ILY-AUGUST 1977 The Professiona/ Journal of the United States A ir Force from the editors aerie

lf the recent crop of college graduates cherishes the expectation that they have seen the last of report cards. then they are subject to blighted hopes Whether it be a banker confronted by the examiner or a plumber awaiting the building inspector, our society seems determined that we be periodically evaluated. Our report card results from a reader questionnaire that was included in a recent USAF Officer Periodic Survey. This sample was limited to a selected audience and did not include generais, airmen, or readers outside the Air Force. The survey departs from our previous practice of enclosing questionnaires in copies of the Review and was thus answered by those who had recent access to our |ournal; those personnel selected at random by the Officer Periodic Survey may not have seen the Review lately —or ever Nevertheless, we are happy to share a preliminary analysis with you There was a striking correlation between advanced rank and familiarity with the Review Over 70 percent of the colonels indicated they read at least part of each copy. There was a gradual decrease in readership in descending rank to second lieutenant, 60 percent of whom said they did not read it. There was a similar correlation in the rank structure regarding the evaluation of how well the Review was períorming its mission All ranks were generally agreed that articles on strategy, tactics, the threat, and leadership and management were the most useful Technical and historical pieces were reported as less useful, and book reviews were read least of all Unless we receive contrary opimon. then, space committed to book reviews will be gradually cut back Incidentally, the survey demonstrated conclusively that the obvious and growing professionalism among the women officers of the Air Force is not reflected in their interest in the professional journal A significantly larger portion of the women either did not read or had never heard of the Review than was the case for the men Any explanations? In the opemng article, Ambassador |ohn Walsh takes us on a global tour of the world's dwindling energy resources. The cover, by Art Editor Bill DePaola, reflects the earth s steadily shrinking oil pool The issue of women in combat is raised by Dr Kenneth Werrell, who advocates their complete employment in the profession of arms. Jacqueline Cochran, who probably holds more flight records than any other living flier, offers a negative opinion We doubt that we have heard the last of this controversy As we go to press, word has been received of an adverse decision on the production of the B-1 bomber Nevertheless, because we doubt that the last word will be published on this controversial subject for some time to come, we include an article by Dr G k Burke that offers new perspectives on the utility of the B-1

From the Editor’s Aerie...... Pacing Page The Energy Problem in a Global Setting...... 2 The Honorable John Patrick Walsh A Case for the Manned Penetrating Bomber...... 15 Dr. G. K. Burke Tactical Air Power and Environmental Imperatives...... 27 Lt. Col. Robert S. Dotson, AFRES National Security Policy: The Unspoken Assumptions...... 36 Dr. James H. Toner A New Look at People’s War...... 44 Maj. William L. Cogley, USAF Four Momentous Events in 1971-72...... 56 Maj. Harold F. Nufer, AFRES Women in Combat: A Two-Part Dialogue Should Women Be Permitted in Combat? Yes...... 64 Kenneth P. Werrell Should Women Be Permitted in Combat?N o...... 69 Jacqueline Cochran Military Affairs Abroad British Defence Capabilities and Commitments...... 70 Martin H. A. Edmonds Books and Ideas The Electronics Revolution...... 81 Dr. Thomas H. Etzold Whither Zionism?...... 84 Dr. Lewis B. Ware Potpourri...... 88 Books Received...... 93 The Contributors...... 95 mm mm ATTENTION The Air University Review is the professional journal of the United States Air Force and serves as an open forum for exploratory discussion. Its purpose is to present innovative thinking and stimulate dialogue concerning Air Force doctrine, strategy, tactics, and related national defense matters. The Review should not be construed as representing policies of the Department of Defense, the Air Force, or Air Uni­ versity. Rather, the contents reflect the authors' ideas and do not necessarily bear official sanction. Thoughtful and informed contributions are always welcomed. THE ENERGY PROBLEM IN A GLOBAL SETTING T he Honorable John Patrick Walsh

HE WORLD has entered a period of Virtually everywhere, government strives growing turbulence with mixed and for relevancy in the face of increasingly com- ominous portents. Population has plex issues. Yesteryear’s bright dreams of a T soared, along with a marked proliferationunified of world remain unrequited. The Unit­ nation-states. And with the increased num- ed Nations, the visionary Parliament of Man, bers, there appears to be growing callousness survives in disharmony, marked by limited between governments and peoples and be- accomplishments and tarnished hopes. East tween governments. Simultaneously, trans- and West remain in precarious balance while portation and communication technology North and South drift toward confrontation. have shrunk the globe and contributed to the If the sixties were the Decade of Rising Ex- articulation of issues previously obscured by pectations, the seventies appear to be the distance. Democracy is essentially limited to Decade of Declining Hopes. In much of the the industrial States while authoritarianism world, the Outlook for stability and economic grows elsewhere. In much of the world, the growth can hardly be viewed sanguinely. shades of night increasingly obscure human The strength and cohesion of the industrial rights, civil liberties, and the freedom of the States have been weakened by the conse- press. quences of inflation and recession and by 2 ENERGY PROBLEM 3 their increasing dependence on Third World trial world was built on the availability of sources for raw materiais, particularly oil. cheap sources of natural energy. This This is their collective Achilles’ heel. Supply growth, in turn, provided the marginal re- blockages would have catastrophic conse- sources for assistance to the developing quences. This reahty is a major constraint on countries that were increasing their own use their policy formulations. Furtherinore, the of energy. Oil was the Queen of Fuels, and world trade and financial systems are under coal declined in significance. Expectations considerable stress, reflecting to a significant for nuclear energy were high, particularly degree the vast surge in energy prices and after the mid-fifties, but very little considera- the concomitant major accumulation of for- tion was given to other potential energy eign exchange reserves by a small number of sources. The oil market was dominated by oil exporting countries. the international Seven Sisters,* and the ori- Existing energy cost leveis are adversely gin in 1960 of the Organization of Petroleum affecting economic growth in many industri­ Exporting Countries (OPEC) was hardly al and developing countries, thus increasing noted. Throughout the sixties oil was in sur- unemployment and contributing to political plus on world markets, and its price was de- instability. And the outlook in these respects pressed below the $2.08 per barrei levei that is not favorable. While energy is not current- prevailed in 1958. Oil consumption in the ly in short supply, it seems probable that we United States grew at an annual rate of 4.5 have entered a period of accelerated deple- percent and at a higher rate in Western tion of reserves and rising real costs of ener­ Europe and Japan. Natural gas consumption gy. This situation and outlook demand a high soared, particularly in North America. Mean- degree of collaboration within the industrial while, exploration peaked in the United world and between the industrial and devel­ States, and there were warnings about de- oping countries. But this is neither an easy clining reserves of hydrocarbons. There is lit­ nor assured outcome. Individual govern- tle evidence, however, that the implications ments within each grouping ride their pet of these warnings were understood either by hobbyhorses at the expense of unity, and government or other elements of society. disarray appears to deepen. As William But- The closing of the Suez Canal in 1967 and ler Yeats mordantly noted, the periodical severing of the Trans-Arabian The best lack all conviction, while the worst Pipeline drove tanker rates upward and con- Are full of passionate intensity. tributed to the development of the giant How this global situation develops will de- tankers. In 1970, the revolutionary regime in pend to a considerable degree on the actions Libya of Colonel Muammar el-Qaddafi con- and leadership of the American people. We cluded that it should receive a price differen- must now establish a comprehensive na- tial relative to Persian Gulf oil because of the tional energy policy, consonant with our freight advantage. In the course of bizarre more straitened circumstances. We must negotiations, the companies capitulated to face up to reality. Libyan demands, and a price-ratchetting process began between Libyan and Persian Gulf producers. Efforts to halt this process resulted in a January 1971 agreement be­ The Nature and tween the companies and the Gulf produc­ Causes of the Problem ers, which in effect gave OPEC the power to In the postwar period, the substantial ex- •The seven biggest oil corporations: Standard Oil of New Jersey. Stan­ pansion of production throughout the indus­ dard Oil of Califórnia, Mobil Oil. Shell, British Petroleum, Texaco, and Culf. 4 AIR UNIVERSITYREVIEW control production and prices. If the five- the event of a renewed embargo. The Con­ year price and supply agreement held at all, gressional committee structure churned into the Yom Kippur War in October 1973 pro- action, numerous hearings were held, and vided the excuse for its termination. With much testimony was taken. The legislative supply curtailed by the Arab oil embargo, results, however, have been minimal. OPEC decreed a fourfold price increase The performance of the industrial world as effective 1 January 1974. The era of cheap a whole, and of the United States in particu­ energy was over. lar, has not been consonant with the exigen- In the face of the Arab oil boycott of Octo­ cies of the situation or with expressed ber 1973 and the steep OPEC price increase, objectives and goals. Due to a variety of fac- the industrial countries were thrown into tors, especially the global recession, energy considerable disarray. The cited actions consumption declined in 1974 and 1975. But caught the world at a delicate point of eco- as economic growth resumed and memories nomic passage, contributing to high leveis of of the embargo dimmed, energy consump­ inflation and subsequent recession. These tion in 1976 increased sharply. In the United trends deepened the inherent problems of States, total energy consumption was about the developing countries. four percent above 1975 leveis with a par- The United States reacted to these events ticularly sharp increase in the use of refined initially with considerable vigor. Operation Petroleum products. These trends accelerat- Independence was announced with brave ed during the first quarter of this year. Prod­ goals of reduced energy consumption and in- ucts demand, which averaged 16.3 million creased energy production. Conservation barreis a day (mmbd) in 1975, approximated was discussed as a new ethic. In addition, the 17.4 mmbd in 1976, and probably exceeded International Energy Agency was estab- 19.5 mmbd during the January-March period lished with 19 members committed to col- of 1977. laborate in conservation, energy research Meanwhile, the production of U.S. oil and natural gas has continued to decline. Oil out- put peaked in 1970 and natural gas in 1973; Sirice the Arabs possess the lions oil is now about 16.5 percent and natural gas share of OPECs surplus capacity, about 13 percent below peak leveis. Tradi- tional fields have declined in productivity, further increases in U.S. import and exploration and exploitation have been demand would have to come from hampered by high costs and a variety of price those sources. Controls. This has resulted in a drop in output and a depletion in proven reserves, particu- larly in respect to natural gas. and development, and, if necessary, energy- Since the supply of other energy sources in sharing. By the magic of goal-setting, oil im- the 1970-77 time-span has not significantly ports were to be reduced to very low leveis. changed, the overall increase in energy con­ Simultaneously, the United States govern- sumption has forced a very substantial rise in ment railed against the price-gouging by the the importation of hydrocarbons, primarily oil exporters. OPEC was viewed as a public oil. In 1970, oil imports averaged about 3.4 menace. Punitive Congressional action mmbd or 23.3 percent of total domestic de­ against its members was contained in the mand. In 1976, imports approximated 8.0 Trade Act of 1974, and the Secretary of State mmbd or more than 41 percent of domestic alluded to the possibility of military action in demand. In the same time span, the cost of ENERGY PROBLEM 5 fuel imports rose from $2.56 billion to over $32 billion. The latter outlay was a major fac- The two most significant countries tor in the substantial 1976 trade déficit. Dur- ing the first quarter of this year, daily oil in this supply/demand equation imports have exceeded 9 mmbd at an aver- are Saudi Arabia and the United age price about eight percent higher than in States, with the former supplying 1976. This was a major factor in the record trade deficits during this period and probably about 30 percent of the OPEC out­ presages a hydrocarbon import cost of about put and the latter importing about $45 billion for the year as a whole. Outlays of the same percentage. this magnitude would heavily burden our trade and current account balance. In addition to the financial and inflationary centage. The way in which they handle their consequences of this growing dependence separate energy positions will be major fac- on imported hydrocarbons, there is reason tors in world markets. The Saudis, for exam- for concem about the source and location of ple, could influence future price leveis by those imports. As late as 1970, Western increasing, maintaining, or reducing their Hemisphere sources provided 78 percent of current offtake leveis. Somewhat similarly, U.S. oil imports, primarilv from Canada and the United States could increase or decrease Venezuela, but subsequently this pattern has international price pressures by moderating shifted dramatically. Currently about 80 per­ or increasing current import demand leveis. cent of our imports comes from the Eastern Since U.S. imports during the first quarter of Hemisphere, and over 40 percent of the total 1977 were almost 50 percent more than in is supplied by Arab producers, particularly 1973, it seems evident that it has provided Saudi Arabia. Since the Arabs possess the major underpinning for OPEC pricing deci- lion’s share of OPEC’s surplus capacity, fur- sions, including the awkward two-tier pric­ ther increases in U.S. import demand would ing system established at the December have to come from those sources. When the 1976 meeting. Alaska pipeline is in operation, a welcome There are numerous variables in the global supply of North Slope oil will be available, energy supply and demand picture. Future but this source will provide only temporary economic growth rates are uncertain, but surcease unless consumption can be they are likely to be correlated fairly closely checked. At some point in the next decade, to the growth in energy demand. The cur­ México may become a significant exporter, rent global oil supply is adequate and will be but at the best this will be a slow process. augmented in the next year by increasing At the present time, global crude oil pro- supplies from Alaska’s North Slope and the duction exceeds 58 mmbd. The OPEC mem- North Sea fields. However, growing global bers provide more than 90 percent of the demands will gradually push against the self- crude in world trade, the Arab share approx- imposed OPEC offtake ceilings. Unless these imating 60 percent. Currently, world de­ are raised, supply will tighten with concomi- mand for OPEC oil approximates 31 mmbd. tant increases in price pressures. This could The two most significant countries in this lead to ruthless competition for access to supply/demand equation are Saudi Arabia tight supplies. Although the Soviet Union is and the United States, with the former sup- currently self-sufficient in respect to energy, plying about 30 percent of the OPEC output it may become a net importer within a few and the latter importing about the same per- years. 6 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW The energy outlook for the next decade is somber, marked by a grim race between the depletion of existing hydrocarbon sources, The energy outlook for the next conservation efforts, and the search for new decade is somber, marked by a energy sources. Whether supply dislocations grim race between the depletion of occur or not, substantial increases are proba- ble in the real cost of energy. This is likely to existing hydrocarbon sources, be a heavy burden for the world economy conservation efforts, and the and political structure to carry. search for new energy sources.

The Strategic Significance could reflect the positive decision of the gov- of the Energy Problem ernments or their inability to resist the de- In a very real sense, the United States has mands of their agitated populaces. The now joined the crowd. For many years, West­ results would be the same. Countervailing ern Europe has received over 70 percent and political and economic actions by the con- Japan over 90 percent of its oil from the Mid- sumer nations would be unlikely to force a dle East, particularly from the Persian Gulf resumption of oil exports. Resort to military area. Currently about 50 percent of our oil action would • be highly adventurous and comes from this region, and this percentage would have long-term adverse conse- will inevitably increase. When the Arab boy- quences. cott was announced on 17 October 1973, it An embargo of significant duration would affected about 19 percent of our oil imports. have most serious economic results for the Similar Arab action would now affect more industrial countries. Production and distribu- than 40 percent of our imports. tion would be disrupted, and heavy unem- There are a number of interrelated aspects ployment would occur. This, in turn, would to the heavy dependence of the industrial- subject individual governments to consider- ized countries on imported hydrocarbons. able strain. While the consultative and The most serious of these is the vulnerability sharing provisions of the International Ener­ of supply. In the event of major power hos- gy Agency would be triggered, it is by no tilities, the U.S.S.R. ostensibly would endeav- means assured that the members would or to cut the oil flow at its sources or to agree on counteractions against those who interdict tanker passage. Either would be had imposed the embargo. Dangerous leveis diflicult to prevent. Safeguarding the lengthy of disagreement might appear within our al- sealanes to Western Europe, Japan, and the liance structure, with other governments, United States would be a formidable task in and within our own country. Under these the face of Soviet submarines, surface ships, circumstances, the threshold to war might be and bombers. This is not an acceptable situa- low. tion from a national security viewpoint. In addition to the problem of supply vul­ Furthermore, in conditions short of open nerability, the heavy global demand for high- warfare, the flow of Persian Gulf oil could be priced imported oil has had distortionary at least diminished by sabotage. In addition, consequences for the global economy, ad- the Arabs in the past have demonstrated the versely affecting production, trade, price lev­ strength of the embargo weapon. In the eis, the balance of payments, and event of renewed Israeli-Arab conflict, they international monetary stability. This, in would probably reimpose the embargo. This turn, has adversely affected the political, eco- ENERGY PROBLEM 7 nomic, and security interests of much of the dreams of the less-developed countries are world. requited in respect to a New International Since the price surge at the outset of 1974, Economic Order, it is evident that extensive the members of OPEC and particularly cooperative action will be required to main- Saudi Arabia have amassed very large re­ tain the stability of the existing system. If we serves of gold and foreign exchange, far ex- continue to drift with these problems, the ceeding those of the industrial countries. In ultimate consequences could be very serious. 1976, the OPEC members as a whole had a In effect, our inability or unwillingness to current account surplus of over $40 billion, establish a more rational balance between with three-quarters of this accruing to Saudi the domestic supply and consumption of en- Arabia, Kuwait, and the Union of Arab Emir- ergy and the consequent surge in oil imports ates. In view of the heavy demand for oil and is creating a major threat to our economy the price increases that have already oc- and to our national security. curred, their current account surplus is likely The linchpin of our alliance structure is the to be higher this year even if their imports strength and stability of the industrial triad of rise. Western Europe, North America, and Japan. VVhile the international financial system Furthermore, the economic prospects and has displayed considerable finesse in han- stability of the developing countries are dfing the vast shifts in resources embodied in heavily dependent on the security and rela- these developments, its capacity as currently tive prosperity of the industrial countries. constituted to perform this function over the However, dependence on Middle Eastern oil years is questionable. The maintenance of very high leveis of private bank financing is particularly doubtful. International indebt- . . . our inability or unwillingness edness is quite high, and the refinancing re- to establish a more rational quirements of the importing countries are growing in number and difficulty, especially balance between the domestic sup­ with respect to the less-developed countries. ply and consumption of energy The foreign indebtedness of the latter has and the consequent surge in oil im­ about doubled since 1973 and now approxi- mates $180 billion, including a substantial ports is creating a major threat to proportion of private credits. This precarious our economy and to our national situation will dampen their economic growth security. rates and could lead to a series of defaults. To darken the outlook even further, the OPEC members may decree additional price is a serious threat to the industrial structure. rises, particularly if demand remains buoy- The United States no longer has the capacity ant and begins to press against their offtake in crisis conditions to transfer oil to its allies ceiling capacities. In any event, hydrocarbon or even to meet its own energy require- production will decline at some time in the ments, and we do not currently possess a absence of massive new oil discoveries, strategic oil reserve. The individual and col- which will give rise to additional price pres- lective foreign policies of the industrial coun­ sures. tries are heavily burdened by this reality, and Separately and collectively, these are ma­ the consequences could be calamitous. This jor issues that require urgent joint considera- situation cuts directly across domestic and tion by the industrial countries. Whether the foreign policy. 8 AIR UMVERSITY REVIEW American diplomacy must be focused on indexing, debt relief, and the transfer of the realities and potentialities of the global technology. energy balance. The stability of the world In view of its growing dependence on Per- and our own national security are inter- sian Gulf oil, the United States must be par- twined with the various energy issues. While ticularly assiduous about its relations with the ramifications are global in nature, we Saudi Arabia and Iran, the two largest oil ex- should realize that the prime area of decision porters. Unless Saudi Arabia, for example, is is within the continental limits of the United prepared to expand its offtake significantly, States. Diplomacy cannot indefinitely com- supply shortages could materialize in the pensate for inadequacies of domestic poli­ course of the next several years. Since Saudi cies. We must establish a viable national Arabia is running heavy financial surpluses at energy policy. current production leveis, it has little direct interest in accommodating the desires of the consumer nations. In a sense, this reality cir- The United States no longer has cumscribes the flexibility of U.S. policy in re­ spect to Saudi Arabia and to the region as a the capacity in crisis conditions to whole. This includes the tangled and com- transfer oil to its allies or even to plex Israeli-Arab issues. The outbreak of war meet its own energy requirements, between the Arabs and Israelis would prob- ably precipitate an embargo. And the con- and we do not currently possess a tinuation of the current impasse could lead strategic oil reserve. to Arab intransigence in regard to the supply and pricing of oil. Until recently, American military power, technology, and prestige We should collaborate closely with our in­ created an asymmetrical relationship with dustrial allies in the International Energy the oil exporting countries. Today, however, Agency and in other forums. Energy, non- these relationships are more evenly bal- fuel raw materiais, economic development, anced. Saudi Arabia and Iran, for example, and international financial issues are inter- still need the shield of American power and woven in the ongoing considerations of the a continuing supply of American equipment Conference on International Economic and technology to defend and develop their Cooperation. Substantial compromises will countries. Conversely, the United States now be required by both the industrial and devel- needs a growing supply of Saudi and Iranian oping countries if these discussions are to re- oil to maintain its economic growth in the sult in a reasonable degree of success. The absence of domestic restraints on energy major objective of the industrialized coun­ consumption. Mutual dependence, however, tries is to obtain assurances of continuing en­ is not necessarily conducive to amicable rela­ ergy supplies at price leveis that do not tionships since the members of this triangle disrupt the world economy, while avoiding have both converging and diverging inter- harmful arrangements in respect to nonfuel ests and problems. A particular problem raw materiais and international debt rela- emerges from the lack of American compre- tionships. Conversely, the objective of the hension of the changing nature of the U.S.— developing nations is to win support for the Saudi—Iranian power equation. Our ability general concept of a New International Eco­ to force acceptance of our views has been nomic Order that would embrace raw mate­ considerably diminished as has our capacity rial buffer stock arrangements, price to reject their specific desires. The equation ENERGY PROBLEM 9 includes the supply of military equipment, domestic tranquillity. It cannot be effectively the tangled skein of Arab boycott provisions managed by resorting to gimmicks, press and countervailing Congressional enact- agentry, or persiflage. While the problem of ments, and sensitive human rights issues. energy should not be viewed in a penitential Hobson-type choices loom in respect to these sense, it will require painful sacrifices. Fur­ problem areas. thermore, its consequences are likely to rest unevenly on varying elements of the society. Those whose ox is gored can be expected to A National Energy Program remonstrate. Unless the administration and There are no quick and certain Solutions to Congress were prepared to stand firm, politi- our domestic energy problem. This is the cal pressures could produce a growing list of frustrating reality vvith which we will have to exceptions that would effectively destroy the live. Furthermore, our efforts to bring it un- energy program, while producing a vast der better control will be difficult to formu- regulatory monster. late and implement. Adjusting to straitened The objective of the domestic program circumstances is seldom easy, and, in these should be to bring the supply and the de- respects, we should be aware that the Presi- mand for energy into better juxtaposition, dent will propose, Congress will dispose, and while simultaneously improving the usage the people will judge the results. efficiency of existing fuel sources. Coal, for A coherent national energy policy must be example, should replace oil and natural gas formulated, enacted by Congress, and vigor- to the extent feasible. The program should ously implemented. This action must be ac- not be an autarchical effort to produce ener­ companied by a determined, systematic gy self-sufficiency. Even if it is successful, the effort to contribute to public comprehension United States will still import very substan- of the nature of the problem and the ra- tial volumes of oil and natural gas. tionale for the varied aspects of the overall The American society has a strong propen- program. Unless this can be accomplished, sity to consume energy, accompanied by the program will remain a bent arrow, both conspicuous waste. Substantial reductions in in the society as a whole and within the U.S. energy consumption could occur without Congress. serious economic losses. However, blithe Extensive reorganization will be required suggestions that at least fifty percent of the at the federal levei to establish a rational energy utilized is wasted can be misleading. structural approach to energy issues. This Eliminating waste would hit sensitive eco­ process should be accompanied by a reorgan­ nomic nerves far below that levei, resulting ization of the relevant Congressional com- in serious economic dislocations including in- mittee structure. There should be no creased costs, impediments to production, illusions, however, about the significance of and unemployment, which in turn would the structural changes. Structure is only a contribute to societal unrest and political tool, contributing to relative degrees of effi- disarray. ciency and inefficiency. Unless the program Economic development requires an annu- is substantively sound and the requisite will al increase in energy consumption, which exists to implement it, we shall continue to traditionally has exceeded three percent. drift with the problem. This percentage probably would decline as The energy problem must be viewed as a the economy grew in sophistication. Fur­ fundamental threat to our national security, thermore, curtailments in waste could make to the well-being of our people, and to energy available for more productive pur- 10 AIR UMVERS1TY REVIEW poses, including antipollution efforts. It re- energy program must affect each of these mains to be seen, however, if traditional segments, primarily by reflecting the repro- energy growth rates could be reduced in duction cost of energy. If, for example, gaso­ periods of economic expansion. This savings line and diesel prices are held at the lowest would require a highly effective energy con- levei in the industrial world and rationing is servation program. not instituted, there would be no reason to Energy consumption could be directly anticipate a fall-off in the consumption rate controlled. Oil import ceilings could be es- until the existing rolling stock was replaced tablished, and energy in its varied forms, in­ by cars and trucks with significantly higher cluding gasoline, could be rationed. In time per gallon gasoline ratings. This process will of war this would be necessary. However, be a gradual one. Some gasoline price in- such restriction, particularly in peacetime, creases will emerge from existing legislation would be an extremely cumbersome proce- and the increasing costs of the petroleum in- dure with high potentiality for corruption. It dustry. It is quite possible that this gradual is very doubtful that the administration increment would be viewed by the consum- would propose and Congress enact legisla- er as part of creeping inflation and would not tion authorizing such a system. lead to a cutback in consumption. On the other hand, a sharp increase in federal excise taxation of gasoline and diesel fuels would be The stability of the world and our likely to have the desired effect, although it own national security are inter- would also have dislocational consequences, twined with the various energy including inequities. The funds derived from such taxes could be earmarked for the effort issues. While the ramifications are to expand the output of energy, for public global in nature, we should realize transport or for the purpose of alleviating that the prime area of decision is some of the indicated inequities. There should be no illusions about the divisive na­ within the continental limits of the ture of a stiff increase in fuel prices. The United States. truckers, in particular, will oppose higher prices and more rigid speed standards. Theoretically, it is possible that a national Mandating the pace of technology is an un- consensus could be developed that would certain process. However, the establishment lead to voluntary reduction in the use of en­ of tight average gasoline ratings for automo- ergy, but it is improbable. In a practical tive production would either lead to ac- sense, this sequence would be putting the celerated technology or a reduction in cart before the horse. It is far more likely that automotive weight. The latter process would such a consensus would develop after the en­ also be expedited by the imposition of special ergy program had been promulgated. And, taxes on heavier cars and rebates on lighter in fact, the degree of success of such a pro­ cars. Again, actions of this nature would be gram will be a measure of the degree of pub- controversial, since they would probably lic acceptance of the need to conserve. affect company earnings and employment Energy consumption is computed in broad adversely. Furthermore, they would in­ terms:transportation (24.9%), residential and crease the expenses of those who wish to commercial (34.1%), industrial (35.2%), non- have and need to have larger cars. fuel, for example,petrochemicals (5.5%), and The logic and implications of higher fuel miscellaneous (0.3%). To be successful, the costs would also apply to commercial air ENERGY PROBLEM 11 transport, private aircraft, the various types pervasiveness of governmental regulations of power boats, and to the varied forms of and probably increase costs. automotive campers. Spin-off consequences There is ample rooin for energy saving in for vehicle producers and for the large tour- the commercial sector. Building codes could ist industry would result. be tightened, and operating hours could be The use of public transportation facilities locally controlled. The most effective energy must be stimulated. This requirement has limitations for both residential and commer­ both positive and negative facets and is cial buildings probably could be indirectly bound to be controversial. It presupposes enforced through higher energy prices. En- that adequate transportation facilities are in tertainment facilities, which are high-energy place and operating with reasonable efficien- utilizers, will be subject to higher energy cy and safety. In these respects, there are costs. Night football and baseball games are great variations within the country as, for ex- cases in point. Owners of existing high-cost ample, between New York and Los Angeles. structures may be subject to adverse conse­ Capital and operating costs in the public quences. transport sector are high, and the creation American industry, which is sensitive to and maintenance of viable transport systems cost factors, has already tightened its energy are hardly feasible without substantial feder­ belt. While further efficiency is possible, at al financing. Car-pooling is an awkward and some point energy curtailment would have irritating process which can be stimulated by ill effects on production. It seems probable traffic regulations and taxation of parking that concern about the availability and cost facilities, but it will not contribute to the of energy is already adversely affecting in- tranquillity or productivity of the individuais vestment decisions and, therefore, the con- concerned nor will it deepen their affection struction industry. for the public officials responsible for such The productivity of American agriculture regulations. There is a limit to the tolerance reflects to a considerable degree high-energy levei of the citizenry for government in a utilization. Furthermore, it is capital rather collective sense, and vexatious regulations than labor intensive. Higher energy costs can be counterproductive. will result in higher operating costs. To the In the interest of energy conservation, extent that these cannot be covered by im- building codes for all types of residential, proved efficiency, they will result in higher commercial, and industrial structures should product costs and, perhaps, in reduced pro­ be tightened. In various ways, the insulation duction. capacities of existing structures should be im- While it is imperative to improve the effi­ proved. Some inequities in respect to those ciency of energy use, there should be no illu- who have already accomplished this task ap- sions that our national objectives can be pear inevitable. The electrical utility compa- realized solely through this route. It must be nies could be made the focal point of this accompanied by a systematic and vigorous effort in either a mandatory or advisory effort to expand energy production in its var­ capacity. Alternatively, higher insulation ied forms. In an approximate sense our ener­ standards could be encouraged by tax gy is currently derived from the following concessions. sources: oil (46.5%), natural gas (27.9%), coal Higher standards could also be mandated (18.5%), hydroelectric (4.5%), and nuclear for various types of equipment and for elec­ (2.5%). These proportions are unlikely to trical appliances. While beneficiai in an ener­ change significantly in the short term, al- gy sense, these measures would increase the though the use of coal and nuclear energy 12 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW will expand moderately. The availability of reached between environmental and pro­ North Slope oil late this year should check duction requirements. To the maximum fea- the decline in domestic oil production, but sible degree, electrical Utilities should be natural gas production will continue to fali in compelled to shift to coal, which will prob- the absence of an accelerated rate of explora- ably require some modification of environ­ tion and exploitation, particularly in off-shore mental standards. It may also require areas. Increases in consumption will necessi- disincentives in respect to the use of natural tate a further expansion in oil imports. gas, which could be accomplished by federal The most efficient method of maximizing regulations or federal taxes. exploration and exploitation of hydrocarbons Despite the problems related with nuclear would be the removal of all price Controls on energy, phased expansion of nuclear power energy. Domestic price leveis would then facilities will have to continue. There is no come into line with world energy cost leveis. current substitute for the energy they can This adjustment would ha ve shock conse- produce. quences for the American economy and soci- Hydroelectric power has leveled off as an ety, including our competitiveness in world energy source, and the more favorable sites markets unless corrected by a decline in the for large dams have been utilized. However, exchange rate of the dollar. The Carter ad- some further expansion may prove feasible ministration is unlikely to give full-rein to by resort to the use of smaller dams. market forces, and it is quite doubtful that Energy derived from exotic sources is un­ Congress would approve proposals of that likely to reach significant proportions for nature. The present complex system of vary- many years. These sources include solar, hy- ing price leveis for domestic oil and natural drogen, geothermal, thermal gradients, gas will continue with gradual price in­ shale, coal gasifícation, and oil sands. Their creases. However, new sources of natural gas development is currently impeded by tech- should be decontrolled. This action should nological problems, environmental consider- stimulate exploration and development ations, and high costs. Sufficient research efforts to produce more oil and natural gas funds should be made available for each. Fur- from domestic sources, the continental shelf, thermore, federal developmental funding and the Prudhoe Bay region. Exploration may be merited for coal gasifícation and pos- work should also proceed in the Alaskan Na­ sibly for other potential sources. val Petroleum Reserve No. 4 area. Until this is done, there is no way to determine the extent of the hydrocarbons in that vast re­ The expeditious development of gion. Some, if not all, of these developmental an adequate oil-reserve supply efforts will be delayed by environmental con- siderations and legal suits. It will be late in must be an integral part of the na- the year at the earliest before a final decision tional energy program. ... In is made regarding the route of a natural gas essence, it would be insurance line from the Prudhoe Bay area. As a result, this energy source will not reach American against an oil embargo. and Canadian markets during this decade. Coal production and utilization must be The expeditious development of an ade­ expanded. To do so will require the passage quate oil-reserve supply must be an integral of a strip-mining bill with which the industry part of the national energy program. This can live, and compromises will have to be provision has major national security im- ENERGY PROBLEM 13 plications. In essence, it would be Insurance to be implemented will force changes in our against an oil embargo. The costs will be unique lifestyle and will have painful eco­ high, however, in terms of fiscal outlays and nomic, social, and political consequences. In­ increased oil demand pressures, but these dividual and collective sacrifices will be are the unavoidable prices of past errors. required, and an effective energy program The Energy Policy Act of December 1975 will cut across other national objectives, such declared that it is national policy to establish as dampening inflation, expanding the oil reserves of one billion barreis. The only economy, and diminishing unemployment. deadline established was 500 million barreis We will have to choose between objectives by the end of 1982. with disjunctive effects. On 13 April 1976, the Ford administration The energy problem and the way it is han­ announced a Presidential decision to commit dled will be a major factor in the public as­ $871 million by 30 September 1977, for stor- sessment of the Carter administration and age facilities, studies, and the purchase of 50 the Ninety-fifth Congress. In the existing million barreis of oil with a goal of 150 mil­ political atmosphere, mandating public sac­ lion barreis by the end of 1978. Subsequent- rifices is hardly the route to political ly, the Carter administration increased the popularity. The issue will severely test the fiscal allocation to $3 billion, and raised the leadership qualities of the President and the target reserve figure to 250 million barreis by cohesiveness of our policy. the end of 1978 and 500 million barreis by Our vast economy is intricately inter- the end of 1980 instead of 1982.* This is a twined with much redundancy. As a general- laudable development, but moving from ization, it can adjust to most problems, goals to a reserve in existence is time-con- including material shortages and national suming and expensive. Furthermore, the physical disasters. It is, however, heavily de- safety margins provided by the indicated tar­ pendent on the ready availability of natural get leveis are being eroded by the high im- energy. Furthermore, its vibrance depends port growth rate. to a considerable degree on the availability of cheap energy. Soaring energy prices will lead to considerable rationalization of the The energy problem and the way produetion and distribution processes. Despite the intertwined nature of the it is handled will be a major factor economy, there are unique aspects to the in the public assessment of the varying energy sources. Each form of energy Carter administration and the —coal, oil, natural gas, nuclear, hydroelec- tric, and exotic fuels—has specialized histo­ Ninety-fifth Congress. ries, characteristics, constituencies, and regulations. Policy proposals regarding them The global and domestic energy problems will be complex and politically controversial. are very deep-seated and will have major Typical examples are the decontrolling of consequences for the international milieu for natural gas and oil prices; the expansion of many years to come. There should be no illu- nuclear plants; forcing the Utilities and cer- sions about the inherent threats embodied in tain industrial plants to use coal; taxing coal the energy problem to our national security, for environmental and other purposes; economic well-being, and domestic tranquil- choosing a route for a Prudhoe Bay natural lity. The corrective measures that will have gas pipeline; solving the problem of moving •On 20 April 1977, they again raised it to one billion barreis. North Slope oil inland; federal participation 14 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW in financing the costs of developing exotic substantial danger that a divided Congress fuels such as shale, coal gasification, hydro- will be unwilling or unable to produce mean- gen, thermal gradients, and solar energy; ingful legislation. This, in turn, would in- choosing a site for the national solar center; crease the dangers inherent in the energy and constructing deep-sea facilities to handle problem. giant tankers. Unless a high degree of civility and re- Somewhat comparably, energy consump- straint can be maintained in the national de­ tion also involves specialized interests, and bate which stretches before us, one can efforts to restrain consumption will conflict visualize the likelihood of a series of rancor- with other objectives and contribute to ous disputes which will occur in Congress political discord. What appears to be waste to and elsewhere. These would include quarrels some will be regarded as necessity to others. within the administration; between the ad­ Furthermore, the conservation effort will ministration and Congress; between federal embody elements of compulsion not normal- and state governments; between energy pro- ly experienced in peacetime. This pressure ducing and energy déficit regions; between will occur at a time of growing resentment of industry and labor and within each of those the pervasive nature of governmental in- sectors; and between the environmentalists volvement in what are deemed by many to and energy production advocates. be personal affairs. Since the energy issue affects the interests It is difficult to visualize any element, short of the nation as a whole, the administration of war, that is likely to be as divisive as the and the Congress are likely to be inundated implementation of an effective energy pro- with advice. Pressure groups will endeavor gram. In the first instance, it is likely to lead to promote and protect their individual in­ to considerable tugging and pulling within terests with considerable zeal. And in this the administration and between the adminis- welter of communication, it will not be easy tration and Congress. Despite the basic na­ to keep the national interest in focus. In view tional interest involved in this issue, the of the nature of the problem and the objec- members will probably view the varied as- tive of a national energy policy, it is unlikely pects of the administration’s proposals in that there will be individual winners in the parochial and local terms. Maintaining party accelerating debate. In fact, there is consid­ unity in the ensuing embroglio will be ex- erable danger that we will fail the test of tremely difficult. Furthermore, in a matter as responsible democracy and that we will all sensitive as this, the legislative process is like­ be losers. Ineluctable forces would then ly to be very slow and cumbersome. Various come into play to our national detriment. members will ride pet hobbyhorses, and it Air University may prove easier to form blocking than affir- mative voting groups. As a result, the legisla- tion that ultimately ensues probably will be Editor’s note considerably different from the original ad­ The article reflects data available to the author before ministration proposals. If the ultimate legis- the President submitted his energy program to Con­ lation proved to be effective, this would not gress. Nevertheless, Ambassador Walsh’s comments re- be particularly relevant. There is, however, garding an effective energy program remain sound. A CASE FOR THE MANNED PENETRATING BOMBER Dr . G. K. Burke

