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The Use of Racist, Antisemitic and Xenophobic Arguments in Political Discourse

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The use of racist, antisemitic and xenophobic arguments in political discourse Jean-Yves Camus ECRI: European Commission against Racism and Intolerance March 2005 The opinions expressed in this work are the responsibility of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy of the Council of Europe or of any of the mechanisms or monitoring bodies established by it. ECRI (European Commission against Racism and Intolerance) Council of Europe F-67075 Strasbourg Cedex © Council of Europe, 2005 Printed at the Council of Europe Foreword The European Commission against cal discourse or of a discourse otherwise Racism and Intolerance (ECRI) is a mecha- impacting on racism and intolerance within nism which was established by the first public opinion. It was agreed that the analy- Summit of Heads of State and Governments sis should cover the European Parliament of the Council of Europe (October 1993). elections of June 2004, and national or local ECRI's task is to combat racism, xenopho- elections, which took place between June bia, antisemitism and intolerance at the 2003 and June 2004 in at least three Council level of greater Europe and from the per- of Europe member States. The study was spective of the protection of human rights. forwarded by the consultant to ECRI at its ECRI is composed of independent and plenary meeting from 14-17 December 2004. impartial members, nominated on the basis ECRI decided to adopt at its plenary of their moral authority and recognized meeting from 15-17 March 2005 a Declara- expertise in dealing with matters related to tion on the issue and to publish it together the fight against racism and intolerance. with the consultant's study on 21 March ECRI's programme of activities comprises 2005 on the occasion of the International three aspects: country-by-country Day for the Elimination of Racial Discrimi- approach; work on general themes; relations nation. with civil society. In the context of its work on general This publication contains the study themes, ECRI decided at its plenary meeting drawn up for ECRI by Mr Jean-Yves Camus from 22-25 June 2004 to entrust an outside as an outside consultant. It should be noted consultant with the task of preparing a that the study was conducted independent- study on cases where recent European and ly by the consultant and does not fall under national elections have given rise to the use the responsibility of ECRI, or the Council of of racist, antisemitic and xenophobic politi- Europe. The use of racist, antisemitic and xenophobic arguments in political discourse 3 Xenophobic, racist and antisemitic discourse in national and European Parliament election campaigns between June 2003 and 13 June 2004: general analysis and national case studies Jean-Yves Camus General introduction In 2004, in both west European and homogeneous to multicultural society in central and east European countries, albeit many countries, the fact of immigrants set- with variants, parties that use racist, antise- tling and founding families and the econom- mitic and xenophobic political discourse are ic crisis), racist and xenophobic discourse increasingly being censured, stigmatised has been reinjected into the political agenda and therefore sidelined. The Charter of by traditional (conservative or liberal and European Political Parties for a Non-Racist sometimes even left-wing) political parties Society adopted in 1997 and the range of or at least by individual members of those national legislation imposing criminal pen- parties. I shall demonstrate that this dis- alties for expressions of racism, course primarily targets immigrants and ref- antisemitism, xenophobia and, as a rule, ugees, especially those from Muslim coun- negation of the genocide of the Jews by the tries, and sometimes Islam itself, as a Nazis reflect a high degree of consensus on religion, often confused with its political the subject among democratic parties and expression, Islamism. Lastly, I shall discuss public opinion. Until recently, the use of the specific case of the resurgence of antise- these topics in political discourse during mitic acts and statements and the discourse and outside election periods was more or referring to them, as well as the very scat- less restricted to parties classified by politi- tered but very real instances of antisemitic cal scientists as far-right.1 As we shall see, prejudice in political parties which nonethe- these parties scored modest results in the less remain marginal. European elections, including in the coun- tries newly admitted to the European Finally, I shall make three case studies of Union. But I shall show that under the pres- the use of racist, xenophobic and antisemit- sure of both the international context (the ic discourse in countries belonging both to rise of radical Islamist terrorism) and specif- the Council of Europe and to the European ically European trends (the shift from Union: Belgium, the Republic of Ireland and Latvia. To conclude this introduction, I 1. For a theoretical definition of the far right, see the should like to make one point clear. Firstly, thesis of the Dutch political scientist Cas Mudde: a reference to a given political party or The Extreme Right Party Family; University of Leiden, country in this report does not in any sense 1998. For an up-to-date review of the forces within this movement: Pierre Blaise/Patrick Moreau (ed.): imply an intention on my part to stigmatise Extrême-droite et nationaux-populismes en Europe de that party or country or make a value judg- l’Ouest, Editions du CRISP, Brussels, 2002. ment denying its democratic nature (except The use of racist, antisemitic and xenophobic arguments in political discourse 5 in the case of parties unanimously recog- the international organisations they belong nised as anti-democratic). All the parties to (or of the European Union or the Council mentioned operate legally, as evidenced by of Europe). While the facts mentioned in their participation in the electoral process. this report call for discussion and possibly Where one of them breaches the law, it is for for changes in attitude, and in some cases the courts of the country concerned, and for require legal penalties, they do not warrant them alone, to punish that party. Likewise, a blanket derogatory judgment on the all the countries mentioned are democracies country concerned. which support the founding principles of Part one: The far right, the traditional vehicle for racist, antisemitic and xenophobic discourse, has scored modest election results in recent years Any study of the use of racist and xeno- score rose from 15.1 to 23.16% of the Dutch- 1. Election results: an phobic themes in an election campaign pre- speaking electoral college vote, while the outline interpretation supposes an analysis of the presence of far- Front National, standing in Wallonia and right parties and their results. From this Brussels, scored 7.45% of French-speaking standpoint, the outcome of the June 2004 vote (as against 4.1% in 1999). This success elections was undistinguished and cannot was confirmed by the regional elections held be regarded as a landslide for xenophobic on the same date and was indisputably the nationalist parties. A country-by-country best result scored by a far-right party in examination shows a decline in Austria, western Europe. The increase was also spec- where the FP scored 6.33% and only one tacular in Poland, where the League of seat as against 23.4% and five seats in 1999. Polish Families (LPR) scored 15.92% and In Germany, far-right parties remain very the Samobroona (Self-Defence) party much on the sidelines, since the National- 10.78%. It was substantial in Greece, where demokratische Partei Deutschlands (NPD) ex-New Democracy MP George Karat- scored 0.9% and the Republikaner 1.9%. In zaferis’ party LAOS obtained one seat with France the Front National admittedly pro- 4.11% of the vote. It was real in Slovenia, gressed (9.81% as against 5.69% in 1999), where the SNS (Slovene National Party) but this increase should be viewed with scored 5.2%, with no seats, but progressed caution because the 1999 score was not rep- by comparison with the general election resentative in the wake of the split caused held in 2000 (4.4%) and above all confirmed by Bruno Mégret leaving the party in this trend in the general election of Septem- January 1999, and the FN’s score was lower ber 2004, when it scored 6.6%. Lastly, the than its score of 12.9% in the 2004 regional Latvian Fatherland and Freedom Party elections. The far right made little progress (LNKK), which ranked first with a score of in Italy: Fiamma Tricolore, an unrepentant 29.82%, is on the borderline between con- fascist party, scored 0.7% where its prede- servative right and far right. cessor, MS-Fiamma Tricolore, had scored There was a much smaller increase for 1.6%, though this loss was offset by the 1.2% the Danish Dansk Folkeparti (6.8% as scored by Alessandra Mussolini’s Alternati- against 7.1%) and the Swedish Sverige- va Sociale list. These two parties obtained demokraterna (1.13% as against about 1%). only one seat owing to the electoral system, In the Netherlands the only reason for the which borders on full proportional repre- increase was that the List Pim Fortuyn, sentation, and while the National Alliance which scored 2.6% this time, did not stand party moved up from 10.3 to 11.5%, it can no in the 1999 election. Lastly, the British longer be regarded as part of the far right. National Party’s score of 4.9%, totalling The Lega Nord (Northern League) showed 808,200 votes, must be viewed as a danger only a very slight increase, from 4.5 to 5%, signal.
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  • WORLD INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR FORUM Geneva - January 23Rd, 2018

