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Amphibious Operations, Excluding Marshall Islands, AMPHIBIOUS OPERAT I ONS DURING THE PERIOD AUGUST TO DECEMBER 1943 CONINCH P- 001 Title taken from "Amphibious operations, excluding Marshall Islands," Cominch P- 004 , p . 6-12 . r SECRET DN11ED STATES 1~~ET HEADQUARTERS OF THE COMMANDER l:N CHIEF NAVY DEPARTMENT, WAS.HmGTON, D. C. 22 April 1944 This publication, "Amphibious Operations", is a continuation of the series entitled "Notes on Amphibious War­ fare No, 1 and No, 2" , It promulgates material originating from reliable sources and arranged according to operations and the areas in which they took place. It contains comments and expr essions of opinion concerning war experience that were available at the time the operation under discussion was com­ pleted. This publication is classified as secret, non­ registered. It shall be handled as prescribed by Article ?6, U. S. Navy Regulations 1920. It should be widely circulated among commissioned personnel. When no longer r equired it shall be destroyed by burning. No report of destruction need be sub­ mi tted. This publication is under the cognizance of, and is distributed by the Colnmander in Chief, United States Fleet. Transmission by registered mail within the con­ tinental limits of the United States is authorized. R. S. KDWARDS, Chief of Staff, i SSCRET CONTENTS Chapter I. LANDING OPERATIONS Central Pacific, • • • • • . • . • 1-1 Gilbert Islands Operation • . 1-1 Mediterranean 'llleatre •.•.•.• 1-7 !anding on North Coast of Sicily. 1-7 Landing at $alerno .•.•.. 1-8 South Pacific, •.••..... 1-12 Landing at Vella I.e. Vella • • . • 1-12 Treasury Island Occupation, . 1-13 Landing at Empress Augusta~. 1-14 Southwest Pacific, ••• • 1-18 Landing at I.e.e. • • • . 1-18 landing at Jinschhafen. • • • 1-19 Landing at Arave, • . 1-22 Landing at Cape Gloucester, • 1-25 Chapter II. illi SUPPORT Central Pacific. .• • . • . 2-1 Control of Support Aircraft • 2-1 ~-Ground Liaison. • 2-4 Mediterranean 'llleatre •• 2-14 South Pacific ••. 2-16 Southveet Pacific, 2-19 Chapter III. UV.AL GUNF!ll Central Pacific. • • 3-1 Mediterranean Theatre. 3-12 South Pacific, ••• 3-18 Southwest Pacific. • 3-21 Chapter IV, INT.ILLIGENCJ Central Pacific. • . • • . 4-1 Mediterranean Theatre. 4-7 South Pacific ••• 4-13 Southwest Pacific. 4-15 Chapter V. U>GISTICS Central Pacific. • , • • • S-1 Medical , ••• S-4 Mediterranean Theatre. .•.• 5-6 South Pacific. • • • • • • • S-9 Southwest Pacific, •• s-16 Chapter VI. SHIP TO SHORE MOVJ:MllNT Central Pacific. .• . 6-1 Mediterranean Theatre •• 6-7 Southwest Pacific ••• 6-11 Beach and Shore Parties • 6-12 ill SECRET CONTENTS (Cont'd) Chapter VII. LANDING CR.A.FT ~T. • • • ..... • . • 7-1 Method of Unloading LST • 7-3 LCT(5) • 7-4 LCI(L) 7-S LCM(3) 7-6 LVT ••• • 7-7 LCS •• 7-8 DUXWS. 7-9 LC(R) •• • 7-9 SALVAGE CRAJ'T •• 7-10 Chapter VIII. COMMUNICATIONS Central Pacific. • 8-1 Mediterranean Theatre. • 8-10 South Pacific, • • 8-12 Southwest Pacific. 8-12 Chapter IX, MISCiLLAN:IOUS llalloona. • 9-1 Smoke. • • • • • • • . • 9-2 Medium Tanke • • • • • • . 9-S LIST OF EFFECTIVE PAGES Promulgating letter . .. i Contents • . • . • iii, iv List of Effective Pages . • iv Chapter I . .. • 1-1 to l-27, inclusive Chapter II • . .. • 2-1 to 2-22, inclusive Chapter m . 3-1 to 3-21, inclusive Chapter IV • . 4-1 to 4-15, inclusive Chapter V . .. 5-l to S-20, inclusive Chapter VI • . .• 6-1 to 6-17, inclusive Chapter VII 7-1 to 7-10, inclusive Chapter VIII . • 8-1 to 8-12, inclusive Chapter IX • . 9-1 to 9-7, inclusive iv SECRET CHAP'l!IR I LANDING OPEBJ.TIONS Q!B?JUL PACIJIC G1lbert1 Operation - lovember 1943. from: Comnander :Pi!th .Amphibious Force. In the Gilberte Operation, the master plan required the simultaneous capture of Makin and Tarawa, and the subsequent oc­ oupation of .APEMAMA, The following table 1e an outline of the rela­ tionship of the major elements of the amph1bioua organization. Table o! Malor Xlement1 of the Amphibious Organization .Aa1ault Force, (Tl' 54). (1) .&mphibioue Corpt. (2) Support (.Amphibious) Aircraft. (3) MAXIN LST Groups l and 2 (9LST, 3LCT, 2 DD, transporting LVTa and Defense :Battalion). (4) TAB.AIU LST Group1 l and 2 (12 LST, 5 LCT, 2 DD, transport­ ing LVTs, and Defense :Battalion). (5) MAKIN Gerrilon Group (2 AP, 2 AX, 2 DE, transporting Gar­ rison and Construction Troops). (6) TARAWA Ge.rrilon Group (2AP, 2AK, 2 D.Z, transporting Gar­ rison and Construction Troops). (?) .AP»WlA Gerriaon Groups l and 2 (3 AP, 2 .AX, 4 LST, 3 LCT, 3 Im, transporting Garrison and Construction Troops. (8) APJi'.MAMA Reconnais1ance Group (l submarine, transporting a Marine Reoonnaiaeance Platoon). liO'l'E: (3), (4), (5), (6), (?),and (8) (leas the submarine ) paaeed to command of the local Task Force Collllll&llders on arrival at destinations. LCT were loaded on LST and launched at destina­ tions. (9) Northern Attack 1orce (Tl 52). (a) Transports, (4 APA, l AXA, l LSD). (b) Support Groups (4 OBB, 4 CA, 3 ~. 