prescribed by Article ?6, U. S. Navy Regulations 1920. It should be widely circulated among commissioned personnel. When no longer r equired it shall be destroyed by burning. No report of destruction need be sub­ mi tted.

This publication is under the cognizance of, and is distributed by the Colnmander in Chief, United States Fleet.

Transmission by registered mail within the con­ tinental limits of the United States is authorized.

R. S. KDWARDS, Chief of Staff,

i

SSCRET

CONTENTS

Chapter I. LANDING OPERATIONS Central Pacific, • • • • • . . • . • 1-1 Gilbert Islands Operation • . . . 1-1 Mediterranean 'llleatre •.•.•.• 1-7 !anding on North Coast of Sicily. 1-7 Landing at $alerno .•.•.. 1-8 South Pacific, •.••..... 1-12 Landing at Vella I.e. Vella • • . • 1-12 Treasury Island Occupation, . . 1-13 Landing at Empress Augusta~. 1-14 Southwest Pacific, ••• • 1-18 Landing at I.e.e. • • • . . . 1-18 landing at Jinschhafen. • • • 1-19 Landing at Arave, • . . . . 1-22 Landing at Cape Gloucester, • 1-25

Chapter II. illi SUPPORT Central Pacific. .• • . • . 2-1 Control of Support Aircraft • 2-1 ~-Ground Liaison. • 2-4 Mediterranean 'llleatre •• 2-14 South Pacific ••. 2-16 Southveet Pacific, 2-19

Chapter III. UV.AL GUNF!ll Central Pacific. • • 3-1 Mediterranean Theatre. 3-12 South Pacific, ••• 3-18 Southwest Pacific. • 3-21 Chapter IV, INT.ILLIGENCJ Central Pacific. • . • • . 4-1 Mediterranean Theatre. 4-7 South Pacific ••• 4-13 Southwest Pacific. 4-15 Chapter V. U>GISTICS Central Pacific. • , • • • S-1 Medical , ••• S-4 Mediterranean Theatre. . .•.• 5-6 South Pacific. • • • • • • • S-9 Southwest Pacific, •• s-16 Chapter VI. SHIP TO SHORE MOVJ:MllNT Central Pacific. .• . 6-1 Mediterranean Theatre •• 6-7 Southwest Pacific ••• 6-11 Beach and Shore Parties • 6-12

ill SECRET

CONTENTS (Cont'd)

Chapter VII. LANDING CR.A.FT ~T. • • • ..... • . • 7-1 Method of Unloading LST • 7-3 LCT(5) • 7-4 LCI(L) 7-S LCM(3) 7-6 LVT ••• • 7-7 LCS •• 7-8 DUXWS. 7-9 LC(R) •• • 7-9 SALVAGE CRAJ'T •• 7-10 Chapter VIII. COMMUNICATIONS Central Pacific. • 8-1 Mediterranean Theatre. • 8-10 South Pacific, • • 8-12 Southwest Pacific. 8-12 Chapter IX, MISCiLLAN:IOUS llalloona. • 9-1 Smoke. • • • • • • • . . • 9-2 Medium Tanke • • • • • • . 9-S

LIST OF EFFECTIVE PAGES Promulgating letter ...... i Contents • ...... • . • iii, iv List of Effective Pages . . • iv Chapter I ...... • 1-1 to l-27, inclusive Chapter II • ...... • 2-1 to 2-22, inclusive Chapter m . . . . 3-1 to 3-21, inclusive Chapter IV • . 4-1 to 4-15, inclusive Chapter V . .. . 5-l to S-20, inclusive Chapter VI • . .• 6-1 to 6-17, inclusive Chapter VII 7-1 to 7-10, inclusive Chapter VIII . . . • 8-1 to 8-12, inclusive Chapter IX • . . 9-1 to 9-7, inclusive

iv SECRET CHAP'l!IR I

LANDING OPEBJ.TIONS

Q!B?JUL PACIJIC G1lbert1 Operation - lovember 1943. from: Comnander :Pi!th .Amphibious Force. In the Gilberte Operation, the master plan required the simultaneous capture of Makin and Tarawa, and the subsequent oc­ oupation of .APEMAMA, The following table 1e an outline of the rela­ tionship of the major elements of the amph1bioua organization.

Table o! Malor Xlement1 of the Amphibious Organization .Aa1ault Force, (Tl' 54). (1) .&mphibioue Corpt. (2) Support (.Amphibious) Aircraft. (3) MAXIN LST Groups l and 2 (9LST, 3LCT, 2 DD, transporting LVTa and Defense :Battalion). (4) TAB.AIU LST Group1 l and 2 (12 LST, 5 LCT, 2 DD, transport­ ing LVTs, and Defense :Battalion). (5) MAKIN Gerrilon Group (2 AP, 2 AX, 2 DE, transporting Gar­ rison and Construction Troops). (6) TARAWA Ge.rrilon Group (2AP, 2AK, 2 D.Z, transporting Gar­ rison and Construction Troops). (?) .AP»WlA Gerriaon Groups l and 2 (3 AP, 2 .AX, 4 LST, 3 LCT, 3 Im, transporting Garrison and Construction Troops. (8) APJi'.MAMA Reconnais1ance Group (l submarine, transporting a Marine Reoonnaiaeance Platoon). liO'l'E: (3), (4), (5), (6), (?),and (8) (leas the submarine ) paaeed to command of the local Task Force Collllll&llders on arrival at destinations. LCT were loaded on LST and launched at destina­ tions.

(9) Northern Attack 1orce (Tl 52). (a) Transports, (4 APA, l AXA, l LSD). (b) Support Groups (4 OBB, 4 CA, 3 ~. 13 DD, l AM) NO~: Additional Support Aircraft were provided by other carrier groupt. (o) Northern landing lore•. One Regimental Combat Team of the 27th Division, .A.,U . s., plua reen!oreing units, (d) Garrieon Poree. Army and minor Naval garrison units. (e) Aircraft, MAKIN Be.ae. Army base aircraft unite. (Aleo com­ manded Support Aircraft, leas Combat .A.ir Patrol and anti­ submarine patrol, after shore headquarters were eetabliehed.).

(10) Southern Attack Force (Tl 53). (a) Transports. (12 APA, 3 AXA, l AP, l LSD). (b) Support Groupe (3 OBB, 3 CA, 3 CL, 5CVE, 21 DD, 2 AM).

1-1 SECRET LANDING OP"&RA!IONS - CEN'l!RAL PACIJIC

NOTE: Additional Support Aircraft were provided by other carrier groupc).

(c) Southern Lending Force. . Two regimental Combat Teams of the S.ICOND Marine Diviaion plu• reinforcing units. Corps Reserve, one Regimental Combat team of SECOND Marine Diviaion, (Not to be c0111111itted eicept on authority of CTF 54). (d) Garrison Force, ~A. Marine Corps Garrison Troops. Navy Acorns, Casus, Sea :Bees, Marine and Naval air uni ta, minor Naval garrison uni ts. (Also co=anded support air­ craft, leas Combat Air Patrol and anti-eubma.rine patrol, after headquarter• were established ashore). (e) Garrison Jorce, APEMAMA. Marine Corps Garrison 'l'roope. Navy Acorn, Caau, Sea Beea, Marine and Naval air unite, minor Naval garrison units,

The plan of the Coll!llander in Chief, U, S, Pacific Fleet, en­ visaged three phases of the GILBIRTS Operation. Theae phases necessar­ ily overlap, but in ceneral terms were:

(a) The assault, (b) The occupation of the positions by garrison and development forces, and the evacuation of the aesault troope, (o) The development of the poeitions as air and minor naval ba1e1.

The auaul t forcee compriaed the S.ICOND Marine Divi- sion and one Regimental Combat Team of the 27th Army Division, reinforced by medium tank companies and advance element• of the garrison forcea. The assault forces on evacuation were to leave in the captured position• the infantry and field artillery elements initially assigned to the gar­ rison. The bulk of the garriaon forces were Marine and J.rm;r Defense Battalions, construction battalion•, &nd aviation ground organizations. These were to be moved in behind the aasault troops as rapidly as the tactical situation and available transportation would permit. Each unit of the assault and garrison forces Yae to take in, in general, five unite of fire and thirty ~s 1 consumable supplies, plus neceesary organizational equipment, The transportation of permanent base facilities, garrison e­ quipment, and of supplies s~ficient to establish a sixty-day level, waa to be inaugurated as soon as the garrison troop• were moved in. It vaa directed that ships of the first echelon vere to be loaded to no more than 60% capacity, in order to permit a balanced load and a reasonabl.7 rapid discharge in combat areas where ships would constantly be s11b j ect to enemy attack. Furthermore, due to the very difficult unloading condi­ tions at these atolls, only a few vessels could be expected to 1lnload sim­ ultaneously at anything approaching a reaao.nable rate.

Owing to the imminence of succeedint; amphibious opera­ tions, which would require all veseels of the FIFTH Amphibious Force,

1-2 SECRET LANDING OPERATIONS - CENTRAL PACIFIC and the fact that the Covering Forces must necessarily be withdrawn from the forward areas after about two weeks, it became essential, in spite of some disadvantages, to move all the garrison forces for­ ward very closely behind the assault forces, instead of spreading them out over a somewhat longer period. 'I'b.e Commander of Task Force 54 vae charged with responsibility for these movements, which involved about four-fiftha of the garrison forces. 'I'b.e ColllJtlander Service Force, U. s. Pacific Fieet, was charged with the responsibility of the move­ ment of the remainder, and for building up and maintaining the required level of aupplies. forces destined for the various positions. except the troops in NEW Z1A.LABD, SAMOA, WALLIS, and the ~ICE ISLANDS, plus large quantities of equipment and atorea, vere assembled in OAHU, reorganized, and prepared for final embarkation. A short period of time became available in which to give the assault troops a small amount of basic amphibious training, botr. in NEW ZEA.LAND and HAWAII. Abbreviated final rehearsals of the assault echelons were held in EFATE and HAWAII though aome of the combatant vessels and a large part of the carrier aircraft could not participate. Thia training, and these rehearsals, curtailed as they had to be, were invaluable. '!'his basic training and battle rehearsals are considered essential to succe1e against defended positions.

Although operations for the capture of atolls have long been studied by the U, S, Navy and Marine Corpe, this is the first operation in which we have engaged in atoll warfare. There are many points of difference between this and amphibious as1ault ~inst an enemy occupying large land masses,

Our lack of anything like adequate information of the atolla and the enemy situation in the GILBERTS was, after considerable effort, conaiderably rectified tbro"OE:h:

(a) The employment of aircraft for ta.king large numbers of vertical and oblique photographa of land areas, beaches, lagoons, reefa, channels, and defen1e inatallations.

(b) The employment of the NAUTILUS (Submarine) on a special m11aion to obtain horizontal panoramic photograp~s of the atolls to observe enemy ac~ivitie1; and to obtain data aa to surf, tidal, wind, and current conditiona.

(c) The assembly of about fifteen British who had lived in the various islands, or had been ehipmastere operating amall ateamera and achoonere among them. Most of these individual• were either members of the :Britiah armed forcea or of the British civil establishment. Under authority of the Navy Department, they were employed and paid aa experts. The

1-3 S2CRET LANDING OPERATIONS - CEN'l'BJ.L PACI7IC

information obtained from them wa1 invaluable, 1n apite of 1ome of it being inaccurate in matters affecting many of the detail• particularly applicable to our operations.

It soon became apparent that, at leaat at T.ARAWA, landing boata could not paaa through the protective wire and log barr1- cadea which had been erected to seaward on the reefs and beaches. Ex­ periment a in breaking up auch barricade• were nade with LVT1 (Amphibian Tractors). The1e teets turned out very favorably. After some diffi­ culty, fifty additional amphibian traotora were obtained for the SECOND Marine Division, and fifty for the uae of the 27th .Army Diviaion. ~igh­ teen LVT(2)a could be loaded in one LST, which at the 1ame time car­ ried one LCT on ita upper deck. Each Attack force uaed three LSTa 10 loaded, In addition, the SECOND Marine Divi1ion tranaported 75 LVT(l)e in transport•, though this involved leaving behind a oonsiderable n1.1111- ber of landing boats, The amphibian tractors, though unarmored, proved invalwi.ble for landing troops and aupplies, for tearing out wire and log barricadea. for dragging droYned truck• ashore• and for towing atranded boata off reefs. '!he capture of TARAWA would have been far more difficult had these vehicle• not been employed.

Prelimin.&I7 aupporting operation• by covering forcea of the Fil'TH Fleet involved shore-baaed air strike• on enemy ~es in the MARSHALLS; carrier air strikes on NAURU and TARAWA on Dog minua TWO Day; carrier air s trikea on MU.~. MAKIN, and T.ARAWA on Dog minu1 ONE Day: Ship bombardment of TARAWA on Dog minu1 ONE Day; and shore­ baaed air 1couting. Aircraft from the South Pacific Force also struck NAURU, and provided acouting by 1horebased aircraft.

Atoll Attae!c

Attack on an atoll reaemblea in many respects the aa­ saul t of a fort or fortified locality with, of cour1e, the added com­ plication of having to initiate the as1ault with the ahip to shore movement. The eucceaa:t'ul. aesault of such a position requires I

(1) Early detailed information of the exact location, type, atren&th and character of the defeneee.

(2) Early distribution of t~e above information to all echelon& for the preparation of detailed plan•.

(3) Training of all echelons down to the smallest units in the details ttey are to execute in the asaault. Replicas and dumJDies of hostile defenses ehould be constructed for the trainin6 of small asaault unite.

(4) Protracted and intensive preparation fires by all possible supporting weapons with a view toward ma~'lllll destruction

l-4 SSCRET 'J.A.BDING OPSB.t.TIONS - CJIN?RAL PACIFIC

of en~ inatallationa, guna, obataclee, communication• and auppliea,

(6) Adeqt1at• coTer and protection for the aaaaulting troop• to insure they arrive v1thin uaaulting diatance of the defenae.i,

(6) Oslo• the position 1a broken into, the tilll91)' arrival of .-o;pporta and reaert'91 muat be 1naured for the reduc~ion of the garriaon.

