OPERATION EMBED: THE HOST OFFICER EXPERIENCE WITH EMBEDDED MEDIA DURING THE IRAQ WAR
By
ANA-KLARA HERING
A THESIS PRESENTED TO THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF THE UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS IN MASS COMMUNICATION
UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA
2006
Copyright 2006
by
Ana-Klara Hering
To my parents, Dad on the left shoulder, Mom on the right
and to the memories of
Staff Sergeant Gene Ramirez Sergeant Jason Pool and Lance Corporal Chad Charlet―casualties of the war and wartime
2,597 and still counting
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
Six years ago a friend and fellow Marine gave me a book he thought I would be interested in. I devoured Peter Arnett’s memoir, Live From the Battlefield, and the seed
for this thesis was planted. To Captain Thompson, I am grateful.
The Marine Corps History Foundation generously funded this research. Its
financial support and encouragement of projects like this one ensure a legacy for the
Marine Corps. I am grateful for the confidence bestowed in me by its members.
My sincere thanks to Professor Bill F. Chamberlin, Ph.D., my graduate advisor and
committee chair for his insightful guidance and thorough review of this study. His
excitement for and belief in this endeavor encouraged me to think beyond the boundaries
of graduation requirements to become a researcher with something to offer the world.
His endurance and personal investment in all his students is humbling. Many a late hour
was inspired by the thought that he, too, was probably awake and working. He is a
godfather to any student fortunate enough to study with him.
Also, I have much appreciation for the efforts of Lisa Duke Cornell, Ph.D., and
Professor Laurence B. Alexander, J.D. who generously shared with me their valuable
expertise, resources and time as members of my thesis committee. Professor Duke
Cornell inspired me to pursue phenomenological research as the method for this study.
Her enthusiasm and passion for the field of qualitative research are contagious. Professor
Alexander guided me in the construction of the historical and legal portion of this thesis
and provided me with sound advice in the development of my thesis question.
iv I would also like to thank Professor Sandra Chance, J.D. for her initial assistance
with my thesis proposal. Her door ― and heart ― were always open. She and Alana
Kolifrath provided me a sanctuary at the Brechner Center for Freedom of Information during my graduate years at the University of Florida.
My thanks to the members of the U.S. Marine Corps who helped in various ways.
The 14 Marine officers who volunteered their memories of the war for this study recounted challenging periods of their lives with the same spirit and humanity with which they served their country. Their sacrifices and courage extend beyond the interviews granted to me, and for their time I am extremely grateful. Thanks to Captain Jay
Delarosa and Captain Patrick Kerr, of the Headquarters Marine Corps Public Affairs office, who provided historical context for the study and numerous documents, which will surely nurture future research in this area. I am grateful, too, to the several other
Marines who assisted me in identifying research participants for this study.
I consider myself blessed to have wonderful parents, whose support during this
research was tremendous. My father introduced me to the Hegelian dialectic at an age
when most kids are interested in comics and bugs. He served as my unofficial
proofreader, even if I had to teach him a thing or two about comma usage. He was an
endless source of optimism. My mother spent many hours listening to my ideas,
challenges, and plans and never ran out of encouragement. She saved every newspaper
clipping about and by embedded media during my deployment to Iraq and was the first to
encourage my initial thoughts about the embedded system. I thank my sisters, Alejandra
and Kimberly, for their humor and friendship, my Aunt Edythe, Uncle Buddy,
v grandparents, and several other family members for their constant encouragement and
support throughout the years despite the physical distance between us.
I give many thanks, also, to the friends who encouraged me. To Christina, Ece, and
Hilit, especially, the challenge of “thesis-izing” would have been terribly lonely without
you. Jody Hedge in the Graduate Department of the College of Journalism and
Communication and Debbie Muga in the Marion Brechner Citizen Access Project made
many things happen behind the scenes.
My sincere appreciation to Marion Brechner for her support of my assistantships at
the Joseph L. Brechner Center for Freedom of Information and the Marion Brechner
Citizen Access Project. My experiences there have been defining elements of my
graduate experience and helped to support my studies and this research.
Many thanks to the journalism mentors with whom I have worked since I began writing professionally in high school: Rick Robb, Kathy Pellegrino, Berta Delgado,
Oline Cogdill, and the numerous other editors and journalists with whom I have been privileged to work. Finally, I give a special thanks to my first journalism teacher, Brian
Rowland.
vi
TABLE OF CONTENTS
page
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ...... iv
LIST OF TABLES...... x
LIST OF FIGURES ...... xi
ABSTRACT...... xii
CHAPTER
1 INTRODUCTION ...... 1
The Phenomenon: The Host Officer Experience...... 9 Purpose for the Study...... 12 Need for the Study...... 15 Background...... 16 Audience and Publication Potential...... 21 Theoretical Framework...... 23 Criteria for Evaluation ...... 28 Outline of Thesis...... 29
2 LITERATURE REVIEW...... 31
Historical Texts...... 31 By War Correspondents, about War Correspondents...... 40 Embedded Media Program Studies ...... 49
3 THE HISTORY OF MEDIA-MILITARY RELATIONS...... 58
Military vs. the Media: Where Does the Tension Come from?...... 58 Pattern of Media-Military Relations...... 64 Thesis...... 66 Antithesis...... 69 Synthesis Becomes the New Thesis ...... 73 Second Antithesis ...... 77 An Argument for Embedding: Combating Misinformation ...... 91 Principle Themes of Embedded Media Policy ...... 94 Access...... 94
vii “Security at the Source” ...... 95 Symbiosis ...... 96
4 METHODOLOGY ...... 98
Conceptual Framework of Model...... 98 Methods of Collecting Data...... 98 Selection Criteria...... 98 Branch of service...... 99 Rank of personnel...... 100 Nature of unit mission...... 102 Time frame of deployment...... 103 Level of prior media experience and/or media training ...... 104 Specific embed assignment ...... 105 Level of interaction with embedded journalists ...... 107 Selection Method...... 107 Number of Participants...... 110 Telephone Interviewing Methodology ...... 112 Informed Consent of Participants...... 114 Relationship with Participants...... 115 Debriefing of Participants...... 117 Potential Benefits and Anticipated Risk for Participants ...... 118 Potential benefits...... 118 Anticipated risk ...... 119 Data Collection...... 119 Audit Trail ...... 120 Methods of Organizing and Analyzing Data...... 121 Data Analysis...... 121 Reflexivity ...... 122
5 FINDINGS...... 125
Meaning Units and Themes of the Host Officer-Embed Experience...... 130 Thematic Portrayals of the Data ...... 134 Textural-Structural Description...... 156 Textural Description...... 157 Composite Textural Description...... 157 Structural Description...... 159 Composite Structural Description ...... 159 Composite Textural-Structural Description ...... 161 Validity of the Findings...... 165
6 SUMMARY, IMPLICATIONS, AND OUTCOMES...... 168
Summary of Entire Study ...... 169 Contribution to the Body of Literature ...... 173 Historical Texts ...... 174
viii By War Correspondents, about War Correspondents...... 175 Related Studies ...... 176 Limitations of the Study ...... 177 Recommendations for Future Research...... 179 Social Implications and Outcomes ...... 182
APPENDIX
A INFORMED CONSENT FORM...... 187
B GLOSSARY OF PHENOMENOLOGICAL TERMS ...... 192
C INTERVIEW GUIDE...... 193
D CO-RESEARCHER DEMOGRAPHICS...... 195
E RELATED IMAGES...... 197
F I MEF MEDIA EMBED IN-COUNTRY TRAINING AND INFORMATION OVERVIEW...... 198
G RECOMMENDED EMBED GEAR LIST―OIF I...... 200
H I MARINE EXPEDITIONARY FORCE MEDIA EMBED INFORMATION...... 203
I GROUND RULES FOR MEDIA EMBEDDED WITH THE 15TH MARINE EXPEDITIONARY UNIT (SPECIAL OPERATIONS CAPABLE)...... 212
J DOD PRINCIPLES OF INFORMATION, 27 SEPT 2000...... 214
K THIRD INFANTRY DIVISION (MECHANIZED) AFTER ACTION REPORT ...... 216
L PUBLIC AFFAIRS GUIDANCE (PAG) ON EMBEDDING MEDIA DURING POSSIBLE FUTURE OPERATIONS/DEPLOYMENTS IN THE U.S. CENTRAL COMMANDS (CENTCOM) AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY (AOR)...... 220
LIST OF REFERENCES...... 233
BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH ...... 243
ix
LIST OF TABLES
Table page
D-1 Co-researcher demographics ...... 196
G-1 Recommended gear list for embeds during OIF I from First Marine Expeditionary Force Public Affairs Office ...... 200
x
LIST OF FIGURES
Figure page
3-1 Wartime media-military symbiosis ...... 62
3-2 Operational security systems: Assigning responsibility among service members and journalists ...... 63
3.3 Diagram of Hegelian Dialectic...... 65
3-4 “Baghdad Bob” was a compilation of clips featuring Iraqi Information Minister Said Al-Sahhaf spreading mistruths about the state of the Iraq Republican Guard Forces against Coalition troops...... 93
3-5 Cartoon featuring Iraqi information minister Said Al-Sahhaf, known as “Baghdad Bob,” denying U.S. presence in Baghdad during the Iraq War...... 93
5-1 Graphic representation of the Moustakas modification of the Stevick-Colaizzi- Keen model of analysis of phenomenological data...... 128
6-1 Cartoon published on the Air Force Web site, depicting embedded media and U.S. troops during the Iraq War...... 168
E-1 (Left) Marines and sailors of Bravo Surgical Company, 1st Force Service Support Group prepare to load helicopters at Camp Chesty in central Iraq in May 2003. Each Marine carries all of his or her belongings. (Right) An embedded journalist waits with the gear for his embed team, which comprised of three journalists. Embeds were required to carry their own gear during their assignment to a U.S. military unit. Photo by Ana-Klara Hering...... 197
xi
Abstract of Thesis Presented to the Graduate School of the University of Florida in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Master of Arts in Mass Communications
OPERATION EMBED: THE HOST OFFICER EXPERIENCE WITH EMBEDDED MEDIA DURING THE IRAQ WAR
By
Ana-Klara Hering
December 2006
Chair: Bill F. Chamberlin Major Department: Mass Communication
The 2003 Iraq War coincided with the wide-spread implementation of embedding wherein civilian journalists were assigned to live and travel with U.S. military units in combat. The Embedded Media Program was not the first time such a system had been used by the U.S. military to manage the media during war, but the scope and sophistication with which it was executed represented a milestone in media-military relations. This study focused on one aspect of that program: the relationship between embeds and the junior officers to whom they were assigned.
At the lowest level of the military command structure, captains and lieutenants were made responsible for the day-to-day livelihood and safety of embeds. While facilitating the Embedded Media Program, these officers gained a “boots on the ground” perspective of the program. This research was based on in-depth interviews with 14 non- public affairs, junior Marine Corps officers, who had significant interaction with embeds
xii
during the Iraq War. Using the phenomenological method, a universal description of the
host officer-embed experience from the junior officer’s perspective was constructed to
provide understanding of this phenomenon.
The description is an insider’s view of life as a junior Marine Corps officer in a
combat zone and the intersection of that world with the media. It reveals that the impact
of the DOD’s media policy on non-public affairs Marines in combat was largely benign.
Junior officers understood upfront the purpose of the program despite some skepticism
about the media’s intentions. They resigned to the fact that the decision to embed
journalists was made at a level much higher than their own. They communicated directly
with embeds in a no-nonsense approach characteristic of Marine Corps leadership. They
treated embeds no better or worse than the members of their own unit, instituting a one-
for-all, all-for-one mentality. They provided protection, sustenance, transportation, and
facilitated communications to the best of their ability without hindering their unit’s safety
or operational security. They allowed embeds access to Marines in their natural environment, trusting that their Marines would do the right thing. They censored their
Marines from speaking about policy issues, but rarely found the need to screen, let alone
censor the news reports of embeds. Essentially, a junior officer hosted embeds in their
endeavor to chronicle the war, adopting them into his or her fold of responsibility.
No other research has provided first-hand accounts from the platoon and company
level where embeds ate, slept, traveled, lived and sometimes died with U.S. troops.
Policy makers, from both the media and the military, should consider and act upon the
input and recommendations of those who put the DOD policy into practice.
xiii CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION
The world hears war stories told by reporters and retired generals who keep extensive notebooks and journals. They carry pens as they walk, whereas I carried a machine gun.
—John Crawford, The Last True Story I’ll Ever Tell
On April 3, 2003—two weeks after the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq began1—the war claimed its first embedded journalist2 as a casualty.3 Michael Kelly,4 a senior editor and contributor with several major U.S. newspapers, was traveling with the U.S. Army’s
Third Infantry Division in an area south of Baghdad International Airport, part of the fertile bed along the Tigris River where irrigation canals run adjacent to most major roads. As he traveled one of those routes into the capitol, Iraqi Republican Guard forces opened fire on his Humvee.5 Army Sgt. 1st Class Wilbert Davis, who drove the Humvee
1 The White House, “President Bush Addresses the Nation,” 19 March 2003,
1 2
in which Kelly traveled, tried to avoid the barrage but ran their vehicle off the road. The
Humvee rolled into a canal, and Kelly and Davis drowned.6
Kelly’s assignment to the Army unit was part of the newly developed, Department
of Defense-sponsored initiative called the “Embedded Media” policy.7 According to the
policy, “A Media Embed is defined as a media representative remaining with a unit on an
extended basis—perhaps a period of weeks or even months.”8
The Embedded Media policy was introduced in early 2003 amid the U.S. military
buildup for an invasion of Iraq. The DOD Public Affairs Guidance (PAG) message stated
that the purpose of the Embedded Media Program was to “[provide] guidance, policies
and procedures on embedding news media during possible future operations/deployments
in the CENTCOM AOR [Central Command Area of Operation].”9 It was published on
February 3, 2005 when U.S. forces were already amassed in Kuwait. The U.S.-led
invasion of Iraq began 42 days later. The policy outlined a program in which the media
were secured a place among U.S. and Coalition military units from which to cover the
war. Embeds would benefit from the logistical support and security that the U.S. and
Coalition military units offered, and they would receive access to operations that
unilaterals did not. More than 600 members of the 2,200 journalists, who were in Iraq covering the war, embedded with the U.S. military.10
6 Sgt. 1st Class Doug Sample, “Marine General and Soldier Inducted Into Little League's Hall of Fame,” 24 Aug 2003, American Forces Information Service, United States Department of Defense,
3
For example, the San Diego Union-Tribune’s James Crawley was embedded with the Marine Corps’ 1st Light Armored Reconnaissance (LAR) Battalion, which is stationed
near San Diego and was a part of Regimental Combat Team (RCT) 5, a leading element
in the invasion of Iraq. The Sydney AM Herald embedded one of its print journalists,
Lindsay Murdoch, with the 5th Battalion, 11th Marines, a unit that specialized in artillery
fire.11
The DOD promised journalists, such as Crawley and Murdoch, “maximum, in- depth coverage of U.S. forces in combat” and an environment in which “commanders and
public affairs officers must work together to balance the need for media access with the
need for operational security.”12 However, the DOD warned journalists that chose not to
participate in the embedding program that they would be subjecting themselves to grave danger in enemy territory, Iraqi desert and that they would have to endure the hostilities
of the war on their own.13
In the first three years of the war, enemy forces killed 57 journalists.14 Statistically,
journalists were ten times more likely to die than the 250,000 American and British
military personnel during the invasion phase.15 The large majority of those killed (95
percent) worked as unilateral journalists and without the aid of U.S. forces. Indeed,
11 DOD Public Affairs, Jan 2003-March 2003, on file with the author. 12 DOD Directive, PAG, 10 Feb 2003. 13 Phillip Knightley, The First Casualty: The War Correspondent as Hero, Propagandist, and Myth- Maker From the Crimea to Iraq (London: André Deutsch, 2003), 537. 14 Conflict in Iraq: Resources, Links and Information, Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ)
4
embeds faired much better in the hostilities than unilaterals, thanks to the embedding
policy.
Embedding, however, was not necessarily a guarantee of safety. The lives of three
more embeds would be claimed within the first two months of the war. NBC
correspondent David Bloom died of a pulmonary embolism while embedded with the
U.S. Army’s Third Infantry Division.16 Christian Lebig, a reporter for the German
weekly magazine Focus, and Julio Anguita Parrado, a correspondent for the Spanish
daily El Mundo, died in an Iraqi missile attack while accompanying the U.S. Army’s
Third Infantry Division south of Baghdad. Two U.S. soldiers were also killed during the latter attack. Fifteen more were injured.17
Three years into the war, the duties of a correspondent in Iraq were no less dangerous. The International Press Institute ranked Iraq as the most dangerous place from which to report the news in 2006.18 In January of that year, ABC anchorman Bob
Woodruff and cameraman Doug Vogt were injured in a roadside bombing while
reporting with Iraqi police forces working with U.S. troops.19 Five months later, a CBS
cameraman and soundman were killed, and a CBS correspondent was seriously injured
after their convoy was struck by a roadside bomb in Iraq. The three were reporting on
patrol with the U.S. Army’s 4th Brigade Combat Team, 4th Infantry Division. A U.S.
soldier was also killed in the attack.
16 Robert Sullivan, ed., The War In Iraq (New York: Life, 2004), 84. 17 Judith Sylvester and Suzanne Huffman, Reporting from the Front: The Media and the Military, (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2005), 58. 18 Michael Kudlak, “65 Journalists Killed 2005: Dying Before Their Time,” 2005 Death Watch,
5
Though these deaths were tragic in their own right, the scope of violence that
affected embedded journalists assigned to U.S. and Coalition forces paled in comparison
to the casualties suffered by journalists who were not reporting under the auspices of U.S.
forces and the Embedded Media Program.
The program was applauded by senior members of the military, DOD public affairs
officials, and members of the military as an evolutionary step toward positive media-
military relations. The military jargon used to describe the perspective that military
service members offer is “boots on the ground.” 20 They worked firsthand with the
embedded journalists and put the Pentagon’s policy into practice. This thesis examines
the embedded policy from this yet unexplored perspective.
The development of the Embedded Media policy was a complete reversal of
DOD’s policy toward the press. In the approximately four decades between the Vietnam
War and the Iraq War, the military restricted the media’s ability to cover U.S. military
operations more often than not, sometimes requiring the media to subject all their
coverage to military censorship or preventing them from covering military operations all
together.21 The Embedded Media policy promised journalists that they would not be
subjected to the same kind of censorship during the Iraq War. For example, instead of imposing pre-publication screenings and censorship of the media’s news coverage as it had in the Persian Gulf War, the military practiced “security at the source,” which placed the onus on service members to not provide classified information to the media.22
20 Boots on the Ground, http://www.dvidshub.net/?script=features/features_show.php&id=6&table=video (accessed 1 June 2006). 21 Jacqueline Sharkey, Under Fire: U.S. Military Restrictions on the Media from Grenada to the Persian Gulf, (Washington, D.C.: The Center for Public Integrity, 1991), 1-6. 22 DOD Directive, PAG, 10 Feb 2003.
6
Embeds were briefed on the type of information that could not be released to the public
so that if sensitive information (i.e., troop strength, future operational plans, weapons
capabilities) was accessible to embeds, the responsibility would then be on the journalist
not to publish it.23 This issue is discussed further in Chapter 3.
Safety is one of the tangible benefits for journalists who have an embedded relationship with the U.S. military. Likewise, there are reciprocal benefits for the United
States, like increased coverage of the war from the U.S. perspective and indirect influence over the content of the coverage.
The Embedded Media policy was a well-packaged, public relations effort that brought two formerly antagonistic forces into a symbiotic relationship: the media was able to cover the war with the military’s blessings, protection and support, and without the censorship it had found intolerable in prior decades, and the military was able to keep a watchful eye on its main critic and ensure, at the very least, a loose control over the news coverage of the war. DOD Secretary Donald Rumsfeld described the embedded policy as an opportunity for the United States to ensure that the Iraqi government did not spread “misinformation.” This would be accomplished by assuring that the airwaves and publications were flooded with the message of journalists reporting from the U.S. perspective. The program was a modern-day twist on the advice: “Keep your friends close, and your enemies closer.”24
The DOD originally offered the mainstream U.S. and international media industry about 920 slots for embedded journalists and their crew. During the combat phase of the
23 Ibid. 24 Michael Corleone’s advice in Mario Puzo's novel, The Godfather. (New York: G.P. Putnam and Sons, 1969). The phrase has also been attributed to Sun Tzu, The Art of War (London: Oxford University Press, 1963).
7 war from March 20, 2003 – May 1, 2003, the number of embeds in Iraq reached its peak at 600. This number represented more than 250 national and international news agencies.
Some journalists with previous experience covering the Vietnam War were wary of the barter, contending that journalists were giving up their objectivity in exchange for access, security, and support even if the military promised an environment that would be, for the most part, free of censorship. Proponents of the program argued that the security afforded to embedded media was critical to their ability to report from the front lines of the battlefield. Proponents also argued that unilaterals would not have the access, safety, and logistical support necessary to maneuver the war zone.25
Though discussion about embedded media addressed the variety of ways in which the policy might affect the media, it failed to address how the new program might affect the military service members responsible for facilitating the embedded experience on the ground during the war. To understand the Embedded Media policy as a whole, it is necessary to also examine the microscopic media-military relationship—the journalist and the service member—in addition to the larger, industry-related issues. Thus far, academic and trade research on the Embedded Media policy lacks thorough examination of service members’ perspectives. This leaves a conspicuous gap in the overall understanding of the program’s successes and failures and the state of media-military relations as a whole.
Little is known about the experiences of service members who interacted with media while in a combat zone from any war. This study provides an essential understanding of that experience with the immediacy of a war that was still underway
25 A review of the literature on these subjects is available in Chapter two of this thesis.
8
when the research was conducted and from the perspective of service members who only
just returned from the battlefield. It focuses on one group of company-grade ground
officers from the U.S. Marine Corps who had significant interaction with embedded
media while in a combat zone during the Iraq War. What they offer is a perspective that
is unavailable elsewhere in the literature.
Unlike their media counterparts, U.S. service members have had less of an ability
to tell their story about the embedded media experience. In contrast, journalists have had
ample opportunity to express their opinions about the service members with which they
were embedded and the program, through which they were assigned. For example, in
Generation Kill, 26 Evan Wright, a journalist writing for Rolling Stone magazine embedded with the Marines of Bravo Second Platoon, First Reconnaissance Battalion wrote
this book would not have been possible without the bravery of the United States Marine Corps, which in its mission to defend the U.S. Constitution allowed a reporter in its midst. Thanks to all the men of First Recon, from Godfather on down, who helped in providing access, interviews and support. Special thanks to Nate for his wisdom, to Josh for his exceptional driving and to Brad, James, Gabe and Walt for their warm hospitality and accurate shooting.27
In contrast, the thoughts of service members about journalists are not so readily
available in published form. One Army soldier offered a glimpse of the experience in his
memoir: He said: “The world hears war stories told by reporters and retired generals who
keep extensive notebooks and journals. They carry pens as they walk, whereas I carried a
machine gun.”28
26 Evan Wright, Generation Kill (New York: G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 2004). 27 Ibid., 355. 28Crawford, The Last True Story I’ll Ever Tell, XIII.
9
In general, service members are not considered policy makers; they execute the
policies made by senior level government officials. Their opinion of the embedded
media policy is no less critical to its comprehensive evaluation. This qualitative study gives everyone—military members, policy makers, journalists, citizens—a rare glimpse into all the stakeholders involved in the Embedded Media Program. Additionally, it reflects on how this policy affected service members’ ability to wage the war they were
sent to Iraq to fight. These insights can be utilized to mold press policies that ensure a
balance between the needs and wants of the media with the military’s ability to wage war
and protect its citizens.
Although the initial reactions toward the Embedded Media policy from both the
media and the military have been generally positive, it is important to recognize that the
potential for a regression in media-military relations still exists. For example, during the
Vietnam War, the press enjoyed the benefits of military policies that were the least
restrictive of their time, but, in the post-war period, the military established restrictive
media policies that were meant to limit media influence over public opinion. As public
opinion about the Iraq War wanes, a repetition of events like those that followed the
Vietnam War is not out of the question. Careful consideration of what members of the
military have to say about the Embedded Media Program may assist policy makers in
decision-making about future press policies.
The Phenomenon: The Host Officer Experience
While the presence of journalists on the battlefield is not unique to the Iraq War,
the relationship between embedded journalists and the service members with whom they
traveled was. To illustrate this phenomenon, one can imagine a scenario in which a
company of 100-300 highly trained Marines who worked together for months, maybe
10
years, was introduced to an unfamiliar civilian journalist. The military unit’s objective
was to succeed in its assigned mission, while the journalist’s objective was to chronicle
the unit’s efforts and report them.
More than likely, the embed had neither prior military service nor experience as a
war correspondent. The embed was not in uniform, was unarmed, held no rank and no responsibility in the unit yet required all the same sustenance, shelter, and protection of a
regular unit member.29 Only a certificate of good health and an endorsement from the
parent media organization were required for a journalist to join a U.S. military unit as an
embed.30 Commanders were required to:
provide billeting, rations and medical attention, if needed, to the embedded media commensurate with that provided to members of the unit, as well as access to military transportation and assistance with communications filing/transmitting media products, if required.31
The unit commander, who was typically a senior lieutenant or captain (a company-
grade officer) would take on for him or herself, or delegate to a junior officer,
responsibility for the embedded journalist. This officer became the go-to person for the
embedded journalist—the first point of contact for the embed on numerous issues,
ranging from obtaining water and shelter to gaining access to patrols and receiving
security briefings. While this relationship was not formalized in the DOD’s Public
29 Captain Jay Delarosa, USMC, Plans, Policies & Operations, Programs & Resources, Installations & Logistics, Intel and C4, Public Affairs, HQMC Div. of Public Affairs, telephone interview by author, 25 May 2006. 30 Ibid. 31 Billeting is the military term for shelter. DOD Directive, PAG, 10 Feb 2003.
11
Affairs Guidance (PAG) for the embedded media, it was a typical manner in which
Marine commanders dealt with the presence of a civilian journalist.32
The relationship between the officer and the embedded journalist in this
circumstance can be likened to the symbiotic relationship found in biology. Symbiosis
includes the interaction between two organisms living together in more or less intimate
association. The term “host” is usually used for the larger of the two members of a
symbiosis. The smaller member is called the symbiont.33 While various forms of symbiosis exist, including parasitism, the “host officer-embedded journalist relationship” is most representative of mutualistic symbiosis, in which the association is advantageous to both parties. This phenomenon, which I have dubbed the “host officer-embedded journalist relationship,” is the focus of this study. This relationship is an appropriate representation of the relationship between embeds and the company-grade officers with
whom they worked.
Host officer represents the parent organization in the relationship ― the DOD.
According the PAG, which was signed by Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld, the DOD
benefited from the embedded journalists’ news coverage of the war. The embed
represents the symbiont in the relationship ― the media. Journalists benefited when they
were allowed access to U.S. troops, security in a hostile battlefield, and logistical support
in the arid, desert environment.
32 Captain Jay Delarosa, USMC, Plans, Policies & Operations, Programs & Resources, Installations & Logistics, Intel and C4, Public Affairs, HQMC Div. of Public Affairs, telephone interview by author, 25 May 2006. 33 W.B Rudman,. “Symbiosis, commensalism, mutualism and parasitism” in Sea Slug Forum. 24 July 2004, Australian Museum, Sydney,
12
Granted, tension between the military and the media was inherent to their relationship. There was a distinct dichotomy between the average company-grade officer and the typical embedded journalist during the Iraq War. When the Iraq War began, few journalists covering the war had served in the military or knew someone who had.
Likewise, few in the military had experience working as a journalist, or with journalists, and many inherited the distaste and distrust for the media that developed among members of the military in the post-Vietnam era. An all-volunteer military and the infrequency of wars since the Vietnam War created a divide between those who served in the Armed
Forces and those who worked as journalists. Partnering a company-grade officer with a journalist was in many ways a marriage of opposites.34
Purpose for the Study
Initial studies in the months following the combat phase of the war reported that high-ranking military officials and media leaders alike said the Embedded Media policy served to foster an understanding and mutual respect between the two parties that had been absent in the military operations previous to the Iraq War.35 It is important to note, however, that the perspectives offered from high-ranking military officials and media leaders were ones born from privileged positions in the Pentagon and editorial offices in news bureaus outside of Iraq linked to the battlefield by satellite. The first-person experience between the host officer and the embedded journalist is a more realistic representation of the Embedded Media policy and how the theory behind it played out in practice. So far, the journalists who covered the war have provided input on the program.
34 Alicia C. Shepard, Narrowing the Gap: Military, Media and the Iraq War (Chicago: McCormick Tribune Foundation, 2004), 6. 35 Ibid.
13
This thesis gave a group of service members an opportunity to voice their opinions on the
program and offers an insider’s look at the host officer-embedded journalist experience.
The purpose of this study is to gain understanding of the experiences of company- grade Marine Corps ground officers who played the role of hosts to embedded journalists assigned to their units while in a combat zone during the Iraq War. This was accomplished in a phenomenological study in which in-depth interviews were conducted with 14 company-grade officers. The data was collected in a manner that captured the essence of their shared experience of the host officer-embedded journalist phenomenon.36
The desired outcome of this study, according to the phenomenological method, is for the
reader to better understand “the essential, invariant structure (or essence) of the
experience, recognizing that a single unifying meaning of the experience exists.”37
Unlike a biography, which reports the life of a single individual, the phenomenology examines the experiences of several individuals and provides a description of the shared experience of several people with that phenomenon.38 This phenomenological study
describes the meaning of the lived experiences for several individuals about this
phenomenon.
The term “phenomenology” is a combination of the Greek words phainomenon and
logos. “It signifies the activity of giving an account, giving a logos, of various
phenomena, of the various ways in which things can appear.”39 In this study, the
participants were asked to give their accounts of the host officer-embedded journalist
36 John W. Creswell, Qualitative Inquiry and Research Design: Choosing Among Five Traditions (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 1998), 51. 37 Ibid., 55. 38 Ibid., 51. 39 Robert Sokolowski, Introduction to Phenomenology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 13.
14
phenomenon. This study examined the “intentionality” of the participants. For the
purposes of a phenomenological study, intentionality is defined not in the practical sense,
such as indication of one’s intentions, but rather in the cognitive meaning, the
consciousness one has of a relationship.40 In the case of this study, that would be the
consciousness a company-grade officer had of the phenomenon he or she experienced as a result of the relationship he or she had to an embedded journalist. High-ranking officials in the DOD may have devised the Embedded Media policy, but U.S. service members facilitated it.
Another purpose for this study is personally motivated. I served as a company- grade officer in the Marine Corps and deployed to Iraq in 2003. While in Iraq, my unit was assigned responsibility for a team of embedded journalists from CNN. I played the role of host officer to these journalists and experienced both burden and satisfaction from the responsibility. I came away from the experience motivated to influence future military-media policy in a manner that best suits the actual conditions and circumstances under which journalists and military service members work together during wartime.
Additionally, I wanted to ensure that the media was made aware of both its strengths and weaknesses during war time from a perspective other that their own. While my personal experiences with embedded journalists were, for the most part, not positive in the immediate sense, I realized the important role journalists played. They went where the public could not in order to report what the public needed to know. This is a noble task and deserves both legal and policy protections. However, the media is liable
40 Ibid., 8.
15
Need for the Study
From the onset of the DOD’s announcement of its new program, the experience of the reporter who participated in the Embedded Media Program was a topic of discussion among stakeholders in the program. Media critics, academics, and professional journalists pondered the pros and cons of the partnership in editorials and scholarly journals, between pundits and across airwaves. Content analysis of war coverage produced by embeds and unilaterals remained a popular topic in academia and among practitioners.41 DOD officials absorbed the media’s response to its initiative.
The personal experiences of war correspondents inspired romantic portrayals and first-person accounts.42 Journalists described their experiences dealing with dwindling food supplies, haphazard shelter and the trials of reporting under fire. War correspondents were portrayed as heroes in the media. For example, The Society of
Professional Journalists pictured Time magazine photographer Christopher Morris in a self-portrait taken during a vicious Iraqi sandstorm on the cover of its September 2004 supplement to Quill Magazine, The Journalist. The headline over the image read:
“Courage in the Pursuit of Truth.” Indeed, the media industry did an adequate job of covering itself during the Iraq War. It made a story out of covering the story.
While the perspective of embedded journalists is important to understanding of the
Embedded Media policy, it represents only one portion of the conversation about the media and the Iraq War. The amount of information about how the Embedded Media policy affected the U.S. service members with whom embedded journalists interacted is
41 Paul and Kim, Reporters on the Battlefield. 42 A review of this literature is available in Chapter two of this thesis.
16
disproportionate to the amount of information available about the experiences of
embedded journalists. So, what of the host officer whose responsibility it was to protect, feed, and shelter an embed? What was his/her experience like? What do the perspectives of the military officers who supervised the embeds have to tell us about the strengths and weaknesses of the Embedded Media policy and the media-military relationship that was fostered? While academics have examined the coverage that embedded journalists generated, and journalists have written about their personal experiences in the program, there is still a significant perspective missing from the overall understanding of the program ― the host officer experience.
Background
During World Wars I and II, a sympathetic press was willing to subject itself to government censorship in exchange for access to the frontlines.43 Later, during the
Vietnam War, the battlefield was captured on film and broadcast widely to Americans
who had before only heard radio broadcasts from the wars in Europe. The media in
Vietnam was given the opportunity to cover the war in a relatively censorship-free environment. With the advent of television, the media publicized the most graphic
images of war ever made available to the public.44
In the post-Vietnam era, the military’s treatment of the media regressed into the
most restrictive yet.45 Some government and military leaders openly denounced the
media, saying that the media turned the tide of public sentiment against the Vietnam War.
43 See generally John MacVane, On the Air in World War II (New York: William Morrow and Company, Inc., 1979). 44 See generally Daniel C. Hallin, The Uncensored War: The Media and Vietnam (Berkley: University of California Press, 1986). 45Paul and Kim, Reporters on the Battlefield, iii-iv.
17
In reaction to the critical media coverage it received, the U.S. government withdrew the
freedoms it had once afforded the media during military operations.46 Those policies
clouded a 40-year period that encompassed the Grenada invasion, U.S. operations in
Panama, and the Persian Gulf War. They were conducted behind a screen of censorship in which the military selected which bits of information would pass from the frontlines to the public.47
Then, in 2003, on the eve of the Iraq War and with little forewarning, the military reversed its frosty policies toward the media and unveiled the Embedded Media policy.
The new DOD plan allowed the media access to U.S. troops in combat and promised the media protection and support. Additionally, the media would, under most circumstances, be able to report the news from the war without the censorship the media had endured in the period since Vietnam.48
The historical record showed that there was no long-term, consistent relationship
between the military and the media. So, the development of the Embedded Media policy
was a benchmark for a new era in military-media relations. However, the development of
the Embedded Media policy was neither impulsive nor uncalculated. In the face of two
major forces—sophisticated communication technology and enemy propaganda—the
DOD employed civilian public relations experts to establish a manageable relationship
between the media and the military.49
46 Hallin, The Uncensored War, 3-5. 47 Paul and Kim, Reporters on the Battlefield, iii-iv. 48 DOD Directive, PAG, 10 Feb 2003. 49 James Dao and Eric Schmitt, “Pentagon Readies Efforts to Sway Sentiment Abroad,” New York Times, 19 Feb 2002, A1, available from LexisNexis; Internet (accessed 21 July 2006).
18
U.S. military leaders said they realized there was no way they could control the
flow of information about the military’s operations. For example, during the Iraq War,
use of personal cellular and satellite phones by U.S. service members in Kuwait and Iraq
was prohibited by the military, but it was not uncommon for local Kuwaitis and Iraqis to
make pre-paid cellular phones available to homesick service members for a nominal
price.50 Internet communication was available on a limited basis to most units within
months of the invasion with the purpose of providing service members a means by which
to communicate with their friends and families.51 Some service members took advantage
of the opportunity to post blogs, which chronicled their unit’s day-to-day operations and lifestyles alongside digital photographs that depicted the war.52 While the military
controlled what its service members communicated to the outside world with regulations
prohibiting subversive expression,53 the availability of communication technologies
eroded the military’s ability to control the flow of information from the battlefield as it
had since the Vietnam War. Excluding the media no longer meant controlling
information about the war.
In addition to the challenges posed by the availability of sophisticated
communication technologies, the government was preparing to face off with Saddam
50 Personal experience of author during her deployment to Kuwait, Jan 2003 – March 2003 and Iraq, March 2003-Sept 2003. See also, Ana-Klara Hering, “Red, White & True: An American Independence Day in Iraq,” The Palm Beach Post, 4 July 2004, available at
51 Nick Wakeman, “Satellite communications boost troops’ morale in Iraq,” Washington Technology, 24 Nov 2003; Vol. 18 No. 17,
19
Hussein, who was notorious for his use of propaganda and the dissemination of
misinformation.54 DOD officials predicted that the world would be flooded with
information about the conduct of the war, both true and untrue. To combat the enemy’s
use of misinformation as a weapon, the DOD made it possible for national and
international media to “have long-term, minimally restrictive access to U.S. air, ground,
and naval forces.”55 Beating Saddam to the punch was the only viable option. According
to the DOD directive that outlined the Embedded Media policy (the PAG),
media coverage of any future operation will, to a large extent, shape public perception of the national security environment now and in the years ahead. This holds true for the U.S. public; the public in allied countries whose opinion can affect the durability of our coalition; and publics in countries where we conduct operations, whose perceptions of us can affect the cost and duration of our involvement. Our ultimate strategic success in bringing peace and security to this region will come in our long-term commitment to supporting our democratic ideas. We need to tell the factual story – good or bad − before others seed the media with disinformation and distortions, as they most certainly will continue to do. Our people in the field need to tell our story – only commanders can ensure the media get to the story alongside the troops. We must facilitate access of national and international media to our forces, including those forces engaged in ground operations, with the goal of doing so right from the start. To accomplish this, we will embed media with our units. These embedded media will live, work and travel as part of the units with which they are embedded to facilitate maximum, in-depth coverage of U.S. forces in combat and related operations.56
Many media leaders recognized that the Embedded Media policy was an
improvement over past DOD press policies.57 Those who agreed to participate − including CNN, The New York Times, The Washington Post, and the major U.S. TV
54 “Apparatus of Lies: Saddam’s Disinformation and Propaganda 1990-2003,” The White House, n.d.,
20
networks58 − took advantage of the promise made by the DOD to allow embeds to report
the news in most circumstances without being subjected to prior-military reviews or
censorship. During a panel discussion at The College of William and Mary on October
23, 2003 about bias among embedded reporters, Washington Post correspondent William
Branigin, , commented that the experience was an improvement on previous “reporter
pools” in which he had participated during the 1992 Persian Gulf War. He was referring
to the system of press pools instituted by the DOD, which assigned a limited number of press representatives the opportunity to join the press pool to cover a military operation
under the agreement that they would share their news products with news media unable
to join. He described the pool system as “pretty miserable from a journalistic point of
view” and that there was a lot of censorship.59 He later reported from Afghanistan as a
member of a press pool north of Kabul where he said he and his colleagues could find no
one from the military who was willing to talk to them. 60 In contrast, the Embedded
Media policy was a polished, public relations program packaged like a 21st century
extreme getaway.
But not all media were pleased with the plan. Some veteran journalists who had
experienced the rejection of the military after Vietnam warned against the partnership.
Jeff Gralnick, who covered Vietnam, compared war coverage then to the Embedded
Media policy
you are not being embedded because that sweet old Pentagon wants to be nice. You are being embedded so you can be controlled and in a way isolated. Vietnam
58 DOD Public Affairs, Jan 2003-March 2003, on file with the author. 59 Paul and Kim, Reporters on the Battlefield, 42-43. 60 WMNews, “An Embedded Bias? Media Professionals Debate Iraqi War Coverage,” The College of William and Mary, 23 Oct 2003,
21
was easier, we came and went – serial embedees – essentially uncontrolled which made for a great deal of reporting the Pentagon would rather have buried. And this embedding plan, which is being adopted now like war summer camp, has been put together by guys, now senior officers, who were burned or felt burned by the press as juniors 35 or so years ago. Fool me once …61
After the Vietnam War, no studies were conducted that sought to understand the
experiences of service members who dealt with media on the battlefield. Four decades
later, the Iraq War presented itself as an opportunity to examine this phenomenon. This
understanding is critical to the development of future military policies toward the media
and vice versa. It is imperative that both members of the media and the military
understand the complexities of the Embedded Media policy. One need only imagine
another forty years of military secrecy like that which followed the Vietnam War to
understand the significance of the Embedded Media policy as both a revolution in the
military’s management of the media and as a portal through which information about the
U.S. government and its operations is released to the public. Given the fickle nature of
media-military relations, there is no guarantee that the embedded portal will remain open
or in what way it will be redesigned during the next military conflict.
Audience and Publication Potential
The focus of most of my graduate research has been guided by my interest in
military-media relations. My first research article focused on the First Amendment rights
of military personnel using a legal research methodology. I presented the study at the
national conference of The Association for Educators in Journalism and Mass
Communication (AEJMC) in August 2005. Additional articles I wrote on the Embedded
Media policy explored its development from a historical perspective and a legal
61 Stuart Allan and Barbie Zellizer, ed., Reporting War: Journalism in Wartime (London: Routledge, 2004), 195-196.
22
perspective. This study is a continuation of this research focus and seeks to explore the
Embedded Media policy using a qualitative research method.
I plan to generate articles for conference presentation and publication from this
research. Appropriate publication outlets would include Qualitative Inquiry and
Journalism and Mass Communication Quarterly.62 Also, the World Phenomenology
Institute (WPI) publishes a series of phenomenological research studies: Analecta
Husserliana: The Yearbook of Phenomenological Research; the WPI Monograph Series;
and, the Institute’s journal, Phenomenological Inquiry: A Review of Philosophical Ideas and Trends.63
In addition to journalistic and qualitative academic audiences, this research is
relevant to the military community, whose members influence DOD policies toward the
media. There are several journals catering to this audience. For example, The U.S. Army
War College publishes a quarterly publication called Parameters, which is a refereed
journal on the art and science of land warfare, joint and combined matters, national and
international security affairs, military strategy, military leadership and management,
military history, ethics, and other topics of significance and current interest to the U.S.
Army and the DOD. It publishes the work of USAWC graduates and other senior
military officers, as well as members of government and academia concerned with
national security affairs.64
62This report was written using the 14th Edition of the Chicago Manual of Style, which is the preferred method of JMCQ, the author’s primary publication outlet. The University of Florida Graduate School Editorial Office required some variations. 63World Phenomenological Institute,
23
Additionally, this study will be archived in the library of the Marine Corps Heritage
Foundation, which provided funding for this study.
Theoretical Framework
I selected the phenomenological approach for this research because it most aptly lends itself to gaining an understanding of the host officer-embed experience. Gathering personal, firsthand, explanations from the service members who interacted with embedded journalists during the Iraq War was accomplished through in-depth interviews.
Other methodologies, such as quantitative or legal research, could provide different and valuable perspectives on this subject, but neither would garner the kind of rich, textual understanding I sought to gain about how the policy was actually executed during the war and what the experience was like for those who lived it.