HOUGH the outcome is uncertain, the summer of 1977 should witness the final chapter in the saga of the B-l bomber, T“the most expensive weapon system in the nation’s history” (approximately $24 billion). This aircraft may also be the most extensively researched system in the nation’s history, as well as the most maligned and the most misunderstood. It has been called spurious and unnecessary by some; essential and criti- 15 16 AIR U.MVERSITY REVIEW cal by others. The volumes of testimony con- still possessed active weapons, the situation cerning it line whole shelves in major created could be harrowing. The latter alter­ libraries; few of us are able to master the native is unthinkable. technology and nomenclature necessary to a In the face of the dual nature of this strate­ proper understanding of the claims and gic counterforce/countervalue challenge, counterclaims of the protagonists.1 the question becomes what levei of force is It is possible, however, that the difficulties necessary? Sizing the force is not easy be­ surrounding this controversial system are cause realities differ from nation to nation, more apparent than real. If the decision to and no man is able to predict with high confi- procure the projected force of 244 B-ls is dence what the exact circumstances of some made in the affirmative, it will constitute the unnamed future crisis will be. Nevertheless, backbone of one leg of the strategic Triad for the best analysis available, that made by then a period of some thirty years, commencing Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara around 1986. Its merits (or demerits) might twelve years ago, estimated that 400 one- then most readily be gauged through an megaton equivalents (OME) optimally deliv- evaluation of its ability to contribute to the ered upon the Soviet Union would be suffi- strategic Triad and through an evaluation of cient to destroy 30 percent of the civil the Triad itself. population and 76 percent of the industry. It In theory the Triad, composed of the land- was further estimated that this megatonnage and sea-based missile forces in addition to the would effectively terminate civilization in manned bombers, provides the nation with the U.S.S.R.3 the capability to inflict unacceptable leveis of In the meantime, however, considerable damage on any power or group of powers— doubt has arisen over the continued validity the potential capability of the People’s of this analysis. The question hinges largely Republic of China (PRC) would have to be on one’s interpretation of four vital caveats. included in any thirty-year progression—ca- First, the use of OME as a unit of measure- pable of threatening the survival of our na­ ment for nuclear destruction has been criti- tion.2 In recent years it has also been cized as being obsolete. OME is calculated considered sagacious to include a redundant by raising the explosive force of the warhead capability, a capability beyond assured de- to the two-thirds power. Hence,.a 27 mega­ struction, for inflicting lower leveis of dam­ ton (MT) warhead equals 9 OME, or has a age (counterforce) aimed at targets other burst equal to nine one-megaton explosives.4 than a potential adversary’s urban and indus­ The equation is 3 X 3 X 3= 27, 3 X 3= 9; trial centers (countervalue). by the same process a 27 kiloton (KT) war­ In the future, this counterforce capability head would equal .09 OME. This reduction will continue to be necessary because in its in explosive force was necessary because a absence the nation would be perilously ex- greal deal of the burst, particularly among posed should a foe choose to strike at weap- the large explosives, is released in close and ons rather than populations. In such a overkills the immediate area of the target. circumstance, the national leadership would Thus, this unit of measurement once repre- find itself in the position of having to reply to sented a considerable advance in the pre- a limited strike aimed at isolated weapon Sys­ dicting of the destructive force of a nuclear tems with massive countervalue retaliation burst. or capitulate to the adversary’s demands. However, recent developments have fur­ Since the first alternative would invite the ther improved the sophistication of the mod- foe to reply in kind, assuming the adversary el. This upgrading was made necessary by MANNED PENETRA TING BOMBER 17 the fact that most targets are small, and more than one weapon, others by none. The many are not circular, as is the arc of the following rule then prevails: If prompt re­ blast. Bv raising the number to the three sponse is desired, more than 400 OME/ tenths power for American vvarheads and to AOME must survive in order to deliver 400 the four tenths power for those of the OME/AOME optimally.7 U.S.S.R., more of the wasted energy released Fourth, the 400 OME figure fails entirely by a typical burst is accounted for. Within the to account for the redundant force necessary framework of this model, a 27 MT warhead to reply to lower-level strikes. When all is would equal 2.691 adjusted one megaton considered, a conservative estimate of the equivalents (AOME). On the other hand, a 50 force necessary to deter the Soviet Union KT explosive (the standard Poseidon war­ across the entire counterforce/countervalue head) has been raised in value from .13 OME spectrum must be increased by an order of to .409 AOME. This is true for all small war- magnitude, with particular emphasis on heads, and the strategic implications are con- weapons programmed to offset Soviet “soci- siderable.5 etal hardening” measures. This force should Second, and most disturbing, for some ten include large numbers of (1) medium-size, years the Soviet Union has been systematicaJ- accurately delivered explosives pro­ ly engaged in hardeningits society. This pro- grammed to eliminate the numerous, hard, cess has included: civil defense training and widely dispersed targets the new matrix con- evacuation planning for the populace, mas- sists of and (2) extremely large explosives, sive shelter construction programs for vital programmed to create the large quantities of command and control elements, dispersing fallout necessary to attack an evacuated from 60 to 80 percent of the new industry to populace protected by, ” ... hasty shelters small or medium-sized towns, employing constructed from materiais at hand.”8 simple measures to harden vital machinery When the PRC is factored in, the estimate to withstand up to 300 pounds per square increases substantially. The PRC is only 20 inch (psi), and the placing of key factories in percent urbanized contrasted to the Soviet positions that render destruction of more Union, 56 percent, and the United States, than one of them by a single re-entry vehicle 73.5 percent. This is relevant since assured (RV) impossible. The end product of this mas- destruction is related to urban population sive program (estimated to cost between $50 density and concentration. That explains and $100 billion) is a society that might se- why the Soviet Union was once considered cure 98 percent population survivability in vulnerable to 400 optimally delivered OME, the event of all-out countervalue strikes. compared to the 200 OME requirement for Such programs would appear to have in- the United States. Precisely what the figure validated analyses based on 400 OME or for the PRC would be has never been declas- even 400 AOME.6 sified, but it may safely be assumed to be at Third, the 400 OXÍE or AOME must be least twice that of the U.S.S.R. In toto, then, optimally delivered. Prior to the enemys a conservative, responsible estimate would initiation of hostilities, the most vital targets indicate that the original McNamara esti­ would be covered by at least one weapon mate is now inaccurate by several orders of apiece. But afterwards, in the confusion and magnitude.9 destruction that will inevitably accompany any thermonuclear counterforce strike aimed at weapon systems, this may not be T HE ROLE of each arm of true. Some target may still be covered by the Triad in producing this force levei might 18 AIH UMVERSITY REI IEW next attract the attention and consideration Of more significance, small warheads pro- of the analyst. The most heralded of the arms duce small quantities of fallout, which is one is the ballistic missile submarine because of aspect of a nuclear burst that is directly pro- its invulnerability to detection and destruc- portional to the size of the explosion (approx­ tion in terms of one swift strike. But it should imately 100 pounds to a one-megaton be noted that a conventional warfighting detonation). Since large quantities of fallout phase of undetermined duration in Western may be necessary to secure the assured de- Europe looms among the most sophisticated struction of an evacuated populace dispersed projections of nuclear confrontation. Given in hastily constructed shelters, small subma- weeks or months, portions of the ballistic rine-launched RVs may be expected to have missile fleet could be detected and de- limited value in attacking it. These re-entry stroyed. And this condition would be greatly vehicles might be more cost-effectively em- exacerbated if the real-time antisubmarine ployed against general, soft area targets.11 warfare (ASW) breakthrough, projected by The following should also be observed: Dr. Malcolm R. Currie, former Director of (1) Attacks on submarines at sea produce Defense Research and Engineering, were to little or only limited collateral damage. This occur. system invites attacks upon itself to a far A second difficulty results from the rela- greater degree than either of the other two tively small and inaccurate RVs that current arms of the Triad. and projected sea-launched ballistic missiles (2) Ten Trident boats will cost an estimated (SLBMs) are armed with: they are ill- $15 billion. To procure a force approaching equipped to attack hardened or dispersed in­ the levei required for assured destruction dustrial and population targets. For example, would impose an unendurable fiscal burden the projected Trident 1 and Trident 2 sub- on the nation. marine-launched missiles, outfitted with op- (3) A sudden breakthrough could wipe out timally designed inertial guidance systems, the entire deterrent if it were committed to have notional accuracies of no more than .25 a single médium. nautical miles (NM). The Trident 1 missile is (4) Severe communication problems may expected to be armed with eight 100 KT exist in relation to the ballistic missile subma­ warheads and the Trident 2 with as many as rine. The boat may possess more survivabili- seven 350 KT Mark 12A RVs. The former ty than the means to communicate with it, would have approximately a .32 single shot even assuming that the Seafarer communica­ kill probability (SSKP) against a structure tion system is constructed. hardened to withstand 300 psi, while the lat- (5) Limited strikes from a ballistic missile ter would possess approximately .59 SSKP. submarine present serious difficulties. Once a Neither value is impressive. This lack of per­ missile is launched the boat has disclosed its formance could be overcome by equipping position and would in some instances be in the ballistic missile submarine fleet with ter­ danger of destruction. minal guidance systems, but many critics feel Conclusion: Though a key portion of the that accuracies of at least .05 NM (1.00 SSKP strategic Triad, the ballistic missile subma­ against a target hardened to withstand 300 rine lacks the cost-effective survivability to psi) will destabilize the strategic balance be­ cover the entire counterforce/countervalue cause missiles so equipped would be equally spectrum alone.12 lethal against hardened missile silos. In any The second arm of the deterrent is the event, terminal guidance will not achieve land-based missile force. This arm of the initial operating capability before 1987.10 Triad is currently passing through a stage of MANNED PENETRA 77.VC ROMPER 19 uncertainty. Careful analysis indicates that if Lastly, the proposed MX, with its fourteen current trends continue, by the late 1980s a 350 KT Mark 12A RVs, will encounter many Soviet land-based missile force of 313 SS-18 of the same difficulties the Trident missiles and approximately 65 SS-19 ICBMs will be are apt to be exposed to in terms of attacking sufficient to destroy about 95 percent of the a widely dispersed populace.16 current American land-based missile force.13 Conclusion: With regard to the land-based Since the Vladivostok aide-mémoire permits missile force, follow current force planning each superpovver to procure 1320 missiles goals. Introduce modifications to the current with multiple warheads, the situation could silo-based Minuteman force, withhold land assume criticai dimensions. mobile basing and large-scale MX alterna­ The logical response to such a threat would tives pending the outcome of U.S.-Soviet appear to be to move at once in the direction negotiations. of one of the mobile basing alternatives avail- Manned bombers constitute the third and able. Eventuallv this may become necessary, final arm of the strategic Triad. They are the but at present powerful forces argue against least understood of the three systems com- the adoption of such a course. Three factors prising the Triad, but paradoxically they are are paramount: (1) The inability to detect the also the most lethal. The maximum payload number of missiles present in either the cov- per unit is enormous. Today a single B-52G/ ered trenches or the multiple aim points of H optimally equipped with four gravity the two most-often-proposed land mobile bombs (10 MT X 2 + 5 MT X 2) and six 200 Systems could mean the end of SALT KT short-range attack missiles (SRAM) dis- negotiations and serve as a powerful catalyst poses a payload that due to its enormous to nuclear proliferation. (2) The existing silo weight is optimal for attacking widely dis­ force is relatively inexpensive to maintain. persed targets. In terms of megatonnage, an This would not be true of a land mobile force, optimally armed B-52 would notionally dis- which will be 1.5-2.0 times as costly. Equally pose 30 MT as compared to a Trident subma- disturbing is that in a period of high labor rine’s 19.17 costs the approximately eight men it requires From another standpoint, the extreme ac- to operate and maintain each Minuteman 3 curacy of air-delivered gravity bombs ren- leap to an average of 40 to 50 men for most ders the manned bomber the ideal candidate mobile systems studied so far.14 (3) The great- to attack such portions of Soviet society that est problem may lie in creating cost-effective have been hardened to withstand nuclear as- firepower. Even the 10,000 point system sault. In fact, witnesses before the Senate recommended by Paul H. Nitze would se- Armed Services Committee have testified cure inadequate survivable firepower within that some targets in the single integrated op- the confines of currently proposed Minute­ erations plan (SIOP) cannot be attacked cost man force leveis.15 Juxtaposed, if a crash pro- effectively by any other means. (For exam- gram were mounted and the entire ple, the Hoover Dam may require up to 10,- Minuteman force of 1000 missiles was re- 000 psi.)18 placed by the 150-170,000 pound version of Considering that the prime mission of our the MX, it should be possible to secure a for- strategic forces is deterrence, the manned midable poststrike force. But it should be fur- bomber force is the only leg of the Triad that ther noted that to procure such a force could can be flexed in time of crisis. Neither ICBMs entail expenditure in the area of $20-$30 bil- nor SLBMs can be recalled once fired. It is lion. This figure does not include the $10-$20 unthinkable that either of them would ever billion estimate for the mobile system itself. be launched under any conditions other than Continurd an pagr 22 20 The A ir force H-l manned homher underfíoiri.i’ extensh e t<•xtini’ .111(1 e\aluation /' ,\hoieiiQ d d riiif! .n> earh test Hii;hl (eith it> lariable 'ieeep lein.us extended (op- fufiite. top) and durim; a test lliifht »*/th its icinffs fulh mu pt topposite, bottomi. The aircraft is capable <»/ hiith subsome '/vivív at lo\e altitude and supersonu spevds a1 hiish altitudes . On 30 October 1074. four da\s aíter the pub jic roll-out <>/ tlit' H -l. initia l static tests o í the four L.TJ T W l engjuies urre beiw n (belo\e). The Tour-part static test profiram ineluded acoustic and i ibration e/Tects on aircraft systems. exhaust phnne effects on aircraft struetures. enainc performance, and enaine operation intearation uith the total aircraft s\ stem.

