Foreign Minister Wang Yi Diaoyutai State Guesthouse, 6 January 2016

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Foreign Minister Wang Yi Diaoyutai State Guesthouse, 6 January 2016 Remarks at Foreign Ministry’s 2016 New Year Reception Foreign Minister Wang Yi Diaoyutai State Guesthouse, 6 January 2016 State Councilor Yang Jiechi and Madam Le Aimei, Your Excellencies Diplomatic Envoys and Representatives of International Organizations and the Spouses, Ladies and Gentlemen, Dear Friends, It gives me great pleasure to host this new year reception and meet you, both old and new friends. On behalf of the Chinese Foreign Ministry, I extend warm welcome to all of you. I express my heartfelt thanks to all the diplomatic envoys and representatives of international organizations present here for what you have done in the past to strengthen friendship and cooperation between China and the world. My thanks also go to all other Chinese government departments which gave strong support to the conduct of China’s diplomacy last year. The year 2015 was a crucial year for deepening all-round reform in China. Success only favors those who boldly forge ahead. The Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (CPC) with Comrade Xi Jinping as the General Secretary led Chinese people of all ethnic groups in a concerted endeavor to pursue the four-pronged comprehensive strategy. Bearing in mind both China’s domestic and international interests, we made advances while maintaining stability and achieved new and major progress in various fields, and successfully completed the 12th Five-Year Plan for national economic and social development. In 2015, China’s economy registered steady and fast growth, and China remained a major contributor to global growth. The Fifth Plenum of the 18th CPC Central Committee was held, which adopted a proposal for the 13th Five-Year Plan, setting ambitious goals for China’s development in the next five years. In 2015, all-round progress was also made in advancing China’s diplomatic agenda. We stayed committed to peaceful development and national renewal. Focusing on peace and development, the defining trends of our time, we launched diplomatic initiatives with distinctive Chinese features on all fronts and made remarkable progress. We solemnly marked the 70th anniversary of the victory of the Chinese People’s War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression and the World Anti-Fascist War. Addressing the world from the Tian’anmen Rostrum, President Xi Jinping declared that “Justice will prevail! Peace will prevail! The people will prevail!”, expressing China’s dedication to the cause of peace and justice of mankind. We endeavored to promote common development and shared prosperity of all countries. We championed a vision of innovative, coordinated, green, open and shared development and created more development opportunities for the world by deepening the reform and opening-up program. We released the Vision and Actions on Jointly Building Silk Road Economic Belt and 21st-Century Maritime Silk Road and signed cooperation agreements with over 20 countries along the routes. The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank was inaugurated. The Silk Road Fund went into operation. A number of major mutually beneficial cooperation projects were launched. The Belt and Road Initiative achieved important early harvests, providing strong impetus to the development and revitalization of countries along the routes. We signed agreements on production capacity cooperation with over 20 countries, covering Asia, Africa, Europe and the Americas. Implementation of such agreements signed earlier has started, with promising prospects. We respectively signed free trade agreements with the Republic of Korea (ROK) and Australia, which have gone into effect. We concluded negotiations on upgrading the Free Trade Area with ASEAN. Substantive progress was made in negotiations on Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership. The convergence of interests between China and other countries has significantly expanded. We promoted sound and all-round growth of relations with major countries. President Xi Jinping paid a historic visit to the United States, reaffirming the goal of jointly building a new model of major-country relationship and elevating cross-Pacific cooperation. China and Russia decided to align the Silk Road Economic Belt and the Eurasian Economic Union. The China-Russia comprehensive and strategic partnership of coordination continued to maintain high standard performance. China and the United Kingdom gave greater priority to their bilateral relations and opened a golden era of global comprehensive strategic partnership for the 21st century. China and Germany agreed to deepen practical cooperation and synergize the “Made in China 2025” and Germany’s “Industry 4.0” initiative. Our efforts to open up new areas of cooperation with France have led to the signing of the first China-France joint statement on cooperation with third countries. Premier Li Keqiang and the leaders of 16 Central and Eastern European countries had a successful meeting. The four-pronged China-EU partnership delivered fresh results. China and other BRICS countries agreed to forge a closer partnership. We endeavored to build a community of shared future with China’s neighbors. We formulated with ASEAN a plan of action for cooperation in the next five years and launched with countries on the Indo-China Peninsula the process of Lancang-Mekong River sub-regional cooperation. We continued to grow traditional friendship with Mongolia and other neighbors, and resumed China-Japan-ROK cooperation after a three-year hiatus. We adopted with Central Asian countries the development strategy of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization for the next ten years and enhanced all-round strategic trust and cooperation with South Asian countries. We firmly upheld territorial sovereignty and maritime rights and interests; and we strove to manage differences through dialogue and cooperation and sought peaceful settlement of disputes through negotiation and consultation. We launched three main initiatives to boost our cooperation with other developing countries. In early 2015, the first Ministerial Meeting of the Forum of China and the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States was successfully convened, creating a new platform for China’s cooperation with all Latin American countries. In mid-2015, President Xi Jinping attended the Asian-African Summit and activities commemorating the 60th anniversary of the Bandung Conference, enriching the Bandung spirit. In late 2015, President Xi Jinping and leaders of close to 50 African countries attended the Johannesburg Summit of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation, upgrading China-Africa strategic relations. We unveiled ten cooperation plans to meet the most urgent need of Africa, lifting China-Africa cooperation to a historical new high. We actively participated in global governance, taking on our responsibility for promoting progress of mankind. President Xi Jinping attended summits marking the 70th anniversary of the United Nations where he announced a number of major initiatives, including the setting up of a China-UN peace and development fund and an assistance fund for South-South cooperation, as well as decisions to join the UN Peacekeeping Capability Readiness System, build a peacekeeping standby force of 8,000, and exempt debt owed by least developed countries as part of China’s efforts to fulfill its due international responsibilities. We released joint statements on climate change respectively with the United States, France, the European Union, India and Brazil, announced the creation of a RMB20 billion South-South cooperation fund on climate change, and made important contribution to reaching a comprehensive, balanced, ambitious and binding agreement at the Paris Conference. We actively promoted the political settlement of hotspot issues such as the Iranian nuclear issue, South Sudan, Syria and Afghanistan, strengthened international counter-terrorism cooperation, and played a constructive role in upholding world peace and security. Ladies and Gentlemen, Friends, China’s 13th Five-Year Plan will be implemented in 2016. Under the leadership of the CPC Central Committee with Comrade Xi Jinping as the General Secretary, we will continue to pursue major-country diplomacy with distinctive Chinese features, shoulder our due international responsibility, endeavor to foster a more favorable international environment for finishing building a society of initial prosperity in all respects, and thus make new contribution to world peace and development. We will make every effort to facilitate China’s domestic development. With promoting the Belt and Road Initiative as the overarching goal, we will focus on the three key areas, namely, connectivity, production capacity cooperation and people-to-people exchanges, in accordance with the three main principles of consultation, joint development and shared benefits. We will work to make our mutually beneficial cooperation with other countries deliver more outcomes, and contribute our share to the smooth launching of the 13th Five-Year Plan. We will strive to lead the way for global growth and host a successful G20 Hangzhou Summit to unlock new driving force for growing the global economy. We will offer new solutions to resolving difficulties in the global economy, and explore new ways to improve global economic and financial governance. We will endeavor to uphold world peace, continue our efforts to build a framework of major-country relations based on constructive interaction and win-win cooperation, advance the process of seeking political settlement of hotspot issues, and take an
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