The history of phenomenology began with German mathematician Edmund Husserl
(1859-1938). While Husserl’s ideas about phenomenological methodology were abstract, he identified several key components that were later explored and expounded upon by other qualitative researchers. Qualitative researcher John W. Creswell examined the various methods available in the field and summarized the following description of the qualitative endeavor: “[Qualitative] researchers search for the essential, invariant structure (or essence) or the central underlying meaning of the experience and emphasize the intentionality of consciousness where experiences contain both the outward appearance and inward consciousness based on memory, image and meaning.”65
Husserl said, “Any phenomenon represents a suitable starting point for an investigation. What is given in our perception of a thing is its appearance, yet this is not
65 Creswell, Qualitative Inquiry and Research Design, 52.
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an empty illusion. It serves as the essential beginning of a science that seeks valid determinations that are open to anyone to verify.”66 Husserl’s phenomenology is also
referred to as Transcendental Phenomenology because it “emphasizes subjectivity and
discovery of the essences of experience.”67 Transcendental idealism is a doctrine
founded by 18th-century German philosopher Immanuel Kant. Kant presented it as the
belief that one’s experience of things is about how they appear to oneself, not about how
those things actually are in and of themselves.68
There are four processes within the phenomenological model: epoche,
phenomenological reduction, imaginative variation, and synthesis. The first process,
epoche, is the “setting aside of prejudgments and opening the research interview with an unbiased, receptive presence.”69 In order to reach epoche, the researcher acknowledges
that he or she plays a central role in the phenomenological research. Unlike the study of
the natural sciences, which rely on quantifiable data and the complete exclusion of the
researcher in the data collection and analysis process, phenomenological research
includes the influence of the researcher as an unavoidable factor and makes allowances for ways in which it may be limited. To understand this concept, first we must define the phenomenological viewpoint. This is the position from which a researcher or co-
66 Edmund Husserl, Ideas, trans. W.R. Boyce Gibson (London: Georg Allen & Unwin., 1931), 129. 67 Edmund Husserl, Phenomenology and the Crisis of Philosophy, trans. Q. Lauer (New York: Harper & Row, 1965), 5-6. 68 Clark Moustakas, Phenomenological Research Methods (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 1994), 26, 44-45, 49. See generally Paul Guyer, ed. The Cambridge Companion to Kant and Modern Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006); Victoria S. Wilke, Kant’s Antomies of Reason: Their origin and their resolution (Washington, D.C.: University Press of America, 1982). 69 Clark Moustakas, Phenomenological Research Methods (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 1994), 180.
25
researcher experiences a phenomenon. For the researcher, the phenomenological
viewpoint must include a separation of self from the phenomenon in order to study it.70
Phenomenological scholar Robert Sokolowski described the attitude of the phenomenological researcher as one of an unattached observer. “The shift into the phenomenological attitude, however, is an ‘all or nothing’ kind of move that disengages completely from the natural attitude and focuses, in a reflective way, on everything in the natural attitude…”71 This is different than the consciousness experienced by the natural
observer who is involved in the phenomenon at issue. For the purposes of the
phenomenological method, the natural observers in this study were the participants
interviewed. They are also referred to as “co-researchers,” a term that emphasizes the
role of the primary researcher in the study. The primary researcher must disengage him or herself from their own perspective in an attempt to reach the state of a natural observer. The phenomenological attitude requires the researcher to suspend his/her own intentionalities and consciousness in order to examine those of others who have experienced the phenomenon.72
It is impossible to accept that any researcher is able to completely dismiss his/her
own convictions, doubts, suspicions, certainties and perceptions. However, it is
necessary that the researcher make an effort to suspend them as much as possible in order
to encounter, interpret and analyze the research without imposing his or her self-
awareness of the phenomenon. In keeping with phenomenological principles, the
70 Sokolowski, Introduction to Phenomenology, 47. 71 Ibid. 72 Ibid.
26 researcher does her/his best to suspend them so that a separate understanding of someone else’s attitude toward the phenomenon can be experienced.73
By doing this, the researcher is receptive to the descriptions provided by the co- researchers about their experience with the phenomenon. An in-depth interview guided by open-ended questions allows the co-researchers to explain and describe their lived experience. The primary researcher guides each interview and analyzes and synthesizes the data collected from all the co-researchers in order to reach a universal description of their shared experience.
The second phenomenological process is that of phenomenological reduction.
Sokolowski dissects the word to its Latin origin, re-ducere, which “signifies the ‘leading away’ from the natural targets of our concern, ‘back’ to what seems to be a more restricted viewpoint, one that simply targets the intentionalities themselves.”74 In this process, there are several steps, which are described in further detail in Chapters 4 and 5.
Briefly, the first step is bracketing of the topic or question. In a similar fashion that epoche challenges the researcher to identify his or her own beliefs about the phenomenon in order to view it from a natural, unbiased perspective. Bracketing focuses on revealing the beliefs, ideas, and values present in the social world that surround the phenomenon in question. The researcher places what are normally automatic assumptions about a phenomenon in “brackets” in order to reveal the underlying thinking and values that people bring into their understanding the world. This analysis gives the researcher the context necessary to investigate the ordinary methods with which social members (the co-
73 Ibid., 48. 74 Ibid., 49.
27
researchers) use to comprehend the social world, specifically their experience with a
phenomenon.75
The next steps in the phenomenological reduction process focuses on the analysis of data, which is comprised of the individual descriptions provided by the co-researchers about their experiences with the phenomenon. The individual steps of this process are described further in Chapter 5, where the data analysis for this thesis is discussed. The overall goal of this process is that the data analysis process must be transparent and respectful of the data, applying equal importance to all the co-researchers’ descriptions of the experience. The steps in this process, which include horizonalization and the identification of overarching themes of an experience, result in the construction of a textural description. The textural description explains what happened in the experience according to the co-researchers.
The third phenomenological process is that of imaginative variation. In this process the researcher views the phenomenon from different vantage points, such as opposite meanings and various roles. Imaginative variation focuses on the structural qualities, or dynamics, of a phenomenon that describe how that experience happened.
Like the process that developed textural themes, in this step the researcher develops structural themes that are focused on time, space, relationship to self, to others, bodily concerns, causal or intentional structures.76
The fourth and final process in the phenomenological method is the synthesis of
composite textural and composite structural descriptions. Here, the researcher integrates
the composite textural and composite structural descriptions constructed in processes
75 Ibid., 50. 76 Moustakas, Phenomenological Research Methods, 181.
28
three and four in order to develop a universal description of the meanings and essences of the phenomenon.77
Criteria for Evaluation
The appropriate criteria for evaluation of phenomenological research findings consisted of standards proposed by Creswell for a phenomenological study.78 Creswell is
Professor of Educational Psychology at Teachers College, University of Nebraska-
Lincoln. He specializes in qualitative and quantitative methodology. In his book,
Qualitative Inquiry and Research Design, he drew from the works of several established
academics in the field of qualitative methods and provided a framework and how-to
approach for researchers.
Creswell identified four specific challenges that a researcher faces when conducting
a phenomenological study.79 Each of the following expectations and challenges were
addressed in this thesis:
1. The researcher requires a solid grounding in the philosophical precepts of phenomenology.
2. The participants in the study need to be carefully chosen to be individuals who have experienced the phenomenon.
3. Suspending personal experiences by the researcher with the phenomenon may be difficult.
4. The researcher needs to decide how and in what way his or her personal experiences will be introduced into the study.
77 Ibid. 78 Creswell, Qualitative Inquiry and Research Design, 55. 79 Ibid.
29
Another academician in the phenomenological field is Donald E. Polkinghorne,
who posed five questions the qualitative researcher must ask him or herself in the conduct
of a phenomenological study.80 These questions were also addressed in this thesis:
Did the interviewer influence the contents of the subjects’ descriptions in such a way that the descriptions do not truly reflect the subject’s actual experiences?
Is the transcription accurate, and does it convey the meaning of the oral presentation in the interview?
In the analysis of the transcriptions, were there conclusions other than those offered by the researcher that could have been derived? Has the researcher identified these alternatives?
Is it possible to go from the general textural and structural descriptions, which describe what happened and how it happened, respectively, to the transcriptions of the interviews in order to account for the specific contents and connections in the original examples of the experience?
Is the structural description situation specific, or does it hold in general for the experience in other situations?
Outline of Thesis
Now that the purpose of the study has been explained and I have demonstrated the need for the study, I will explain my application of the phenomenological process and provide additional historical context for the findings of this study. Chapter 2 provides a review of the literature related to media-military relations and includes a specific focus on other studies that examined the Embedded Media Program. In Chapter 3, I explore the historical record of media-military relations that preceded the Embedded Media
Program. Chapter 4 reviews in detail the methodological processes of phenomenological research. The selection criteria for the participants in this study are explained, and I provide rationale for my decision-making in the data collection process. Chapter 5
80 Donald E. Polkinghorne, Phenomenological Research Methods, in R.S. Valle & S. Halling (ed.) Existential-phenomenological Perspectives in Psychology (New York: Plenum Press, 1989), 41-60.
30
reviews the findings, and it also explains the manner in which the data was analyzed and synthesized in order to construct the structural and textural descriptions of the experience.
Chapter 6, which is the final chapter, explores the significance of the findings, limitations of the study, and proposes future research in this field. The last two chapters are the most significant parts of the study in that they provide transparency of the data analysis process and the universal textural-structural description of the host officer-embedded journalist phenomenon.
CHAPTER 2 LITERATURE REVIEW
Three primary groups of literature relevant to the study of the Embedded Media
policy exist. They are organized according to the respective authors’ perspectives on the topic. The first and largest of the groups consists of historical texts written before the
2003 Iraq War in which the authors examined the historical and political role of the war correspondent and the media-military relationship. The second group of literature includes materials authored by and about war correspondents and their experiences. The literature in this group explores experiences both before and during the Iraq War. This section also includes the relatively few books written by members of the military about the war. The third group of literature is comprised of academic studies that examined the
Embedded Media policy.
Historical Texts
The First Casualty: The War Correspondent As Hero, Propagandist and Myth-
Maker from the Crimea to Iraq1 is an exhaustive work that chronicled the tumultuous
relationship between the military and journalists from the Crimea in the mid-1800s to
Vietnam, Bosnia, and Iraq more than a century and a half later. The award-winning book
on war reporting and war propaganda was written by internationally recognized journalist
and author Phillip Knightley.2 Knightley made extensive use of primary documents from
1Phillip Knightley, The First Casualty: The War Correspondent as Hero, Propagandist and Myth- Maker from the Crimea to Iraq (London: André Deutsch, 2003). 2The first publication of The First Casualty (1975) was recognized by the American Book of the Month Club and received the Overseas Press Club of America award for the best book on foreign affairs.
31 32
the archives of newspapers whose correspondents covered these conflicts. His recount is not only a historical record of war correspondence, but it is also a critical review of it.
Knightley examined the history of media and war and said that “the lengths to which governments lie to fool the citizens of the enemy and, even more so, fool their own, has not diminished with the years … it has grown.”3 His work is a scathing criticism of what
he alleges is a ploy by Western governments to manage the media and deceive their
citizenry with propaganda. The media is equally to blame, he said, because they
unapologetically present propaganda as truth.4 He posed a challenge to journalists to
present the truth regardless of its unpopularity.5
Knightley first published his book in 1975 and again in 2000 and 2003. The most
recent version includes a chapter on the conduct of the media in the Iraq War. However,
it was published the same year of the invasion, limited his examination of the media- military relationship in Iraq to the combat phase and the months that immediately
followed.
Knightley said that the United States and the United Kingdom devised the
Embedded Media policy in cohort with the purpose of managing the message that would
reach the global public. He said the introduction of Arab TV networks, such as al-
Jazeera, solidified the prospect that both the U.S. and Iraqi experiences of the war would be broadcast, a dichotomy that was unprecedented in the history of media coverage.6 The
The book has been revised several times since, including a November 2003 edition that chronicles embedded media during the US-led war in Iraq. 3 Phillip Knightley (describing his opinion of war-time information and the government’s role in its dissemination),
33
Coalition effort now depended not only on content of the message, but on its immediacy and redundancy as well. This could be accomplished by flooding the information marketplace with the American perspective of the war. Embeds assigned directly to U.S. military units would have the access, security and support to dominate the headlines and airwaves. Anyone who wanted to report from the enemy’s perspective would, by default, be guilty by association and in danger of U.S. attack.
Knightley said, “[T]he embedding part of the strategy worked so well that it will now, without question, be part of any future war.”7 He summed up his critical interpretation of the program’s objectives in four points:
1. Emphasize the dangers posed by the Iraqi regime
2. Dismiss and discredit those who cast doubt on these dangers
3. Do not get involved in appeals to logic but instead appeal to the public’s hearts and minds, especially hearts
4. Drive home the message to the public: ‘Trust us. We know more than we can tell you.’8
The government’s media-management accomplished two goals, according to
Knightley. First, it branded a government-sanctioned form of terrorism against unilateral journalists who rejected the opportunity to embed with U.S. forces and chose instead to report the war from the enemy’s perspective. Knightley said the Pentagon made clear before the war that it would not “allow the presence of journalists to inhibit it from attacking areas of military significance.”9 When the war played out, a series of deadly attacks in enemy territory against known media safe holds highlighted the U.S. military’s
7 Ibid., 534. 8 Ibid., 529. 9 Ibid., 5.
34
view of the unilateral contingent: those who had forsaken the opportunity to embed with
U.S. and Coalition troops would not impede the war effort. Knightley said the U.S.
administration had an attitude toward war correspondents that reflected President George
W. Bush’s statement about terrorists: “You’re either with us or you’re against us.”10
The second major accomplishment of the Embedded Media policy, according to
Knightley, was the reinvention of the war correspondent’s persona. No longer was the
war correspondent a beacon of truth in the fog of war as he had been dubbed in Vietnam.
The correspondent had been “made over” by the military. To the military, the media was
a pawn whose purpose was to relay propaganda. “The correspondents were merely extras
in a piece of theatre. The system was designed not to inform journalists but to play over their heads toward an international TV audience, which soon accorded the briefing officers the status of soap stars.”11
Knightley’s critique of the media’s role in the Iraq War does not include the
perspective of U.S. service members who interacted with the media—embedded or
unilateral—while serving in Iraq. Besides citing a few heated interactions between
unnamed public affairs representatives from the Pentagon and testy correspondents, his
book does not provide the perspective offered in this study.
Another author who provided an overview of military-media relations is Duncan
Anderson, although his is drastically less critical than Knightley’s. Anderson chronicled
the evolution of the war photographer in War: A Photo History.12 He compiled unique
and rare photographs from The Times (London) that had not yet been widely published
10 Ibid., 537. 11 Ibid., 535. 12 Duncan Anderson, War: A Photo History (New York: Times Books, 2003).
35 into a timeline of war photography beginning in the Crimea when William Howard
Russell first used his photographic devices on the battlefield13 and ending with an image of a U.S. Marine draping a U.S. flag over the statue of Saddam Hussein during the Iraq
War.14
Anderson’s compilation is more than a collection of images from battlefields. Each photograph was accompanied with information that provided historical context about what that moment meant to the battle and what it meant to have a war photographer capture it. For example, images of a U.S. Army Ranger’s lifeless body being dragged through the streets of Mogadishu in October 1993 were symbolic of the Somalis’ overwhelming force against the U.S. troops who attempted to arrest a Somali warlord.
Once publicized in the United States, the images were a catalyst for the Clinton
Administration’s abandonment of the U.S. humanitarian mission in Somalia. Anderson said that at one point the Somalis almost turned on the photographer, Paul Watson of the
Toronto Star, but he was saved by the very photos he was taking. Watson said he sensed that the Somalis understood that his photographs would convey to the world their victory over the Americans.15
Anderson also discussed what war photographers have been unable to capture. For example, the images released by the DOD from the U.S. invasion of Grenada—Operation
Urgent Fury—were carefully screened by the U.S. government to present a positive image of the first U.S. military offensive following the Vietnam War. For the military, whose memory of the media’s influence during Vietnam was still painfully fresh, the
13 Ibid., 9. 14 Ibid., 187. 15 Ibid., 181.
36 invasion of Grenada was an opportunity for the U.S. military to regain the American public’s confidence. To do that, the press was strictly controlled and restricted from covering the initial offensive. Images that were released by the military pictured grateful
American students being rescued from their Communist captors. In reality, the overall execution of the mission included several operational debacles. It took more than three years for the full details of those events to seep out.16
In The War Correspondent, 17 Greg McLaughlin18 looked at the modern-day war correspondent. He said the war correspondent’s mission: “to report a conflict as objectively and accurately as possible without undue risk to self and without compromise of professional integrity.”19 He presented evidence that beyond this mission there are forces of influence both internal and external to the journalist that must be accounted for.
First, he wrote about what it meant to be a part of the “luckless tribe”20 of war correspondents. He explored their motivations, ranging from participation in history and tradition to thrill and adventure. Then he juxtaposed these to the larger societal and professional pressures that come from military, political, technological, and economic forces. He noted that modern-day war correspondents were much more likely to censor themselves as a result of these pressures. Modern war coverage, he said, is also
16 Ibid., 168. 17 Greg McLaughlin, The War Correspondent (London: Pluto Press, 2002). 18 Greg McLaughlin is Lecturer in Media Studies at the University of Ulster (Coleraine Campus), Ireland. Ibid. 19 McLaughlin, The War Correspondent, 207. 20 William Howard Russell, who reported from the Crimea, is known as the first war correspondent. He called himself the “miserable parent of a luckless tribe.” Ibid., 4-5.
37
motivated by “the tyranny of the satellite uplink and the demands of the 24-hour ‘real-
time’ news agenda.”21
McLaughlin provided an abbreviated history of war correspondence as well, the
most significant portion of which chronicled the first time the basic concept of
embedding emerged in U.S. military operations. McLaughlin noted that in Bosnia the media were much freer to move around than they had been in the Middle East during the
Persian Gulf War. An evolution took place in the way the military perceived the media.
McLaughlin said that the “military had clear ideas both of their objectives in
Bosnia and of how the American media might help them meet those objectives.”22
Military leaders of the Bosnia operations explicitly stated their three goals in respect to
the media:
Gain support of the American public for the conduct of the operation;
Maintain the morale of American troops; and
Use the world’s media influence to promote compliance with the Dayton Accords among the former warring factions.
To meet these objectives, military planners lessened the controls of the press pool
system, which was unpopular with the media during Grenada and the Persian Gulf War,
and devised the idea of assigning media personnel to specific units for a two-week
period. About 40 reporters accompanied Coalition troops on the ground for two weeks in
order to get “a more nuanced picture of [U.S.] activities by allowing them virtually free
access to the soldiers and commanders.”23
21 Ibid., 23. 22 Ibid., 98. 23 Ibid., (citing William L. Nash, “The Military and the Media in Bosnia,” Harvard International Journal Press/Politics, Sept 1998, Vol. 3, No. 4, 131-135.)
38
The most significant opportunity afforded to the media by the military was the
ability to report “at points of conflict as a means of demonstrating the transparency of our
operations and the firmness of our purpose.”24 The military had discovered the advantage of media presence in a military operation, the fruits of which were dissemination of a
well planned message and its operational victories. Later, at the onset of the Iraq War,
the U.S. government would again be faced with a situation in which information warfare
was equally important to ground and air warfare. The tool of embedding, which was first
introduced on a miniature scale in Bosnia, evolved into the Embedded Media policy.
McLaughlin’s most significant contribution to the understanding of military-media
relations are the interviews he conducted with war correspondents who covered the
Persian Gulf War in 1991, the American bombing of Iraq in 1998, and the post-Cold War
conflicts in Bosnia, Somalia, and Kosovo. His interviews with prominent war
correspondents, such as Robert Fisk25 and Christiane Amanpour,26 offered first-person
accounts of the press pool experience during the Persian Gulf War where the Pentagon
corralled a small number of journalists that traveled under military supervision and strict
censorship guidelines. The journalists also provided their recollection of the initial
implementations of the embed concept during military operations in Bosnia.
In addition to research that provided historical overviews of media-military
relations, it is worthwhile to look at studies that focus on individual military conflicts.
24 Greg McLaughlin, The War Correspondent (London: Pluto Press, 2002). 25 Robert Fisk is a British journalist and the Middle East correspondent for the British newspaper The Independent. He was described by The New York Times as "probably the most famous foreign correspondent in Britain." Ethan Bronner, "A Foreign Correspondent Who Does More Than Report,"The New York Times, 19 Nov 2005, B16. 26 Christiane Amanpour is chief international correspondent for CNN. Forbes magazine named her one of The 100 Most Powerful Women
39
The time frame most relevant to this thesis begins with the Vietnam War. Daniel C.
Hallin wrote The Uncensored War: The Media and Vietnam,27 ten years after the war’s
end. He offered reflections on the media-military relationship fostered during the
Vietnam War and its influence on later military operations. His central focus was to
explore the idea of whether the media was really to blame for “losing the war” in
Vietnam.28 A discussion of his findings is presented in Chapter 3.
Ed DeMello is an obscure author who also offered a critical view of the media. He
focused on their role in the Persian Gulf War. He could not be identified beyond
authorship of his book, in which he compiled highlights of over 110 military briefings,
press conferences and interviews in A Desert Storm Diary of News Media Coverage.29
He highlighted what he called “the absurd and thoughtless questions asked by the media” about the war, many of which, he said, endangered U.S. and Coalition troops and the war effort. DeMello’s commentary of the media’s sometimes-farcical nature during crisis is unabashedly critical. “War is not the time for the news media to be coldly objective and impartial. They should be, like the majority of the American society, supporting the troops in battle and promoting the war effort to bring it to a successful conclusion.”30 He argued that when the press opposed its own government in a time of war or ignored the guidelines presented to it by that government, it was no better than a media plaintiff whose irresponsible writing or broadcast made him or her liable for resulting personal
27 Daniel C. Hallin, The Uncensored War: The Media and Vietnam (Berkley: University of California Press, 1986). 28 Ibid., 211. The concept had been given life by critical government and military leaders who credited the media’s negative coverage of the war with turning the public sentiment against it, forcing the eventual withdrawal and unofficial defeat of U.S. forces. 29 Ed DeMello, A Desert Storm Diary of News Media Coverage, (Fairview, NJ: Kenobi Productions, 1994). 30 Ibid., 4-5.
40
injuries suffered by the public. DeMello argued that the sometimes “irresponsible and
even simplistic press,”31 if it had had its way, could have caused the United States to lose
the war in the Gulf as it had during Vietnam.32
In addition to the historical perspectives offered by these authors, it is also useful to look at more personal accounts by journalists about war correspondence. Some of the following texts are compilations of interviews and essays by various war correspondents, while others are first-person memoirs of the embedded experience and the Iraq War.
By War Correspondents, about War Correspondents
Broadcaster Peter Arnett made a name for himself as a war correspondent in the rice fields of Vietnam and then forty years later reporting from Baghdad. The seasoned journalist is renowned for his coverage of the Vietnam War, which often put him in harm’s way. But during the Iraq War, his bold, outspoken opinions cost him his CBS and
National Geographic positions. In a televised interview with an Iraqi state-owned
station, Arnett said, “The first war plan has failed because of Iraqi resistance.” He also
offered that his reporting about Iraqi civilian casualties “helps those who oppose the
war.”33 Arnett’s words were widely criticized as traitorous by Westerners who supported
the war. At first, defended him, but the network later fired him. 34
In 1994, Arnett published his experiences as a war correspondent in conflicts
beginning with the Vietnam War through the Persian Gulf War in Live from the
31 Ibid., preface. 32 Ibid., 5-6. 33 “Transcript of Peter Arnett interview on Iraqi TV,” CNN.com/World, < http://www.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/meast/03/30/sprj.irq.arnett.transcript/> (accessed 25 July 2006). 34 Robert Sullivan, ed., The War in Iraq (New York: Life, 2004), 83.
41
Battlefield: From Vietnam to Baghdad, 35 years in the World’s War Zones.35 His book
about his experiences as a war correspondent is a quintessential example of the
“journalist as story,” a model that did not lose its popularity in the Iraq War.
Authors Bing West and retired Major General Ray L. Smith provided a firsthand
account of the 22-day march to Baghdad in The March Up: Taking Baghdad with the 1st
Marine Division.36 Both served in the 1st Marine Division during the Vietnam War and
joined the Marines during the Iraq War as invited spectators whose acknowledged intent
from the onset was to write a book about their experiences on the frontlines.
At three in the morning it was freezing, pitch black, and smelly inside the Amtrac, an amphibious vehicle stuffed with troops dozing on two benches… I was lying on the cold metal floor, listening to then, trying not to smell the feet. A few weeks earlier the 1st Marine Division had welcomed Ray Smith and me as family, including us in every briefing and battle…37
While neither West nor Smith was a practicing journalist, their account of the
combat phase of the Iraq War was the first in book form to reach the American public,
hitting the shelves just months after the combat period ended. It is a good example of the
increased media presence on the battlefield during the Iraq War.
Judith Sylvester38 and Suzanne Huffman39 captured the experiences of embedded
journalists in Reporting from the Front.40 They conducted more than 25 interviews with
35 Peter Arnett, Live from the Battlefield: From Vietnam to Baghdad, 35 years in the World’s War Zones (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1994). 35 Ibid. 36 Bing West and Major General Ray L. Smith, The March Up: Taking Baghdad with the 1st Marine Division (New York: Bantam Books, 2003). 37 Ibid., 1. 38 Judith Sylvester is associate professor at the Manship School of Mass Communication at Louisiana State University. 39 Suzanne Huffman is associate professor of journalism and the broadcast journalism sequence head at Texas Christian University.
42
embedded journalists who covered the Iraq War and a few DOD public affairs officials
who helped developed and facilitate the Embedded Media policy. The authors said they
set out to learn what it was like to be an embedded reporter in Iraq during the war; what it
was like to write and photograph and report under those conditions; and what it was like
to live with those memories and pictures.41 The research proposed in this thesis is similar
in mission, but it focuses on the experiences of military service members.
Sylvester and Huffman constructed vivid, individual synopsis of each embedded
journalist’s experiences. For example, Ed Timms, a staff writer with the Dallas Morning
News, Washington Bureau, discussed the issues he had to weigh when his editors first approached him with the idea of sending him to Iraq as an embed.
Age had something to do with it—I’m 46—and my children, ages thirteen and ten, are now old enough to actually know what’s going on and to worry. I’ve also seen a fair amount of death and suffering over the years and didn’t look forward to a fresh set of memories. But the curiosity that first prompted me to seek out overseas assignments hadn’t entirely left me. I also rationalized that my previous experience in the region might help me to provide my newspaper’s readership with some insight into the situation in Iraq.42
In Reporting from the Front, the embeds discussed issues they faced in the course
of covering the war, such as maneuvering and politicking with the military chain of
command and struggling with the mundane day-to-day issues of desert survival. Richard
Ray, an anchor/reporter for KDFW-TV (Fox) in Dallas, Texas, recalled preparing for the
embed experience, too. “We got training in gas masks, [chemical] suits, first aid, how not
be an easy target for terrorists, and that sort of thing. I thought it was all very useful. It
40 Judith Sylvester and Suzanne Huffman, Reporting from the Front (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2005). 41 Ibid., 9. 42 Ibid., 118.
43
certainly made you think about all the different ways you could get killed.”43 He also
recalled eating Meals-Ready-To-Eat (MREs) with the U.S. Army’s Fourth Infantry
Division out of Fort Hood, Texas. “Bottom line, we ate what they ate,”44 he said.
Though the Sylvester-Huffman book provided little comparative analysis between
the interviews and was not conducted in a true qualitative method, it is an example of the
kind of descriptive, textual description this study captured. The interviews they
conducted provided the most descriptive details yet by embedded journalists about the
experience.
Life Books published The War In Iraq: An Illustrated History45 with a section devoted to the role of civilian media during the Iraq War. It depicted the threat that journalists endured in the combat zone, such as when the U.S. fired upon on the Palestine
Hotel, which served as headquarters for the press in Baghdad. The U.S. defended its actions, alleging that enemy fire had originated from a hotel balcony. 46
In America at War, The Battle for Iraq: A View From the Frontlines,47 Dan Rather
and other reporters of CBS News provided their firsthand accounts of the war. In short,
diary-style entries, reporters, photographers, and broadcast journalists described their
embedded experiences in Iraq. For example, CBS correspondent John Roberts said:
we were three days into the war and still no sign of the enemy … but the war was supposed to become infinitely more difficult…. Oily smoke roiled out of Iraqi tanks and armored transports. The air was filled with an acrid smell that will forever conjure up images that the mind would rather forget: headless bodies;
43 Ibid., 134. 44 Ibid., 136. 45 Sullivan, The War in Iraq. 46 Ibid., 81. 47 America at War, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2003).
44
civilians cut down in the cross fire; scarred prisoners. There was death in abundance.48
Bill Katovsky and Timothy Carlson provided an oral history of the embedded
media’s coverage of the Iraq War in Embedded.49 The book included dozens of
interviews with seasoned journalists from leading broadcast and print media outlets who
reported from Iraq. Los Angeles Times staff writer and Pulitzer Prize-winner David
Zucchino described his experience as an embed.
During seven weeks spent with half a dozen units, I slept in fighting holes and armored vehicles, on a rooftop, a garage floor and in lumbering troop trucks. For days at a time, I didn’t sleep…. Most important, I wrote stories I could not have produced had I not been embedded….50
The authors of Embedded said they presented the interviews as the personal stories behind the “media’s own war stories.”
Embedded reporters ate, lived, traveled, and slept with the troops. They choked on the same sandstorm grit, and carried the same mandatory gas mask and chem. Suits. They dined on the same MREs (Meals Ready to Eat), and bounced along the same rutted desert tracks. They faced the same enemy fire51….They were as fearless as the soldiers they covered. And as fearful.52
The interviews were conducted in person in Qatar, Kuwait, and Iraq and by phone
from San Francisco and Boulder. They were conducted over a single eight-week period.
The average length of these interviews was 45 minutes. The authors said it was
“impossible … to synthesize all their disparate oral histories into a single, overarching
48 Ibid., 72-73. 49 Bill Katovsky and Timothy Carlson, Embedded (Guilford, Connecticut: The Lyons Press, 2003). 50 Ibid., 141-142. 51 Ibid., VII. 52 Ibid., XX.
45
view of the war. Their personal narratives are as varied as their experiences on the
battlefield.”53
In general, this book provided glimpses of the war from the perspective of
embedded journalists. The compilation included only a handful of interviews with
members of the military who were either public affairs officials or high-ranking DOD civilians involved in the development of the Embedded Media policy. For example, combat cameraman Staff Sergeant Ronald Mitchell said, “I’m completely against embedded journalists because it takes soldiers away from their jobs to protect somebody who volunteered to come over here.”54 While public affairs personnel like Staff Sergeant
Mitchell and the DOD officials interviewed for the book offered two valuable
perspectives on the program, this thesis is focused on examining the perspective of those
non-public affairs Marines who did not have special media training and who were not vested in the development and success of the program.
Another book on war correspondence, Reporting War: Journalism and Wartime,55 examined the nature of contemporary war reporting in a range of locales, including
Africa, the Balkans, the Middle East, and southern Asia. The contributors were both practicing and former journalists and academics in the field. The authors considered, in part, the role of journalists ― both embedded and unilateral ― during wartime. One section explored the idea that embedded journalists lost their ability to be objective as they built personal relationships with the service members on about which they reported.
Keith Harrison, of the Wolverhampton (UK) Express and Star, reported from Umm Qasr,
53 Ibid., 419. 54 Ibid., 341. 55 Stuart Allan and Barbie Zelizer, ed., Reporting War: Journalism in Wartime (New York: Routledge, 2004).
46
a southern post in Iraq in 2003. He described the socialization process he experienced as
an embed:
we look and sound like soldiers, which is a tribute to the Army’s embedding system, …We answer to the Commanding Officer, we follow orders, we share the rations, we eat where the soldiers eat and we sleep where they sleep…As our vehicle was being prepared, TV pictures showed an Iraqi bunker being blown to smithereens at close range by a US tank and I found myself cheering along like a bloodthirsty Dallas cowboy.56
Jeff Gralnick, a journalist with reporting experience in Vietnam,
warned against the potential pitfalls of the Embedded Media Program.
You’re all going over to report. Truth. Honesty. The real story. But that is going to be difficult because once you get into a unit, you are going to be co-opted. It is not a purposeful thing, it will just happen. It’s a little like the Stockholm Syndrome.57
Books by Service Members
Half a dozen memoirs about the Iraq War were authored by U.S. service members and published in the immediate years after the invasion.58 However, none specifically
focused on the media. Nonetheless, they provided other relevant insights about the war
experience that added context to the findings of this study.
In The Last True Story I’ll Ever Tell: An Accidental Soldier’s Account of the War in
Iraq,59 John Crawford recounted his experience as a Florida National Guardsman serving
in Iraq during the first year of the war. His limited recollections about the media offer
56 Ibid., 194-195. 57 Ibid., 195. 58 John Crawford, The Last True Story I’ll Ever Tell: An Accidental Soldier’s Account of the War in Iraq (New York: Riverhead Books, 2005); Kayla Williams, Love My Rifle More Than You: Young and Female in the U.S. Army (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2005); Jason Christopher Hartley, Just Another Soldier: A Year on the Ground in Iraq (New York: HarperCollins, 2005); Nathaniel Fick, One Bullet Away: The Making of a Marine Officer (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 2005); Paul Rieckhoff, Chasing Ghosts (New York: Penguin Group, 2006); Colby Buzzell, My War (New York: J.P. Putnam Sons, 2005). 59 John Crawford, The Last True Story I’ll Ever Tell: An Accidental Soldier’s Account of the War in Iraq (New York: Riverhead Books, 2005).
47
one soldier’s perception of the media. He recalled his homecoming after more than a year in Iraq.
We all wanted to be heroes when we got back. There was this illusion that none of us would ever have to buy a drink again, that everyone would treat us differently. The only ones excited to see me get off the plane were the reporters. They swarmed in like angry bees.60
In One Bullet Away: The Making of a Marine Officer, Nathanial Fick was a 25-
year-old Marine lieutenant leading a scruffy group of young Marines from 1st
Reconnaissance Battalion through Iraq with one reporter in tow. Rolling Stone journalist
Evan Wright, who embedded with Fick’s platoon, also wrote a memoir called Generation
Kill.61 Fick and Wright provided the only glimpse available of the host officer-
embedded journalist experience from both perspectives. Fick described his first
encounter with Wright.
I pegged him with all the traits of my earlier assailant: a clueless opportunist chasing a Pulitzer Prize on the backs of men he wouldn’t speak to on the street at home. As a citizen, I supported the Pentagon’s much-touted embedded media campaign as a way to give Americans an uncensored look at the war and the warriors. As an officer, I dreaded dealing with the information leaks, distraction to my Marines, and constant moral oversight of people who knew little about our culture and the demands of combat decision making.62
Nonetheless, Fick welcomed Wright into his platoon. He described Wright’s
introduction to the platoon.
When we walked back across the camp, I pointed out my platoon’s tent and invited him to speak with my men anytime. He wanted to meet them immediately. We pushed through the flap and into the platoon’s living area. Colbert was reading. Reyes was doing pushups on his knuckles. Two corporals, Garza and Chaffin, were flicking each other with the tips of their eight-inch knives, just enough to draw blood. I walked away, feeling as if I had thrown a rabbit to the
60 Ibid., 177-178. 61 Evan Wright, Generation Kill (New York: G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 2004). 62 Nathaniel Fick, One Bullet Away: The Making of a Marine Officer (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 2005), 184.
48
greyhounds….when I issued my operations order to the platoon a few days later, Wright was there. We had reached a basic agreement – I would let him ride along with Sergeant Colbert’s team, and he would stay out of the way and not reveal our plans.63
An unconventional relationship of mutual respect, trust, and brotherhood burgeoned between Fick and Wright over the course of the war. In his book, Fick revealed the practical nature of the embedded policy and some of the ways it affected
Marines fighting the war.
Colbert’s Humvee had also been shot up. There were twenty-two bullet holes in it, including six in the door next to Evan Wright’s seat. When I walked up, he was studying them with a kind of awe. ‘How you feeling, Evan?’ I half expected him to say he had enough information for his story and wanted to leave on the next resupply helicopter. ‘Embedded,’ he replied. ‘More embedded than I ever thought I’d be.’ Espera put an arm around his shoulders. ‘But he’s staying with us. Dude’s got balls.’64
Several other service members wrote memoirs about the war, but none touched on any interactions they may have had with embedded media. Nonetheless, their stories offer vignettes of the war with the same proximity offered by the embeds who wrote about it. In Love My Rifle More Than You: Young and Female in the U.S. Army,65 Kayla
Williams recounted her year in Iraq serving in the military intelligence field. Jason
Christopher Hartley wrote about his experiences as an Army National Guardsman in Iraq in Just Another Soldier: A Year on the Ground in Iraq.66 His memoir is a compilation of postings from the blog he kept while deployed, which was eventually shut down by his
63 Ibid., 185. 64 Ibid., 221. 65 Kayla Williams, Love My Rifle More Than You: Young and Female in the U.S. Army (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2005). 66 Jason Christopher Hartley, Just Another Soldier: A Year on the Ground in Iraq (New York: HarperCollins, 2005).
49
superior officers.67 Paul Rieckhoff wrote Chasing Ghosts: A Soldier's Fight for America from Baghdad to Washington68 and Colby Buzzell wrote My War.69
Finally, the third group of literature relevant to this study included academic studies
that focused on the media products examined the Embedded Media Program.
Embedded Media Program Studies
Five studies of the Embedded Media Program were published in the three years
since the Iraq War began. First, the McCormick Tribune Foundation published a report
of a conference it conducted on media-military relations in 2003. The conference was
held three months after the combat phase of the Iraq War ended. Forty-two
representatives of the media and military attended, including generals, admirals, and
colonels from the four military branches of service and bureau chiefs, correspondents,
editors, anchors, and reporters from television networks, newspapers, wire services, and
magazines. This was the seventh such conference since the end of the Persian Gulf War
in 1992. The foundation said its goal in sponsoring these conferences was to foster
cooperation and understanding between the press and the military so that the public might
be better informed about critical national security issues.
The findings of the 2003 conference were presented in an optimistic and positive
report about the embedded system.70 The report stated: “By going to war together, and
making a greater effort to understand and respect one another’s profession, a shift has
67 Terry Gross, “‘Just Another Soldier’ Revives a Banned Blog,” National Public Radio, 3 June 2006, < http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=4953949> (accessed 3 June 2006). Hartley’s blog is available at
50
occurred from warring neighbors to grudging, possibly fond, admiration.”71 However,
the conference participants admitted the relationship was not entirely devoid of
apprehension despite the gains fostered by the Embedded Media Program. The report’s authors admitted that “[t]here’s still tension [between the military and the media]. But it’s not nearly as intense [as it was before the Iraq War]. There are still misunderstandings. But they’re very much narrower.”72
The report concluded that the most positive outcome of the program was “the
opportunity for members of the military and media to break down stereotypes and see
each other as men and women equally dedicated to doing their jobs well.”73 The report
called for ongoing communication and conversations between members of the media and
members of the military in order to continue to improve relations and understanding
between the two. The following recounts the opinion one senior military officer had
about the media before the Iraq War.
One general said she used to think very differently about the media. She was trained that way. Ten years ago, the media-training course in the Air War College ‘consisted of describing the media as definitely having horns. Some of you have tails. But all of you came from the dark side and we were going to be trained how to defend ourselves against you.’
But just two years after the McCormick Tribune Foundation held the 2003
conference that boasted so many positive comments about the embedding system, signs
that the policy’s future might be in danger began to surface. The McCormick Tribune
Foundation held a second conference and commissioned a Gallup pole in 2005 to study
how the military-media relationship evolved since the start of the Iraq war and the initial
71 Ibid., 82. 72 Ibid. 73 Ibid., 83.
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implementation of the Embedded Media policy.74 In its report of the conference, one of the foundation’s senior vice presidents commented at the close of the conference that
there is tremendous goodwill in this room, but the relationship seems strained. The advances discussed in 2003 seem vulnerable, and the near euphoria around embedding already runs the risk of becoming a blip in our past.75
His remarks reflected the strain of a nation that was still fighting a war two years
after President George W. Bush declared “Mission accomplished.”76 The McCormick
Tribune Foundation’s study blamed the apparent tension that conference participants –
leaders from the media and the military– had toward each other on two issues: 1) the
encroachment of Information Operations, including such subspecialties as military
deception, psychological operations (PSYOPS), and electronic warfare, into mainstream
public affairs; 2) a lack of concrete information from civilian leadership about the conduct of the war, the reasons for it, and its future.77
During the conference, participants discussed the results of the findings of the
Gallop poll sponsored by the McCormick Tribune Foundation. Gallop queried members
of the public, press, and military. The military portion was conducted through Internet
interviews with 279 high-ranking military officers from the Army, Air Force, Marine
Corps, and Navy. The participants’ names were provided to Gallop by the DOD.78
When asked whether media access to military officials and officers was sufficient
to cover most military-related stories that the public should or wants to know about,
74 The Military-Media Relationship 2005: How the armed forces, journalists and the public view coverage of military conflict (Chicago: McCormick Tribune Foundation, 2005). 75 Ibid., 117. 76 Ibid., 116. 77 Ibid. 78 Ibid., 35.
52
almost three-fourths of military participants surveyed said yes. In contrast, only16
percent of media participants said it was sufficient.79
One-third of the military participants said the media should have maximum access
to the military, while more than half said that access should be limited.80 In contrast, 84
percent of media participants surveyed in the study said they should have maximum access to military officers and officials during military conflicts.81
Sixteen percent of the military participants surveyed said embedding the media
hindered military operations in comparison to five percent of the media representatives
who thought so.82 Sixty-three percent of the military participants and 85 percent of the
media participants said the embedded process increased the military’s willingness to
speak with the media.83
One-third of the military participants said the media should have maximum access
to the military, while more than half said that access should be limited.84 In contrast, 84
percent of media participants in the study said they should have maximum access to
military officers and officials during military conflicts.85
Sixteen percent of the military participants said embedding the media hindered military operations in comparison to five percent of the media representatives who
thought so.86 Sixty-three percent of the military participants and 85 percent of the media
79 Ibid., 52. 80 Ibid., 53. 81 Ibid., 54. 82 Ibid., 58. 83 Ibid. 84 Ibid., 53. 85 Ibid., 54. 86 Ibid., 58.
53 participants said the embedded process increased the military’s willingness to speak with the media.87
A third study on the Embedded Media Program resembles both the methodology and central issues explored in this thesis research. University of Florida master’s student
David S. Westover, Jr. conducted phenomenological research in 2004 that sought to understand the shared experience of embedded journalists and military public affairs officers in Iraq. In his thesis, “Interpreting the Embedded Media Experience: A
Qualitative Study of Military-Media Relations During the War In Iraq,”88 Westover conducted in-depth interviews with 13 participants, including journalists embedded with
U.S. forces during the Iraq War and military public affairs officers who worked with embedded journalists during the war. Westover found that four main themes (trust, understanding, access, and exchange) emerged from the data he collected. Additionally, he drew several theoretical connections to the relationship theory of public relations.
Westover himself was an active duty Air Force public affairs officer at the time of the study.89
This thesis differed from Westover’s study because it examined the experiences of service members who were not public affairs officials and did not have specialized media training prior to their deployment to Iraq. Another difference between the methodology of Westover’s study and the one in this thesis is that this study does not compare the descriptions provided by the host officers with those of embedded media. It focused,
87 Ibid. 88 D. Westover, “Interpreting the Embedded Media Experience: A Qualitative Study of Military-Media Relations During the War In Iraq” (M.A.M.C. thesis, University of Florida, 2004). 89 Ibid.
54
instead, on a larger participant group representing only one demographic group, which
was underrepresented in the academic literature on the subject.
A fourth major study of the Embedded Media policy was conducted in 2004 by the
Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA), a non-profit corporation that assists the U.S.
government in addressing important national security issues. It is important to note that
IDA works for the government but not for the individual military departments. For
example, the Assessment of the DoD Embedded Media Program90 was commissioned by
the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs) but not by the public affairs division
of one of the individual branches of service.
The IDA study encompassed the period from initial planning of the embed program
in the summer 2002 through the end of major combat operations on May 1, 2003 and
reports the findings from extensive interviews with 244 military and media personnel and
from analysis of program data and documents. The findings are based on interviews with
four groups of stakeholders in the embedding process: commanders, military public
affairs officers, bureau chiefs, and embeds. While the scope of the study far exceeded the
methodology of this thesis, it addressed one issue in particular of significant relevance to
this study: the “commander-embed relationship.”91 The study credited the success of the
Embedded Media Program to the trust and confidence established between the
commander and the embeds assigned to his or her unit.