21 22 AIR C LMVERS1TY REl IEW general hostilities. But the bomber force can current Soviet civil defense measures is able be launched on warning and recalled at any to be developed in a cost-effective manner time short of reaching the target. In short, without a high volume, high accuracy the bomber force gives our national com- manned bomber.19 mand authorities a strategic option between all or nothing when hostilities appear immi- nent. IF IT is assumed that a As with the other arms of the Triad, several manned bomber is a viable portion of the caveats need to be observed. First, a single Triad, the next consideration should involve B-52 with ten weapons embarked could the configuration of the aircraft. Under this strike at no more than ten targets, while the heading few serious analysts question the Trident class submarine could theoretically need to procure a replacement for the aging (if implausibly) strike at up to 192. Second, in B-5« fleet. Built to perform over a 5000 hour terms of a large target structure, one com- flight profile, the average B-52 has logged prised of many small noncircular sites, the over 8000 hours with many exceeding manned bomber fares poorly when contrast- 11,000; built to perform for ten years, the last ed to the submarine. A B-l with an optimal B-52/H was delivered in October 1962. By payload of 24 SRAMs possesses 15 AOME, 1990 these veterans will no longer be able to the Trident submarine with 24 missiles, 98. perform a first-line mission. If they are not Third, in many instances the bomber would supplemented by some alternative system, it deploy a payload far less than the maximum is doubtful that they will be able to perform one quoted above (a typical B-52 bomb load at all.20 might consist of 1 MT X 4 or 400 KT X 4). In terms of the future, two candidates have The target structure to be attacked would be been proposed to augment/replace the ag­ the determinant. Therefore, across some ing B-52 fleet: the Air Force B-l manned, profiles the submarine would be superior. penetrating bomber and the Brookings Insti- But it must be remembered that the tution cruise missile armed, wide-body, bomber is a reusable platform, and no other stand-off bomber.21 Which of the two will system has this capability in cost-efficient eventually be adopted and procured as the terms. When this capability is factored into B-52 follow-on is not clear at this writing. the equation, it invalidates most other meas- Nevertheless, the final decision should be urements. Invariably, the manned bomber is based on considerations involving basic sur- undervalued because its real-time capability vivability, which must be seen both in terms for multiple strikes is ignored. This becomes of escaping from a base under attack and in more apparent when it is remembered that terms of successfully penetrating to the tar­ the Minuteman 3 and Poseidon missiles have get. a current price of approximately $9 million Regarding the former consideration, two per unit. The cost of reloading missile silos or factors become relevant: (1) In a “worst pos- submarines would be prohibitive. Of equal sible case” scenario, eight minutes of vacilla- significance, many bombers may be pur- tion by the national command authorities in chased for the price of one submarine. The the face of a dedicated attack by depressed proposed force of 244 B-l bombers has an trajectory SS-N-8 missiles could lead to the estimated cost of $24 billion. A mere ten Tri- complete loss of any bomber force. Conclu­ dent-class submarines have been cost es­ sion: Any bomber force is vulnerable even to timated at $15 billion. Conclusion: No small human error. No bomber force pos­ high-volume force capable of coping with sesses a sufficiently high levei of survivability MANNED PENETRA T1NC BOMBER 23 to be entrusted with the whole of the nation’s needed for the wide-body. The result of this strategic defense.22 (2) In "worst plausible phenomenon is that only Rapid City, South case” scenarios, crisis preparations combined Dakota, has the right combination of runway with the anticipated timely decision-making length and distance from the sea to enable at the national levei will be able to invalidate the wide-body to escape attack from dedicat- any foreseeable enemy attack aimed at ed SLBMs. In contraposition, the four largest preempting the bombers on their runways. municipal airports in the State of Wyoming Conclusion: In most plausible crises, the themselves possess a notional capability to manned bomber is a valid system and re- launch 49 percent of the proposed B-l crisis mains a vital portion of the strategic Triad. force of 210 in the face of the same assault. This conclusion is most readily grasped by Conclusion: Of a total force procurement of examining a typical crisis. Whatever the ori- 244, generating a crisis alert force of 210, B-l gin (possibly involving Europe), the adminis- produces 210 survivors operating either tration would have adequate warning of the from existing airstrips or easily modified air- impending collision, w ould be eager to con- strips, the wide-body fewer than ten.24 trol the levei of tension, but at the same time In light of this harsh reality, a force of would find it advantageous to optimize its wide-bodies would have one of two choices: force levei should negotiations collapse. either to risk preemptive destruction or pro- From the standpoint of the manned bomber, ceed to airborne alert. The latter move this State could be most readily achieved by would preserve that portion of the force so deploying the available number of bombers deployed, but the gambit has its drawbacks. at sparselv inhabited points w'here a preemp- Primary among these is that it requires a tive strike could not reach them prior to very large force on the ground to sustain a their successful escape. Though it should be very small force in the air. It is estimated that observed that at present the Soviets have not in the early 1960s the United States pos- developed depressed trajectory capability sessed a capability to sustain 12.5 percent of for their modem naval missiles (SS-N-6 and the then existing bomber force in the air for SS-N-8), they have tested it on the enormous a period of one year. For crises of shorter land-based SS-9 system. Inasmuch as the next duration improved percentages should be generation of bombers is expected to have a possible, but the implications are obvious.25 life-cycle span of thirty years, the possibility A second problem encountered in sce­ that this “within the state-of-the-art” con- narios involving airborne alert touches on cept may be deployed is difficult to ignore.23 the delicate question of crisis management. Were it to be deployed, its impact may be While in some situations it might be deemed illustrated by observing that the total escape desirable to place bombers on airborne alert time for B-l is approximately 240 seconds. to signal resolve, in others it might not. It The Brookings wide-body cannot perform should be understood in advance that plac- the same mission profile in less than 330 se­ ing bombers on airborne alert has ominous conds and is only able to perform it that well escalatory overtones. Even a quick deploy- if rocket-assisted takeoff is provided. In addi- ment to deep interior bases, away from vul- tion, B-l is smaller and hence is able to take nerable coasts, would not have the same off more swiftly than the wide-body, one ev- impact. Conclusion: Airborne alert is not ery 7.5 seconds as opposed to one every 15 necessarily a desirable State. seconds. Finally, B-l is able to operate from Provided the bombers survive attempts short (7500 foot) runways, as contrasted to aimed at preemptive destruction, they must the approximately 10,500 foot runways then possess the capability to penetrate to 24 Alfí i mVERSITY fíE\ IEW their targets. Twenty years ago Albert Wohl- AWACS should be far more effective, espe- stetter estimated that on a typical mission an cially when they are combined with the individual bomber possessed between .5-9 high-altitude profile the lumbering wide- chance of survivability, depending on the body would be flying and its vast radar cross State of the defense and the skill and execu- section.29 tion of the oífense. Under present conditions, Second, in regions where the wide-body analysis would indicate that the wide-body is would have to approach nearer to the coast near the lower end of that profile, while the to attack its targets, less costly and sophis- B-l is at the upper end.26 ticated measures should sufiRce. Current or The wide-body, presumed to be in the 747 projected interceptors supported by AWACS class, is vulnerable to a wide range of criti- and, in some instances, by in-flight refueling cisms. Among them is the fact that the 1500 should be able to exact a considerable toll nautical-mile-range cruise missile that the among the lumbering wide-bodies. It is pos- Brookings experts proposed as the irreduci- sible that the mortality rate would approach ble minimum does not exist. Proposed air- the 50 percent mark.30 launched cruise missiles (ALCMs) have no- Third, in addition to the bomber, the tional ranges of between 1000-1200 nautical ALCM itself may be attacked. It is not often miles. And while a longer-range ALCM noted, but all projected cruise missiles fly a could be developed from the Navy’s sea- portion of their profile at very high altitudes launched cruise missile (SLCM) program, to (as much as 45,000 feet). At such heights, achieve 1500 nautical miles in the airborne even primitive interceptors with standard mode would entail additional expenditure.27 air-to-air weapons should be lethal. Of per- Of more significance, the aircraft and its haps more importance, during the next 30 missile (whatever the range) are vulnerable years interceptors equipped with look-down- to enemy air defense. The Soviet Union has shoot-down systems should be developed the world’s largest and most modem air de­ and deployed. Brookings experts estimate fense system. It currently lists in its inventory that 600 such interceptors, each equipped 5000 air surveillance radars, over 2500 inter- with six missiles capable of a 50 percent in- ceptors, and some 12,000 surface-to-air mis­ tercept/reliability, could inflict up to 1000 sile (SAM) launchers. It is constantly being kills on a notional cruise missile force.31 upgraded. This air defense would have a Fourth, sophisticated terminal air defenses wide range of options to deploy against the should be able to engage and kill several hun- handful of surviving lumbering wide-bodies dred more slow-moving, subsonic cruise mis­ that could be maintained on airborne alert.28 siles. The effectiveness of these defenses First, the Soviets could attack them at ex­ hinges largely on the number of sites to be treme range with a combination of airborne defended, the number of rounds each warning and control system (AWACS) air­ launcher is able to fire at an approaching craft and transports (possibly of the 11-76 ALCM concentration, and, most significant, class) armed wlth air-to-air missiles. The pro- how many sites are able to be avoided by portion that this problem is apt to assume skillfully preplanning ALCM flight patterns. may be best illustrated by observing that a- Taking these factors into consideration, one nalysis indicates that even the current primi­ conservative estimate yields approximately tive Soviet AWACS (NATO code-named 300 additional kills.32 Moss) works acceptably over water, the very Finally, it would appear that the wide- médium above which the wide-body would body/cruise missile system is a vulnerable be expected to launch its ALCMs. Future weapon. It would also appear that the Brook- MANNED PENETRA TINC BOMBEE 25 ings experts were cognizant of this. To over- bility by providing the maximum number of come the weaknesses inherent in the options for defense suppression, ranging wide-body svstem, they proposed that a path from jamming, to avoidance, to destruction. for the ALCMs be cleared through the termi­ Unlike the ALCM it will not be bound to a nal defenses with air-launched ballistic mis- set, slow'-moving flight profile devoid of alter- siles (ALBMs). This system does not exist in natives. any form today, and the expense of develop- The lethality of the system is best gauged ing it might be exorbitant.33 Conclusion: by observing the performance of the aircraft Without ALBM support the vvide-body Sys­ under conditions depicting “the worst plausi- tem is highly vulnerable and, in addition, is ble case.” This scenario envisions the na- subject to the earlier elaborated caveats con- tional command authorities’ failing to cerning the difficulty of attacking dispersed disperse exposed aircraft to secure inland populations with low' fallout producing ex- sites. Thus, only those bombers deep based at plosives (ALCM warhead = 250 KT).34 Minot and Grand Forks, North Dakota, and The strategic picture involving B-l is diff- at Rapid City would survive preemption. If erent. B-l combines a relatively small radar Rapid City were outfitted with a double cross section with an electronic counter- squadron wing, some 34 B-ls could escape a measures suite that will prove difficult for dedicated attack by depressed trajectory many enemy sensors to penetrate. The air- SLBMs with a notional capability to travei craft is capable of near sonic speed at heights 1100 NM in 445 seconds and have operation- as low as 200 feet above the ground. This al access to Hudson Bay.36 renders tail chase by any foreseeable inter- The amount of firepower deliverable by ceptor highly implausible. Should the enemy such a force in a single strike would vary with improve his sensors or electronic counter- the payload carried. But if .9 of those able to countermeasures, B-l has room to grow and escape preemption proved to be mechani- will be fully capable of accepting advanced cally reliable and .85 survived enemy de­ systems such as the short-range ballistic de- fenses (as the USAF has hypothesized), then fense missile (SRBDM) and the advanced 26 B-ls should reach their goals armed with strategic air-launched missile (ASALM). The as many as 24 SRAMs per bomber (if each former would be used to protect the bomber proved to have a .9 reliability that would from air-to-air missiles; the latter will be ca­ equal almost 600 weapons delivered on tar­ pable of nuclear engagement against air or get) or a far smaller number of heavy gravity land-based targets and will combine SRAM bombs.37 speed (Mach 2..5-3.0) with ALCM range (650 Under similar conditions, a mere six wide- NM). If their deployment becomes neces- bodies would escape from their only safe ha- sary, they should provide an acceptable an- ven, Rapid City. And it is questionable that swer to an advanced Soviet AWACS and any weapons would be delivered on target look-down-shoot-down interceptors.35 by this handful of survivors if the rest of the Above all B-l will penetrate to the target equation included: .9 mechanical reliability, with its weapon mix of SRAMs (as many as .5 survivability, and serious degradation to 24), or gravity bombs, or ALCMs, or the 50 ALCMs (.9 reliability) embarked SRBDMs, or ASALMs, providing unrivaled aboard each aircraft from both interceptors flexibility of payload, extraordinary accuracy and terminal defenses. of delivery, and even some immediate recon- naissance of the target area. The fact that this In the period of the late 1980s the concept of system is manned optimizes system surviva- the strategic Triad may be discarded, and 26 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW revolutionary strategies may develop. How- a desirable feature for the strategic forces of ever, until such plans are reasonably for- the United States, then there would appear mulated, the classical model will necessarily to be little cost-effective alternative to the have to be followed. If it is, and if it is decided B-l bomber system. that a high-volume, high-accuracy payload is New Rochelle, New York

Notes 1. Francis P. Hoeber, 'The B-l: A National Imperative,” Strategic Re­ 17. "Weapon Advances Raise B-52 Capability,” A viation Week & Space view (Summer 1976), pp. 111-17; John W. Finney. "Who Needs the B-l?" Technology (May 10. 1976), pp. 132-35; The Military Balance J972-1973 New York Times Magazine (July 25, 1976), p. 7. (London: International Institute For Strategic Studies. 1972), pp. 66-67, 2. U.S., Congress, Senate, Hearings Before The Committee On Armed 85-86; Jane s All the World's Aircrafí 1975-76 (London: St. Ciles House, Services. Part I Authorizations, 94th Cong., lst sess., February 5. 1975, p. 1975) ; Kemp, p. 6; Bellany, loc. cit. 50. 18. U.S., Congress. Senate, Hearings Before The Committee On Armed 3. Ceoffrey Kemp, "Nuclear Forces for Médium Powers: Part 1; Targets Services. Part 7 Research and Development, 93rd Cong., 2d sess., April 4, and Weapons System sAdelphi Papers, No. 106 (Autumn 1974), p. 26. 5, 12. 16, 23, 25, 26. and May 2, 1974, pp. 35-39; U.S., Congress, Senate, 4. Ian Bellany, "The Essential Arithmetic of Deterrence," The Royal Hearings Before The Committee On Armed Services, Part 4 Research and United Services Institute for Defence Studies (March 1973), pp. 28-34. Development. 94th Cong., lst sess.. March 4 and April 5, 1975, p. 2122. 5. Thomas J. Downey, "How to Avoid Monad—and Disaster," Foreign 19. Geoffrey Kemp. "Nuclear Forces for Médium Powers: Parts 2 and 3: Policy (Fali 1976), pp. 172-201. Strategic Requirements and Options," Adelphi Papers, No. 107 (Autumn 6. Editorial, “The Erosion of the U.S. Deterrent: The Real Intelligence 1974), p. 19; Clarence A. Robinson, Jr., "Minuteman Production Defend- Crisis," Strategic Review (Summer 1976), pp. 4-5; John W. Finney. "Stron- ed," Aviation Week & Space Technology (January' 19. 1976), pp. 12-15. ger U.S. Civil Defense Effort Urged by an Industrial Study Group,” New 20. “B-52 Lifetime Extension Effort Pushed ."Aviation Week & Space York Times (November 18, 1976), p. 16; "Intensified Soviet Civil Defense Technology (May 10, 1976), pp. 140-42; "Policies Altered to Stretch Seen Tilting Strategic Balance," Aviation Week & Space Technology Funds," A viation Week & Space Technology (May 10, 1976), p. 151; “SAC (November 22, 1976), p. 17; "Strategic Defensive Systems Emphasized,” Tests Consolidation of Maintenance," A viation Week & Space Technology Aviation Week & Space Technology (September 20, 1976), p. 49. (May 10. 1976), pp. 152-53. 7. Robert J. Carlin. "A 400 Megaton Misunderstanding," Militarv Review 21. Some critics have suggested that the B-52 might be replaced by a (November 1974), pp. 3-12. stretched FB-111 or an improved version of the B-52 itself. At this writing 8. Arthur A Broyies and Eugene P. Wigner, “The Case For Civil De­ neither suggestion has attracted much bipartisan support. fence." Survival (September/October 1976), pp. 217-20. 22. Alton H. Quanbeck and Archie L. Wood, Modernizing the Strategic 9. Kemp, p. 5; P. J. McCeelan and D. C. Twitchett, editors, The Times Bomber Force (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1976), p. 44. Adas of China (New York: Quadrangle/The New York Times Book Co., 23 Janes Weapons Systems 1973-1974 (London: St. Ciles House, 1973). 1974). p. xvi; Alan Golenpaul, editor. Information Please Almanac Atlas and 24. Low Altitude Instrumental Approach Procedures. Volumes 1-9 (St. Yearbook (New York: Dan Colenpaul Associates, 1975), p. 708. Louis: The Defense Mapping Agency Aerospace Center, 1976); Quanbeck 10. For Currie statement see U. S., Congress, Senate, Hearings Before and Wood, pp. 47, 52, 109; U.S., Congress, Senate. Hearings Before The The Committee On Armed Services, Part 6 Research and Development. Committee On Armed Services. Part 7 Research and Development. 93rd 94th Cong.. lst sess., March 7, 11. 17. 19, 21, and April 25, 1975, p. 2828. Cong., 2d sess., April 4. 5. 16, 23, 25. 26. and May 2, 1974, pp. 3873-78; Clarence A. Robinson, Jr., “New Propellant for Trident Second Stage," Janes All the Worlds Aircrafí 1975-76, loc. cit.; Craig Covault, "FB-1 U's Aviation Week & Space Technology' (October 13, 1975), pp. 15-19; Bella­ Effectiveness Increased," Aviation Week & Space Technology (May 10. ny, loc. cit.; "Study Finds Joint MX/Trident Impractical,” A viation Week 1976) , pp. 103-13. & Space Technology (October 13, 1975), p. 17; Downey, loc. cit.; All SSKP 25. Quanbeck and Wood, p. 23. calculations were done with a General Electric Missile Effectiveness Cal- 26. A. J. Wohlstetter, F. S. Hoffman, R.J. Lutz.and H. S. Rowen,Selection culator. and Use of Strategic Air Bases (Santa Monica: The Rand Corporation, 11. Henry A. Kissinger, Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy (New York: 1954). p. 20. Harper Brothers. 1957), p. 74. 27. Clarence A. Robinson,Jr., "Strategic Programs Scrutinized," Aviation 12. U.S.. Congress, Senate, Hearings Before The Committee On Armed Week & Space Technology (March 31, 1975), pp. 12-13; Clarence A. Services. Part l Authorizations. 94th Cong., lst sess., February 5, 1975, p. Robinson, Jr.. "Tentative SALT Decision Made." Aviation Week & Space 74. Technology (February 16. 1976), pp. 12-14. 13. Lynn Etheridge Davisand Warner R. Schilling. "All You Ever Want- 28. The Military Balance 1975-1976 (London: International Institute ed To Know about MIRV and ICBM Calculations But Were Not Cleared For Strategic Studies, 1975), p. 8. To Ask," The Journal of Confíict Resolution (June 1973), pp. 207-42; John 29. Senate, Armed Services Committee, February' 5, 1975, p. 224 W. Finney, "Soviet Deploying 2 New Missiles," New York Times (Januarv 30. Hoeber. loc. cit. 15. 1975), p. 1; Paul H. Nitze, "Assuring Strategic Stability in an Era of 31. Quanbeck and Wood. p. 73; Robinson, A viation W eek & Space Tech­ Détente." Foreign Affairs (January 1976), pp. 207-32; Thomas A. Brown, nology (March 31, 1975), loc. cit. "Missile Accuracy and Strategic Lethality," Survival (March/April 1976), 32. The equation is: Total surface-to-air missile launchers: 800, Shots per pp. 52-59. launcher at ALCM concentration: 1, Percentage of launchers successfully 14. General William J. Evans. "The Impact of Technology on U.S. Deter­ effecting engagement with ALCM concentration: .46, Overall reliability of rent Forces," Strategic Review (Summer 1976), pp. 40—47; “B-l Bomber surface-to-air missiles: .81. Kills: 300. Crux of SAC Plans," A viation Week & Space Technology (May 10, 1976), 33. Donald E. Fink, "Minuteman Experiences Aiding MX,” Aviation pp. 39-45. Week & Space Technology (July 19, 1976), pp. 113-20. 15. Nitze. loc. cit.; "B-l Bomber Crux of SAC Plans," loc. cit; "Study 34. Clarence A. Robinson. Jr., ‘Tomahawk Clears Crucial Test,’ Aviation Finds Joint MX/Trident Impractical," loc. cit Week & Space Technology (November 22, 1976), pp. 14-16. 16. U.S.. Congress, Senate. Subcommittee On Arms Control, Internation­ 35. U.S., Congress. Senate. Hearings Before The Committee On Armed al Law And Organization Of The Committee On Foreign Relations, U.S.- Services, Part 4 Research and Development. 94th Cong., lst sess., Febru­ USSR Strategic Policies. 93rd Cong., 2d sess., March 4, 1974, p. 19; U.S., ary 25. 27, March 4 and 5. 1975. p. 1995. Congress, Senate, Hearings Before The Committee On Armed Services 36. Low Altitude Instrumental Approach Procedures, loc. cit.; Quanbeck United States Senate, Part 6 Research and Development, 94th Cong., lst and Wood, pp. 44-48. sess., March 7. 11, 17, 19, 21. & 25. 1975, pp. 2804-5. 37. Wohlstetter, pp. 94-95; Quanbeck and Wood. p. 65. TACTICAL AIR POWER AND ENVIRONMENTAL IMPERATIVES L ieu t en a n t Colonel Robert S. D otson. AFRES OME months ago, a thoughtful article the appeal that this so-called trip-wire strate­ by Major Dennis W. Stiles in the Air Uni- gy held for the NATO nations in the fiftie: versity Review dealt with the intrinsic and sixties. The perceived linkage between Sstrengths and weaknesses of tactical airtheater-nuclear war and general war has forces.1 By their very nature, tactical fighters become uncomfortably tighter with the ac- can do some things well and others poorly, quisition of a formidable nuclear arsenal by independent of the environment in which the Soviet Union. they are employed. But the combat environ­ It is no surprise, then, that the defense of ment itself imposes additional conditions Europe has been planned around NATO’s that must be accommodated if tactical air- conventional forces—under the expectation craft are to be employed effectively. It is nec- that these forces can prove strong enough to essary, then, to expand on the concepts preserve the territorial integrity of the al­ explored by Major Stiles so that we may at- liance while keeping the intensity of the con­ tempt to answer hard and specific questions flict well below the nuclear threshold. about: But the Soviet Union has not been content • the composition of the future tacti­ to upgrade only its nuclear forces. Any re- cal fighter force structure (how many F-15s, spected source of data will show the conven­ F-16s, and A-lOs); tional forces of the Warsaw Pact to be unset- • the weapons that can be best com- tlingly heavy in armor and artillery, the bined with our aircraft to obtain the most hardware which provides firepower and effectiveness for the dollars available to us. shock for a rapidly moving conventional Without question, a conflict in Europe offensive. To deter the Pact, and to defeat would pose the most demanding environ­ their conventional forces if deterrence fails, ment for our tactical air forces, and it is in the we must maintain first-rate conventional context of a conventional war in Europe that forces of our own. However, the nations of the thoughts to follow will evolve. the alliance, including our own, have shown a reluctance to ofifset Warsaw Pact quantita- tive advantages in conventional ground The Backdrop of forces by expanding our own armies to any appreciable degree. Rather than opt for the Strategy and Technology labor-intensive solution—with its attendant The Air Force’s tactical fighter squadrons, manpower costs—we have, instead, chosen active and Reserve, are assuming a role of the capital-intensive approach. We have de- unprecedented importance in preserving cided to counter Warsaw Pact mass with the integrity of the Atlantic alliance. Because Western technology. our nation no longer enjoys overwhelming A prime example of this reliance on tech­ nuclear superiority over the forces of the nology is the future strengthening of NATO’s Warsaw Pact, defense of Western Europe by tactical air forces with the F-16 and the re- an early use of theater-nuclear forces has lost placement of F-4s in our own active Air Force with A-lOs, F-15s, and F-16s. But it is not enough to obtain new equipment. There is much to be explored in determining the Author’s note: The views expressed in this article are most profitable ways to employ that equip­ those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those ment to enhance deterrence and to make of the U.S. Air Force or the Office of Management and Budget. Central Europe a burial ground for Pact ar­ R.S.D. mor if deterrence fails. 28 TA CTICAL AIR PO WER 29 a shift in emphasis from the familiar close-air- Counterair and support (CAS) mission—where aerial ord- Support of Ground Forces nance is delivered near friendly ground The necessity for an efiFective division of forces—to ground attack in support of friend­ labor between NATOs ground forces and air ly ground forces beyond the efiFective range forces was highlighted recently in an article of weapons organic to those ground forces in .Air Force Magazine that describes the role (the so-called “battlefield” interdiction mis­ of NATO tactical air power as a partner with sion).* alliance ground forces in stopping a Warsaw This interpretation does not mean that Pact armored thrust across Europe. One close air support will be abandoned for bat­ paragraph of the article is particularly il- tlefield interdiction but that the preponder- luminating: ance of the ground-support efiFort will be If intelligence is right, NATO ground forces concentrated against follow-on echelons of could achieve local superiority against the first Pact forces. But close air support will contin­ assault echelon. The second, equally decisive, ue to be a particularly important Air Force “if” is whether US and other NATO tactical airpower would be able to deal with the Pact’s mission. second echelon before it could engage NATO ground forces at the forward edge of the battle Close Air Support area. This, then, leads to the third requirement If breakthroughs by Pact armor threaten for a successful defense by NATO forces—the rapid achievement of local air superiority over at the forward edge of the battle area the main battle area to permit air interdictions (FEBA), air power will be massed in space of Pact follow-on attacks.2 and time to beat down the Pact forces before For the air-superiority mission, the key they can attain breakthrough momentum. words are local air superiority over the main Because CAS attacks must not endanger battle area. The emphasis on aerial battle friendly ground forces, precision-guided implicit in this statement, rather than attack weapons such as the Maverick missile will be of Warsaw Pact airfields, reflects two impor- particularly useful in this role. The A-10 will tant developments for Western airmen: soon play the primary CAS role for the U.S. • NATO air-superiority aircraft will Air Force, and it is well-suited to this mission. have a distinct technological edge over those The A-10 can perform in Europe’s poor of the enemy as the F-15 and F-16 enter weather when other aircraft cannot, and, for NATO air forces in quantity. a CAS aircraft, this capability far outweighs • Attacks on heavily defended War­ others in importance. The mission must be saw Pact airfields—where enemy aircraft are flown when the ground situation demands— well protected with aircraft shelters and sur- not when the weather permits. face-to-air defenses—may be prohibitively Because the A-10 will be thrown into the costly compared with the damage inflicted. breach when points of attempted Pact break­ For the ground-attack mission, the para­ through become discernible, it may be wise graph cited earlier describes what could be strategy to limit A-10 sorties early in the con- an increasingly important role for NATO air flict to conserve the striking power of the •Author’s note: AFM 2-1. Tactical Air Operations-Counter Air. Close Air forces with the words: whether US and other Support. and Air Interdiction. identifies air interdiction ai one of the five combat functioni performed by tactical air forces. Air Force doctrine does NATO tactical airpower would be able to not differentiate within the air interdiction function based on target dis- deal with the Pacts second echelon before it tances relative to the forward edge of the battle area (FEBA). The term "battlefield" interdiction used in this article refers to that portion of the air could engage NA TO ground forces at the for­ interdiction function described above (i.e., ground attack in support of friendly ground forces beyond the range of weapons organic to those ward edge of the battle area. Implied here is ground forces). 30 AIR í/.Y/l ERSJTY REVIEW A-10 force for maximum effect when break- ground attack because a number of con- through massing by the Pact begins to occur. straints that limit the intensity of weapons This strategy, of course, would require delivery in close air support will be over- NATO ground forces to hold their own come. Specifically: against Pact first-echelon forces where • Because ordnance will not be deliv- breakthroughs are not attempted and would ered near friendly ground forces in bat­ depend upon success by the battlefield-inter- tlefield interdiction, there will be a relative diction force in disrupting Pact artillery and lack of dependence on forward air controll- follow-on echelons. (Battlefield interdiction ers (FACs) to coordinate air attacks—and this will be treated in detail later.) coordination can slow the rate at which A reduced employment of the A-10 early weapons are employed. in the conflict could: • Because of this reduced depend­ • preserve the A-10 force until it is ence on FACs, battlefield interdiction will most critically needed: have a relatively reduced vulnerability to • conserve Maverick missiles; enemy electronic countermeasures (ECM), • allow additional time for suppres- which may hinder coordination of strike air- sion of Pact air-defense weapons at the craft with FACs in the CAS mission—another FEBA to reduce attrition of the A-10; and • conserve the A-10 force so that, factor that can slow the rate of weapons when the Pact offensive stalls, the A-10 can delivery. precede counterattacking NATO armies to • Battlefield interdiction will enable help rout Pact ground forces. After Pact sur- face-to-air defenses have been suppressed (or have run low on ammunition because their Tuble 1. Battlefield interdiction attack rnodes— high rates of fire), the A-10 could be particu- options and definitions larly lethal in such a counterattack role. The second point—to conserve Maverick Options: missiles—is particularly important. If A-lOs Option I Single-pass attack with area weapons expend Mavericks at the rates of which they Option 2 Multiple-pass attack with precision-guided are capable, before attempted Pact break­ munitions throughs at the FEBA begin to develop, Definitions these valuable weapons may be in short sup- Weapon loads per sortie ply when they are most needed to defeat K, , — Target kills per pass breakthrough forces. L, — Losses per sortie Earlier, it was stated that the Air Force has Pu — Probability of loss during ingress to target Pip - Probability of loss per weapon delivery pass a continuing, central role to play in the battle Pu — Probability of loss during egress from target at the FEBA. What does seem to be emerg- S„ — Sorties per unit equipment (UE) aircraft (based ing, however, is perhaps a more important on UE aircraft at the beginning of each day) ground-attack mission—beyond the FEBA Pi, — Probability of loss per sortie and beyond the effective range of the Army’s n (!-/>,,) = (I - />„)(! - Pu)( 1 ~ Pir) organic weapons—for our tactical air forces. Where n = number of passes