It 1a bel1ned the (GILBIB.TS Operation} has demonstra.­ ted that the &boTe requirement• for the aucceaatul attack of a forti­ fied loeali ty, at leaat in part, can be met for the attack of an atoll by including the followin& in the plan• and training for the attack:

(a) Repeated photographic cOTer~ vill gin accurate and depend.able infcrmat1on aa to the extent, atrength, location and character of defenaea to be encountered. Since the defender ia confined to Te17 amall and clearl)' defined areae it 1a difficult, if not impouible for him to conceal the location and character of hi• delenaea. Photographic coverage muat be repeated at frequent interrala. It ahould be a"Q&­ aented by aubmarine and other reconnaiaaance a1 required vhen there 1a doubt eoncerninc any imporb.nt piece o! information. (b} 'lhia information ahoul.d be dia1eminated ao that realistic training can be conducted on areaa laid out to tull ace.le vith accurately placed replicas and d'Ullllllies of the actual hoatile defenses, Aa18lllt tactic• ahould be atreaeed to coTer particularly the advance fromthe line of departure, and the debarkation, reduction of beach obstacle• and the &Haul t of the initial beacb defenaea.

(c) Air and naTal gunfire preparation for tvo or three h.oura 1a not adequate. 'l'bie preparation ahould begin aeTeral dsv's prior to D-da;y and ahould be deaigned both for des­ truction and for unrelenting haraasing effect. Thia pre­ paration m11y at times be aU&mented by secondary landing on adjacent iala.nda either on or prior to D-day, for the pur­ poee of placing artille17 in poaition. M&xiJll'Olll uee of beach barrage rockete and boat guns ahould be made in direct sup­ port of the aesault waTea,

(d) To ineure that the aaeaul t troopa arriTe on the beaches armored amphibian tractoreand turret mounted amphibian& should conetitute the leading waves. The aesault wavea must be prepared to remove obstacles a.nd clear paesagev~e throU&}l mine field a both beach and undervater. Medium ta.nke should

l-5 SECRET ...ANDING OPEBATIONS - CENTRAL PACIFIC

follow in accordance with the tacticel plan.

(e) To meet the possibility of tide or surf conditions chang­ ing adversely after the landing of first waves, the ex­ pedi tioue landing of supports and reserves must be assured by the presence of adequate LVT(2)s and DUXWs to get these troops, supplies and ammunition across the reefs and aahore.

1-6 SSCRET LANDING OPERATIONS

I.e.ndings 9n North Coast of Sicily - Au.gust. 1943.

J'rom: Commander U. S, Naval Forces, North African Waters, Taek Jorce Eighty-eight accomplished two success:f'ul aesault landings of battalion landing teams behind ene1117 lines, (amphi­ bious envelopment) which played a major part in breaking through ene­ my defense positions and forcing a rapid withdrawal along the North Coast of Sicily towards Messina. The effective assistance rendered by these sea borne aaaaults became further evident when a third landing on a regimental scale wae planned but waa actually executed as a ferry trip behind friendly linee owing to the rapid advance of the ground forces as enemy resistance was overcome.

It is desired particulal'ly to point out that it was possible to undertakelthese operations with little preparation and on short notice because of the thoro~ training, indoctrination and pre­ vious combat experience of the forces parti~ipating. To some extent, operations were hampered by inadequate air cover. It was necessary to exercise every effort in the operation of landing craft to quickly withdraw them from the assault beachea under cover of darkness and to reduce to the minimum the time they were required to remain in the loading areas. Al.so the risk of subjecting fire support units to air attack by maintaining them constantly in the immediate assault areas ready to deliver prompt !ire support on call was not considered entirely Justified under the circumstances. Complete fighter cover and strong anti-aircraft defense must be established and properly coordinated where important naval units are operating within close proximity to enemy airfields,

Jrom: Commander Cruiser Division Eight,

Operations carried out against the enemy force in furtherance of the miasion consisted of (a) bombardment of enemy pos­ itions in the immediate front of the Seventh Army, (b) bombardment of enemy positions and communications in the rear by day and by night, (c) offensive sweeps nightly by destroyers to intercept attempts to sup~ly or to evacuo.:.te, (d) nightly patrol by motor torpedo boats on reconnaissance and on combat tasks, (e) the ferrying of artillery and heavy equipment around blown tunnels and demolished bridges, (!) ex­ peditions against outlying islands and (g) the conduct of amphibious operations behind enemy lines,

The part played by the ungainly LCT in supporting the advance of the Seventh Army was no minor one, l'ive of these landing craft were sailed from Palermo to the front lines at Castel di Tusa on l August from which point they were employed in ferrying artillery and heavy mobile equipment to Caronia, by-passing demolished bridges and

1-7 SECREI' LANDING OPllATIONS - JW>ITIBlWi.UI 'l'HliTRI

blovn tunnels left in the wake of the retreating enemy. enabling the heavy armor to keep pace vi th the rapidl.7 ad.Tancin« infantry• thus in a measure countering the elaborate and through demolition and ground mining which marked the retreat of the ene111,1 along the coastal highva;r. the one line of communication; other than th0 aea. aTailable to the armies.

lmproTised amphibious operations carried out behind the enemy lines on 8 and ll Auguat undoubtedly contributed to the rapid advance of the 7th Army and the fall of Messina to 0. s. 1orces. That the third operation on 16 .Au&nst proTed unaTailing and merely a ferry trip was due to the rapid a4Tance of the troop• on shore, their way cleared by the tvo previous operations and the advance of armor by the LOT group. That these la.ndint;s were hastily organized and subject to criticism as lacking the plannint; and detail deToted to former larger expeditions ia obvious. It was not, however. the intention of the Taak: 7orce Commander that they should baTe the trimming11 of beach parties and elaborate control and markint; arrangement. and beach aurTaye; with­ out which certain added hazards were introduced but which under the conditions had to be accepted. '!he emplo;y11ent or trained landing craft commanders and crewa waa an initial requisite as waa the employment of troops vi th previous experience. Given theae and some slight knowledge of the beach approaches the existence of exit roads for the Tehiclea and suitable terrain for a beach bead in the immediate vicinity. the succeas of the operation is then dependent on the offena1Te spirit and the will to vin broU&ht into the undertaking.

Thie caapaiBn baa demonatrahd that combatant ships may operate within range of shore based aircraft when suitably covered by friendly aircraft, that an unprotected flank on the seacoast m.a;y be turned by gro"Und forces supported by sea forces and that the early fall of "Measina11 can be accomplished by cooperation and coordination of air, ground and sea forces.

Landing at Saierno - September. 1943 .

.from: Commander Eighth Amphibious 7orce.

Commander Task Jbrce Eighty-One. the Commander Eighth Amphibious Force. was in Command of the Southern Attack 7orce in Opera­ tion (SALERNO). The task of thie 7orce was to establish the 36th In­ fantry Division and attached troops of the 6th J.rmy Corpe ashore oTer beaches in the Gulf of Salerno. south of the Sole .River. Task 7orce Eighty-one consisted of:

9 APAe a.nd XAPs 4 il9 a.nd ill.a 3 LSis (.British) l LSG (lh-itish) l LCS (lh-itieh) 3 .British LSTs (of the"Kille:r" type)

l-8 SSC'.iET LANDING OPERATIONS - MEDITERRANEAN THEATRE

27 LS Ts 36 LCI(L)s 6 LCTs 3 CLs 13 DDs 3 ODDs 1 British "Flak"ship 1 British Monitor 7 PGa 9 AMs 12 YMSs 2 ATa 1 British SS

Thia Force vaa organized into the following groups:

(a) I.e.nding Force •••.•...••••.••.•... (81.1) (b) Transport Group ••...... ••..• (81.2) (c) I.e.nding Craft Group •...... ••• (81.3) (d) Beach :Bettalion...... (81.4) (e) Support Group •••...... ••.••..•..• (81.5) (f) Screen ...... (81.6) (g) Control Group. . • • • • ...... • • • ( 81. 7) (h) Sweeper Group •••...... •...•..• (81.8) ( i ) Salvage .Group. . . . . • . . . . . • . • . . . . . ( 81. 9 ) (j) Beach Identification Group •••.•.. (81.6.5)

The Force deployed into the Transport Area on sche­ dule without event and the work of lowering boats and debarking per­ sonnel was conducted expedi tioual,y. Boat vaves vere formed and led in by PCs acting as control boats. The boat waves followed YMSs sweeping a channel ahead of them for contact mines. A number of mines were er­ ploded or cut adrift but no casualties resulted. The first wave of troops landed on all beaches at 11 H11 hour or within a few minutes there­ of, and with few exceptions, succeeding assault waves came in approxi­ mately on schedule.

Resistance consisting of machine gun, artillery and mortar fire was encountered at all beaches, but landing continued steadily in spite of these and by 0600, the two assault reginents (14lst and 142nd RCTs) had been landed. Landing of the Reserve Regi­ ment (the 143rd ROT) co111111enced at N plus 180 and continued without interruption until it too was lande~.

As soon as the assault troops were landed in scheduled waves, a shuttle service, using LCV(P)s and LCH1 was started, landing artillery, tanks, motorized equipment, am.~unition and other supplies. The shipborne landing craft engaged in the shuttle service were augmentea ty 16 LCTe fro~ t~e Northern Attack Force on the afternoon of D Day and by 11 additional U>Ts on tr.e morning of D plus One Day. Unloading pro­ &ressed rapidly and by 2200, D plus One, all ahipa were completely un­ loaded except for about twenty-five tons of stores on one AX. The trkns­ ports were then got underway and returned to OBAN.

Enemy minefields were known to be planted in the assault

1-9 S::CRET LANDING OPERATIONS - MEDITER..lWIBAN THEATRI

area, Detailed sweeping plane provided for the following areas to be swept in the order named: A Transport Area to seavard of th• minefields, a lane from the Transport Area to the beaches, the Northern and Southern Fire Support Areas and a Transport Area near the line of departure close to the beaches and inside the minefield, Thie plan was carried out, but despite ita execution, the mines caused considerable interference with the operation, A fev boat waves to one beach were delayed, The Fire Support Unite were late in takint; station in their areas, Transports vere held far off the beachee until the evening of D I8y. One ship, HMS A.llERCOMBIE was mined, Information had been received giving the northern and southern limits of the field planted in the Southern Attack Force Area, It was suspected, however , that additional mines might be found outside this area and precautions were taken accordint;ly. The suspicious proved to be well grounded and the precautions justified, No mines were encountered in sweeping the initial Transport Area to seaward of the known minefield, out a !l\lJ:lber were found elsewhere outside the limits of that field. The south end of the field was mar~ed by a PC and all boat traffic to and from the outer Transport Area routed through lanes south of this PC. In addition, the lead­ ing boat waves throUE;h this lane were preceded by sweeper's gear. Despite this, boat traffic vent on continuously through this channel and later, destroyers and cruisers of the Fire Support Group and transports and landing craft of the Transport Group and Landing Craft Group proceeded through it without casualty. During the first two d.aye a total of sixty-six mines were swept from areas outside the reported limits of the field.

Throughout D and D plus One Day, considerable enemy resistance was encountered, At intervals, all beaches vere under firs from artillery, machine guns and mortars, Enemy te.nks pene­ trated to the vicinity of Blue Beach on the southern extremity of the la~ading beaches and it had to be abandoned, Fortunately an addition&l beach, Red 2, bad been set up to the northward of, and adje.cer.t to the origir.al Red :Beach, and was already tunctionir.g so that unloadiug continued over four beaches during practically the entire period.

Cruisers and destroyers in the Fire Support Groupe ... ere late in taking their aesie;ned areas because 01 the mines. Th~y stood ic about 1000 D-Da.y, ho"ever, and by noon all were in position. Some of them had difficulty establishing coc:municat!on "itl. the Fire Control Par•ies ashore due to the fact that some of tr.e lntter had been scattered ene others had lost or damn.ged the!r radio sate. However, both cruisers and one destroyer did establish comr:.unication, the ren~ining ships of the Fire Support Group were eaei~nec tarbets by Collll:lander Task Group 81,5 on the basis of air inforwation and .Army requests through those channels whic& ha.d been

l-10 s:::cRET !ANDING OPERATIONS - MEDITERRANEAN THEATRE

established and considerable effective fire was delivered in the afternoon of D Day. Machine gun emplacegents were destroyed, ene:uy batteries, including the rail~ battery, were knocked out or ailenced and tanks destroyed or scattered.

Requests for the use of Army planes as spotting agencies had succeeded in obtaining four P-51 sorties of one half hour each covering the period 0800 - 1000 D Day, and during this period the AJU:RCRO~Illl fired one problem with air spot. later, cruiser planes were used with some success. During the night of ~D f 1, the Shore Fire Control Parties were able to reorganize and obtain needed radio parts, and by the morning of D plus One all the designed fire support circuits except that with the LUD­ IJJW had been established. Naval gun.fire support rendered on D f One was quite effective, altho~ because of the confused and dis­ organized situation ashore as well as the terrain, which was rugged and unsuitable for naval gun.fire, there were long stretches when no targets presented themselves to the Shore Fire Control Parties,

On the evening of D Day on signal from the Force Commande'r, tre.neporte moved in throue;n the swept channel and closed the beaches to facilitate unloading which continued steadily thro~­ out the night. LSTs had been started in the forenoon. Pontoons had been beached promptly and by nightfall of D Day, LSTs carrying the 36th Division equipment were being rapidly unloaded.