90 Richard K. Wright, The Assessment of the DoD Embedded Media Program, Institute for Defense Analyses, Joint Advanced Warfighting Program, IDA Paper P-393, September 2004,
55
This thesis and the IDA study are similar in methodology in that the interviews
lasted approximately the same amount of time in both studies.92 However, there are
several differences between the two studies.
First, my findings are a synthesis of the shared experiences of this specific
demographic group alone and were not meshed with the experiences of other
demographic groups. Of the 55 interviews IDA conducted with military commanders, 15
were with members of the Marine Corps.93 Of those, eight were conducted with
company-grade officers who served with ground forces. The study did not indicate the
specific military occupational specialties of the participants.
I interviewed 14 company grade officers, almost twice the amount interviewed in
the IDA study. The IDA study’s findings were based on the experiences of all the media
and military personnel who were interviewed. My thesis provided understanding of a
specific group of service members.
Second, this thesis and the IDA study cover two different periods of U.S.
involvement in Iraq and only overlap during the three-month combat period. This thesis encompassed a two-year period beginning with the invasion of Iraq in March 2003 through the end of the second major Marine Corps troop rotation of the war (March
2005).94 In contrast, the IDA study encompassed the period that began with the initial
planning for the war in the summer of 2002 through the end of major combat operations
in May 2003.95
92 The average interview length in the IDA study was one hour. Ibid., II-3. The average interview length in this thesis was 80 minutes. 93 Ibid., II-4. 94 Unclassified, DOD schedule of OIF troop rotations, n.d., on file with the author. 95 Ibid., II-2.
56
The fifth and final study on the Embedded Media Program was also conducted in
2004 by the RAND Corporation’s National Security Research Division.96 The RAND
Corporation is a nonprofit research organization that provides analysis and solutions to
address challenges facing public and private sectors around the world. The study
underwent a peer review process before publication to “ensure high standards for
research quality and objectivity.”97 The book’s authors, Christopher Paul and James J.
Kim, made several scholarly contributions to the understanding of the Embedded Press
system.
Paul and Kim analyzed the relationship between the press and the military using
quantitative measurement. The findings identified a set of outcomes for the evaluation of
press-military strategies and proposed rigorous quantitative measures of those outcomes.
The result is a comparative historical analysis of numerous U.S. military conflicts.
Additionally, the study presented findings from public opinion surveys and other poll data collected by prominent polling organizations. The authors also focused on the interim periods between military conflicts in which events drive eventual military policy towards the media.98
Paul and Kim based their study primarily on comparative historical case studies for
conflicts that preceded the Iraq War. However, the authors relied more on primary
sources for its evaluation of media-military relations since the Iraq War began, including
96 “Support for this study was provided, in part, by donors and by the independent research and development provisions of RAND’s contracts for the operation of its U.S. Department of Defense federally funded research and development centers.” Christopher Paul and James J. Kim, Reporters on the Battlefield: Embedded Press System in Historical Context (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2004), ii. 97 Paul and Kim, Reporters on the Battlefield, back cover. 98 Ibid., 5.
57
news articles in the archives of major newspapers, official Pentagon press releases, and
documented meetings and conferences involving press and Pentagon representatives.
The Paul- Kim study informed this thesis work with its identification of similar and
contrasting missions and goals between the military and the press.99 Its case studies on
the press systems implemented during various military conflicts informed my historical
study of the evolution of media-military relations.
Additionally, the authors constructed a system of organization that identified and
defined the different systems within military-press relations. First, they identified
“Access Strategies for Organizing Press-Military Relations,” such as denial of access and
the use of press pools. Second, they identified “Operational Security Strategies” used by
the military, such as credentialing and censorship.100 This organizational structure was
helpful when I developed the graphic representation of “Wartime Media-Military
Symbiosis,” which is explained in Chapter 3.
Like many of the studies reviewed in this section, this thesis also relied on the use of primary sources in addition to the secondary literature. Since the period of time studied in the research occurred within three years of its publication, I relied on news articles from major newspapers, magazines and established Internet news sources, official
Pentagon press releases, and the minutes and summaries of meetings and conferences about the Embedded Media Program.
99 Ibid., 27. 100 Ibid., 63-73.
CHAPTER 3 THE HISTORY OF MEDIA-MILITARY RELATIONS
Military vs. the Media: Where Does the Tension Come from?
The tension between the military and the media is natural given the disparity
between their goals during wartime. The press focuses specifically on reporting, while
the military focuses on accomplishing its operational mission. In the process of gathering
news to report, both to inform the public and/or gain profits and ratings, the press often
clashes with the military, which needs to ensure operational and informational security, a
goal that often requires the limitation of access to information.1
Regardless of the major differences between the media and the military, they have
some key commonalities, too. According to a 2004 study by the RAND Corporation
National Security Research Division, the military and the media both aspire to “a high
level of professionalism and both focus on serving the public, albeit in very different
ways.”2 The media and the military’s missions, to inform and protect the citizenry,
respectively, are key in a working democratic system. Additionally, both obtain their
authority and privileges from the U.S. Constitution. The U.S. Constitution calls for the
1 Christopher Paul and James J. Kim, Reporters on the Battlefield: The Embedded Press System in Historical Context (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation National Security Research Division, 2004), xiv. 2 Ibid.
58 59
nation’s citizenry to “provide for the common defense”3 and includes “freedom of the
press” as one of the five tenets of the First Amendment.4
Although both the media and the military strive to serve the public interest and can
claim constitutional roots, tensions surface when the press attempts to gain access to
information that the military needs to maintain secret from its enemies. In reaction to this
tension, the military has employed a variety of media management strategies, which will
be reviewed in this chapter. The issue of media access to the battlefield has also has also
been debated in the U.S. court system. The U.S. Supreme Court recognized “the
different character of the military community and of the military mission”5 and, as recent
as 2004, confirmed the need to protect the national security outweighs the public’s right
to know.6 Recent surveys have shown that the American public, too, favors the military’s
need for operational security over the press’ desire for full disclosure as well.7
Finding a balance between the different goals of the media and the military is
further complicated because the “public also has goals of receiving a high level of war
coverage and in being ‘well-served’ by such coverage.”8 To achieve this, the public
relies on the press, which is regarded as the “Fourth Estate,”9 a status that recognizes the
3 U.S. CONST. Preamble. 4 U.S. CONST. Amend. I. “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.” 5 Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 758 (1974). 6 Flynt v. Rumsfeld, 543 U.S. 925; 125 S. Ct. 313 (2004). 7 Paul and Kim, Reporters on the Battlefield, xiv. 8 Ibid. 9 The term “fourth estate” is frequently attributed to the nineteenth century historian Thomas Carlyle in 1841, though he himself seems to have attributed it to Edmund Burke: “Burke said there were Three Estates in Parliament; but, in the Reporters' Gallery yonder, there sat a Fourth Estate more important than they all. It is not a figure of speech, or a witty saying; it is a literal fact, .... Printing, which comes necessarily out of Writing, I say often, is equivalent to Democracy: invent Writing, Democracy is
60
key role it plays in a democratic society and its ability to advocate and frame political
issues for consumption by the public.
Thus, the military and the media each has its own compelling rationale for
existence. They struggle to gain the confidence of the American public. This struggle is
exacerbated when the nation is under duress, particularly during times of war. The
following statement by General Dwight D. Eisenhower exemplified this precarious
balance.
The first essential in military operations is that no information of value shall be given to the enemy. The first essential in newspaper work and broadcasting is wide-open publicity. It is your job and mine to try to reconcile those sometimes diverse considerations.10
Systems of Control for Access and Operational Security
The result is a two-dimensional plane in which the media’s desire for access to the
battlefield interfaces with the military’s mission of maintaining operational security.
Christopher Paul and James J. Kim conducted a study on this interface in 2004 and
identified the various media-military relations systems that comprise each. The result is a
series of organization systems that control access and another that controls operational security.11
inevitable...... Whoever can speak, speaking now to the whole nation, becomes a power, a branch of government, with inalienable weight in law-making, in all acts of authority. It matters not what rank he has, what revenues or garnitures: the requisite thing is that he have a tongue which others will listen to; this and nothing more is requisite.” Thomas Carlyle, On Heroes, Hero-Worship and the Heroic in History (Boston: Ginn, 1901). 10 Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1944, quoted in Conduct of the Persian Gulf War, Washington, D.C.: Officer of the Secretary of Defense, Final Report to Congress, April 1992, 651, available at
61
Access is determined by the type and amount of information to which the media is
privy and the manner in which it is collected. There are four major systems for
organizing the press that have been employed by the military.
Press Pools: The military gives a small number of media representatives access to information that would otherwise be inaccessible; the pool receives a limited amount of access controlled by the military. In exchange for access and information, the members of the press pool must share their information with other news sources unable to participate because of the military’s logistical and security limitations. Press pools may include high levels of censorship, such as during the Persian Gulf War, when the U.S. military screened all news reports before broadcast or publication.12
Battlefield Exclusion: The military denies the media access to the battle space completely, such as during U.S. operations in Panama and Grenada. This complete restriction is credited to operational security needs. Often, special operations are off limits to the media. In some cases, denial of access does not eliminate coverage of the war, it merely changes the scope and perspective of the information sources, often limiting the information to that which comes from official DOD sources. In some cases, the media is denied access to the military during the operation but finds its own way to the battle space, as was the case in Haiti and Somalia.13
Embedded Press: Embedded journalists have first-person access to troops in the battlefield, accepting a set of ground rules that is relatively liberal in terms of censorship compared to other access systems. Embeds are assigned to units until they want to leave, at which time, they will not be able to rejoin the unit. Officially, embeds are not supposed to travel from unit to unit, but this study revealed that this often occurred when embeds encountered units with more desirable newsgathering opportunities, or, in the words of a participant in this study, “more action.”
Unilaterals: In this system, journalists are not necessarily assigned to military units, but they are free to travel with them, as was the case during the Vietnam War. Unilaterals have been depicted as rogue reporters traversing the battle space on their own and at their own risk.14
12 Ibid., 66-67. 13 Ibid., 65-66. 14 Ibid., 67. See also The Military-Media Relationship 2005: How the armed forces, journalists and the public view coverage of military conflict (Chicago: McCormick Tribune Foundation, 2005), 40-41.
62
I developed the following two-dimensional plane, which depicts the four systems for organizing media access to the battlefield (battlefield exclusion, press pools, embedded media, and unilaterals) relative to each other. Each system falls on this grid based on the intersection of the level of access the system provides to journalists with the amount of press freedoms the system allows for. Press freedoms include logistical support, freedom from censorship, and protection by military forces. Figure 3-1 is meant only to suggest relationships between media plans on an access/press freedoms grid and should not be interpreted as an effort to quantify those relationships, which would misrepresent the preciseness of the Paul and Kim model. In addition, it should be understood that this author has no data to support the relationships on the grid.
Figure 3-1. Wartime media-military symbiosis
63
The second set of organizational systems that Paul and Kim identified manages
operational security. These systems enable the military to control the media’s influence
on operational security. The goal of which, of course, is to minimize risk. Paul and Kim
identified three specific systems.
Credentialing: In this system, the military screens reporters through a process in which they earn credentials to cover an operation. In exchange for this access, the journalists promise to respect the agreement with the military to not reveal certain kinds of information. Negation of this contract results in expulsion from the battle space. This honor system has a positive track record between the military and the media.15
Censorship: Another traditional method with which the military attempts to protect operational security is through pre-publication censorship. Journalists still have access to the information, but are restricted from ever publishing what the military deems restricted.16
“Security at the Source”: The military places responsibility for operation security on the service member, who should be prudent to not divulge classified information to a journalist. Journalists are encouraged to ask when in doubt about the operational risk posed when sensitive, but not classified, information is published.
I developed the following spectrum to represents the various operational security strategies identified by Paul and Kim. This spectrum depicts to whom responsibility is given within each operational security strategy.
Figure 3-2. Operational security systems: Assigning responsibility among service members and journalists
15 Ibid., 68-69. 16 Ibid., 69-70.
64
Pattern of Media-Military Relations
The history of U.S. media-military relations can be explained within the context of
the dialectic theory developed by the German historian and philosopher Georg Wilhelm
Friedrich Hegel.17 Hegel approached the study of logic by investigating the fundamental
structure of reality itself. According to his paradigm, all logic, and therefore, all of
reality, is dialectical in character.18 The following section will apply this theory to the
progression of media-military relations in order to explain the development of the
Embedded Media policy and establish a framework for the future of the policy.
Hegel was influenced by Kant, who posited in Antinomies that pensive
consideration of a subject eventually leads to a contemplation of its opposite.19 Hegel
adopted this reasoning, but added a subsequent step to the human understanding of reality. He believed that human progress, in general, did not function in a pendulum-
style model, ebbing between two extremes. He supposed, instead, that two concepts, considered to be opposites, find a singular purpose when a paradigm shift occurs,
spawning a new level of thought. “Thus, human thinking invariably moves from thesis to
antithesis to synthesis, employing each synthesis as the thesis for a new opposition to be
transcended by yet a higher level, continuing in a perpetual waltz of intellectual
17 Georg Wilhelm Friedrich. Hegel (1770 – 1831), Philosophy Pages, n.d.
65 achievement.”20 I developed the following representation of the Hegelian dialectic which represents this progression.
Figure 3.3. Diagram of Hegelian Dialectic
Hegel identified reality with thought and believed that the same triadic movement is found in nature, cultural progress, and history.21 This philosophy on the progression of thought and understanding was instrumental in constructing the foundational precepts of phenomenology. “For Hegel, phenomenology referred to knowledge as it appears to
20 “The Development of Absolute Idealism,” Philosophy Pages, n.d.
21 “Thesis/Antithesis/Synthesis,” Philosophy Pages, n.d.
66
consciousness, the science of describing what one perceives, senses, and knows in one’s
immediate awareness and experience.”22 Hegel wrote in Phenomenology of the Mind that
‘meaning’ and ‘perceiving’, which formerly were superseded so far as we were concerned (für uns), are now superseded by consciousness in its own behalf (für es). Reason sets out to know the truth, to find in the form of a notion what, for ‘meaning’ and ‘perceiving’, is a ‘thing’; i.e., it seeks in thinghood to have merely the consciousness of its own self. 23
Hegel’s interpretation had limited influence on Husserl in his development of the
individual tenets of phenomenology, but his basic definition of phenomenology is still a
benchmark in the development of the phenomenological theory. Hegel’s separate theory
of the dialectic indirectly relates to phenomenology in that they both comment on the
development of human consciousness. Phenomenology describes consciousness on the
individual scale and the dialectic describes it on the larger, societal scale. Thus, the
dialectic serves as an effective companion framework with which to explain the evolution
of media-military relations.
Thesis
The history of military-media relations in the United States begins with the
Colonial Period. On April 19, 1775, when the Revolutionary War began with the battle
at Lexington, 37 newspapers were published in the colonies.24 Press coverage was
22 From Harper & Row’s Torchbooks' edition (1967) of the Phenomenology (1807), translated by J B Baillie (1910), from University of Idaho, Department of Philosophy, thanks to Jean McIntire. § numbers from the Baillie translation have been inserted into the text of the Baillie translation and linked to explanations by J N Findlay. Links to original German text: Phänemenologie des Geistes,
67
almost wholly dependent upon the correspondence of Colonial soldiers. Newspapers had no organized means by which to cover the war. For the most part, the colonists garnered
their war updates from the sporadic arrival of private letters and official and semi-official
messages.25
The reliance on correspondence from the frontlines continued during the War of
1812.26 Up until this point, the press industry in America had served primarily as a
resource by which to make mass reproductions of publications rather than a gatherer of
the news.27 The concept of the modern journalist had not yet emerged.
However, by the time the Mexican-American War began in 1846,28 the American
press had developed from a printing industry into one focused on newsgathering.29 While there was still reliance on reports from soldiers, it was the first time that newspapers implemented an organized means by which to cover a U.S. military conflict. The
Mexican-American War marked the introduction of the modern war correspondent. The military placed no restrictions on the press. In fact, the legendary feats of journalists who rode into battle on horseback along side General Zachary Taylor still color passionate arguments for increased press freedoms on the battlefield. 30 This style of war
correspondence marked the beginning of an era of amicable military-media relations in
which the military granted wide-ranging access to the first war correspondents without
25 See generally Nathaniel Lande, Dispatches From The Front: News Accounts Of American Wars, 1776-1991 (New York: H. Holt, 1995). 26 Ibid. 27 Leonard W. Levy, Emergence of a Free Press (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985), 87. 28 Lande, Dispatches From The Front. 29 Levy, Emergence of a Free Press, 86-87. 30 Lande, Dispatches From The Front, 52.
68
censorship. As a result, Americans waiting anxiously at home were able to keep abreast
of the war “more closely and quickly than ever before.”31
The Civil War was the first American conflict extensively covered by large
numbers of professional war correspondents.32 In general, war correspondents in this
conflict enjoyed access, freedom from censorship, and logistical support. While there
were some reports of commanders from both the North and South banishing reporters
from their camps, 33 there were equal accounts confirming that the press was afforded wide privileges of access and support by the armies they covered. The North, however, had a more sophisticated and established press industry, thus affording it more correspondents to cover the war. News coverage of the Southern offensive was sparse in comparison.34
The period between the American Civil War and First World War (1865-1914) is
considered a “Golden Age” for the war correspondent because of the rise of the popular
press, the increasing use of the telegraph, and the “tardy introduction of organized
censorship.”35 Just before the turn of the century, the era of Yellow Journalism began.36
Media moguls, such as newspaperman William Randolph Hearst, fueled the American
appetite for sensational news content.37 While muckrakers initially served as newsmen
31 Ibid., 51. See generally Donald Paneth, Encyclopedia of American Journalism (New York: Facts on File, Inc., 1983). 32 Brayton Harris, Blue And Gray In Black and White (Washington: Brassey’s, 1999). 33 Lande, Dispatches From The Front, 96-97. 34 Harris, Blue And Gray In Black and White. See also Phillip Knightley, The First Casualty: The War Correspondent as Hero, Propagandist and Myth-Maker from the Crimea to Iraq (London: André Deutsch, 2003), 19-41. 35 Knightley, The First Casualty, 43. 36 Lande, Dispatches From The Front, 127-128. 37 Ibid., 126.
69 attempting to unearth government hypocrisy and fraud, the journalism industry developed into a scoop-hungry press focused on sensationalism.38 In 1898, the United States made a hasty entrance into the Spanish-American War—a development widely credited to the scandalous reports of yellow journalists.39 “[T]he Spanish-American War was bred, not born ….[I]n ‘yellow journalism,’ events were transformed into both hard drama and melodramatic stories driven by violence and action.”40 Military commanders allowed the press wide freedoms during this conflict, including access to the beachhead as U.S. forces went ashore.41 In the aftermath of the conflict, military leaders interpreted the media’s audacity in newsgathering as intrusive and sensational.42 Relations between the media and the military grew tense, resulting in a degradation of trust between the military and the press.
Antithesis
The next evolution in media access to the battlefield occurred during World War I.
Long before the United States joined the Allied Powers in Europe, the British and the
French had imposed strict restrictions on the press covering the war.43 U.S. military leaders, keen to the sensational zeal of the media during the Spanish-American War,44
38 Ibid. See generally Paneth, Encyclopedia of American Journalism. 39 Ibid. 40 Ibid., 127. 41 Ibid. 42 Ibid., 128. 43 Drew Middleton, “Barring Reporters From The Battlefield,” The New York Times, 5 Feb 1984, S6, 37. 44 Lande, Dispatches From The Front.
70 adopted restrictive regulations.45 As the war continued, the demand in the United States for news from the war front increased. To meet the demand, the military initiated a carrot and stick-style credentialing system.46 In exchange for unrestricted access to U.S. troops in combat, the media was obliged to accept blanket censorship by government and military officials. In general, the media did not object to the military’s restrictive system because the pro-war sentiment of the American public permeated the American press as well.47 However, reporters sometimes “rewrote” stories after returning from the theater of operations, breaking their correspondent’s pledge to have their stories reviewed by military authorities before publication.48 The credentialing policy negated the censorship-free environment the press had enjoyed in earlier U.S. military conflicts. The credentialing system made it possible for the DOD to retain control of American war correspondents in the combat area while satiating the public’s demand for news about the war.49
During World War II, military censorship was established almost immediately.50
Military authorities cut off news reports from the United Press Office in Honolulu after the attack on Pearl Harbor.51 The government’s Office of Censorship published a Code
45 War Reporting: Reader’s Companion to Military History, n.d.
71 of Wartime Practice, which detailed the military’s restrictive measures for the press.52 A system of accreditation was implemented, much like the one used during WWI.
There were correspondents present at the landings of Normandy and when the
Marines battled for Iwo Jima; some even parachuted into enemy territory with U.S. troops. However, the press was not allowed to cover significant battles like the Battle of
Midway and the submarine raid on Macon Island by Carlson’s Raiders in 1942. There were no firsthand accounts by the press when the first atomic bomb was dropped on
Hiroshima.53 Blanket censorship of media reports was the standard. Access to military operations was only granted to those members of the press who agreed to prior review of their reports by official military censors.54 There was not a great deal of opposition from the media in response to these restrictions. “[T]he habit became firmly established of evaluating news in terms of its service to the war.”55 The popular sentiment of this war, like WWI, colored the reports of iconic war correspondents, like Ernie Pyle, who was known as the “soldier’s journalist.”56 However, this unofficial partnership between the
52 Office of Censorship, Code of Wartime Practice for American Broadcasters (1942). For a survey of the initial operations of the Office of Censorship, see, Robert E. Summers, Wartime Censorship of Press and Radio (New York: Wilson, 1942, 1942), 86-128. 53 John MacVane, On The Air In World War II (New York: William Morrow and Company, Inc., 1979). 54 Knightley, The First Casualty, 130. See generally Paneth, Encyclopedia of American Journalism. 55 Mathews, Reporting The Wars, 175. 56 Ernie Pyle (1900-1945), an American newspaperman, won a Pulitzer Prize in 1944 for his syndicated columns during World War II. Pyle became one of the best-loved reporters in the United States. He is sometimes criticized for losing objectivity because of the close relationships he developed with the troops he reported on. Pyle was eventually killed by a sniper’s bullet while reporting on the island of Ie Shima, just off the coast of Okinawa, where island-hopping American forces were making a push toward mainland Japan. Although Pyle was not part of an official “embedding” program, critics of the Embedded Media Program have used Pyle as an example of the loss of objectivity that occurs when a reporter is gets too close to the members of a unit. “The Wartime Columns of Ernie Pile,” Indiana University School of Journalism,
72
military and the media would wane with the introduction of a less popular war and more
cynical military leaders.
Tensions between the military and the media surfaced during the Korean War.
Colonel Pat Echols, who was the press chief for U.S. Forces Pacific Commander General
Douglas MacArthur, publicly expressed his disdain for the press, calling journalists his
“natural enemies.”57 In an ironic twist, Echols did not initially impose pre-publication
censorship on the press, but, when he and General MacArthur read published reports with
which they disagreed, they would routinely expel the journalists responsible.58 War
correspondents eventually went to Echols and asked for a system of prior review in order
to avoid being barred from the military operation all together.59 In December of 1950,
full censorship of media representatives in theater was established.60 One year later, war
correspondents were under the complete jurisdiction of the Army and were even subject
to courts-martial proceedings. Courts-martial proceedings are a judicial review of alleged misconduct generally reserved for members of the U.S. Armed Services. They are adjudicated in a separate military judicial system in accordance with the Uniform
Code of Military Justice (U.C.M.J.).61 Limited logistical support from the military made
the media’s mere existence on the battlefield—let alone its ability to cover it—difficult.
General MacArthur was eventually relieved of his command in theater after voicing his
57 Knightley, The First Casualty, 338. 58 Ibid., 337. Ninety percent of correspondents covering the war requested the imposition of military censorship. See, also, Mathews at 198. 59 Knightly, The First Casualty, 337. 60 Ibid., 345-346. 61 Ibid.
73
discontent with the U.S. Administration’s policies. Censorship policies were relaxed
after his exit, but still continued in many forms.
Censorship of the media by the military continued in the 1961 Bay of Pigs
invasion. In preparation for the U.S. invasion of Cuba, the Kennedy Administration
requested the media not report on its potential maneuver into Cuba. Most media outlets
agreed, as they had during the earlier World Wars. Few newspapers did not comply with
the de facto injunction. 62 When the Bay of Pigs invasion was aborted, the media was a natural target for public criticism. Criticism of the media’s lack of impartiality and
failure to check the government’s actions spurred a national debate.
Synthesis Becomes the New Thesis
The Vietnam War ushered in a new era in military-media relations. 63 Members of
the American military were sent to South Vietnam under the auspices of “advisors,” and
were not participating in an overt offensive action.64 This made censorship of the media
by the military “politically impractical.”65 As “guests” of the South Vietnamese, the U.S.
military was merely an extension of the administration. As such, excluding the press
would be seen as unnecessarily restrictive.66 This conflict marked the greatest amount of
access and the least amount of censorship thus far in media-military relations during
wartime.67 However, the illusion that there was no censorship whatsoever and that
62 Paneth, Encyclopedia of the Press, 103. 63 See generally Daniel C. Hallin, The Uncensored War (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986); Don Rignalda, Fighting and Writing The Vietnam War (Jackson, MS: University Press of Mississippi, 1994.) 64 Hallin, The Uncensored War, 9. 65 Ibid. 66 Ibid. 67 Ibid., 6. See generally Paneth, Encyclopedia of American Journalism.
74 journalists operated free of any military restrictions has since been debunked. Certain military bases were off limits to the media during the war, military escorts sometimes accompanied journalists, and service members were given instructions on what information was appropriate for discussion with the media, which often excluded military policy.68
In response to the criticism it had received when it cooperated with the government during the Bay of Pigs invasion, the press took a more objective stance in its Vietnam coverage. Political independence became a badge of distinction for the reporter. With that came a healthy distrust of leaders who held political power and, by extension, the military executing its foreign affairs policies.
Television delivered the realities of war into American living rooms for the first time in history.69 Media products, such as Morley Safer’s CBS-TV broadcast from the burning village of Cam Ne, South Vietnam, and AP photographer Eddie Adams’ 1968 photograph of General Nguyen Ngoc Loan executing a Viet Cong soldier, won critical acclaim. CBS News aired images of American Marines setting fire to the thatched huts of
Vietnamese villages with their Zippo lighters.70 Journalists aired images of the Vietnam conflict that starkly contrasted the positive spin propagated by the DOD.71
68 Sharkey, Under Fire, 40-41. See also William M. Hammond, U.S. Army in Vietnam – Public Affairs: The Military and the Media, 1962-1968 (Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History – U. S. Army, 1988), 16-17, 29-30, 44-45, 72, 93, 160, 366-67. 69 Hallin, Daniel C., Uncensored War: The Media and Vietnam (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989), 114-147. 70 Sharkey, Under Fire, 6. 71 Ibid.
75
The first “living room war” influenced the American public’s ability to be informed
about its government’s actions.72 American sentiment for the war began to dwindle,
unlike the popular sentiment that had characterized the first and second World Wars,
when the press succumbed to complete censorship from the military.73
In response to the caustic portrayal of the war by the press, the Nixon
Administration began an equally critical anti-media campaign. U.S. Vice President Spiro
T. Agnew attacked the three national television networks for their coverage of the
Vietnam War. He characterized their coverage as hostile to President Richard Nixon and
lacking in credibility. He assailed media leaders as elitist and dictatorial. He claimed that they used their power in the media in a dictatorial fashion, representing only the upper echelons of the nation and not the views of the majority of American citizens.
“Agnew was a master of the memorable phrase—he called journalists ‘nattering nabobs of negativism,’ a phrase actually coined by William Safire, then a White House speechwriter.”74
Anti-war demonstrations and seething pressure against the administration led to the
military’s withdrawal from Vietnam. Some military and government leaders blamed the
Unites States’ unofficial defeat on the media’s critical coverage, both in print and
broadcast, of the war. As a result, the government became gun-shy of the media.75 The
media demonstrated that it wielded an incredible power to influence public opinion. It
72 See generally Paneth, Encyclopedia of American Journalism. 73 Ibid., 211. 74 Goldstein, Tom, Killing the Messenger: 100 Years of Media Criticism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1989). 75 Ibid.,
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asserted its independence and import alongside the other branches of government.76 The media had irrevocably separated itself from the military and the government. In doing so, it also solidified some military leaders’ opinions that the media was the military’s
“natural enemy.”77 In the wake of the Watergate scandal and other press exposes, the
DOD soon made a radical shift to more restrictive press policies and the most restrictive
period in media-military relations yet.78 Hallin posited that the idea that the media “[lost]
the war” is often assumed, but that the evidence shows otherwise. He said it is probably
that American power could have been used more effectively during the Vietnam War if officials had had more control over the media, but that the media is not the catch-all fall
guy for the failure of U.S. forces and policy during the conflict.79
The 1960s encompassed a volatile societal environment in the United States.
Pivotal events, like the assassinations of President John F. Kennedy, such as Reverend
Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., and Sen. Robert F. Kennedy, the Vietnam War abroad, and
urban riots at home encouraged the burgeoning of an underground press, which
represented divergent views apart from the mainstream media that the public had come to
distrust. A league of writers was inspired to charge against the established press in
virulent, cynical, and autonomous voices, establishing a new genre of writing.80
Additionally, trade and academic journals, such as the Columbia Journalism Review,
More, and Chicago Journalism Review criticized established media’s ethics, practices,
and standards. A number of books on the subject of press criticism were generated.
76 Ibid., 9. 77 Knightley, The First Casualty, 46. See generally Paneth, Encyclopedia of American Journalism. 78 Knightley, The First Casualty, 211-212. 79 Sharkey, Under Fire, 211. 80 Paneth, Encyclopedia of the Press, p. 103.
77
Published criticisms included James R. Wiggins’ Freedom or Secrecy (1964), David
Halberstam’s The Making of a Quagmire (1965), Malcolm W. Browne’s The New Face
of War (1968), James Aronson’s Information War (1970) and Deadline for the Media
(1972).81
Second Antithesis
The government’s distrust of the media surfaced in policies toward the media in the
1980s. In October 1983, U.S. forces invaded the Caribbean nation of Grenada in
Operation Urgent Fury. The Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS) requested
assistance from member nations in 1983 when the overthrow and execution of Grenadian
Prime Minister Maurise Bishop and other government officials threatened regional
security. The United States and six other Caribbean countries invaded Grenada to restore
the government and safeguard the Americans and other foreigners on the island.82 Not a single member of the civilian press witnessed the event unfold. The media were limited to reporting the invasion from Panama and Barbados as U.S. forces went ashore in
Grenada. For two and a half days, no independent, firsthand reports were made. This was the first time that American reporters were completely excluded from an overt U.S. combat operation.83 It marked a complete reversal from the no-holds barred access that
the media experienced during the Vietnam War. Instead, President Ronald Reagan dictated that coverage of the invasion would be handled strictly by military press agents.84 The civilian press fervently demanded access, but it was not until the initial invasion was over—a matter of days—that just one civilian reporter was added to the
81 Ibid. 82 See generally Sharkey, Under Fire. 83 Ibid. 84 William Safire, “Us Against Them,” The New York Times, 39 Oct 1983, E19.
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press pool of military correspondents covering the invasion. A press pool was defined in
the Defense Department National Media Pool Ground Rules as a group of media
representatives who cover events as a whole and are responsible for disseminating the
news to the media at large. The pool system accommodated the logistical limitations of
the media as it attempted to support the large numbers of journalists who requested
access to military operations. 85 When civilian reporters were finally allowed on the
island, none was allowed to travel without a military escort.86
Grenada was a slap to the democratic face of a free press. In 1984, heated editorials arguing for increased press access to military operations were published in major newspapers and broadcast on the network news stations.87 In the wake of the
negative press that the military’s media policies in Grenada received, Joint Chiefs of Staff
formed a review panel headed by Major General Winant Sidle, a former military
spokesman in Vietnam. 88 The Sidle Panel included representatives from leading
journalism schools and retired members of the press. However, active members of the press chose not to participate in the proceedings. The general question posed to the panel
was, “How do we conduct military operations in a manner that safeguards the lives of our
military and protects the security of the operation while keeping the American public
85 Sharkey, Under Fire, 76. See generally Paneth, Encyclopedia of American Journalism. 86 Ibid. 87 “Grenada – and Mount Suribachi,” The New York Times, 28 October 1983, A26; “U.S. Press Curbs: The Unanswered Questions,” The New York Times, 29 October 1983, A1. Sam Zagoria, Damning The Messenger, The Washington Post, 18 April 1984, A26. Arthur Unger, “The 'Inside Story' on guarding press freedom,” Christian Science Monitor, 20 Jan 1984, Arts & Leisure, 22. 88 “A Second Look at Off-the-Record War” Time, 21 Nov 1984, 77.
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informed through the media?”89 The report made eight major recommendations on
military-media relations for war coverage, including accreditation of journalists,
logistical support for the media, and military public affairs planning. Recommendations
that operational planning be conducted concurrently with public affairs planning and that the military provide support personnel to assist and facilitate the media’s news gathering
were met with satisfaction from the media,90 but some of the major recommendations
ignored the media’s most blatant complaints. For example, the Sidle Panel recommended
continued use of the “pool system” of coverage, which had been used during Grenada
and to which there was much consternation from the press.
In August of 1984, Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger made the panel’s
findings public and ordered that the recommendations be put into effect. Initially, the
panel’s findings represented apparent diplomatic progress between the military and the
media.91 However, the majority of the recommendations were never actually
implemented into military policy.
Some members of the press took the plight for battlefield access to the courts. In
Flynt v. Weinberger,92 Larry Flynt, publisher of Hustler magazine, sought declaratory
and injunctive relief against Secretary Weinberger, alleging that the exclusion of
correspondents from Hustler magazine from the U.S. invasion of Grenada was a violation
of the First Amendment guarantee of a free press. The court held that a challenge to the
89 The Sidle Panel Report, available in Jaqueline Sharkey, Under Fire: U.S. Military restrictions on the Media from Grenada to the Persian Gulf (Washington: The Center For Public Integrity, 1991), Appendix B. 90 Ibid. 91 Charles Mohr, “The Continuing Battle Over Covering the Wars,” The New York Times, 14 Sept 1984, A24. 92 Flynt v. Weinberger, 762 F. 2d 134 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
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press exclusion from Grenada was moot because the conflict at issue—the actual military
operation—was no longer active.93 Though the case was resolved with the court’s decision, the question of whether the media had a Fist Amendment right to the military during combat was not. Flynt and other media organizations were dissatisfied with the
court’s deference to the military and the obfuscation of the issue.94
During the 1989 U.S. invasion of Panama, the military once again employed the
press pool system despite the media’s complaints after Grenada.95 Though there was
greater civilian media representation in the pool during this conflict, it was too little, too
late. The press pool arrived after the main military offensive occurred. Immediately
upon landing, the press pool was ushered into a briefing room and presented a lecture on
the history of Panama.96 Media leaders once again vocalized their angst over limited
access to military offensives. In response to negative press coverage of the
administration’s restrictive policies, a military panel was formed to review the military’s
press policies. The panel blamed the inadequacy of the military’s press policies on a lack
of planning on the part of the military, not on an overt effort to exclude the press.
93 Ibid. 94 The Doctrine of “capable of repetition yet evading review” was not applied in Flynt or subsequent cases dealing with the First Amendment issue of media access to the battlefield. The doctrine allows for a case to go forward if it presents a challenge with which other persons will frequently be faced even if its resolution will not result in a timely remedy for the parties involved. For example, the 1973 United States Supreme Court case of Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) challenged a Texas law forbidding abortion in most circumstances. The state argued that the case was moot because plaintiff Roe was no longer pregnant by the time the case was heard. The Court cited Southern Pacific Terminal Co. v. ICC, 219 U.S. 498, 515 (1911), which had held that a case was not moot when it presented an issue that was "capable of repetition, yet evading review.”
95 Jaqueline Sharkey, Under Fire, 93. See also, Paul and Kim, Reporters on the Battlefield, 40-41. 96 Ibid., 91-105.
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In the 1990s, the press pool system was tested once again.97 In August 1990, Iraqi
troops crossed the country’s southern border into the small, oil-rich Persian Gulf nation
of Kuwait. The United States began amassing forces in Saudi Arabia in preparation for
the liberation of Kuwait. The DOD referred to the buildup of U.S. forces in Saudi Arabia
between August 1990 and January 1991 as Operation Desert Shield. 98 By January 1992, the U.S. began air strikes against Iraqi troops. The DOD referred to the military offensive to liberate Kuwait from Iraqi control as Operation Desert Storm.
Coalition ground forces crossed into Iraq and Kuwait on February 23, 1991.99 Less than two dozen press representatives were initially granted credentials to join the official
DOD press pool that organized to cover the war.100 The apparent disparity in numbers
between civilian journalists and the tens of thousands of U.S. service members
participating in the operation resulted in a futile effort by the press pool to effectively
cover the war.101 While the U.S. built up its forces in neighboring Saudi Arabia, press
leaders at home grew frustrated with the disproportionate amount of representation.
In early 1991, The Nation magazine was joined by several other press organizations
in a lawsuit against the DOD.102 Like Flynt, Nation claimed a First Amendment right of access to military units in combat. The plaintiffs alleged that the press regulations implemented during Operation Desert Storm/Desert Shield (The Persian Gulf War) violated the First and Fifth Amendments. Less than a week after Nation was filed, U.S.
97 Ibid., 109. See generally Paneth, Encyclopedia of American Journalism. 98 Ibid. 99 Ibid. 100 Ibid., 109. See also Sharkey, Under Fire, 111. 101 Sharkey, Under Fire. 102 Nation Magazine v. United States Department of Defense, 762 F. Supp. 1558 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
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forces launched the first air strikes against Iraqi troops. In this case, the court ruled that
mootness was not an issue since the conflict in question was still underway when the case
was heard, but the court dismissed the case based on findings that the issues presented
were not of a “clear-cut and concrete form”103 and that “the Supreme Court had not
articulated any guiding standards.”104
During the U.S. offensive against Iraqi troops that invaded Kuwait, there were
1,400 members of the press in the Persian Gulf region, but only 131 of them were
actually assigned to the military’s press pool and afforded access to U.S. troops. In exchange for this access, wholesale censorship of their news products was invoked. All transmissions by the press pool covering the war were accompanied by a disclosure statement signifying that the U.S. military had reviewed the content of the report before its dissemination.
Caustic editorials complaining about the state of military-media relations once again surfaced in major publications and broadcasts. The media argued that it was ready to play an integral part in the planning of its role during military operations. In late
September 1991, a group of five media representatives and Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Public Affairs Pete Williams began coordinating revisions to the DOD media ground rules. This marked the first time that media leaders collaborated with the DOD on the review process of a DOD press policy. The result came to be known as the Joint
103 Nation Magazine v. United States Department of Defense, 762 F. Supp. 1558 (S.D.N.Y. 1991), 44 (citing Rescue Army v. Municipal Court of Los Angeles, 331 U.S. 549, at 584). 104 Nation Magazine v. United States Department of Defense, 762 F. Supp. 1558 (S.D.N.Y. 1991), at 44).
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Doctrine for Public Affairs,105 which encouraged maximum access whenever possible for
the media to military operations, including combat operations, increased logistical
support for media, and treatment of the media as if they were part of the military unit,
which they were covering. The directive also established the information security
strategy known as “security at the source,” in which service members would ensure that
classified material was not divulged to the media
In the mid-1990s the U.S. deployed its military in humanitarian operations to
Bosnia. It was during this operation that the basic concept of embedding emerged in U.S.
military operations. In Bosnia, the media were much freer to move around than they had
been in the Middle East during the Persian Gulf War. The military perceived the media’s
presence as less of a burden and more of an opportunity to advance its efforts. The
“military had clear ideas both of their objectives in Bosnia and of how the American
media might help them meet those objectives.”106 U.S. military leaders in Bosnia stated
their three goals in respect to the media:
Gain support of the American public for the conduct of the operation;
Maintain the morale of American troops; and
Use the media influence to promote compliance among the former warring factions with the Dayton Accords.
To meet these objectives, military planners lessened the controls of the press pool
system and devised a plan in which media personnel were assigned to individual military
units for a two-week period. These units would provide their respective embeds with
105 Pascale Combelles-Siegel, The Troubled Path to the Pentagon’s Rules On Media Access to the Battlefield: Grenada to Today (15 May 1996), U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute,
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logistical support and protection. The military lifted its use of pre-publication censorship
and instituted “security at the source.”107
As a result of the embedding system, about 40 reporters accompanied Coalition
troops on the ground in Bosnia for two weeks in order to get “a more nuanced picture of
[U.S.] activities by allowing them virtually free access to the soldiers and
commanders.”108 The military’s objective behind embedding was to allow the media to
report “at points of conflict as a means of demonstrating the transparency of [its]
operations and the firmness of [its] purpose.”109 Military public affairs officials discovered the advantage of media presence during a military operation, the fruits of
which were dissemination of its message, publicity about its progress, and iconic visual
representations of its victory.
The next major U.S. military operation occurred in reaction to the September 11,
2001 terrorist attacks after which the United States began offensive operations in
Afghanistan against the Taliban. Despite the media-military cooperation in Bosnia, military practices toward the media in Afghanistan were no more progressive than what had been implemented during the Persian Gulf War a decade earlier. The media were restricted from accompanying troops on most missions because of the nature of the warfighting. The military excluded the media from most special operation missions, which played a primary role in the offensive. Information about the conflict was strictly controlled by the U.S. government.
107 Ibid. 108 Ibid., (citing William L. Nash, “The Military and the Media in Bosnia,” Harvard International Journal Press/Politics, Sept 1998, Vol. 3, No. 4, 131-135.) 109 Greg McLaughlin, The War Correspondent (London: Pluto Press, 2002).
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Eventually, the DOD gave in to media pressure for increased access and implemented an informal system of embedding like the one that had been used briefly during military operations in Bosnia.110 Brigadier General Andrew Davis, director of
Marine Corps Public Affairs during the Iraq War, commented on the execution of the
embed process during U.S. military operations in Afghanistan: He said
it was done ad hoc. There was no rhyme or reason to it. But on the longest amphibious assault in the history of warfare, six journalists made the initial assault to be followed by a total of about 40 others that we cycled into country. The Army picked up on it and they started embedding by the time (Operation) Anaconda happened. That really signaled the success of the embedding process. At that point, we had 350 stories about the Marines even though that wasn’t our principal war, just because we had the reporters with us.
Larry Flynt, the publisher who unsuccessfully sued the DOD in the 1980s, alleging
a First Amendment violation when his reporters were restricted from covering the
Grenada campaign, reintroduced the issue to the courts in 2001 in reaction to the
military’s restrictive management of the press in Afghanistan. In Flynt v. Rumsfeld,111
Flynt and his publishing company asserted that their First Amendment and Due Process rights were violated by the DOD's refusal to allow the magazine's correspondents to accompany troops in combat and to report the military’s activities.112 The DOD argued
against Flynt’s motion on several grounds, including the assertion that judicial review of military decisions with respect to media access to the battlefield may be inappropriate.113
The U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia denied the motion for
preliminary injunction, stating that Flynt failed to demonstrate a high probability of
110 Alicia C Shepard, Narrowing the Gap: Military, Media and the Iraq War, Catigny Conference Series Conference Report (Chicago: Robert R. McCormick Tribune Foundation, 2004), 20-21. 111 180 F. Supp. 2d 174 (2002). 112 Id., at 1. 113 Id., at 2.