K, — Target kills per sortie Battlefield Interdiction total passes This mission will enable air power to be K, = (! - Pu) 2(1 - Pir) " Kr applied with maximum speed and mass in n = I TACTICAL AIR POWER 31

the mass employment of area weapons, mu- Table 2. BattleEeld interdiction illustrative exam ple nitions that allow intense firepower to be delivered at high rates but which are danger- Assumptions • ous to use near friendly troops in close air support. Option 1 W, = 8 x Rockeye However, these advantages of battlefield Kp = .9 interdiction come at greater risk of attrition, Pi, = .01 compared with operations in the CAS mode, P,p = .03 Pu = .01 because of a relatively longer exposure to Sa =2 enemy defenses. Therefore, gains in effec- tiveness must be balanced against increased Therefore: risks of loss. Attempts to achieve such a bal­ (1 ~ A ) = (l - .01) (1 - .03) (1 - .01) Pu = .05 ance have resulted in lively and useful de­ K, = (1 - .01) (1 - .03) (.9)= .86 bates about the following modes of attack for battlefield interdiction: Option 2 W, = 6 x Maverick • single-pass deliveries of area weap­ Kp = .1 ons; Pu = .01 • multiple-pass deliveries of preci- P,p = .03 sion-guided weapons. Pu = .01 Because this article attempts to deal with the Sa = 2 specifics of the battlefield-interdiction mis- Therefore: sion, the strengths and weaknesses of each (1 ~ Pu) = (1 - .01) (1 - .01) ( 1 - .03)6 attack mode will be explored in some detail. Pu = .18 Table 1 lists definitions that will be used in 6 subsequent tables to illustrate tradeoffs in the two modes of attack. Shown in Table 2 are Ks = (1 - .01) X d " °3) (-7) = 3.74 assumptions about the various parameters n = / defined in Table 1. These assumptions are intended to be relatively consistent, from one option to the other, though the absolute Illustrative Campaign History values may not suit the individual reader’s intuition. The reader can easily determine Dav / 2 3 4 5Total the effects of his own assumptions by placing Option 1 UE aircraft 500 450 405 364 328 them in the framework described by the ta­ Sorties 1000 900 810 728 656 4094 bles. Kills 860 774 697 626 564 3521 The effects of the assumptions shown in Losses 50 45 41 36 33 205 Table 2 are found in the five-day campaign Kills per loss 17.2 history for 500 unit-equipment (UE) aircraft Option 2 at the bottom of the table. Specifically, for UE aircraft 500 320 245 157 100 Table 2: Sorties 1000 640 490 314 200 2644 Kills 3740 2394 1833 1174 748 9889 • The single-pass option results in Losses 180 115 88 57 36 476 about one third the kills produced by multi- Kills per loss 20.8 ple attacks. • The losses incurred in the multiple- *Thc rcadcr should remcmbcr that these values. though not ncccssarily pass attacks àre greater than those of the sin­ unrealistic. are illustrative The data and equations shown are presented in detail *° that the reader can cmploy his own parameters ií those shown in this and gle-pass option by more than a factor of two. subsequent tables do not suit him

34 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW • Fewer losses and, thus, a higher It should be noted that no peacetime operat- kills-per-loss ratio for the single-pass option. ing and support (O&S) costs have been as- Multiple kills from an area weapon could sessed against the additional UE aircraft. result if sufficient area of coverage and densi- though O&S expenditures would be re­ ty of coverage can be applied against dense quired to provide 290 fresh, combat-ready targets. If a multiple-kill area weapon could UE aircraft at the fifth day of conflict. be employed: it would be highly cost effec- The key point shown by Table 6 is this: If tive. Table 6 shows that: a weapon could be delivered against Warsaw • If the outcomes in losses shown in Pact artillery and armored targets, and could Table 5 were to be equalized by purchasing achieve multiple kills in one pass, this weap­ additional aircraft for the multiple-pass op­ on would be highly cost effective—even if its tion so that the surviving UE aircraft would R&D cost and unit acquisition cost were be the same in each case, $2.3 billion would quite high. be required to procure additional UE air­ Though this section on battlefield interdic- craft; tion is somewhat detailed, the problem of • For the cost of these additional air­ target acquisition, prior to attack, has not craft and the Mavericks expended, been dealt with specifically because it is not $500,000,000 in R&D could be expended for clear that a target-acquisition sensor—eye- the new weapon, and its cost could be $484,- ball or other device—would favor either sin­ 000 per sortie. gle-pass or multiple-pass weapons for visual attacks. With either weapon the pilot must find, identify, and strike the target. However, Table 6. Cost efTectiveness o f poor weather would preclude attacks with an area weapon (FY76 dollars) precision-guided weapons, while area weap­ ons could be employed in the general area of Déficit in surviving UE aircraft for the multiple-pass option suspected targets. Also, poor contrast of tar­ of Table 5 get and background could deny the lock-on (500 - 205) - (500 - 495) = 290 of a precision weapon when a pilot can suffi- Cost to procure 290 additional UE (435 total aircraft — ciently locate a target to deliver an area based on the F 16 program ratio of 650 total aircraft for 432 weapon. UE aircraft): Flyaway Cost (based on $1827 million (435 F-16 end-of-program aircraft @ $4.2 flyaway cost in FY 80) million each) Area and Precision Weapons Procurement Additive $457 million The desirability of one weapon or the oth­ (@ .25 of flyaway cost) er for battlefield interdiction depends, as the — Subtotal $2284 million tables have shown, on: Maverick Costs: • the attrition suffered by attacking in one mode compared with the other; 1650 sorties. x 6------weapons---- x $20------thousand = $198 million .... • whether multiple kills can be sortie weapon achieved by dropping area weapons in one Total $2482 million pass. New-Area-Weapon Economics: Actually, a mix of area and precision-guided $2482 million - $500 million (R&D) = $1982 million weapons may be a better answer than the $1982 million______$484 thousand either/or implications of the tables shown 4094 sorties (Table 5) sortie earlier. TACTICAL AIR POWER 35 First, the use of area weapons early in the • Pact forces, enjoying a favorable ad- conflict, especially against massed artillery, vantage in ground forces, are less dependent could provide multiple kills and reduced on their air forces for early air support; losses to our tactical fighters. Later, after de- • The Pact tactical air force may be fense suppression has been applied liberally, employed sparingly near the FEBA early in and possibly after the enemy has attempted the conflict so that Pact surface-to-air de- to reduce his losses by spreading his forces, fenses can attrit NATO’s air force— precision-guided munitions could be em- unimpeded by cumbersome requirements ployed to good efiFect. Such a mixed-weapons for the coordination of their own aircraft and strategy could achieve a favorable balance surface weapons; between kill rate and force conservation. • After the Pact surface-to-air de- It will not be surprising, therefore, to see fenses have been substantially suppressed or the F-16, armed with a new area weapon, have drawn down their ammunition, the evolve as a very important ground-attack Sys­ Pact tactical air force may be unleashed to tem in the NATO arsenal. The F-16, with its destroy the remainder of NATO’s air forces small size, high speed, and ability to maneu- and to add more punch to the ground oflfen- ver defensively without great energy loss, sive. should prove to be a highly survivable air- Thus, the conspicuous absence of Soviet- craft. Also, its survivability will be enhanced trained Egyptian fighter forces during the by its bombing system which will incorpo- early battles of the 1973 Yom Kippur War rate a continuously computed impact point may be an indication of Soviet employment (CCIP) release cue that will allow effective concepts for tactical fighters. We may well weapons delivery without exposure to the have witnessed a conscious effort by the risks of relatively long periods of target track- Egyptians to withhold fighters from the bat­ ing required by other weapons. Finally, the tle area until duels between the opposing air F-16 should be able to carry the load that a force and friendly surface-to-air weapons new area munition will probably require. had run their course. Though this treatment of battlefield inter- Because the Warsaw Pact will come at diction has covered a good deal, more needs NATO with quantity on the ground and in to be said about the importance of force con­ the air, we must conduct battlefield interdic- servation. Perhaps this subject is an appropri- tion and close air support skillfully, so that we ate closing note. conserve our forces while exploiting the great firepower potential only tactical air power can bring to the battlefield—to stop Force Conservation the enemys ground ofiFensive before it gains The environmental imperatives of a war in momentum. Central Europe may place a high premium Fairfax, Virgínia on early force conservation by NATO to de- feat the Pact, because: • NATO air forces are indispensable Notes to the containment of a Pact ofiFensive and 1. Major Dennis W. Stiles, “Air Power: A New Look from an Old Roof- top." Air University fíeview. November-Deccmber 1975, pp. 49-59. must be employed with effect at the outset of 2. Edgar Ulsamer. “Tac Air—History's Most Potent Fighting Machine," battle; Air Force Magazine, February 1976, p. 22. ATIONAL SECURITY policy is vitally important—or so, at least, we are instructed almost daily by scholars and soldiers, politicians and Npundits. Despite its importance, or perhaps because of it, national security is a subject for frequent discussion and debate. But a curious and puzzling feature about national security issues is not that they are widely discussed; rather, what is bewildering is how narrowly they sometimes seem to be understood. Discussions of national security or defense policy, whether academic or casual, seem invariably to take for granted a number of fundamental considerations, what I call “unspoken assumptions.” Any discussion of national security policy is necessarily founded on several basic beliefs, about which there has to be agreement, tacit or otherwise, before any sensible dialogue can ensue. Usually, such agreement is simply understood or unexpressed, and the conversation or lecture or article proceeds unchallenged. One thing needed for a more detailed investigation of defense policy is a study of precisely those unspoken assumptions that lie, usually mute, at the heart of defense policy discussions.

NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY the unspoken assumptions

Dr . J ames H. Toner 36 NA TIONAL SECURITY POL1CY 37 This article outlines five unspoken assump- prepared to give my life in their defense.” tions that constitute the foundation of both Because American armed forces have never national security policy itself and of all in- been portrayed as purely mercenary, it is a formed and intelligent discussion about and matter of great personal conviction to sol- criticism of such policy. Readers are en- diers that what they are defending—and pos- couraged to challenge the number or the ex- sibly dying for—is eminently worthy of their position of the assumptions I have marshaled efforts. Not for nothing do United States here. Unless and until there is some common Army drill sergeants wear emblems embla- understanding about these unspoken as­ zoned with, “This We’ll Defend.” The same sumptions, national security policy cannot be Code of Conduct instructs the soldier never debated and discussed, argued and analyzed, to forget that he must be “ . . . dedicated to as it must be, whether over the neighbor’s the principies which made my country free. fence, in the Pentagon, or in the national I will trust in my God and in the United political arena. States of America.” Whether the discussion concerns the in­ dividual soldier in the field or the entire mili- The Unspoken Assumptions tary establishment, people who debate Of the five unspoken assumptions enumer- military practices and policies should recog- ated here, the first one is perhaps the most nize and reflect on the elementary and para- philosophical. Any discussion of this assump- mount issue: Is our society worthy of tion will lead, almost inevitably, to the ques- protection? If so, why? To what extent does tion, “Why is American society worthy of it merit protection? Under what circum- protection?” The answer is important—and stances does it forfeit the right to such pro­ not just for academic reasons. tection? Is there a different point of view on the issue between soldiers and civilians? American society is worthy of protection. There is a real threat to American security. Any discussion of national security policy im- plies acceptance of the proposition that It is possible to define national security sim- American society is worthy of protection. If ply as “the ability of a nation to protect its the society were entirely venal and de- internai valuesfrom externai threats. 'n How bauched, there would be Üttle point in ex- important this idea is has been explained by pending blood and treasure to secure it. It is Henry T. Nash, who contends that precisely on this point that some discussions Since World War II America’s foreign policy has been a response to a sense of threat. The of national security issues end before they basic guiding principies of this policy were for- actually begin. A violent revolutionary, for mulated immediately following the war in re­ example, will surely have a different version sponse to the threat of Communism and have of national security priorities from those held remained fundamentally intact for a quarter of by a mainstream American liberal or conser- a century.2 vative. Put bluntly, if there are no threats to Ameri­ The Code of Conduct for Members of the can national security, the American military United States Armed Forces, or Executive establishment is superfluous and should be Order 10631, 17 August 1955, instructs the dismantled or at least severely cut back. And soldier that “I serve in the forces which one does not have to browse long through a guard my country and our way of life. I am library to find a number of works dedicated 38 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW to the proposition that international threats competing groups pressing their claims for to American society are mere mispercep- greater budgetary allocations in nondefense tions by American leaders; or that such matters. The Soviet Union, for example, does threats are manufactured by American mili- not publish figures on its military expendi- tary leaders for the aggrandizement of the tures, but it appears to be substantially in- military; or that such threats are the result of creasing its military budget. American Communist self-defense efforts in the face of experts believe that last year’s Soviet military massive American armaments. budget was $141 billion; the United States In discussions of American defense policy, spent $94 billion. In 1964, the United States there is probably no more important strate- spent $110.4 billion on defense (in 1976 dol- gic question than this: Is there a real threat lars), while the Soviets spent $100 billion. Re- to American security? If the answer to that cently, the Central Intelligence Agency question is yes, corollary questions will quick- (CIA) admitted that it may have been un- ly follow: How extensive or dangerous is the derestimating by almost half the percentage threat to the United States? What is the na- of Soviet GNP spent on the military. Some ture of the threat? What can be done to di- analysts contend that the Soviets have been minish or eliminate it? Can a threat be a spending as much as 15 percent of their GNP positive thing in leading to a balance of on defense, compared with about 6 percent forces? If so, is it possible to live with a rival for the United States.3 in a State of mutual insecurity? What are the Ordinarily, in the United States, the ques­ alternatives? tion to be asked is not whether there must be defense spending; rather, the basic question The United States has the means is “How much is enough?”4 With an unset- to establish its national security. tled national and international economy and with the nagging questions of unemploy- At first glance such a proposition seems hard- ment and inflation, it is not too much to sug- ly to warrant any attention. But consider that gest that the material means of establishing this year’s military budget request of about national security are no longer sure and cer- $115 billion is the highest in history. And tain. How much for guns? How much for but- consider that in an open society there is ac­ ter? And who establishes those priorities? tive and energetic competition among a Can we afford the national defense that we number of groups and causes for a larger require? Can we afford not to have that de­ piece of the “federal pie.” Almost every year fense? there is a hue and cry that the defense budg­ This unspoken assumption—which is the et is exorbitant. Even in the United States, paramount question in terms of national lo- which is still wealthy beyond the dreams of gistics—concerns materiais and money. But most people in the Third World, there is a at this time, it also concerns the men and limit to spending. Frequently, the first place women who are the means of national de­ policy-makers seek to lower such spending is fense. Without people, after all, the imple- in the annual defense budget. ments and instruments of national defense The competition for government funds in are merely so many wasted goods. Again, closed societies is, in some respects, more while this precept appears to be self-evident, tightly controlled. Closed societies may se- it may be worth recalling the words of Mao cretly funnel an incredible percentage of the Tse-tung: “Weapons are an important factor gross national product (GNP) into military in war, but not the decisive factor; it is peo­ spending, with little fear (or toleration) of ple, not things, that are decisive. The contest NA TIONAL SECURITY POLICY 39 of strength is not only a contest of military fortable with professional military men if and economic power, but also a contest of only because Americans traditionally tire human power and morale.”5 In asking easily of the things and thoughts of war; whether the United States has the means of Americans prefer to turn their minds to less self-protection in terms of people, we are, in unpleasant ideas.7 effect, inquiring into our own character. As The first paradox to be understood in try- the great military strategist Sir Basil Liddell ing to comprehend the circumstances and Hart once put it, “The nature of armies is setting of American national security is that determined by the nature of the civilization it is precisely that most commendable and in which they exist.”6 perennial American concern with peace—a Of all the unspoken assumptions underly- streak in the American political tradition ing debate about national security policy, that remains somewhat utopian—that re- perhaps the one that should never be taken quires Americans to take special care about for granted is the question of whether the adequacy and upkeep of their armed American defense forces possess the profi- forces. The second paradox with which we ciency and the morale necessary to ensure must be concerned stems from the first and national security. reveals that Americans are customarily un- happy with professional military forces, and despite an imperative need to preserve the The United States has the will power, prestige, and professionalism of its to establish its national security. armed Services, Americans energetically set In almost any listing of the elements of na­ about to civilianize their soldiers and their tional power, one can find some reference to soldiers’ ethic. The third paradox deals with national will or some synonym thereof. If a the nature of global strategy in the post-1945 nation lacks the desire and determination to world and reveals that in a world in which defend itself, all the powerful and sophis- global conflict—the righteous war, the cru- ticated weaponry in the world cannot assure sade—is precluded on pain of virtual human its security. Without the conviction that de- extinction, the type of war which Americans fending itself is mightily important, a nation must learn to wage is exactly the type they may, in fact, be inviting its enemies to ag- will have none of and for which they ada- gress against it, and is almost certainly mantly refuse to prepare their armed Ser­ foreordaining its defeat in war. vices. This fourth unspoken assumption is Do Americans have the will only for “all or worthy of attention because of three para- nothing” wars? Is it true for Americans, as doxes of the American understanding of the General Douglas MacArthur once suggested, problems of national security. Each of the that “In war there is no substitute for victo- three paradoxes emanates, to some extent, ry”?8 Or, can America muster the will to fight from the American post-World War II insist- the kind of limited, political war in which the ence that soldiers should become more cor­ Communists seem increasingly to place their dial to the civilian society; that soldiers military faith? Serious discussion of this un­ should adopt an ethic more sympathetic to spoken assumption leads in short order to the that of the society as a whole; that soldiers analysis of such intractable questions as: should be willing to demonstrate a more What is victory? (Must it always be the con- Progressive attitude and thus be more re- quest or unconditional surrender of the ene- sponsive to the times. The American people my?) What are the purposes of warfare? Who have been, and will continue to be, uncom- defines them? 40 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW Security is a aimed at providing a protective shield if a flexible, adjustable concept. nuclear power threatened a nation friendly If sailors killed in the 7 December 1941 at- or important to the United States. In addi- tack on Pearl Harbor could be brought back tion, the Nixon Doctrine promised that while to life, imagine how shocked they would be America would observe all its treaty commit- to learn that the nation whose implements of ments and furnish military and economic as- war killed them is now one of America’s clos- sistance in accordance with those est friends. The same, of course, is true of commitments to nations endangered by ag­ Germany, a nation that the United States gression, the United States expected those struggled desperately against in two world endangered nations to bear the primary re- wars. The same sailors might be equally sponsibility for providing the manpower for shocked to learn that the Soviet Union, their own defense. Most recently, the subtle- which was fighting valiantly (with American ties of deterrence policy seem to be replac- aid) against the Nazi invasion in 1941, had ing any simple slogans for nuclear strategy. become America’s chief antagonist almost In short, to serve the purposes for which it immediately after the war. The constella- is designed, strategy must be flexible in order tions of world politics change, and it is practi- to respond to the peculiar challenges and op- cally axiomatic that national security policies portunities of the moment. Clearly, the issue and strategy must change course with them. of strategy cannot be dismissed with the sin­ What permanence there is in international gle shibboleth, “Superiority!” A wise strate­ affairs is not to be found in allies but in funda­ gic blend requires more additives than the mental national values. “England,” Lord military one alone. As Bernard Brodie has Palmerston is supposed to have said in the written, ” ... good strategy presumes good mid-nineteenth century, “has no permanent anthropology and sociology.”10 But while friends, only permanent interests.” security policy and strategy must be amena- American nuclear strategy has changed a ble to evolving circumstances, some atten- good deal in the past three decades. From tion must be paid to those enduring national 1945 until 1949, the United States was the values which it is the task of that strategy to sole owner of “the bomb.” The doctrine of preserve and protect. “massive retaliation,” or immediate response If we assume that strategy cannot be re- to aggression “at places and with means of duced to a magic or rigid formula, just how [our] own choosing,”9 was the strategic for­ flexible can it be? On what basis does the mula during most of the Eisenhower ad- nation choose its allies and mark out its long- ministration. Under President Kennedy, the term interests? What are the occasions when policy of “flexible response” or “graduated compromise is warranted? And when is com- response” became the new strategy. The use promise impossible? These are intensely diffi- of force was to be controlled very carefully, cult matters, both for statesmen to decide with responses to any acts of aggression and for the citizenry to debate. In discussing geared to defeating the aggression without the issues that cluster around this unspoken triggering a nuclear response from the ene- assumption, one should recall the admoni- my. Emphasis was placed on the develop- tion attributed to the Athenian leader Peri- ment of conventional forces so that the cles: “I fear our own mistakes far more than nation would be able to wage limited war the strategy of our enemies.” and not have to threaten nuclear strikes in These, then, are the fundamental, unspok­ every military circumstance. Under Presi­ en assumptions which, regardless of whether dent Nixon, a doctrine was developed that they are ever articulated in national security NA TIONAL SECURITY POLJCY 41 debates, lie at the heart of defense policy. fy, the strains and tensions of that interna- They form the basis not only for public dis- tional danger can lead to a powerful cussion but also for official decisions. For it is temptation for the open society to emulate on these elementary and bedrock ideas that the closed society. Adolf Hitler, for example, American military policy is founded. It is the confidently predicted that “The great task of American policy-makers to formulate strength of a totalitarian state is that it forces a national security policy that is in keeping those who fear it to imitate it.”12 George with the spirit of .American assumptions Kennan, too, has admitted the fear that about such pohcy and is, at the same time, Americans, locked in a struggle (regardless of based on a realistic assessment of the interna- whether it might be downplayed at a given tional exigencies of the moment. moment) with the Soviet Union, might be Such policy-makers include, principally, tempted to copy it in a number of respects: the President and his closest advisers (some- “After all, the greatest danger that can befall times referred to as the “kitchen cabinet”). us in coping with this problem of Soviet com- Other important national security policy- munism is that we shall allow ourselves to makers include the members of the National become like those with whom we are cop­ Security Council and other key scientific, ing.”13 military, political, and economic advisers. A major objective of all security pohcy is to Lengthy discussion of the theories and mod- ensure the survival of the nation. But surviv­ els of pohcy-making would have to include a al alone makes no sense unless it is in the study of the role of the Congress and of vari- Service of fundamental values that imbue the ous governmental bureaucracies, something nation’s existence with meaning and pur- which space does not permit here.11 It may pose. Secretary of State Dean Acheson put it be enough in the present context to record well: “ ... the means we choose to overcome that the President is entrusted with primary the obstacles in our path must be consonant responsibility for the national defense. with our deepest moral sense.” Thus could American policy-makers have to develop Senator Frank Church say of alleged CIA security pohcy on the basis of the five na­ murder plots: “The notion that we must tional unspoken assumptions already out- mimic the Communists and abandon our lined. But, in addition, such policies must be principies [is] an abomination.”14 formulated with a view to obtaining three A few moments of reflection on this basic principal objectives that, in recent years, objective of security policy reveals its difficul- have necessarily become the cornerstone of ty. It says, in essence, that there are things American defense policy. that the United States will not and cannot do, despite the possible concomitant sacrifice of advantage. “If one fought against an enemy The Objectives ostensibly because of his methods,” wrote of Defense Policy Kennan, “and permitted oneself to be im- The first objective of our national security pelled by the heat of the struggle to adopt policy is survival of the nation—and in a man- those same methods, who, then, could be said ner that reflects our cherished national val- to have won?”15 ues. Open societies from Athens to America There will, of course, be those who disa- have had major problems to surmount in in- gree, those who argue that victory is all that temational competition with closed socie­ matters. Probably the best rebuttal is that of ties. And, as recent transgressions of the General Matthew B. Ridgway: “If we put American intelligence community will testi- ‘victory’ at any cost ahead of human decency, 42 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW then I think God might well question our nizes the desperate need for increased right to invoke His blessing on our Cause.”16 interdependence, it is equally aware of con- A second major objective of national tinued global competition and threats to the security policy is the prevention of nuclear physical security and well-being of the na­ war through a posture of military readiness tion. Problems such as these have no simple that deters major aggression and yet is textbook answers. The perennial dilemma of equipped to deal effectively with less fla- when open cooperation is wise to yield to grant, but still serious, military threats or ag­ guarded competition is never easy to resolve. gression. The curious logic of deterrence tells Perhaps the best answer, as true today as it us that the United States possesses its thou- was in 1748 when it appeared as a sentence sands of nuclear warheads in order never to in The Spirit of the La ws, was provided by use them. But mere possession of such weap- Montesquieu: “The law of nations is naturally ons of mass destruction raises the most awe- founded on this principie, that different na­ some moral problems and clearly dictates tions ought in time of peace to do one anoth- that the nation do its utmost never to employ er all the good they can, and in time of war such weapons—unless no conceivable alter- as little injury as possible, without prejudic- native exists. ing their real interests.” Richard Sterling wrestled with this prob- Wise defense policy is thus a careful bal­ lem and gave as his answer this judgment: ance of realism and idealism struck by states- ... no one can escape the terrible question: men with an ear to the assumptions of the Are there any circumstances in which I would citizenry and an eye to the imperatives of the endorse the use of nuclear weapons? Each per- son must find his own answer. Those who an­ world political system. But American de­ swer yes, as does the writer, assume an fense policy, one hopes, is not founded appalling responsibility and may be tragically merely on what is expedient; it must be wrong. But the same may be said of those who founded as well on an ordered conception of answer no. Those who prefer, for themselves or what is ethically required, for that, in es- mankind, survival over all other values fre- quently get what they are looking for—a value- sence, is what makes American society less existence. Frequently, too, the sacrifice of worthy of protection. The British writer and all other values does not achieve the survival so diplomat, Sir Harold Nicolson, had this to say ardently desired. In the final analysis, no one about the moral dimension of statecraft: can say with certainty whether nuclear pa- There does exist such a thing as international cifism or acceptance of the nuclear contingen- morality. Its boundaries are not visibly defined cy represents the more dangerous stance. The nor its frontiers demarcated; yet we all know only certain result of nuclear pacifism is that where it is. If other countries transgress these the nuclear option will eventually be vested in frontiers, We at least should respect them. Allis men and nations less pacifically inclined.17 licet: tibi non licet. That is to say, what is right The third major objective of security poli­ for others is not right for us. That should be our cy is the promotion of a world environment motto; by that we shall in the end prevail.18 in which all States can enjoy peace and pur- sue prosperity. Today, as never before, the nations of the world are interdependent. The National Security Circuit Problems of war, pollution, resource deple- It is possible to depict diagrammatically tion, and population explosion simply do not what has been outlined here. As we have respect national borders. Problems in the at- noted, national security policy is founded on mosphere and under the oceans cannot be certain bedrock assumptions, shared by the settled or solved merely by national initia- public and by policy-makers alike, who par- tives. While prudent security policy recog- ticipate in a dialogue of sorts about those as- NA TIONAL SECUfílTY POLICY 43 sumptions. The role of policy-makers is to P uzzlinc out national security policy is a bur- produce a national strategy and defense poli- densome and serious responsibility in which, cy that reflects public assumptions and is de- in a republic, we all have some share. If one veloped according to prevailing security assumes, as I do, that our society merits pro- objectives. Such a strategy is dictated, in tection, that threats to our security exist, that part, by what must be done, according to the we have the means and will to establish our exigencies of the moment, and, in part, by security, and that security is flexible, then the what should be done, according to the as­ task of our national security policy is reasona- sumptions of the society being protected. bly clear: We must try to ensure our princi- The resultant strategy then plays its role on pled survival, try to avert nuclear war, and the stage of the international system and try (whenever possible) to cooperate with helps to shape world political circumstances. other nations. The task is awesome and not a These circumstances, in turn, provide new little discouraging. We may, however, find challenges and opportunities, influencing the some consolation in the injunction of Sir assumptions and objectives of the nation’s Winston Churchill: security policy: The day may dawn when fair play, love for — World The public Political one’s fellow men, respect for justice and free- Circumstances dom, will enable tormented generations to Assumptions march forth serene and triumphant from the hideous epoch in which we have to dwell. Policy-makers Internationalt Meanwhile, never flinch, never weary, never System despair.19 Norwich University Objectives ------Policies1 (strategy)

Notes 10. Bernard Brodie. War and Politics (New York: Macmillan. 1973), p. 1. Morton Berkowitz and P. C. Bock, "National Security," International 332. Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, 1968, XI. p. 40; their emphasis. 11. To pursue the point, cf. Craham T. AUison, Essence o f Decision: 2. Henry T. Nash. .American Foreign Policy Response to a Sense of Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (Boston: Little. Brown, 1971); Morton Threat 'Homewood. Illinois; The Dorsey Press, 1973), preface. H Halperin, with Priscilla Clapp and Arnold Kanter. Bureaucratic Politics 3. 'That Alarming Soviet Buildup," Time, March 8, 1976, p. 35. and Foreign Policy (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1974); 4 Cf. Alain C. Enthoven and K. Wayne Smith. How Much Is Enough? and James N. Rosenau, The Scientifíc Study o f Foreign Policy (New York: Shaping the Defense Program. 1961-1969. Colophon book (New York: The Free Press, 1971), Chapter V. Harper At Row, Publishers, 1971). 12. Quoted in Charles Burton Marshall, The Limits o f Foreign Policy. 5. Mao Tse-tung.Selected Works. II ÍPeking: Foreign Languages Press, enlarged edition (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press. 1968), p. 104. 1965), p. 143. 13. George F. Kennan, Memoirs. 1925-1950. Atlantic Monthly Press 6. Quoted in Roy E. Appleman. United States Army in the Korean lVar Book (Boston: Little, Brown, 1967), p. 559. South to the Saktong. North to the Yalu, Department of the Army, Office 14. Acheson is quoted in Robert Leckie, Confíict: The History of the of the Chief of Military History (Washington, D C : Government Printing Korean War. 1950-1953 (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1962), p. 399. Office. 1961), p. 49, Church is quoted in "Leaving Murky Murders to the Senate," Time. June 7. On this theme, see T. R. Fehrenbach. This Kind of War: A Study in 16, 1975, p. 10. “Ours is not a wicked country," said Church, "and we Unpreparedness (New York: Pocket Books, Inc.. 1963), pp. 92-93, 100. cannot abide a wicked government," 126, 152-53, 193, 366, 455.457,460-61.466-67,471.490.492,496.499, 15. Kennan, p. 198. 553, 558, 649, and 706. 16. Matthew B. Ridgway, The Korean War (Carden City. New York: 8. On this theme. see John W Spanier, The Truman-MacArthur Contro- Doubleday, 1967), p. 76. versy and the Korean War (New York: W. W. Norton At Co.. Inc., 1965), 17. Richard W. Sterling. Macropolitics: International Relations in a Glo­ p. 222 bal Society (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1974), p. 92. 9 From an address by John Foster Dulles, on January 12, 1954, as it 18. Harold Nicolson, Diplomacy. third edition (New York: Oxford Uni­ appears in Peter V. Curl, editor. Documents on American Foreign Rela- versity Press, 1963), p. 147. bons, 1954. publíshed for the Council on Foreign Relations (New York: 19. From a Churchill address of March 1, 1955. in Parliamentary De­ Harper At Brothers. 1955). p. 10. bates. 5th series, vol. 537, col. 1905. N THE last decade, insurgency, or “wars of national liberation,” became the domi- Inant form of conflict in the world, and Mao Tse-tung’s revolutionary theory of Peo- ple’s War became famous as the doctrine be- hind this new kind of war. In 1965, Mao—through his surrogate, Lin Piao—pro- claimed that People’s War was “universal truth,” a model for revolution applicable to any society anywhere.1 With the war in Viet- nam expanding, many in this country con- cluded that Lin’s article was designed to outline the grand Chinese design for the eventual destruction of the United States. As a result, People’s War became the object of much study and great concern within the American military.