About 2200 on D Day oral orders were received from the Comcander Western Naval Task Force to land the l79th ROT of the Floating Beserve. Thie unit was embarked in LSTe and LCI(L)s which were still outside the minefield. Because of a communication failure the sweepers which were ordered to lead them thro~ the swept channel failed to rendezvous at the appointed tiae and landing of this unit was not commenced until 0700 the following morning,

Unloading of transports and of landing craft con­ tinued without interruption thro~out D plus One Day, On the evening of D t One, it was discovered that due to a misunderstanding of orders trom the Unit Commander, C,T.U. 81.3,2 the 157th ROT, also part of the Floating Reserve, had commenced to land and a consider­ able portion had landed before the mistake was discovered and the movement stopped. As a result of this the remainder of the use l57th ROT was put ashore the night of D f One. By 2200 of D f On:e, all land.ing craft except those loaded with bulk cargo and those having reserves e.mbarked were unloaded. All combat loaded transports and three LSis which accompanied them had been emptied and at 2215 these ships under the command of the Task Force Colll!llander sailed from the assault area for ORAN, escorted by DesRoris Eight an~ Thirteen, plus DALLAS, BERNADOU and COLE.

1-ll SSCRET LA.NDING OPERATIONS

SOUTH PAQIJIC

landing at Vella Le. Vella - Augwit 1943.

From: Commander Tl:ird Amphibious Force. On 12 July 1943 Commander South Pacific Force proposed that the intended assault on KOLOMBANGARA, followin& the anticipated capture of MUNDA, be cancelled and VELLA LAVELLA seized as the next etep in our advance through the SOLOMONS.

Commander South Pacific Force designated August 15, 1943 as D-Da;y, and made the following ground units, available for the operation:

Headquarters Detachment, Northern Landing Force 35th Combat Team 4th Marine Defense Battalion 58th Construction Battalion Naval Be.ee Group including lloat Pool No. 8

From the Naval forces then under t he operational con­ trol of Comcander Amphibious Force, (plus four destroyers later made available by Commander South Pacific), the following were designated to participate in the initial landing:

12 Destroyers 6 APDs l2 LCis 3 LSTe 2 see 26 MT:Ss from RENDOVA and LEVER HARBOR

The Main llody, under Commander Amphibious Force in the CONY, was divided int'J three groups. The Advance Transport Group con­ sisted of six APDs.ecreened by 5 DDe. The Second Transport Group con­ sisted of 12 LCis screened by 4 DDs. The 'l'hil·d Transport Group con­ aisteu of 3 LSTs screened by 2 DDs and Q SCs. These three groups departed independently on August 14.

The several groups made independent passages without inci~ent altholl6h ene::iy planes were over GU.ADAL~~. the RUSSELS, and positions in 1lEW GEORGIA throug..liout the night. The groups leap-frogged prior to dawn in the area south of GIZO STRAIT, and the Advance Trans­ cort Group arrived off B.ARAXOMA at 0610. Friendly air cover had ar­ rived fro1.1 :.fm."DA at 0605, Debarkation of tro'Jps, equipment and supplies com.~enced at 0615, was co~pleted by 0715 and at 0730 the six APDe de­ parted with a screen of four destroyers for GUADALCA.i.~AL, CONY, wi tn Co!lllllanuer Amphibious Force, and PRI~GLE remained to cover further op­ era ti·Jns and as additional screen for the Second Transport Group on

1-12 SECRET LANDING OPERATIONS - SOU?H PACIFIC returning.

At 0715 the Se.cond Transport Group bad arrived and commenced beaching. It was found that the three beaches would ac­ commodate only eight instead of twelve LCia as had been planned. baaed on information from the reconnaissance party. Thia fact. and an im­ properly tranami tted viaual message from the beach party. deleyed the completion of unloading the last four Lela until about 0900.

ln the meantime the Third Transport Group arriTed at 0800 as achedul.ed and were avai ting retraction of LCTe in order to beach and unload. At 0740 and 0751 bogie11 were picked up by the Fighter Director Destroyer's radar. sighted at 0758. a.nd at 0759 dive bombers commenced attack on destroyers of the screen1 maneuvering at high speed. Near misses were noted on destroyers, Few attacks were apparently made on the more favorable targets, the imlllobile LCis and the slow moving LSTe, although two near misses bracketed LST 395. Another air attack wa~ attempted about 0845 but was broken up by friendly fighters.

After retraction of LCis. LSTs of the Third Transport Group commenced beaching, and LCls commenced retirement to GUADALCANAL, The CONWAY and EATON were left to screen the three LSTs while beached and during retirement. All other ships ret.ired with the LCla. During retirement, the SAUJ'LEY destroyed a.n enemy barge north of SUM~LA.J POINT.

THIS VAS THE J'lRST INSTANCE IN THE SOOTH PAOillC OJ' !rHE SUC­ CESSFUL EMPLOYMDT OF A 'l'ECHNI"UE OJ' BY JPASSING RESISTANCE. THIS LANDING WHICH BY PASSED THE ENEMY POSITION ~ KOLO!IBAN­ GARA l!ROUGHT A:BOUT THE EVACUATION o:r THE LATTER.

Treasury Island Occupation - October 1943.

The Treasury Islands were seized and developed as a staging area !or landing craft ae part of the offensive against Im­ press Augusta l!ay. lrom: Commander Task Qroup Thirty-One Point One,

(Commander Third .Amphibious Force} made the following ground 1.Ulits av~ilable for the operation:

8th li, z. Brigade Group (less detachments). 198tb CA (AA) leas detachments and l prov, battalion, Detactu:ient Headquarters. ComAirNorSola. including ARGUS 6. 2nd Platoon, Co. A. lat Corps Signal :Sn.• !MAC. Advanced Naval Base: Comm. Unit No. 8; Boat Pool No. 10. Co. A87th Construction :Battalion. 1 Bn. 14th N. Z, :Brigade (in Reserve).

1-13 5ECHET LANDING OPERATIONS - SOU'rH PACilIC

J'rom the Naval Forces under the operational control of Commander South Pacific, frora the Naval Forces under the operational control of Co1111:1ander THIRD Amphibious .force, and from the landing craft under the onerational control of Commander landing Craft Flotillas, THIRD Amphibious Force, the following were designated by Commander ('lhird Amphibious Force) to participate in the initial landing on Treasury Islands and the Second and Third Echelons:

8 Destroyers 3 LOT1 8 APD1 2 APCa 4 LSTe 2 AT1 16 LCI(L)e 8 Alb 4 LOI(L) Gunboats 2 Thie

landing at :&uJ>rees Augusta l3e.,y - November 1943.

From: Commander THIRD Amphibious Force.

In September 1943 preliminary plane were formulated for seizure of a position on BOUGAINVILLE from which aircraft of the South Pacific Force could operate to neutralize R.All.AUL, BUXA, SHORT­ LAND ISLAND and KAHILI were all rejected aa immediate objectives -­ llUXA, becauae too diatant from MIINDA and RARAIOMA to permit fighter aircraft to cover the operation; SHORTLAHD ISLA.ND bacause ground re­ connaiasance in August disclosed there was insufficient usable beach area to permit a landing in force; and XAHILI ae too atrong to justify an attack with the forcea available in the South Pacific,

Two alternate localities were finally selected, the ]Dpress Augusta Bay Area on the West Coast and either the Numa Numa or the Kieta Area on the East Coast. Should the latter be finally adopted Choiseul Bay (on Choiseul Island) was to be first seized and an airfield constructed as a preliminary to the seizure of Xieta,

In order to determine which of these two alternate plans should be adopted, three ground reconnaissance patrol• were organized and landed at the areas in question. The li'aipreaa Auge.eta and the Kieta Patrols were landed by submarine, the Choiaeul Patrol by seaplane. After receiving reports of these patrols, Commander South Pacific determined upon the Northern l!bipreae ~sta Bay Area as the objective. It was directed that the Treasury Islands be seized and developed as a staging area for landin& craft, as a part of this offensive.

The period October 13-30 was devoted to embarkation of troops at Guadalcanal, training and rehearsal at Guadalcanal and Vila, Efate, and rendezvous of the Attack Force for the approach to :Bout;ainville.

1-14 SECRET LABDING OPERATIONS - SOUTH PACIFIC

On October 12, 1943, Commander South Pacific issued hie Operation Plan, designated November l ae D-De.y, and directed (the Third -'mphibioue rorce) on D-De.y to seize and hold a suitable site 1n the Northern :Empress ~eta Bay Area, to establish there at facili­ ties for small craft, and to construct such airfields as IJSJ.y be dir­ ected by Commander South Pacific. (The Third Amphibious Force) was also instructed to lay defensive and offensive minefields as directed.

On October 15, 1943, Commander (Third ~hibious Force) ieeued hie Operation Plan. (For this operation the Transport Group con­ sisted of 8-AP.la and 4 AXAa. The landing Force was composed as fo1low1:

Third Marine Division (leas 21st Reg, C.T. and detachments) Second Provisional Raider Regiment Third Defense Battalion (leas detachments) Corps Troops aseigned by ComGen !MAC Detachment Headquarters - ComA.irNorSols - incl • .ARGUS-5. Detachment Naval Bau Unit No. 7 including. Comiunication UDit No. 7 and Boat Pool No. 11, Total personnel - 14.321.)

H-Bour wae tentatively aet for 0715 U>ve but was changed on arrival to 0730 by lignal. At 0545 WADSWORTH and the Minesweeper Group colll!lenced shelling the beach, covering own m1ne1weeping operations and at 0615 the leading transport changed course to the left into the Transport Area. At 0643 the OTC directed the traneport1 to anchor at discretion and at 0645 executed the sign.al •Iand the Ianding Force."

lire on prearranged targets by the Fire Support Groupe commenced at 0710, debarkation of assault waves proceeded, and the leading wave started for the beach. At 0721 friendly planes bombed and strafed the landing beaches !or five minutes after gun.fire had lifted, The first wave landed at 0726, slightly ahead of schedule. Resistance was light &1008 moat of the beach area, except on Puruata Island and Torokina Peninsula, the main bivouac area of the hostile force, in which locations heavy machine gunfire, with consequent casualties, was enco:un­ tered,

:Between seven and eight thousand troops (over half the landing force) were landed in the first trip of the boats and several signals "Landing Success:fulH were observed, In the meantime many bogiea within thirty miles were picked up by radar and at 0738, after all as­ sault waves bad cleared the ships, signal was made for ships to get underway to evade and repel air attack. For the next two hours the for­ mation was kept underve.;y maneuvering by turn sign.ale while our fighter cover broke up s6Veral att-empta at serious attack on our ships. A few divebombing planes got through but without damage to vessels. Four planes were shot down by the transport group and screen, During this period the enemy fighter planes strafed the beach area, but few casualties

1-15 SECRET LANDING OPERATIONS - SOUTH PACI~IC

resulted.

By 0930 the transport group had returned to the Trans­ port .Uea and reaumed the debarkation. Shipe dropped anchor underfoot and turned to seaward so as to continue unloading as long as po ssible before getting underway in the event of further attacks. Strong re­ sistance had been encountered at :Beach Blue One (TOROXINA PENINSULA) but wae finally overcome. eo th.at stores could be received at that beach.

Beach conditions on the northwest flank of the land­ ing area wete bad because of the high surf. Many boats were broached and lost in the leading waves and it became necessary to discard three of these beaches and double up at the next tr.ree. SIOUX vae directed to assist hauling off broached boats but could not close the beach due to shoals in that vicinity.

In spite of frequent bogies over and beyond .BOUGAIN­ VILLE. unloading continued until 1300 when the formation again stood out to seaward to avoid a large air attack coming in. The AMERICAN LEGION had meantime grounded on an uncharted shoal and remained at the anchorage. with APACHE and SIOUX attempting to pul her off. Numer­ ous bogies. totalling over 100 planes were over and around the formation. A number of bombs were dropped but without damage. Failure of the enemy to push through a strong attack was again frustrated by aggressive figh­ ter director group.

At 1500 the transport group had returned to the Trans­ port Area and resumed unloa.daig, The A!l..ERICAN LEGION was soon thereafter pulled clear. without any extensive damage apparent.

By 1600 it was evident that the ALCHIBA, AMERICAN LEGION, BUNTER LIGGETT and CRESCENT CITY could not complete unloading until late in the night. By 1730 the other e1€)lt were completely un­ loaded except for 23 tone remaining in LIBRA. Decision vas accordingly made to retire the entire disposition and to return the LIGGETT, LEGION, CRESCENT CITY and .Al.CHIBA in time to resume unloading the next day, This decision was influenced by several considerations:

The impossibility of maneuvering the formation in uncharted waters near Torokina in the event of night torFedo or bombing attack.

Difficulty in unloading both at the ship and on the beaches with­ out lights,

An eneray task force of four cruisers and six destroyers at 0750 had been standing toward RABAUL presumably from TRUK. Indications were tr.at this force might be expected after fueling at RAllAUL to move to EMPRESS AUGUSTA during the late afternoon and early evening.

1-16 SECRET LANDING OPERATIONS - SOUTH PACiiIC

At 0950 (the Cruiser Taek Force) had been requested to i ntercept ----. Commander Aircraft SOI.OMONS was requested to furnish further in!or111&tion o! the enemy task force previously reported and to make special search to detect movement of that force toward TOROXINA. The Escort Commander meanwhile had been informed of the enemy force and directed to be prepared to defend ~1e transports if enelllY ---- attacked.

At 1800 the transport group got underway• and retired to the southeastward in the general direction of TBEl.SURY ISLANDS.

At 0248 November 2 0 1943, Commander (Cruiser Task Force) reported that he was attacking enemy surface force in latitude s0 20 1 South 154°30 1 East. Upon receipt of this information, Co=ander (Third Amphibious Force) directed Commander Transport Group to reverse course to southeas~ard pending developments but at 0438, on receipt of infor­ mation that Task Force 39 had defeated and driven back the enemy, in­ structed him to return to TOROXI~ •....•...... •.. !rhe transports mean­

time completed unloading, departed TOROKINA at 1500 0 and reached GUAD­ ALCANAL at midnight November 3, 1943, without further incident.

1-17 SECP.ET LANDING OPERATIONS

SOUTHWEST PACIFIC

Landing at LAE - September. 1943.

From: Commander Seventh Amphibious Force.

