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The Domestic Political Situation in Armenia Dr. Benyamin Poghosyan, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies

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The Domestic Political Situation in Armenia Dr. Benyamin Poghosyan, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies The Domestic political situation in Armenia Dr. Benyamin Poghosyan, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic Studies The capitulation of Armenia as a result of the second Karabakh war has significantly weakened the positions of Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan. Even before the war, some part of the population was unhappy with his policies, given the mismanagement of the COVID – 19 pandemic, and the absence of the increase of prosperity. Yes, Armenia secured some 7.5 percent GDP growth in 2019 and an average 10 percent of pensions’ increase was implemented in January 2020. However, the key promises of Pashinyan – to return the stolen assets of Armenia from former elites, to fully repay the Armenian external debt, and to significantly increase the living standards of an average Armenian citizen, have not been materialized. Immediately after the revolution, Armenia’s national debt was approximately 7.2 billion USD, while in summer 2020 it reached almost 8 billion USD.1 The key forces in Pashinyan’s government For a better understanding of the current domestic political landscape in Armenia, we should look through the key forces behind Pashinyan’s government until the recent changes after the capitulation. It comprises three different layers. The first layer was people personally loyal to Pashinyan, who were members of his Civic Contract party, which Pashinyan established in 2015. Among these politicians’ the key actors are National Assembly Speaker Ararat Mirzoyan, Minister of territorial administration and infrastructure Suren Papikyan, Deputy Speaker of the National Assembly Alen Simonyan, Minister of science, education, sport, and culture Arayik Harutyunyan. The second layer was people who had significant positions in the government during Serzh Sargsyan’s presidency. The key figures were Minister of Defense Davit Tonoyan (who was fired on November 20, 2020), Minister of foreign affairs Zohrap Mnatsakanyan (resigned on November 16, 2020), and Minister of Finances Atom Janjughazyan. The third layer was the representatives of the Western-funded NGOs, such as Transparency International, Open Society Foundation, etc. The key figure here is the Secretary of the Security Council Armen Grigoryan. These three teams or camps had almost no common political history before the revolution, albeit 1 Armenia`s national debt grew by 14% per annum by August and almost reached $ 8 billion, https://finport.am/full_news.php?id=42787&lang=3. some members of the Pashinyan’s inner circle had personal friendly relations with the representatives of the civil society. Domestic politics of Armenia (May 2018 – August 2020) The revolution and the snap parliamentary elections of December 2018 had a significant impact on Armenian domestic politics. The Republican party, which was the ruling party of Armenia since 1999, did not enter the Parliament receiving less than 5 percent, the same case was with the nationalistic Armenian Revolutionary Federation (ARF). Pashinyan’s “My step” coalition secured a 2/3 majority in the parliament, while “Prosperous Armenia” (PA) party headed by one of the wealthiest Armenian businessmen Gagik Tsarukyan (party was established in 2006 by the second President of Armenia Robert Kocharyan to secure a political influence after leaving President office in 2008, but after 2008 party was mainly pursuing independent policy), won 8.2 percent, and liberal “Bright Armenia” party won 6.3 percent. During the first one and half years after the revolution, there was no real opposition in Armenia and the political landscape was fully dominated by Prime Minister Pashinyan. He was very skillful in representing himself as the only bulwark against the return of former corrupted elites and thus was harnessing the support of the society. The situation started to change in late 2019 and the beginning of 2020 when some new parties were established. Among these new parties were “Homeland” (was established by the former director of the National Security Service Artur Vanetsyan2. Vanetsyan was appointed immediately after the revolution and during the first months was the key hero of the revolution, a guy fighting against corrupted former elites and criminals, but then disagreements emerged between him and Pashinyan and he was fired in September 2019. Another new party was the “National Agenda” which founding Congress took place in November 2019. Party was established by technocrats and intellectuals, who were not part of the prerevolutionary governments, but they did not accept Pashinyan’s foreign and domestic policy accusing him of incompetence, demagogy, and populism