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success or irreparable harm. The court held that an appropriate case there could be a substantial likelihood of demonstrating “that under the First Amendment the press is
guaranteed a right to gather and report news involving United States military operations
on foreign soil subject to reasonable regulations to protect the safety and security of both
the journalists and those involved in those operations, as well as the secrecy and
confidentiality of information whose dissemination could endanger United States soldiers
or our allies or compromise military operations.”114 However, Flynt failed to show that
the DOD denied him the access he sought or that he necessarily would have been denied
such access if he had pursued the matter through the available channels.115
On appeal, the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia dismissed Flynt’s claims and refused to exercise its discretion to declare a DOD directive that controlled
media access to combat troops facially unconstitutional.116 The appeal was again denied
by the District Of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals.117 The U.S. Supreme Court
denied hearing the case in 2004.118
The Second Synthesis becomes the new Thesis
While Flynt’s case played out in the courts, the United States began to prepare for a
second offensive in Iraq. In 2002, U.S. forces deployed to Kuwait for a potential
offensive against the Iraqi Republican Guard Forces. The U.S. media pressured the DOD
for access to the ensuing war. Bryan Whitman, the deputy assistant secretary for media
operations at the DOD, said in retrospect as he recounted how the Embedded Media
114 Id., at 4-5. 115 Id, at 1. 116 Flynt v. Rumsfeld, 359 U.S. App. D.C. 402 (2004). 117 Flynt v. Rumsfeld, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 7005 (D.C. Cir., Apr. 7, 2004). 118 543 U.S. 925; 125 S. Ct. 313 (2004).
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policy was developed, that his staff had three main courses of action from which it could choose to deal with the media during the impending Iraq war with Iraq: 119
Revert to the unpopular and restrictive method of press pooling employed during the Invasion of Grenada and the Persian Gulf War.
Continue the policies in effect in nearby Afghanistan in which the media’s access to the battlefield was strictly limited and information flow was controlled through official press briefings in theater and at the Pentagon.
Develop and implement the embedded concept introduced during the Bosnia operation, which incorporated individual journalists into military units, provided them with support and protection, and relied on security at the source instead of pre-publication censorship as a means of protecting confidential information.
Whitman said the DOD made the decision to implement the third option and call it the Embedded Media Program. Whitman said that the planning for the Embedded Media
Program began in the latter half of 2002.120 At the Pentagon, senior public affairs
officials did not pinpoint a sole creator or mastermind behind the program. Some
mainstream media reports credited Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs
Victoria Clarke with devising the program,121 but senior officials involved with its development, including Whitman, often referred to it as a collaborative effort between
many individuals within the military and the administration who recognized the
significant role the media would play in the conduct of the war. He said, “[T]here is
plenty of credit to go around for [the Embedded Media policy],” and he credited the
“strong support of Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld; Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff, General Richard Meyers; the vision and enthusiasm of people like Victoria
119 Sylvester and Huffman, Reporting from the Front, 42. 120 Ibid. 121 Vernon Loeb, “Pentagon’s Clarke Quits, Citing Personal Reasons,” The Washington Post, 17 June 2003, A02.
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(Tori) Clarke; and all of the public affairs officers who really made it happen in the
field.”122
Whitman also noted the invaluable role of the press in the formulation of the
program. “I worked with [the Washington Bureau chiefs of the major news
organizations] on a daily basis as we started to put this together, developing a construct
that would allow them to accomplish their mission without interfering with our mission.”123 Public Affairs Officer Major Tim Blair was responsible for matching the
more than 600 journalists who applied for embedding credentials with appropriate
military units. Blair said, “I certainly don’t like to take more credit than I am due
because I certainly had a wonderful opportunity to manage and implement the
program.”124
Clarke played a central role in assuaging military leaders’ apprehension about their
new companions on the battlefield. Just days into the Iraq War, General Tommy Franks,
Commander of the U.S. Central Command, wanted to prematurely terminate the
program. After numerous attempts over secure Pentagon communications channels,
Clarke was able to reach General Franks in Qatar in order to resolve his doubts. Clarke
said, “I told him that we had in place a plan designed to deal with problems as they
occurred…All the contingencies he was concerned about were covered in the plan and
we were prepared to deal with them.”125
122 Sylvester and Huffman, Reporting from the Front, 42. 123 Ibid., 42. 124 Ibid., 43. 125 “Inside Victoria Clarke’s Two Years at the Pentagon,” 2003 Public Relations Society of America International Conference, n.d.
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The DOD Public Affairs Office (PAO) unveiled the Embedded Media Program in
early 2003 as U.S. military forces prepared in Kuwait for a second round with Iraq. The
purpose of the policy and the ground rules for its execution were explained in a 13-page
military directive entitled, “Public Affairs Guidance (PAG) On Embedding Media During
Possible Future Operations/Deployments in the U.S. Central Commands (CENTCOM) of
Responsibility (AOR).”126 Senior DOD public affairs officials said the plan was
designed with both the military and the media in mind. At a Foreign Press Center
briefing in early 2003, Whitman said that the Embedded Media policy was designed to
meet the needs of the media while achieving the DOD’s need for global reach of its efforts.127 The Embedded Media policy was radically different from the press policies
employed just a year earlier in Afghanistan when U.S. troops responded to the 2001 Al
Qaeda terror attacks.
The overarching theme of the Embedded Media policy guidance was clear.
Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld signed the policy, which promised the media “…long-
term, minimally restrictive access to U.S. air, ground and Naval forces through
embedding.”128 He said, “…we must organize for and facilitate access of national and
international media to our forces…with the goal of doing so right from the start.”129
126 Department of Defense (DOD) Directive, “Public Affairs Guidance (PAG) On Embedding Media During Possible Future Operations/Deployments in the U.S. Central Commands (CENTCOM) of Responsibility (AOR),” 10 Feb 2003, from the Secretary of Defense Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense-Public Affairs to the Secretary of Defense Chairs,
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In addition to the security regulations to which the media would have to abide, the
PAG established that logistical support would be made widely available and that embeds
would be able to gather and report the news in an environment relatively free of
censorship. The directive promoted an attitude that facilitated access for the press
whenever possible.130
One element of the PAG, in particular, best personifies the reversal in attitude of
the military toward the media. Regardless of the unsuccessful outcomes of three previous
court cases in which the media alleged a First Amendment right to access and cover U.S.
troops during combat, the PAG stated that the media did in fact have a “right” to do just
that.
These ground rules recognize the right of the media to cover military operations and are in no way intended to prevent release of derogatory, embarrassing, negative or uncomplimentary information.131
The general overtone of the PAG encouraged partnership between the media and
military commanders. In a briefing with the press, Clarke’s deputy, Bryan Whitman, told journalists that
[there has been] a lot of heavy lifting [by the media]. I really appreciate the time, energy and really the investments that you’ve made in particularly the embedding process…the success of this is really going to be dependent on not only us but also on [you]. It really is a two-way street and there is some mutual responsibility on the part of both you and us to make this work.132
Clarke, and members of her staff, met with the media repeatedly during the development of the plan. She said her agenda to keep lines of communication open with
130 Ibid. 131 DOD Directive, PAG, 10 Feb 2003, 4. 132 Bryan Whitman, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs (media operations), ASD PA Clarke Meeting with Bureau Chiefs, United States Department of Defense News Transcript, 27 Feb 2003 http://www.defenselink.mi/transcripts/2003/t02282003_t0227bc.html (accessed March 21, 2005).
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the media continued after the plan was unveiled. In an interview with Columbia
Journalism Review about the development of the Embedded Media policy, Clarke
reflected on what she learned during the Afghanistan campaign about media management
that influenced the embedding system she helped establish in Iraq. “I don’t think I …
communicated clearly enough down the line to people on the ground in Afghanistan and
elsewhere what our intent is and what our expectations are in terms of handling the
media.”133
An Argument for Embedding: Combating Misinformation
More than 2,300 years ago, the ancient Chinese strategist Sun Tzu appreciated the
value of information in the conduct of war. He said that information about one’s own
forces, allied forces, and opposing forces was a key feature of military operations.
If you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not fear the result of a hundred battles. If you know yourself but not the enemy, for every victory gained you will also suffer a defeat. If you know neither the enemy nor yourself, you will succumb in every battle.134
Information warfare in the Digital Age relies on the same principle described by
Sun Tzu: the use and management of information with the purpose of obtaining a
competitive advantage over one’s opponent.135 Information warfare may involve collection of tactical information, confirmation of the validity of one's own information, the dissemination of propaganda or disinformation among the enemy, undermining the quality of the opposing force’s information and denial of its information collection
133 “Afghanistan and Beyond: Q&A with Victoria Clarke,” Columbia Journalism Review, Issue I: Jan/Feb, 2002,
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opportunities.136 It may also take the form of a government using its own media as a tool of disinformation.
The following description in Columbia Journalism Review explains how the media
can be targeted by its own government to employ informational warfare.
The weaponization of information is not original to the war in Iraq, nor is it unique to any military engagement during what has come to be known as the Information Age. Journalists have always encountered wartime spin, they have been the targets of propaganda and selective leaks, and, on occasion, have been used for purposes of deception (which has resulted, in certain cases, in saving the lives of American soldiers). 137
When the DOD published its directive establishing the Embedded Media policy for the Iraq War, the Public Affairs Guidance (PAG),138 it specifically noted the use of
misinformation by the enemy as a reason for allowing civilian media an opportunity to
embed with U.S. forces.
Our ultimate strategic success in bringing peace and security to this region will come in our long-term commitment to supporting our democratic ideas. We need to tell the factual story – good or bad − before others seed the media with disinformation and distortions, as they most certainly will continue to do.139
The DOD’s predictions about Iraq’s use of information warfare were correct. Iraqi
Information Minister Mohamed Said Al-Sahhaf was dubbed the “Minister of
Misinformation” by international media. On Iraqi state television, he touted Iraqi supremacy over Coalition forces. Meanwhile, embedded media were simultaneously
136 Science at War: Information Warfare, n.d.
93 reporting Coalition victories with real-time footage of U.S. tanks rolling into Baghdad.
The documentary film “Baghdad Bob” collected some of his most outlandish statements and misstatements.
Figure 3-4. “Baghdad Bob” was a compilation of clips featuring Iraqi Information Minister Said Al-Sahhaf spreading mistruths about the state of the Iraq Republican Guard Forces against Coalition troops.
Figure 3-5. Cartoon featuring Iraqi information minister Said Al-Sahhaf, known as “Baghdad Bob,” denying U.S. presence in Baghdad during the Iraq War.140
140
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Principle Themes of Embedded Media Policy
The PAG included instructions on a variety of operational issues, ranging from the types of camera lights journalists could use to when reporters could publicize the names of Americans killed or wounded in action. Three major themes were present in the guidance. First, it promised access for the media to troops and logistical support in order to function the arid, Iraqi desert. Second, the policy instituted a policy called “security at the source,” which would foster a relatively censorship-free environment for journalists.
Instead of government officials reviewing the media’s reports before publication or broadcast, the onus was on military members to prevent the release of classified information and for journalist to self-censor information that was vital to national security. Third, the policy emphasized the benefits of a synergistic relationship between the military and the media.
Access
The PAG directed military leaders that the “media will be given access to operational combat missions, including mission preparation and debriefing whenever possible.”141 It dictated that threats to the security of an embedded journalist are not a reason to restrict him or her from access to an operation.142 However, in almost every circumstance outlined in the PAG, there is a caveat that provided the battlefield commander authority to restrict or censure an embedded reporter should operational security be at risk.143 Regardless, no commander had the authority to terminate an embed agreement without the prior approval of the theater’s senior public affairs
141 DOD Directive, PAG, 10 Feb 2003, 2.B. 142 Ibid., 3.G. 143 Ibid., 3.F.
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command.144 For journalists, one of the stipulations of joining the program was the
“Release Indemnification, and Hold Harmless Agreement and Agreement Not to Sue.”145
The policy states that media must abide by the ground rules established in the PAG “in exchange for … access to service members [and] information….”146
“Security at the Source”
“Security at the source” was a phrase used by the DOD to describe the practice in
which U.S. military personnel were responsible for protecting classified information from
“unauthorized or inadvertent disclosure.”147 The PAG detailed the categories of
information that could and could not be released by the embedded media.148 Information
restricted from dissemination had to meet a specific standard. Censure was warranted if
its “publication or broadcast could jeopardize operations and endanger lives.”149 The
PAG instructed, “The standard for release of information should be to ask ‘why not release’ vice ‘why release.’ Decisions should be made [as soon as possible], preferably in minutes, not hours.”150
Although the PAG placed the responsibility on service members to safeguard
classified information from release, embeds would still be privy to information, such as
troop strength and weapons capabilities because of the very nature of their association
with their respective military units. Although not necessarily classified, according to the
144 Ibid., 3.N. 145 “Release Indemnification, and hold Harmless Agreement and Agreement Not to Sue” n.d.
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DOD’s rules for classification, such information could still be sensitive to a specific
mission and should be treated accordingly. According to the PAG, “troop movements,
battle preparations, material capabilities and vulnerabilities,” were sensitive material.
The PAG gave embeds the following instructions for determining publication of such
information: “When in doubt, media will consult with the unit commander or his/her
designated representative.”151
The PAG also provided direction for the media and military ground commanders in circumstances when the media requested access to classified information. If providing embeds with classified information would give them a general situational awareness that would indirectly be in the “best interest of the DOD,”152 the military authority could oblige with the understanding that the information was not for publication. For example, letting an embed know about an upcoming offensive maneuver could help the embed prepare to cover it. However, the embed would be prohibited from announcing the attack in his or her news reports before it occurred. In order to receive such classified information, the embed was required to voluntarily agree to a security review of his or her news products. The PAG further clarified that such security reviews were intended for security purposes only and that no editorial changes could be made by the military authority overseeing the review.153
Symbiosis
Though press policies during the Vietnam War were similar to the Embedded
Media policy in that they allowed for wide access to troops and eliminated the wide-
151 Ibid., 6A. 152 Ibid., 6.A.1. 153 Ibid., 6.A.1.
97 spread use pre-publication censorship, the DOD now publicly recognized the strategic benefit of media cooperation. The idea that the military and the media could have a mutually beneficial relationship is expressed throughout the DOD policy. The DOD’s strategy was a wide departure from the antagonistic rhetoric that characterized the last half century of adversarial relations between the military and the media.
CHAPTER 4 METHODOLOGY
Conceptual Framework of Model
This was a qualitative study using phenomenological methodology, specifically the
psychological approach, which focused on the meaning of individual experiences with
one phenomenon. The phenomenological method calls for in-depth interviews with
specifically selected participants. “From the individual descriptions, general or universal
meanings are derived, in other words, the essence of structures of the experience.”1 The phenomenological design was the most appropriate methodology by which to gain understanding of this subject. The nature of the data collection process allowed participants to respond to open-ended questions with illustrative, descriptive explanations about their experiences. A Glossary of Phenomenological Terms is available in
Appendix B.
Methods of Collecting Data
Selection Criteria
The criteria for selection of participants for this study were honed into seven categories in order to identify a select group of individuals. Criteria included branch of service, rank of personnel, location on the battlefield, time frame of deployment, level of prior-media experience and/or media training, specific embed assignment, and level of interaction with embedded journalist(s).
1 Clark E. Moustakas, Phenomenological Research Methods (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications Publications, 1994), 13.
98 99
Branch of service
Although the Army had the largest contingent of service members and embeds
during the war, the Marine Corps was chosen because of a combination of three factors.
First, my personal connection to the Marine Corps as a reserve officer at the time that this
study was conducted made research on this branch of the Armed Forces far more feasible
than it would have been on branches with which I did not have a professional connection.
With personal experience in Iraq as an active duty Marine who served for nine months during the Iraq War, I had several personal contacts within the company-grade officer community who could assist me with the participant selection process for this study.
Additionally, my affiliation to the Marine Corps provided me with the opportunity to obtain information and build rapport with participants that may have otherwise been prohibitively difficult to obtain. Also, I was already familiar with the conduct of the war, military jargon, and the Marine Corps organizational structure, which facilitated my research.
While my personal connection to the Marine Corps may be considered a detraction from the objectivity with which I collected and analyzed data. I took the necessary steps, according to the phenomenological method to limit this negative influence this aspect may have had. This issue is discussed later in this chapter and in Chapter 5.
The second reason that I chose to study the Marine Corps was the proportionality of embeds assigned to the Marines Corps versus the other branches of service. There were 775 slots allocated to the four branches of the U.S. Armed Services for the combat phase of the Iraq War. Out of the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force units that participated in the war, the greatest number of slots for embedded journalists were allocated to the Army (351 slots; 45.29 percent). Although the Marine Corps is the
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smallest branch of the Armed Services, it received the second largest amount (214 slots;
27.61 percent). Proportionally, it had the largest number of embeds.2
The third, and final, reason for which I chose to focus on the Marine Corps was the
role it played during the invasion of Iraq. It is important to distinguish between the
branches of service because each has different warfighting capabilities and, thus, had a
different mission during the war. The Marine Corps played a key role in the invasion in
the eastern sector of Iraq. It is equipped as the U.S. military’s quick reaction force with
the ability to conduct maneuver warfare at faster speeds than any other branch of service.
Using these capabilities, it served the initial sting to Iraqi Republican Guard in the eastern
sector of the country while the U.S. Army moved along the western sector of the country
at a slower pace.3 As a result of its prominent role during the invasion and its push north
to Baghdad, the Marine Corps received the second largest number of casualties after the
Army.4 This perspective, coupled with the highest proportional amount of embeds and my personal connection, made it a logical choice for study.
Rank of personnel
This study focused on company-grade officers (lieutenants and captains) because
this is the lowest level of command within the military officer structure. These
individuals were the primary points of contact for embedded media during the war. Since
most of the literature on the subject of the Embedded Media Program focuses on the
2 Judith Sylvester and Suzanne Huffman, Reporting from the Front (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2005), 54. 3 See generally, Christopher Cerf and Micah L Sifry, eds., The Iraq War Reader: History, Documents, Opinions (New York: Touchstone, 2003). 4 “Fallen Heroes,” U.S Department of Defense News about the War on Terrorism, n.d.
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opinions of high-ranking officers, this study’s aim was to understand the experiences of
the low-level officers who had the most firsthand interactions with the embeds.
The basic structure of the military unit begins with approximately thirty individuals
who form a platoon. Three platoons form a company, and three companies form a
battalion. While there are aberrations to this structure depending on a unit’s mission, the
issue of importance within the context of this study is that a company is the lowest level
of independent command within which an embedded journalist would be assigned, and
company-grade officers are assigned authority and responsibility for these units.
According to the allocations of embeds within the Marine Corps for the initial invasion of
Iraq, journalists were generally assigned to a battalion level command and then
reassigned within that battalion to a company.
A company commander, who was typically of the rank of senior lieutenant or captain, would then be responsible for hosting the embed. As discussed in the
Introduction, the company commander could assume the responsibility of hosting the embed or delegate the assignment to a subordinate officer within the unit. In many cases, this responsibility was delegated to a junior officer. While this was not an official tasking required by the Embedded Media policy, it was, in practice, the method by which some
officers dealt with the presence of a civilian embedded journalist amongst their unit.
This study focused on the experiences of officers and not enlisted service members because officers have decision-making authority on a large-scale, mission-influencing capacity. While the interactions of enlisted Marines is not forsaken or diminished, it is outside the scope of this particular study.
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Nature of unit mission
The operating forces of the Marine Corps were organized into three groups during
the Iraq War: ground, air, and maritime forces. The experiences of the service members during the war were characterized, in part, by the group to which they belonged. For
example, the experience of an ammunition specialist on board an aircraft carrier was
different than that that of a Marine driving a truck loaded with ammunition through the
Iraqi desert to an infantry unit in Baghdad. Additionally, both of these experiences were different that that of a helicopter crewman who flew medical evacuation missions. Given the disparity between the experiences of service members assigned to the various forces within the Marine Corps, this study focused on one force in particular. The specific force was chosen based on the proportional assignments of embeds among the three. The
largest number of embeds out of those assigned to the Marine Corps in general were assigned to the ground Marine Corps forces (69 percent).5 Therefore, only ground officers were interviewed for this study.
Specialties in the ground force include combat units (infantry, artillery, and reconnaissance) and non-combat service support units (logistics, supply, and military police). While there are inherent differences between these units given their specialized missions, this study did not further distinguish among the ground officers for a second selection criteria. In past wars like Vietnam, the frontline was distinctive, and support units were relegated to safer, rear echelon areas. However, during the Iraq War, some of the deadliest battles, such as the battle at an-Nasariyah, occurred on main supply lines
and decimated logistics units closely in tow of infantry units. Therefore, this study used
5 DOD Public Affairs, Jan 2003-March 2003, on file with the author.
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the force identifier (ground, air, or maritime), rather the combat /non-combat distinction
as a means by which to purposely select its participant group.
Time frame of deployment
The invasion of Iraq occurred on March 20, 2003. The official combat period
lasted thirty-four days, ending on May 1. When the combat period ended, the Coalitional
Provisional Authority took power over the country, and its forces transitioned into the
Security and Sustainment Operations (SASO) phase. The combat and SASO phases
comprised the first cycle of the war and were known as Operation Iraqi Freedom I (OIF
I), which lasted until June 2004. Marine forces during OIF I were primarily comprised of
Marines from the 1st Marine Expeditionary Force (I MEF), which is located in Camp
Pendleton, California . In June of 2004, there was a change of command from I MEF to
the 2nd Marine Expeditionary Force (II MEF), which is stationed in Camp Lejeune,
North Carolina. OIF II lasted approximately one year until April 2005.6
Although there was a thirty-four-day period dubbed the combat phase of the war,
the enemy threat was no less evident during the remainder of OIF I and throughout
OIF II. In fact, the largest number of casualties occurred after the combat phase officially
ended. Although there was a mass exodus of embeds from Iraq immediately following
the combat period and the number of embedded journalists never again rose as high as
the numbers present during the invasion, journalists have continued to utilize the
Embedded Media Program as a means by which to cover the insurgent movement in Iraq.
This study focused on the experiences of Marines during OIF I and OIF II,
covering two major periods of the war, the invasion and the insurgency. No other study
6 The periodical change of command occurs in order to rotate the deployment of various Marine Corps units around the world.
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has explored the experiences of service members with embeds during this time. The few studies that have examined the topic at all limited their time frame to the combat period when the highest number of embeds were present in Iraq. While the combat period is a significant period of the overall conflict, there are still lessons to be learned from the remainder of the conflict, which is now in its fourth year. Indeed, unless the media and the military never expect to wage a war that lasts more than three months, the experiences of service members in the post-combat phase are equally important as an area of study.
This research encompassed the beginning of the combat period, March 2003, until the end of the second troop rotation in Iraq, April 2005. Extending the period of study beyond this point was not feasible because of the researcher’s time requirements for completion of the thesis.
The majority of the participants in this study described experiences with embeds during deployments that occurred during OIF I. However, several also had significant
interaction with embeds during OIF II. This study included both cycles because it was during these periods that the Embedded Media Program was most utilized by the media as a means to cover the war. Additionally, these periods offer a perspective dealing with
an invasion and counter-insurgency operation, which can be applied to the involvement
of the media in future offensives which include similar periods.
Level of prior media experience and/or media training
A limited amount of media training is provided to all Marine officers during their
basic officer training regardless of their individual occupational specialty. Additionally,
they may have received subsequent “media briefs” at their commands. This training
provides a cursory review of an officer’s rights and responsibilities in regard to the
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media. For example, Marines are taught about the use of “talking points”7 during an
interview with the media and guidelines for answering questions about military policy.
Marines specifically assigned to the public affairs specialty have follow-on training that
consists of a six-week course designed to develop media-savvy spokespersons for the
military. There are more than twenty-eight military occupational specialties for officers
in the Marine Corps, one of which ― public affairs ― accounts for less than 1 percent of
all Marine Corps officers.8 The scarcity of public affairs officers translates into one PAO
per battalion-level command. Therefore, the wide majority of Marine officers who
served during the Iraq War were not public affairs officers; nor did they have specialized
media training.
This study focused on the company-grade ground officers who were not public
affairs specialists and who also did not have any media experience prior to their military
service. This is an important distinction to make since the vast majority literature already
available on the subject of the Embedded Media project that did include interviews with
military personnel focused on public affairs personnel. This study sought to examine the
experiences of non-PAO Marines whose mission was not media management.
Specific embed assignment
Like the Marine officers who served during the war, the journalists who covered it
were not a homogenous group. There were approximately 252 news organizations
represented by the embeds in Iraq. They included television, newspaper, cable, radio,
7 Talking points are short, pre-prepared phrases that are used repeatedly in speeches, interviews, and debates. The strategy is to make the idea represented by the phrase a common assumption by means of repetition. 8 Captain Jay Delarosa, USMC, Plans, Policies & Operations, Programs & Resources, Installations & Logistics, Intel and C4, Public Affairs, HQMC Div. of Public Affairs, telephone interview by author, 25 May 2006.
106 and wire services.9 Another difference among the embeds was their nationality. Since the Embedded Media policy allowed international media, a U.S. military unit may have been assigned a native English-speaking journalist or a foreign journalist for whom
English was a second language.
There were several other differences among the embeds. For example, both male and female journalists embedded with Marine Corps forces. The discussion of this demographic is limited though because there were no guidelines based on gender established in the PAG. Depending on the media organization, a unit may have received one embed or several. Some reporters worked in teams. For example, television or cable journalists may have required a soundman and/or cameraman. Depending on their medium, journalists also brought varying logistical challenges to the battlefield. In addition to the personal gear each embed required, they carried with them the gear needed to photograph, film, record, report, and transfer the news of the war.10
While all of these circumstances highlight the differences among the embedded journalists who covered the war, this study focused on a less tangible, yet more significant distinction between them. The scope of influence an embedded journalist wielded was based on the media organization he or she worked for. For example, journalists from cable news channels who were capable of live, twenty-four-hour satellite feeds could reach much larger audiences with their coverage. Similarly, journalists representing a wire service or major newspaper had the potential to reach multiple audiences. With this in mind, journalists who represented more influential media organizations were sometimes provided with greater access to frontline units and critical
9 DOD Public Affairs, Jan 2003-March 2003, on file with the author. 10 See Appendix E for a photograph of a broadcast embed and his gear in central Iraq.
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operations.11 Therefore, one of the selection criteria for selecting participants for this study was based on the scope of influence of the embedded journalist to which the service member was a host. Participants’ embeds had to have represented a wire service, major television network, cable news channel, a leading U.S. magazine, one of the 200 highest circulating U.S. newspapers, or an international newspaper or magazine that was
a leading publication in its respective country.12
Level of interaction with embedded journalists
Participants in this study were specifically selected because they were assigned the
role of host officer for journalists embedded in their unit. In the role of host officer, a
participant:
• Had interaction with embedded media that were permanently or temporarily attached to his/her unit.
• Was not serving in a public affairs capacity.
Selection Method
There were several methods I used to find the participants for this study. I used a
combination of the snowball13 and criterion sampling14 methods. Creswell said criterion
sampling works well when all individuals studied represent people who have experienced
11 Captain Jay Delarosa, USMC, Plans, Policies & Operations, Programs & Resources, Installations & Logistics, Intel and C4, Public Affairs, HQMC Div. of Public Affairs, telephone interview by author, 25 May 2006. 12 “Top 200 Newspapers by Largest Reported Circulation,” Audit Bureau of Circulations, 31 March 2006,
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the phenomenon being studied.15 It is important to note that I did not request participants
directly from the U.S. Marine Corps Public Affairs Office (USMC PAO), as most previous studies have. This would have resulted in a filtered participant pool and negated any sense of confidentiality among the participants.
Before approaching potential participants, I contacted a USMC PAO official and
requested permission to conduct interviews for this study with active duty and reserve
Marines in general. This served two purposes. When I approached potential participants,
I was able to ensure them that the Marine Corps had already approved the general
participation of Marines in this study. Secondly, it provided the PAO office with the
professional courtesy of advising them that I was conducting this research. The USMC
PAO office response to my endeavor was encouraging and responsive. Officials there
provided me with several documents relevant to the study and facilitated a security
review of the final manuscript, which I requested, in order to ensure that classified
material or material sensitive to current operations would not be published inadvertently.
Sensitive material is defined in the PAG as “information which is not classified but which
may be of operational value to an adversary or when combined with other unclassified
information may reveal classified information.”16
I used four strategies to recruit participants. First, I used a database provided to me by a USMC PAO official that included points of contact for all the media organizations that embedded journalists with the military during the war. I sent approximately 150
15 Creswell, Qualitative Inquiry and Research Design, 118. 16 Department of Defense (DOD) Directive, “Public Affairs Guidance (PAG) On Embedding Media During Possible Future Operations/Deployments in the U.S. Central Commands (CENTCOM) of Responsibility (AOR),” 10 Feb 2003, from the Secretary of Defense Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense-Public Affairs to the Secretary of Defense Chairs,
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introductory e-mails requesting the POC’s listed in the document to provide me with the
names of the embeds who were with USMC units. My intent was to contact these
embeds and ask them for the names of the Marine officers with whom they worked most
closely during the war. Unfortunately, this method did not reap any participants. I
received a couple dozen replies, but none had definitive information that led me to a
potential participant.
The second attempt I made at locating potential participants entailed calling all of
the USMC regional public affairs offices in the continental U.S. and asking for the names
of individuals who interacted with the media during their deployment. This, too, did not
result in any potential participants. In many cases, the journalists no longer worked for
the media organization or did not fit the participant profile I had established for the study.
The third attempt entailed reviewing the primary literature, books, and articles that had been written about the embedded media. I was evaluating the literature based on any
potential participants that could have been revealed. This method was impractical. The
literature available from print embeds during the designated time frame was extensive
and beyond the scope of this study, and network and cable broadcasts were not accessible
in a timely and cost efficient manner. Therefore, I focused my attention on published
books and studies that discussed embedding. The result of this search was one qualified
person who agreed to participate.
Since I did not have a fruitful search using the purposeful selection method, I also
utilized the snowball method to locate potential participants. I used my personal network
of Marine Corps colleagues to identify qualified participants. I sent e-mails describing
my research purpose and the participant profile to thirty officers with whom I served in
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the Marine Corps. Ten of these contacts volunteered themselves for the study, two of
whom were unavailable for a phone interview because they were located in the Middle
East at the time the data collection was conducted. Of the original thirty people
contacted, eight potential participants who I did not originally contact were also
identified. However, two did not fit the selection criteria and one rejected the offer to
participate based on personal time restrictions.
The combinations of these methodologies provided several aspects of reliability.
The fact that I did not request the Marine Corps to provide me with hand-selected
participants ensured that my participant pool was not pre-screened for this study.
Additionally, I conducted an exhaustive search of the literature, my personal contacts in
the military, and journalists at major U.S. and international media organizations in order
to locate potential participants.
Number of Participants
The goal of this study was to interview as many qualified participants as necessary
until a point of saturation was reached.17 Saturation is the point at which the researcher no longer finds new data to add to the body of collected material. At the beginning of this study, I estimated that I would interview ten to fifteen participants before reaching saturation. Saturation for this study was reached at ten participants. However, an additional two participants replied to my original request for an interview after this point, so interviews were conducted with them and included in the data pool.
The issue of how many participants is necessary for a sound phenomenological study is debatable. Several qualitative scholars in the field have provided substantive
17 Creswell, Qualitative Inquiry and Research Design, 56.
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arguments for different satisfactory numbers of participants. Creswell recommends that
interviews can be conducted with up to 10 people.18 Morse argued that six is a sufficient
number.19 McCracken argued that eight is a suitable participant pool from which to draw
data.20 Dukes recommended studying three to ten participants.21 At the other end of the
spectrum, Polkinghorne conducted a study with 325 participants.22 Creswell notes that
the important aspect of the size of a participant pool is that it facilitates the eventual
description of an experience by a small group of people.23
Though these authors provide a basic framework with which to evaluate the participant pool, their arguments are based on the use of face-to-face interviewing techniques. This study utilized phone interviews, which present a separate set of benefits and risks in the data collection process which are discussed in the following sections. I will demonstrate that the literature supports my argument that I have reached a suitable number of participants for the scope and context of my study. Although no literature points out a specific number of participants that is necessary for a phenomenological study conducted by telephone, they provide an even more important quality assessment: the results of a telephone study are similar to those of face-to-face studies. Given this finding, and the various scholars (McCracken, Dukes, and Creswell), I am satisfied that
18 Creswell, Qualitative Inquiry and Research Design, 112-113, 122.
20 D.G. McCracken The long interview (Newbury Park, CA: Sage, 1988). 21 S. Dukes, “Phenomenological methodology in the human sciences,” Journal of Religion and Health, 23(3), 197-203. 22 D. E. Polkinghorne, “Phenomenological Research Methods” in R.S. Valle & Halling (Eds.), Existential-phenomenological perspectives in psychology (New York: Plenum, 1989), 41-60. 23 Creswell, Qualitative Inquiry and Research Design, 122.
112 my participant pool of 14 co-researchers, meets the standards of phenomenological research.
Telephone Interviewing Methodology
The primary benefit of conducting this study via in-depth telephone interviews was the ability to gather data without being restricted by the location of the participant.
Potential participants who were still on active duty were located in numerous locations across the Unites States and at overseas military bases, including Iraq. Additionally, participants may have since left the Marine Corps since their deployments, and, therefore, could have been any where in the world. Face-to-face interviews, traditionally the choice method for phenomenological research, were not feasible given these circumstances.
Phenomenological research studies usually rely on face-to-face interviews, while telephone interviews are used to a relatively lesser degree. Yet, telephone-based interviews have numerous advantages. First, their cost is one fourth to one half of face- to-face interviews. Second, telephone interviews allow the interviewer to perform the interview without being influenced by the demographic and physical nature of the participant or vice versa. Third, telephone interviews provide a convenient method of interviewing that does not require travel time or the need to locate an interview room, for example.
I made a successful search for academic articles that compared and contrasted telephone and face-to-face interviewing. I was able to review thirteen articles which focused on this subject. However, the majority focused on survey data collection and explored the health-related fields. None of them specifically discussed phenomenologies or was specifically on point with the topic I explored.
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Nonetheless, all of the articles, both those dealing with survey interviews and
qualitative interviews, came to a similar conclusion relevant to my question. Researchers
found that the quality of data derived from telephone interviewing versus face-to-face
interviewing is comparable given that all the same precautions were taken for conducting
effective interviewing. Little difference was found in the measures of willingness to
participate, willingness to discuss sensitive issues, and variations in quality of data based
on context of interview. I was not able to find any studies that discussed specifically how
many participants are necessary in a telephone interview study, but I think this question is
moot considering the common conclusion that regardless of method, the data collection
quality is relatively similar. Nonetheless, I reviewed several qualitative studies that
employed this data collection method in order to ensure that my telephone interviewing
skills were adequate. I also reviewed several articles that discussed the art of
interviewing in general.24
The studies in the articles I reviewed pointed out some distinctions between
telephone and face-to-face interviewing methods. For example, one study pointed out
that telephone interviews tended to be relatively shorter than face-to-face interviews, but
the synthesis of actual content related to the focus of the study is similar to that derived in
24 See generally Lisa A. Burke and Monica K. Miller, “Phone interviewing as a means of data collection: Lessons learned and practical recommendations,” Forum: Qualitative Social Research, Vol.2(2), May 2001; Elizabeth M. Smith, “Telephone Interviewing in healthcare research: a summary of evidence,” Nurseresearcher 2005; 12(3):32-41; Shmuel Fenig, Itzhak Levav, Robert Kohn, and Nava Yelin, “Telephone vs. Face-to-face interviewing in a community psychiatric survey,” American Journal of Public Health, June 1993, Vol. 83(6); Graeme Hawthorne, “The effect of different methods of collecting data: Mail, telephone and filter data collection issues in utility measurement,” Quality of Life Research, 2003, 12:1081-1088; Robert M. Groves, Peter V. Miller, and Charles F. Cannell, “Differences between the telephone and personal interview data,” Vital and Health Statistics, Data Evaluation and Methods Research, Series 2, No. 106, 11-19.
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face-to-face interviews.25 This is because phone interviews are often conducted in three
parts with an introductory period (accomplished in writing or in a pre-telephone call),26 the actual interview, and a follow-up member check. This is different that the standard face-to-face interview, in which much of the rapport-building period is conducted as part of the actual interview and, thus, included in the "time" calculation of the interview.
I utilized the three-part method in order to build participant confidence and participation. Including the time dedicated to each of the three-part interviews, the average contact made with each participant was approximately eighty minutes.
Additionally, more than half of the interviews I conducted were with personal contacts with whom I did not have to spend as much time building rapport, a task that would have added to the interview length.
Informed Consent of Participants
Once a possible participant was identified utilizing the aforementioned purposeful sampling and snowball methods, I ensured the following protocol was followed in accordance with IRB requirements.
• I provided each participant with an Informed Consent Form (ICF), which is available in Appendix A. Participants were given an option to receive the ICF via e-mail, fax, or mail depending on what they felt was the most secure, confidential, and direct method for delivery given their individual circumstances. The same protocol was followed for the return receipt of the ICF.
• The participants were given the contact information for my faculty supervisor. Each participant was also provided information that detailed the research process and the purpose of the study.
25 Mohamed A. Aziz and Susan Kenford, “Comparability of Telephone and Face-to-face interviews in assessing patients with posttraumatic stress disorder,” Journal of Psychiatric Practice, Vol. 10(5), Sept 2004, 307-313; 26 Jane Williams Bergsten, Michael F. Weeks, and Fred A. Bryan, “Effects of an Advance Telephone Call in a Personal Interview Survey,” The Public Opinion Quarterly, Vol. 48(3), Autumn 1984, 650-657.
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• I ensured that each participant understood what he or she would be requested to do and the amount of time required for participation. I explained how and when the research would be conducted, any anticipated risks, and the potential benefits. Each of these is discussed in a later section of this chapter.
• I explained how and to what extent a participant’s identity would be protected.
• Each participant was notified that there was no compensation for his/her involvement in the study.
• I ensured that the participants understood that he or she had the right to withdraw consent at any time without consequence and that he or she did not have to answer any question that he or she did not wish to answer.
• I ensured participants consented to the recording of their interviews.27
• The participants were told who would have access to the tapes and what the disposition of the tapes would be following the study.
• I informed participants that the results of the study would be published by the University of Florida in the form of a thesis and could potentially be published in other forms, such as academic articles.
• I offered to answer participants’ questions regarding the study and provided a means by which the participants could reach my faculty supervisor and the UF Institutional Review Board (IRB) officer responsible for this area of study.
Relationship with Participants
Prior to conducting interviews, I ensured that each participant was aware of both
my connection to the University of Florida and my current affiliation with the U.S.
Armed Forces as a captain in the Marine Corps Reserves. Establishing commonalities
with the participants was critical to my ability to establish rapport. While some
participants were curious about my own personal experiences with embedded media, I
limited my discussion of my personal experiences in order to not influence participants’
interview responses. For example, some participants asked me whether I had a positive
or negative experience with the embeds attached to my unit and how I handled situations
27 Fl. § 934.215 (2005).
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that dealt with circumstances like operational security breaches. I politely informed the
participants that I preferred to abstain from discussing my specific personal experiences, since I did not want to taint their impressions of the subject. Participants with whom I encountered this situation expressed an understanding for the purpose of my interviewing
strategy.
It was important that I set aside my own personal experiences with embedded media in order to allow for uninfluenced testimony from the participants and unbiased interpretation of the data. Creswell defined this process as epoche, in which the researcher sets aside all prejudgments on a subject.28 He or she disengages from his or
her experiences and relies on “intuition, imagination, and universal structures to obtain a
picture of the experience.” Discussing my personal experiences with participants would
taint the objective mindset that I had already established through the process of epoche.
In an effort to ensure the questions I asked in the interview process were
sufficiently open-ended and unbiased, I developed an interview guide that was reviewed
by my advisor and a member of my thesis committee who specialized in qualitative
research. The interview guide was developed to fulfill the requirement of an assignment
in a qualitative research methods course. As part of the class assignment, I conducted a
practice interview utilizing the guide.29 I chose a participant, who met the participant
selection criteria, through the snowball method. Following the practice interview, I
28 Creswell, Qualitative Inquiry and Research, 235. See also, Moustakas, Phenomenological Research Methods, 85. 29 After completion of the data collection and in the process of data analysis, I came to the conclusion that the data collected in the pilot study (practice interview) was of the same standard of quality as the data collected in the 13 other interviews. This assertion is validated in the literature on the subject (see later section in this chapter “Telephone Interviewing Methodology.”).
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revised the guide to further ensure unbiased, open-ended questions. The final interview
guide is available in Appendix C.
Debriefing of Participants
I debriefed each participant by conducting a follow-up phone call in which I conducted a member check of his/her responses to my initial questions. A member check
is defined by Creswell as the responsibility of the researcher to return to his/her
participants and review with them the information that they passed on during the
interview. I contacted participants following their initial interviews by e-mail and
provided them with a synthesis of the information that they provided during the initial
interview. The goal of the member check process was to ensure that I correctly
interpreted what the participant meant to convey and that the participant was comfortable
with what was shared. This was an opportunity for the participant to share further
information or clarify previous information if necessary. All of the participants
responded to the member check positively. Three participants provided additional
information that I subsequently added to the data.
When the manuscript was finalized, each participant was sent a PDF version for
review. They were encouraged to contact me with any questions, comments, or critiques.
The final correspondence with the participants was a handwritten thank-you card,
including information where they could obtain the published form of the thesis
manuscript and a $15 gift card.
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Potential Benefits and Anticipated Risk for Participants
Potential benefits
The University of Florida Internal Review Board (IRB)30 required that I address
potential benefits and risks of participation with anyone considered for this research.
Each participant received a copy of the approved interview guide and the informed consent letter, outlining the risks and benefits associated with this research. Considering
the participants’ vested interest in the welfare and viability of the U.S. Armed Forces,
their involvement in this study may contribute to effective media policy decision making
by the DOD and increased understanding of the embedded process by media
organizations and journalists. This is a benefit that extends beyond the military as well.
Military-media policy directly affects the media’s ability to cover U.S. military
operations, and indirectly affects the type and amount of information that reaches the
public. Participants who participated in this study benefited from the opportunity to share
their experiences in a constructive, even cathartic manner. Having undergone
deployment debriefings myself following my own deployment, I knew that the debriefing
process did not specifically address media interaction. This study provided participants a
forum in which this subject could be discussed.
Similarly, the opportunity to contribute to the development of future policies is a
constructive exercise. Although military service members are charged with executing
policy and not developing it, it is a common military practice to develop “after action
30 The University of Florida Internal Review Board reviews all research involving human subjects to ensure that their welfare and rights are protected as mandated by federal regulations. University of Florida IRB, http://irb.ufl.edu/ (accessed 26 July 2006).
119
reports” after an evolution that highlight “lessons learned” and recommendations.31 The
recommendations that resulted from this study are discussed in Chapter 6.
Anticipated risk
The Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), which embodies the regulations
governing all military service members, prohibits any military service member from knowingly divulging classified information to a source who does not hold a security
clearance commensurate with the classification of the information transferred. The
rationale behind this regulation is founded on the principle of safeguarding national
security. As an officer in the U.S. Armed Forces, I hold a secret clearance, which allows
me access to secret information on a need-to-know basis. However, I did not seek to
record any classified information in the interviews and conducted them accordingly.
I understood the participants’ obligation to abide by the UCMJ regulations and
reminded the participants of this duty before commencing each interview. Had classified
information been divulged during an interview, I would have been required to turn that
medium over to an authorized DOD security manager. This was a necessary limitation of
the study.
Data Collection
A total of fourteen company-grade Marine Corps ground officers participated in
phone interviews that ranged in length from one hour to an hour and 45 minutes. The
average contact with a participant was 80 minutes in length. The interviews were
conducted in June and July of 2006. Participants were assured of confidentiality, that the
31 See generally Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned, n.d.,
120
research report would not specifically identify them by name, unit affiliation, and that all
other personally identifying material would be omitted.
Respondents were also told in advance that the interview would be recorded. The
interviews were taped using a handheld, Radio Shack digital audio recorder. This
method was tested in the practice interview. The questions asked were based on an
interview guide, which is located in the Appendix C. The research questions were
designed to explore the meaning of a participant’s experience and interaction with
embedded media in Iraq. Participants were asked to describe their “lived experiences.”32
The phenomenological framework emphasizes the importance of individual experiences of people who as conscious human beings understand something to be.33
I hired two fellow graduate students to assist me with the process of transcription.