The objective of the operation was the capture of LAE, This force landed the Ninth Australian Division which operated from the eastward of LAE in conjunction with a separate landing by air-borne troops to the northwest,

General Planning - The following three problems occasioned major attention during the planning stage:

(1) ~ould air protection of naval units and of landing beaches be afforded by air umbrella or air alertT (2) 'tlhat time for H hour would best coordinate with related pro­ blems of accurate beach identification, naval bombardment, and air strafin~ prior to landing? (3) What quantity of freight should be carried in each craft consistent with the need for speed of unloading and the maximum period craft should remain on the beach?

Joint Planning - Each service involved in an opera­ tion should provide an adequate nUC1ber of officers for joint planning that have the experience, knowle~e, and authority which are necesaary to insure early completion of the final plans.

Air Support Planning - Although senior officers of the Fifth Air Force Advance Echelon visited MILNE BAY on several oc­ casions prior to the operation to discuss plans for air support, there was at no time a representative present who had sufficient authority to make definite decisions. As a result, finality on the air plan was not reached until shortly before D Day.

Throughout the planning stage the air representative emphasized the efficiency of interception by aircraft upon ground alert, and proposed that this method of protection be adopted. Ultimately, however, a thirty-two plane air cover was provided, with additional squadrons on ground alert.

Selection of H Hour - 4 September, 1943, was set as D Day and R Hour was 0630, eighteen minutes after sunrise. This time was determined as the earliest at which the exact location of the beach co~li be determined with certainty. The landing force had requested an approach during darkness with a landing at dawn, about 0515, This was considered impracticable as the shore was low-lying swampy Jungle with no prominent features. Clumps of coconut pal.ms and a river bed were the main aide to identification, Radar could not be used as a

1-13 SECRET LA.NDING OPERATIONS - SOUTHWEST PACIFIC primary means of identification because of the unfavorable shore con­ tours.

Initial landings - Red Beach, approximately fourteen miles east of LAE and just east of the :BUSO River, was occupied by the main force. Yellow .Beach, approximately three miles east of Red Beach, was occupied by one battalion. !Ihese beaches were believed to be un­ occupied and outside of the range of any known shore batteries.

The initial landing of 560 assault troops was made en the two beaches almost simultaneously. The initial wave on Red Beach consisted of 8 LCP(R)s and landed at H plus 2 minutes. The initial wave on Yellow .Beach consisted of 8 LCP(R)e and landed at H plus l min­ ute. These waves were followed, at approximately 15-minute intervals, by waves of LCI(L)s which landed 3780 troops, 15 LCI(L)s landing on Red Beach and 3 LCI(L)s landing on Yellow .Beach. LCT(S )s and L5Ts fol­ lowed and landed antiaircraft batteries, vehicles, ammunition, stores, and 2400 troops. At about the eeme time, a Shore llattalion of 1060 troops and equipment of the Second Engineer Special Brigade vas landed in LCVs, LCM(3)s and LCT(S)s. The last wave of the initial landing consisted of seven (7) LCT(S)s, each loaded with 120 tons of bulk stores and ammunition.

Seventy-eight hundred troops, together with a large nuober of vehicles, guns, 8l:llllunition and stares, were on the beaches by 1030 when LSTs commenced to withdraw. The last craft of the initial landing, seven bulk-loaded LCT(5)s, withdrew at 1430, at which time approximately 1500 tons of stores had been landed on the beaches.

Landing at Finschhafen - September, 1943. l'rom: Commander Seventh Amphibious Force.

The objective of the Operation was the capture and oc­ cupation of FINSCHRAJ'EN which is approximately 64 miles beyond LAE on the HOON GULF. The purpose of the occupation was to develop the area as a concentration point and staging area for further operations, and as an advance base for aircraft and light surface ships. Originally, it had been planned to etage the Operation four weeks after the fall of LAE. However, the quick capture of SALAUAUA and LAE made it de­ sirable to accelerate the operation 8.l,&inst FINSCHHAFEN. 22 Sep tember was eelected as the day to commence operations, six da;ye after the fall of LAE. FINSCHJlAJEN was captured on the morning of 2 October 1943.

General Planning

Acceleration of operation date - The capture of SALA.­ !-!AUA and LAE in quick succession plus the Japanese failure and losses in the defense of these areas made it desirable to stage the FINSCHHAFEN

1-19 S3CRET LANDING OPERATIONS - SOUTHWEST PACIFIC

Operation four days after the fall of LA.E. Up until this time no de­ tailed plans had been formulated and no target date set. Some preli­ minary planning, in anticipation of the possible acceleration of the Operation, ensued between 10 and 14 Septecber between SEVENTH Amphibious Force and First Australian Corpe staff at :BUNA.

Selection of D Day - LAE fell on 16 Septemcar. After conferences at General Headquarters and with First Australian Corps on 17 September, it was decided to stage the FINSCHB.Alt'EN Operation on 22 September.

Forces Involved - The Twentieth Australian Infantry r ~ade, reinforced, was selected to carry out the landing. A de­ tacillJlent of the Second Engineer Special Brigade wa s provided as Shore P~ty. A .Royal Australian Navy beachmaster and small detachment &ccom­ nanied the Shore Party.

The following ships and craft were allotted for the operation: Operation Reserve D:O. 10 APDs 4 LS Ts 6 2 (at Bun.a) LCI(L)s 16 SCs 7 AP Cs l several available Tug l LCM(3)s 10 several available LCVPe 15 9

Although the LSTs and LCI(L)s had been going steadily since the commencement of the LAE Operation, they had received a few days of upkeep at MILNE BAY. DDs and APDs also had two days upkeep in MILNE BAY after a very strenuous two weeks of operation. PT boats of Task Group 70.l assisted. A tug accompanied LSTs to assist retraction, if necessary.

Landing Plan - To minimize risk from air attack in the e.xposed area of VITIAZ STRAIT, the outline plan provided establish­ ing the force ashore in one operation, with its gu.ns, vehicles and re­ quirecents for 15 d~s. Subsequent supply by LCT(5)e and LCMs was to be provided as opportunity afforded in case enemy air opposition vas strong.

No Time for Training or Rehearsal - Aesembl,y of Troops - The speed with which this operation was launched was made possible large­ ly because of the experience of both Army and Amphibious Force plan- ning staffs gained during the previous Operation. 1he Twentieth .Austra­ lian Infantry .Brigade had participated in the LAE Operation • .Because

1-20 LANDING OPERATIONS - SOUTHWEST PACIFIC

of the shortness of time available a rehearsal was out of the question.

The main difficulty confronting the A:nII:f was the assem­ bly of the Twentieth Infantry Brigade Group with its Tehicles, guns, and equipment ready for loading 1n three days. The Ninth Australian Division had just completed an operations and troops were tactically dis­ posed in an area where time had not permitted development of tracks for vehicle movements.

Amphibious Scouts - A party of six white and four n.a.­ tive amphibious scouts had been put aahore near the proposed beach dur­ ing the night of 11/12 September by PT and rubber boat and were with­ drawn on 14 September. They were unable to obtaln the desired hydro­ graphic information because of the native and Jap activity on the beach. No beach defenses were obserTed, but machine gun nests were thought poasibly spotted at the north end of the beach,

§election of H Hour - The determination of the time of H Hour was the result of a compromise. The Arm:! desired a darkness approach and dawn landing, The Amphibiou:; Force, however, in view of anticipated early morning air attack, desired all craft to be off the beach as early ae poasible, and accordingly proposed a landing at 0200 in moonlight. It wae finally agreed that the landing would take place at 0445 on 22 September.

lloate from .APDa approached the beach under cover of the destroyer bombardment which commenced on achedule from a range of about 5000 yards. No return fire was received, The first wave was seven minutes late in landing due to smoke and dust, following the bom­ bardment, obscuring the landing beach, The landing was unopposed,

Summary of troopa and equipment landed - Troop1, equipment, and stores landed totaled:

Pereonnel 5300 Vehiclea 180 Ou.n1 32 (25 pounders, Australian, a.nd 40Ml~. AA) lluJ.k Stores 850 tons (15 ~· supplies, 12 days ammunition).

Bapid Plan.ping and h<9cution of Ooeratiop - Thie op­ eration proved that experienced planning staffs and well trained troops who have worked together in previous amphibioua operations can organize and affectively execute a small amphibious operation in very short or­ der, In this case, lees than five days elapsed between the decision to stage the operation and H Hour.

THE J'INSCHHA.FEN LANDING IS AN EX.AMPLE OF THE EXPLOITATION OJ

1-21 SECRET LANDING OPERATIONS - SOUTHWEST PACIFIC

UNEXPECTED SUCCESS BY SPEED AND FLEXIBILITY IN PLANNING AND EXECUTION, THERE UNDOUBTEDLY Will :BE MANY OCCASIONS IN 'I'HE FOTtmE WHEN SPEED, FLEXIBILITY AND MOBILITY IN THE CONDUCT OF AN .AMPHIBIOUS OPERATION WILL ENABLE THE FORCES CONCERNED TO CAPITALIZE ON AN UNEXPECTED SUCCESS.

landing at J.rawe - December 1943.

l'rom: Commander Seventh Amphibious Force - Arave,

On 22 lfovember 1943, Commander-in-Chief, Southwest Pacific .Area, i1sued the directive for the seizure, on 15 December 1943 of Arawe, on the Island of New :Britain. The object of the operation "as to obtain a suitable location for the establishment of light naval wtich force• would protect the southeiistern flank of our forces in the impend­ ing seizure of the Gloucester Peninsula.

It wae anticipated that the occupation of J.rawe would isolate Western New :Britain from supplies and reinforcements proceed­ ing via the south coa1t and assist in protecting our use of Vitiaz Dampier and Straits in tuture operations, A successful landing was made at Arave on 15 D~cember 1943.

Composition of Landing Force

112th U, S. Cav~lry liegi~ent, reinforced, and with two AA(AW) Batteries anc one SL Battery vas selected for the task with tbe addition of: Naval Beach Party (reduced size) Amphibious Tractors and U. S, Marine crews, E, S.E. :Boat and rocket dets. F.adar Detachment Fighter sector control party, Shore Fire Control Party.

Organization of Assault Forces

Commander Seventl. Amphibious Force was responsible for the overwater move~ent. Cruiser Task Force 74, PT :Boats, and 5th Air Force co-operated, The force was transported in:

2 APDe 300 troops 1 LSD (CARTER HALL) 10 :ait'faloee 29 Alligators 2 Rocket .Dukws 940 troops 1 APA (WESTRALIA) 16 LCVP 2 LQ.1 660 troops 40 tone etoree Eeeential 1-22 SECRET LANDING OPERATIONS - SOUTHWEST PACIFIC

equipment

Additional echelons arrived from CAPE CRETIN after the landing ae follows: 5 LCT 0900/Z 150 tons DW equipment and 7 LCY. bulk stores, and 50 personnel per LCT, 2 tons stores per LCM 8 LCT 0800/Z f 1 150 tons and 50 personnel per LCT

The force va• reinforced on 18 December by 900 troops tran•ported from GOODENOUGH ISLA!ID in APDs, and by one l3n l58th Inf, ebout 29 December :from CAPE CRETIN.

Subsidiary Landin&s

The plan called for two surpriee landings in darkness (Z-1 hour) each of 150 personnel in 15 rubber boats :from the APDs. One party we.a to seize :BLUE Beach 5000 yards east of Arave and block both entrance to and exit from the narrow intervening peninsula, The other party was to land at the northern tip of PI LEl.O ISLAND in order to seize a suspected enemy V/T station.

The rubber boat landing on BLUE :Beach "as repulsed with approximately 50~ casualties. That on PILEI.O ISLAND vas successful and a small party of Jape were exterminated,

At each beach troops were 81llbarked in rubber boats from APDa about 100 yards from shore, Enemy at BLUE Beach apparently observed the approach and opened fire w1 th several heavy and light machine gun.a from both flanks before the leading boats beached.

Although it vas considered that the moonlight might prevent surprise, the Landing Force Commander desired to attempt it without any preliminary bombardment, One DD, however, had been de­ tailed to engage targets of opportunity after the landing hour and si­ lenced tha enemy machine guns on BWE Beach very rapidly. This action was too late to save the situation, Later it vas learned that the leading rubber boats had nearly all been sunk and that none reached the beach. The darkness and the merging of the landing boats with the jungle background made it impossible for the supporting destroyer to accurately apprEi1e the situation. Communication with the boats was never satisfactory, There were a nU111ber of casualties throughout the party. Boats in rear were apparently 1ubjected to fire and did not press the attack, A nuober of survivors were rescued from the water after daylight,

Main !Anding

Orange beach was situated on the western shore of

1-2.3 -- SECRET LANDING OPERATIONS - SOUTHW::ZST PACIFIC

Arawe Peninsula. The apporach to the beach vae difficult owing to reefe and islands. The course ran ro\l&hly west through Pilelo pauage and within 800 yards of Cape Merk:us. on the mainland, then turned north parallel with the shore for 2000 yards. within effective small arms range. and finally east to Orange beach. Reeta along the shore were almost cont1nuoua and providad only two beachee about 75 yarda and 100 yards long respectively and 400 yards apart. Offshore reefs limited movement. The main landing vaa to take place in ~light at Orange beach after 15 minutes initial destroyer bombard.cent of Cape Merkua, Orange beach and ite flanks. Upon cesaation of the bombardment, the final approach was to be covered by the fire of two rocket Du.kvs supple­ mented by rockets from the Control Subohaaer. A second Subchaser e­ quipped with rockets stood by to en~ Cape Merkua if required.

Th• amphibious vehicles were launched in moonlight at 0500 hours at a point about 5 miles from Orange beach. 1-! hours was allowed for their approach. Their slow speed and errors in le&darehip and station kesping resulted in delays and contusion during the movement. The few fuffaloes perforimd well, The difficulties encountered were due to the Alligators. In consequence timing broke down, the naval bombardment was insufficiently delayed and the main landing, fortunately very lightly opposed, took place during the period Z t 35 to Z t l"hour 15 minutes covered by fire of rockets from SCe and Du.kvs and bombing and strafing of the bee.ch by one squadron of ~25s which wae on call over the landing area. .4 number of amphibian vehicles actually landed on the coral shelf in the vicinity of the beaches with difficulty.