13 DD, l AM) NO~: Additional Support Aircraft were provided by other carrier groupt. (o) Northern landing lore•. One Regimental Combat Team of the 27th Division, .A.,U . s., plua reen!oreing units, (d) Garrieon Poree. Army and minor Naval garrison units. (e) Aircraft, MAKIN Be.ae. Army base aircraft unite. (Aleo com­ manded Support Aircraft, leas Combat .A.ir Patrol and anti­ submarine patrol, after shore headquarters were eetabliehed.). (10) Southern Attack Force (Tl 53). (a) Transports. (12 APA, 3 AXA, l AP, l LSD). (b) Support Groupe (3 OBB, 3 CA, 3 CL, 5CVE, 21 DD, 2 AM). 1-1 SECRET LANDING OP"&RA!IONS - CEN'l!RAL PACIJIC NOTE: Additional Support Aircraft were provided by other carrier groupc). (c) Southern Lending Force. Two regimental Combat Teams of the S.ICOND Marine Diviaion plu• reinforcing units. Corps Reserve, one Regimental Combat team of SECOND Marine Diviaion, (Not to be c0111111itted eicept on authority of CTF 54). (d) Garrison Force, ~A. Marine Corps Garrison Troops. Navy Acorns, Casus, Sea :Bees, Marine and Naval air uni ta, minor Naval garrison uni ts. (Also co=anded support air­ craft, leas Combat Air Patrol and anti-eubma.rine patrol, after headquarter• were established ashore). (e) Garrison Jorce, APEMAMA. Marine Corps Garrison 'l'roope. Navy Acorn, Caau, Sea Beea, Marine and Naval air unite, minor Naval garrison units, The plan of the Coll!llander in Chief, U, S, Pacific Fleet, en­ visaged three phases of the GILBIRTS Operation. Theae phases necessar­ ily overlap, but in ceneral terms were: (a) The assault, (b) The occupation of the positions by garrison and development forces, and the evacuation of the aesault troope, (o) The development of the poeitions as air and minor naval ba1e1. The auaul t forcee compriaed the S.ICOND Marine Divi- sion and one Regimental Combat Team of the 27th Army Division, reinforced by medium tank companies and advance element• of the garrison forcea. The assault forces on evacuation were to leave in the captured position• the infantry and field artillery elements initially assigned to the gar­ rison. The bulk of the garriaon forces were Marine and J.rm;r Defense Battalions, construction battalion•, &nd aviation ground organizations. These were to be moved in behind the aasault troops as rapidly as the tactical situation and available transportation would permit. Each unit of the assault and garrison forces Yae to take in, in general, five unite of fire and thirty ~s 1 consumable supplies, plus neceesary organizational equipment, The transportation of permanent base facilities, garrison e­ quipment, and of supplies s~ficient to establish a sixty-day level, waa to be inaugurated as soon as the garrison troop• were moved in. It vaa directed that ships of the first echelon vere to be loaded to no more than 60% capacity, in order to permit a balanced load and a reasonabl.7 rapid discharge in combat areas where ships would constantly be s11b j ect to enemy attack. Furthermore, due to the very difficult unloading condi­ tions at these atolls, only a few vessels could be expected to 1lnload sim­ ultaneously at anything approaching a reaao.nable rate. Owing to the imminence of succeedint; amphibious opera­ tions, which would require all veseels of the FIFTH Amphibious Force, 1-2 SECRET LANDING OPERATIONS - CENTRAL PACIFIC and the fact that the Covering Forces must necessarily be withdrawn from the forward areas after about two weeks, it became essential, in spite of some disadvantages, to move all the garrison forces for­ ward very closely behind the assault forces, instead of spreading them out over a somewhat longer period. 'I'b.e Commander of Task Force 54 vae charged with responsibility for these movements, which involved about four-fiftha of the garrison forces. 'I'b.e ColllJtlander Service Force, U. s. Pacific Fieet, was charged with the responsibility of the move­ ment of the remainder, and for building up and maintaining the required level of aupplies. forces destined for the various positions. except the troops in NEW Z1A.LABD, SAMOA, WALLIS, and the ~ICE ISLANDS, plus large quantities of equipment and atorea, vere assembled in OAHU, reorganized, and prepared for final embarkation. A short period of time became available in which to give the assault troops a small amount of basic amphibious training, botr. in NEW ZEA.LAND and HAWAII. Abbreviated final rehearsals of the assault echelons were held in EFATE and HAWAII though aome of the combatant vessels and a large part of the carrier aircraft could not participate. Thia training, and these rehearsals, curtailed as they had to be, were invaluable. '!'his basic training and battle rehearsals are considered essential to succe1e against defended positions. Although operations for the capture of atolls have long been studied by the U, S, Navy and Marine Corpe, this is the first operation in which we have engaged in atoll warfare.
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