Each of them signed a confidentiality agreement. Following each transcription, I
conducted a quality check of each transcript to ensure the accuracy of the transcription
process. This was accomplished by listening to the recordings while reading the
transcriptions and making necessary adjustments to ensure the transcripts reflected the
language and expression of the participant.
Audit Trail
In order to keep track of the research process, I established an audit trail. I
designed an interview tracker that helped me organize and keep track of day-to-day
requests, contacts and observations about the data collection process. Before each interview, I made notes about intentions. Following each interview I noted both my own
32 Creswell, Qualitative Inquiry and Research, 54. 33 Ibid., 236
121
and the participant’s reactions to the interview process. I also noted any personal motivations that were evident behind my decision making.
Throughout the data collection process, I reviewed the notes in my interview tracker and made necessary adjustments, such as altering the format of a question to be more clear, conducting periodic tape recorder checks, and improving my interviewing techniques to meet phenomenological principles. I was especially keen to any necessary
instrument development. Two specific topics were brought up by participants that
revealed to me a new facet about the subject that I had not thought of. A question was
added that dealt with the issue of gender as a consideration in the placement of an embed.
Another question was added that asked whether or not the participant had seen the
official DOD regulations for embedded media during the Iraq War. I asked these
questions during the member checks with the individual participants if they had not
already been a part of the original interviews.
Methods of Organizing and Analyzing Data
Data Analysis
Husserl emphasized that phenomenological data analysis “proceeds through the
methodology of reduction, the analysis of specific statements and themes, and a search
for all possible meanings.”34 These steps were organized and further explained in the
Stevick-Colazzi-Keen description, which Moustakas identified as one of the two primary
methodologies in phenomenological study.35 I followed the Moustakas modification of
the Stevick-Colazzi-Keen method in the following steps. They are discussed in further
detail in Chapter 5.
34 Ibid., 52. See also Moustakas, Phenomenological Research Methods, 121. 35 Ibid., 32.
122
• I set aside, as far as humanly possible, in the process of epoche all preconceived experiences in order to best understand the experiences of participants in the study.36
• Following all the interviews and transcriptions, I read all data in its entirety to ensure the accuracy of the transcripts.
• I extracted significant statements from the participant’s descriptions of their experiences in the interviews about how they experienced the topic (the Embedded Media policy). Each statement was treated with equal worth. These were collected into a list of non-repetitive, non-overlapping statements. This is called horizonalization.37
• These statements were grouped into “meaning units.” Meaning units are thematic clusters under which the various statements can be organized. I included “textural descriptions,” which described in detail what happened during the experience of the participants and “structural descriptions,” which reflect how the experience took place. The distinction between these two forms of descriptions is the type of information that is conveyed. The textural description described the more individual, emotional experience, while the structural description reflected the spatial, chronological experience of events.
• To ensure that I did not distort participant expression, verbatim text from the interviews was included in the narrative to support the meaning units that I developed.38
• Finally, I integrated “these themes into a narrative description” of the participants’ experiences with embedded media during the Iraq War in order to reflect the shared experiences of the participants in a composite statement. This is not a generalizable statement, but rather one specific to the participants in this study and their experiences as they expressed them at the time of the data collection. Nonetheless, its descriptive nature should leave the reader with an understanding of what it was like for a person to have experienced such a phenomenon.
Reflexivity
In conducting this research using the phenomenological qualitative approach, it was essential that I examined in a reflexive manner my own role in the overall conduct of the
36 Ibid., 235. 37 Ibid., 235. 38 Ibid.
123
study. This process is called reflexivity39 and was accomplished by keeping a reflexivity journal as part of my overall interview tracker. Within this reflexivity journal I wrote my reactions to the evolution of my study, made notes about challenges I faced along the way, and described how I dealt with them. The journal included my feelings before and after interviews and personal observations of the motivations behind my own decision making and my personal motivations for the study.
This process also required me to continually assess my own feelings about the subject matter in order to maintain epoche, according to phenomenological principles. I originally became interested in this topic because of my personal experiences as a Marine officer deployed to the Middle East in 2003 during the Iraq War. As the executive officer of a combat surgical company for nine months, one of my responsibilities was to act as a liaison to embedded media assigned to report on my unit. This experience raised questions for me about the military’s preparedness to deal with journalists in a combat zone. I questioned the risks created by the presence of embeds and whether the benefits of media coverage outweighed the risks to myself and the members of my unit.
An example of when journalistic and military priorities conflict in the battlefield is represented when a service member is injured or killed in the line of duty. Notification of his/her next of kin is done in person by official representatives of the military. During my deployment to Iraq I was presented with this situation. I verbally instructed the embeds assigned to cover my unit that they could not film any American casualties in such a manner that would reveal their identities. Despite my efforts, they released footage
39 See generally Creswell, Qualitative Inquiry and Research; Moustakas, Phenomenological Research Methods. M. Hammersley and P. Atkinson, Ethnography: Principles in Practice, (New York: Routledge, 1995).
124
of bloodied American troops retrieved from rescue helicopters, lying on hospital beds. I
did not learn about the disclosure until after my deployment was over.
This incident illuminated the lack of preparedness by both the military and the
media to deal with the litany of legal, ethical, and logistical problems that the Embedded
Media policy presented. The training I received did not equip me for situations in which the media violated DOD policy; nor did the training received by the embeds adequately
ingrain in them the necessity for such policies.
The incident, along with other similar experiences, left me doubtful of whether the
media’s ability to cover the war in the manner designed by the Embedded Media policy was a warranted burden on the troops made responsible for them. Was my experience the
only one of its kind? Who amongst my peers felt the same outrage, distrust, and even
empathy for embeds covering the war? Would my trials fade away in vain only to be
experienced by the next wave of service members accompanied by media into the
battlefield? I was emboldened to study the program and help shape more-effective DOD
policy toward the media.
CHAPTER 5 FINDINGS
This chapter presents the findings of the phenomenological study of company-
grade Marine Corps ground officers who were host officers to embedded media in a
combat zone during the Iraq War. It further explains how the data collected from several
individual accounts of this lived experience evolved into a synthesized, shared experience
from which we may gain a deeper understanding of its essence. The evidence examined
in this process is based on the individual descriptions provided by twelve co-researchers
who experienced the subject phenomenon firsthand.
In accordance with the phenomenological principles prescribed by Moustakas,1 those descriptions make possible understanding of the meanings and essences of the experience. However, gaining a credible understanding of the phenomenon depends on the quality of the evidence and the transparency of the researcher’s method and decision- making rationale.2 Thus, the findings of this study are presented in such a manner that
also describes the process of data analysis that I followed and the method with which the
data was synthesized.
Moustakas offered two modifications of methods for analysis of phenomenological
data. The first, call the Van Kaam method, does not include a specific analysis of the
researcher’s experience along with that of the co-researchers. Given that my motivation
for studying the subject phenomenon is based on personal experience and that I am
1 Clark Moustakas, Phenomenological Research Methods (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 1994), 183-184. 2 Ibid., 84.
125 126
currently affiliated with the Marine Corps, I felt that the Van Kaam method did not
provide for me an adequate opportunity to reflect on my own experiences in accordance
with the phenomenological principles of epoche. Therefore, I chose the second method
of analysis offered by Moustakas, which was based on the methods of analysis suggested by Stevick,3 Colaizzi,4 and Keen.5
The Stevick-Colaizzi-Keen method has the analyze his or her own experience with
the phenomenon as part of the epoche process. Only after the researcher has explored
and understood his or her own experience, can they move on to collecting and analyzing
the data of the co-researchers. I would be remiss if I did not acknowledge my own
intimate, individual experience with the subject phenomenon. Exploring my personally
held beliefs and suppositions about the host officer-embed experience allowed me to
effectively identify dominant overtones in my own understanding of the experience that
might affect my analysis of the data. After identifying the themes central to my own
experience, I made a conscious decision to suspend them as much as possible in order to
view the experiences of the co-researchers without imposing my predilections, prejudices, and predispositions. Acknowledging my own experience made it possible for me to allow “things, events, and people to enter anew into [my] consciousness, and to look and see them again, as if for the first time.”6
3 E. L. Stevick, An Empirical Investigation of the Experiences of Anger in A. Giorgi, W. Fisher, and R. Von Eckartsberg (Eds.), Duquesne Studies in Phenomenology, (Pittsburg: Duquesne University Press, 1971) Vol. 1., 132-148 in Moustakas, Phenomenological Research Methods, 115, 116, 121. 4 P. R. Colaizzi, Reflection and research in Psychology (Dubuque, IA: Kendall/Hunt, 1973) in Moustakas, Phenomenological Research Methods, 121. 5 E. Keen, Doing Research Phenomenologically. (Lewisberg, PA: Unpublished manuscript, Bucknell University, 1975) in Moustakas, Phenomenological Research Methods, 121. 6 Moustakas, Phenomenological Research Methods, 85.
127
The Moustakas modification of the Stevick-Colaizzi-Keen method suggests that the
researcher follow the following method in analyzing his/her own experience with the
phenomenon and then that of the co-researchers:7
Using a phenomenological approach, obtain a full description of your own experience of the phenomenon.
From the verbatim transcript of your experience complete the following steps:
• Consider each statement with respect to significance for description of the experience.
• Record all relevant statements.
• Through the phenomenological process of reduction,8 list each non- repetitive, non-overlapping statement. These are the invariant horizons or meaning units9 of the experience.
• Relate and cluster the invariant meaning units into themes.
• Synthesize the invariant meaning units and themes into a description of the textures of the experience.10 Include verbatim examples from the testimony.
• Reflect on your own textural description. Through imaginative variation,11 construct a description of the structures of your experience.12
• Construct a textural-structural description13 of the meanings and essences of your experience.
7 Moustakas, Phenomenological Research Methods, 122. 8 Ibid., 90. 9 Invariant Horizons or meaning units “point to the unique qualities of an experience, those that stand out.” Ibid., 128. 10 A textural description evokes clear images of what happens during an experience. Ibid., 133. 11 Imaginative variation is the process of analyzing a situation from multiple perspectives in order to gain a structural description of an experience. This process explores “the underlying and precipitating factors that account for what is being experienced; in other words the ‘how’ that speaks to the conditions that illuminate the ‘what’ of experience.” Ibid., 98-99. 12 A structural description describes the “how” behind an experience and is often communicated in vocabulary that connotate time, space and graduation of force. It defines the precepts that brought an experience to be. Ibid., 121-122.
128
Figure 5-1. Graphic representation of the Moustakas modification of the Stevick- Colaizzi-Keen model of analysis of phenomenological data
After I applied this process to my own experience of the phenomenon and established epoche, I applied the process to each of the descriptions provided by the co- researchers. The results of these processes, including my own description of the experience, are available in the appendix.
The individual steps within this process require sensitivity to the nuances of the data, attention to detail, and a willingness to accept the data in and of its self. First, the
13 A textural structural Description is an integration of the individual textural and structural descriptions already synthesized fro the data. It provides a synthesis of the meanings and essences of the experience. Ibid., 144.
129
process of horizonalization required that I be “receptive to every statement of the co-
researcher’s experience, granting each comment equal value.14 “Each horizon of the
research interview adds meaning and provides an increasingly clear portrayal of scenes
[from the experience of the phenomenon].”15
The data that was synthesized from the horizonalization process was reduced by the
elimination of repetitive or overlapping statements. The remaining statements are
classified as meaning units. I then clustered these meaning units, which Moustakas also
referred to as invariant constituents,16 into groups with similarities and common dominant
themes.
Now that the method of data analysis has been explained, the following sections
will present the findings in the three stages described within the data analysis process.
First, the meaning units, or invariant constituents, that were derived from the collective
interviews were listed according to their overarching themes. The second section
describes the numerous themes that emerged from the data with supporting text from the
co-researchers’ individual descriptions of the phenomenon. Finally, all the individual
textural-structural descriptions that were synthesized through the Stevick-Colaizzi-Keen
process were integrated to form a composite textural-structural description of the
meanings and essences of the experience. This universal description of the experience
presents the lived experience of this particular group of co-researchers at this time and
place and from my perspective as the researcher.17
14 Ibid., 122. 15 Ibid., 125. 16 Ibid., 128. 17 Ibid., 122.
130
Meaning Units and Themes of the Host Officer-Embed Experience
“In order to determine the significant, relevant, and invariant meanings that provide
living descriptions or highlights of the experience,”18 I analyzed the verbatim transcripts
of all twelve of my co-researchers’ descriptions of their experiences as host officers for embedded journalists while in a combat zone during the Iraq War. Using the Stevick-
Colaizzi-Keen process, I derived seventy-eight meaning units, or invariant constituents,
and clustered them into twenty-four themes.
It is important to note that there is no statistical rationale behind the identification
of these themes other than the fact that at least one co-researcher presented it as a relevant
part of the experience of the phenomenon. There was no requirement that a certain
percentage of co-researchers share a certain experience in order for it to be considered a
valid and relevant part of the phenomenon. On the contrary, phenomenological
principles assign relevance to a statement based on the significance that each individual
co-researcher placed on an occurrence as a part of their experience with the phenomenon.
Since the findings in this section are not representative of all company-grade Marine
Corps officers who worked with embedded media during the Iraq War, a statistical
quantification was not an appropriate method of data analysis.
The themes are specific to the lived experiences of the co-researchers in this study
alone. The study examined the experiences of thirteen Marine Corps company grade
officers, which were comprised of five captains and eight first lieutenants. At the time of
the interviews, seven of the officers were still on active duty. The other six were
members of the Marine Corps Reserves in either an active or inactive reserve status. Five
18 Ibid., 130.
131
were infantry officers and eight worked in combat service support specialties, such as
supply, combat engineering or logistics. A complete listing of the co-researcher
demographics is available in the Appendix D.
The following are the invariant constituents, or meaning units, derived from the
data. They are organized according to their overarching themes:
1. Embeds were fish out of water • Embeds did not conform to the military mold • Embeds had the right gear but didn’t know how to use it correctly
2. Gender of embeds was a consideration • Female embeds were an issue with all-male combat units • There was culture shock for male Marines when female embeds were present • Female embeds were considered a liability • Society is not ready for female embeds in male units • Gender of embedded journalists was not an issue for co-ed units • Female embeds were a distraction in co-ed units
3. Marines’ opinions of embedded news coverage of their units • War stories generally accurate, but sometimes embellished • The Internet made it possible to see the news coverage of one’s own unit in real time • Been there done that, so I don’t need to read about it
4. Synergy among embeds and journalists • There was a mutual respect between Marines and embeds for each other’s jobs • The presence of an embed had no bearing on the conduct of the mission or day-to- day events
5. Embedded journalists were self-sufficient • Host officer is not the equivalent of babysitter • Embeds carried their own weight
6. Host officers’ support for Embedded Media policy • Importance of documenting story • Media attention was good for morale • Embedded media were a necessary evil • Public support is an integral part of the war campaign • Embeds would bear witness to the enemy’s actions
132
7. Host officer instructions to the embedded journalists • Embeds need permission of host officer before interviewing Marines • Embeds were required to stay with a particular section of the unit (headquarters • unit or a certain platoon) • Embeds got basic weapons and first-aid training just in case
8. Instructions to enlisted Marines about the embedded media • Stay within your box (i.e., area of influence and knowledge, pay grade, military occupational specialty) • There was trust that Marines do the right thing with or without the media present • How to handle the ‘what-if’ scenarios involving embeds (i.e., contact with enemy forces, injury to embed, kidnapping of embed, violation of ground rules, threat to operational or informational security)
9. Embeds came prepared for the fight • Embeds had better gear than the Marines • Embeds had familiarity with the combat environment and military
10. Embeds learned the Marine Corps way of life • Everyone suffered equally • Embeds went with the program • Embeds adjusted to a new environment • Embeds learned the tricks of the trade
11. Defining the host- officer responsibility • Being a host officer was more of an inconvenience than a major burden • The officer was responsible whether he had media experience or not • The public doesn’t need to witness everything • The officer was responsible for everyone’s life, including the embed • Medical care of embeds was the Marine Corps’ responsibility • Embeds were seen as “just another body,” and “one more mouth to feed.”
12. Communication between embeds and host officers • Embeds bartered for interviews with Marines • Embeds had an open-door policy with officers • Delegating responsibility to junior officers
13. Censorship was still part of the package • Censorship was necessary for information control and quality control • Censorship was not a host-officer responsibility • The spot-check method was implemented
14. Marine-perceived motivations of the embedded journalists • Every embed has an angle • The media is biased, but any news is better than no news
133
• Some media are anti-war • The goal is not propaganda, it’s news • The media has a hidden agenda
15. The cost of Embedded Media in Iraq • Everyone’s a Monday Morning Quarterback • One embed meant one less gun • Embeds may be targets
16. Host-officer preparation for embedded media presence • Quick down-and-dirty media class • Media-management classes both before deployment and in Kuwait • Complete lack of familiarity with Embedded Media policy • Verbal brief about Embedded Media policy was sufficient • Policy for removal of embeds • Good preparation for dealing with embeds • The goal was to not let embeds interfere
17. Embeds adapted to the combat environment • Embeds learned to deal with restrictions of light discipline • Embeds were silent observers; there was a direct correlation between a host officer’s positive experience in that role and the less the embed was seen and heard • Embeds learned to “hurry up and wait” • Embeds learned to take cover during combat
18. Embeds earned Marines’ respect • Embeds had intestinal fortitude, a.k.a. ”guts” • Embeds shared their resources with Marines
19. Dealing with sensitive and classified information • American casualties were the most sensitive information • Embeds were kept out of the Command Operations Center (COC) • It was an honor system: We trusted them until they gave us a reason not to
20. Timing of embed assignment was crucial • Sooner rather than later was better • Concern for embeds who want in the night before the Super Bowl
21. Enlisted Marine’s reactions to embedded media • Concerns about safety • Opinion of embeds changed over time
22. When and why the embeds were attached to and left a unit • After the death of a Marine
134
• Marines were not given an opportunity to volunteer to be hosts for embeds; they • were “volun-told” that it would be their responsibility
23. The bond between the embeds and the host officer • Bonds forged under pressure • Bonds that outlasted deployment
24. Senior-level officer instructions to embeds and host officers • Embeds should have fun • Junior-level officer will do what they can to facilitate your coverage of the war • Host officers were not given specific guidelines as to the repercussions for not adequately supporting the embeds according to the senior-level guidelines
Thematic Portrayals of the Data
Using supporting texts from the interviews with the twelve individual co- researchers, I constructed thematic portrayals of each of the themes that developed from
the clustered meaning units.19 The following thematic portrayals represent a cumulative
description of each theme. This description represents the original horizons identified from the statements made by the co-researchers in their interviews, the subsequent
meaning units delimited from those statements through the process of phenomenological
reduction, and, finally, their clustering into core themes.20 These thematic portrayals
describe the distinctive responsibilities that are inherent to combat situations and
reflective of the unique position and experiences of company-grade officers as hosts to
embedded media during the Iraq War. They are accompanied by supporting text from the co-researchers’ descriptions of their experience. Co-researchers were assigned
pseudonyms in order to protect their anonymity.
Embeds were fish out of water: Marines have a distinctive culture unique among
the U.S. military branches of service. The data reveal that some embeds’ success in
19 Ibid., 131. 20 Ibid.
135
newsgathering from within their assigned units depended on their ability to fit in among the Marines to which they were assigned. Some host officers viewed their respective embeds as peculiar in personality and “lost in the sauce,” describing the embeds’ inability to use their military gear and adapt to the desert environment.
Amy, who served as a first lieutenant and platoon commander with a combat engineering company, recalled how the embed assigned to her unit made an effort to assimilate with the Marines despite his obvious unfamiliarity with his circumstances.
She said
[the embeds] were nice guys, really nice guys. Very, kind of nervous about what they were getting themselves into … he tried to maintain a positive attitude. There were definitely, I remember distinctly a couple of times when he was just totally down because you could tell he missed his family and he was real tired of not having a shower for the third week in a row or whatever … I think he was nervous, I think he didn’t know what he was getting himself into … My distinct memories of him are just sitting. We had a little company area and he would just sit out there with us and basically do, you know, chit chat … it was almost like sitting around a campfire. Of course, there wasn’t one, but we were all just sitting around, and he’d be there with us, and, you know, we were just kind of shooting bull more than anything else. That’s what I remember mostly about him is just that, you know, he made a very conscious attempt to fit in even though obviously as a reporter, he was a reporter, he was having a hard time with it, but he was definitely trying.
Stephen, a captain who served as the executive officer of an infantry company, said
[one embed in particular], some of the Marines thought he was kind of weird (laugh) personality-wise, but that wasn’t necessarily because he was a journalist. He was just different from us.
Gender of embeds was a consideration: Some host officers expressed concern with the gender of the embeds, describing it as their main concern when they were initially informed that embeds would be assigned to their unit. The data reveal that three main factors influenced participants’ personal perceptions of this issue: 1) Having females present in all-male combat units would be a distraction; 2) Female embeds would be a liability and could be seen by the enemy as a vulnerability; 3) Society is not ready
136 for female embeds in male units where they would be at higher risk of becoming casualties as a result of enemy actions. Some host officers who served in co-ed, non- combat units said that the gender of the embed was never a concern because their units were already comprised of females, while other host officers in the same position said that a female embed was a distraction even if female Marines were present because the female embed was not a trained member of the unit, and, therefore, her gender was a predominant part of her identity and distraction for the male Marines.
Bob, a captain who served as an infantry company commander, said
I would not have allowed [a female embed] to [join my unit]. Initially couldn’t do. It, number one, the, it’s a, it’s a dangerous situation. Call it male egos. Call it macho. Call it whatever you want to call it, double standard. The concern is these insurgents utilize the fears and techniques against Americans, and if they have an opportunity to capture a female reporter, I think they would have gone the extra mile to do it, and, then, I think the Marines would have gone the extra mile to ensure the female reporter, you know, was, was not captured, and I think it would have taken away from the focus on what needed to be done.
Host officers’ opinions of embedded news coverage of their units: The data reveals that, occasionally, the Internet would make it possible for Marines to see news stories and photographs shortly after their publication. However, most host officers said they did not have the opportunity to see the news coverage of their units while they were still in Iraq. Some host officers said that after returning from their deployments they read or viewed the news coverage of their units and that the stories were generally accurate.
Some host officers said that the reports about their units sometimes embellished the impact of the Marines’ actions in an excessively positive light. Other Marines said they were indifferent to the idea of reading news reports about their units during or after their deployment since they had “been there, done that.”
137
Jill, a first lieutenant who served as the executive officer of a motor transport company, described what she thought of the news coverage of her unit during an enemy attack. She said
well at one point our company was split up, and [one lieutenant] and the [commanding officer] were up toward the front. I was with the second half of the company with [another two lieutenants]. We stopped for a refueling, and it was also a rest for the Marines, too. We were all just hanging around eating, stretching, getting a quick break, you know, and then [one of the lieutenants at the rear] radios to me that he’s taking fire. He’s the last platoon at this point, and, so, I tell him, ‘Okay, I’ll send some mounted guns to you, and I do, and he radios again, ‘No really, we’re taking some bad fire back here,’ and I’m like, ‘Yeah, I know. I sent you some guns. Didn’t they get there by now?’ And he says, ‘Yes, but we need more.’ And, then, we started taking some incoming mortars, and we were all just surprised, and, so, I start putting the company into position and setting up our defense, and we got the rest of the company involved. Tanks sent over some support …Well, [the embeds] got out of their vehicles. I mean, it wasn’t our job to make them stay in their vehicles or anything. They were there to do their thing. So I was running around getting the defense set up, and they were taking pictures and one of those pictures actually ended up as the whole centerfold for Time magazine about a week later. One of the Marines got it in the mail, and it was just really cool that a [combat service support] Marine was photographed like that. It was a picture of one of the Marines calling out order. He was in the dirt, shooting and looking back and calling orders to another Marine. It was really neat for the Marines to see something like that about themselves. Almost like bragging rights, you know, to be able to say, look we did something too.
Synergy among embeds and Marines: Some Marines said there was a sense of mutual respect and empathy between them and the embeds. They said that this developed over time when they saw the integrity and dedication with which the journalists worked and the appreciation they demonstrated for the responsibilities the Marines had.
Edward, a captain who served the company commander of an infantry company, said
this particular gentleman, he worked for The New York Times, mostly doing photo work, a photojournalist. What was significant about him … was that his contract ran out on November 1st. He was kind of freelancing … Once we got the order [for Fallujah], he asked to stay, and, of course, he had built a relationship with the Marines, living with them … He generally got along with the Marines and the
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Marines really liked him. So even before Fallujah, this journalist in particular had built a rapport with the Marines.
Other host officers described the experience as inconsequential. William, a captain who served as the commander of a motor transport company, said
there’s a certain level of apprehension about being responsible for someone that, you know, isn’t necessarily a Marine. But at the same time, it really wasn’t, it didn’t really affect the way I was going to do business or how. You know, we still had the mission to do, so I wasn’t really too concerned about doing it. It wasn’t going to disrupt our operations really in any way.
Stephen, a captain who served as the executive officer of an infantry company, described his relationship with the embed. She said
[the embed and I] had a professional relationship. He appreciated any help and input that I provided him, you know, and I understood that he had a job to do and appreciated the fact that he was there and trying to do it.
Embedded journalists were self-sufficient: The data reveals that Marines viewed embedded journalists as self-sufficient entities, who, besides food and water, were capable of policing themselves. Two main factors influenced this perception: 1) Embeds did not expect or want the host officers to act as babysitters; 2) Embeds were able to
“carry their own weight.”
Stephen, a captain who served as the executive officer of an infantry company, described what the experience of having embeds in the unit was like and how the embeds’ ability to function without a lot of supervision was important to the unit’s operational success. She said
I’d like to just give somebody basic instructions and have them follow them without having to worry about keeping my eye on them 24/7… The reporters that I saw, they could take care of themselves. They were big boys and girls.
[Embeds] carried their own crap (laugh) … If he didn’t carry a sleeping bag, he didn’t have a sleeping bag that night. And if he didn’t carry a camera, he didn’t have to have a camera … The Marines were burdened enough, with, I mean,
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missions, and stress, and armor and everything else … If [embeds] wanted to be there, then they’d pull their own weight. So that was that.”
Host officers’ support for Embedded Media policy: Marines identified both
macro and micro-level benefits to the embedded media presence in Iraq. They said the
media attention was good for unit morale when the embed was reporting for a national or
hometown media organization, but international media did not offer this benefit. They
also recognized that embeds were documenting history and that their presence was a
“necessary evil.” Some Marines identified the importance of public support for the war
and the main reason why they supported their embed(s), describing it as “an integral part
of the war campaign,” especially because the enemy was expected to “play dirty.”
Stephen, a captain who served as the executive officer of an infantry company,
described why he supported the embed in his unit. He said that
especially at the beginning of the war, we wanted people to now what we were doing over there … I think most Marines were excited that there was going to be cameras there and broadcasting it, so that people could see, even if it was just mom and dad, seeing what little Johnny does (laugh). You know, it’s kind of nice to have people noticing and talking an interest in what we do.
I think the risk is worth it to get a valuable message out there ‘cause there’s two main negative messages that come out, but I think I would be willing to shoulder the risk to get the valuable message out.
John, a captain who served as an infantry platoon commander and then later as a battalion intelligence officer, said
the general feeling about them was that embeds are, are, important to have, important to help document and get our story out. We should support them as, you know, as much, you know, it, it the war of public opinion is certainly a, an aspect of the war in Iraq that we need to also win, so we need to support embedded reporters.
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Other host officers recognized the positive effect the embedded media could have on unit morale. William, a captain who served as the commander of a motor transport company, said
it would be great if you could have a reporter that was just really happy to be there, really proud to serve alongside the Marines and really want to tell their story. I mean, I think that morale-wise, that would be just an incredible boost that if you got a young lance corporal that goes out to do a really tough mission and they come back, you know, there’s a reporter that wanted to write their story and send it home, I think that’s a really great thing. I think if you have the right reporter, one that really supports what you’re doing, that can be a real morale booster for the unit … I would say that [the embed with my unit] was more neutral. I don’t think he did not support [the war], but I don’t think he was necessarily a big supporter. He was also, I would say, a more introverted, so he was kind of, pretty, quite, kept to himself, was more of an observer. He really didn’t socialize with the Marines that much, didn’t really hang out with them. He just kind of, like, did his work and what not.
Mike, a first lieutenant who led a reconnaissance platoon in Iraq, recalled when his colonel told him an embedded journalist would be assigned to his unit. He said that he
resigned, resigned, not as in resigned the mission, but resigned to [the embed assignment], and said, ‘Yeah you know, I’m a captain, he’s a colonel,’ and I tried to rationalize it, too, and said, I mean, in the big picture, this is fundamentally a good thing, this is better than the press pool … in the first Gulf war. This is a good thing strategically even if it’s a tactical challenge for me.
Host officer instructions to embedded journalists: Marines said they provided embeds with instructions about what they were and were not allowed to do as attachments to their units. The data revealed that some host officers provided their respective embeds with some or all of the following four regulations, which were not already a part of the DOD guidance for embedded media: 1) Embeds needed the permission of the host officer before interviewing enlisted Marines; 2) Embeds were required to stay with the headquarters unit or with a specific group of enlisted Marines away from the headquarters unit; 3) Embeds got basic weapons training and first-aid
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instruction “just in case;” 4) Embeds were told to not interfere or participate with the day-
to-day operations of the unit (i.e., “stay out of the way”).
John, a captain who served as an infantry platoon commander and later as a
battalion intelligence officer said
I did not want [the embeds] coming to my Marines without coming to me first only because myself and my Marines deal with a large volume of classified information on a minutely, throughout every minute of the day, and I was concerned with what items were discussed with [the embeds]. So, I did not want [the embeds] going up to any of the younger Marines who were not as experienced at dealing with reporters who might possibly disclose information whether deliberately, inadvertently, or drawn into it, whether they did it because they got caught up in the interview, whatever the case was.
Amy, a first lieutenant who served as a platoon commander in a combat engineer company, said
I basically told [the embed] to get the heck out of the way. Get cover, hide, stay with the Marines and do what they tell [you] to do. You know, and don’t try and get out there and get this great story. If there’s a lot of crazy crap going on, we just need [you] to get the hell out of the way.
Edward, a captain who served as an infantry company operations officer and later
as an infantry company commander, said:
[The Marines] were being given their boundaries and we were definitely encouraged not to speculate.
Instructions to enlisted Marines about the embedded media: Marines said that
the presence of embedded media did not influence them to instruct their enlisted Marines
on any issues other that what they were and were not allowed to discuss with embedded
media. The phrases “Stay within your box” and “Don’t speak above your pay grade,” were used to describe the types of information enlisted Marines were instructed to avoid.
Marines also described their belief that the presence of the press would not influence their
Marines’ actions because the “standard operation procedure was to do what’s right.”
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Issues involving “what-if” scenarios were also discussed with enlisted Marines, but were
not the main priority.
Bob, a captain who served as an infantry company commander with a photographer
and a print journalist assigned to his unit, said
Marines understood that that when you talk to a reporter you’re staying within, you know, the confines of the information that you are aware of and not to speculate on, you know, the policies of politicians or what someone else is thinking, you know. Now, if they want to know you’re name, tell them, “I’m Corporal Scmuckatelli.” Tell them that you are a machine gunner then, and tell them everything that you do, that you know about your machine gun and what you have seen so far; but not to speculate on, you know, decisions that honorable Mr. Bush and honorable Mr. Rumsfeld were making.
Thomas, a first lieutenant who served as a battalion supply officer and detachment
officer-in-charge, said
I gave [my Marines the] expressive direction not to, the proper answer is not ‘I have no comment.’ I believe that we were taught that, ‘I have no comment’ is inappropriate. It’s rude, and Marines can reply as people. They just can’t give away classified information.
Embeds came prepared for the fight: Marines said that the embeds often arrived into the theater of operations with sophisticated combat protective gear and did not give
the impression that they were neophytes to the combat environment.
John, a captain who served as an infantry platoon commander and later as a battalion intelligence officer, described how the embeds attached to his unit arrived. He said
[the embeds] came better prepared than us, actually … Maybe not all of them, but, at least the ones we saw had usually had some of the best equipment. I know they had SAPI plates21 when we didn’t. They had tan mop suits (desert chemical protection suits) when we had green mop suits. It seemed that someone had put a
21 Small Arms Protective Insert (SAPI) is the bullet-proof plate inserted into a protective vest worn by Marines in a combat zone. Without this insert, the vest provides limited protection from shrapnel but can still be penetrated by ammunition.
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lot of money on their gear, so that was always a laugh…. It did not appear that we had someone who was completely green to being in a combat zone.
Jack, a first lieutenant who served as a platoon commander in a motor transport company, recalled that the embed attached to his unit had protective gear that even the
Marines did not have. He said
[the embed] had his own chemical suit, and he had a mask, which looked a little better than ours did, (laugh) and he actually had a flack jacket that had armor, and we only had a flack jacket, and we didn’t have bulletproof plates.
Edward, a captain who served as an infantry company operations officer and later as an infantry company commander, remembered being impressed with the embeds’ professional experience. He said
I remember being impressed that [the embeds] seemed to have some experience. You know, they didn’t seem to be kind of deer in the headlights. They understood what they were getting into, especially the ones who had some military experience, but even the journalist that were with [magazines], these were individuals that had done this before. You could tell they were professionals. So, I think, from that specter , the Marines were comfortable being around them.
Embeds learned the Marine Corps way of life: Marines said they appreciated the ability of the embeds to adapt to the military way of life. For example, some Marines said that “everyone suffered equally,” which means that neither the embeds nor the
Marines received any special treatment. This is a hallmark of the Marine Corps, in which rations and shelter are provided to the enlisted Marines equally, and senior-level Marines
(staff non-commissioned officers and officers) go without if the enlisted Marines go without.
Matthew, a first lieutenant who served as a motor transport platoon commander, who had a foreign print journalist assigned to his unit, remembered how his embed functioned with the Marines. He said
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[the embed] ate MRE’s like everybody else. He had some snacks and crap like that, but nothing, I mean he basically lived and survived exactly the way we did. And I actually demanded that of him. He was, if we were out hiking around in Kuwait or digging holes or whatever, I would suggest, and he was perfectly willing. He wanted the real experience, and, so, he was perfectly willing and got out in the holes with the guys. I don’t remember him ever digging or anything like that, but he would get out there and spend time with Marines and stuff like that.
Some Marines remembered how the embeds “went with the program,” a phrase that describes the Marine-mentality of cooperation and teamwork in order to accomplish the mission. This phrase also describes the military culture in which orders from a higher ranking Marine are followed. Although, the embeds did not technically fall into the military rank structure, some Marines described how the embeds followed orders that dealt with operational and informational security without resistance and, essentially,
“went with the program.”
Mike, a first lieutenant who served as a reconnaissance platoon commander, recalled taking away his embed’s satellite phone in order to safe guard his platoon’s operational and informational security. He said
a lot of what we were doing was very sensitive stuff. I mean, we had a whole collateral mission called sensitive site exploitation, which was not for public disclosure, and, I just, I didn’t know [the embed] well enough to trust him, and none of my Marines had phones, and he made clear to me that he was writing for a magazine and his deadlines were after the war ended, so he didn’t have to file daily updates, and, and so, you know, I just said, you know, ‘How do you feel about giving up the phone?’ And he consented, so, I gave it back to him in Baghdad.
Mike and other officers also recalled how embeds learned the “tricks of the trade,” referring to the techniques for desert survival and cultural norms characteristic of the
Marines. Mike remembered how the embed assigned to his unit took advantage of the fact that Marines often trade amongst themselves for food, hygiene and recreational items. He said
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(laugh) It was, it was utterly ridiculous. It was really funny. [The embed assigned to my unit] showed up with just … pens and notebooks. He had a duffel bag full of Marlboro Red cigarettes (laugh)…Not only to smoke but to trade. He’d worked enough in the Middle East that he knew that was like a bag of 100 dollar bill … It was very funny.
Defining the host-officer responsibility: Acting as a host officer was more of an inconvenience than a major burden. Ultimately, it was another responsibility that came with the position. Some host officers described the assignment of an embed to their unit as “just another body,” and “one more mouth to feed.” Some host officers said that whether or not they had media experience, the assignment became part of his or her overall responsibilities, and ultimately, as the officer, he or she was responsible for the lives of everyone in the unit, Marine or embed. The host officer assigned personal responsibility for the safety and overall experience of the embed, but did not have a concrete understanding of what, if any, repercussions might exist if he or she abandoned those responsibilities as the host officer.
William, a captain who served as the commander of a motor transport company, said
I looked at it as feeling responsible for every Marine and person that was assigned to that unit, and [the embed] at that point was basically assigned to the unit as far as I was concerned, so I wanted to ensure his safety just as much as any Marine. I don’t know if there was any specific action I took with regards to [safety] for him, but I couldn’t really focus specifically on him. I mean, I was more focused on the big picture with regards to safety.
Jill, a first lieutenant who served as the executive officer of a motor transport company, said
we were told, and my [commanding officer] gave me the responsibility of basically like being an escort to them, making sure we knew what they were doing, making sure they were following the rules, etc. Honestly, I thought it was pretty cool actually because it was a real morale booster for the Marines to see that even as combat service support Marines, they were getting attention … I basically took the
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role of letting them do what they needed to do to get their job done, but at the same time making sure the rules were being followed.
John, a captain who served as an infantry platoon commander and later as a
battalion intelligence officer, said
I was the officer-in-charge. [Dealing with the embeds] was my responsibility, and, really, experienced [with the media] or not, that’s where it stopped. It was my responsibility.
Communication between embeds and host officers: Communication between an
embed and a host officer was informal and officers encouraged an open-door policy with
the journalists. Officers often recognized that any kind of favors an embed might give
them, such as the use of their communication technologies (satellite phones, Internet)
could come with the cost of an impromptu interview. Company commanders often
designated junior officers in the company as the primary points of contact for the embeds.
Some host officers recognized that embeds used different newsgathering techniques,
ranging from interviews that took on a conversational tone to ones that were more aggressive in nature.
Thomas, a first lieutenant who served as a battalion supply officer and detachment officer-in-charge, said
[the embed] was looking for information. He was definitely looking for something to publish. I mean, that was, there wasn’t a question there with him. The other reporters, I would say they were, they would at least carry on casual conversation. This one was much more direct and was looking for answers, and he really wanted to hear our opinions on the way [the war was being conducted]. I kind of left it to the answer of, ‘You know, my job isn’t to question anything. It’s to carry on with the mission and accomplish the mission.
William, a captain who served as the commander of a motor transport company, said
when [the embed] came to the unit, I basically took on the responsibility of being his point of contact for matters or any issues that he had while he was assigned to
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the unit. I tried to filter that to the [commanding officer] so that she could stay busy doing what need to be done operationally. So, I guess, yeah, he basically had an open-door policy with me so that I could try and deal with any issues.
Censorship was part of the package: Some officers considered pre-screening of
embeds’ news products as necessary for “information control and quality control,” while
others did not consider it part of their responsibilities as host-officers. Some implanted a
“spot-check method” in order to “keep an eye” on embeds, describing their infrequent review of the embeds’ stories. Officers described embeds as being amenable to sharing their news products with the officers prior to publication.
Matthew, a first lieutenant who served as a platoon commander with a motor transport company, recalled asking to read the news stories that the embed assigned to his unit wrote before they were sent out for publication, especially because the embed was writing for a Spanish publication. He said
[the embed] wrote [his news reports] in Spanish, and you know, no hablo español, so …I would occasionally have him read [his stories] to my lance corporal or allow my lance corporal to read it, and he would then give me the gist of what he was talking about. I occasionally asked him; he was very cordial with me, and when I said, ‘What are you writing about today?’ and he said, ‘Ah, I was writing about when we came and up and the tankers came in and they were, you know, how they came in, and they were talking to our Marines and how they seemed to be friends and blah, blah, blah, blah, blah.’ And, ah, and, so, most of the time he would tell me what it was, and I trusted him. There was nothing I could do, it was not my job to censor his information, and you know he was put there, and he was not using my equipment, and he was not, you know, nor was I ever told I needed to censor his information. If I had ever been ordered to, I would have read everything that he wrote before he sent it, but that wasn’t required of me, and, to be honest, personally, I trusted him, and, occasionally, if I ever had any questions about what he was writing on, I would ask him, and he would tell me.
Host officer-perceived motivations of the embedded journalists: Many host
officers described their distrust for the embeds’ motivations and newsgathering
techniques. Some officers had the impression that every embed “has an angle” and that
they are biased, but that ultimately, “any news is better than no news.” Some expressed
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the desire for the DOD to pre-screen embeds for pro-war, pro-U.S. sentiments, but that
this would contradict the goal of not propagating propaganda.
Amy, a first lieutenant who served as a platoon commander in a combat
engineering company, said
I think primarily because of Desert Storm and the media being in Desert Storm. None of us had been in that situation before … It’s like, we don’t know what we’re getting ourselves into, let alone, we don’t want the world to see every bit and every detail of what we’re doing, you know, when we’re not really sure what’s going on. And you know, your natural tendency is just to think that everybody’s out to get you, I guess, as far as the media’s concerned. That’s how we all thought, anyway …. Pretty much, we all had the same consensus – keep those guys away from us.
Jill, a first lieutenant who served as the executive officer of a motor transport company, said
I’d want to see [the embed program] happen again. I mean, I know that some of the older, more senior enlisted guys weren’t happy about it … I think it stems a lot from the first Gulf War when I think the media had a reputation for not getting things right or making drama when there was none, and I think those guys had that impression about the media, but I’m glad they were there. I mean if they hadn’t been there, I don’t think I would have missed them, but it wasn’t a bad thing … It was really good for morale. Well, in the long run, I think it made the Marines feel really good about their unit. [It was] the Marines’ chance to talk all about their unit. I mean, over time, people who had been really skeptical of [the embed] had learned to trust him and finally said, ‘Yeah, you know, he’s okay.’
Robert, a first lieutenant who served as a motor transport platoon commander, said
[the embed] seemed like a good guy, a good journalist, as far as journalists go. You know … in my opinion, journalists and lawyers are pretty close to each other, but there are some good journalists out there. The whole politicizing of everything, journalists can be just as political as a politician.
The cost of Embedded Media in Iraq: Marines described the frustration they
experienced with the “Monday Morning Quarterbacks” in the U.S. who criticized their
decision-making in combat. Another cost of the embed presence was felt in the fact that
embeds were not armed. One infantry captain said, “One embed meant one less gun.”
Embeds were also seen as potential targets of the enemy forces, which could draw
149 unwarranted enemy actions against Marine units. Some host officers said embeds were privy to conversations amongst Marines that should not necessarily be for mass consumption and when taken out of context could get the Marines in trouble or cause disorder among the command.
Matthew, a first lieutenant who served as a platoon commander with a motor transport company, said
I’m sure [the embed] overheard conversations, and that’s a risk you take when you let these guys out there. They’re gonna go hear stuff that Marines talk about, and Marines don’t always say that Lieutenant [Smith’s] the coolest thing ever, you know, how, they say, man, ‘This again, today,’ or ‘Why are we digging friggin’ holes in Kuwait when we don’t need to? Why don’t we just save our energy for the big fight?’ You know what I mean?
Mike, a first lieutenant who served as a reconnaissance platoon commander, recalled his initial impression to the assignment of an embed with his unit. He said
well, the platoon had been together for about a year, and we knew each other very well. I knew the guys and trusted them. They knew me and trusted me, and bringing a journalist in at the last minute is a wild card, another mouth to feed, another life to worry about, somebody whose conduct I could not really control. I didn’t know, I didn’t know what would happen to him when things got crazy. I saw, I saw no advantage of having him in there, and I saw a lot of potential disadvantages … I should modify that I saw no advantage as a platoon commander. As an American citizen, I saw the advantage of transparency and letting people at home have a clear view of what we were doing; but that ideal didn’t really trump my more pragmatic concerns.
Mike said he had logistical concerns about having responsibility for an embed, too.