By mid afternoon the Landing Force had secured the eastern end of the peninsula, which was their final objective for Z ~. against alight opposition.

IDUS WESTRA.LIA carried 16 LCV(P) and 2 LCl-1(3) from 2 ESB and manned by Engineer Special Brigade crews. These landing craft loaded at ships aide between 0400 and 0500 and followed amphibious ve­ hicles to Orange beach in order to allow time for beach party to locate suitable landing points. The craft remained in the area for coastal patrol and supply work. After discharging their landing craft, BMAS WESTRA.LIA and USS CARTER HALL (LSD) left the transport area under escort at 0500 in order to avoid riak from air attack in the landing area after daylight.

~hibious Scouts

A small rerty of .Amphibious Scouts was landed at :BLUE beach on Z - 5, remained a.bout 2 hours and were wi thdravn. Japanese were discovered in the ar~a although no defences were seen, It has been suggested that the strong defences on Blue beach may have been due to this reconnaissance. There was no indication, however, tta.t the party was detected, while the beach wa.a the only practicable one known for many miles east of Cape Merkus, 1-24 SECRET LAl\IDING O~IONS - SO~T PACI1IC

Lan.dine at Cape Gloucttter - December. 1943.

1r01t l Oomnander SeTenth .&mphibioua lorce - Cape Gloucester.

ObJect - 'l!he object of the operation was the capture and deYelopment of the Cape Gloucester area (Western Nev :Britain) for aubsequent operations agianst the Bismarck ArchipeJ..&&o.

G!neral - Cape Gloucester i1 located at the northwest end of Bev :Britain on a n.e.rrow coaatal plain 1lopilli: to the· sea from Mt. Talawe, an act1Te TolC8Jlo, which ri1e1 to a height of 6600 feet within ~ mil•• ot the coaat. The area ii ooTered by jungle and scatter­ ed kun.ai patchea. 'l!he airetripa are located north of Mt. Talawe and within 50 ;rarde of the 1hore.

The bulk of Japanese troop• (abo~t 7500) were be­ lieTed to be biTouaoked in the vicinity of the airatrips and at Bor­ gen~. about aeTen milee to the eastward. lixed defenses of du.e.l purpoae gun.a had been located in both theae areaa, Sinall patrols were presumed to be :maintained between these points and along the coaat to aouthvard.

Qompoeition of Landing 7orce1 - The landing force con­ aiated of lirst Marine DiTision, together with tvo Be.ttaliona of &Tia­ tion engineera, AA artillery, air warning detaci 4enta, and artillery unite, A laTal :Beach Party trained vith and accompanied +,he Shore Party,

The aasaul. t force vas formed in to three groups:

(1) Regimental Combat Team •c" with additional artillery, Shore Party and Detachment ESB l!oat Be.ttalion (Main Landing Yellow .Beaches). (2) Regimental Combat Team 11 B11 leee one Be.ttalion Landing Team vi th Detachments Shore Party and ESB :Boat Bat talion (to f-ollow ( l) on Yellow Beaches). (3) One lattalion Lan.ding Team with Detachment ESB Boat l!a.ttalion and auxiliary unite (subsidiary Landing Green Beach).

Regimental Combat Team "A11 vaa in reserve near BONA ready to go in on D plus 2 Day if released by Commanding General Sixth Army.

Plapnin.g: - RepresentatiTes of the Sixth Army, First Marine D1Ti1ion, lifth Air Force and Seventh Amphibious force, all of vhom were concerned vith the planning, met from time to time, but did not plan continuously as a group. Thia vas prevented by the separation of the varioua headquarters at Goodenoll&h Island, Cape Sudest, Dobadura and Milne ~. In spite of the delays and difficulties due to this eeparation, the final plane vere well coordinated although the complete air plan yas not aTailable until shortly before the operation,

1-25 SECRET LANDING OPD.ATIONS - SOUTEUST P.A.CIJ'IC

Training - A large part of the Jiret Marine Division were veterans of Guadalcanal, and altho~ experienced in jungle fight­ in& and in AP.A landings, had no previous experience in LCI1 or LST1.

Assault elements were given landing e.xercises from APDs, LCia, and LSTs. A training group of these craft was formed which conducted four dawn landings. Troop& were embarked at staging point• at Goodenough bland, Cape Sud.est and Milne lie¥ and moved to the prac­ tice landing beach. A full day was oc~pied in landing and maneuvers in beaching. This training was pracitcal and realistic, and included a thorough test of the shore party organization for unloading vehiclea and stores.

Three days prior to the final embarkation, a rehearaal with all craft participating in the main aaaault landing was held at Cape Sudest.

Outline landing Plan - The lead.in& assault groups (Regimental Combat Teams "C• and "1! 11 less one lls.ttalion) were carried as follows and landed on "Seaches Yellow One and Two:

9 APDs 1300 personnel, H to Hf 15 min. 4 waves of LCP{R)a to each beach

14 LCis 2800 personnel Ht 20 to Ht 40 2 waves (6 LCia) to Y.l min. 3 waves (8 LCis) to Y.2 7 LSTa 3500 personnel, vehicles, guns H f 40 min to H f 5 and unit equipment 1050 rN tone bulk hra.

7 LSTs 3350 personnel, vehicles, guns 1400 to 1800 D and unit equipment 1050 rM tons bulk

Total troops and equipment transported to the Cape Gloucester area and craft actually involved during the period D to D plus 14 amounted to the following; Craft employed Totals transported 9 APD 24000 personnel 19 LCI (approx) 2,300 vehicles and guns 12 LOT 11,475 rN tons bulk stores 24 LST ( 45 LST loads)

Timing and coordination were excelleni; Wll:uughout the landings from the efficient and spee~ work of the Barbor Control Unit in buoyin& and sweeping the reef-bordered approach to Yellow Beaches through the interlockin& e~es of the naval and air bombardment to the landing of the leading assault wave.

1-26 SSCRET L.&.NDING OP:.IRA!lOHS - SOUTBWJST PACIFIC

There vas no oppoaition to the landings at either Yel­ low or Green Beaches. Thia vae probably due to the naYal and air bom­ bardment which preceded the landinga aa abandoned guna. rifle• and documenta were found 1n the vicinity of all beaches. Subeequent infor­ mation haa ahown that the only beachea on the north coast which were not defended in conaiderable strength by pill boxea and trenches were the two Yellow beaches chosen for the landing. :Both the airatrip and :Borgen ~ Area were particularly well defended from a possible amphi­ bioua attack.

In spite of protection from the reef. a 3 foot to 4 foot surf was encountered at the Yellow :Beachea vhich waahed across the entire width of the narrow. hard •and. Condition• were worse on Yellow Two where a sand bank 50 yard• off shore was alao encountered. The use of Yellow Two waa diacontinued because of the surf after LCia had disembarked troop•.

Naval and Air Operatione - Task Force 74. co.DSisting of tvo Australian CAa, and tvo U. S, CLa with four DD escorts, covered the convoy during movement to objective, took part in the initial bom­ bardment under operational command of Commander Taak Force 76, and later occupied a position of readiness to protect landin& operationa from surface attack. PT boata aupported the operation. A destroyer was used as the headquarters ship for the (Naval) Attack Force Collllll8.nder .IC:xtra communication facilities were installed. All local amphibious force communications worked aatisfactorilJ' during the operations. There appeared to be no del~ in transmiaaion of reporte and the use of the destroyer as headquartere ship wa. aatisfactory.

No attempt vas made to oppose the landing although troops had obviouslJ' been in the beach area prior to the bombardment. It is assumed that the naval and air bombardment vae reaponaible for the withdrlW&l.

The old problem of arranging efficient joint planning has not yet been adjusted.

1-27

SECRET CBAPHR II

.ua stlPPOll!

OD'!lW. PACIJIQ

Gilbert I•lapda Operation - November. 1943. from: Commander J'i!th -'mphibioua Jnrce,

Air Support tor (the Northern Attack ,orce) duriJl8 Gilberta Operation vaa furnished by three e•cort carriera o! Car­ rier Diviaion i\fenty Four supplemented by bombera and fighters from (Northern Carrier Group), Thia waa the first extended operation ot the Xaher-built CVI. Jach vessel carried 16 tightera of either the 141 or JM typea and 13 torpedo planes, type TBF, a total in the three carriera of 48 !ightera and 39 torpedo planes. The average availability ot aircraft up until Dog ~ vas approximately 40 Wildcat• and 30 Avengers. There were numer­ ous operational loaaea due, it ia believed, largely to the inexperience of the•• air groups in carrier operations.

Air Operations by Task Group 5.2.3 on Dog ~ and aub­ •equent there to while at the objective were under the control of Com­ mander Task Group 50,2 who waa in direct charge of aupport of the land­ ing operation•. Combat Air Patrols, Anti-Submarine Patrols, :Bomber and lighter Sapport Group, and Liaiaon planes were provided by the carriers. Report ot operations during this period is covered by the Support Air­ craft Commander, Gilberta Operation, It is of interest to note that only one plane, an AveJl8er, was lost in combat.

The operational requirements of Task Group 52,3 air­ craft over the long period of the operation were rigoroua and placed heavy flight loads on both pilots and aircraft. Nevertheless, CVEs have rather limited usefulness in combat operations. For the future it is recommended that only fighters be carried by CVE, except for tvo or three ~ to be employed for liaison with troops ashore.

J'rom: Support Aircraft Commander, Gilbe1·ts Operation,

Summarizing, the following tasks were assigned for air:

land baaed aircraft.

(1) Photographic reconnaissance of objectives and t heir sup­ porting bases. (2) long range searches in the objective areas and in the sea approaches thereto. (3) Night strike against objective and their supporting bases, (4) Routine fighter protection of friendly land bases.

2-l SBCRET .&.IR SUPPORT - Cl!l'TlW. P.&.CIJIC

Carrier baaed aircraft. (l) ~stablisbment and maintenance of aerial euperiority, (2) Destruction or neutralization of enem_y defenaee on objectiTes. (3) Support of the assault. ( 4) Medium range aearchea forward of each Task Unit. (6) J'ighter protection of each Taak Unit, and of objectiTea after friendly troope landed. (6) Anti-aubmarine aearchea adjacent to each Taek Unit. (7) Gun fire epottine for fires on otjective1. (8) Continuou• ~bserYation and ~eport of aituation on objective•.

Total aircraft available . TB(R} VB(M) m m !l Land baaed 21 82 131 Carrier baaed ~ 191 366 Total --21 --82 203 191 497

:lach landing foroe unit, down to and including the bat­ talion, was furnished an air liaison team for the purpose of aesiating the Unit Com:iander in the aelection of 1uitable air ta.rgeta, and convey­ ing theee target designations to the Support Aircraft Commander at each objective.

The Aa sault Force Flagahip at each objective was equip­ ped vi th an air communieation3 net containing sufficient channels to dir ect, or lieten in on all phases of air activity. These channel• vere guarded by operators especially trained for the purpose. The nets vere supervised by 1pecially trained air support communications officers, for i nsurance of continuous efficient functioning. OYer this system the Force Commander imposed his vill on air activity thro'\l&h his Support Air­ craft Commander .

A mobile shore based air co11111unication net, duplicating that installed in the Flagahip, was furnished the collDl8Jlder of the land­ ing force for hie use ashore, vhen command of Support Aircr~ft vas re­ linquished by the Aaeault ?orce Commander.

Minor discrepancies 1n radio procedure wasted time and placed unnecessary traffic on the air net. niis obviously arose from lack of t horough indoctrination of pilots in procedure due to inadequate time for aufficient preparatory exercise•.

Due to apparent misunderstanding, fighter direction vae t he weakest of all air activities. It was intended that the strongest possible combat air patrols should be automatically maintained over the objective area by the adjacent carrier group, that each patrol coming

2-2 S:SCRET illl SUPPORT - an!lW. P.lCUIC on station should report direct to the designated fighter director deatro7er, and '1lat the fighter director would lceep the flagship in­ formed of the current combat air patrol atren&th. Combat air patrol flights i:tpon being relieTed on station, were to report to the Support Aircraft eo-an.der for aupport strafing aiaaiona, prior to returning to baa•. The following diecrepan.eiea in the above pl.an were noted: (1) Some flights reported to the Support Aircraft Comaander, rather than to the fighter Director, vhen coming on station. (2) Some fligbh failed to report to the Support .Aircraft Commander upon relief from Combat J.1r Patrol. (3) !l'he fighter Director baae re.rely informed th.a Support .lircrait Co111111&.nder of the statue of combat air patrols. (4) One n~ter Director vae out of contact with hia Combat JJ.r Patrol tor a long period without informing a.n;rt>ne or transferring control to an alternate :righter Director. 'l'hia reauHed in failure to intercept a snooper vb!> came near the objective area.

1a1lure to insure proper :tunctio;:i.ing of the ll'1 on each aircraft entering the objective area, or failure of the aircraft commander to turn it on, caused an inordinate number of 1 1riendly l!ogies". Thia one item alone caused more trouble and unnecessary con­ fueion than a.n;r other. It applied equally to Army eearch planes and naval aircraft. .Anti-submarine search sectors were laid out in the .A.ir Plan, and it vaa intended that the ea:rrier group adjacent to the objective area should :turniah &lid automatically maintain aircraft over these aectore. lor the information of the .laeault Commander, each tligh t vu to report on 1tation to the Support .lircraft Commander, and, upon being relieved on 1tation by the succeeding pat1ol, again report to him for a support miaaion prior to returning to baae, Discrepancies in this plan were noted ae follows: (1) Some flights failed to report on sta­ tion. (2) Some flights failed ~o report upon being relieved. (3) Some flights upon arriving on station reported for assignment to a support target. One such flight waa auigned a target and then-vent on anti­ submarine patrol unarmed until the situation was ascertained and re­ med1ecl.

'l'he Air Liaison Parties tunctioned as planned and b7 their zeal and reaourcef'ulneae kept the Assault and Landing force Com­ m.anders in!oraed of the situation aehore in ao far as it vae intelli­ gible to them.