and vying for social conservative values and protection of traditions and national values3. These new parties started to make efforts to garner support in the society and the failure of Pashinyan’s government in his fight against COVID made this task easier. Starting from summer 2020 there was growing cooperation between PA, ARF, and “Homeland”. They started to demand the resignation of Pashinyan. However, as PA and ARF were part of the former elites, few in society supported them being afraid of the return of the former faces. Thus, despite growing resentment in the population against Pashinyan, Prime Minister was able to portrait the political developments as a “Black and White” fight between revolutionary forces and anti- 2 Former NSS chief elected chairman of Homeland party, https://www.panorama.am/en/news/2020/05/30/Former- NSS-chief-elected-chairman-of-Homeland-party/2301164. 3 National Agenda party of Armenia: We are national center-right force, https://news.am/eng/news/542318.html. revolution old guys, arguing that if he resigns Serzh Sargsyan or Robert Kocharyan will return and will start to plunder Armenia again. Domestic political situation during and after the second Karabakh war This was the situation before the second Karabakh war, which started on September 27, 2020. The same day martial law and general mobilization were declared in Armenia. All political parties including the Republican party, Homeland, and others declared suspension of political activities. Even PA, which leader Gagik Tsarukyan was arrested by the court two days before the start of the war for an alleged voter buying during the April 2017 parliamentary elections, suspended its anti-governmental activities. After Pashinyan’s call to form volunteers’ detachments and to go to the frontline, several opposition parties including ARF and Homeland established military detachments and went to Karabakh. After Tsarukyan’s release on bail on October 22, PA also sent some detachments to Karabakh. However, the November 10 capitulation caught almost everyone in Armenia by surprise. The reason was the official information provided by MOD representatives during the 44 days of the war according to which Armenian forces were successfully resisting Azerbaijani troops. “We will win” hashtag was offered by MOD and was very popular in Armenian segments of Facebook and Twitter. For about a month Armenian Ministry of Defense was rejecting the fact of the significant territorial and human losses and only partly accepted them at the end of October. Thus, Armenian society was sure that Armenia and Karabakh were winning the war. Meanwhile, at the beginning of November 17 political parties (almost all functioning Armenian political parties except “My step” and “Bright Armenia”), suggested establishing a government of the national accord to be able to better resist the enemy. This offer was dismissed by Pashinyan. Hours before the signature of capitulation, these 17 parties demanded the resignation of Pashinyan, but again without any success4. On the eve of the November 10 morning, some pogroms took place in Yerevan. Hundreds of people stormed government and parliament buildings, as well as Prime Minister’s residence. However, after signing the capitulation Pashinyan was hiding in the Ministry of Defense bunker. As a result of mass protests, the Speaker of the National Assembly was seriously beaten and taken to hospital. Meanwhile, there are no clear pieces of evidence regarding the organizers of these events. The opposition is arguing that riots were organized by Pashinyan himself, to provide him a legitimate base to crackdown on the opposition. After remaining in the bunker for several days and making statements only via his personal Facebook account, Pashinyan met with the "My step” faction on November 16. He stated that 4. 17 Armenian political parties demand resignation of Nikol Pashinyan and his team, https://arminfo.info/full_news.php?id=57905&lang=3. everyone is guilty for this disastrous defeat, arguing that in the last 29 years after the independence people did not pay taxes, gave bribes, robbed the state budget, and thus the defeat and capitulation is the result of 29 years of failed statehood and it’s unfair to blame only him as a leader of Armenia. He again refused to resign and instead published a 6-month road map (December 2020 – May 2021), promising to fire ministers, to care about refugees from Karabakh and wounded people, to relaunch economic growth, etc5. Meanwhile, all political forces, except “My step” require his resignation, formation of the interim government, and organization of snap parliamentary elections in Summer/Autumn 2021. President of Armenia Armen Sarkisian and the leader of the "Bright Armenia" party Edmon Marukyan also stated that the only way to overcome the political stalemate is the resignation of the Prime Minister6. Meanwhile, pieces of evidence started to emerge proving the
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