He said
we were prepared to do long-range, desert reconnaissance, so for the first ten days of the war, first twelve days of the war, my whole platoon was eating one MRE [meal ready-to-eat] a day. We simply didn’t have room to carry more stuff, and I looked at a 180 pound journalist and saw him as, you know, six boxes of MREs. (laugh). I’d rather have food for my guys than have this joker along. So, that was my attitude. I mean, it was very pragmatic. I was thinking in terms of, ‘Okay, if we bring him, how much less fifty caliber ammunition can we carry?’
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Other host officers discussed their concerns with the operational security risks that embeds posed. Robert, a first lieutenant who served as a motor transport platoon commander, said
everything’s so hush-hush in terms of operational security … [H]ere you’ve got some civilian coming in with no security clearance and he’d be snooping around your day-to-day operations and reporting back, you know, via satellite phone communications. That seemed like a bit of a concern.
Robert, a first lieutenant who served as a motor transport platoon commander and who had a foreign journalist embedded with his unit, said the overall experience of having an embed present was a positive one. He said
[the embed] didn’t bug us. He was pretty good. Our guy was really good. He wasn’t pushy. He really, he listened to what we had to say and was very cooperative and what not, so it was a very minor burden.
Edward, a captain who served as an infantry company operations officer and later as an infantry company commander, said the risks of having the embed present were minimized because of the way the embed conducted himself. He said
[the embed] definitely wasn’t endangering the Marines. He wasn’t trying to get the perfect shot. Of all the photos he took in that house because of his proximity to where the fighting was taking place, probably 6-7 feet away, I think he was able to understand that he could do his job but also not put anyone in jeopardy. You can tell from the series of photos that the Marines don’t even know he’s there. It’s definitely nobody posing for pictures. He’s just kind of capturing everything as it’s happening, which I though was interesting.
Host-officer preparation for embedded media presence: Officers recalled receiving “quick, down-and-dirty” media classes,” referring the impromptu, informal nature of the lesson, which focused on the main issues of the subject at hand. Officers said the classes included basic instructions for dealing with the embeds assigned to their units. Some, however, had a complete lack of familiarity with Embedded Media policy and the regulations behind it.
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Embeds adapted to the combat environment: Some host officers said that they preferred a situation in which the embed assigned to their unit acted as a silent observer and did not interfere with operations of the unit. Some host officers described their appreciation for the embeds’ ability to adapt to the requirements of the combat zone. For example, embeds learned to deal with light discipline restrictions, which refers to restrictions on the use of white light during periods of darkness in order to avoid detection by the enemy; embeds were observers rather than participants; embeds learned to “hurry up and wait,” which describes the frequent pace of military operations in which urgency getting some where is usually followed by a long period of waiting for something to happen; embeds learned to “take cover,” referring to protective shelter while under enemy attack.
Thomas, a first lieutenant who served as a battalion supply officer and detachment officer-in-charge, said
[the embed was] extremely professional. She was a little bit uneasy about the fact that at that time we were living in some very rough conditions where she was living out of a two-man tent and it was pretty dirty and dusty and it was pretty austere conditions, and she probably talked about that more than anything, but she was able to handle the situation and she was extremely professional, as I don’t think I’ve met a reporter that was not professional.
William, a captain who served as the commander of a motor transport company, said
we were so busy trying to do what we needed to do, he really didn’t, he didn’t interfere in any real way. We constantly, you know, would make sure that he was not using his phone at times that were deemed by higher headquarters as basically black out times. You know, a couple of times he was typing on his laptop, which was bad for light discipline, but as soon as we addressed it with him, you know he would stop. He really wasn’t a burden on this unit.
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Embeds earned Marines’ respect: Officers had respect for the embeds who displayed “intestinal fortitude,” a.k.a. “guts,” and who generously shared their communication resources, like Internet and satellite phones, with Marines.
Thomas, a first lieutenant who served as a battalion supply officer and detachment officer-in-charge, said
basically, it was a convoy several miles long that went from Anderson to the New Chest, as it was termed, basically some thirty miles from Baghdad was the destination and we ended up coming up onto a firefight, I believe, that was a mile or so ahead of us. There were several traffic accidents between the Humvees. I believe that one of the reporter’s Humvees rolled or something, or went into a ditch, and that’s when that [part of the convoy] got cut off. I remember that happening. That was behind me. There was also a fire somewhere close to them, their vehicle that we ended up putting out. But the majority of the night was just me remembering the cobra light up the enemy targets … [the embed] hit his face. I don’t know if he broke his nose, but I remember … year, and I thought that he handled that pretty well, but that was probably one of the most intense nights of driving that I have ever had in my life. I believe it was a seventeen-hour convoy, and I chewed so much tobacco to stay away that I puked and never chewed again.
Mike, a first lieutenant who led a reconnaissance platoon in Iraq and recalled speaking to the embedded journalist attached to his platoon after a firefight with Iraqi
Republican Guard forces. He said
a few days into the war after our first big fire fight, I found [the embed assigned to my unit] on his hands and knees counting holes in the door of a Humvee that he was sitting next to, and there were six holes in the door and he was unhurt, and, at that point if I were a journalist, I think I would probably raise my hand and say, ‘Guys, this has been fun, but I have enough information for my story, and I am going back to Kuwait to file it,’ but he did not do that. He stayed with us to the very end, and, after that day, that is when he earned our respect, and from that day on it was almost like he was a member of the platoon.
Edward, a captain who served as an infantry company operations officer and later as an infantry company commander, recalled when the embed assigned to his unit was injured by enemy fire and how that influenced his relationship with the Marines in the unit. Edward described how the embed was injured. He said
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one of the squads came into [enemy] contact. [The embed] dived into a house and took a series of probably 35 photos of the incident where [the Marines were injured and one lost his leg] and [another] was killed. He was actually two feet away from them. He was in the house when all of that was going on, and he was basically another part of the platoon. [He] didn’t get in the way. But what happened was once they got all the Marines out of the house, and they couldn’t get to the two insurgents. They had killed a couple of them but couldn’t get upstairs to the one. They blew up the house with a … charge, and [the house] came down, and, in the rubble, one of the insurgents, who our interpreter said was, I believe, an Algerian, was buried to his waste in rubble, just broken up. But he still had a hand grenade in his hand, and the Marines thought he was dead and so did [the embed]. [The embed] went forward to take a picture of him, and this guy opens his eyes and threw a hand grenade, and [the embed] caught some fragmentation in the leg.
Edward said the embed’s demeanor during all the chaos was “very calm.” He said he refused to be evacuated with the injured Marines, was treated by the platoon’s corpsman and staid with the unit. Edward described how the embed’s decision affected his relationship with the Marines. He said
I think more than anything [the embed’s injury] just solidified the personal relationship … [The Marines] didn’t really see [the embed] as much as a journalist anymore. [They saw him] as more a part of Third Platoon.
Dealing with sensitive and classified information: Information about American casualties was the most sensitive information outside of operational information to which embeds were privy. Embeds had sensitivity for these issues.
Jill, a first lieutenant who served as the executive officer of a motor transport company, described issues with the embeds’ communications technology. She said
well, I was responsible for the security of the company, so, like when we had to take away their satellite phones, I really felt badly about it. You know, that was how they were relaying their stories back, and that was their job, and we had to take them away for security reasons. I mean, they understood, but I still felt badly, so we tried to do something to help them out. I mean, I knew they were just trying to do their job, so we would let them use our sat phones, which were secured … They appreciated it, but, at the same time, I guess their phones were way better than ours were, and they had better reception, so they still weren’t too happy about it, you know?
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Timing of embed assignment was crucial: The timing with which embeds joined
units was critical to the success with which they assimilated to the unit and functioned
under stressful circumstances. Some host officers said they preferred that the embed was
assigned to their units “sooner rather than later” and that this had positive effects on the
host officer-embed experience. Officers were skeptical of embeds who wanted “to join
the fight the night before the Super Bowl.”
Jill, a first lieutenant who served as the executive officer of a motor transport company, said
I think also what really helped us work well together is the fact that [the embeds] were attached to us before we went into Iraq. That really helped things out because we had time to get to know each other and get used to the situation. I think that resolved a lot of issues that didn’t even come up because we worked together.
Mike, a first lieutenant who led a reconnaissance platoon in Iraq and had a print
journalist attached to his unit, recalled his initial hesitance when he was assigned an
embed. He said
it wasn’t that I was leery of journalists or that I had anything, I didn’t know anything about [the embed assigned to my unit] personally, just in general, if, you know, if we had gotten a new Marine at that point, if a new sergeant had been walked up to me, and I was told, ‘This sergeant who you don’t know and none of your Marines know is going to ride along with you,’ I think I would have reacted the same way. Said, ‘No, no, I don’t want him. We’ve trained together a prolonged time, and we’re ready to go as-is, I don’t want to introduce a wild card now at the eleventh hour.’
Enlisted Marine’s reactions to embedded media: A few of the host officers said that some of the enlisted Marines seemed hesitant to interact with the embeds at first.
However, the host officers said that these concerns were assuaged over time if the embed was with the unit long enough to establish rapport with the Marines and a reputation for being self-sufficient and safety conscious.
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Other host officers said that their Marines did not express any concerns about the presence of embeds. William, a captain who served as the commander of a motor transport company, said
[the embed] really didn’t mean much to [the Marines]. It really didn’t change the way they did their work. It really didn’t affect things that much.
Thomas, a first lieutenant who served as a battalion supply officer and detachment officer-in-charge, said
I don’t believe that I ever had a Marine discuss the fact that a reporter was in camp. I think that it was a little bit expected that such a big evolution such as the invading of a country would be televised and publicized, that I do not ever remember a Marine … ever mentioning that it was a problem that reporters were in the camp. I don’t remember them ever coming to me and telling me, ‘Sir, why is this guy hanging around?’ That was never a problem.
When and why the embeds were attached to, and left, a unit: Some host officers described their introduction to the idea of having an embed attached to their unit as being
“volun-told.” This term is a manipulation of the word, “volunteer,” and is common in military jargon. It reflects the common practice that assignments are usually not volunteer opportunities but rather assignments. Although this experience was common among several of the host officers, some felt that, had they voiced concerns, senior officers would have been receptive.
In circumstances when embeds left their assigned units, some host officers said they felt empathy for embeds who experienced the death of a Marine and subsequently asked to return to the U.S., considering the relationships that had been forged between the embeds and the Marines.
Amy, a first lieutenant who served as a platoon commander with a combat engineer company said
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we had a very calm time … another reason that [the embed] didn’t stay with us that long. I don’t know why, but our company ended up getting the shaft pretty much. We never got any good missions and we were a day late and a dollar short for everything. Which, you know, we can’t complain about. You never want to be in a firefight, you know, but [the embed] just wasn’t getting enough stories, enough interesting stuff to send home, so he kind of switched to a different company after a while.
Other host officers said they felt as though embed left their units because they were
looking for the most exciting story instead of being dedicated to the story of a particular
unit, whatever that unit’s war experience was.
Jill, a first lieutenant who served as the executive officer of a motor transport company, recalled when the embeds attached to her unit moved to another unit. She said
[the embeds were with my unit] up until we were in Baghdad, and then they ran into a more forward tank unit and decided they wanted to go with them, and they came to me and asked me if I was okay with that, and I was like, ‘Sure thing.’ And that was that.
The bond between the embeds and the host officer: Bonds between the embeds and the host-officers were forged under high-pressure situations, some of which outlasted the deployment and continued in e-mail correspondence, attendance to memorial services, weddings, photo exhibitions and visitations while the host officer was in the international journalists’ home country.
Senior-level officer instructions to embeds and host officers: Senior-level
officers gave embeds instructions to “have fun” with the experience and that junior-level
officers were instructed to give them wide-ranging opportunities to cover the war, assist
them with logistical requirements, and provide them access.
Textural-Structural Description
After themes have been extracted from the data, the next step in the
phenomenological process is to construct textural and structural descriptions of the
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experience. Textural descriptions describe what happened during an experience with
rich, detailed explanation of the feeling and effects experienced. The compliment to the
textural description is that of a structural description, in which the co-researcher explains how something was experienced in a spatial, time-oriented manner using terms and phrases that connotate progress, time, escalation, and space. According to the Moustakas modification of the Stevick-Colaizzi-Keen method of data analysis, the researcher
constructs a textural and structural description for the experience of each co-researcher.22
These individual descriptions are synthesized into composite textural and structural
descriptions. Finally, the two composite descriptions, one textural and one structural, are
combined into a universal textural-structural description of the experience with the
subject phenomenon.
Textural Description
First, an individual textural description for each co-researcher was constructed.
Next, I constructed a composite textural description based on those individual
descriptions.23 It explained what happened during the experience as a host officer to
embeds during the Iraq War. It highlights the particular effects and considerations unique to this experience and the position of company-grade officers who had this responsibility.
Composite Textural Description
The core textural themes of the phenomenon of the host officer experience
included: the bond between the embed and the host officer; the embed’s ability to adapt to the combat environment and the Marine Corps way of life; the tangible benefits and
22 Ibid., 122. 23 Ibid., 137.
158 risks of the embed’s presence; and a relationship of trust between the embed and the host officer, which was fostered by open communication and was almost devoid of censorship in comparison to media-military relationships of the recent past. The following is a narrative of the composite textural description.
All the co-researchers in this study recognized the Embedded Media policy as an integral piece of the overall war effort and said they thought it had a tangible benefit for U.S. troops and U.S. foreign policy. Whether they felt properly trained for the responsibility is debatable amongst them, but most felt that the common sense demeanors and no-nonsense attitudes of the embedded media made the relationship between the journalists who were embedded and the company-grade officers who served as their hosts in the combat zone a positive experience with both benefiting in some manner.
Many participants described the experience in terms of how the experience didn’t affect them. In their opinion, there was a direct correlation between their positive experience as a host officer and the less the embed was seen and heard. Embeds were seen as “just another body,” “one more mouth to feed,” “one less gun,” or “a necessary evil.” There was a positive connotation to their description of their experiences when the embeds, “just stayed out of the way,” took cover, and asked questions when the firing was over.
Host officers described their sense of responsibility for the embed no differently than the responsibility they felt for any Marine in the unit. However, they did not expect the same kind of loyalty and devotion in return. Many of the co-researchers described their distrust for the embeds’ motivations and newsgathering techniques. This influenced the instructions that host officers gave to the embeds and the enlisted Marines and were, by far, the greatest concerns expressed by the host officers for the presence of embeds.
A second concern of host officers about the presence of embeds was the security risk they posed. They were considered possible “targets,” “distractions,” “liabilities,” and “annoyances.” However, these negative impressions were countered by the positive relationships that were built over long durations of embedded assignments or over periods of high-intensity combat. Host officers described the mutual respect that was forged between themselves and the embeds for the individual responsibilities each had, the help they could provide each other to accomplish those goals, and the trust that was built despite the lack of immediate gratification from the relationship. Host officers noted the positive effects of the embed presence included improved morale from the media attention and an opportunity to utilize the media’s communication resources. Additionally, the host officers recognized the macro-level benefits of informing the global public about the Marine’s accomplishments during the war, the enemy’s unethical fighting tactics, and the overall conduct of the war.
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Structural Description
The process of constructing the structural description of a phenomenon requires use of imaginative variation. “The task of imaginative variation is to seek possible meanings through the utilization of imagination, varying the frames of reference, employing polarities and reversals, and approaching the phenomenon from divergent perspectives, different positions roles or functions.”24 The ultimate goal of this process is to construct a structural description of an experience that effectively relates the how behind the experience, which further expands our understanding of what was experienced. The major task in this process is to describe the essential structures associated with time, space, and graduation. The steps of imaginative variation include:25
1. Systematic varying of the possible structural meanings that underlie the textural meanings; 2. Recognizing the underlying themes or contexts that account for the emergence of the phenomenon; 3. Considering the universal structures that precipitate feelings and thoughts with reference to the phenomenon, such as the structure of time, space, bodily concerns, materiality, causality, relation to self, or relation to others; 4. Searching for exemplifications that vividly illustrate the invariant structural themes and facilitate the development of a structural description of the phenomenon.
Composite Structural Description
The steps of imaginative variation were followed in order to arrive at the universal structure of the host officer experience. This was based primarily on the descriptions from several of the participants that depicted an absence of the embedded journalist’s influence over the self. In other words, host officers described their interaction with embeds in terms of how they were not affected rather than how they were affected. This was followed by several substructures, including resignation to the existential nature of
24 Ibid., 97-98. 25 Ibid., 99.
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the combat environment (host officers had not control over their assignment to the role),
restriction to a designated sphere of knowledge (host officers were encouraged not speak
to embeds outside of their sphere of influence and, in turn, encouraged subordinates to act
accordingly), acceptance of a hierarchical power structure (the decision to embed
journalists was made at a higher level, at which they had no influence), approval of
decentralized decision-making authority (host officers functioned well in an environment
in which they understood the overall goals and given authority to meet those goals by
whatever means they thought were appropriate), and a selfless adoption of responsibility
for dependent subjects who were not military subordinates (host officers took responsibility for the welfare of embeds because they were the senior-ranking members of they were in a position of leadership). The following is a narrative of the of the composite structural description.
Working with embedded media during the Iraq War was a collateral duty for some Marine Corps company-grade officers who were a part of the ground forces during the first year and a half of the war. While they were busy completing their responsibilities as infantry or military police officers, in logistics units or coordinating artillery attacks, the task of dealing with the press was never the primary responsibility. It was, however, no less important to the overall success of the war effort, and, as such required the attention, time and consideration of these men and women during a time of extreme physical and emotional duress.
Most of the co-researchers described their initial introductions to the idea of the embedded media as a casual piece of information passed during routine staff meetings. When official assignments of embeds were made, they were not volunteer opportunities, but, rather, volun-told expectations of company level commanders. In most of the cases for the co-researchers in this study, the responsibility for the embed was delegated to them by the battalion commander and then re-delegated from the company commander. In some cases the company commander took the primary responsibility as host officer on for him or herself.
Timing for the embed’s attachment to a unit was the primary indicator for success, according to the co-researchers in this study. Embeds who joined units while they were in Kuwait preparing to cross the border into Iraq had the opportunity to acclimate to the arid desert environment, adjust their gear, assimilate to the austere conditions of life within a Marine Corps unit, and, ultimately, build personal
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relationships with the Marines of the unit to which he or she was attached. Conversely, some host officers expressed skepticism about embeds who wanted to join their unit only after hearing about its involvement in a major combat offensive without having been attached to the unit for a length of time that would have given them familiarity for the unit and its mission. The length of an embed’s assignment to a unit was also positively correlated to the trust that was built between the unit’s Marines and the embed. Similarly, the intensity of the mission during that time also had a positive correlation to the bond that was built between them.
The host officers described the physical location of the embeds as one in which they preferred them to function in one of two ways. Either the host officer wanted the embed to maintain a position with the headquarters unit at all times or the host officer wanted the embed to stay out of sight without wandering from the unit. Depending on the co-researcher, these were ideal locations for the embeds, and the they usually obliged to whatever the host officer preferred and were able to fulfill their newsgathering responsibilities effectively either way.
Many host officers described the physique, dress, and gear of the embeds in comparison to that of the typical Marine. As long as the embed was physically capable of carrying his own gear and not slow down the unit with physical limitations of extra gear or personally physical inabilities, embeds were considered self-sufficient.
Composite Textural-Structural Description
The final step of Moustakas’s phenomenological data analysis process requires an
integration of the composite textural and composite structural descriptions. This provides
a synthesis of the meanings and essences of the experience and their underlying structural
designs.26 This process relies heavily on the intuitive evaluation of the data by the
researcher. In order to reach the essence of the experience, as described by Husserl, the
researcher must make an attempt to exhaust all possible experiences of a phenomenon
with the realization that this is ultimately impossible. According to Husserl, essence
means that which is common or universal, the condition or quality without which a thing
26 Ibid., 100.
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would not be what it is.27 Essence is not one thing in and of itself, but the culmination of
multiple things and more than the sum of the parts.
While the endeavor of this study was to capture the essence of the host officer
experience with embedded media in a combat zone during the Iraq War, it is limited to
that time and place and, those persons, interviewed for this particular study.28 Thus, the essence described herein is that of their experience alone and not generalizable to all
Marine officers who worked with embedded media. Nor does it translate across to other branches of the military like the Army, which also hosted a considerable number of embeds during the war. Additionally, the essence described herein is particular to the
description and synthesis that is a product of my particular vantage point.29 Thus, epoche
and bracketing of the phenomenon were essential to the methodological principles of the
study in order to limit as much as possible my influence on the perception and synthesis
of the data while recognizing at the same time that separation of the data from the
researcher is ultimately impossible, despite my efforts to have disengaged myself from it.
The following is the universal textural-structural description of the host-officer
experience with embedded media in a combat zone during the Iraq War:
During the Iraq War, journalists were assigned to U.S. military units in a newly
designed program called the Embedded Media Program. While journalists were, by far,
the central figures of the new policy and Marines the subject of their reporting, a third,
distinct group of service members played a critical, yet less recognized role in the
27Edmund Husserl, Ideas, trans. W.R. Boyce Gibson (London: Georg Allen & Unwin, 1931), 43. 28 Moustakas, Phenomenological Research Method, 100. 29 Ibid., 101.
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execution of the program. Company-grade officers within the Marine Corps’ ground forces represented a variety of combat and combat service support fields. They
commanded reconnaissance platoons into the oil fields of Ramadi, led convoys over the
Saddam bridge, crossing the Euphrates, and ordered artillery attacks on the city of
Fallujah. Each had his or her own designated mission, a piece of the overall military campaign that overthrew the Ba’ath party and eventually led to the capture of its leader,
Saddam Hussein. In addition to their primary responsibilities, some were delegated the
responsibility for an embedded journalist or several. This collateral duty placed them in the unofficial role of “host officer” to civilian journalists from multiple national and international news organizations, representing print, radio, television, cable, and wire media organizations.
Neither babysitter, escort, nor chauffeur, the company-grade officer in this role can be described more aptly as a host to the embed during their assignment covering the Iraq
War. Much like the relationship of a host organism to a symbiont in a biological relationship, the host officer, representing the military as a whole, and the embed, both benefited in a mutualistic symbiosis.
The assignment was not voluntary, came with minimal instructions that were usually passed verbally, and the attachment of the embed to a unit was not at a time of the host officer’s choosing. The host officer became responsible for whomever he or she was assigned, whatever age, gender, level of experience, media organization, or nationality.
The host officer was just that, the host to the embed, who, for the most part, came and went as he or she pleased, ate, slept and traveled as a guest, and was promised by senior
Department of Defense official the treatment of a guest amongst the Marine unit. While
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the DOD published guidance outlining the Embedded Media program, the situation on
the ground did not always reflect the DOD’s lofty goals for the policy.
On the ground, the host officer controlled his or her battle space and resources.
Removal from the theater of operations was not out of the question when disorder and liability became an issue. Screening of the embed’s news products was at the discretion of the host officer. The host officer dictated the embed’s access to his or her unit’s missions and Marines. The host officer controlled the embed’s fate, too, with the mere control of tangible necessities, like food and water. The host officer assigned personal responsibility for the safety and overall experience of the embed, but did not have a concrete understanding of what, if any, repercussions might exist if he or she abandoned those responsibilities as the host officer.
Some host officers expressed concerns with the gender of embeds that were to be assigned to their units. Male Marine officers with all-male combat units said having a female embed with their unit would be more disruptive and hazardous than they were willing accept despite the acknowledged benefits of the Embedded Media Program.
Other host officers who were with co-ed units also expressed concern for the gender of embeds and were doubtful that female journalists could assimilate in co-ed units because they were not trained with the unit the way the female Marines had been. Still, other host officers who commanded co-ed units felt did not see gender of the embeds as an issue of concern.
Overall, the host officers expressed satisfaction with the program and understanding for the military’s support for it. The primary motivations for their support were based on the personal and professional relationships built with embeds over long
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periods of time during the war or during periods of high-intensity combat. Most host
officers noted that the role of the host officer was made more difficult because some of the embeds were attached to units after the combat period had already begun, noting that
embeds worked better with their units when they had an adjustment period before
entering the combat zone. Other host officers expressed concern for embed’s familiarity
with survival tactics, first aid, weapons familiarity, and basic knowledge of military gear,
such as the protective suits used by service members during nuclear, biological, or
chemical (NBC) attacks, which were major concerns during the combat phase of the war.
Host officers expressed respect for embeds who endured combat experiences
alongside the Marines, sometimes suffering from wounds incurred during contact with
the enemy. The primary influences of host officers perceptions of their experiences with
embedded journalists was the general conduct, professionalism, and apparent motivations
of the individual journalists that were embedded with their unit. Although many host
officers mentioned negative perceptions of the media as a whole, they expressed attitudes
of trust, mutual respect, and understanding for embeds assigned to their units and the role
they played in the war.
Validity of the Findings
Triangulation is a method employed by researchers to check and establish the
validity of their studies. The concept is based on the navigational concept of finding a location by using the position of two fixed points of a known distance apart from each
other. This theory is applied to qualitative research as a method of validation in such that
variations in the investigator, method, environment, theoretical precept and data facilitate
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further confirmation of the findings.30 There are five types of triangulation, of which two were utilized in this study based on the research design and limitations. The following section defines each method of triangulation and its relevance to this study:
• The process of data triangulation31 requires the comparative analysis of different stakeholders’ perception of something. Although this study focused on one particular group of stakeholders in the Embedded Media Program ― non-public affairs company grade Marine Corps officers who served with ground forces during the Iraq War ― it evaluated several different types of Marines within this category (males and females; first lieutenants and captains; Marines with different specialties, such as infantry and logistics, platoon commanders; Marines with different leadership positions, such as company executive officers, company commanders; Marines with different staff officers positions, such as operations and supply officers).
• The process of investigator triangulation32 was not suitable for this study because it required more than one principle researchers. Since this research was conducted to satisfy a thesis requirement for a master’s degree, multiple primary researchers was not feasible.
• The process of theory triangulation33 was applied in the process of data analysis. As discussed earlier, Moustakas and Creswell both discuss two methods for phenomenological data analysis (the Van Kaam and Stevick-Colaizzi-and Keen methods). Both were evaluated as to their utility for the research framework of this study, and the latter was considered more suitable. Additionally, the phenomenological method requires both a textural and structural analysis of the data, which garner what was experienced and how it was experienced, respectively.
30Norman K. Denzin, “Strategies of multiple triangulation,” in Norman K. Denzin,. ed. The research act in sociology: a theoretical introduction to sociological method (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1970), 297- 313. See also Sandra Mathison, “Why triangulate?” Educational Researcher (1988) 17, 2, 13-17. 31 Data triangulation supposes that something is more than likely true if stakeholders who have different points of view on an issue see the same outcome. Denzin, “Strategies of multiple triangulation,” in Denzin,. ed. The research act in sociology: a theoretical introduction to sociological method, 297-313. 32 Investigator triangulation supposes that something is more than likely true if several researchers examine the same thing using the same methodology and come to the same findings. This method is not always practical given time and financial constraints of a particular research project. Ibid. 33 Theory triangulation involves the use of multiple theoretical concepts to evaluate the same data. Merilyn Annells, “Triangulation of qualitative approaches: hermeneutical phenomenology and grounded theory,” Nursing Theory and Concept Development or Analysis (2006)
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• The process of methodological triangulation34 required the use of multiple qualitative and/or quantitative methodologies. This was outside the scope of this research, which was limited to phenomenology. Although I did not conduct any quantitative analysis on the Embedded Media Program, I analyzed other researchers’ quantitative studies on the subject. None specifically addressed the focus of this study, but they provided context for its analysis. Additionally, I employed the use of historical methodology in order to construct a contextual analysis within which to examine the findings of the study. For example, I analyzed several primary documents, including law cases, newspaper articles, transcripts of Pentagon press conferences, press releases, and DOD directives.
• While this method is applicable to some studies, environmental triangulation35 was not an appropriate method of triangulation for this study. In fact, it was a factor that I tried to limit in order to ensure consistency among the conduct of the interviews. Some issues were not controllable, such as the time of the interview. Since the interviews were conducted by phone, I also could not control the environment of the co-researcher. The practice interview was conducted in person, unlike the majority of the interviews. However, research suggests that both telephone and in-person interviewing derive the same quality of data.36
34 Methodological triangulation utilizes multiple qualitative and/or quantitative methods to study something. If the conclusions from each of the methods are the same, then the findings are validated. Fu- Jin Shih, “Triangulation in nursing research: issues of conceptual clarity and purpose,” Journal of Advanced Nursing, 1998, 28(3), 631-641. 35 Environmental triangulation uses different locations, settings and other key factors related to the environment in which the study took place, such as the time of day, day of the week or season of the year. If the findings are the same despite varying environmental conditions, then validity has been established. Denzin, “Strategies of multiple triangulation,” in Denzin,. ed. The research act in sociology: a theoretical introduction to sociological method, 297-313. 36 See generally M.A. Aziz and S. Kenford, “Comparability of telephone and face-to-face interviews in assessing patients with posttraumatic stress disorder,” Journal of Psychiatric Practice, Sept 2004, 10(5), 307-13. See also Chapter 4 for further explanation of research that compares telephone and face-to-face interviewing techniques and results.
CHAPTER 6 SUMMARY, IMPLICATIONS, AND OUTCOMES
Figure 6-1. Cartoon published on the Air Force Web site, depicting embedded media and U.S. troops during the Iraq War.1
According to Moustakas, the organization, presentation, and analysis sections of a
phenomenological investigation are followed by a summary of the study in its entirety,
which includes a synopsis of the researcher’s motivations for conducting the study, an outline of the phenomenological method, highlights of the most significant findings, and the major implications and outcomes that emerged from my analysis of the data.2 A
comprehensive review of the study also includes considerations of the limitations of the
investigation. In this chapter, I accomplished these goals; I also discussed how this research can be distinguished from prior research in this area, and I outlined future research endeavors that could propagate further knowledge on this subject. I discuss the
1 Air Force Web site,
2 Clark Moustakas, Phenomenological Research Methods (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 1994), 155.
168 169
findings of the investigation within the context of their social significance and their
implications for the future of media-military relations. Finally, I reflect on how
conducting this study and discovering its outcomes have affected me personally and
professionally. An important function of this summary section is to provide information critical in the verification and assessment of plausibility of the methodology, the data, and implications of the study.3
Summary of Entire Study
In Chapter 1, I detailed how I became interested in studying the Embedded Media policy, its development within the context of media-military relations, and how discussion of the subject thus far has, for the most part, excluded an entire segment of the
military demographic—the junior officer. I introduced my research question: “What was
the lived experience of company-grade Marine Corps officers who served as host officers
to embedded media in a combat zone during the Iraq War?” This question focused on the
unique role that non-public affairs company-grade Marine officers played during the Iraq
War when they were assigned responsibility for members of the press. Under extreme
physical and mental duress, these officers served as the initial points of contact for
embedded journalists and were the primary facilitators for the DOD-developed program.
They had a “boots on the ground perspective” that senior DOD officials did not.
I examined the significance of the Embedded Media policy in the context of a 200- year history of fickle U.S. media-military relations. I reviewed the various reasons why understanding of this subject is critical to maintaining open lines of communication between the military and the media. Further, I revealed how my own experiences as a
3 Ibid.
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junior Marine Corps officer dealing with embedded journalists during the Iraq War motivated me to study the subject. I demonstrated that understanding for the experiences of junior officers is necessary if future policymaking is to improve on the lessons that history has to offer.
In addition to presenting the purpose of the study and demonstrating a need for it, I introduced the theoretical and methodological structure within which I answered my research question. In doing so, I provided a brief explanation of phenomenology and its founder, Edmund Husserl. I explained why I thought phenomenology was the most appropriate method for investigating this topic and how my method facilitated reaching
my stated goal.
In Chapter 2, I carefully reviewed the relevant literature on the subject of military-
media relations and the Embedded Media policy. I concentrated on literature that
examined the history of the military-media dichotomy, related government policies, and
recent examinations of media in Iraq. Since I found an abundance of historical reviews of military-media relations, I limited my review of works that assisted me in building a conceptual model of the historical development of media-military relations, which I presented in Chapter 3. Additionally, I examined literature that addressed media conduct during individual war campaigns, specifically in the period between the Persian Gulf War and the Iraq War. Of particular interest was any literature that included first-person accounts of the war by service members. However, this turned up little information relevant to media activities during the war. Third and finally, I reviewed studies about the media and the military that focused on the Iraq War. The review of the literature provided context for this study by demonstrating the dearth of knowledge about the
171 experiences of U.S. service members who have worked with the media in combat situations.
In Chapter 3, I revisited the theoretical foundations of phenomenological investigation as described first by Husserl in 1931. Further, I examined a related theoretical precept by Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, whose work on the consciousness of man had influenced Husserl’s phenomenological design. I applied the Hegelian dialectic as a framework within which to explain the cyclical progression of media- military relations, culminating in the present state of the Embedded Media policy.
Hegel’s thesis-antithesis-synthesis model depicts progress as the fruit of an action and its reaction. The result of their interaction is a new level of consciousness, which begins a new dialectic cycle. As explained within this context, the Embedded Media policy is the thesis of a new cycle, born from the conflict between a forty-year period since the Vietnam War in which the military has held an exclusionary policy toward the media and the proliferation of communication resources that have made the military’s role as the gatekeeper of information from the battlefield obsolete. I contended that the friction between these two periods forced the development of the Embedded Media policy. The large-scale implementation of an embedding system signaled the military’s acceptance that it could not control whether or not there would be media coverage of the war. In response to this reality, it established a system of embedding that would at least allow it influence over the media message.
In Chapter 4, I outlined the phenomenological processes and methodology that guided my study. I paid specific attention to explaining the major stages within the phenomenological process: epoche, phenomenological reduction, imaginative variation,
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and the synthesis of the composite textural and composite structural descriptions. I also
committed extensively to explaining the methodology of the study in order to allow for
transparency in the process, which is critical to validating its findings and outcomes. I
explained how I prepared for the data collection process and how the process of data collection evolved as I conducted the study.
Chapter 5 explained how the data was organized and analyzed utilizing the
Moustakas modification of the Stevick-Colaizzi-Keen method and how I synthesized the data into a collective, universal description that answered my original research question.
I construct the universal structure of the host officer experience, which is based on the absence of an embedded journalist’s influence over the self. In other words, host officer described their interaction with embeds in terms of how they were not affected. This was followed by several substructures, including resignation to the existential nature of the combat environment (host officers had no control over their assignment to the role), restriction to a designated sphere on knowledge (host officers were encouraged and encouraged subordinates to not speak to embeds outside of their sphere of influence), acceptance of a hierarchical power structure (the decision to embed journalists was made at a higher level, over which they had no influence), approval of decentralized decision- making authority (host officers functioned well in an environment in which they understood the overall goals and given authority to meet those goals by whatever means they thought were appropriate), and a selfless adoption of responsibility for dependent subjects who were not military subordinates (host officers took responsibility for the welfare of embeds because they were the senior-ranking members of they were in a position of leadership).
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The core textural themes of the phenomenon of the host officer experience included: the bond between the embed and the host officer; the embed’s ability to adapt to the combat environment and the Marine Corps way of life; the tangible benefits and risks of the embed’s presence; and a relationship of trust between the embed and the host officer, which was fostered by open communication and was almost devoid of censorship in comparison to media-military relationships of the recent past.
In Chapter 6, I summarized what I have discovered about the experience of a host officer during the Iraq War and its relevance to me, the field of communications, and to other areas of study, including strategic international studies and political science. I also made a critical review of my research methods and procedures and discussed what may have been done differently. I acknowledged the limitations of the study and how they might guide future research in this area. I also accepted certain advantages which were specific to my connection to the research subjects that may have influenced the conduct of the study and may not be reproducible. I identified what function my research serves within the body of literary work discussed in Chapter 2. I closed with a discussion of the personal and professional development that I experienced as the primary researcher in this study.
Contribution to the Body of Literature
In comparison to the literature that I reviewed while immersing myself in this subject matter and which was described in detail in Chapter 2, this study fills an important gap in the knowledge base and understanding of this phenomenon. I reviewed twenty-eight citations and categorized them into three areas based on the method of presentation, the time frame of publication, and the authors’ perspectives on the subject matter. This led to three categories of materials: historical texts that depicted the role of
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the war correspondent in conflicts prior to 2003; materials authored by and about war
correspondents and their experiences, specifically experiences both before and during the
Iraq War; and academic studies that examined the Embedded Media policy since its
inception in 2003. In the following section, I comment on the similarities and differences
between my study and the works in each of the above categories.
Historical Texts
The first category examined texts that provided a historical review of military- media relations. These works were much larger in scope than my own. Some, such as
Phillip Knightley’s critical book on the history of the war correspondents, encompassed the period between the Crimea in the mid-1800s through the first year of the Iraq War.4
Some authors focused on the media’s role in singular conflicts, like Daniel C. Hallin, who wrote about the media’s influence during the Vietnam War.5 These texts differed
from my study because they were written after at least a decade had elapsed since a
military conflict occurred and included a more critical review of the media’s influence on
an individual conflict. My study was conducted amidst the very war on which it is focused, with some of its co-researchers still poised for second or third rotations to the battlefield. Indeed, the body count of embedded journalists killed by enemy actions and
U.S. service members continued to escalate while conducting and writing this study.
Instead of a critical, historical review of the influence of the media during the Iraq
War, this study provides a contemporary, and in many ways, raw view of a process that is still unfolding and whose future is uncertain. The interviews conducted in this research
4 Phillip Knightley, The First Casualty: The War Correspondent as Hero, Propagandist and Myth- Maker from the Crimea to Iraq (London: André Deutsch, 2003). 5 Daniel C. Hallin, The Uncensored War: The Media and Vietnam (Berkley: University of California Press, 1986).
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captured the memories of service members shortly after their experience with the
phenomenon, the timing of which is critical to the nature of their recollections and
perspective. While there are drawbacks to conducting a study such as this one without
having time elapsed since the conflict, such as knowledge of the war’s outcomes, the
benefits of interviewing the co-researchers as soon as possible to the occasion about
which they spoke adds validity to the data.
By War Correspondents, about War Correspondents
The second category of literature included texts written by journalists that focused
on the experiences of war correspondents during the Iraq War. Some were published
within months of the end of the combat period and authors provided first-person accounts
of the war.6 Other authors conducted interviews with individual war correspondents that
participated in the Embedded Media Program and synthesized their interviews into short,
capsule-like summaries.7 While this study offers the same immediacy presented in these texts, it followed a specific academic method for collecting and analyzing its data, something the authors of these texts did not acknowledge doing. Their texts were published for the mass media market and avoided discussion of theoretical background, methodology, and researcher reflexivity—all issues addressed within my study.
This section of the literature review also included a handful of memoirs written by service members who deployed to the Iraq War. While those books reflected the lived
experiences of the authors, they did not provide the synthesized analysis that I conducted
6 Bing West and Major General Ray L. Smith, The March Up: Taking Baghdad with the 1st Marine Division (New York: Bantam Books, 2003). 7 Judith Sylvester and Suzanne Huffman, Reporting from the Front (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2005).
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in this study, which ultimately led to a universal textural-structural description of the phenomenon based on the experiences of fourteen company-grade Marine Corps officers.
Related Studies
The third and final category in the literature review included studies that focused on the Embedded Media policy. These publications were the most closely related and most similar to the methodology and focus of this study. However, these publications differed from my study in that they did not have the same target participant group. For example,
David Westover conducted a phenomenology on embedded journalists and public affairs officers during the Iraq War.8 In contrast, this study focused on non-public affairs officers who did not have prior media experience or extensive media management training and for whom responsibility for an embedded journalist was a collateral duty.
The majority of officers in the Marine Corps are not specialized in public affairs and the majority of embeds during the Iraq War were assigned to these types of Marines. While there were instances where an embed was assigned a public affairs escort, this was an anomaly considering the disparate ratio between embeds in Iraq and Marine public affairs
officers.
Another study conducted by the Joint Advanced Warfighting Program on the
Embedded Media policy did include some data on non-public affairs Marine Corps
officers.9 However, its researchers interviewed about half the number of company-grade
officers recruited in my study. Furthermore, the synthesis of the data collected in those
8 D. Westover, “Interpreting the Embedded Media Experience: A Qualitative Study of Military-Media Relations During the War In Iraq” (MAMC thesis, University of Florida, 2004). 9 Richard K. Wright, The Assessment of the DoD Embedded Media Program, Institute for Defense Analyses, Joint Advanced Warfighting Program, IDA Paper P-393, September, 2004,
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interviews was analyzed and presented in conjunction with the collected from officers of all ranks and branches of service. While the study provides the largest review of military
service members to date, the method with which its authors presented the data made it
impossible to isolate the opinions of the junior Marine Corps officers, which was
accomplished in my study.
Limitations of the Study
This study focused on a particular demographic in order to produce findings that
would accurately reflect the lived experiences of a specific and significant group of
military service members. Although establishing these boundaries was in line with the
purpose of this study, it excluded the experiences that other service members had with
embedded media during the Iraq War. Their experiences may provide significant
understanding and insights into the program and the Embedded Media policy and are
worthy of future research. This can be accomplished by conducting a similar study that
focuses on other ranks and branches of service.
A second limitation of the study is the number of co-researchers that were available
for participation. Although I felt this study included a sufficient number of participants
in accordance with phenomenological principles and the recommendations of
phenomenological scholars, untapped experiences of other potential co-researchers may
always exist. I had difficulty finding participants for this study because there is no master
list of junior Marine Corps officers who served in the unofficial capacity of host officer
for embedded journalists during the Iraq War. Given the haphazard nature in which the
host officer-embedded journalist relationship often developed and the lack of familiarity
most host officers had with the official DOD policies on embedded media, it is not a
surprise that there was no official record of the role these service members played during
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the war. This study recorded that aspect of history and provided a synthesis of their
shared experience with the phenomenon. From this, members of the media and military,
in addition to other concerned with the subject, may learn and positively affect future
media-military policies that meet both the needs of operational security and satisfy the
people’s right to know.
Another difficulty I encountered in my efforts to recruit participants was that some
of the active duty service members who qualified for participation under the selection
criteria were already re-deployed to Iraq. Given the physical and technological restrictions of their circumstances, I was unable to conduct phone interviews with them.
Although all were amenable to participating via an e-mail interview, this medium was outside of the chosen methodology for this study. In the future, these people may be available for participation in another study and could provide insights that have not yet been accounted for in this one.
Location was also a limitation with the participants who were not deployed to Iraq.
About half of the participants were on active duty at the time of their interviews and the other half had since left active duty status. Therefore, participants were located across
the United States. This made face-to-face interviews, which is the traditional method of
data collection in phenomenological investigation, logistically and financially unfeasible.
Although this limited my ability to gather data related to non-verbal body language, I am
confident that I adequately addressed the limitations and idiosyncrasies that were
presented by conducting phone interviews, resulting in a transparent and sound data
collection process. This issue was discussed in Chapter 4.
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Another limitation of this study is that it may not be easily reproducible. Given my personal connection to many of the participants and personal knowledge of the subject matter, another researcher without such a background may have to employ different participant recruitment strategies. To minimize this limitation, I have included several primary documents that I utilized in my original search for participants in the appendix.
Additionally, I provided extensive detail in the methodology section on the various methods I used to recruit participants, some of which do not require prior-military experience.
My study of media-military relations and the Embedded Media Program over a three-year period has provided me with an enhanced understanding of the subject’s complexities. Nonetheless, it left me dissatisfied with the disparity between the attention paid to the experiences of war correspondents compared to the experiences of service members with whom they interacted. Although I am confident that this study begins to relieve that problem, it has only scratched the surface of a generation of Iraq War veterans.