Jach ilr Liaiaon party vas trained to supplement ra­ nio communicatione by the uae of simple panel signals which assisied aircraft in the location of targets designated for attack.

'rroopa of the landing force were :furniahed individual fluorescent panels for diepla;y preceding an air attack. for the purpose of marking their positions and thus avoiding accidental attack by friendly

2-3 SZCRET ilJl SUPPO:S.!' - CD'1!liI. PACI1IC

planea.

Liai1on Plsnes. An experienced 1enior aviator conver­ sant with the ground plan and in radio contact with the Support .t.ircraft Commander, maintained constant eurTeillance of the objective.

11gbter Direction. J'ighter direction tor Gilberta components vaa accomplished as followa:

(l) Land baaea - by established directors. (2) Task Unit• underway - by designated carrier in the Unit. (3) Ta1k Unite at objective• - two deatroyera equipped with fighter director radio IDBJllled by experienced fighter director peraonnel were designated fighter director and 1ta.ndby fighter director respectively. All alternative 1tandby fighter director was located in each of the .A.aaauJ.t J'orce J'l.agahips. Fighter director unite ashore at each objective took over when set up and established.

Air strikes prior to D-~ gained, and the coverin& carrier force maintained, complete aerial supremacy durin& the assault. Enemy air activity va1 limited to an occaaional snooper and, in the later stages, unsuccessful night attack•.

!Die air schedule for D-Dey vaa exe~ted exactly as planned. Attacks were effectively coordiD.d.ted with ~ire and furnished material assistance in landing troop1. No beach resistance va.a offered during the primary landing on Beaches Red, and only very minor resia­ tance met the landing on l!eache1 Yellow. .Adequate support aircraft were available on atation thro~out the day and thereafter during the assault.

Contact was maintained between the nagship, all air activities and the Air Liaison parties ashore thro~out the entire ae- 1auJ.t pha.ae and thereafter.

The moat valuable source of information concerning the situation ashore vae the Liaison Plane.

!lbe value of support aircraft vae curtailed due to the failure of the ground troops to display their fluorescent panels. Thie was also a contributing factor to the dropping of one bomb on a target other than that assigned. Had these panels been displayed as planned, far greater assistance might have been rendered ground troops by aircraft.

:ilTRACTS J'ROM AN INTERVIEW WITH A STRIKE COMMAND OPnATIOilS OJTICER IN THE SOUTH PACIFIC ON THE SUlkJllCT OJ AIB.-GROUND LIAlSON.

Air-ground support is practicable and can be done, if you have trained pilots and trained men on the ground. I am interested

2-4 s::.:c~ET AI1i SUPPORT - CENTRAL PACirIC in this because I worked with air-ground support for a long time.

What happened in a couple of instances, and will happen t!IVery time you send a miesion out where the pilots get a little rattled and the bo1'lb racks stick, was that every now and then a bomb went into our own forces. You can avoid a gooC. bit of that by extremely caretV..l briefing about approach and retirement from the target. I can recall many instances in which it could be seen that an air mission was war­ ranted but couldn't go out because it wasn't requested. Air-ground aupport can be done well, but it does take a lot of understanding on both sides. We worked for about two mo~ths doing some good sound check­ ing here and there, and teaching people how to find ground targets. When the Third Marine Division went into Bougainville we knew what we were going to do for them, and t.~ey knew what we could do for them. We now give them air-groWld support missions within 100 yards of their lines. They come back with these "very pleased'' messages, and send their officers back every now and then to say, 11 You't' support is wonder- 1V..l! You can really do it." We worked it out this way: The aircraft got on station, called for smoke on the target; smoke shells were put on the target. '!he target vas neTer Tery far way, so it could be marked with mortars if desired, a smoke line was marked showing our front lines. The pilots were briefed Tery carefully. When a 100-pound bomb is dropped 100 yards away from &Dy position everybody in that position has to be lying flat on the ground or someone is going to get hurt, because a few bombs will move around a little, they won't all be down the line, You actually can provide good air-ground support: we have done it repeatedly. It is practicable, but it does require training.

AN .EJTI:lENT MEANS O!' SHOWING THE AVIATOR THX LOCATION OF OWN FRONT LINE TROOPS UNDER ALL CONDII'IONS OF TER..>t.AIN HAS NOT YET BZEN DISCOVERBD. PANELS ARE USELESS IN JUNGLE COUNTRY AND TD JRONT Lim: SOLDIER IN OPEN TERRAIN WILL NOT DISPLAY A .BRILLIANTLY COLORED PAHEL WHERE BY SO DOING HE WILL DISCIDSE HIS POSITIO~ TO THE ENmY.

ONE SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM LIES IN THE FIELD OF TARGET DESIG!I.A­ TION RATHER THAN FRONT LINE IDENTIFICATION, SMOKE PrtOJECTILES SHOULD PROVIDE A MEANS OF OBTAINING CLOSER AND MORE ACCURAl'E AIR SUPPORT OF GROUND UNITS.

Frau: Support Aircraft CoWDA.nder, ~1lbert Operations (Cont 1d).

As the operation progressed, air losses, particularly those from operation, took a severe toll of our air strength. These operational losses were particularly heavy on the CVEs and tended to increase as pilot fatigue became apparent. szcnET AIR SUPPORT - cnTBAL PACIJIC

It 1a believed that vi th our prepondera.nce of carrier• a.nd auperior airmanehip it i1 poasible to eatablish mastery of the air at any given time and place in the Jape.neae held i1land ba1es. Main­ tenance of this mastery over any protracted period will require ::aain­ tenance of initial air sU-ength by an adequate e71tem of replacemenb for both fati~ed pilots and damaged aircraft.

The 17stem eTolved for the utilisation of aircraft for 1upport miaaions is aound. The efficiency could be greatly increaaed by:

(l) Going over the entire pl.An with all pilot• prior to ea­ barldng on the operation. (2) Comprehensive rehear1al1 with the landing troops, air liai1on parties and aircraft. (3) Chalk talks and CPXe enroute to objective. (4) The compilation of a pilot'• cockpit file including: (a) Target chart and/or photo~aph•. (b) Radio calla and procedure for each t,-pe of minion. (c) Panel code. (d) Shackle code for the day. (e) Authenticator for the d.&7. (5) Indoctrination of ground troop• in the u1e of fluorescent ma.ricer panels. (6) Caretul selection, special training and correct use of liaison pilots.

Fighter direction over the objective area1 can be 1m- proved by:

~l) Unmistakably placing respon1ib1lity for its establi1bment and maintenance with the adjacent carrier group. (2) Selecting competent, experienced, aggre1eive fighter director personnel completely conversant with their grave reeponsibility and in­ doctrinated in procedure. (3) Eliminating ~friendly bogiea11 by 1trict IFl discipline. (4) Indoctrinating CAP pilot• in procedure.

Anti-submarine search over the objective area can be improved by:

(1) Unmistakably placing responsibility for its establishment and maintenance with the adjacent carrier group. (2) Eliminating "friendly bogies" by strict IYJ' discipline. (3) Indoctrinating A/S pilots in procedure.

J'rom: Commander l'ifth .Amphibious Foree ,

The outstanding deficiency observed in the Gilberts op­ eration was the f~ilure of aircraft to identify themselves with proper

2-6 SSCRET AIR SOPPOR! - CDTRAL PACIJIC

ID, either aa a i-esul t of faul. t;y equipment ar careleaaneaa ot per­ sonnel. On arAr&l occadons ehipe o! Task 1orce 52 were obliged to get unde~, fol'JI up, and urepare to repel air attack when approach­ ing planH were trieruily. COnaiderable unload.in& tbae ¥& l loat, thus expoeing ehipa in t'orvard area• longer than va1 neceHa.ry, Pod tive atepa should be taken by all activitiea operatin& aircraft to insure that IJ'F 1a on and hnctioning propercy. Aircraft whose 171' h in­ operative ahould be grounded until equipment 11 placed in working order, Pilot• and radiomen need instruction in order to recognize when their Ill' 11 inoperative, and radiomen need training in making minor emergency rep&ire in the air, In caee of doubt, approach11!18 air­ craft must make the proper approach procedure required b;y PAC-10, and be ready to identify tbem1elvea by light, using th~ daily identification dgnala.

Pilot• ~ radiomen need to be thoroughly familiar with the uae of the proper code• available in the Irf equipment. l!lum­ erous ca••• were obaerved of aircraft on anti-1ub11&rine patrol •bowing the code a81igned to eearoh and attack aircraft, Maliy c:&HI of 1mpro­ per uae of the emerceney signal were observed, In aa 1n1ch aa it appear• reaaonable to believe that the Japaneae are. or mq some ti!M• be operating recovered United State• aircraft, the desirability of periodically chan&ing identification 1118J'k­ ings appeara to be neceaaary. Ae eaaily applied and easily removed pa.illt wash might ba deYeloped in various color• so that the identifica­ tion insignia could be varied in color, shape and location.

Eury att911pt should be made to turnhh at least a minimum requiaite of night fighter• to all carrier• so that each force conta1nill8 a carrier vill have night fighters to break up the Japaneae night torpedo attaekt. This is an extremely important problem, vhoae aolution should be vigorously pursued,

All vea1els should be furnished and should use flalh­ less powder during night air attaek:s. On the night of 25 November one of the carriers ot Task Foree 52 was oompletely illuminated by the fllm• of ordinary amoke~~•e powder beill8 fired b;y one of the destroyere of the 1oreen. Tracers trom automatic weapons also discloee •hips po11- tions, It might be vell to eliminate tracers vhen firill8 at &irera!t 3.t night, It i• recommended that the 1yatem of using aircraft tor support missions employed for Gilberts operations be generally adopted as standard. Sufficient air liaison and air command parties should be trained immediately for tuture operations. Methods of train­ ing and allowances o! equipment of these parties should be standardized and should include exerciees with aircraft whenever poasible, and pre­ ferably while attached. to the ground units they will eerve in action,

2-7 S8CRET AIR SUPPORT - CENTRAL PACIFIC

Altho~ radio equipment should be standardized, it should not be al­ lowed to beco~e static, but should tend towards l1ghtneas, mobility and dependability aa new development are evolved.

Future operations should include a definite progressive plan for maintaining carrier aircraft and pilots at initial atrell8th. Be.see in the GILBERTS should be stocked prior to the assault phase &Di aircraft and equipment be staged forward as required.

Far more attention ehould be paid to the destruction of enemy defenses before lan1ings are attempted. PreliJllinary air at­ te.cka should start many weeks in advance of the assault with the pri- mary purpose of destroying fuel, ammunition and supplies of all kinds, Replenishment of supplies should be denied ~ air. The assault should be preceded by several d~s (not hours) of deliberate bombardment and ~ and night air attacks. Defenders should be given no rest d~ or night for at leaet a week prior to the landing, After bombardment and after bombers, employing two thousand pound daisy cutters, have neu­ tralired heavy and medium AA weapons, large formations of heavy bombera should saturate the defense area with one hundred pound demolition bombs and fragmentation clusters from such altitudes that misses a.re imnossible. Prior to the lanalng the selected beaches should be subjected to a devastating Dombing and bombarament w1th part of the one hundred pound demolition bombs being dropped on the reef along the route to be followed by l~nding creft for the purpose of detonating mines and des­ troying barriers.

From: Observers Reports.

In coordinated operations tillling is most illlportant and one of the criticisms of some of the strikes at Makin was the small regard for time element. It is desirable that air attacks commence on tLn~, but it is mandatory that they cease precisely at the time set.

In the attack east of Kings Wharf on November 21st, the striYe was to commence at 1000 and end at 1016. The air liaison officer with the 2nd Battalion bad ordered all air attacks in that aree to cease by 1015. '!his was acknowledged and relayed. Neverthe­ less, the strafin~ continued until approxilllately 1030, after which VTB dropped several bombs until 1045, holding up the infantry which was leaning against its restraining line. This introduced an element of uncertainty in the minds of the soldiers who feared they might get caught in our own aerial fires while advancing. The last section of VF further confused them, In addition to this, the strafing attack was not well coordinated, It was not continuous, there being intervals of t i ree and four minutes between attackifig sections, and the troops could not be certain when the attack was completed. Strafing VF for­ ~ations should be so disposed in the air that the interval between attac'cing sections, or planes if necessary, not be longer than 30 or

2-8 s::::c~ET AIR SUPPORT - CENTRAL PACIFIC

40 seconds, with perhaps a minute or so between flights. Thia should enable the first flight to arrive in position for its second 11paas" by the time the laat section in the laat flight baa "Pushed over" into its attack. In this manner the attack can be made more continuous and effective.

Carrier pilots should be thoroughly indoctrinated with the need for accurate timing when working with the ground forces. It may or may not be important if an attack against a naval target is not broken off on time, but it is almost a.l~s costly 1f this occurs 1n sup­ port of ground action.

A atrafing attack by VF in support of "E" Company on Novewber 21st just east of Kings Wharf was effectiTe, killing approxi~ 1:1&tely 20 Jape and acaring hell out of the rest. However the last aection of Via strafed our own lines, despite the fact that panels were d1aplayed and in previous "passes" these ple..nes bad fired in safe areaa, One man vaa injured and the others forced to dive into nearby ditches.

Constant reiteration for care in observing safety lines and panela should be a part of every 1 briefing11 session. Air liaison officers :must furniah this necessary information constantly for rel~ to the carrier group a.

Strafing attacks just prior to the landing of the first wave should be related in time to the movement of the first wave and not to a apecific time schedule related to H-hour. (Comment - Several other Commanders have mentioned this and concur).

SU LANDING OPERATIONS DOCTRINE (J'TP-167, PAGE 130).

Air strikes should not be scheduled for any specific time in relation to gun.fire.

1he ability to conduct point target bombing after bombardment has commenced is questionable due to clouds of smoke and duet.

lt is also recommended that carrier groups have adequ­ ate opportunity to maneuver with the air liaison unite and ground force& they are to support prior to the actual operation, Ground force com­ m.anders are especially desirous of this, The exercises at Maui prior to the Gilberta operation were not, in the considered judgement of those who took part, adequate in preparing the ground forces for air support operations, nor the carrier groups for working with the infantry, It is believed that a standard maneuver exercise to achieve this can be devised, and all troops assigned for an amphibious operation where air support is contemplated be put through this exercise as frequently as is neceasary to assure complete understanding and coordination between

2-9 SECRET .I.IR SUPPORT - CD'1'BAL PACIJIC air and ground.