A NEW LOOK AT PEOPLE'S WAR

Major William L. Cocley PEOPLES WAfí 45 In this decade, that concern has faded. Chinese Communist support for revolution- ary movements has declined since the Cul­ tural Revolution, and American involvement in Vietnam has come to an end. The theory itself has not fared well; it was significantly modified by Ho Chi Minh and Vo Nguyen Giap and then “subverted” by the newer ideas of Che Guevara, Frantz Fanon, and Herbert Marcuse. Noting these develop- ments, one scholar recently concluded that while People’s War might not be dead yet, the time had come for an autopsy on the body.2 Many in the American military seem to agree that Peoples War has outlived its usefulness, and they see no need to include it in our strategic consideration. Clearly, we must now re-examine the theory. What is the theory of People’s War? Is it dead or alive? What is its role in the 1970s? Does it have a place in the strategic thinking of the American military? These questions “A single spark can start a prai- provide the focus for a new look at People’s ríe Ere,” Mao’s motto is shown War. here in his own calligraphy.

Theory of People's War before his thoughts seem to have crystal- People’s War was not an overnight phe- lized. The result was the formulation of his nomenon.3 The theory developed over a pe- three essential principies of People’s War: riod of about ten years, from the time in 1926 that his revolution would be carried out from when Mao first discovered revolutionary po- bases located in remote, rural areas; that it tential among the peasants until the spring of would involve a central role for the Red 1938 when he completed the last of his major Army, a role that would be more of a political theoretical works. During this time, Mao’s than a military one; and that his revolution ideas shifted and evolved in response to ex- would take the form of a protracted war—a perience, new problems, and situational war of long and undetermined length, but changes. Thus, the theory is best described in one which would proceed through orderly the context of the events that shaped it. We stages.5 shall first discuss the basic concepts of the In the early years when Mao was first ap- theory that Mao developed during the plying and evaluating these essential princi­ Kiangsi Soviet period, and then review the pies, his major concern was the defense of his refinements that he made when he put the base area, the Kiangsi Soviet. The Nationalist theory into systematic, written form in the forces opposing him were clearly superior in late 1930s.4 numbers of weapons, equipment, men, and Although the seminal ideas of People’s the like; moreover, they could easily encircle War entered Mao’s mind in 1926, it was 1930 and penetrate his base area. To defend 46 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW against the Nationalists, Mao, in effect, re- overall inferior situation into an overall su­ defined “power.” We in the West usually perior one. This was Mao’s idea of maintain- think of power in terms of the number and ing the initiative—never losing a battle, capabilities of weapons, the number and skill always being on the offense even within de- of the men who employ them, and the eco- fense.8 In sum, power, in Mao’s view, was nomic resources available to support the defined primarily in spiritual terms and only weapons and men. In other words, we tend secondarily in material terms. to define power primarily in terms of mate­ The military strategy that Mao employed rial things; man is involved, but only second- in defense of the Kiangsi Soviet was guerrilla arily. Mao declared that this view of power warfare, i.e., the use of small units engaged in was too narrow. He based his wider view of hit-and-run, harassment-type operations. power on three arguments. Guerrilla war was a natural outgrowth of First, he argued that there was a broader Mao’s wider view of power, making max- set of resources available on which to build imum use of all the ideas within it. These two power—the most important of them being elements, together with the three essential the morale and will power of man, contin- principies, make up the basic concepts of the ually reinforced by political mobilization. He theory of People’s War. They were not, how- put it this way: ever, sufficient to preserve the Kiangsi Sovi­ Weapons are an important factor in war, but et. In its initial form, People’s War was a not the decisive factor; it is people, not things, failure.9 that are decisive. The contest of strength is not only a contest of military and economic power, After the famous Long March in the wake but also a contest of human power and morale. of the Nationalist destruction of the Kiangsi Military and economic power is necessarily Soviet,10 Mao put his theory into systematic wielded by people.6 written form—refining and expanding on the basic concepts as a result of his experience in In short, Mao concluded that man, who is Kiangsi. He seemed to have learned two les- spiritual, can defeat weapons, which are sim- sons. The first was that remote, rural bases ply material. That is why he believed man’s remained vulnerable to military pressure. To morale and will power to be such an impor­ relieve that pressure, Mao added to his theo­ tant source of power. Next, Mao said that ry the principie of political protection for material resources could be transferred from bases. In this particular case, it meant “If I one side to the other; this is the meaning can’t beat them, Tll join them,” and he began behind his statement that the enemy was the to advocate a second united front with the Communist transport corps.7 Last, Mao as- Nationalists against the Japanese. He suc- serted that one could increase his power in ceeded in December 1936.11 The principie certain ways that had not been fully exploit- of political protection for bases appears in ed in the past, the most effective of them the theory of People’s War in Mao’s formula- being proper definition of a situation. He said tion of a political objective for the war that one could begin with an overall inferior against Japan: “To drive out Japanese Im- situation and, by properly defining it, identi- perialism, and to build a new China of free- fy certain parts within which he was superior dom and equality.”12 That is quite specific for —that is, one could find superior subsitua- theory, but it was Mao’s style to put his tions; then, by acting within one of these su­ theoretical statements into concrete terms. perior subsituations and by continually To those who knew the situation in China at moving from one superior subsituation to an- the time, his meaning was very clear.13 other, one would eventually transform his The other lesson Mao learned in Kiangsi PEOPLES WAfí 47 [was that guerrilla warfare alone offered little mobile war was always primary overall with­ ihope for expansion. Successful guerrilla war in protracted war. It was also prime in stages depends on two basic advantages: full sup- one and three, because its role was annihila- port of the populace in the battle area and tion—destruction of the enemy—and de­ intimate knowledge of its terrain. When struction of the enemy is the key element of guerrillas begin expansionary activity, it is the dual military objective.17 Guerrilla war, inevitable that at some point these two ad- for Mao, was always secondary overall within rvantages will no longer apply. To overcome protracted war, but it was primary in stage the limitations of guerrilla war, Mao added to two; this is because guerrilla war can play his theory the concept of mobile warfare, i.e., two roles. When employed in conjunction the employment of regular forces engaged in with mobile war—when guerrillas provide offensive operations on big fronts over wide regular forces with assistance—guerrilla war areas. The concept of mobile war leads us can play an annihilation role. However, into a discussion of Mao’s entire military when employed alone, because of its inher- strategy within the theory of People’s War. ent limitations, it can play only the role of Mao began by saying that since the war attrition, gradual weakening of the enemy. against Japan was going to be a protracted This latter role made guerrilla war primary one, it was reasonable to assume that it would in the strategic stalemate stage. During this proceed through three orderly stages. The stage, Mao had to continue military opera­ first stage he envisioned was the strategic de- tions in order to maintain the initiative, but fensive, the stage in which the enemy had the one thing he could not do was cause so strategic superiority and the revolutionaries much trouble that he would call too much were on the defensive. Next was the strategic attention to his revolutionaries. To do so stalemate stage, during which the power of would bring down upon them the still over- both sides was more equal—because the whelming power of the enemy—resulting in revolutionaries had been building on their their destruction—before that externai force spiritual strength—but the enemy retained had a chance to destroy the enemys strategic the upper hand. The last stage was the strate­ superiority. Guerrilla war was ideally suited gic counteroffensive, in which the revolutio­ for this strategy. Finally, positional war was naries had gained strategic superiority and always supplementary in Mao’s view because become engaged in destruction of the ene­ its only role was attrition. It was not that he my.14 Behind this three-stage formulation discounted it totally, just that he believed it lies one very crucial assumption that Mao had uses only in certain special situations— made. He assumed that at some point during situations in which the revolutionaries clear- stage two, some sort of “externai force” ly had superiority and in which the political would act on the enemy’s situation in a way benefits of employing it were worth the mili­ that destroyed his strategic superiority.15 tary risks involved. To fight this three-stage war, Mao pro- That is the military strategy of People’s vided his forces with a purely military objec- War. Although it is the portion of the theory tive for war: "to preserve oneself and destroy that most American students—especially the enemy.”16 He also provided them with those in the military—concentrate on, it is three types of warfare, each of which was only one aspect of People’s War, and to Mao, related to the objective and the stages by a secondary aspect. To Mao, the primary as­ means of its role or function: mobile, guerril­ pect of People’s War involved political la, and positional war, i.e., the attack upon or mobilization of the people and the army: the defense of point geographic targets. To Mao, battle to make the political objective of the 48 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW war known to everyone; and the battle to army, and lowering morale. In a word, the mobilize the people to implement a political Japanese destroyed the Nationalist Party’s program that will achieve the political objec- control over a large segment of its population tive of the war.18 The primacy of political and contributed to its inability to regain that mobilization rests on Mao’s belief that power control after the war. is defined primarily in spiritual terms. To Meanwhile, the impact on the Communist him, political mobilization is the practical party was much different. Because they had means of actuating spiritual power. Political overextended themselves, the Japanese mobilization, then, is the key to the whole were unable to replace the Nationalist con­ theory of People’s War. Certainly, that was trol system they had eliminated, thus leaving the case in the Chinese experience. the Communists with an open field in which At the end of the Long March in 1935, the to mobilize the peasantry. The appearance of Communists were near the point of extinc- the Japanese also permitted the Communists tion. Yet, by August 1945 their power was to assume an anti-Japanese stance and argue almost equal to that of the Nationalists. Many successfully for the United Front. Not only explanations for that dramatic change have did this silence the remaining conservatives been offered, but they can all be reduced to in the countryside by creating fear that oppo- one point: successful political mobilization. sition to the Communists would appear pro- Such mobilization was the product of a very Japanese but it also alleviated the Nationalist complex web of interrelated and interacting military threat which in the past had inhibit- factors, and a complete explanation of all of ed peasant acceptance of the Communist re­ them may never be possible. However, there form program and hampered its are three factors that stand out as important: implementation. The Japanese, then, gave the Japanese invasion and occupation, the the Communist party access to a leaderless Communist economic and social reform pro­ peasantry that no longer feared the conse- gram, and the Communist organizational quences of attempting to improve its own lot ability. First, let us examine the effect of the and provided it with an environment rela- Japanese. tively free of military pressure in which to The Japanese invaded China in July 1937, operate.19 and by the end of 1938 they had occupied The next factor behind successful political most of the northern and eastern parts of the mobilization was the Communist economic country. The invasion and occupation had a and social reform program. The extent of significant impact on the situation of both peasant unrest in the 1920s and 1930s makes political parties. On the Nationalist side, it it obvious that the Chinese peasant had dis- drove Nationalist government officials and covered that there was some sort of better the traditional elite from rural areas, thereby life available, and he wanted that better life eliminating the party’s means of control over above all else. It was that better life which the peasantry. It also forced the Nationalists the Communist reform program offered him. to retreat from the Coastal cities that had The reports of on-the-scene observers and served as the political and economic power later researchers all lead to the inescapable base of the more Progressive party elements, conclusion that the reform program was the thereby increasing the power of traditional appeal that gained the Communists mass factions and in turn limiting the options support among the peasants.20 That support available to deal with needed reforms. Last, would not have lasted long had the Commu­ it weakened the Nationalist system in gener­ nists not been able to carry out their pro­ al by accelerating inflation, debilitating the gram, but they were able to do so, and the PEOPLES WAR 49 program had a significant ímpact on the life ty. Together, new material prosperity and of the average peasant in Communist-con- new personal dignity produced a population trolled areas. Economic reform produced that had a vested interest in Communist suc- newfound material prosperity, and social re­ cess—willing to fight other Chinese as well as form produced a new sense of personal digni- the Japanese in order to maintain the Com-

In 1965, Lin Piao, Mao Tse-tung's vice chairman and minister of defense, de- clared P eo p les War as valid not only for China but also "a great contribu- tion ... to oppressed nations and peoples throughout the world. ” The two old eomrades-in-arms had been fírm allies, as seen here, since the early days of the Chinese Communist struggle. 50 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW munist rule. In short, the reform program chological change in his mind—he found that created revolutionary potential among the it was possible for him to change his situation peasants of China. in life. Communist organizational ability, the The Communists were able to deepen and third major factor behind successful political reinforce this psychological change through mobilization, was responsible for effective the two-way information system, which from implementation of the reform program and the top down consisted mostly of education. for effective exploitation of the peasant sup- Education was limited to the basic “three port that it produced. “Organizational abili­ R’s,” but they were always taught with a ty” is a general term that is relatively highly political content designed to widen meaningless without some definition. In this the peasant’s world and to create in him a context, it is best described as the ability to: belief that, contrary to the old Confucian tra- — weld people into cohesive groups capa- dition, change was right and proper. Military ble of effective action, providing the vehicles intelligence was the most obvious contribu­ through which the policies of leadership are tion of the information system working in the translated into reality; other direction, but it also produced adminis- — employ the group structure as a two- trative feedback: information on ideological, way information system, ensuring that the organizational, and policy-implementation accomplishments of the movement as a problems. Because of its effectiveness, the whole and the policies of the leadership are Communist leadership was able on several known and understood by all the members occasions to act to correct problems that had and that the interests and policy-implemen- only recently developed at lower leveis. tation problems of all members are known Education, of cadres and soldiers in this and understood by the leadership; case, appears again as the principal method — maintain control over all members of of control. The education was so intensive the movement, enabling the leadership to that it might better be termed indoctrina- apply its policies consistently and to employ tion. Not only did it clarify policies but it also effective sanctions against those who resisted imbued students with the “spirit” of the or deviated from their policies. party. For cadres and army commanders, in- The role of organizational ability in the ternalization of this “spirit” meant that they War of Resistance is so pervasive that it is were able to carry out their duties with a impossible to do it justice in a few words. minimum of supervision, which was essential Here we can only sketch the broad outlines in the situation of the Communists, operat- of its contribution to successful political ing mostly behind Japanese lines. For ordi- mobilization. nary soldiers, internalization of the “spirit” The relationship of organizational ability meant that they religiously followed the to the reform program has been noted. Actu- “three rules and eight points,”21 thus making ally, the Communist party did not impose an invaluable contribution to the Communist reform, it inspired it. The peasants carried effort to gain mass support by producing the out the reform through groups—mass orga- first army in China that treated the peasant nizations and local self-government commit- with justice and dignity. tees—which the Communists had helped While there were many other factors in- them form. Thus, the peasant, for the first volved, the three noted above were the key time, gained a sense of participation in the factors; it was their combined effect that was determination of his own destiny, and recog- most responsible for the outcome. Their in- nition of that fact produced a profound psy- teraction might be compared to a Chemical PEOPLES WAfí 51 reaction in which the Communist reform however, these theories and strategies have program combined with organizational abili- increasingly deviated from the model, even ty in the presence of a catalyst, the Japanese to the point of contradicting some of its basic invasion and occupation, to produce success- tenets.23 This assessment leads us to the con- ful political mobilization. As Mao had ex- clusion that the influence of People’s War has pected, successful political mobilization been transitory. While its success inspired produced real Communist power: a Commu­ new forms of warfare, the doctrines behind nist party in control of vast areas of northern the new forms now have only a loose rela- China with the support of millions of people tionship to the People’s War model. and in command of an army of more than a Thus, the question of the health of People’s million men with a guerrilla force of perhaps War arises. What life it has had as a model for twice that number. Although it took four revolution since 1949 has, for the most part, more years to destroy the Nationalist mili- been breathed into it by Chinese efforts to tary forces, the outcome was virtually inevi- promote it as relevant to other revolutionary table by 1945, because the Communist efforts. Now that Peking has reduced its sup­ system had already vitally undermined the port for revolutionary movements, even that Nationalist political, economic, and social un- bit of life is fast ebbing away. People’s War, derpinnings. The theory of People’s War had then, is near death. Or is it? guided the Communists to victory—a new Could it be that the health of People’s War model for revolution had been born. might appear quite different if our approach to it were not so restricted? It could. Being so involved with our effort to analyze Peo- People's War in the 1970s ple’s War and assess the effect of Chinese Western observers usually regard People’s efforts to promote it, we have neglected to War as a model, a model for Communist-di- consider the existence of another perspec­ rected or Communist-influenced revolution tive: the perspective of those with a cause in the form of rural insurgency. That per­ but without the power to achieve their goals, spective is the product of our own efforts to those who—for lack of a better term—can be analyze the theory and its success, Chinese identified as “revolutionaries.” The revolu­ efforts to employ the theory as a foreign poli- tionary does not study People’s War seeking cy weapon, and Mao’s 1965 claim of univer- to compare it with his own or other strate­ sality. With that perspective, we approach gies; he studies it seeking help in his quest for People’s War as an indivisible body of power. To him, People’s War is less a model thought and judge its impact on revolution- than a source of ideas or principies on which ary activity throughout the world according- to build a strategy suited to his particular ly. We note that People’s War embodies a requirements. He takes what is needed and very particularistic model, Mao’s claim not- discards the rest. In this sense, as a source of withstanding. As described above, the theory ideas for revolution, People’s War has been evolved in response to particular conditions, very much alive and remains so today. problems, and events in China from 1926 to Of the many ideas within the theory, two 1945. No similar situation has developed are worthy of note here to illustrate the role elsewhere in the world as yet, and we cannot that People’s War plays as a source of ideas envision one arising in the future.22 We ob­ for revolution. The first is Mao’s idea that serve that People’s War did stimulate other power is defined primarily in spiritual terms revolutionary theories and strategies, caus- and only secondarily in material terms. This ing much disruption and difiBculty for us; definition is the keystone of People’s War, Chairm an Mao Tse-tung, author of the theory of People’s War, with his able assis- tant, Lin Piao, receives the plaudits of the people at Tien An Men Cate, at about the time of Lin Piaos 1965 proclamation. PEOPLES WAfí 53 and it constitutes Mao’s most significant con- ers and civilian leaders have concentrated on tribution to modern revolutionary theory. military action and neglected or ignored The revolutionary’s greatest dilemma is that political action.24 Consequently, they have he has been left with but one alternative, the fought—and often won—the wrong war. use of armed struggle, yet he is unable to French forces were on the verge of defeating employ it because he lacks the required ma­ the National Liberation Front in Algeria, yet terial resources. People s War successfully President De Gaulle granted the country in- solved that dilemma. It demonstrated that dependence. American and South Viet- people, rather than things, could be decisive namese units defeated North Vietnamese in war, that man could defeat weapons— and Vietcong forces on the battlefield time meaning that those who are weak can defeat after time, but a Communist regime now those who are strong if only they rely on the rules Saigon. In both cases, military success spiritual power of man. Spiritual power proved irrelevant: the war was lost political- makes armed struggle a viable alternative for ly.25 Armed struggle based on spiritual the revolutionary. power is by no means an invincible strategy, Spiritual power has had a profound effect but the conventional military approach is on armed struggle in later revolutionary inadequate to defeat it. Until that fact is strategies. The form has varied—guerrilla recognized, it will remain an effective tool warfare, mobile warfare, and terrorism have for the revolutionary. been employed, alone or in some combina- The other noteworthy idea within People’s tion—but all strategies have contained a War is closely related to the first: an “externai common approach to armed struggle rooted force” that destroys the enemy’s strategic su- in reliance on spiritual power. In that ap­ periority. A minor feature of People’s War,26 proach, ideological indoctrination and organ- it has assumed greater importance with izational efforts rank with combat in the recognition of its effectiveness in armed mission of the armed force; political consid- struggle based on spiritual power. The revo­ erations take precedence over military con- lutionary faces an enemy armed force he siderations in determining courses of action cannot hope to defeat strategically by mili­ on the battlefield; control of people is more tary means. People’s War suggests that he important than control of land; and psycho- may solve this problem by looking beyond logical defeat of the enemy rather than the immediate arena of conflict for some physical destruction of his war-making capa- type of pressure which, if brought to bear, bility is the ultimate objective. Armed strug­ will neutralize the enemy force. The pres­ gle based on spiritual power is just as violent sure may be political, economic, or military; and destructive as that based on the conven- it may be spontaneous or created. It origi- tional view of power, but its principies, pri- nates at a distance from the conflict and ex- orities, and objectives are far different. erts its influence on the enemy force Despite surface appearances, it is primarily indirectly. Once the “externai force” takes political, secondarily military. effect, there is no need to defeat the enemy Failure to recognize, or refusal to accept, force in battle or break its will to fight. Its the different nature of armed struggle based military capability has been rendered in- on spiritual power has been the major stum- effective; hence, strategic superiority has bling block for those attempting to counter been negated. it. Convinced that power is defined primarily Later revolutionary strategies have includ- in material terms, that weapons are the deci­ ed a conscious effort to create an “externai sive factor in war, professional military offic- force.” A classic example is the 1968 Tet 54 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW Offensive in Vietnam. It was a disaster for the “externai force” is devastating in effect and Communists on the battlefield, but a triumph difficult to defend against; it is a valuable in the United States.27 The shock of the offen- weapon in the revolutionary’s arsenal. sive crystallized the antiwar sentiments of Once we recognize People’s War as a the American people and produced the “ex­ source of ideas for revolution and examine ternai force” being sought by the North Viet- the function it performs in this role, yet an- namese and Vietcong. Although it was not other perspective emerges. The revolution­ immediately apparent, that force effectively ary is not the only world actor with a cause destroyed the strategic superiority of U.S. but without the power to achieve his goals. forces in Vietnam. A current example, some- Nations, too, often find themselves in similar what different in nature, is the Palestinian situations. The weak nation facing the strong, terrorist campaign. Unable to confront Israel the small nation facing the large, encounters militarily, the Palestine Liberation Organiza- the same obstacles at the international levei tion (PLO) faced oblivion in the late 1960s. It that confront the revolutionary at the domes- turned to international terrorism in an effort tic levei. People’s War can be a source of to create an “externai force” of world opin- ideas for it as well. It seems only a matter of ion that would compel the Israelis to recog- time before national strategies employing nize the PLO and eventually submit to its ideas such as spiritual power and the “exter­ demands. Clearly, the effort has succeeded to nai force” appear.29 Thus, People’s War may date. Pressure on Israel to accept PLO repre- be more than a source of ideas for revolution sentation at the Middle East negotiating ta- in the future, it may be a source of ideas for ble mounts steadily. Israel is now on the warfare in general, be it revolution or con- defensive against the PLO, its strategic su­ flict among nations. periority negated by the terrorism-generat- ed “externai force.”28 Our new look at People’s War, then, reveals History has demonstrated that it is virtual- that it remains very much alive in the 1970s. ly impossible to counter an “externai force” In fact, its role may expand in the future. It after it takes effect. The damage has been is apparent that the theory must be a consid- done, and adjustment to the new reality is eration in the strategic thinking of the the only course of action available. The de- American military. Revolution persists in the fense against an “externai force” is to pre- world, and People’s War plays an active part vent its development. Military and civilian in it. Despite the current mood, we cannot leaders involved in revolutionary situations assume that the United States will never must be prepared to look far beyond the again be involved in a revolutionary situa- combat area and identify potential forces tion. Moreover, since the United States is one that might adversely affect their efforts; then, of the world’s largest and strongest nations, it they must act to preclude the development is reasonable to assume that our future ad- of those forces. This is no easy task. If Ameri­ versaries will be comparatively small and can leaders had recognized the threat in weak. In either case, we may be confronted time, they might have been able to prepare with a strategy built on the ideas of People’s the public for the Tet Offensive and fore- War. stalled its disastrous effect. However, there That strategy will be based on a view of appears to be little the Israelis could have power that is radically different from ours; it done to prevent the pressures generated by will employ an armed force that works on PLO terrorism, even if they had been aware entirely different standards from ours. If we of the danger it posed beforehand. In sum, an are successfully to combat an adversary in- PEOPLES WAH 55 spired by People’s War, we must understand political, secondarily military. Our starting the principies on vvhich he operates, and we point is the study of People’s War. must recognize that his war is primarily Armed Forces Staff CoJJege