Recommendations for Future Research
The process of phenomenological investigation, if conducted according to its principles, results in the researcher becoming intimately familiar with the subject matter and the prior research conducted on the topic. Equipped with this knowledge, the researcher is the most receptive to recognizing what direction future research on the subject matter should take to further propagate understanding for the subject.10
10 Moustakas, Phenomenological Research Methods, 162.
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The methodological model developed in this study can be applied to other branches
of service and other ranks of service members. Compliments to this study would include
a phenomenological examination of field-grade officers (majors, lieutenant colonels, and
colonels) or enlisted Marines, of which there are several subgroups, including non-
commissioned officers and staff non-commissioned officers. Each represents a different
level of military experience and responsibility and would provide unique perspectives on
their interactions with embedded media during the Iraq War. Additionally, the embedded
journalists who were assigned to the participants of this study could be interviewed in a
separate phenomenological study and their responses could be compared to those of their
respective host officers. This would provide a comparative analysis of the host officer-
embed experience which is only available in the publications of two books, one written
by a company-grade Marine officer and the other written by the embed assigned to his
platoon.11 An overall comparison of the findings from studies evaluating various
stakeholders in the Embedded Media Program (junior officers, senior officers, enlisted,
public affairs officers, civilians, civilian leadership) would provide an opportunity to
conduct data triangulation. The theory behind data triangulation supposes that something is more than likely true if stakeholders who have different points of view on an issue see the same outcome.12
The study of the Embedded Media program would benefit from the application of
varied research methodologies, specifically a historical review and legal research
11 Analysis of these books is provided in Chapter 2. Nathaniel Fick, One Bullet Away: The Making of a Marine Officer (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 2005); Evan Wright, Generation Kill (New York: G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 2004). 12 Lisa A. Guion, “Triangulation: Establishing the Validity of Qualitative Studies,” University of Florida Institute of Food and Agricultural Sciences, Sept 2002, available at
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analysis. Historical research on the subject will not be possible until a relatively adequate amount of time has passed since the end of the Iraq War to allow for sufficient secondary literature to be generated, informing the researcher’s work. An author’s effort to collate primary sources with numerous secondary sources increases the quality of the evidence and the historical analysis is substantially improved. This balance and cross-referencing between primary and secondary sources is necessary for a researcher to create authentic
historical research.13
Legal research is appropriate for exploring the numerous legal questions that have
risen from battlefield since the Iraq war began, including issues surrounding the ethical responsibilities of embedded journalists versus their legally binding ones, their status as non-combatants, and issues regarding copyrights to their news products. Legal research can also be applied to examine the influence of government-imposed regulations on the media during wartime. From a philosophical perspective, legal research can be applied to examine the differing perspectives that unilateral journalists and embeds bring to the
marketplace of ideas. The Embedded Media Program, both in theory and in practice, can
be examined against theories of free expression. For example, how did the embedded
media program influence the Marketplace of Ideas, as developed by Justice Oliver
Wendell Homes in Abrams v. United States?14 Does the Embedded Media Program
facilitate self-governance, according to Alexander Mieklejon? These topics and others
concerning the impact and future of the Embedded Media Program are worthy of further
investigation.
13 James D. Startt and Wm. David Sloan, Historical Methods in Mass Communication (New Jersey: Lawrence Erbaum Ass., Publishers, 1989), 117. 14Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 624 (1919).
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Social Implications and Outcomes
Although the official guidance that detailed how the Embedded Media policy was to be executed was published by the DOD prior to the initiation of the Iraq War, the
stories and experiences related by the participants in this study described what actually
happened when the policy was put into practice. The findings demonstrated that there
were some differences between the stated policy and its actual practice. For example,
host officers recalled embeds entering medical facilities during operations. This violated
PAG regulation 4.H.6, which stated, “Reporters may visit those areas designated by the
Facility commander, but will not be allowed in operating rooms during operating
procedures.” Other embeds recalled confiscating the satellite phones that their respective
embeds carried due to the operational risks posed by its use. This violated PAG regulation 6.A.2., which stated that “media products will not be confiscated or otherwise
impounded.” The regulation goes on to say that “if it is believed that classified information has been compromised and the media representative refuses to remove that information notify the CPIC and/or OASD/PA [higher military command] as soon as possible so the issue may be addressed with the media organization's management.”
Although none of the host officers reported that their respective embeds recorded classified materials with their satellite devices, the issue was still handled in a different manner than prescribed by the DOD directive. Some of the embeds reported getting the
order to confiscate the satellite phones from their higher command, while others made the
decision on their own. No host officers reported that their respective embeds resisted the
confiscation of the phones.
Although there were some discrepancies, like the examples provided, that
demonstrate a divergence in practice from the outlined regulations, these seem to be
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anomalies among the participants and were influenced by situational circumstances that made them necessary for operational security reasons. For the most part, the overall goals of access, security at the source, and synergy represented in the PAG were accomplished and the regulations outlined within were practical and manifested in practice during the war. The overall positive tone of the participants’ reflection on their experience as host officers bodes well for a program that has yet to establish itself as a
permanent DOD policy for future military conflicts.
This phenomenological study gave an underrepresented group the voice it would
otherwise not have had. Many other studies about the media during the Iraq War focused
on the opinions of high-ranking officers who did not have firsthand experience with
embedded journalists on the ground during the war or did not distinguish among the
distinct experiences of service members from different ranks.15 While officers are often
encouraged to construct after-action reports that include lessons learned about an
evolution, my search found only one available to the general public.16 This study
provides additional recommendations for consideration.
Ultimately, the balance between the military’s ability to wage a war and the
media’s ability to cover one conflicts on numerous levels. The recommendations of
company-grade officers who facilitated the Embedded Media Program represent one
perspective and should be considered in light of the recommendations from other groups
15 Alicia C. Shepard, Narrowing the Gap: Military, Media and the Iraq War, Catigny Conference Series Conference Report (Chicago: Robert R. McCormick Tribune Foundation, 2004) 82. 16 The findings and recommendations in this after-action report are the result of embedding within a U.S. Army unit. No after-action reports were available for Marine Corps units. Several of the recommendations in this report coincide with the recommendations of co-researchers in this study. “Third Infantry Division (Mechanized) After Action Report, Chapter 6 Embedded Media,” n.d., Military Reporters and Editors,
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who participated in the program, such as the embedded journalists themselves.
Ultimately, it was the goal of this study to correct the imbalance of perspectives that were
available to policymakers. Now that this study has provided a synthesized description of
the host officer experience, persons with the opportunity to shape both media and military
policies have available to them a more diverse critique of the Embedded Media policy.
Personal and Professional Reflections of the Researcher
The process of phenomenological research in the area of military-media relations
and the Embedded Media policy has been a journey of remembrance and sympathetic
therapy for me. It brought back to the surface experiences I had since forgotten, or at
least had not had the occasion to remember and offered me a soothing explanation that I
was not alone in the struggles and challenges I faced during the war. Given my own
familiarity with the subject phenomenon, listening to the experiences of other junior
Marine Corps officers who served during the Iraq War and were responsible for
embedded media was a cathartic process. That journey was initiated with the
phenomenological process of epoche, in which I acknowledged my own experiences, biases, prejudgments, and predispositions and made a conscious effort to suspend them in
order to see anew the experiences of my co-researchers. I would be remiss if I supposed
that I reached complete objectivity, but I can honestly say that I made every effort to
disengage my own personal feelings about my experiences with the embedded media in
order to effectively receive and analyze the information that others generously imparted.
The process of epoche was particularly difficult for me, considering the overall
negative impression I had of the embedded media that were attached to my unit during
185 the war.17 In fact, my primary motivation for conducting this study was the fact that I was dissatisfied with the conduct of embeds assigned to my unit, the preparedness of the military to deal with the legal and ethical ramifications of the program, and the bias of the reporting generated about my unit. Given these major proclivities against the Embedded
Media Program, I constantly reminded myself about the principles of my research methodology and my responsibility to the co-researchers who participated in the study.
Aspects of this study influenced me both professionally and personally. First, the actual conduct of this study in accordance to the phenomenological principles was a journey that challenged my academic sensibilities. I was encouraged to return to a perspective of naivety, to examine the data from a multi-dimensional perspective in order to construct both structural and textural descriptions, and to extract from the raw data a universal description that effectively and accurately reflected the lived experiences of my co-researchers.
Second, the findings of the study challenged my own perceptions of the Embedded
Media Program and the experiences I had as a host officer during the Iraq War. While the findings of this study were particularly surprising to me, I was able to come to an understanding that I had a particularly negative experience with one group of embedded journalists under specific circumstances during the war and that this experience, although generally disagreeable, was an anomaly among those of my peers. Since I conducted the research myself, I was personally familiar with the details of the data. This helped me differentiate and explain my own experience from those of the co-researchers.
17 A description of my personal experience during the Iraq War dealing with embeds is available in the Reflexivity section of Chapter four.
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The phenomenological investigative process has two purposes, the most significant of which is to impart on its audience a deep, rich understanding of a particular phenomenon, one which, examined in any other method, would not be as sensitive to the nuances of an emotional and personal experience. Second, its conduct is a crucible of discovery for the researcher who is challenged and inspired by the very process. The researcher is encouraged to recognize him or herself as an inherent participant in the research process and simultaneously disengage from the data in order to open up possibilities of understanding and insight.
This study attempted to gain understanding about the lived experiences of company-grade Marine Corps officers who were host officers to embedded media during the Iraq War. In that pursuit, this phenomenological study explored an under-recognized population of service members whose contributions and responsibilities were significant to the war, the media’s ability to cover it, and the public’s right to know about its government actions. According to the data provided by the co-researchers in this study, a host officer’s initial experience was determined by his or her superiors, influenced by subordinates, and shared by peers. The experience was shaped by the embeds, his or her strengths and weaknesses, professionalism and trustworthiness, and his or her actions under duress. The host officer-embed phenomenon was, for this group of Marines, another component of command.
APPENDIX A INFORMED CONSENT FORM
Protocol Title: A phenomenological study of U.S. military service member
experiences with embedded media during the 2003 Iraq War.
Please read this consent document carefully before you decide to participate in this study.
Purpose of the research study: The purpose of this study is to gain an understanding of the experiences of U.S. military service members who interacted with embedded media assigned to cover the Iraq War via the Department of Defense-sponsored Embedded
Media Project. While several studies that explore the experiences of embedded media exist, no research on the military population in this context exists.
What you will be asked to do in the study: If you participate in this study, you will be asked a series of questions about your experiences during your deployment to the Middle
East as a member of the U.S. Armed Forces in support of the Iraq War. The questions
will be focused on your interaction and responsibility for members of the civilian media
who were embedded with U.S. Forces as part of the Department of Defense-sponsored
Embedded Media Program. Following the initial interview, the researcher may conduct
follow up interviews in which she will ask you to review your responses for clarity and
accuracy.
Time required: Two sessions over the course of a two-week period between Jan. 1, 2006
and March 31, 2006
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Initial Interview- 1.5 – 2 hours, conducted in person, if possible, or by phone at a
time and place convenient to you
Follow-up- 10-20 minutes, conducted in person, if possible, or by phone at a time
and place convenient to you
Risks and Benefits:
Potential benefits: Should you agree to participate in this study, you may benefit
from the opportunity to share your experiences and opinions. You will be asked to
contribute to a worthwhile study that has the potential to influence the course of
military/media relations in the future. Considering your vested interest in the welfare and
viability of the U.S. Armed Forces, your voluntary involvement in this study may
contribute to effective media policy decision-making by the DOD and increased
understanding of the embedded process by media organizations and journalists.
Anticipated risk: The Uniformed Code of Military Justice, which embodies the regulations governing all military service members, prohibits any military service member from knowingly divulging classified information to a source that does not hold a security clearance commensurate with the classification of the information transferred.
The rationale behind this regulation is founded on the principle of safeguarding the national security.
The researcher, who is also a member of the U.S. Armed Forces and holds a Secret clearance, is eligible to discuss classified information up to the level of Secret. However, the researcher does not seek to record any classified information in the interviews because she will not be able to include it in the study. She will conduct the interviews accordingly.
189
Following the completion of the study, the researcher’s thesis will be reviewed by a
DOD official to ensure that no classified or sensitive information that may be detrimental to the national security has been released. This is merely a precautionary step and will not
involve or identify the participants.
Compensation: The researcher will not compensate you for your participation in
this study.
Confidentiality: Should you chose to participate in this study, your identity will be
kept confidential to the extent provided by law. Your information will be assigned a code
number. The list connecting your name to this number and all your identifying
information, such as unit name, will be kept in a locked file in my faculty supervisor's
office. When the study is completed and the data have been analyzed, the list will be
destroyed. Your name will not be used in any report.
You have been identified for this study in one of two ways. One way you may
have been selected was based on news reports written by embedded media who were
attached to your unit or covered your unit during the Iraq War. A second manner in
which you may have been selected was by the referral of other members of the U.S.
military. The researcher asked previous participants to provide the contact information
for other possible participants.
You will be advised of the manner in which the researcher identified you as a
possible participant for this study. If you were contacted as a result of a referral by
another member of the military, you will be notified that this was the method by which
you were identified. However, the researcher will not divulge who identified you as a
possible participant unless that person gave her permission to do so.
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Should you chose to participate, the researcher intends to make audio tape
recordings of her interview with you. You will not be asked to provide identifying
information on these tapes. All identifying information will be transcribed by hand by
the researcher during the interview and will be kept on file in a secure filing cabinet in
the supervisor’s office. The code assigned to you will be used to categorize the transcript
of your interview. Only the researcher and the researcher’s thesis committee, which
consists of three University of Florida faculty members, will have access to these tapes
and transcripts. The tapes and transcripts will be kept by the researcher after the study is
completed.
The results of this study will be presented in my master’s thesis and will be on file
with the University of Florida. My research and the results of this study may also
become published. However, in either situation, your identity will remain confidential.
Voluntary participation: Your participation in this study is completely voluntary.
There is no penalty for not participating.
Right to withdraw from the study: You have the right to withdraw from the study
at anytime without consequence.
Whom to contact if you have questions about the study:
Researcher: Ana-Klara Hering, Masters Student, College of Journalism and
Communications, University of Florida, PO Box 118400, Gainesville, FL 32611-8400,
352-846-1154, [email protected], Fax: (352) 273-1094
Faculty Supervisor: Bill F. Chamberlin, Ph.D., 2060 Weimer Hall, PO Box 118400
Gainesville, FL 32611-8400, office phone: (352) 273-1095, [email protected],
Fax: (352) 273-1094
191
Whom to contact about your rights as a research participant in the study:
UFIRB Office, Box 112250, University of Florida, Gainesville, FL 32611-2250; ph
392-0433.
Agreement:
I have read the procedure described above. I voluntarily agree to participate in the procedure and I have received a copy of this description.
Participant: ______Date: ______
Principal Investigator: ______Date: ______
APPENDIX B GLOSSARY OF PHENOMENOLOGICAL TERMS
• CLUSTER OF MEANINGS. This step in phenomenological data analysis requires the researcher to cluster the statements of the participants into themes or meaning units, removing overlapping and repetitive statements.1
• EPOCHE OR BRACKETING. This is the first step in the phenomenological process. The researcher sets aside, as much as humanly possible, all preconceived experiences in order to best understand the experiences of participants in the study.2
• ESSENCE. This is the goal of the phenomenologist. The analysis should reduce the textural (what) and structural (how) meanings of experiences into a brief description that typifies the experiences of all the participants in the study. All individuals experienced it; therefore, it is invariant, and is a reduction to the “essentials” of the experiences of the participants.3
• HORIZONTALIZATION. In this step of the phenomenological data analysis process, the researcher lists every significant statement relevant to the topic and gives it equal value.4
• PHENOMENON. This is the central concept being examined by the phenomenologist. It is the concept being experienced by subjects in a study, psychological concepts such as grief, anger or love.
• STRUCTURAL DESCRIPTION. The researcher writes a description of how the phenomenon was experienced by the participants in the study.5
5. textural description- The researcher writes about what was experienced by the participants in the study; a description of the meaning behind the experiences.6
1 Clark E. Moustakas, Phenomenological Research Methods (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 1994).
2 Id.
3 Id.
4 Id.
5 Id.
6 Id.
192 APPENDIX C INTERVIEW GUIDE
TITLE OF PROTOCOL: A phenomenological study of U.S. military service member experiences with embedded
media during the 2003 Iraq War.
PRINCIPAL INVESTIGATOR(s): Anaklara Hering, Masters Student, College of Journalism and Communications,
University of Florida, 5221 N.W. 33rd Place, Gainesville, Florida 32606, (cell phone)
760-458-7455, [email protected], (no fax)
SUPERVISOR (IF PI IS STUDENT): Bill F. Chamberlin, Ph.D., 2060 Weimer Hall, PO Box 118400
Gainesville, FL 32611-8400, office phone: (352) 273-1095, [email protected],
Fax: (352) 273-1094
______
(Responses to the following questions will be audio recorded with the consent of the
participant.)
• Review participants’ understanding of researcher’s intent to not discuss sensitive or classified information. • Review the participant’s ability to withdraw from the interview process at any time, for any reason, without consequence.
Biographical Data For Purposes Of Record Keeping:
Please state your name.
Ice Breaker: Discuss something about the participant and something the researcher and participant have in common in order to establish rapport.
Grand Tour:
193 194
During your deployment in the Iraq War, what unit were you assigned to and what was your position?
1. What were your responsibilities during your deployment?
2. In terms of the media, what kinds of responsibilities did you have?
3. How did you find out that you were going to have an embed in your unit?
4. Were you given a choice? Did you volunteer?
5. If you had had a choice, what would you have done?
6. How did you feel when you found out?
7. How did you prepare for that responsibility?
8. How were you prepared for that responsibility?
9. Tell me about your first meeting with the embed?
10. Who was your embedded media?
11. What did you tell the embed?
12. What was your first impression of the embed?
13. Did your impression change over time?
14. What was it like to have the embed living amongst your unit
15. How did they function in your unit?
16. What was your relationship with the embed?
17. How did you communicate?
18. How did it feel to be responsible for the embed?
19. Did you ever see what the embed wrote or produced about your unit?
20. What did you think of his/her reports?
21. What do you think of the embed program?
22. Would you participate in it again given the opportunity?
23. Do you have any other experiences or memories you would like to add?
APPENDIX D CO-RESEARCHER DEMOGRAPHICS
Table D-1: Co-researcher demographics Co-researcher Name Gender Rank during Military Level of Command Embed Assignment (CR) deployment Occupational Specialty
CR1 Stephen M Captain Infantry Infantry Company, Executive Officer Print journalist CR2 John M Captain Infantry and Infantry Battalion, Battalion Intelligence; Wire service Military Infantry Company, Platoon Commander Cable news crew Intelligence Print journalist CR3 Bob M First Infantry Infantry Company, Company Commander Print journalist Lieutenant Photographer CR4 Jack M First Logistics Motor Transport Company, Platoon Print Journalist Lieutenant Commander CR5 Mike M First Infantry Reconnaissance Company, Platoon Print journalist Lieutenant Commander CR6 Matthew M 1st Lieutenant Logistics Motor Transport Company, Platoon Print journalist
196 Commander CR7 William M Captain Logistics Motor Transport Company, Company Print journalist Commander CR8 Jill F First Logistics Motor Transport Company, Executive Print journalist Lieutenant Officer CR9 Thomas M Captain Supply Medical Service Battalion, Battalion Supply Cable news crew Officer and Detachment Officer-in-charge Print journalist (OIC) CR10 Edward M Captain Infantry Infantry Company, Operations Officer; Print journalist Infantry Company, Company Commander Photographer CR11 Amy F First Combat Engineer Combat Engineer Company, Platoon Print journalist Lieutenant Commander CR12 Robert M First Logistics Motor Transport Company, Platoon Print journalist Lieutenant Commander CR13 Timothy M Captain Logistics Motor Transport Company, Platoon Print journalist Commander CR14 Mark M Captain Logistics Motor Transport Company, Commanding Print journalist Commander Note: Names have been changed to provide anonymity
APPENDIX E RELATED IMAGES
Figure E-1. (Left) Marines and sailors of Bravo Surgical Company, 1st Force Service Support Group prepare to load helicopters at Camp Chesty in central Iraq in May 2003. Each Marine carries all of his or her belongings. (Right) An embedded journalist waits with the gear for his embed team, which comprised of three journalists. Embeds were required to carry their own gear during their assignment to a U.S. military unit. Photo by Ana-Klara Hering.
197 APPENDIX F I MEF MEDIA EMBED IN-COUNTRY TRAINING AND INFORMATION OVERVIEW
I MEF Media Embed In-Country Training and Information Overview
Here is a brief overview of information and briefings you will receive once you arrive within your unit. The information will be provided to you in order to fully familiarize you. Question and answer periods will also be provided. Acclimation and reduction of your uncertainty of your surroundings will help you concentrate on your primary mission and enable you to begin providing information to your audiences as soon as possible.
1. Camp rules and services. This will include, but not be limited to, schedules and rules for showers, heads, chow, postal, medical, religious services, electrical usage, phone usage, water discipline, uniform requirements and travel within and outside of the camp(s).
2. Camp orientation. Orientation will include all aspects of the camp to include locations of principle and special staff, heads, billeting, hygiene (showers), postal and messing facilities. Additionally, this orientation will include areas that are off-limits. It is important for the media to understand that some areas, such as the armory, have heightened security measures.
3. Security procedures for the personnel including media on camp to include challenge and password information.
4. Casualty identification measures to include dog tags for the media, marking media's left boot with name, blood type, SSN, and any medical alerts.
5. Power requirements and workspace media will have access to.
6. Medical briefings to include training for appropriate hygiene procedures, indigenous environmental hazards, care of anthrax and smallpox (implications if media did not get smallpox shot i.e. use of same showers, towels other personal items with those who have received the shot), personal medications and review contents of military first aid kit.
7. Safety brief by a safety officer.
8. Rank structure and military customs and courtesies.
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9. Command brief, history of the unit, current unit preparations and activities.
10. Major end items (equipment) of that unit and combat identification for units.
11. Different types of preparation techniques for MRE combat rations.
12. Electronic emission considerations and procedures for media operations.
13. Light restrictions specific to units, locations, convoys and night operations.
14. Conduct force protection training and familiarization training for actions during SCUD, NBC, or infiltration attacks.
15. Provide refresher NBC training as required in these areas:
1. MOPP/M40 op check 2. Don and Clear and all MOPP conditions 3. Atropine and 2pamChloride administration 4. M291 Decontamination kit use 5. MOPP exchange 6. Drinking out of canteen 7. Hasty/deliberate decontamination
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APPENDIX G RECOMMENDED EMBED GEAR LIST―OIF I
Table G-1: Recommended gear list for embeds during OIF I from First Marine Expeditionary Force Public Affairs Officer ITEMS TO BE WORN QUANTITY KEVLAR HELMET W/CHIN STRAP 1 MOPP SUIT (W/ GLOVES CARRIED IN RT CARGO 1 POCKET) UNDERSHIRT 1 UNDERWEAR 1 PAIR PT SHORTS 1 ID (IN LEFT BREAST POCKET) 1 SET SOCKS, CUSHION SOLE 1 PAIR BOOTS (MARK LEFT BOOT WITH BLOOD TYPE/SSN) 1 PAIR NBC BOOTIES WORN OVER FIELD BOOTS 1 M-40 SERIES FIELD PROTECTIVE MASK W/ FILTER 1 NBC MEDS: ATROPINE AND 2PAMCL (IN M-40 1 CARRIER) M291 CHEMICAL DECON KIT IN M-40 CARRIER 1 ARMOR, BODY, UPPER TORSO (MARK W/ NAME AND 1 BLOOD TYPE) CANTEENS W/COVERS AND NBC CAPS 2 FIRST AID KIT (CONTENTS LISTED BELOW) 1 BANDAGE, ADHESIVE 18 BANDAGE, GAUZE 1 BANDAGE, MUSLIN 1 BOTTLE, SNAP-ON 3 DRESSING, FIRST AID, FIELD 2 INSTRUCTION CARD 1
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CHAP STICK 1 PROVIDONE-IODINE SOLUTION 1 EYE DRESSING 1 BOTTLE, WATER PURIFICATION TABLETS 1 WRISTWATCH 1 DESERT FLOPPY COVER (HAT) 1
ITEMS IN BACKPACK QUANTITY TROUSERS/SHIRT (MUTED DESERT COLORS 1 SET W/ CARGO POCKETS) BELT (AS APPLIES) 1 UNDERSHIRT 3 UNDERWEAR 3 PAIR SOCKS, CUSHION SOLE 5 PAIR POLYPRO LONG UNDERWEAR (TOP AND 1 PAIR BOTTOM) KNIT WATCH CAP 1 TOWEL, SMALL 1 BATH SPONGE 1 SOAP, ANTIBACTERIAL (W/PLASTIC 1 BARS CONTAINER) SHAVING CREAM 1 CAN RAZOR 1 DISPOSABLE BLADES 10 BABY WIPES 1 PACKAGE HAND SANITIZER 1 BOTTLE LAUNDRY DETERGENT POWDER (IN 1QT 1 ZIPLOCK BAG) WATER PROOF BAG 1 TRASH BAGS 2 SHOWER SHOES (AKA FLIP FLOPS) 1 PAIR
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SEWING KIT 1 FOOT POWDER 1 TOOTHPASTE, FULL TUBE W/TOOTHBRUSH 1 FIELD MIRROR 1 NAIL CLIPPERS 1 EXTRA EYE GLASSES (AS REQUIRED) 1 GLOVES 1 SLEEPING BAG WITH BIVY SACK 1 ENTRENCHING TOOL (SHOVEL) W/CARRIER 1 CAMELBACK 1 FUNNEL (FOR WATER) 1 PER 4 PERSONNEL SLEEPING PAD / ISOPORE MAT 1 EAR PLUGS W/CASE 1 EXTRA BOOT LACES 1 SUNSCREEN 1 INSECT REPELLANT 1 GOGGLES/SUNGLASSES 1 GORTEX JACKET/TROUSERS 1 2 MAN SHELTERS (TENT) (OPTIONAL) 1 PER 2 PERSONNEL PRESCRIPTION MEDICINE (MUST HAVE 90 DAY SUPPLY PRESCRIPTION) DOXYCYCLINE, CIPRO 1 TOILET PAPER 2 ROLLS NECK SCARF/BANDANNA 1 SMALL DAYPACK 1
APPENDIX H I MARINE EXPEDITIONARY FORCE MEDIA EMBED INFORMATION
I MARINE EXPEDITIONARY FORCE
MEDIA EMBED INFORMATION
ALL MEDIA due to embed with Marine forces must be present at the Press Information Center in the Kuwait Hilton on March 1, 2003 @ 8:00 a.m. to begin the Marine Corps specific registration process.
Frequently Asked Questions – Marine Ground
Forces Media Embedding
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Q1: When will media representatives embed with I MEF forces? A1: I MEF public affairs will embed media upon conclusion of registration after on
March 3rd. Media representatives should plan to arrive in Kuwait at least two days prior
in order to complete registration with the press information center.
Q2: If I can’t make it by March 1st, will there be another opportunity to in-process? A2: Yes, we will make every effort to incorporate you into the process. However, we
are not sure when that date will be for I MEF. The CPIC will be open for in-processing
daily throughout this operation. I MEF embeds will be embedded on later specified days.
Q3: Where will media register? A3: The Hilton Hotel, south of Kuwait City, Kuwait.
Q4: What do I need to register? A4: All reporters must have a Kuwaiti visa, Kuwaiti press credentials, a DoD “letter
of authorization” to embed with Marine forces (if applicable.) You must also have a letter from your organization designating you as the authorized representative to embed
with Marine forces. Bring all gear that you intend on bringing to the field with you. That
includes personal and professional gear and all items on the gear list (provided).
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Q5: How do I get accredited with the Kuwaiti government? A5: Contact the Kuwaiti Ministry of Information Foreign Media Office at (956) 242-
1820, fax number 246-4460. The director is Abdallah al-Khalidi.
Q6: How long after registration will I wait to be embedded? A6: We anticipate registration will take approximately two days. You will embed upon completion. Target date is March 3, 2003.
Q7. What will registration consist of? A7. Registration will cover these areas:
• Badge issue.
• NBC gear issue (includes 1 protective over-garment with boots and
gloves, 1 gas mask with 2 filters, 3 nerve agent antidote shot kits.)
• Prophylactic vaccinations to include Anthrax and Smallpox (if desired.)
• NBC familiarization training.
• Gear and equipment inspection.
• Introduction to I MEF organization brief.
• Introduction to the Deputy Commanding General I MEF.
• Once registration is complete, you will embed with your unit.
(For additional information consult the registration schedule of events.)
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Q8: How will I know which unit I’m embedding with? A8: I MEF public affairs will inform you of your unit at the beginning of registration.
At that time, we can give you details on what to expect and information on the command.
Q9: How long can I expect to remain with the unit I am assigned to? A9: It is our intent for you to remain with your assigned unit throughout the duration of
operations.
Q10. Will I be able to leave the unit to which I am assigned? A10. The intent of embedding is to have reporters remain with their assigned unit prior
to hostilities commencing and throughout the duration of combat operations.
Q11: Can I transfer to another unit if they have a story that better suits me? A11: Your placement has been specifically tailored meet your organizations request. As
a general rule, we do not intend on moving media representatives from one unit to
another. However, there may be some flexibility based on operational commitments and
local unit command desires.
Q12. Will I be able to send or receive professional items required to complete my
mission after I am embedded?
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A12. Yes, you will be able to coordinate with your news agency to receive any need items.
Q13: What limitations are there to my reporting and will I be prohibited from filing stories at any time?
A13: The intent of media embedding is to allow real-time reporting as events occur.
However, due to operational security concerns, there may be periods of time when reporting is embargoed.
Q14: Will somebody review my stories before release? A14: Your products will not be subject to a security review. You are responsible to ensure your reporting is consistent with the ground rules you have signed. If at any time, you are unsure of a possible security concern, contact the on-scene commander for assistance.
Q15: What can I expect from the unit I’m embedded with? A15: Your unit will provide transportation, food and medical care as required and access to their operations.
Q16: What equipment will the Marine Corps provide? A16. The Marine Corps will provide you with NBC protective gear only and the recommended gear list.
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Q17. Do I have to pay for food provided by the military and what type of food will be provided? A17. News media embedded with Marine ground forces are not required to pay for food.
MREs and supplemental food will be provided. MREs are prepackaged combat rations
specifically designed to meet nutritional demands during strenuous periods. MREs
contain a variety of well-balanced and fortified meals. Vegetarian and Kosher meals are
also available upon request.
Q18: Can I bring a weapon? A18: Media are not permitted to carry weapons in theater. Possessing a weapon on the battlefield is a violation of the ground-rules and would also jeopardize your status as a
noncombatant under the Geneva Convention.
Q19. What items should I not bring? A19. Items that could potentially compromise a unit or yourself to include:
• Overly heavy items
• Overly noisy items
• Scented products
• Perishable food
• Flammable items
• Bright or reflective clothing
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Q20: Will I be authorized to broadcast live from the battlefield? A20: The battalion or squadron commanders have been authorized to grant this request.
You must obtain their specific approval prior to transmitting live.
Q21. Do I have to have an escort at all times? A21. You must remain with your unit and an escort at all times to ensure unit integrity
and safety of all involved.
Q22: Will someone help me carry my equipment? A22: Media are responsible for carrying their own equipment. Adjust your combat load
accordingly.
Q23. Can I bring a generator and if my source of power fails can I seek assistance? A23. You must be capable of carrying your equipment. Media are encouraged to obtain
and maintain suitable alternative power sources capable of meeting their needs. Power
inverters, solar sources and adaptors are highly recommended.
Q24. How will I file my stories? A24. You are responsible for equipping yourself for filing stories on your own. In the event you lose that capability, you may be offered assistance in filing provided that
assistance does not inhibit operations.
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Q25. Is flash photography permitted? A25. Flash photography at night is not permitted. Night vision devices will be helpful in
helping you document night operations.
Q26. If I am injured or have to leave my position, will my agency be permitted to
replace me?
A26. Generally, once a reporter vacates an embed position, that spot will not be re-filled.
Q27. What identification should I bring with me on the battlefield? A27. We recommend that you purchase standard military dog tags with name, blood type and social security number. Additionally, we recommend that you write your blood type on a boot or sleeve to facilitate emergency response should you require it.
Q28. How will my family or organization be notified in the event I am injured or
killed in battle?
A28. The Military will notify your news media organization in the event that you are
injured or killed.
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Q29. How will I travel back to my start point upon conclusion of combat operations? A29. The Marine Corps will return you to the nearest commercial port or terminal to ensure your safe return if available. If commercial transportation is not available, we will make necessary arrangements for your safe return.
Helpful Web-sites:
• United States Marine Corps: (will help with back-round information on Marine
units.) www.usmc.mil
• Gear sites for NBC canteen caps:
Helpful site describing canteens and cap system with helpful advice on use: http://www.xs4all.nl/~gurth/afv/pse/alice.html
Helpful sites to purchase NBC caps and canteens if desired: http://www.airsoftarms.com/viewproduct.php?ProdCatID=12
http://www.uscav.com/shop/uscsearchresultsr.asp
http://members.tripod.com/~nbcguy/cheap.html
http://www.tgoemall.com/mallcanteen.htm
http://militaryapparel.7p.com/canteens__compasses__shovels.html
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APPENDIX I GROUND RULES FOR MEDIA EMBEDDED WITH THE 15TH MARINE EXPEDITIONARY UNIT (SPECIAL OPERATIONS CAPABLE) Ground Rules for media embedded with the 15th MEU (SOC)
1. Background – Media members embedded with the 15th MEU will be exposed to certain sensitive material. In order to protect national security, the following ground rules have been established by the Office of the Secretary of Defense. The following information is reprinted directly from the SECDEF PAG ON EMBEDDED MEDIA.
2. Media Members CAN release the following information:
1. Approximate friendly force strength 2. Approximate friendly causality figures by service 3. Confirmed figures of enemy personnel detained or captured 4. Size of friendly force participating in an action in approximate terms 5. Information and location of military targets and objectives previously under attack 6. Generic description of origin of Air operations such as “Land Based.” 7. Date, time or location of previous conventional military missions and actions as well as mission results in general terms 8. Types of ordnance in general terms 9. Number of aerial combat or reconnaissance missions or sorties flown in CentCom area of operation 10. Type of forces involved 11. Allied participation by type of operation after approval of allied commander 12. Operation Code Names 13. Names and hometowns of U.S. Military Units 14. Service members’ names and hometowns with the individuals consent.
3. Media Members CANNOT release the following information:
1. Specific number of troops in units below a Corps/MEF Level 2. Specific number of aircraft in units below the Air Expeditionary Wing Level. 3. Specific numbers regarding other equipment and critical supplies 4. Specific numbers of ships in units below the Carrier Battle Group Level 5. Names of military installations or specific geography locations of military units in the CentCom AOR unless specifically released by the DOD or authorized by the CentCom commander. News and Imagery that identify or include identifiable features or these locations are not authorized for release. 6. Information regarding future operations.
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7. Information regarding force protection measures at military installations or encampments. 8. Photography showing level of security at military installations or encampments. 9. Rules of Engagement 10. Information on intelligence collection activities compromising tactics, techniques or procedures. 11. Extra precautions are required at the commencement of hostilities to maximize operational surprise. 12. During an operation, specific information regarding friendly force troop movements, tactical deployments, and dispositions cannot be released. 13. Information on special operations units. Terms like “low” and “fast” can be used. 14. Information on the effectiveness of enemy electronic warfare 15. Information identifying postponed or cancelled operations 16. Information on missing or downed aircraft or missing vessels while search, rescue and recovery operations are being planned or underway 17. Information on the effectiveness of enemy camouflage, cover, deception, targeting, direct and indirect fire, intelligence collection or security measures 18. Photographs or other visual media showing an enemy prisoner of war or detainees recognizable face, nametag or other identifying feature 19. Still or video imagery of custody operations or interviews with persons in custody.
APPENDIX J DOD PRINCIPLES OF INFORMATION, 27 SEPT 2000
Department of Defense DIRECTIVE NUMBER 5122.5 September 27, 2000 DA&M SUBJECT: Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs (ASD(PA))
PRINCIPLES OF INFORMATION
E2.1. INFORMATION
It is DoD policy to make available timely and accurate information so that the public, the Congress, and the news media may assess and understand the facts about national security and defense strategy. Requests for information from organizations and private citizens shall be answered quickly. In carrying out that DoD policy, the following principles of information shall apply:
E2.1.1. Information shall be made fully and readily available, consistent with statutory requirements, unless its release is precluded by national security constraints or valid statutory mandates or exceptions. The "Freedom of Information Act" will be supported in both letter and spirit.
E2.1.2. A free flow of general and military information shall be made available, without censorship or propaganda, to the men and women of the Armed Forces and their dependents.
E2.1.3. Information will not be classified or otherwise withheld to protect the Government from criticism or embarrassment.
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E2.1.4. Information shall be withheld when disclosure would adversely affect national security, threaten the safety or privacy of U.S. Government personnel or their families, violate the privacy of the citizens of the United States, or be contrary to law.
E2.1.5. The Department of Defense's obligation to provide the public with information on DoD major programs may require detailed Public Affairs (PA) planning and coordination in the Department of Defense and with the other Government Agencies. Such activity is to expedite the flow of information to the public; propaganda has no place in DoD public affairs programs.
APPENDIX K THIRD INFANTRY DIVISION (MECHANIZED) AFTER ACTION REPORT
Lessons Learned
Third Infantry Division (Mechanized) After Action Report
Chapter 6 Embedded Media
Introduction
In the wake of the most recent military/media problems during Operation ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF) in Afghanistan, the Department of Defense decided to implement an ambitious media embed operation with U.S. military forces. The reasons were several, including the desire to have media tell the soldiers' story, but also to have the ability to counter the Iraqi propaganda machine. Prior to deploying in November 2002, the Third Infantry Division (Mechanized) (3ID [M]) agreed to embed 50 news media representatives (NMRs) within the division. The division conducted extensive training exercises during December 02-January-03 where 3ID (M) embedded media in units for 3-4 day periods. Unit leaders and the public affairs section developed extensive tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) to support media in the event media were embedded for war. By the time the war started, the Marne Division crossed the Iraqi border with 97 NMRs from more than 60 media organizations.
Observation Synopsis
Embedding is a doctrinal term defined in FM 46-1 as "…the act of assigning a reporter to a unit as a member of the unit. The reporter eats, sleeps, and moves with the unit. The reporter is authorized open access to all sections of the unit and is not escorted by public affairs personnel. Rather, the unit is the public affairs escort. Reporters file their stories from unit locations and security is accomplished at the source, by establishing with the reporter what can be covered and reported on and what cannot be reported on, or when material can be reported." (p 25).
The military media relationship had been tenuous at best since Operations DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM and subsequent low intensity conflicts and stability and support operations (SASO) during the 1990s. Media received information during after-operations press briefings from an official spokesperson and were allowed to interview soldiers who participated in the operation. There was little firsthand information from observations made by media who were allowed to accompany troops during these embeds.
Prior to deploying, the division had never trained with embedded media. Media training primarily dealt with encountering media on the battlefield. If we were going to embed media, then we would have to train as we would fight. The 3 ID (M) embedded media for 3-4 days at a time in December during Second Brigade Combat Team's (2nd BCT's) battalion task forces' live fire exercises (LFXs) that culminated with the BCT's LFX in December 02. Feedback from the media was extremely favorable and the print and broadcast stories reflected that enthusiasm. Commanders and soldiers also started feeling more comfortable with media in their ranks.
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After the entire division received a deployment order and units arrived, media were embedded with them as part of their training program. These training exercises also offered media the chance to train as they would fight. We discouraged the transfer of broadcast tapes and news stories on daily runs out of the training area. Instead, we encouraged media to use technology that they would probably take to war to file with their editors and producers. Media were required to stay in the field for the duration of the four-day exercise. These training opportunities helped the division and media develop tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) that would benefit both organizations. Chief among the TTPs was how media would be transported. Several vehicles were available and used in training including the Bradley Fighting Vehicle (BFV) in front line units. Sources of power were made available to recharge batteries for still and broadcast cameras. Inverters became a necessity for power from high mobility multi-purpose wheeled vehicles (HMMWVs). Clothing packing lists were also evaluated and refined. But the most important TTP was for the media understand the soldier and for the soldier to understand the media.
Due to restrictive Department of Defense (DOD) public affairs guidance, media were not allowed to embed with 3ID (M) units from the United States early in the deployment cycle. This proved a hardship on local and regional media who could not afford the cost of airfare to Kuwait. This restriction also interrupted team building between units and media who covered the deployment from Fort Stewart. The team building would prove essential later when building trust between media and soldiers, a prerequisite for briefing the media on unit plans.
Media were embedded in 3ID (M) units on March 11. The Coalition Press Information Center- Kuwait provided chemical protective equipment to include suits and masks. Public affairs assigned media across the division down to the brigade combat teams and to certain separate battalions including 3-7 Calvary, 3rd Military Police Battalion, and 1st Battalion 3rd Air Defense Artillery Regiment. Commanders had the flexibility to assign media anywhere within their brigades/battalions. Commanders had additional flexibility to move them among units to highlight different operations.
When assigning media to brigades/battalions, every effort was made to distribute media owned by the same corporation evenly within a brigade to ensure greater coverage across the division. As an example, the four newspapers from the Tribune News Corporation: The Chicago Tribune, LA Times, Newsday, and The Orlando Sentinel were assigned to the 3rd BCT, 2nd BCT, 4th Brigade, and the 3rd Military Police (MP) Battalion respectively. The three major weekly magazines were each assigned to a different BCT. Every brigade and 3-7 Cavalry had a major network or cable broadcast station assigned. The three major wire services, Associated Press, Reuters, and Agence France Presse (AFP) were assigned to different brigades. AFP wanted greater coverage and asked that their print journalist and photographer be split between units. This decision offered AFP the only photographer assignment with the division's aviation. Cox News, Hearst, and Knight-Ridder news services were treated similarly. On any day during operations, a wide variety of articles about different 3ID (M) units could be found across the various news media.
What the division would tell the media about the plan, if anything, before crossing into Iraq was a big concern. The embed ground rules stated explicitly that media were not authorized access to classified information. However, the idea of embedding requires trust as implied in the doctrinal definition. Two days before the ground war, the 3ID (M) provided the media a broad overview of the plan, including tentative timelines, so that the media would understand the context of what they were observing and avoid filing stories that would tip intentions to the Iraqis. If media were not provided the context, they could report their observations and unknowingly provide the Iraqis sensitive information.
Public affairs emphasized the ground rules concerning access to sensitive information and the penalties for knowingly releasing sensitive information prior to the briefing. For the purposes of the definition, sensitive information included any mention that the media was privy to classified plans. As the operation progressed, media were allowed unprecedented access to
218 plans. We know of no media that violated the trust during the entire operation. After all, they were coming along.
The 3ID (M) advocated media vehicles since units would have to carry media equipment in addition to military equipment and several days' basic load. Media could also bring additional support such as engineers, producers, and sound technicians. Media would be able to bring better transmission equipment; therefore, a better quality of video would be produced for the world to see our great soldiers. No vehicles traveled near the front of formations. The reporter or broadcast cameraman often traveled forward to gather footage, but the vehicle remained in the combat trains. When time allowed during a pause, vehicle and people linked up for broadcast. News media representatives and their vehicles all made it safely through the war. The world saw vivid pictures of disciplined, well-trained U.S. soldiers in action.
The following criteria was established for a broadcast media vehicle: 1) Vehicles would be civilian equivalents to military vehicles, primarily HMMWVs and Land Rovers. 2) Vehicles would run on diesel fuel compatible with JP8. 3) Individual commanders would determine where vehicles were placed in formation. 4) Should vehicles break down, we would repair on a non- interference basis. If we could not repair the vehicle, media could abandon it and cross level only necessary equipment into military vehicles.
During the war, the soldiers of the division had the opportunity to review articles written by embedded media, usually through the Early Bird. It was evident the program was working to our expectations. Media published and broadcast the great work of 3ID (M) soldiers around the world, accurately and unvarnished. As an example, William Branigan wrote about the family members near An Najaf that were killed when they ran a checkpoint from his own first hand accounts. Media often checked with unit personnel to ensure security before filing. Public affairs know of no instance when commanders required broadcast or print journalists to have news reviewed for security before filing. Embedded media had a more realistic understanding and were more optimistic in their accounts than media who were reporting from the Pentagon, from Central Command (CENTCOM) in Qatar, or from Coalition Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC) in Kuwait. This was most evident during the extreme sandstorm near An Najaf. The commanding general (CG) had briefed the media before the war that 3ID (M) would consolidate at that point for 48-72 hours to rearm, refit, and refuel. The pause was placed in context when they filed, even with the unexpected heavy fighting nearby. Media outside Iraq immediately began suggesting a "quagmire" and flawed plan. In sum, the embedded media balanced the negative press from reporters outside Iraq.