Jrom: Command.1Il8 Officer - USS USU (CV).

Piloh flyill8 low oTer Tarawa after two da,ya of atead.T bombing and bombardment reported tbat the entire surface inatallation appeared deTaatated, and that the aubaequent asaault ahould proTe re­ latiTelJr eaey. Visiting the ialand after its capture, the•• aame pilo~• obserTed for themeelTea tbat the aurface installation bad 1n ~act b•en virtuallJr destroyed, but +;hat aheltera a.nd t;11n poeitiona underground were relatively secure. It wae here that the Japa surYiTed all preliminary attack and were ready to meet our aaaault troop• in atrell8th. Pilota al10 reported that the high Telocity, flat trajectory fire of ahip bombardment aeemed to produce little effect &&ainst such surface targets as remained when the gun action atarted. A high percen~ of the shells were 11li1sea, falling into the ocean or the lagoon, apparentlJr due to only amall error• in elevation. Like­ wise hi ta of major caliber shell• failed to tear up the area in an 1»­ pressive fashion.

1 SD U. S. RAT.il PROVING GROUND .BEPORT NO. 8-43 NOTIS O!l PD.­ J'OIUWICE 01 PROJllCTILES AND IDM.BS AGAINST SHORE INSTALLATIONS" DATED 24, DJ:CEMBER 1943 JOR IlD'OBKATION 01 DTECTS TO m: :ta.­ PECTED l"ROM NAVAL AND AIR ID~LBABIXDT.

It is apparent that aome better form of attack ia ne­ cessary to deatroy defense works of other bases which m~ be as stroll817 held as Tarawa. Air bombill8 and ship gun bombardment lllBY be relied on to clear the abov-ground atructuree, but the underground vorlce remain relatively invulnerable. le..rge caliber mortar fire appear1 to be indi­ cated.

.lir Support of Initial le.ndill8 Wave

Our fighter pilots believe that they could have ren­ dered effective support at this time by coming in directlJr over the landing boat& to strafe shore firing posts which neceaeai·ilJr • on a low atoll, cover a very amall range of eleTation. With maxim\1.111 number of fighters so ueed in a critical phaae • the shore fire would certainlJr be greatly reduced.

Coordination of Air Support Miaeiona

At times on D day, flights from CV a, CVLs, and CVEs , plus some float planes, operated oTer the target area - with little semblance of orderlJr procedure. DiTe and glide bombing, and strafing attacks, were apparently carried out according to the taste of indiTidual leaders, with the reaul ting serious confusion. The Support Air Commander

2-10 SSCRET illi SUPPORT - cmmw. PACIJIC suat exerciae po1itiTe control oTer all aircraft a11igned him for sup­ por~ miuion•.

Support plane• were called on 1tat1on in the morning before d~light, and at lee.at half an hour before ground objectiVH were d.ht1ngo.ilhable and planes could be UHtully employed. On a long campaign thil 11apl7 add1 to pilot fatigue, already high, and con!ulion at the \arget.

Id.entification of J"rie~ lorce1

In an atoll area contailiin& m1111eroua emall ialand.1 there i1 trequentl7 doubt ae to ju1t where friendly force• ~ he.Ye landed. Tariou1 of our units at Tarawa, either by nece11ity or design, landed on 11land1 adjacent to Bititu and thereby became liable to attack by fighter plan81 ordered to 1trate ho1t1le personnel. BllHable grou.nd or beach pan~l~ 1houl.d correct thia aituation.

Conclu1iou

The need ie mo1t eTident for coordinated training and indoctrination of all elements concerned with :tuture air 1upport mie­ e1on1. A suitable program to thi1 end ah.ould be considered an essential preparation for ADY further operations on the ace.le of those in the Northern Gilberti.

from: Commanding Officer, USS BUN!ERHILL (Cf) .

J.e a result of this action, combined with previous ex­ perience at Caaa lllanca and later experience at Nauru, the Commanding Officer malce1 the following recommendations:

That the opening bombing strike prior to aa1ault aprinkle target area. with aa JlllUlY 100 pound bomb1 a.1 the planes can carry with a view to doing some damage to as ~ target• as po1sible. In this connection, if it appaa.ra that complete surprise has been achieved the bombing at­ tack 1hould precede the strafing attack. Whether to bomb first or strafe first ahould be left to the di1cretion of the aenior aviator in the flight. Heavy bomb• can be used later in &rG&e where strong resistance haa been encountered by the assault troops.

That 1ome di•cretion be allowed the fighter1 in atrating thtl beach aa the boats come in. They are in a position to aee the progress of the first wave and can coordinate the beach 1trafing to give moat aaeistanca to the landing wave. Where 1tra!ing h done upon a definite time sche­ dule - and the boats are late - the atrating 1a over and the enemy back up out of hi1 d.ugouta before the boata hit the beach.

SD LANDING OP:.&BAT!ONS DOCTBINE (J"fP-167 P.t.GI 130).

2-11 SBCRET AIR SUPPORT - CU!RAL PACil'IC

That troop• going ashore mark their front lines with •moke and panel signs.le and then the fighting planes strafe ahead of them. nu. Taluable aeeietance cannot be safely utiliaed unleas the ground troopa mark their front line positions. We are not making the most-out of this phase of support.

The target cbarte used in thia operation, with the en­ tire island divided into tfll'get areas, each separately numbered, proTed very satisfactory. It is belieTed that the uee of numbered target areas is much superior to the grid system. It is suggoeted that where mosaic photographs of the target are turnished, the numbered target areas be overlaid upon the photographs to corre1pond with the charts. Thie wae done by the squadron intelligence officers for this operation, and pilota found it moat helpful in their stu.d.y of the target. liTom: Commander Carrier Air Group Nine,

The apparent effect• of the eubjeot strikes were very dieappointing to this observer, About ninety per cent of all bombs were seen to hit in the assigned areas, Rita were seen within 10 or 15 feet of assigned gun targets - but after a slight pause theae guns were fir­ ing again. Direct hits were seen on buildings - but no fires started in the majority of cases. Incendiaries had no effect. The great ma­ jority of all bombs merely dug a nice crater and raised a great cloud of coral dust which hampered the bombing of other planee.

Against such an ieland target it is felt that dive bombing and glide bombing should be assigned only buildings and fUel and anmiunition dumps. The accuracy required to hit a reveted gun em­ placement for example which is at best a 20 foot circle is not usually obtained.

It ie believed that the B1118ller bombs with the short delay fuses were moat effective. It ie reco111111ended that for auch strikee SJID type airplanee carry 1 5001 and 2 100# bombs and that the TBF type carry 12 1001 bombs.

It is believed that horizontal bombing by the TBFs would have been much more effective against this target than their glide bomb­ ing was,

From: Commanding Officer - USS MARYLAND.

Air strikes should not be scheduled for any specific time in relation to naval gunfire. The naval gunfire support group must be free to fire at any time after its arrival within range until the first wave is approaching the beach if effective use is to be made of this means for demolishing enemy strong points. 13ombs may be re­ leased at a height sufficient to escape projec~ile explosions using

2-12 S:SCRET AIR SUP.POR! - CJlNTRAL P.A.CIJIC area targets instead ot point targets. !he ability to conduct point target bombing after bombardment baa commenced ia que1tionable due to cloud1 of amok:e and dllllt •

.l1r bombardment group should use large cane of gaso­ line fitted to bur1t and burn on impact to de~ use of collll!lunication trenches, open machine gun po1ition1, etc., to defenders, provided amoke doee not interfere with assault waTee.

De~ermine poaeibility of using numerous small (100 lb) BC bomb1 with delay action fuzes to countermine boat approach lanes and beach mines installed by the enemy.

1rom: Comiander Taak Force 1ifty, (Commander Carri ere) •

Uee of airfields can be denied the enemy proTided run­ ways are heavily bombed and with a lapse of time between strikes of no aore than 25 hours.

ID must be kept on throU&}lout flights when numerou1 strikes are airborne, and target ie 100 miles or lee• from the Taek 1orce.

Bits on the power house at MILLI eliminated U fire trom all except automatic weapons. When the position of an enemy power houae 1a lcnovn for an bland attaek, 1 t 1hould invariably be attacked by din bomber• on the fir1t 1trike.

~ JMPU>Dml! AND CO'H!ROL 01 SUPPORT AI.RCRAJ'T IN THll GILl!ERTS {_AS MORI SUOCJISSJ'UL TBAlf IN ANY PREVIOUS LARGE SCALI .AMPHIBIOUS OP­ DATIO!i. 1'BE ORCWlIZil'ION PROVIDED A J'LEXlBLE ME.ABS OJ' APPLYING l'HJJ'ULL DIS'?RlJCTin POOR OJ' SUP.PORT AI.RCR.U"l' AT THE TIME .A.ND PLAal WBDJ MOST llUDD IN J'UR'l'HEB.ANCE OJ' THE IJJiDING ATTACK. THIS J'LKXI.BILITT .A.ND CONTROL WJ.S O:BTAINID :BT1 (J.) HAVIHG ALL SUPPORT AI.RCRAn' DTERillG TD AREA RmPORT TO AND RECEIV:l ORDERS J'BOM THE J.IR SUPPORT COMIWIDER. {B) HAVING ALL SOPPORT AIRCRAJ"l' VBI.LJ: IN THE Ul'lDING ATTA.CI AR.li UHDD TACTICAL COMM.lBD 01 THE 01J'ICll llS­ PONSIBLI JOR 'ml LA.NDIBG ATT.A.CI.

2-13 S.2CRET AIR SUPPORT

Mlll TDlWlE&N TB.liTRI

Salerp.o

J'rom: Colllllll nder, .lighth .Amphi bioua Jore•.

There waa no direct air aupport of the l.a.nding opera­ tion in the form ot bombing and strafi11& of enelllY poeitiona in the vicinity of the landiI14t beaches, It ia understood that indirect aup­ port by attack• on en9111Y reinforcement•, 1uppl;r line1, communication• and air force• was strong and continuoua - thia cannot be co~i.rmed b7 obHrvation,

Air coverage up to the departure of thia force troa the &HauU area vaa much 911perior to that in Sicil.T. Tb.a Baval ~•k ?orce Commander waa better i~ormed a1 to tighter cover provided but was 1till not told what J./S patrola or escorts were operating in th• vicinity of the oonvoy. Air defense b7 friendly tigh~era during the 1ta,y of the tran1port1 in the aa1ault area waa excellent. The en~ succeeded in making only a few minor attacks on the ahipa in the 'l're.na­ port Area prior to the eve of departure, !here appeared alao to be a definite improvement in the air raid warning eervice and in anti-air­ craft fire discipline on 1hips of the Attack J'orce1. The exception was the occasion of the attack during the departure of the tranaport1 from the aa1ault area. At thi1 time, with no target• in eight there was a great deal of firing without director control, and with weapon• whose ma.ximum range wa1 tar short of the probable altitude of the enemy aircraft. In a night attack, aueh indiacriminate firing, while it may serve ae a partial deterrent to low fl;riI14t bomber1 or torpedo plane•, provides an e.xeellent point of aim for high level bombers above the max­ imum range of the short range automatic weapon•.

The question of Fighter Director Control Unite ia still unsettled, There are several such unite consisting of Artst1' Air Joroe and Army Communication per1onnel on board ship1 of the .Amphibioua Foree, with no apparent central command and very vague order1. The statu1 of theae unite should be clarified and clearl.;r understood by both the Army &Ld the Navy.

TD J.AF HAS ORGABillD TWO (2) AIR C())(.BU' CON'l'ROL SQU.lllRONS, .AMPHIBIOUS (J'!GBTER DIRECTOR TE.AMS) J'OR DU'1'Y ON AGC1 OR J'IGB'l!ER CONTROL SHIPS. THESE ARE TEMPORARILY ALLOTED TO TRliTRll COM­ MANDERS FOR THE DUTY INDICATED. ALL AGCs (EXCIPT THE USS ANCON) HAVE A NAVY CIC COMPLEMENT OJ' 9 OlJ'ICIB.S AND 38 ENLISTED.

In future operations a high altitude patrol should be kept over the transport area if there is any likelihood of rocket bomb­ ing.

A fighter director or radar warning guard ship should

2-14 SSCRET All SUPPORT - MIDi fDRAHIAW 1'Hli'l'BI. be spo,ted aom• diat&nc• to Havard and up aun from the tranaport area where prM>Ucabl• to break up or giTe adTanoe warning of low alti tu.de fighter bomber• or torpedo plane attacks.

1rom: Comma.ndin,; Officer• USS PBILADELPHli.

ln9111;Y air a.ctiTity in the SA.LmiNO .BA.I area waa in­ tanae. Du.ring the period 9 to 19 September, inclueiTe, there vere ap­ proximately 65 red alert. in the area during which tillle approximately 25 actual attac.lc• were deliTered. The aUack• were of very ahort dura­ tion, except for four or fiTe attack• during hours of darkneas, vhich vere prolonged to from thirty five minutes to aeTenty minutes. .!'riendly fighter cover vaa constant and excellent, considering the handicaps under which our fighter planee vere compelled to operate. .U in previous similar circum1i&nce1, a daring air force such as the Lu!tvaffe is, will alva;r• succeed in making hit and run attack& during daylight hours des­ pite superior fighter plane coTer in the general area. 'l'he attacks by fighter bombers uaing standard type bomb• vere Tery costly to the enemy, as a large number of the attacking planes, and 1t is believed a goodly percentage alao, were ahot dovn either by friendly fighters or by An~i­ aircraft fire. The glider bomber•, on the other hand did a great deal more by near miasea. Thia vessel vaa directly attacked by hostile air­ craft in some twenty attacks and su1'fered very near misses from five glider bomba, the moat inaccurate one of which landed 100 yarda distant and the cloaeat one fiT• yarda diai&nt. Since Teasels en&&ged in shore bombardment actiTitiea becem.e high priority targets for the Lu!tvaffe, thi1 type of enemy air attack vill continue to be a very serious menace until method• vhich can 1Ucceasfully combat it are found. It is be­ lieved that the only effectiTe defenae at the present time againat thia form of attack, ia that of amoking up the area to the extent that over­ h.ad Tiaibility 1a reduc9d very materially, The commanding officer also beliBTes that high speed and radical m&neuTera also reduces Terr •light• ly the a.ocurac;r ot thia type of bombing.