tneans of actions in the Pacific Islands. which actually destroyed Japan's Notes superioríty in China. 16. íbid.. p. 230. 17. Although "anmhilation" is the official translation. the Chinese term J. "Comrade Nlao Tse-tung's theoo' of people's war has been proved by hsiao-mieh also connotes dispersion or dissipation. suggesting that destruc- the long practice of the Chinese revolution to be in accord w ith the objec- tion of the enemy might not necessarily involve his physical destruction. tive laws of such wars and to be invincible. It has not onlv been valid for The significance of that connotation will become apparent later in the China, it is a great contribution to the revoiutionary struggles of the op- article. pressed nations and peoples throughout the world." Lin Piao. Long Live 18. Ibid., pp. 228-29. Later, Mao adds. 'There are, of course. many other the Victory of Peoples War (Peking: Koreign Languages Press. 1968). p. conditions indispensable to victory. but political inobilization is the most 95: origináliy published in Peoples Daily. 3 September 1965 fundamental." Ibid.. p. 261. 2. Chalmers Johnson, Autopsy on Peoples War (Berlteley: University of 19. It has been argued that peasant nationalism generated by thejapa- Califórnia Press. 1973). nese ínvasion and occupation was the decisive factor in the successful 3. For other analvses of People's War. see Howard L. and Scott A. Boor- Communist mobilization effort; see Chalmers Johnson. Peasant Nationalism man. "Chinese Commumst Insurgent VVarfare, 1935—19." Political Science and Communist Power: The Emergence of Revoiutionary China, 1937—45 Quarterly. LXX1 ijune 1966). pp. 171-95: Edward L. Katzenbach and (Stanford. Califórnia: Stanford University Press. 1962). However. Johnson Gene Z. Hanrahan. "The Revoiutionary Strategy of Mao Tse-tung." Politi­ overstates his case. In particular, he minimizes the effect of the reform cal Science Quarterly. LXX (September 1955). pp. 321-40; Katzenbach. program as noted in the subsequent discussion. “Time, Space. and Will: The Poütico-Military Views of Mao Tse-tung." in 20. See Edgar Snow , Red Star over China (New York: Random House, T. N. Green, editor. The Cuerrilla—and Hou to Fight Him (New York: Inc.. 1938); Jack Belden, China ShaJtes the World (New York: Harper, Praeger. 1962). pp. 11-21; Ralph H Powell. "Maoist Military Doctrines," 1949); Harrison Forman. Report from Red China (London: Hale, 1949); Asian Survey. VII i.April 1968), pp. 239-62. Donald C. Gillin. “ 'Peasant Nationalism' in the History of Chinese Com- 4. The Kiangsi Soviet period includes the vears from 1927 to 1934, munismJournal o f Asian Studies, February 1964, pp. 269-89. during which Mao established the Kiangsi Soviet in Southern Kiangsi. Hu- 21. The Three Main Rules of Discipline and Eight Points for Attention nan. and Fukien provinces. The theory of People's War is presented in were a set of regulations designed to govern the ordinary soldier's behavior, three of Mao's major articles: "Problems of Strategy in China's Revolution- for the most part his behavior toward the civilians he might encounter. The ary War" (December 1936), "Problems of Strategy in Cuerrilla War against rules were as follows: all actions are subject to command; don't steal from Japan" (May 1938i, and "On Protracted War” (May 1938). the people: be neither selfish nor unjust. The points were direct: replace 5 See Stuart Schram's introduction to Mao Tse-tung. Basic Tactics. trans- the door when you leave the house; roll up the bedding on which you've lated by Schram (New York: Praeger. 1966), pp. 20-25. slept; always be courteous; be honest in your transactions; return what you 6. Mao Tse-tung, "On Protracted War," Selected Militar) Writings o f borrow; replace what you break: don't bathe or urinate in the presence of Mao Tse-tung iPeking: Foreign Languages Press, 1968). pp. 217-18. Mao women; don't search the pocketbooks of those you arrest unless you have also pointed out that another resource was intelligence. Knowledge of the authority. enemy and oneself. he concluded. was a significant source of power. 22. Hammond Rolph. "People's War: Vision or Reality," Orbis, vol. XIV, 7. Mao. "Problems of Strategy in China's Revoiutionary War." p. 147 no. 3 (Fali 1970). pp. 572-87. 8. Mao. "Problems of Strategy in Cuerrilla War against Japan." pp. 177— 23. Johnson. Autopsy on Peoples War. pp. 87-102. 79. Although the idea sounds complex in the abstract, it is quite simple in 24. Two exceptions have been Ceneral Sir Gerald Templer in Malaya practice and often applíed in recent vears—w itness the Palestinian terror- and Ramon Magsaysay in the Philippines. See Brigadier Richard L. Clutter- ist campaign Another method of mcreasing pow er that Mao suggested was buck, The Long, Long War: Countermsurgency in Malaya and Vietnam the use of deception to lure the enemy into making his own mistakes. This (New York: Praeger. 1966); Charles T. Bohannon and Napoleon D. Valeria- idea Mao took almost directly from an ancient Chinese military strategist. no. Counter-guerrilla Operations: The Philippine Experience (New York: Sun Tzu. In faet, the roots of many of the concepts in People's War can be Praeger, 1962). found in the thoughts of Sun Tzu. 25. Edgar 0'Ballance, The Algerian Insurrection. 1954-62 (Hamden, 9. However. since Mao was not in control of the Communist movement Connecticut: Archon Books, 1967); Lawrence E. Crinter. "How They Lost: during the last Nationalist campaigns against the Kiangsi Soviet. his faith Doctrines. Strategies and Outcomes of the Vietnam War,” Asian Survey, in the worth of the basic concepts remained unshaken. XV (December 1975). pp. 1114-32. 10. In October 1934. the Nationalists forced the Communists to abandon 26. Mao made little effort to develop the “externai force" that he de- the Kiangsi Soviet. Over the next twelve months. the Communists marched scribed in "On Protracted War." He seems to have used the idea primarily some 6000 miles through the rugged terrain of western China to a new base to buttress his argument that spiritual power would eventually bring China m northem Shensi province; the joumey became known as the Long victory over Japan. The additional support was required because not all of March. Mao‘s comrades. particularly the professional military officers, had his faith 11 Dunng this month. Chiang Kai-shek was kidnapped by the troops of in spiritual power. and they often resisted his efforts to exploit it. See a warlord ally m what is known as the Sian Incident. Chiang was released William W. Whitson, The Chinese High Command: A History o f Commu­ only after agreeing, in principie at least, to the formation of a Second nist Military Politics, 1927-71 (New York: Praeger. 1973), pp. 24-100. United Front. The First United Front was established in 1922 and de- 27 There is much debate about Communist objectives in the Tet Offen- stroyed by Chiang in 1927. it was directed at defeating the various war- sive. If we accept the opinion that they believed it would produce a general lords and unifymg China uprising and result in capture of South Vietnam's major cities. we must also 12. Mao. "On Protracted War." p. 229. While the united front policy is accept the fact that they were carried away with their own propaganda interpreted here as an application of the principie of political protection That is highly unlikely; realistic appraisal of the situation was always their for bases, others have identified it as a principie in itself See Lyman P Van hallmark The only plausible explanation is that the offensive was planned Slyke. Friends and Enemies: The United Front in Chinese Communist for its psychological effect. We might also note that the Irish Republican History (Stanford, Califórnia: Stanford University Press, 1967). Army is attempting to create a similar effect in England through terrorism, 13. Obviously. the North Vietnamese and Vietcong received the mes- without success as yet. sage, since for most of the war in Vietnam. political protection was the 28. Emíle A. Nakhleh. “The Anatomy of Violence: Theoretical Reflec- pnmary defense for many of their base areas. We have only to recall the tíons on Palestinian Resistance," Middle East Journal, vol. XXV, no. 2 laments of U.S military officers about the political restrictions which pre- (Spring 1971), pp. 180-200. vented them from attackmg I^aotian and Cambodian base areas. 29. In some respects, the time has already arrived. Although the Vietnam 14. Mao. “On Protracted War." pp, 210-15 war was a revoiutionary situation, it was also a conflíct between nations— 15. Ibid., p 218. Mao argues that one or more countries will come to one small and weak, the other large and strong. The outcome speaks for China s aid in the war against Japan, and in the end, it was the U.S., by itself. FOUR MOMENTOUS EVENTS IN 1971 -7

Catalysts for Reform of the National Security System?

Major Harold F. Nufer. AFRES

; ERHAPS at no similar period in United sified, and no casualty figures or other nega- States history have four separate hap- tive results were reported by U.S. newsmen penings within a seven-month span so unless such stories were first cleared by the Pshaken the confidence of many AmericansPentagon. Possibly most U.S. officers and en- with regard to foreign policy pronounce- listed personnel are given “secret”* clear- ments and/or actions by the Executive ances for work with or access to classified Branch in international relations as did the information, whether given orally through events between June 1971 and January 1972. the chain of command or by written docu- Three of those events involved what has ment. Nevertheless, a need to know deter­ become known as the Pentagon Papers, a mines the matter: an American military man mammoth (47 volume) study covering the or woman will not receive access to classified decision-making process of the United States material simply by virtue of his or her clear- government vis-à-vis that area still known as ance listed on personnel records. South Vietnam, for the period of 1945-68. Still, there is a broader use of secrecy than The fourth happening appeared to be the that already noted, such as that found in the blatant disregard, by a Washington, D.C., rather amorphous area of diplomacy regard- newspaper columnist, for the top secret labei ing the national security of the United States. and meaning affixed to certain minutes of the For instance, although John Jay’s input into National Security Councils deliberations. Al- the Federalist Papers was modest, compared though these occurrences all fell within a with that of Alexander Hamilton and James seven-month period, the repercussions are Madison, he rightly should be credited with still being felt in the mid-1970s. a strong justification for secrecy in the con­ This article will focus, specifically, on three duct of international relations. Writing un- areas of inquiry: on secrecy as a national der the pseudonym of “Publius” (as did security shield by the Executive Branch of Hamilton and Madison), the learned New the federal government; on the conduct of York lawyer, Jay, in Federalist Paper No. 64, the Supreme Court of the United States stressed the following: when the nine justices on that tribunal are It seldom happens in the negotiation of trea- pressured into making extremely quick deci- ties, of whatever nature, but thatperfect secre­ cy and immediate dispatch are sometimes sions; and on declassification of documents requisite. There are cases where the most use- efforts by Executive Branch departments ful intelligence may be obtained if the persons and agencies, principally in the years since possessing it can be relieved from apprehen- 1971. The question to be answered through sions of discovery. . . . The [U.S.] President this exploration is the following: Have these must . . . be able to manage the business four momentous events served as catalysts of intelligence in such a manner as pru- for reform of the National Security Classifica- dence may suggest.2 (Italics added.) tion System? Jay was in part defending the powers of the American President as enumerated and im- plied in Article II of the U.S. Constitution, as Secrecy: well as in the “Supremacy Clause” found in A National Security Shield Article VI of that document;3 however, one The question of secrecy in the conduct of may turn to a number of U.S. Supreme Court military affairs is generally recognized as decisions and acts of Congress (in addition to necessary, especially in time of war. Thus, Executive decisions) to substantiate the many aspects of the American invasion of views expressed by the Federalist Jay on the North África during World War II were clas- need for secrecy in diplomatic and/or mili-

57 58 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW tary conduct of the Executive Branch.4 (John even though considered reputable, as were Jay later—from October 1789 to June 1795— those of the New York Times, the Washing­ served as Chief Justice of the Supreme Court ton Post, and others, later—is establishing a of the United States, resigning to concen- questionable precedent. As was suggested trate his full efforts as an American ambassa- (by this writer) the day after the Pentagon dor.5) Papers were first published in the New York More recently, there have been a number Times in June 1971, we had no way of know- of events in the thirty-two-year, post-World ing what delicate agreements or advising our War II era which, under the protective blan- State Department diplomats or the then Na­ ket aegis of national security, have retained tional Security Council adviser, Dr. Henry A. classified labeis on a need-to-know basis with- Kissinger, may have been engaged in at that in the Executive Branch. Twice during a very moment; for diplomacy is “ninety-five four-year period (1967 and 1971), I queried per cent covert.” Ten days later, the White Dr. William M. Franklin, Director of the His- House announced that Dr. Kissinger had just torical Office in the Department of State, to completed a secret trip to Peking and that obtain documentation pertaining to President Nixon planned to visit China in “background meetings” of administration early 1972. Through hindsight, one might officials and military leaders concerning the wonder how that trip to China might have decision-making process that led to U.S. en­ fared (if at all) had a “broadside blast” in the trance into a “strategic trusteeship,” under published Pentagon Papers included what the United Nations Security Council, for the might have been considered as insulting and, formerly Japanese-mandated islands of Mi- possibly, unwarranted references to Chair- cronesia during 1945-47. Both times, Dr. man Mao’s regime vis-à-vis the Vietnam war Franklin replied that such requested docu- still being prosecuted.9 ments were still classified.6 Barely three weeks after the first of six in- Cooperation does exist, however, between stallments of excerpts from the Pentagon Pa­ the Executive Branch and the news media pers appeared in the New York Times, on with respect to the public release of hereto- June 13, 1971 (followed by the Washington fore classified material, when practicable. Post on June 18), the U.S. Supreme Court Benjamin C. Bradless, executive editor of the made headlines during a brief four-day pe­ Washington Post, indicated that “the Execu­ riod in late June. The nation’s highest tribu­ tive Branch ... normally, regularly, routine- nal, by grouping the two individual cases ly and purposefully makes classifíed involving those two newspapers as one,10 Information available to reporters and edi- held an extraordinary Saturday session (on tors in Washington."7 (Italics added.) June 26) to hear the litigants (the New York Times and the Washington Post, as Plaintiffs; the United States [meaning, the Executive Branch], as Defendant) present their respec- The Pentagon Papers tive oral arguments,11 with a mere four days and the Court elapsing before that court’s per curiam deci- Although publishing excerpts in 1971 from sion was announced (on June 30).12 the approximately 7000 pages of documenta­ The per curiam decision in the Pentagon tion that represented the Pentagon Papers8 Papers Case was but three short paragraphs, may not have compromised diplomatic or followed by all nine justices writing their in­ military negotiations then classified, to rely dividual opinions, either concurring (as six on the judgment of editors of newspapers— did) or dissenting (as the other three justices FOUR MOMENTOUS EVENTS IN 1971-72 59 chose to do). The crux of the brief decision, ment guarantee of freedom of the press, was which ruled against the Executive Branch on articulated by the now retired Justice Wil- 30 June 1971, was as follovvs: liam O. Douglas, who, while acknowledging that "these disclosures [i.e., the publishing of “Any system of prior restraints of expression classified documents in the two newspapers] comes to this Court bearing a heavy presump- may have a serious impact” on the conduct tion against its constitutional validity.” Baniam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963). of American foreign policy, concluded by in- . . . The Government “thus carries a heavy dicting “secrecy” and gave strong support burden of showing justification for the imposi- for “open debate and discussion:” tion of such a restraint.” Organization fora Bet- Secrecy in government is fundamentally anti- ter Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415, 419 (1971) democratic, perpetuating bureaucratic errors. and the District Court for the District of Co- Open debate and discussion ofpublic issues are lumbia and the Court of Appeals for the Dis­ vital to our national health. On public ques- trict of Columbia Circuit in the Washington tions there should be “uninhibited, robust, and Post case [1971] held that the Government [i.e., wide open” debate .... The stays in these the Executive Branch] had not met that bur­ cases that have been in effect for more den. We agree.13 than a week constitute a Houting of the principies of the First Amendment.16 (Ital- Thus, in the opinion of the U.S. Supreme ics added.) Court, the Executive Branch, by seeking A proportionate amount of space in the lower federal court injunctions against the Pentagon Papers Case was taken by the continued publication of excerpts from the three dissenters on the Burger Court, led by Pentagon Papers, had, in the highest court's the Chief Justice himself, Warren E. Burger. view, failed to meet the “heavy burden of He viewed the Pentagon Papers Case as one showing justification” for the enforcement of in which the court was given insufficient time such prior restraints.14 to consider the salient issues, unless one Some 33 pages of the United States Be- would want to make the First Amendment a ports were required to express the concur- coverall for carte blanche rights of the press: ring opinions in the Pentagon Papers Case, In these cases, the imperative of a free and with Associate Justice Hugo L. Black (who unfettered press comes into collision with an- WTOte the majority opinion of the court) other imperative, the effective functioning of a maintaining that the Executive Branch’s complex modem government and specifically continued demand to have the federal courts the effective exercise of certain constitutional powers of the Executive. Only those who view maintain injunctions against the two newspa- the First Amendment as an absolute in all cir- pers in question from publishing classified cumstances—a view I respect, but reject—can documents was, in the words of that late ju- Bnd such cases as these to be simple or easy rist, “a flagrant, indefensible, and continuing .... We do not know the facts of the cases. violation of the First Amendment,” and No District judge knew all the facts. No Court of Appeals judge knew all the facts. No mem- Black further felt it “unfortunate” that some ber of this Court knows all the facts.17 of his brethren on the court were “apparent- We all crave speedier judicial processes, but ly willing to hold that the publication of news when the judges are pressured as in these may sometimes be enjoined. Such a holding cases, the result is a parody of the judicial func- would make a shambles of the First Amend­ tion.19 (Italics added.) ment.15 Possibly, the most extreme view by one of The late Justice John M. Harlan, in his dis- the six concurring justices in the Pentagon sent, also stressed the frenzied train of events Papers Case, with regard to the First Amend­ experienced by the highest court as it strove 60 AIR UMVERSITY REVIEW to deal with the Pentagon Papers matter in (Democrat, Montana), had promised, on 24 late June 1971, noting that “the briefs of the June, on behalf of his 99 colleagues in the parties were received [by the court] less than Senate, that the voluminous Pentagon Pa­ two hours before [oral] argument on June pers—then in the possession of that upper 26.”19 house of the U.S. Congress—would be placed Briefs of amici curiae (“friends of the in a vault and not released by the Senate court”) were presented at the 26 June oral pending action by the U.S. Supreme Court; arguments session by the representatives for thus, this conduct of Senator Gravei is diffi- the following groups, all on behalf of the cult to understand. That Gravei was a “dove” plaintiffs, the newspapers: the Twenty-Seven regarding the Vietnam war is well known. Members of Congress, the American Civil One may assume that the Alaska Democrat Liberties Union (ACLU), and the National also felt strongly in favor of the First Amend- Emergency Civil Liberties Committee.20 ment freedom-of-the-press rights which had One may vvonder why the Nixon administra- been argued the previous Saturday (26 June) tion chose not to have any amici curiae sub- before the U.S. Supreme Court by the noted mitted on behalf of the Executive Branch in American constitutional law professor, Alex- this instance. ander M. Bickel. The U.S. Senate took no censuring action against Senator Gravei for his unauthorized reading of excerpts from the classified Penta­ Senator Gravei gon Papers into the subcommittee minutes. Enters the Controversy However, there was talk among the senators United States Senator Mike Gravei (Demo- that such action should be taken.22 crat, Alaska) became involved in the Penta­ As for the New York Times and the Wash­ gon Papers controversy by unexpectedly ington Post, those newspapers resumed pub- convening the Subcommittee on Buildings lishing portions of the Pentagon Papers and Grounds, which he chairs under the Sen- following their favorable ruling of 30 June ate’s Public Works Committee, on Tuesday 1971 by the U.S. Supreme Court, with the evening (29 June 1971)—barely 14 hours pri­ understanding that the editors would be cir- or to the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in cumspect with regard to releasing any infor- the Pentagon Papers Case was announced— mation harmful to national security. to which Gravei invited news media repre­ Accordingly, the New York Times resumed sentatives. Then, to everyone’s apparent sur- publication of excerpts from the classified prise, the Alaska senator proceeded to read documents on 2 July.23 Other newspapers orally selected portions from the transcripts across the nation did likewise. of the Pentagon Papers. After several hours, Dr. Daniel Ellsberg was to stand trial, punctuated by pauses during which Senator along with his associate, Anthony J. Russo, Jr., Gravei literally wept over the contents, he on eight charges of espionage, six of theft, submitted the 47 volumes for inclusion in and one of conspiracy resulting from the pil- that day’s CongressionaJ Record. His actions fering of the Pentagon Papers. However, were to lead eventually to another U.S. Su­ when it was learned that John D. Ehrlich- preme Court decision in June of the follow­ man, then a White House Presidential aide, ing year.21 had approached the sitting federal district What made Graveis actions of 29 June judge involved—William Matthew Byrne in 1971 particularly unusual is that the then Los Angeles—and asked that judge if the lat- Senate Majority Leader, Mike Mansfield ter might be interested in becoming the next FOUR MOMENTOUS EVENTS IN 1971-72 61 Director of the FBI, Judge Byrne declared a Security Council shortly after hostilities be- mistrial for both Ellsberg and Russo, dismiss- tween índia and Pakistan ceased. Is it in the ing all charges after only four-and-a-half best interests of the Executive Branch to months of the trial, in May 1973.24 Thus, one have classified materiais publicly released by can see the Pentagon Papers controversy nongovernmental sources? Should the feder­ caught up in the web that became known as al government be forced into a declassifica- the “Watergate scandal” during 1972-1974. tion program by outside pressures? What has the Executive Branch done since 1971 to de- classify documents relating to the national Columnist Anderson security of the nation? Compromises Diplomacy The fourth and final event during the sev- en-month period from June 1971 to January Declassification Efforts 1972 that appeared to serve as a catalyst for since 1971-72 reform of the National Security Classification A school-book solution in the closing pages System did not involve the Pentagon Papers of this article would seem to credit the or the U.S. Supreme Court, although some preceding four momentous events as the im- legal action was comtemplated by the Justice petus for a ground swell in the declassifying Department. This last happening centered of documents in the Executive Branch in the on the public release by Washington colum­ interim since mid-1971. However, the facts nist Jack Anderson, through his widely syn- available seem to place the initiative at a dicated newspaper column during the point earlier than the Pentagon Papers con­ winter of 1971-72, of the minutes of certain troversy. For example, the Director of Infor­ top secret meetings held by the National mation Security in the Department of Security Council. Those minutes showed the Defense (DOD) referred to a Presidential di- public that the Nixon administration main- rective issued on the subject of declassifica­ tained, during the Indian-Pakistani Conflict tion in January 1971, some five months prior of late 1971, a pro-Pakistan position—when, to the New York Times release of the Penta­ at the same time, the State Department had gon Papers. That study within the Executive been claiming official neutrality with regard Branch in early 1971 focused on the then to those two South Asian nations. What hap- existing classification, downgrading, declas­ pened to Anderson as a result of his revela- sification, and safeguarding procedures of tions? He eamed the 1971 Pulitzer Prize “for the federal government and culminated in national reporting.”25 The New York Times the issuance of Executive Order 11652, on 8 also won a Pulitzer Prize that same year: “for March 1972.27 meritorious Service to journalism for its pub- The U.S. Army indicated that its declassifi­ lication of the Pentagon papers.”26 cation efforts dated back to 1946 and in- One may question the apparent double volved "all records origina ted before and standard of excellence cited by the above during WWII. ”2S And the National Archives awarding of the Pulitzer Prize. On one hand, became involved in the Executive Branch the New York Times was lauded for publish- declassification program also in early 1971.29 ing classified documents pertaining, in part, Thus, one may conclude that the Executive to warfare then being conducted in South- Branch initiated its own declassification east Asia; and Anderson was honored for re- efforts before the four momentous events oc- leasing top secret minutes of the National curred in mid-to-late 1971 and no doubt did 62 AIR VN1VERSITY REVIEW feel a spur to accelerate such reorganization- that the “‘Pentagon papers case’ resulted in al procedures as a result of the public’s con- the complete revision of the classification Sys­ cern over the Pentagon Papers and tem.”33 These four momentous events of subsequent happenings.30 1971-72 did have an effect on the declassify- Where does the Executive Branch stand ing of numerous governmental documents as more recently with regard to public access to well as on needed revisions in the procedures governmental source materiais? The U.S. Air for handling such materiais. However, the Force Chief of Staff, in commenting on the initiative for such changes predated the Pen­ Freedom of Information Act of 1966, which tagon Papers controversy of mid-1971. Over- was amended in 1974, stated: all, one may conclude that, in the words of The [Freedom of Information] act ensures the the then Secretary of Defense, Donald H. American public that its right to know what Rumsfeld, “the Department of Defense will goes on in its government will not be re- conduct its activities in an open manner, con- strained or suppressed for capricious reasons bv Federal agencies or individuais. However,/f sistent always with the need for security and does not automatically open every file and personnel safety.”34 document in the Air Force for public inspec- President Jimmy Carter, in his press con- tion. The security classification System is not ference just prior to Secretary of State Cyrus affected, and certain reports will continue to R. Vance’s unsuccessful trip to Moscow for maintain their “privileged” status and be ex- empted from disclosure under the act.31 (Italics disarmament talks with Communist Party added.) Chief Leonid Brezhnev and Foreign Minis- The Chief of the Freedom of Information ter Andrei Gromyko, in late March of this and Personal Torts Branch in the Office of year, declared his belief that foreign policy is Judge Advocate General commented also on a direct extension of domestic politics; thus, the effects of the above act, indicating that the new Commander in Chief reiterated his the 1974 amendments, which actually desire to “talk publicly about details of [for­ became effective in February 1975, are “de- eign] policy negotiations.”35 Whether Presi­ signed to make the workings of the executive dent Carter’s “open Presidency” in 1977 branch . . . more open by compelling the may prove to be a change in the secrecy nor- executive agencies to disclose their records mally found in the conduct of foreign affairs to the public upon request in a timely man- —as discussed at the outset of this article and ner.”32 Again the “timely manner” would practiced by each of the Chief Executives not compromise established classifications dating back especially to Franklin D. Roose- where the national security is involved. velt in 1940—remains to be tested in future The Chief of Information Security Divi- months. sion in the United States Air Force believes Houghton, Michigan