There were very few instances of media breaking ground rules. At times CFLCC and V Corps told embedded reporters from Fox News and Cable News Network (CNN) to shut down, although they had their unit commander's permission to broadcast. There were only two instances that public affairs is aware of when injuries were announced in the paper before next of kin could be notified: Major Roger Shuck's Bradley was hit by an rocket propelled grenade (RPG) and reported in The Washington Post and Major Ron Coffey sustained injuries which were reported in The Jerusalem Post and further reported in the States. There was only one instance when a reporter was asked to hold information until a spouse was notified and the reporter did not. The Long Island Newsday reporter filed a story that included a reference to1st Battalion 3rd Aviation Regiment Commander, Lieutenant Colonel Williams having a hard landing behind enemy lines the first night of the war.
Overall, the ambitious media embed program executed by the 3ID (M) was an unqualified success. Media that became part of the team told first-hand accounts of the 3ID (M) fairly and accurately. Neither mission accomplishment nor the integrity of the media was compromised. The media we surveyed spoke highly of their experience and stated the embed far exceeded their expectations. Soldiers, media, and the American public were the true beneficiaries.
Lessons Learned
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• Embedding media should be the first consideration for media accompanying and covering military operations. • Embedding media is a relationship of trust. Embedding at the earliest opportunity allows for sufficient time t • build a trusting relationship. • Media will follow clearly established ground rules. Some flexibility within the ground rules is appropriate. • Media require a basic understanding of future operations to put their observations in context. Otherwise, their reports could inadvertently tip adversaries to friendly intentions just by interpreting what they observe. • Access to leaders and soldiers through embedding provided first-hand accounts and balanced negative press from media not embedded. • Embedded media will provide an accurate and truthful picture that can counter state run media propaganda. • "Train as you fight" requires training with embedded media. Combat Training Centers (CTCs) and Battle Command Training Program (BCTP) do not prepare units for embedded media, rather they train for encountering media on the battlefield. • Allow broadcast media to bring their own transportation when accompanying mechanized or ground assault convoys. They can transport their own equipment and provide better coverage. Establish clear coordination measures for ensuring safety of the vehicle and people.
APPENDIX L PUBLIC AFFAIRS GUIDANCE (PAG) ON EMBEDDING MEDIA DURING POSSIBLE FUTURE OPERATIONS/DEPLOYMENTS IN THE U.S. CENTRAL COMMANDS (CENTCOM) AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY (AOR).
101900Z FEB 03 FM SECDEF WASHINGTON DC//OASD-PA// TO SECDEF WASHINGTON DC//CHAIRS// AIG 8777 HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE//PA// USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE//ECPA// JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//PA// SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC//PA// CJCS WASHINGTON DC//PA// NSC WASHINGTON DC WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM INFO SECDEF WASHINGTON DC//OASD-PA/DPO// UNCLAS SUBJECT: PUBLIC AFFAIRS GUIDANCE (PAG) ON EMBEDDING MEDIA DURING POSSIBLE FUTURE OPERATIONS/DEPLOYMENTS IN THE U.S. CENTRAL COMMANDS (CENTCOM) AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY (AOR). REFERENCES: REF. A. SECDEF MSG, DTG 172200Z JAN 03, SUBJ: PUBLIC AFFAIRS GUIDANCE (PAG) FOR MOVEMENT OF FORCES INTO THE CENTCOM AOR FOR POSSIBLE FUTURE OPERATIONS. 1. PURPOSE. THIS MESSAGE PROVIDES GUIDANCE, POLICIES AND PROCEDURES ON EMBEDDING NEWS MEDIA DURING POSSIBLE FUTURE OPERATIONS/DEPLOYMENTS IN THE CENTCOM AOR. IT CAN BE ADAPTED FOR USE IN OTHER UNIFIED COMMAND AORS AS NECESSARY. 2. POLICY. 2.A. THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE (DOD) POLICY ON MEDIA COVERAGE OF FUTURE MILITARY OPERATIONS IS THAT MEDIA WILL HAVE LONG- TERM, MINIMALLY RESTRICTIVE ACCESS TO U.S. AIR, GROUND AND NAVAL FORCES THROUGH EMBEDDING. MEDIA COVERAGE OF ANY FUTURE OPERATION WILL, TO A LARGE EXTENT, SHAPE PUBLIC PERCEPTION OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY ENVIRONMENT NOW AND IN THE YEARS AHEAD. THIS HOLDS TRUE FOR THE U.S. PUBLIC; THE PUBLIC IN ALLIED
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COUNTRIES WHOSE OPINION CAN AFFECT THE DURABILITY OF OUR COALITION; AND PUBLICS IN COUNTRIES WHERE WE CONDUCT OPERATIONS, WHOSE PERCEPTIONS OF US CAN AFFECT THE COST AND DURATION OF OUR INVOLVEMENT. OUR ULTIMATE STRATEGIC SUCCESS IN BRINGING PEACE AND SECURITY TO THIS REGION WILL COME IN OUR LONG-TERM COMMITMENT TO SUPPORTING OUR DEMOCRATIC IDEALS. WE NEED TO TELL THE FACTUAL STORY - GOOD OR BAD - BEFORE OTHERS SEED THE MEDIA WITH DISINFORMATION AND DISTORTIONS, AS THEY MOST CERTAINLY WILL CONTINUE TO DO. OUR PEOPLE IN THE FIELD NEED TO TELL OUR STORY – ONLY COMMANDERS CAN ENSURE THE MEDIA GET TO THE STORY ALONGSIDE THE TROOPS. WE MUST ORGANIZE FOR AND FACILITATE ACCESS OF NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL MEDIA TO OUR FORCES, INCLUDING THOSE FORCES ENGAGED IN GROUND OPERATIONS, WITH THE GOAL OF DOING SO RIGHT FROM THE START. TO ACCOMPLISH THIS, WE WILL EMBED MEDIA WITH OUR UNITS. THESE EMBEDDED MEDIA WILL LIVE, WORK AND TRAVEL AS PART OF THE UNITS WITH WHICH THEY ARE EMBEDDED TO FACILITATE MAXIMUM, IN-DEPTH COVERAGE OF U.S. FORCES IN COMBAT AND RELATED OPERATIONS. COMMANDERS AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICERS MUST WORK TOGETHER TO BALANCE THE NEED FOR MEDIA ACCESS WITH THE NEED FOR OPERATIONAL SECURITY. 2.B. MEDIA WILL BE EMBEDDED WITH UNIT PERSONNEL AT AIR AND GROUND FORCES BASES AND AFLOAT TO ENSURE A FULL UNDERSTANDING OF ALL OPERATIONS. MEDIA WILL BE GIVEN ACCESS TO OPERATIONAL COMBAT MISSIONS, INCLUDING MISSION PREPARATION AND DEBRIEFING, WHENEVER POSSIBLE. 2.C. A MEDIA EMBED IS DEFINED AS A MEDIA REPRESENTATIVE REMAINING WITH A UNIT ON AN EXTENDED BASIS - PERHAPS A PERIOD OF WEEKS OR EVEN MONTHS. COMMANDERS WILL PROVIDE BILLETING, RATIONS AND MEDICAL ATTENTION, IF NEEDED, TO THE EMBEDDED MEDIA COMMENSURATE WITH THAT PROVIDED TO MEMBERS OF THE UNIT, AS WELL AS ACCESS TO MILITARY TRANSPORTATION AND ASSISTANCE WITH COMMUNICATIONS FILING/TRANSMITTING MEDIA PRODUCTS, IF REQUIRED. 2.C.1. EMBEDDED MEDIA ARE NOT AUTHORIZED USE OF THEIR OWN VEHICLES WHILE TRAVELING IN AN EMBEDDED STATUS. 2.C.2. TO THE EXTENT POSSIBLE, SPACE ON MILITARY TRANSPORTATION
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WILL BE MADE AVAILABLE FOR MEDIA EQUIPMENT NECESSARY TO COVER A PARTICULAR OPERATION. THE MEDIA IS RESPONSIBLE FOR LOADING AND CARRYING THEIR OWN EQUIPMENT AT ALL TIMES. USE OF PRIORITY INTER-THEATER AIRLIFT FOR EMBEDDED MEDIA TO COVER STORIES, AS WELL AS TO FILE STORIES, IS HIGHLY ENCOURAGED. SEATS ABOARD VEHICLES, AIRCRAFT AND NAVAL SHIPS WILL BE MADE AVAILABLE TO ALLOW MAXIMUM COVERAGE OF U.S. TROOPS IN THE FIELD. 2.C.3. UNITS SHOULD PLAN LIFT AND LOGISTICAL SUPPORT TO ASSIST IN MOVING MEDIA PRODUCTS TO AND FROM THE BATTLEFIELD SO AS TO TELL OUR STORY IN A TIMELY MANNER. IN THE EVENT OF COMMERCIAL COMMUNICATIONS DIFFICULTIES, MEDIA ARE AUTHORIZED TO FILE STORIES VIA EXPEDITIOUS MILITARY SIGNAL/COMMUNICATIONS CAPABILITIES. 2.C.4. NO COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT FOR USE BY MEDIA IN THE CONDUCT OF THEIR DUTIES WILL BE SPECIFICALLY PROHIBITED. HOWEVER, UNIT COMMANDERS MAY IMPOSE TEMPORARY RESTRICTIONS ON ELECTRONIC TRANSMISSIONS FOR OPERATIONAL SECURITY REASONS. MEDIA WILL SEEK APPROVAL TO USE ELECTRONIC DEVICES IN A COMBAT/HOSTILE ENVIRONMENT, UNLESS OTHERWISE DIRECTED BY THE UNIT COMMANDER OR HIS/HER DESIGNATED REPRESENTATIVE. THE USE OF COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT WILL BE DISCUSSED IN FULL WHEN THE MEDIA ARRIVE AT THEIR ASSIGNED UNIT. 3. PROCEDURES. 3.A. THE OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR PUBLIC AFFAIRS (OASD(PA) IS THE CENTRAL AGENCY FOR MANAGING AND VETTING MEDIA EMBEDS TO INCLUDE ALLOCATING EMBED SLOTS TO MEDIA ORGANIZATIONS. EMBED AUTHORITY MAY BE DELEGATED TO SUBORDINATE ELEMENTS AFTER THE COMMENCEMENT OF HOSTILITIES AND AT THE DISCRETION OF OASD(PA). EMBED OPPORTUNITIES WILL BE ASSIGNED TO MEDIA ORGANIZATIONS, NOT TO INDIVIDUAL REPORTERS. THE DECISION AS TO WHICH MEDIA REPRESENTATIVE WILL FILL ASSIGNED EMBED SLOTS WILL BE MADE BY THE DESIGNATED POC FOR EACH NEWS ORGANIZATION. 3.A.1. IAW REF. A, COMMANDERS OF UNITS IN RECEIPT OF A DEPLOYMENT ORDER MAY EMBED REGIONAL/LOCAL MEDIA DURING PREPARATIONS FOR DEPLOYMENT, DEPLOYMENT AND ARRIVAL IN THEATER UPON RECEIPT OF THEATER CLEARANCE FROM CENTCOM AND APPROVAL OF
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THE COMPONENT COMMAND. COMMANDERS WILL INFORM THESE MEDIA, PRIOR TO THE DEPLOYING EMBED, THAT OASD(PA) IS THE APPROVAL AUTHORITY FOR ALL COMBAT EMBEDS AND THAT THEIR PARTICULAR EMBED MAY END AFTER THE UNIT'S ARRIVAL IN THEATER. THE MEDIA ORGANIZATION MAY APPLY TO OASD(PA) FOR CONTINUED EMBEDDING, BUT THERE IS NO GUARANTEE AND THE MEDIA ORGANIZATION WILL HAVE TO MAKE ARRANGEMENTS FOR AND PAY FOR THE JOURNALISTS' RETURN TRIP. 3.B. WITHOUT MAKING COMMITMENTS TO MEDIA ORGANIZATIONS, DEPLOYING UNITS WILL IDENTIFY LOCAL MEDIA FOR POTENTIAL EMBEDS AND NOMINATE THEM THROUGH PA CHANNELS TO OASD(PA) (POC: MAJ TIM BLAIR, DSN 227-1253; COMM. 703-697-1253; EMAIL [email protected]). INFORMATION REQUIRED TO BE FORWARDED INCLUDES MEDIA ORGANIZATION, TYPE OF MEDIA AND CONTACT INFORMATION INCLUDING BUREAU CHIEF/MANAGING EDITOR/NEWS DIRECTOR'S NAME; OFFICE, HOME AND CELL PHONE NUMBERS; PAGER NUMBERS AND EMAIL ADDRESSES. SUBMISSIONS FOR EMBEDS WITH SPECIFIC UNITS SHOULD INCLUDE AN UNIT'S RECOMMENDATION AS TO WHETHER THE REQUEST SHOULD BE HONORED. 3.C. UNIT COMMANDERS SHOULD ALSO EXPRESS, THROUGH THEIR CHAIN OF COMMAND AND PA CHANNELS TO OASD(PA), THEIR DESIRE AND CAPABILITY TO SUPPORT ADDITIONAL MEDIA EMBEDS BEYOND THOSE ASSIGNED. 3.D. FREELANCE MEDIA WILL BE AUTHORIZED TO EMBED IF THEY ARE SELECTED BY A NEWS ORGANIZATION AS THEIR EMBED REPRESENTATIVE. 3.E. UNITS WILL BE AUTHORIZED DIRECT COORDINATION WITH MEDIA AFTER ASSIGNMENT AND APPROVAL BY OASD(PA). 3.E.1.UNITS ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR ENSURING THAT ALL EMBEDDED MEDIA AND THEIR NEWS ORGANIZATIONS HAVE SIGNED THE "RELEASE, INDEMNIFICATION, AND HOLD HARMLESS AGREEMENT AND AGREEMENT NOT TO SUE", FOUND AT HTTP://WWW.DEFENSELINK.MIL/NEWS/FEB2003/D20030210EMBED.PDF. UNITS MUST MAINTAIN A COPY OF THIS AGREEMENT FOR ALL MEDIA EMBEDDED WITH THEIR UNIT. 3.F. EMBEDDED MEDIA OPERATE AS PART OF THEIR ASSIGNED UNIT. AN ESCORT MAY BE ASSIGNED AT THE DISCRETION OF THE UNIT COMMANDER. THE ABSENCE OF A PA ESCORT IS NOT A REASON TO PRECLUDE MEDIA ACCESS TO OPERATIONS. 3.G. COMMANDERS WILL ENSURE THE MEDIA ARE PROVIDED WITH EVERY
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OPPORTUNITY TO OBSERVE ACTUAL COMBAT OPERATIONS. THE PERSONAL SAFETY OF CORRESPONDENTS IS NOT A REASON TO EXCLUDE THEM FROM COMBAT AREAS. 3.H. IF, IN THE OPINION OF THE UNIT COMMANDER, A MEDIA REPRESENTATIVE IS UNABLE TO WITHSTAND THE RIGOROUS CONDITIONS REQUIRED TO OPERATE WITH THE FORWARD DEPLOYED FORCES, THE COMMANDER OR HIS/HER REPRESENTATIVE MAY LIMIT THE REPRESENTATIVES PARTICIPATION WITH OPERATIONAL FORCES TO ENSURE UNIT SAFETY AND INFORM OASD(PA) THROUGH PA CHANNELS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. GENDER WILL NOT BE AN EXCLUDING FACTOR UNDER ANY CIRCUMSTANCE. 3.I. IF FOR ANY REASON A MEDIA REPRESENTATIVE CANNOT PARTICIPATE IN AN OPERATION, THEY WILL BE TRANSPORTED TO THE NEXT HIGHER HEADQUARTERS FOR THE DURATION OF THE OPERATION. 3.J. COMMANDERS WILL OBTAIN THEATER CLEARANCE FROM CENTCOM/PA FOR MEDIA EMBARKING ON MILITARY CONVEYANCE FOR PURPOSES OF EMBEDDING. 3.K. UNITS HOSTING EMBEDDED MEDIA WILL ISSUE INVITATIONAL TRAVEL ORDERS, AND NUCLEAR, BIOLOGICAL AND CHEMICAL (NBC) GEAR. SEE PARA. 5. FOR DETAILS ON WHICH ITEMS ARE ISSUED AND WHICH ITEMS THE MEDIA ARE RESPONSIBLE TO PROVIDE FOR THEMSELVES. 3.L. MEDIA ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR OBTAINING THEIR OWN PASSPORTS AND VISAS. 3.M. MEDIA WILL AGREE TO ABIDE BY THE CENTCOM/OASD(PA) GROUND RULES STATED IN PARA. 4 OF THIS MESSAGE IN EXCHANGE FOR COMMAND/UNIT-PROVIDED SUPPORT AND ACCESS TO SERVICE MEMBERS, INFORMATION AND OTHER PREVIOUSLY-STATED PRIVILEGES. ANY VIOLATION OF THE GROUND RULES COULD RESULT IN TERMINATION OF THAT MEDIA'S EMBED OPPORTUNITY. 3.N. DISPUTES/DIFFICULTIES. ISSUES, QUESTIONS, DIFFICULTIES OR DISPUTES ASSOCIATED WITH GROUND RULES OR OTHER ASPECTS OF EMBEDDING MEDIA THAT CANNOT BE RESOLVED AT THE UNIT LEVEL, OR THROUGH THE CHAIN OF COMMAND, WILL BE FORWARDED THROUGH PA CHANNELS FOR RESOLUTION. COMMANDERS WHO WISH TO TERMINATE AN EMBED FOR CAUSE MUST NOTIFY CENTCOM/PA PRIOR TO TERMINATION. IF A DISPUTE CANNOT BE RESOLVED AT A LOWER LEVEL, OASD(PA) WILL BE THE FINAL RESOLUTION AUTHORITY. IN ALL CASES, THIS SHOULD BE
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DONE AS EXPEDITIOUSLY AS POSSIBLE TO PRESERVE THE NEWS VALUE OF THE SITUATION. 3.O. MEDIA WILL PAY THEIR OWN BILLETING EXPENSES IF BILLETED IN A COMMERCIAL FACILITY. 3.P. MEDIA WILL DEPLOY WITH THE NECESSARY EQUIPMENT TO COLLECT AND TRANSMIT THEIR STORIES. 3.Q. THE STANDARD FOR RELEASE OF INFORMATION SHOULD BE TO ASK "WHY NOT RELEASE" VICE "WHY RELEASE." DECISIONS SHOULD BE MADE ASAP, PREFERABLY IN MINUTES, NOT HOURS. 3.R. THERE IS NO GENERAL REVIEW PROCESS FOR MEDIA PRODUCTS. SEE PARA 6.A. FOR FURTHER DETAIL CONCERNING SECURITY AT THE SOURCE. 3.S. MEDIA WILL ONLY BE GRANTED ACCESS TO DETAINEES OR EPWS WITHIN THE PROVISIONS OF THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 1949. SEE PARA. 4.G.17. FOR THE GROUND RULE. 3.T. HAVING EMBEDDED MEDIA DOES NOT PRECLUDE CONTACT WITH OTHER MEDIA. EMBEDDED MEDIA, AS A RESULT OF TIME INVESTED WITH THE UNIT AND GROUND RULES AGREEMENT, MAY HAVE A DIFFERENT LEVEL OF ACCESS. 3.U. CENTCOM/PA WILL ACCOUNT FOR EMBEDDED MEDIA DURING THE TIME THE MEDIA IS EMBEDDED IN THEATER. CENTCOM/PA WILL REPORT CHANGES IN EMBED STATUS TO OASD(PA) AS THEY OCCUR. 3.V. IF A MEDIA REPRESENTATIVE IS KILLED OR INJURED IN THE COURSE OF MILITARY OPERATIONS, THE UNIT WILL IMMEDIATELY NOTIFY OASD(PA), THROUGH PA CHANNELS. OASD(PA) WILL CONTACT THE RESPECTIVE MEDIA ORGANIZATION(S), WHICH WILL MAKE NEXT OF KIN NOTIFICATION IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE INDIVIDUAL'S WISHES. 3.W. MEDIA MAY TERMINATE THEIR EMBED OPPORTUNITY AT ANY TIME. UNIT COMMANDERS WILL PROVIDE, AS THE TACTICAL SITUATION PERMITS AND BASED ON THE AVAILABILITY OF TRANSPORTATION, MOVEMENT BACK TO THE NEAREST LOCATION WITH COMMERCIAL TRANSPORTATION. 3.W.1. DEPARTING MEDIA WILL BE DEBRIEFED ON OPERATIONAL SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS AS APPLICABLE TO ONGOING AND FUTURE OPERATIONS WHICH THEY MAY NOW HAVE INFORMATION CONCERNING. 4. GROUND RULES. FOR THE SAFETY AND SECURITY OF U.S. FORCES AND EMBEDDED MEDIA, MEDIA WILL ADHERE TO ESTABLISHED GROUND RULES. GROUND RULES WILL BE AGREED TO IN ADVANCE AND SIGNED BY MEDIA PRIOR TO EMBEDDING. VIOLATION OF THE GROUND RULES MAY RESULT IN THE IMMEDIATE TERMINATION OF THE EMBED AND REMOVAL
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FROM THE AOR. THESE GROUND RULES RECOGNIZE THE RIGHT OF THE MEDIA TO COVER MILITARY OPERATIONS AND ARE IN NO WAY INTENDED TO PREVENT RELEASE OF DEROGATORY, EMBARRASSING, NEGATIVE OR UNCOMPLIMENTARY INFORMATION. ANY MODIFICATION TO THE STANDARD GROUND RULES WILL BE FORWARDED THROUGH THE PA CHANNELS TO CENTCOM/PA FOR APPROVAL. STANDARD GROUND RULES ARE: 4.A. ALL INTERVIEWS WITH SERVICE MEMBERS WILL BE ON THE RECORD. SECURITY AT THE SOURCE IS THE POLICY. INTERVIEWS WITH PILOTS AND AIRCREW MEMBERS ARE AUTHORIZED UPON COMPLETION OF MISSIONS; HOWEVER, RELEASE OF INFORMATION MUST CONFORM TO THESE MEDIA GROUND RULES. 4.B. PRINT OR BROADCAST STORIES WILL BE DATELINED ACCORDING TO LOCAL GROUND RULES. LOCAL GROUND RULES WILL BE COORDINATED THROUGH COMMAND CHANNELS WITH CENTCOM. 4.C. MEDIA EMBEDDED WITH U.S. FORCES ARE NOT PERMITTED TO CARRY PERSONAL FIREARMS. 4.D. LIGHT DISCIPLINE RESTRICTIONS WILL BE FOLLOWED. VISIBLE LIGHT SOURCES, INCLUDING FLASH OR TELEVISION LIGHTS, FLASH CAMERAS WILL NOT BE USED WHEN OPERATING WITH FORCES AT NIGHT UNLESS SPECIFICALLY APPROVED IN ADVANCE BY THE ON-SCENE COMMANDER. 4.E. EMBARGOES MAY BE IMPOSED TO PROTECT OPERATIONAL SECURITY. EMBARGOES WILL ONLY BE USED FOR OPERATIONAL SECURITY AND WILL BE LIFTED AS SOON AS THE OPERATIONAL SECURITY ISSUE HAS PASSED. 4.F. THE FOLLOWING CATEGORIES OF INFORMATION ARE RELEASABLE. 4.F.1. APPROXIMATE FRIENDLY FORCE STRENGTH FIGURES. 4.F.2. APPROXIMATE FRIENDLY CASUALTY FIGURES BY SERVICE. EMBEDDED MEDIA MAY, WITHIN OPSEC LIMITS, CONFIRM UNIT CASUALTIES THEY HAVE WITNESSED. 4.F.3. CONFIRMED FIGURES OF ENEMY PERSONNEL DETAINED OR CAPTURED. 4.F.4. SIZE OF FRIENDLY FORCE PARTICIPATING IN AN ACTION OR OPERATION CAN BE DISCLOSED USING APPROXIMATE TERMS. SPECIFIC FORCE OR UNIT IDENTIFICATION MAY BE RELEASED WHEN IT NO LONGER WARRANTS SECURITY PROTECTION. 4.F.5. INFORMATION AND LOCATION OF MILITARY TARGETS AND OBJECTIVES PREVIOUSLY UNDER ATTACK. 4.F.6. GENERIC DESCRIPTION OF ORIGIN OF AIR OPERATIONS, SUCH AS "LAND-BASED." 4.F.7. DATE, TIME OR LOCATION OF PREVIOUS CONVENTIONAL MILITARY MISSIONS AND ACTIONS, AS WELL AS MISSION RESULTS ARE RELEASABLE
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ONLY IF DESCRIBED IN GENERAL TERMS. 4.F.8. TYPES OF ORDNANCE EXPENDED IN GENERAL TERMS. 4.F.9. NUMBER OF AERIAL COMBAT OR RECONNAISSANCE MISSIONS OR SORTIES FLOWN IN CENTCOM'S AREA OF OPERATION. 4.F.10. TYPE OF FORCES INVOLVED (E.G., AIR DEFENSE, INFANTRY, ARMOR, MARINES). 4.F.11. ALLIED PARTICIPATION BY TYPE OF OPERATION (SHIPS, AIRCRAFT, GROUND UNITS, ETC.) AFTER APPROVAL OF THE ALLIED UNIT COMMANDER. 4.F.12. OPERATION CODE NAMES. 4.F.13. NAMES AND HOMETOWNS OF U.S. MILITARY UNITS. 4.F.14. SERVICE MEMBERS' NAMES AND HOME TOWNS WITH THE INDIVIDUALS' CONSENT. 4.G. THE FOLLOWING CATEGORIES OF INFORMATION ARE NOT RELEASABLE SINCE THEIR PUBLICATION OR BROADCAST COULD JEOPARDIZE OPERATIONS AND ENDANGER LIVES. 4.G.1. SPECIFIC NUMBER OF TROOPS IN UNITS BELOW CORPS/MEF LEVEL. 4.G.2. SPECIFIC NUMBER OF AIRCRAFT IN UNITS AT OR BELOW THE AIR EXPEDITIONARY WING LEVEL. 4.G.3. SPECIFIC NUMBERS REGARDING OTHER EQUIPMENT OR CRITICAL SUPPLIES (E.G. ARTILLERY, TANKS, LANDING CRAFT, RADARS, TRUCKS, WATER, ETC.). 4.G.4. SPECIFIC NUMBERS OF SHIPS IN UNITS BELOW THE CARRIER BATTLE GROUP LEVEL. 4.G.5. NAMES OF MILITARY INSTALLATIONS OR SPECIFIC GEOGRAPHIC LOCATIONS OF MILITARY UNITS IN THE CENTCOM AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY, UNLESS SPECIFICALLY RELEASED BY THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE OR AUTHORIZED BY THE CENTCOM COMMANDER. NEWS AND IMAGERY PRODUCTS THAT IDENTIFY OR INCLUDE IDENTIFIABLE FEATURES OF THESE LOCATIONS ARE NOT AUTHORIZED FOR RELEASE. 4.G.6. INFORMATION REGARDING FUTURE OPERATIONS. 4.G.7. INFORMATION REGARDING FORCE PROTECTION MEASURES AT MILITARY INSTALLATIONS OR ENCAMPMENTS (EXCEPT THOSE WHICH ARE VISIBLE OR READILY APPARENT). 4.G.8. PHOTOGRAPHY SHOWING LEVEL OF SECURITY AT MILITARY INSTALLATIONS OR ENCAMPMENTS. 4.G.9. RULES OF ENGAGEMENT. 4.G.10. INFORMATION ON INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION ACTIVITIES COMPROMISING TACTICS, TECHNIQUES OR PROCEDURES. 4.G.11. EXTRA PRECAUTIONS IN REPORTING WILL BE REQUIRED AT THE COMMENCEMENT OF HOSTILITIES TO MAXIMIZE OPERATIONAL SURPRISE.
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LIVE BROADCASTS FROM AIRFIELDS, ON THE GROUND OR AFLOAT, BY EMBEDDED MEDIA ARE PROHIBITED UNTIL THE SAFE RETURN OF THE INITIAL STRIKE PACKAGE OR UNTIL AUTHORIZED BY THE UNIT COMMANDER. 4.G.12. DURING AN OPERATION, SPECIFIC INFORMATION ON FRIENDLY FORCE TROOP MOVEMENTS, TACTICAL DEPLOYMENTS, AND DISPOSITIONS THAT WOULD JEOPARDIZE OPERATIONAL SECURITY OR LIVES. INFORMATION ON ON-GOING ENGAGEMENTS WILL NOT BE RELEASED UNLESS AUTHORIZED FOR RELEASE BY ON-SCENE COMMANDER. 4.G.13. INFORMATION ON SPECIAL OPERATIONS UNITS, UNIQUE OPERATIONS METHODOLOGY OR TACTICS, FOR EXAMPLE, AIR OPERATIONS, ANGLES OF ATTACK, AND SPEEDS; NAVAL TACTICAL OR EVASIVE MANEUVERS, ETC. GENERAL TERMS SUCH AS "LOW" OR "FAST" MAY BE USED. 4.G.14. INFORMATION ON EFFECTIVENESS OF ENEMY ELECTRONIC WARFARE. 4.G.15. INFORMATION IDENTIFYING POSTPONED OR CANCELED OPERATIONS. 4.G.16. INFORMATION ON MISSING OR DOWNED AIRCRAFT OR MISSING VESSELS WHILE SEARCH AND RESCUE AND RECOVERY OPERATIONS ARE BEING PLANNED OR UNDERWAY. 4.G.17. INFORMATION ON EFFECTIVENESS OF ENEMY CAMOUFLAGE, COVER, DECEPTION, TARGETING, DIRECT AND INDIRECT FIRE, INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION, OR SECURITY MEASURES. 4.G.18. NO PHOTOGRAPHS OR OTHER VISUAL MEDIA SHOWING AN ENEMY PRISONER OF WAR OR DETAINEE'S RECOGNIZABLE FACE, NAMETAG OR OTHER IDENTIFYING FEATURE OR ITEM MAY BE TAKEN. 4.G.19. STILL OR VIDEO IMAGERY OF CUSTODY OPERATIONS OR INTERVIEWS WITH PERSONS UNDER CUSTODY. 4.H. THE FOLLOWING PROCEDURES AND POLICIES APPLY TO COVERAGE OF WOUNDED, INJURED, AND ILL PERSONNEL: 4.H.1. MEDIA REPRESENTATIVES WILL BE REMINDED OF THE SENSITIVITY OF USING NAMES OF INDIVIDUAL CASUALTIES OR PHOTOGRAPHS THEY MAY HAVE TAKEN WHICH CLEARLY IDENTIFY CASUALTIES UNTIL AFTER NOTIFICATION OF THE NOK AND RELEASE BY OASD(PA). 4.H.2. BATTLEFIELD CASUALTIES MAY BE COVERED BY EMBEDDED MEDIA AS LONG AS THE SERVICE MEMBER'S IDENTITY IS PROTECTED FROM DISCLOSURE FOR 72 HOURS OR UPON VERIFICATION OF NOK NOTIFICATION, WHICHEVER IS FIRST. 4.H.3. MEDIA VISITS TO MEDICAL FACILITIES WILL BE IN ACCORDANCE WITH APPLICABLE REGULATIONS, STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES,
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OPERATIONS ORDERS AND INSTRUCTIONS BY ATTENDING PHYSICIANS. IF APPROVED, SERVICE OR MEDICAL FACILITY PERSONNEL MUST ESCORT MEDIA AT ALL TIMES. 4.H.4. PATIENT WELFARE, PATIENT PRIVACY, AND NEXT OF KIN/FAMILY CONSIDERATIONS ARE THE GOVERNING CONCERNS ABOUT NEWS MEDIA COVERAGE OF WOUNDED, INJURED, AND ILL PERSONNEL IN MEDICAL TREATMENT FACILITIES OR OTHER CASUALTY COLLECTION AND TREATMENT LOCATIONS. 4.H.5. MEDIA VISITS ARE AUTHORIZED TO MEDICAL CARE FACILITIES, BUT MUST BE APPROVED BY THE MEDICAL FACILITY COMMANDER AND ATTENDING PHYSICIAN AND MUST NOT INTERFERE WITH MEDICAL TREATMENT. REQUESTS TO VISIT MEDICAL CARE FACILITIES OUTSIDE THE CONTINENTAL UNITED STATES WILL BE COORDINATED BY THE UNIFIED COMMAND PA. 4.H.6. REPORTERS MAY VISIT THOSE AREAS DESIGNATED BY THE FACILITY COMMANDER, BUT WILL NOT BE ALLOWED IN OPERATING ROOMS DURING OPERATING PROCEDURES. 4.H.7. PERMISSION TO INTERVIEW OR PHOTOGRAPH A PATIENT WILL BE GRANTED ONLY WITH THE CONSENT OF THE ATTENDING PHYSICIAN OR FACILITY COMMANDER AND WITH THE PATIENT'S INFORMED CONSENT, WITNESSED BY THE ESCORT. 4.H.8. "INFORMED CONSENT" MEANS THE PATIENT UNDERSTANDS HIS OR HER PICTURE AND COMMENTS ARE BEING COLLECTED FOR NEWS MEDIA PURPOSES AND THEY MAY APPEAR NATIONWIDE IN NEWS MEDIA REPORTS. 4.H.9. THE ATTENDING PHYSICIAN OR ESCORT SHOULD ADVISE THE SERVICE MEMBER IF NOK HAVE BEEN NOTIFIED. 5. IMMUNIZATIONS AND PERSONAL PROTECTIVE GEAR. 5.A. MEDIA ORGANIZATIONS SHOULD ENSURE THAT MEDIA ARE PROPERLY IMMUNIZED BEFORE EMBEDDING WITH UNITS. THE CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL (CDC)-RECOMMENDED IMMUNIZATIONS FOR DEPLOYMENT TO THE MIDDLE EAST INCLUDE HEPATITIS A; HEPATITIS B; RABIES; TETANUSDIPHTHERIA; AND TYPHOID. THE CDC RECOMMENDS MENINGOCOCCAL IMMUNIZATIONS FOR VISITORS TO MECCA. IF TRAVELING TO CERTAIN AREAS IN THE CENTCOM AOR, THE CDC RECOMMENDS TAKING PRESCRIPTION ANTIMALARIAL DRUGS. ANTHRAX AND SMALLPOX VACCINES WILL BE PROVIDED TO THE MEDIA AT NO EXPENSE TO THE GOVERNMENT (THE MEDIA OUTLET WILL BEAR THE EXPENSE). FOR MORE HEALTH INFORMATION FOR
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TRAVELERS TO THE MIDDLE EAST, GO TO THE CDC WEB SITE AT HTTP://WWW.CDC.GOV/TRAVEL/MIDEAST.HTM. 5.B. BECAUSE THE USE OF PERSONAL PROTECTIVE GEAR, SUCH AS HELMETS OR FLAK VESTS, IS BOTH A PERSONAL AND PROFESSIONAL CHOICE, MEDIA WILL BE RESPONSIBLE FOR PROCURING/USING SUCH EQUIPMENT. PERSONAL PROTECTIVE GEAR, AS WELL AS CLOTHING, WILL BE SUBDUED IN COLOR AND APPEARANCE. 5.C. EMBEDDED MEDIA ARE AUTHORIZED AND REQUIRED TO BE PROVIDED WITH, ON A TEMPORARY LOAN BASIS, NUCLEAR, BIOLOGICAL, CHEMICAL (NBC) PROTECTIVE EQUIPMENT BY THE UNIT WITH WHICH THEY ARE EMBEDDED. UNIT PERSONNEL WILL PROVIDE BASIC INSTRUCTION IN THE PROPER WEAR, USE, AND MAINTENANCE OF THE EQUIPMENT. UPON TERMINATION OF THE EMBED, INITIATED BY EITHER PARTY, THE NBC EQUIPMENT SHALL BE RETURNED TO THE EMBEDDING UNIT. IF SUFFICIENT NBC PROTECTIVE EQUIPMENT IS NOT AVAILABLE FOR EMBEDDED MEDIA, COMMANDERS MAY PURCHASE ADDITIONAL EQUIPMENT, WITH FUNDS NORMALLY AVAILABLE FOR THAT PURPOSE, AND LOAN IT TO EMBEDDED MEDIA IN ACCORDANCE WITH THIS PARAGRAPH. 6. SECURITY 6.A. MEDIA PRODUCTS WILL NOT BE SUBJECT TO SECURITY REVIEW OR CENSORSHIP EXCEPT AS INDICATED IN PARA. 6.A.1. SECURITY AT THE SOURCE WILL BE THE RULE. U.S. MILITARY PERSONNEL SHALL PROTECT CLASSIFIED INFORMATION FROM UNAUTHORIZED OR INADVERTENT DISCLOSURE. MEDIA PROVIDED ACCESS TO SENSITIVE INFORMATION, INFORMATION WHICH IS NOT CLASSIFIED BUT WHICH MAY BE OF OPERATIONAL VALUE TO AN ADVERSARY OR WHEN COMBINED WITH OTHER UNCLASSIFIED INFORMATION MAY REVEAL CLASSIFIED INFORMATION, WILL BE INFORMED IN ADVANCE BY THE UNIT COMMANDER OR HIS/HER DESIGNATED REPRESENTATIVE OF THE RESTRICTIONS ON THE USE OR DISCLOSURE OF SUCH INFORMATION. WHEN IN DOUBT, MEDIA WILL CONSULT WITH THE UNIT COMMANDER OR HIS/HER DESIGNATED REPRESENTATIVE. 6.A.1. THE NATURE OF THE EMBEDDING PROCESS MAY INVOLVE OBSERVATION OF SENSITIVE INFORMATION, INCLUDING TROOP MOVEMENTS, BATTLE PREPARATIONS, MATERIEL CAPABILITIES AND VULNERABILITIES AND OTHER INFORMATION AS LISTED IN PARA. 4.G. WHEN A COMMANDER OR HIS/HER DESIGNATED REPRESENTATIVE HAS REASON TO BELIEVE THAT A MEDIA MEMBER WILL HAVE ACCESS TO THIS TYPE OF SENSITIVE INFORMATION, PRIOR TO ALLOWING SUCH ACCESS, HE/SHE WILL TAKE
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PRUDENT PRECAUTIONS TO ENSURE THE SECURITY OF THAT INFORMATION. THE PRIMARY SAFEGUARD WILL BE TO BRIEF MEDIA IN ADVANCE ABOUT WHAT INFORMATION IS SENSITIVE AND WHAT THE PARAMETERS ARE FOR COVERING THIS TYPE OF INFORMATION. IF MEDIA ARE INADVERTENTLY EXPOSED TO SENSITIVE INFORMATION THEY SHOULD BE BRIEFED AFTER EXPOSURE ON WHAT INFORMATION THEY SHOULD AVOID COVERING. IN INSTANCES WHERE A UNIT COMMANDER OR THE DESIGNATED REPRESENTATIVE DETERMINES THAT COVERAGE OF A STORY WILL INVOLVE EXPOSURE TO SENSITIVE INFORMATION BEYOND THE SCOPE OF WHAT MAY BE PROTECTED BY PREBRIEFING OR DEBRIEFING, BUT COVERAGE OF WHICH IS IN THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE DOD, THE COMMANDER MAY OFFER ACCESS IF THE REPORTER AGREES TO A SECURITY REVIEW OF THEIR COVERAGE. AGREEMENT TO SECURITY REVIEW IN EXCHANGE FOR THIS TYPE OF ACCESS MUST BE STRICTLY VOLUNTARY AND IF THE REPORTER DOES NOT AGREE, THEN ACCESS MAY NOT BE GRANTED. IF A SECURITY REVIEW IS AGREED TO, IT WILL NOT INVOLVE ANY EDITORIAL CHANGES; IT WILL BE CONDUCTED SOLELY TO ENSURE THAT NO SENSITIVE OR CLASSIFIED INFORMATION IS INCLUDED IN THE PRODUCT. IF SUCH INFORMATION IS FOUND, THE MEDIA WILL BE ASKED TO REMOVE THAT INFORMATION FROM THE PRODUCT AND/OR EMBARGO THE PRODUCT UNTIL SUCH INFORMATION IS NO LONGER CLASSIFIED OR SENSITIVE. REVIEWS ARE TO BE DONE AS SOON AS PRACTICAL SO AS NOT TO INTERRUPT COMBAT OPERATIONS NOR DELAY REPORTING. IF THERE ARE DISPUTES RESULTING FROM THE SECURITY REVIEW PROCESS THEY MAY BE APPEALED THROUGH THE CHAIN OF COMMAND, OR THROUGH PA CHANNELS TO OASD/PA. THIS PARAGRAPH DOES NOT AUTHORIZE COMMANDERS TO ALLOW MEDIA ACCESS TO CLASSIFIED INFORMATION. 6.A.2. MEDIA PRODUCTS WILL NOT BE CONFISCATED OR OTHERWISE IMPOUNDED. IF IT IS BELIEVED THAT CLASSIFIED INFORMATION HAS BEEN COMPROMISED AND THE MEDIA REPRESENTATIVE REFUSES TO REMOVE THAT INFORMATION NOTIFY THE CPIC AND/OR OASD/PA AS SOON AS POSSIBLE SO THE ISSUE MAY BE ADDRESSED WITH THE MEDIA ORGANIZATION'S MANAGEMENT. 7. MISCELLANEOUS/COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS: 7.A. OASD(PA) IS THE INITIAL EMBED AUTHORITY. EMBEDDING PROCEDURES AND ASSIGNMENT AUTHORITY MAY BE TRANSFERRED TO CENTCOM PA AT A LATER DATE. THIS AUTHORITY MAY BE FURTHER
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DELEGATED AT CENTCOM'S DISCRETION. 7.B. THIS GUIDANCE AUTHORIZES BLANKET APPROVAL FOR NON-LOCAL AND LOCAL MEDIA TRAVEL ABOARD DOD AIRLIFT FOR ALL EMBEDDED MEDIA ON A NO-COST, SPACE AVAILABLE BASIS. NO ADDITIONAL COSTS SHALL BE INCURRED BY THE GOVERNMENT TO PROVIDE ASSISTANCE IAW DODI 5410.15, PARA 3.4. 7.C. USE OF LIPSTICK AND HELMET-MOUNTED CAMERAS ON COMBAT SORTIES IS APPROVED AND ENCOURAGED TO THE GREATEST EXTENT POSSIBLE. 8. OASD(PA) POC FOR EMBEDDING MEDIA IS MAJ TIM BLAIR, DSN 227- 1253, CMCL 703-697-1253, EMAIL [email protected].
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BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH
Ana-Klara Hering moved to the United States from Colombia with her family at the age of six. She was raised in Ft. Lauderdale, FL and is a graduate of The George
Washington University, Washington, D.C, where she studied international relations and
journalism. She served four years on active duty as an officer in the United States Marine
Corps, including nine months in the Middle East during the Iraq War. She was a captain
in the Marine Corps Reserves at the time this study was conducted.
Her first-person accounts of the war have been featured in Women’s World, the
Palm Beach Post, and on numerous Internet newsgroups. She has interned and freelanced
for the Sun-Sentinel, Miami Herald, Palm Beach Post and Dallas Morning News. She
also worked as a news clerk for the Washington Post and as an intern for Sen. Connie
Mack (R-Fl).
While at the University of Florida, she was a research assistant at the Marion
Brechner Citizen Access Project and the Joseph L. Brechner Center for Freedom of
Information. She taught two undergraduate courses in the UF Dial Center for Written
and Oral Communication and a journalism writing course in the College of Journalism
and Communications. She was also a teaching assistant for an undergraduate media law
course. After graduating with distinction with a master of arts in mass communication
from the UF College of Journalism and Communications, she began the joint Ph.D./J.D.
program in media law and policy at UF.
243