Spotting by P-51 planee gave excellent results and ia, by far, the moat 1ucce1sful method of apottin& so far tried. lrom: Commanding Officer, BMS PALOMARES.

If no moro accurate estimation by radar can be attpplied tor future operations of a similar nature, patrols should be stepped up in height (2,000 feet between each flight) and each take atation on the flight abon. The highest flight only should be vectored and the re­ mainder conform. '.t'hia would, ~o some extent, reduce the likelihood of miasin& an interception owiD& to bad height information, since vith 6 flight• 14,000 feet of ak;r would be covered. It ia understood that a good deal of training would be necessary before thia could be achieTed. SZCRET AIR SUPPORT

SOUTll PACI1IC

Landing at Vella Lavella - .August. 1943, J'rom: Command.er Third Amphibious J'orce,

7ighter direction vas conducted, at all times vhen destroyers were present, from the destroyers, using experienced Jighter Director Officers, This should obviously be done in the initial move­ ment, until radar and fighter direction are set up aahore, In thia operation, however, it vaa not poasible satisfactorily to control fight­ ers from the .BARA.KOMA area due to poor radar coverage trom within the perimeter of the initial poaition. In fact, even with ehipborne direc­ tion, it vae necessary, due to land maaeea interfering vi th radar re­ ception, to split the air cover over tvo general areas, the west aide and the east aide of VELLA LAVELLA and to rely upon visual con~ct or radar advicH trom MUNDA for interception to the vest. Enemy bogiea were uniformly interc~pted, although aome dive bombers were able to t;et throU&h to attack the ships, In general, however, our aircraft were able to break up the enemy formation.

~ighter cover can and did protect vessels by~. but the present skill and tenacity of the Japanese in night air attacks, aa noted throU&hout the operation, when cover is ineffective and ship AA batteries of reduced efficiency, "8I'rants every attention to ~he develop­ ment of means and methods of night anti-aircraft protection for vessels in waters accesaible to enemy aircraft,

Adequate and most efficient air cover wae supplied over Bl.RAKOMA during all d!!J"• when a convoy wae preeent. Dile to shortage of fighter aquadrons in this area and other requirements for air cover, aa on striking missions, a continuoua ~-by-da,y coverage in protection of the BARAKOMA position could not be aupplied by Commander Air, SOLOMONS, acting for Commander Air, South Pacific, While t his exposed the position to eomewhat gr~Bter hazard and damage trom air attack, the efficiency of the AA batter~ ; and the discipline of the troops prevented aeriou& lose of life or mater~al. The ehore AA batteries (and those of LSTe when present) bro~ · d.own many enemy planes,

I.anding at Empreas Auguste l!e,y- - November. 1943,

J'rom: Commander Third Amphibious Force,

Commander Air Third Fleet was directed by Collllll8nder South Pacific to support the operation by provi~ing defensive reconnais­ aance, air cover and air euppor~ for the forces en,;sged, and by strikes against airfields on l!OU~AINVILLE and on any enemy unite threatening the attack force, A (cruiser Task rorce) was directed to destroy enem;y surface units threatening (the Amphibioua Force) and to operate against hostile bases as directed by Commander South Pacific, In furtherance

2-16 SSCRET AIB SUPPORT - SOUTH PACI1IO of the latter \&ale the airfields at l3UXA were bombarded during the night ot D minu1 l-~ and SBORTLAND ISLAND in the early morning of D-Day.

1rom: Operations Officer, Strike Command, Comiander Aircraft Solomon• (l:t.tracta from a.n intervi.v).

Dllring the fiTe montb1 I 1erved a1 Operations Officer in Strike Command , ve aet up and sent out approximately 120 1trike1, averagiJl& 50 planet per 1trike duri11t; the tirat two months and increa1- ing to a maxiJDU11 of 120 planee at the eni. The tighter cover we had varied from none up to 100 fighter1.

I think the greateet job we had in that period was trying to knock out the airfields in eouthern l!o~ainville during the period in which the landillg8 were made on Treasury Island and on l!ou­ gainville at Cape Torokina.

There ie quite a bit of diecu.aion about whether air can knock out an airfield and hov to do it, and so on. I 111 state flatly that air cap knock out airfield• and can keep them knocked out, and AAA deny to the enem the uae of hi1 fields. It took us about tvo weeks, ot one strike a ~ with about 100 planes a etrike to keep the three field• in southern l3ouga.inv1ll• (Kahili, Xara, and Be.llale) totally knocked out and thei1 · uae denied to the Jap1. In general1 our strike ••tup acainst thoae fields vae to have the dive bombers go down and hit the guns, vith ae maey diving aimultaneou1ly as poeeibl•. Torpedo plane• came down and hit the field with a lot of variations, due to the faet that the Jape soon caught on that the torpedo planes would hit the field and they would come out of their bolH after the dive bombers went away and wallop the torpedo planes aa they pulled out, So ve had little anealcers arranged here and there - some dive bombers vould l.ay up in the air until the Sm>a had all gone over, then come down and hit some of the Jape who got eaeay; or they would wait until after the torpedo planes had finished their attacks and come down; or a group of four to six torpedo planes would come down in the center of the torpedo plane attack on the field and hit a.cy guns that happened to reopen fire.

1rom1 0olllDl8Jlder Transport Group, !Ihird jmphibious .force.

The brilliant performance of our fighter cover and lighter Director Group who auccesstully turned back or completely broke Up the concerted attacks of four separate groups of enemy planes . With­ out auch effective air cover, severe losses or even failure of the oper­ ation ~ baTe resulted.

J'rom: Commanding Officer, Marine Night Fighter Squadron 531.

The only reasonable employment of the CCI equipment for maximum effectiveness ie to include it in the !irat or 1econd echelons

2-17 SZCRET AIR SUPPOllT - soum P.lCI.J'IC

ot the landing so that n1ght f'ightere can eft1c1entl.7 coTer the area durill4!: thoae first critical night. B.lld during the time that bogey activity is tr.e heavieat. With Gels r8.Ilg6 ot 60 or eo mile• , warning ample can be given for ~ tighter protection, and GCia aupar1or p:..·eaentation of bogey information permitting control direct ftom the acope plus 1 giving altitude information niakee it a more eatia!acto?7 radar to land vi tb. the first echelon than the SCR 270 as vaa the ca•e at both Treaaury and impreaa Anguata. 1urthermore1 the tact• to date indicate that the mobile SCR 527 A can be aet up quicker, with VD communicationa than other radar•.

2-18 SSCRE'T 4lR SQPPOlif

SOU'l'RVU!I' P.lCillC

La;dins at IAe - 8epte:;ber 1943.

~o•: Collll&J).der S.Yenth .Allphibioua loroe.

Ground alert b not conaidered a aathfaotory me\hod of air protection.

It ia beli-.ed \hat the proper air protection can be obta.\ned onl.Jr when fighter eoYer ia ayailable in the immediate Ticinity of the eh1p1 bei~ protected.

ibe J'ifUl Air 1orce prOTided an air umbrella OTer our cozr.07a e.aroute to an4 from Ule bee.ch and undoubtedly broke up a IIllm­ ber of •nellT plane attacks prior to their reaehill8 an attack poaition on our ahipe. Bowner, a preporUon of a he&Ty enem;r attack of about a-.ent;v planea brou th.rouDi our air ecreen at about 1400 on D da;v and anerly da&aged, b7 torpedoes and bomb a, LSTa 471 and 473 which were e.aroute to Bed !each.

:lne31T reconnaiaaance planes hoYered in the general area of our convo7• nearly 11Yery night. Our •hip• were Hldo111 attacked until After anU-atreral't fire was opened. T:.iere seemed eome indication that the enem,y wae not certain of the 9%&Ct location of the conTo;v. lnetnlC­ tiona were ieeued to hold fire at night unleas airera.tt appeared to adopt an attack poaition.

La;idlng at 71.ntchhnfen - Septe:mber. 1943.

Jrom: Commander SeTenth 11.eet.

J'ifth Air lorce arr&n&ed to proYide continuous coTer by two fighter aquadron1, 1eTen aquadrona were actually engaged in the mid­ day baUle.

The movement from llUllJ. to LAE, the loading area at LAE, the convoy moTements, and the be&chill8 operation• on 22 and 23 September were proyided continuoue coYer at two leTels by fighter planes. USS ~ID (DD) acted aa a fighter director ship with conspicuous succeas.

~stim.e.tes indicate that 70 to 100 Japanese aircraft vere inTolved in att&cke on 22 September. Of this number, 38 were des­ troyed b7 our fightera and 8 ~ A.l fire. Our air loaees were 3 fightera. One pilot wa1 aaTed,

J'rom 1 Oommandill8 Officer, USS REID.

During the month of September, Allied Fighter Director Parties haTe been embarked from time to time in thie Teasel, During this period enemy loaeee total approximately 84 enemy planes which have

2-19 SECRET AIR SOPPORt - SOUTlOOIST PA.CIJ'IC baen aha t dovn by the J.llied Air Force directed by the J'ighter Director Party embarked in this vessel. jpproximately four Al.lied planes and two pilots have been loat dur~ these operations.

IA.nd.ip.g: at .Arave - December. 1943.

J'rom: Commander S9Venth .Amphibious lorce.

:Bomber aircraft on call ~ver the area o! operation• vere moat useful in providing impromptu aupport. Future use of this form of support ia recommended.

Air cooperation conaieted of:

Z - l Heavy bombers attacked AliWJ: droppin& over 200 tone of HR. Night Z - l/Z J'ive NaTy Catalinae provided A/S patrol over convoy. One Jnpaneae 1nooper dropped bombe over the convoy at 0330/D with­ out damage. Z - 6 B-25a over A.RAWE at 0625 houri on call for close npport.

A 7ighter Director Ship vaa employed. An Air Support Officer (local Air Co111111ander) controlled B-25a from B~ Ship.

J'ighter cover failed to intercept a bombing and straf­ ing attack on the land.in& area by 33 enelll.}" a/c abant 0900 houri . The convoy had withdrawn into cloudy weather b7 thia time. Beach and H~ Ship only vere attacked.

From: A Digest of a Report by A Member of The Army Ground Force :Board, SWPA Who Accompanied The Task Force Which Landed a.t Ara.we.

First bombardment of the Arave area. vas delayed until D-1 as a aecrecy measure. Prior to D-1 air attacks were continued on the Cape Gloucester area, where 3,500 tons of bombs were dropped and where at least one of the two air strips was rendered unserviceable by D-1 da.y.

On D-1 Arave was hit by two groups of heavy bombere and two groups of attack bombers escorted by one fighter group, droppillg 200 tons of high explosive. Meanwhile, the Ge.emata airdrome, about 80 miles further east along the south coast of Nev :Bri tain, was hit with one group of heavy bombers covered by one fighter squadron and using 1,000-lb. bombs with .l-second delay fUzes.

During the night of :0...1 Le.kunai airdrome at Rabaul wae hit hard by Beauforte.

:Bombing: Bombardment operations on D-d~ were limited

2-20 SSCRET AlR SUPPORT - SOUTHWEST PACIFIC to one strafing and bombing attack just prior to the landing. From 0730 to 0900 one squadron of :B-251 was on air alert in the area. Two aquadrons of A-20e were on ground alert throughout the day. One bomb­ ardment group armed with 1,000-lb. instantaneous-fuzed demolition bombs was on ground alert from 0800 to 1000. One squadron of Bostons was held on ground alert throughout the afternoon prepared to attack Naval targets. None of these available missions was used, since suitable tar­ gets did not develop.

Fighter Cover: Fighter cover was maintained in the area throughout the day, with two flights from daylight to 0800, four flights from 0800 to 0900, six flights from 0900 to 1400, and two flights from 1400 to dusk. Meanwhile, fighter sweeps of one flight each were sent out every two hours along the north and south coasts in the direction of principal Jap air bases.

Although our forces were subjected to two enemy air raids on D-day, it was q_uite apparent that the effectiveness of these attacks had been minimized by the friendly fighter cover, Other attacks attempted by the enemy were completely diverted.

Air support missions on "Dfl and subsequent days consistec principally of reconnaisaance and strafing of rivers and trails, In one instance, however, the flight leader of a flight of .A.-20s, part of a squadron en route to perform a strafing and bombing mission some distance from the beachhead, picked up a message from a detached unit stating that they had been driven back and calling for bombing and atrafing support, The flight leader, after verifyin& the call, diverted hie flight from the squadron miaeion and bombed and strafed the area specified. This action was in violation of SOP, which prohibits diversion of elements briefed for a specific miasion. However, the original mission was in this case a routine area coverage where no targets bad been definitely located, and the flight leader, who alone had received the message, as­ sumed responsibility for diverting his flight to the attack of a definitel located target and thereby assisted materially in relieving the pressure on the ground troops.

An Air Liaison Officer and his party accompanied the Arawe expedition and maintained constant and effective communication with the advanced echelon of the air force except for a short period several days after the landing.

The SOP for attack aviation in close support of ground troo~s in the Southwest Pacific Area requires a unit or taak force com­ l!l&nder to include the following information in any request for close air support:

(1) Type or designation of target. (2) Exact location of target by best means available.

2-21 SZCRET AIR SUPPORT - SOUTHWZST PACIFIC

(3) Direction of movement of target, if any. (4) All particul.siy distinguishing characteristice of target. (5) Time limits of requested support, if neceeaary. (6) If target designation ie by map or aerial photo­ graph, specific reference to same.

2-22