    WORLD INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR FORUM Geneva - January 23Rd, 2018

    WORLD INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR FORUM Geneva - January 23rd, 2018 2018 Global Exclusive Sponsor: PROGRAMME 08:30 Registration & breakfast 09:00 Welcoming speech Grégoire Haenni (Founder of Institutional Circle, CPEG) 09:15 Macroeconomic picture of the world Speakers: Charles Gave (Founder, Gavekal), Emil Nguy (Founder, Income Partners) 10:05 Coffee break 10:25 Global private markets overview Speaker: Roberto Cagnati (Managing director, Partners Group) 10:45 Tactical asset allocation for 2018 Panelists: Emil Nguy (Income Partners), Charles Gave (Gavekal), Roberto Cagnati (Partners Group) Moderator: Grégoire Haenni ( Founder of Institutional Circle, CPEG) 11:15 Outlook on geopolitical risks Speaker: Alexandre Adler (Historian, journalist & geopolitical expert) 12:00 Lunch 13:45 Active vs passive strategies Panelists: Alan Hofmeyr (Partner, Marshall Wace), Laurent Trottier (Global Head of ETF, Index & Smart Beta Management, Amundi), Sinikka Demaré (Founder, SDemaré Advisory), Moderator: Anne-Valère Amo (Institutional Circle, Lombard Odier) 14:30 Climate change: responsibility, challenges and opportunities Standalone presentations & panel Speakers/panelists: Alexandre Ménard (Partner, McKinsey), Peter Damgaard Jensen (Chair, Institutional Investors Group on Climate Change (IIGCC)), Laurent Trottier (Amundi) Moderator: Antoine Prudent (Founder, InPact Advisory) 15:40 Coffee break 16:00 Everything you always wanted to know about blockchain but were afraid to ask Speaker: Arek Wylegalski (Founder, Fly Venture) Fintech: why could the blockchain be a game changer? Speaker: Steve Waterhouse (Partner, Orchid Lab) 16:45 Closing remarks Grégoire Haenni (Founder of Institutional Circle, CPEG) SPEAKERS SPEAKERS Alexandre ADLER Historian, journalist & geopolitical expert Alexandre Adler is a French historian, journalist and expert of contemporary geopolitics, the former USSR, and the Middle East. He is a Chevalier de l’Ordre de la Légion d’Honneur (2002).