Notes 1. For an official explanation of the three categories of elearances—i.e., to convínce the voters of that State that the Constitution of 1787 had to be "confidentiaJ," "secret," and "top secret”—see Air Force Regulation 205- ratified by all 13 States as a vote of confidence for the proposed new federal 1. "Safeguarding Classified Material." 2 January 1968. government. The late Professor Clinton Rossiter, of Cornell University, 2. See The Federalist Papers (New York: Mentor Books. The New Ameri­ referred to The FederaJist Papers as "the most important work in poiitical can Library of World Literature, Inc., 1961), pp. 392-93. The Federalist Science that has ever been written, or is likely ever to be written, in the Papers, a collection of 85 articles which appeared in the newspapers of United States." and expressed his opinion that “The Federalist stands third New York City between October 27, 1787, and March 1788, was intended only to the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution itself among FOUfí MOMENTOUS EVENTS IN 1971-72 63 all the sacred writings of American politicaJ history." Ibid.. lntroduction, 21. See Cravei v. United States, 408 U.S. 606 (1972). The four charges p. vii. brought against Senator Cravei were; [first,) "the retention of public prop- 3. Article VI States that "this constitution. and the Laws of the United erty or records with intent to convert, [second,] the gathering and transmit- States. . -. and all Treaties made. .. shall be the supreme law of the /and, ting of national defense information, [third.J the concealment or removal . any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary of public records or docuinents, und (íourth.) conspiracy to commit such notwithstanding." (Italics added.) offenses and to defraud the United States." Ibid. Although Senator Gravei 4. See. for example, SícCulloch v. Siaryland. 4 W'heat. (17 U.S.) 316 and his legislative aides were not fined or imprisoned for their actions (18191; United States v. Curtiss-Wright Corp.. 299 U.S. 304 (1936); C dr S vis-à-vis the public disctosure of classified documents, the U.S. Supreme Air Unes v. Watennan Corp., 333 U.S. 103 (1948); the "espionage laws” Court did hear the cose on 19-20 April 1972, handing down its decision (18 U.S.C § 792-98 and 50 U.S.C. §783). and the Freedom of Information two months later. In essence, the highest court held, as follows: first. that Act (5 U.S.C. § 552. as amended in 19741. Cravel's aides were protected under the "Speech or Debate Clause” of 5. Jay was in the unique posittun of performing some "ambassadorial Article I; second, that the "Speech or Debate Clause" does not extend duties” while sitting as the Chief Justice. For a suceinct account of Jay's immunity to Craveis aides so far as tcstifying before a grand jury regarding activibes in both the Executive and Judicial branches of the federal govern- "the alleged arrangement for private publication of the Pentagon Papers" ment during the late eighteenth century. see Richard Hofstadter. William —and there were press reports that Senator Cravei "arranged" to have the Miller, and Daniel .Aaron. The Structure of American History (Englewood Pentagon Papers published by Beacon Press or the M I T. Press (see 408 Cliffs, New Jersey; Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1964;, pp. 82-89. U.S. 610)—and third, that the U.S. Court of Appeals' "protective order was 6. See Harold F. Nufer, "Unifying Factors in the Trust Territory of the overly broad in enjoinmg interrogation of [Cravel's] aide with respect to Pacific Islands: An Analysis for the Period of 1963-72,” unpublished Ph.D. any act 'in the broadest sense.' that he [the aide) performed within the dissertation. Tufts University, 1974. pp 8-9 and footnote 7. scope of his employment. since the aide's immunity extended only to legis­ 7. See "The Mass Media and Foreign Policy," Creaf Decisions: 1973 lative acts as to which the Senator would be immune." Thus, the U.S. (New York: Foreign Policy Association, Inc., 1973), p. 21. Supreme Court "vacated and remanded" CravePs case, in this instance 8. Originally known as the “McNamara Study," the Pentagon Papers returning such to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit. (See 408 covered the history of decision-making in the \'ietnam war from 1945 to U.S. 606-607.) March 1968. when that study was closed. See Dr. Daniel Ellsberg. “Secrecy 22. For a more recent review of the behavior by some senators and and Security," Cnsis in ConSdence: The Impact of Watergate edited by congressman. including Senator Cravei, see Mark R. Amold, "Kiss and Teil Donald W. Harward (Boston; Little, Brown and Company, 1974), p. 66. on Capitol Hill?" in the National Observer (February 21, 1976), p. 3. 9. Dr. Ellsberg said that he gave a copy of the Pentagon Papers to the 23. See "Supreme Court, 6-3, Upholds Newspapers on Publication of the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee in the fali of 1969. Ibid., p. 65. Pentagon Report: Times Resumes Its Series, Halted 15 Days." New York 10. The two newspapers were considered by the U.S. Supreme Court as Times, June 30,1971. p. l;alsosee“Victory for the Press," Newsweek, July one case on writ of certiorari to the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Second 12, 1971, pp. 16-20. Circuit (in New York) and the District of Columbia Circuit, respectively 24. See Ellsberg, "Secrecy and Security," p. 65. See .Yen York Times Co. v. United States. 403 U.S. 713 (1971). 25. See 'The Mass Media and Foreign Policy," p. 21. 11. The noted .American constitutional law professor, the late Alexander 26. Ibid., p. 14. M. Bickel. represented the newspapers involved; Solicitor Ceneral Erwin 27. Personal letter from Arthur F. Van Cook. Director of Information N. Cnswold argued the case for the Executive Branch. Ibid. Security, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Security Policy), 12. See 403 U.S. 714. Washington, D.C., 5 July 1974, p. 1. 13. Ibid. 28. Draft article, "World War II Records Declassification Management." 14. See 403 U.S. 714-15. (Washington, D.C.: Department of Army, Adjutant Ceneral Center) Re- 15. See 403 U.S. 722, 724. Joining Black in concurring were Associate vised: 15 July 1974, p. 1. Justices William O. Douglas, William J. Brennan, Jr.. and Thurgood Marshall 29. See James E. 0'Neill, "Secrecy and Disctosure: The Declassification —those justices then generally referred to as the liberais remaining from Program of the National Archives and Records Service," Prologue, V the old Warren Court (1953-69)—as well as Potter Stewart and Byron R. (Spring 1973), 43; see also David P. Young. "Secrecy and Disclosure; Brak- White, the latter two usually referred to as “swing" members of the court ing the Classification Machine," Prologue, V (Spring 1973), 41-42. so far as leaning to the lijjeral view or to the conservative argument in a 30. For an in-depth review of the security classification system as it has given case. affected the DOD, including the impact of the Freedom of Information Act 16. See 403 U.S. 728, 730. (as revised in 1974), see Daniel J. Birmingham, Jr., Colonel, USAF, "Prob- 17. Chief Justice Burger was refemng to what he viewed as the impossi- lems in the Security Classification System," Air War College Research Re­ bility of the nine members of the U.S. Supreme Court being able to digest port Summary, No. 5534 [1975], 55 pages. the contents of the 47 volumes comprising the Pentagon Papers (or, some 31. See "The Public Has a Right to Know,"a statement by Ceneral David 7000 pages) in the brief four days between the oral arguments on 26 June C. Jones, Air Force Chief of Staff, in the TIC Brief, published by The and the court's decision announced on 30 June. Normally, several weeks— Inspector Ceneral, U.S. Air Force, 25 April 1975, as reprinted in Supple- often. a number of months—will elapse between the arguments in court ment to the Air Force Policy Letter for Commanders, No. 7-1975 (July and the decision date. For example. nine months ensued between such 1975), p. 12. events in Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S 186 (1962), which was the watershed 32. Ibid. decision of that court respectmg reapportionment of State legislatures. 33. See "1974 Amendment to Freedom of Information Act," by 18. See 403 U.S. 748,752. All three dissentingjustices—Warren E. Burg­ Lieutenant Colonel James W. Johnson. Chief. Freedom of Information and er, John M. Harlan. and Harry A. Blackmun—were in agreement on the Personal Torts Branch, Litigation Division, Civil Law Direetorate, Office pressure felt by them in trying to come to grips with the substantive issues of Judge Advocate General, in Supplement to the Air Force Policy Letter in the Pentagon Papers Case in such a short time. for Commanders. No. 6-1975 (June 1975), p. 2. 19. See 403 U.S. 753. A typical brief submitted to the justices prior to the 34. See Air Force Policy l-etter for Commanders (Washington. D.C.; oral arguments may run over 100 pages in length. Office of the Secretary of the Air Force, 1 March 1976), p. 3. 20. See 403 U.S. 713. 35. See Los Angeles Times (March 24. 1977), pp. A-l and A-7. SHOULD WOMEN BE PERMITTED IN COMBAT? YES K enneth P. W errell

IKE other minority groups, women in re- cent years have made impressive ad- Lvances toward equal status. The military has been affected by these changes, sometimes leading the way, sometimes being pushed along. Until the 1960s, women in the military were definitely treated as special and inferi­ or. While still not granted equal status, ser- vicewomen have made dramatic gains in the last ten years. The right of women to remain in the Service despite marriage, dependent children, and pregnancy has been recog-

64 WOMEN IN COM BA T 65 nized. A Congressional quota limiting the law, not regulation—prohibits Army women number of women in the Service to two per- from combat. The omission of the Army from cent of the total personnel was eliminated in the combat ban, the absence of any Congres­ 1967. In June 1974, 3.5 percent of U.S. mili- sional debate on the subject when the meas- tary personnel were women, a figure ex- ure was discussed, and the fact that these pected to rise to 6.2 percent in 1978. In the provisions were added to the original by the Air Force the percentage is expected to rise House Armed Services Committee suggest from 3.8 (1974) to 8.5.1 Quotas on the num- that no one really considered that women bers of women in the various officer grades might go into combat.5 These combat exclu- have also been eliminated, and women have sion provisions seem to have been primarily advanced into general grade. ROTC was ful- aimed at keeping women from inadvertently ly opened to women in 1973. straying into combat and only incidentally The most recent victory for women, and a restrict them from combat. major one at that, was legislation allowing Until the 1970s, the military applied the women to enter the Service academies. In spirit of Congress’s wishes broadly by keep­ the summer of 1974, 15 women entered ing all but nurses off ships and aircraft. Since King’s Point, the Merchant Marine Acade- all Navy line officers and pilots can be or- my, and the Service academies followed suit dered into combat, women are not permit­ in 1976. The Air Force Academy enrolled ted in these job categories. The Air Force 157 in the summer of 1976, where, from all went one step further and restricted women reports, they have done a creditable job. officers not only from pilot and navigator Most agree that academy training is impor- slots but also from missile operations—cer- tant to success in the military, since top mili- tainly well beyond the letter of the law. How- tary positions have traditionally been filled ever, there are signs of loosening in this area. by academy graduates: 100 percent in the In early 1973 eight Navy women began pilot Navy, 82 percent in the Army, and 29 per­ training, and six earned their wings. The cent in the Air Force. Military jobs open to Navy also ran tests of women at sea but women have expanded greatly; although stayed within the law by using the hospital most servicewomen still serve in clerical ship U.S.S. Sanctuary for the experiment; roles, 434 of 482 Army jobs, 66 of the Navy’s when that ship was decommissioned, the 88 jobs, and 98 percent of the Air Force jobs program ended. In the summer of 1976, 19 by Air Force Specialty Code (AFSC) are now Air Forçe women entered pilot training.6 open to servicewomen.2 Still the legal barrier remains. It too will The last major legal barrier facing women fali: the only questions are when and how. in the military is the law barring them from Will the Services push for its abolition? Or combat. This law was enacted as part of the will executive action be employed as was the 1948 legislation that permitted women to case with racial integration of the military? serve as part of the regular and reserve mili­ Other possibilities are actions by either Con- tary. It States that women in the Navy “may gress or the courts. Finally, the passage of the not be assigned to duty in aircraft that are Equal Rights Amendment may end the engaged in combat missions nor may they be prohibition of women from combat. assigned to duty on vessels of the Navy other American women have served as noncom- than hospital ships and transports.”3 Similar- batants with the military throughout this na- ly, Air Force servicewomen “may not be as­ tion’s wars, but their status was not signed to duty in aircraft engaged in combat regularized until 1901, when Congress estab- missions. 4 Curiously enough, tradition—not lished the Army Nurse Corps. During World 66 AIR UNIVERSITYREVIEW War I about 11,000 American women per- women saw even more extensive Service in formed numerous military roles at home and combat, in partisan as well as regular units. overseas. In World War II these numbers and English women served in military posts, in­ roles expanded, with over one-quarter mil- cluding at antiaircraft artillery guns that lion women serving in uniform. About 40 carne under fire in the defense of Britain. percent of the women in the Army, the Female agents were parachuted into Ger- WACs, served with the Army Air Forces. man-occupied Europe. But it was the parti- More important, their performance was bet- sans and the Russians, fighting for their very ter and their problems fewer than most ex- existence, who made the most use of women pected. Relative to the average male soldier, in the greatest number of roles. Since 1945, the average servicewoman was more moti- women have fought in various guerrilla wars. vated (all were volunteers) and better edu- Today, Israel makes the most use of wom- cated. While the military was careful not anpower. Outnumbered and practically sur- even to hint that women might be employed rounded, Israel is a State under siege or, if in combat—going so far as to ban weapons you prefer, a frontier society where hostile training and drill with dummy rifles—a num- gunfire is possible anytime, anywhere. ber of women served on noncombat air- Women are drafted and receive weapon crews. As women were banned from aircraft training although they are not trained for between 1945 and this decade, it is germane combat. While Israeli servicewomen may be to inquire how they performed. The answer: assigned to combat units as noncombatants, very well indeed. The Women’s Airforce Ser­ the purpose of their Service is to free men for vice Pilots (WASP) program graduated 1074 combat.8 women as civilian pilots; they certainly showed their physical and psychological fitness and, also, that women could fly most M ANY HAVE argued for and aircraft as well as men.7 against women in the American military, The valuable Service of women convinced more often than not with greater emotion most of the military and Congress to regula­ than intellect. The best argument the critics rize their Service. This was accomplished in make to keep women from combat is that 1948 with laws that are still on the books. As there is no need at this time. While true as far already mentioned, two sections of this law as it goes, it misses the point. It is precisely at prohibit Service by Navy and Air Force this time when no emergency exists that ac- women in combat. tion should be taken to carefully plan and Of course women have served in combat. implement measures that can be applied in During the Bicentennial year we were bom- an emergency. barded with much, including the exploits of The best argument of the proponents is Revolutionary War heroines. There are sto- that of increased military efficiency. There is ries of other women in other wars, including always a need for recruiting the very best Americans, who served in the military while personnel, and to exclude a sizable personnel disguised as men, but they served as in­ pool such as women is ridiculous. Soldiers dividuais. should be judged on their ability to do the In modem times countries other than the job, not their age, color, or sex. In an all- United States have employed women in volunteer military, which is relatively small combat. In 1917 the Russians organized 1000 and expensive, quality must be as high as women into a unit with the awesome name possible. Military efficiency must be the first, of Battalion of Death. During World War II main, and foremost determinant. Further- WOMEN IN COM BA T 67 more, the presence of female soldiers boosts ties. Women might be captured by foes who, overail morale: British and Israeli experi- as in the last two American wars, have treat- ences indicate that the sight of women under ed prisoners with little regard for the rules of fire has a bracing effect on male soldiers. In war or Western traditions. True. But this some U.S. military classrooms, the presence concern should be extended to all soldiers, of females has increased the academic per­ not just women, as should concern for all sol­ formance of males.9 diers killed or wounded. If the thought of Some critics claim that women would be women being maimed and killed is repulsive unable to perform adequately in combat be- to society, perhaps it will be a welcome in­ cause of biological and emotional diflFerences. centive to choose carefully the wars we en­ Admittedly this is true of some women, but ter. Allowing only highly paid male it is also true of some men. Experience in volunteers to carry war’s burden makes war World War II indicates that women can take all too easy, which it should not be. the emotional and physical stresses of com­ A central concern of many of the critics, bat. Recently the Commander of the Marine however, is the traditional hang-up of sex Training Base on Parris Island asserted that and sexism. What of toilets and sleeping “there is no reason the female can’t fight just facilities? How will the military and the like the male.”10 country respond to the knowledge that men While the average woman is both physical- and women are living in close and stressful ly smaller and weaker than the average man, proximity for long periods of time? Prob- it should be noted that warfare has moved lems, yes, but should policy be based on prob- away from an emphasis on physical prowess. lems of this magnitude? Modern operations with missiles and aircraft Finally, there is the practical importance differ greatly from traditional warfare. The for servicewomen of changing this situation. superintendent of the Naval Academy told a Lifting the combat ban will permit the full Congressional hearing in 1974 that he would utilization of women in the military and be hard pressed to find a Navy combat job a open up avenues of promotion and roles now woman could not do.11 Or as former Chief closed. Combat has always been the acme of of Naval Operations, Admirai Elmo Zumwalt the military profession. No group banned said, “ ... women are able to do the work in from combat training and combat Service any rating, and there is no question but that can hope to achieve equality. Combat women will be able to serve in all ships effec- training and Service are symbolic of the mili­ tively. . . . ”12 tary and what the military stands for. Cer- Critics also note that the idea of women in tainly, combat training and Service are a combat is, in the words of an Air Force gen­ major factor in promotion. eral, “an offense against the dignity of Surely there will be problems. The inte- women.”13 What is more dignified than Ser­ gration of blacks indicates all too clearly the vice to one’s country? The rights and respon- difficulties of implementing an overdue and sibilities of citizenship should be extended to correct action which was, at the very least, all, not only to the male half of the popula- unpopular with numbers of the military and tion, and soldiering is one of the most impor- the general public. The same is true with tant and most basic of these responsibilities. women. But attitudes can be changed. The If the U.S. military is to be more than a band past performance of women in the military of mercenaries, our society must stress Citi­ and their present motivation and abilities zen responsibility. suggest that women can successfully handle Critics express concern over female casual- this challenge and opportunity. In the end 68 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW the measure should be simply equality across day, relative to other attributes. Not only did the board for all: black, white, rich, poor, American women pilots do well in World young, old, male, female. Military efficiency War II, but so did Russian airwomen who should come first. The criterion should be served in combat. One all-woman fighter simply: Can they do the job? The military unit downed 38 German aircraft, and at least and the country, as well as women, stand to two Soviet airwomen scored 12 or more of gain. Now is the time to try—slowly, careful- these victories.15 Former Secretary of De­ ly, and reasonably—without the pressures of fense Melvin Laird put it simply, “I don’t see war. why there shouldn’t be a woman fighter pilot What can the Air Force do? It can lead the . . . ”16 Even more impressive are the com- way. At the very least women should be per- ments of General John C. Meyer, who was mitted to train for combat and Service in po- responsible for 24 aerial kills in World War II: sitions that reflect the changes in the conduct “Physically, intellectually or emotionally, I of war—missile operators and aircrews. Why cannot see any reason why some women can’t women serve as missile operators? can’t be first-rate fighter pilots.”17 Physical strength is not a primary considera- First things first. Change the law. Train tion. Motivation, self-confidence, and psy- women. Assign them to all positions in the chological stability are the major requisites. Air Force. Then implement full integration. As all American intercontinental ballistic Finally, if war erupts, employ women with missiles (ICBMs) are deployed within the their units. U.S., there would be no problem with the Abolishing the combat exclusion of women question of capture. And if these weapons is more than a woman’s issue. It is an issue of are used, we need concern ourselves little justice, an issue of military effectiveness. On afterwards, if we have that luxury, with the these grounds how can this action be delayed welfare of the crews.14 any longer? This is the challenge for the Likewise, women could perform pilot du- country, the military, and the Air Force. ties. Again physical strength counts little to- Radford, Virgínia

Notc, Role of Women in the Defense Force of Israel," Army War College thesis, 1. Ceorge Wilson, "Women Seek Equality in Combat," Washington Post May 1974. (16 June 1975), Al; 10: U.S.C. Sect. 3209. 9. N. Goldman, "The Changing Role of Women in the Armed Forces," 2. N. Coldman, "The Utilization of Women in the Military," The AnnaJs American Journal ofSociology (January 1973); Wesley F. Craven and James (March 1973); "How the Military Is Putting Women into 'Men Only'Jobs,” L. Cate, The Army Air Forces in World War II; vol. VII, Services Around U.S. News and Wor/d fíeport (10 December 1973); "When Women Enter the World (Chicago, 1958), p. 522. the Service Academies," U.S. News and World Report (18 August 1975); 10. Major Ceneral Arthur J. Poillon quoted by Ceorge Wilson in “U.S. More Jobs for Women in the Military," U.S. News and World Report (21 Marines Now Looking for *A Few Good Women. RoanoJce Times (7 August 1972). March 1976), p. 2; Congressional Çuarterly (13 July 1974), p. 1820. 3. 10: U.S.C. Sect. 6015. 11. Phil Stevens. "Women at Academies," Air Force Times (26 June 4. 10: U.S.C. Sect. 549. 1974), 34:3. 5. Congressional Record, 80th Cong., 2d sess., pp. 4691-4719, 6958-71. 12. Television Interview, Dallas Times Herald, 7-7: B6. 6 "Young, Successful, and FirstSaturday Evening Post (October 1974); 13. Congressional Quarterly (13 July 1974). p. 1820. I-t- Cmdr. A. E. Norton to author, 31 December 1975; James N. Eastman, 14. Arthur D. Vaughn. "Is It Feasible to Employ Women on Minuteman Jr.. to author, 16January 1976; "Navy Women," All Hands (August 1975); Crews?" Air University thesis. May 1975. Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs), News Release 553-75 (20 15. Air Facts andFeats (London, 1970); E. Meos. “Russian Women Fight­ December 1975). er Pilots," Flight (27 December 1962), pp. 1019-20. 7. J. Merton England. "Women Pilots with the Army Air Forces, 1941- 16. Quoted in "Distaff Pilots? Why Not. Laird Asks," Air Force Times 44." Air Force Study #55.1946; Dorothy Shaffter. What Comes ofTraining (12 April 1972). Women for War? (Washington, 1948); M. Treadwell, United States Army 17. Quoted in "How the Military is Putting Women into 'Men Only’ in World War II, Special Studies: The Womans Army Corps (Washington, Jobs," U.S. News and World Report (10 December 1973). Also see J. Mer­ 1954). ton England. "Women Pilots with the Army Air Forces. 1941-44," Air 8. Israeli Defense Force. Chen (Tel Aviv, 1969); Verna Dickerson, The Force Study #55. 1946. SHOULD VVOMEN BE PERMITTED IN CO MB AT? NO Jacck.eu.nk Cochran

WAS asked by a congressional coinmittee should not be in combat. Imagine your Iand testiíied on wornen being sent to the daughter as a ground soldier, sleeping in the militar y acadernies I thought it was a waste fields and expected to do all the things that of money and effort on the part of our gov- soldiers sometimes have to do! It presents to em m ent to give wornen th»* u m e course that rne an absolute horror! is furrmhed the military cadets 1 also be- I don t think that you can draft wornen for beved then. as I do now, that it was a disrup- war and pick out the job» that they would be t»ve force to ha ve the militar > academies allowed to do. I think that you can have invaded by wornen There are some things wornen in th»* Service, as we did in World that 1 dont think wornen should be prrmit- War II, where their jobs are dcfined, but I ted to do I naturaily assumed that we would think it would be vrry diflú ult to assigri some never put wornen mto com ba t to combat and be selective as to the types of 1 have read the article by Kenneth F Wer* jobs they could do I believe that if wornen rell. who advocates that wornen be put »nto were ever drafted mto combat, the mothers combat If for no other reason than beca use and fathers would be up in arms. wornen are the bearers of children. they huiio, Califórnia 69 / í ? military affairs Mb,abroad

The major function of defence in national policy is to provide a form of power which can be used to infíuence the actions or opinions of other governments in the furtherance of national aims.1 Ministry of Defence working paper HE quoted statement was included in an in-house docu- ment circulated within the Ministry of Defence and serves T to indicate what was perceived in 1968 to be its principal or- ganisational objective. The document continued by outlining in simple terms three modes within which defence operated: dis- suasion (deterrence), prevention (defence), and compulsion.

