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Observation of the Parliamentary Elections in Morocco (7 October 2016)

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Observation of the Parliamentary Elections in Morocco (7 October 2016) http://assembly.coe.int Doc. 14201 rev 30 November 2016 Observation of the parliamentary elections in Morocco (7 October 2016) Election observation report Ad hoc Committee of the Bureau Rapporteur: Mr Ian LIDDELL-GRAINGER, United Kingdom, European Conservatives Group Contents Page 1. Introduction............................................................................................................................................... 1 2. Political context and legal framework........................................................................................................ 2 3. Administration of elections, voter lists and candidate registration............................................................. 4 4. Election campaigning, campaign funding and media coverage.................................................................5 5. Polling day................................................................................................................................................ 7 6. Conclusions.............................................................................................................................................. 8 Appendix 1 – Composition of the ad hoc committee..................................................................................... 9 Appendix 2 – Programme of the election observation mission (Rabat, 5-9 October 2016)......................... 10 Appendix 3 – Press release issued by the election observation mission.....................................................11 1. Introduction 1. On 21 June 2011, the Parliamentary Assembly adopted Resolution 1818 (2011) on the request for Partner for Democracy status with the Parliamentary Assembly submitted by the Parliament of Morocco. It emphasised the importance of organising free and fair elections as the cornerstone of a true democracy and expressed the expectation that it would be invited to observe future parliamentary elections. 2. The Moroccan Parliament was the first to receive this status of partner for democracy, which was granted before the country adopted its new Constitution by a referendum on 1 July 2011. On the basis of the partnership framework, the Parliamentary Assembly was invited and observed the parliamentary elections held on 25 November 2011. 3. The development of this partnership continues to be closely followed by the Assembly, which adopted Resolution 1942 (2013) and Resolution 2061 (2015) on the evaluation of the partnership for democracy in respect of the Parliament of Morocco. 4. On 26 May 2016, Mr Driss EI Yazami, Director of the Moroccan National Human Rights Council (CNDH), sent an invitation letter to the President of the Assembly inviting the Assembly to observe the elections to the House of Representatives on 7 October 2016. At its meeting on 24 June 2016, the Bureau of the Assembly decided to observe these elections, set up an ad hoc committee comprising 11 members and appointed Mr Ian Liddell-Grainger (United Kingdom, EC) as its Chair. 5. In line with the co-operation agreement signed on 4 October 2004 between the Parliamentary Assembly and the European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission), a representative of the Venice Commission was invited to join the ad hoc committee as a legal adviser. F - 67075 Strasbourg Cedex | [email protected] | Tel: +33 3 88 41 2000 | Fax: +33 3 88 41 2733 Doc. 14201 rev Election observation report 6. The membership of the ad hoc committee, based on the proposals of the Assembly's political groups, can be found in Appendix 1. 7. The ad hoc committee visited Morocco from 3 to 9 October 2016 and held talks inter alia with political party members, the President of the CNDH, representatives of the Ministry of the Interior, of the High Council and High Authority for Audiovisual Communication, as well as representatives of the international community present in Morocco and of the media and civil society. The programme of the ad hoc committee is set out in Appendix 2. The ad hoc committee wishes to thank the staff of the Council of Europe office in Morocco. 8. The ad hoc committee wishes to thank the Moroccan authorities for their help in organising this visit. 9. On polling day, the ad hoc committee split into seven teams which observed voting in Rabat and its region, as well as in the towns and regions of Casablanca, Fez, Marrakech and Tangier. 10. The ad hoc committee concluded that the Ministry of the Interior had organised the poll with integrity and in full transparency. The press release prepared at the end of the elections is reproduced in Appendix 3. 2. Political context and legal framework 11. The Kingdom of Morocco is a constitutional monarchy. The King still has effective influence in politics, but he shares this power with the representatives of the parliament. The new Constitution adopted in 2011 was proposed by King Mohammed VI himself and approved by referendum. Article 1 describes the political system as “a constitutional, democratic, parliamentary and social monarchy”. 12. The Constitution was adopted in the aftermath of the “20 February” 2011 popular movement, which can be seen as part of the Arab Spring movements, and represents a significant step towards democratisation in that it significantly increases the powers of parliament. 13. The executive power is exercised by the government, the head of which is appointed by the King “from within the political party arriving ahead in the elections of the members of the House of Representatives, and with a view to their results” (Article 47). The King also appoints, on a proposal from the head of government, the members of the government; and enjoys a high level of decision-making power on long-term and strategic issues, such as foreign policy, large infrastructure projects or the status of Western Sahara. 2.1. Parliament 14. The parliament is bicameral, comprising a lower house – the House of Representatives – with 395 members elected every five years by universal suffrage, and an upper house – the House of Councillors – with 120 members elected indirectly every six years by representatives of professional bodies, employees, the General Confederation of Business (CGE) and regional and local authorities. The elections for the House of Councillors took place in September 2015. 15. The voting process for the House of Representatives is complex and is governed by the Institutional Law on the House of Representatives (LOCR) and other pieces of legislation, including the Law on general electoral registers, referendum operations and the use of public audiovisual media during election and referendum campaigns, the organic law on political parties and the organic law laying down the requirements and arrangements for independent and impartial observation of elections. 16. The 395 members of the House of Representatives are elected by direct universal suffrage under a list system, broken down as follows (Articles 1 and 2 of the LOCR): – 305 members are elected in 92 local constituencies established by decree according to a principle geared towards geographical balance while taking account of spatial aspects. At least one constituency is established per prefecture, for which a number of seats determined by decree are allocated, ranging from two to six. More than one constituency may be established in certain prefectures or provinces; – 90 members are elected to a nationwide constituency with a dual quota: lists of candidates for this constituency must include two sections: the first comprising 60 women and the second 30 young men and women of a maximum age of 40 years on polling day (Article 23 of the LOCR). The law was changed in 2016 allowing the possibility for women to be included on the second list which was, for the 2011 elections, reserved exclusively for young men. 2 Doc. 14201 rev Election observation report 17. Election is by proportional representation according to the rule of largest remainders, without cross- voting or preferential votes. A further change introduced in the electoral law for the 2016 elections is the reduction of the threshold, for both national and countrywide constituencies, to 3%. Officially, this change in the threshold was adopted to bring Morocco into line with international standards and reference was made to Assembly Resolution 1547 (2007) on the situation of human rights and democracy in Europe. 18. The members of the House of Representatives are elected for a five-year term. Any member of the House of Representatives who relinquishes the political affiliation under which they stood for election or membership of their parliamentary group or grouping, forfeits their office. As far as immunity of parliamentarians is concerned, Article 64 of the Constitution stipulates that no member of parliament may be prosecuted, subject to a search warrant, arrested, detained or judged on grounds of an opinion expressed or a vote cast by them in the exercise of their duties, except where the opinion expressed challenges the monarchic form of the State or the Muslim religion or constitutes a violation of the respect due to the King. 2.2. Political landscape 19. Morocco’s political landscape has been marked in the last decade by the emergence of the Justice and Development Party (PJD), which is moderately Islamist, and the decline of traditional parties such as the Istiqlal Party (PI) and the Socialist Union of Popular Forces (USFP). The PJD electorate is mainly made up of conservative, middle-class and urban constituencies and presents itself as an anti-establishment party.
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