BRITISH DEFENCE CAPABILITIES AND COMMITMENTS

A Dilemma in British Military Professionalism

M artin H. A. E dmonds M1L1TARY AFFA1RS ARROAD 71 need to maintain the countrys financial and objectives of defence planning economic strength.”7 In translating these objectives into practical The task of defence planning in 1965 was, reality, the defence planner in Britain has therefore, presented as a serious attempt to had to determine which actions or policies of match political commitments with military other governments need to be influenced, resources and to relate the resources made judge the most effective mode of influence, available for defence to the economic cir- and make provision for the appropriate mili- cumstances of the nation.8 The Statement, tary capability to exercise that influence. The however, provided no guideline as to which problem was to acquire a plan fitted to the was to have priority, the political commit­ foreseeable needs of the future and the ments of defence or the economic circum- means of meeting them.2 Such a plan re- stances of the nation. The only clear quired a clarification of the political assump- indication provided was a strong reluctance tions underlying defence policy in terms of because of the prevailing circumstances to the threat to the nation’s survival and the keep defence spending at a levei of around 7 role of the Armed Services in supporting na- percent of gross national product (GNP). tional objectives. In the light of these as- Defence capability is the appropriate ad- sumptions, the task was to determine the mixture of men, organisation, and equip- forces needed, the weapons they required, ment to fulfill a specific number of military and the organisation and control of the total tasks. These tasks should, theoretically at defence effort.3 least, be equated with commitments. More The 1965 Statement on the Defence Esti- accurately, defence capability is synonymous mates was more explicit and forthright than with the concept of kriegsbild, conceptual- usual. First, the accusation was levelled at ized as the relationship between the military the previous administration that BritaüTs de­ resources at the disposal of the State and the fence forces had been allowed to become manner and context in which they might be seriously overstretched and dangerously un- exercised.9 In the field of foreign policy it has derequipped. To some extent reference was been argued that a policy should not be con­ being made to the aftereffects of the 1957 sidered to exist if commitments are not bal- Defence White Paper.4 Although many of anced with adequate resources.10 A policy, the 1957 decisions were reversed in the early therefore, lacks credibility and fails to 1960s, their effect had been to create a capa­ achieve its objective if commitments cannot bility gap, especially in the area of combat be backed with effective action. The same military aircraft.5 Second, a new approach to argument applies to a defence policy com- defence planning, management, and control mitment; if it lacks credibility, then that poli­ was announced, modelled on that adopted cy commitment is worthless.11 earlier by the United States. This method was the programme budgeting process which, it was asserted, would equate more political and effectively the ends of defence planning and military commitments the costs of achieving them.6 Finally, the The credibility of a commitment depends on 1965 Statement reiterated more emphatical- a number of factors.12 Many of them concern ly a sentiment contained in the 1957 White the perceptions of those governments or na- Paper: “It is in the true interests of defence tions to which the commitment is directed. that the claims of military expenditure The factors that enhance credibility most are should be considered in conjunction with the the demonstration of the determination and 72 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW the will of a government to fulfill its obliga- within a given set of circumstances; the other tions. Declaratory commitments can only go is “an actual employment or intent to em- a limited way in this respect; credibility must ploy force in specific circumstances and ultimately depend on the evidence. In a mili- situations.”16 The latter is distinguished from tary context this must be the acquisition of the former in that the action, or the intention the means by which any policy commitment, to act, need not necessarily arise from an ob- or number of policy commitments simulta- ligation previously incurred. Commitments neously,13 could be met if the options were need not, therefore, be contractual; they can, exercised and the commitments invoked. In for example, be unilateral and declaratory.17 defence planning terms, the means refers to Military commitments must be treated on the men, materiel, and organisation together the assumption that they would be honoured with the operational tactical and strategic if invoked. The more likely a commitment plans covering the manner in which these can be honoured, the greater its credibility. capabilities are to be employed. The art of Contractual commitments are more credible defence planning, the art of taking on com­ than declaratory ones, simply because they mitments, is to demonstrate to potential ad- invariably necessitate preparation and a versaries not only determination but also the defined course of action. The difficulty is that futility of a challenge to policy objectives those circumstances defined in the agree­ through recourse to military means.14 ment which constitute a casus foederis are The concept of “commitment” has been open to wide interpretation; and there are identified as either situational, that is to say no instruments in law by which one State can an undertaking of a government, “the fulfill- force another to honour its commitments.18 ment of which is contingent on whether it Whether a State will honour a commitment still serves national interests in a given situa- depends in part on its degree of adherence to tion,” or nonsituational and refers to an un­ the principie that commitments should be dertaking, the fulfillment of which rests on “a honoured and in part on its ability to honour conviction that a government must keep its the commitment with the capabilities at its commitments.” This latter type of commit­ disposal. It stands to reason that these ment takes on “a symbolic demonstration of capabilities must relate not only to the com­ a country’s dedication to principies, security mitment but also give reasonable assurance interests, and other considerations removed that they will lead to a successful outcome. from the situation with which the commit­ No government, however well intentioned ment is concerned.”15 It is also significant to when a commitment was first adopted, will note that it provides a focus for and sense of honour that commitment if in so doing it purpose to the Armed Forces of the nation. would incur disproportionate costs.19 There The meaning of any military commitment is, therefore, considerable onus on govern- lies in the capability of a government to be ments with military commitments to provide able to fulfill it when a casus foederis arises. continuing proof of their intention to honour The problem, therefore, is first, how to deter­ them by possessing and maintaining a more mine when such an occasion has arisen and, than merely “sufficient” military image. second, who decides how the commitment Purposive, goal-oriented military planning should be fulfilled. Broadly, two types of has not been a distinguishing characteristic commitment exist: one is an undertaking of British defence planning over the past ten that is embodied in a treaty or documented years. The evidence indicates that military agreement in which a prescribed course of forces have been earmarked to meet a wide military action is defined at a specified time range of generally declared commitments MILITAfíY AFFA1RS ABROAD 73 without strong evidence of capabilities hav- five to eight years, depending on the type of ing been specifically developed or main- equipment and the extent to which it ex- tained for any one of them with the single tends the technological State of the art. Only exception of the independent nuclear deter- by purchase from abroad can the time cycle rent. This conclusion is to some extent of weapons acquisition be shortened effec- confirmed by the observation of military per- tively. Experience has demonstrated that the sonnel that Britain does not have commit- lead times on various advanced weapon Sys­ ments as such, no matter what the White tems have caused considerable problems in Papers might say. Instead, there have been forward planning and in cost estimation. numerous contingency plans that have been Weapons procurement can only be an imme- continually updated and modified by the Op- diately relevant exercise if military commit­ erations Planning Staff in the light of chang- ments and defence policy objectives remain ing müitary circumstances. reasonably constant. As a hedge against rap- These contingency plans are the de facto idly changing domestic and international en- kriegsbild of the Armed Forces. Their signifi- vironments, the British government has cance depends on what forces, equipment, reacted by encouraging the Armed Forces to and organisational structure can be put think in terms of multirole weapon Systems together at any one time and on the content designed to fulfill a number of military roles of intelligence reports of potential adversar- and meet the requirements of a range of ies. This is the capability that is intended to commitments. Whilst this approach may ap- give credibility to British military commit­ pear to have made political and economic ments; but no matter how professional,20 effi- sense, it has not entirely enjoyed the support cient, or successful the planning staff may be of the Armed Services. in formulating these plans or moulding a The time required to effect organisational kriegsbild suited to all likely military opera- changes within the Armed Services and the tions, the fundamental consideration is the central organisation for defence is about five relevance of these hypothetical plans and years. All organisations take time to adjust to structures to the declaratory and contracted new procedures and new structural relation- politico-military commitments prevailing at ships. Since 1965 there have been a number the time. of major organisational and structural re- forms both within the British Armed Forces and the Ministry of Defence. Indeed, re-or- the equation of commitments ganisation appears to have been a persistent and capabilities activity, and by the time that one set of or­ To reiterate, the prime objective of defence ganisational reforms has been absorbed, an- planning is to balance equipment, manpow- other set is already in train. er, and organisation with policy; it is, simply, Changes in defence policy and military to equate capabilities with commitments. commitments need take no longer than a Achievement of this objective is complicated few months. In most cases of a major defence by the difference in the time period needed review in Britain since 1965, it was en- to introduce new military equipment com- visaged that policy changes would be put pared with that either to instrument change into effect over a period of time, so that the in the Armed Forces’ organisation or to effect fullest use of defence equipment could be an alteration in defence policy. The lead made and its disruptive effect minimised. time in the development and production of Despite the intention, there have been in- new defence equipment is in the range of stances when commitments have changed 74 AIR UMVERSITY REVIEW overnight and equipment summarily can- ally and ideologically committed to a celled. Under such circumstances, the objec- thorough review of defence policy and de­ tive of keeping capabilities and fence expenditure. However, there were commitments balanced must have been vir- other, more more pressing, reasons. First, tually impossible. What is more significant, there was ample evidence that British forces however, is the question of how long it was were overcommitted and underequipped.22 estimated it would take to restore the three Second, the reforms introduced into the cen­ variables into equilibrium. Equally impor- tral organisation for defence by the Conser- tant is the question of what is the disruptive vative administration had still to be effect of policy change on the British Armed completed. And last, the economic situation Forces and their professional ethos. was such that overall defence expenditure The responsibility of advising the British would have to be reviewed in relation to nec- government on strategy and military opera- essary cuts in public expenditure. tions and on the military implications of de- The State of the economy proved to be the fence policy commitments is vested in and highest priority. Government policy re- assumed by the Chiefs of Staff Committee, quired that defence policy should be re­ although much of the initiative for defence viewed in the light of a financial ceiling on studies on policy, requirements, and opera- the annual defence budget within five years tions may have fallen to the Chief of Defence provisionally put at £2,000 million at 1964 Staff.21 It has fallen to the Chiefs of Staff Com­ prices.23 The ceiling, which ceased to be mittee over the past ten years to try and con- provisional after July 1965, represented a struct a kriegsbild for the British Armed saving of 16 percent in defence expenditure Forces within the context of a number of on the projected defence budget for 1969 rapidly changing and increasingly stringent and marked a drop in defence expenditure political and economic constraints. In the ab- from 7 percent to 6 percent of the estimated sence of details of these commitment-related gross national product. Early studies suggest- contingency plans, an assessment of whether ed that considerable saving could be effected a credibility gap has existed, or still exists, by a number of equipment cancellations and between capability and commitment in Brit­ substitutions. Within a few months the provi­ ish defence planning must be based on the sional fifth Polaris submarine was cancelled stated assumptions about defence policy and several substitutions were made in Royal planning and evidence from the public Air Force (RAF) equipment. TSR.2 and the record. This necessitates examining not so HS 681 were replaced by the United States much the effects of recent defence policy F-111A and C-130E, respectively, the HS changes as the cumulative effects of policy P.1154 supersonic VTOL fighter by the sub- changes over the past ten years. Such evi­ sonic development aircraft, the P.1127 Har- dence as there is suggests immediately that rier, and the Hunter ground support fighter the credibility of the British governmenfs replaced by the American F-4 Phantom. Al­ politico-military commitments is seriously though the impact of these changes on the open to challenge. British aerospace industry was enormous, they did have the merit that the lead time on new aircraft was considerably shortened and Defence Policy Planning 1964-74: consequently improved military capability Capabilities and Commitments in the short to médium term, given prevail- On taking office in the autumn of 1964, the ing commitments. incoming Labour administration was elector- The Labour Governmenfs Defence Re- MILITARY AFFAIfíS ABROAD 75 view was completed by the end of 1965. It situational” reasons the government re- demonstrated that even with the cancella- tained its declaratory policy to maintain a tions and substitutions already effected, the military presence East of Suez.28 The Re­ target budgetary ceiling could not be view, however, failed to effect the savings achieved without further cuts involving required of it by £50 million. Army ground forces, RAF strike capability, As a result of this second Defence Review, or the Navy’s attack carrier programme. “All an observation was made at the time that: were options with serious implications for If ... one considers all the cuts made ... since military commitments.”24 In this event, the 1964 it is difficult to relate them to any coher- ent central pattern or plan. They give the im- Navy carrier programme was terminated pression of having been made piecemeal as and a number of severe conditions applied to and when recurrent economic failures dictated defence commitments “East of Suez.”25 ... Thus on paper Britain is still committed to These conditions were so limiting that it was a global strategy with forces that are not only debatable whether in the event that these unbalanced but which also lack the flexibility commitments were invoked they could ever which is so essential.29 be met.26 Whatever the accuracy of this observation, There is ample evidence that the Defence the situation again changed dramatically fol- Re view of 1964-65 was considered a final lowing the announcement of the devaluation one, and that subject only to marginal updat- of the pound in November 1967. In January ing, no further policy change would be intro- 1968 an announcement was made during the duced for at least another five years or so. A debate on Public Expenditure that the Gov­ number of major equipment decisions had ernment intended to withdraw British forces been taken, commitments had been upheld, from the Far East and the Persian Gulf by albeit on a conditional basis, and the whole 1972. Although the commitment to station exercise had been accomplished not only forces East of Suez was therefore terminat­ within the context of the government’s “Na­ ed, the declaratory commitment to contrib- tional Plan” but also on the basis of “objec- ute forces to maintain peace in the area, tive” cost studies incorporated within the should the circumstances arise, was nonethe- defence policy planning process. Confidence less retained. In line with this reduction in that a firm foundation had been laid was soon commitment and to effect immediate econo- to be shattered. mies, the F-l 1 IA and the Chinook helicopter The July 1966 economic crisis evidently were cancelled, and the carrier Victorious necessitated defence cuts. Directives were was not to be recommissioned after her over- given for the 1969-70 ceiling defence budg- haul.30 Without the F-l 11 A, the “tokenism” et to be reduced from £2,000 million to £1, of the East-of-Suez declaratory commitment 850 million. A second Defence Review was was brought finally to an end. therefore initiated in the middle of 1966 and The Statement on the Defence Estimates emerged in July 1967. This time emphasis in February 1968 merely confirmed these was predictably placed on cutting back mili­ decisions and detailed the speed of the with­ tary commitments in the interests of reliev- drawal. It also re-emphasized the British ing pressure on the balance of payments. commitment to North Atlantic Treaty Orga- Military equipment, however, was left al- nization (NATO) and made Europe the focus most untouched. The major decisions were of British defence planning. However, it still to reduce the British forces in Europe and to made provision for a general capability based start a phased withdrawal of forces from in Europe that would be deployed overseas Malaysia and Singapore.27 Perhaps for “non- as circumstances demanded.31 In thelightof 76 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW the meaningfulness of declaratory military To this end a “token,” and largely naval, commitments discussed above32 and of presence was committed to the Far East, the equipment cuts over the preceding four last remaining carrier was kept in commis- years, this commitment must be considered sion for an extended period, additional naval to have had little credibility. capability was to be provided through a ship- A cut in defence expenditure, however, borne guided missile, the “Exocet,” a Fire does not necessarily mean either a reduction Power Agreement signed to cover combined in security or a diminution in capability. military operations in the Far East, and the Devaluation helped towards balancing capa­ Territorial Army Reserve expanded. These bility and commitment and in so doing raised additional commitments were claimed to the credibility of BritahTs remaining military have been achieved at little extra cost to the commitments. In consideration of the subse- taxpayer through more “effective” use of re- quent military engagement in Northern Ire- sources.36 land, the decision to withdraw might now be seen to be fortuitous, before the lack of credi­ bility of the East of Suez commitment the defence cuts of 1974-75 became wholly evident. Furthermore, the After the defeat of the Conservative adminis­ decision coincided with a shift in NATO tration, the new Labour Secretary of State strategy following the Harmel Report and for Defence announced on 21 March 1974 enabled the Secretary of State for Defence to that the Government had “initiated a review announce with some conviction that with the of current defence commitments and new focus on a European commitment it capabilities” against the resources that could would be possible to have “balanced and be devoted to defence with the view of effective forces which offer a good career to achieving savings on defence expenditure those who serve in them.”33 This was a sec- over a period while maintaining “a modern ond fresh start, in respect of which a number and effective defence system.”37 The extent of major equipment decisions became pos­ of these savings was announced on 3 Decem- sible for roles specifically designed for the ber 1974; defence expenditure was to be re- European theatre and which conveniently duced progressively as a proportion of gross coincided with a political objective to join national product from 6.6 percent in 1974 to the European Economic Community.34 41/2 percent in 1984. This, it was calculated, Redundant forces and equipment trained would effect a total saving of around £4,700 and designed specifically for Britain’s global million at 1974 prices.38 The details of the commitment were redirected as part of Brit- savings were less significant than the un- ain’s expanded commitment to NATO. equivocal assertion that the ten-year pro- Upon the defeat of Labour at the general gramme would achieve “a new balance election in 1970, the now obligatory Defence between commitments and capabilities to Review by a new administration was under- meet the Governmenfs strategic priorities.” taken. In real terms, very little of significance To assist in obtaining this objective, the Re­ happened although a declaratory military view not only determined that commitments commitment to retain a military interest outside Europe would be “reduced as far as East of Suez was reaffirmed. The govern- possible” but also identified after discussions ment asserted that it would “honour [its] ob- with NATO and European allies the areas ligation for the protection of British where and how the British military forces territories overseas and those to whom [it] could most effectively contribute. The effects owes a special duty by treaty or otherwise.”35 of these decisions on the Services were to be MILITARY AFFAIRS ABROAD 77 minimized by taking full advantage of the would leave Britain with military capabilities ten-year period envisaged under the pro- that fell far short of the optimum. And yet gramme: natural wastage both in manpower the credibility of the long-term plan depend- and equipment was to be used to the full, ed on the political will of the Government replacement programmes for equipment not to change its mind or bend before further were to be reduced or stretched, entirely pressures to cut defence in face of a worsen- new weapon systems were to be cancelled or ing national economy. Although pressure reduced, and those specialized units that had was put on the Secretary of Defence from been established primarily for non-European the left wing of the Labour Party to cut de­ commitments, such as the RAF transport fence spending—figures of up to £500 mil- fleet, reduced or disbanded. lion were quoted—the Chiefs of Staff The prospect of effecting these economies evidently called a halt; enough was enough. was received by the Armed Services with Any further cuts, as the Expenditure Com- misgiving. The effects, both personally and mittees Defence and Externai Sub-Commit- institutionally, were not to be taken lightly, tee found out during 1975, would impair since they followed in the wake of three ma­ further “the very serious situation which jor defence reviews in ten years the cumula- confronts NATO.”39 tive impact of which had not been absorbed either separately or collectively. To soften the impact of the 1975 defence cuts, the commitments, cuts, and Government made a commitment to the military professionalism Armed Services that their essential require- The four defence reviews between 1965 and ments for meeting commitments in Europe 1975 ha ve led to one basic conclusion: de­ would be met in full. As a consequence the fence spending during the period must be Navy’s cruiser programme, the procurement seen in the context of overall Government of the multi-rate combat aircraft (MRCA), objectives. This has been manifested in terms and major items of equipment for a modern of a defence budgetary ceiling expressed as a mobile field army in Central Europe were percentage of GNP. But the period has also left predominantly alone. Such Armed been marked by periodic economic crises, Forces re-organisation as was necessary to and the defence ceiling has been changed trim costs was designed to eliminate or frequently; military and defence policy plan- reduce elite units, such as the Parachute ners have therefore been unable to establish Regiment, and to shift the ratio of “teeth” a firm “base-line” from which to work out arms to administration and support groups. fully their kriegsbild within a framework of For a while it appeared that the lesson of political and military commitments. The the effects of the previous ten years of half- effect, at the time of the last Defence Re- initiated or half-completed defence reviews view, was to leave the British Armed Forces had been learnt. A long-term plan had been in much the same situation that they were in initiated, twice as long as any previous one, at the beginning of the period, overstretched but, more important, an attempt was made and underequipped. The claim that defence to equate specific European commitments planning is a “continuous process” has with specific capabilities in concert with Brit- proved to be ill-founded in practice.40 ain’s allies. A target had been set for the To some extent the gap between capability Armed Services which offered “relevance” and commitments created by successive in equipment, organisation, and manpower, weapon programme cancellations, substitu- even if the intervening period of adjustment tions, cutbacks, and stretches, and force re- 78 AIR UMVERSITY REVIEW organisations, reductions, and redeploy- met. In essence, they have been prevented ments has been filled by expedients made from fulfilling the requirements of their possible through a high element of luck.41 profession. The expedients include such devices as sub- On the one hand, military professionalism stitution of one weapon system for another, demands that the Services do their best to the use of obsolete equipment beyond their fulfill the commitments of their political mas­ planned operational life, extended use of ters. To a large degree the British military limited numbers of weapons between have done this, albeit at some cost to their maintenance and refits, the use of defective own sense of integrity by way of a “cover-up” equipment, and the restriction of training operation of the real extent of their situation. with live ammunition to the absolute mini- This expedient may have helped disguise the mum. For the professional military the situation, and the public at large may have whole period has been one that has taken been unaware of its full extent, but the effect their adaptability, initiative, and ingenuity as it has had on the morale of the Services and well as their readiness to operate long hours the attractiveness of the military as a career in units that are undermanned and doing has, in the opinion of many servicemen, as- tasks for which they were not primarily sumed serious proportions. On the other trained. hand, the professional ethic of the British Whilst the practical impact of the defence Armed Forces demands subservience to reviews was a source of irritation to the political masters and noninvolvement in Armed Services, the major source of frustra- politics and presupposes a responsibility to tion was the realization that the military society to guarantee a minimum levei of commitments which they had an obligation competence and an obligation to act when to fulfill were likely beyond their capability circumstances demand and political direc- of meeting. Furthermore, sudden changes— tions are issued. first in equipment and not policy, then in During the 1964-74 period, the successive policy and not equipment, then in both si- policy changes, structural alterations, and multaneously before any obsolete equip­ equipment cancellations and substitutions ment had been replaced from the late have immediately affected the professional 1950s—left a feeling of apprehension and re- ethos of the British Armed Forces and con- sentment about what was to happen next. fronted them with a dilemma. It has been Little wonder that the military were scepti- suggested above that a credibility gap has cal of any defence pronouncement. existed between military commitments and Military professionalism in the West ideal- capabilities and that this gap has only been ly demands subservience to political masters seen to have been filled through a combina- and noninvolvement in partisan politics. It tion of luck, military adaptability, and the also presupposes a responsibility to society to commitment of the individual serviceman. guarantee a minimum levei of competence But as it is unreasonable for the military and an obligation to act when circumstances professional to plan to meet commitments demand. During the ten years prior to 1975, made by politicians when these plans are successive reviews have immediately affect- continually being thwarted by circumstances ed the British Armed Forces and their over which they have no control, so it is professional ethos. This has largely been be- wrong to expect the military to continue to cause the perceived requirements of the be compliant. military to meet the obligations that politi- The evidence suggests that since early cians have defined for them have not been 1976 the British military hierarchy, respon- MILITARY AFFAIRS ABfíOAD 79 sive to pressure from below, has been less where his professionalism is publicly com- compliant than previously regarding politi- promised. cal pressure for further defence cuts. Ru- mours of additional cuts beyond the £4,700 T he solution would appear from the British million announced in 1975 amounting to experience to be straightforward. From a £ 800 million have not materialized; in the morale point of view it would be preferable process of reducing public expenditure fur­ to have a military capability in excess of com- ther, the Ministry of Defence has come off mitments; situations where the military have lightly. It would appear that the military felt themselves not to be up to the task, or have finally dug in their heels. have felt themselves to be up to it but with In support of their stand, the military have little in reserve, have had an erosive effect. taken the unusual and almost unprecedent- Even with this change of philosophy, for in- ed step of taking their case into the public deed such an alteration would be precisely domain. In the press and on TV the service this, the principal problem of planning chiefs have been reported as saying that past would remain, which is to achieve a balance economies have taken almost as much as is of organisation and equipment within a giv- possible without leaving Britain with virtual- en time frame. For this to be achieved, great- ly no viable defence capability at all, an argu- er emphasis should be placed on continuity ment supported by their increasing emphasis of policy. Limited commitments would help on the recent expansion of Soviet conven- towards this, as well as projecting, for inter­ honal capability. As a part of this exercise in nai and externai consumption alike, a more publicizing the criticai issues facing the Brit- realistic assessment of Britains ability to hon- ish defence forces, the British public have our its obligations. Without this change not been presented with the picture on televi- only will the British Armed Forces continue sion of a sênior RAF officer saying, on the one to be in a State of disequilibrium but also the hand, that enough is enough as far as cuts worth of British commitments will be judged were concerned yet reassuring his audience by other States—increasingly in a “situation- that the RAF is as efficient and effective as al” and merely declaratory light. ever before.42 It is a reflection of the times University of Lancaster that a serviceman be placed in a position England

Notes 1 Deciston Malting in Defence, mimeographed. Ministry of Defence 8. Statement on the Defence Estimates, Cmnd. 2592, February 1965, p. worlung paper. December 1968. 5. 2 Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, Hansard, 3rd Mareh 9. H. Beach. "Note on the Part Played by Kriegsbild in British Defence 1965. CoL 1352. These words have been attributed to Secretary of State Policy." mimeographed, USSG working paper, Edinburgh 1970, p. 1. Denis Healey himsetf. 10. Walter Lippmann, "U.S. Foreign Policy. Shield of the Republic." 3. Statement on the Defence Estimates, Cmnd. 2592. February 1965, p. cited by P. Seabury and A. Drischler, "How to Decommit without With- 6 drawal Symptons," Foreign Policy, vol. 1. 1970-71, p. 47. 4 Defence Outline of Future Polícy. Cmnd. 124, April 1957, p. 9. II P. Nailor, "Management of Britain's Externai Relations: Defence 5 Fbght International, 19 December 1963, pp. 994-99 Policy." in J. Groom and R. Boardman, The Management of Britain 's Exter­ 6 Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, Hansard, 3rd Mareh nai Relations (London: Macmillan. 1973). Professor Nailor discusses the 1965. Col. 1350 problems of the relationship between defence and foreign policy with 7 Defence Outline of Future Policy, Cmnd. 124. April 1957, p. 1. reference to long- and short-term planning and how defence planners try 80 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

to bridge the gap between utility and uncertainty. He has implied, how- 27. Supplementary Statement on Defence Policy, Cmnd. 3357, July ever. that whilst military force stiíl has utility. it is increasingly being "ques- 1967, p. 5. The decision was to halve the forces in the Far East from 80 000 tioned as an essential component of major policy making." Pp. 230 et seq. to 40,000 by 1970-71. 12. For a discussion of these. see T. Schelling, Arms and Infíuence (New 28. Ibid. Here the supplementary statement begins to play with words. Haven: Yale University Press. 1966). pp. 35-91. See especially pp. 49-59. It States, "we shall continue to honour our obligations under SEATO, but 13. J. T. Howe, Multicrises (Cambridge: Massachusetts Institute of Tech­ forces assigned to specific SEATO plans will be progressively altered in nology Press, 1971). pp. 31 -36 and passim. Howe investigates issues of U.S. nature and size." There is no attempt to clarify what constitutes an "obliga­ overcommitment arising from the existence of a wide range of commit- tion''; since the same paragraph refers to the fact that it was the govem- ments and obligations at the same time as the war in Vietnam. ment's intention to change commitments in the Far East, it must be 14. Schelling. p. 35. assumed that in no way did (or does) the Ministry of Defence equate 15. F. B. Weinstein, "The Concept of Commitment in International Rela- "commitment” with "obligation." tions," Journal of ConHict Resolution, vol. XIII, no. 1. 1969, pp. 40—11. 29. Editorial, Journal of the Royal United Services Institute, February 16. Seaburv and Drischler. p. 47. 1968. p. 2. 17. Schelling, pp. 35-36. 30. Statement on the Defence Estimates, Cmnd. 3540, February 1968, 18. P. Reuter, Internationa] Institutions (London: Allen and Unwin, p. 2. See especially paragraph 2, which refers to the failure to balance 1958), p. 132. militar> tasks and resources in 1964 (during the Malaysian "confrontation”) 19. J. Brierly, The Basis of Obligation in International Law (London: and to the principie guiding the reduction in manpower that commitments Oxford University Press, 1946), pp. 111-12. He cites Oppenheim, Interna­ (i.e.. military tasks) should proportionately be reduced. tional Law, third edition. 1920, 'The consent of a State to a treaty presup- 31. Ibid., p. 3. poses a conviction that it is not fraught with danger to its existence and vital 32. Ibid., pp. 7-9. development." 33. Statement on the Defence Estimates, 1968, p. 3. 20. M. Howard, Central Orgarüsation ofDefence (London: Royal United 34. For example, the decision to go ahead with the MRCA (Tornado) Services Institution, 1970), p. 44. See also Nailor, p. 224. multirole aircraft in collaboration with West Germany and Italy. 21. Howard. pp. 44-45. 35. Supplementary Statement on Defence Policy. Cmnd. 4521, October 22. Statement on the Defence Estimates. Cmnd. 2592, February 1965, 1970, p. 4. p. 5. 36. Creenwood. p. 72. Creenwood described the arithmetic of the Con- 23. D Creenwood, Budgeting for Defence (London: Royal United Ser­ servative GovemmenFs defence budget as "ingenious” and "Orwellian"; vices Institution. 1972), p. 65. For a discussion of how the figure of £ 2,000 the changes to the new defence programme in budgetary terms he labeis million was arrived at, see also B. Reed and G. Williams, Denis Healey and as "cosmetic.” the Policies of Pow er (London: Sidgwick and Jackson, 1971). 37. Statement on Defence Estimates 1975, Cmnd. 5976. p. 1. 24. Creenwood, p. 65. 38. Ibid., p. 2. 25. Statement on the Defence Estimates, Part 1, The Defence Review, 39. House of Commons Expenditure Committee Defence and Externai Cmnd. 2901. February 1966, p. 7. Affairs Sub-Committee 7th Report, British Forces in Germany, 1 April 26. The Statement on the Defence Estimates 1966 had admitted that 1975, Session 1974-75, House of Commons Paper 472, pp. XV-XVI. British forces were already overstretched before the Defence Review cuts 40. Statement on Defence Estimates, Cmnd. 3203, February 1967, p. 2. to forces East of Suez (paragraph 19, p. 7). The questionable effectiveness 41. Beach, p. 10. of the military commitment in the Far East is referred to in N. Brown, Arms 42. Sir Dennis Smallwood, KCB, CBE, DSO, DFC, Air Officer Command- without Empire (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1967). See also Sir John ing in Chief, Strike Command RAF, interview on Granada Television. Slessor, "Britains Role East of Suez,” The Times (London), 1 November Monday. May 24, 1976. 1965, p. 9.

The guardian’s attitude toward the guarded is revealed in the story about the young veteran who asked his Oxford tutor what he had done during the war. “Young man," was the reply, “I am the civilization you fought to preserve.” O rville D. M en a r d THE ELECTRONICS REVOLUTION Dr . T homas H. E tzold COMMON theme pervades these two the most significant developments in naval A books by Vice-Admiral Sir Arthur Hez- warfare in recent times, f In an even more let and Paul Dickson: In the twentieth cen- striking assertion, Paul Dickson proposes tury, electronics has altered not only that electronics, especially in sensor applica- technical aspects of warfare but its nature. tions, has brought about a revolution in war­ Sir Arthur believes that electromagnetics, fare as profound and consequential as that the airplane, and the submarine have been occasioned by atomic weapons.$

fVice-Admiral Sir Arthur HezletElectronics and Sea Power (New York: Stein and Day, 1976, $15.00), 318 pages. (Paul Dickson,The Electronic Battlefíeld (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1976, $10.00), 244 pages. 81 82 AIR UNIVERSITY REV1EW In Electronics and Sea Power, which sur- ping missile called ‘Harpoon’ with radar ter­ veys uses of electromagnetics in naval war- minal homing.” It would do little good to fare from early in the nineteenth century to catalog here the errors or imprecisions in the late in the twentieth, Sir Arthur discusses text. Suffice to say that the conclusion is inter- three broad categories of application. The esting, but the volume is unfocused, tire- first, important by mid-nineteenth century, some, and often trivial without being was communication, originally by cable and particularly informative. Perhaps the best then, near the end of the century, by radio. chapters are the first ones dealing with the The second category was detection, with be- Royal Navy up to the First World War, years ginnings in the battery-powered searchlights before the Navy—and the book—became of the Royal Navy about 1875, a time when hardware-intensive. sonar, radar, and over-the-horizon detection What Sir Arthur praises, Paul Dickson would have seemed too incredible even to be would like to bury, for he believes that elec­ good Science fiction. The third category was tronics—especially sensor technology—has control of missiles, which Sir Arthur nomi- altered warfare for the worse and far beyond nates as the most revolutionary development the ability of people to manage. In The Elec­ of the years following World War II, for it has tronics BattleBeld he asserts that for centu- led to the virtual replacement of naval guns ries success at war has meant “inflicting the by missiles. greatest damage from the furthest [sic] dis- Together with the pace of improvement, tance.” In terms of this definition, sensor these three applications today mean, in Sir technology now verges on “doing for con- Arthur’s opinion, that “nothing but the best ventional warfare what the atomic missile will be any good in the future.” Low-mix revolution did for total war: that is, to bring ships will be vulnerable, impotent, and ob- it to its logical end point—in this case not solescent almost by definition. This is an in- only distance from the enemy but destruc- teresting argument—an important concern tive precision.” Three developments of the each year as budgeteers, project officers, and Vietnam years underlie the emergence of admirais argue over force structure, weapon sensor technology and an imminent revolu­ development, and procurement. It is unfor- tion in the nature of conventional warfare: tunate that, in developing this viewpoint, Sir first, the integration and miniaturization of Arthur did not adhere more closely to anoth- complex electronic circuits; second, the ap- er of his avowed goals, namely, to “make the pearance and refinement of remotely text intelligible to the general reader with- manned systems; third, the creation of a out removing much that is of real interest to Science of “bionics”—not superstrong secret the naval officer or the expert in electrics or agents but the study of living systems to electronics.” “provide the keys to new invention.” For ex- The book is laden with abbreviations, ample, low-light television image intensifica- designations, and a garble of British and tion was improved partly through study of American terms for various devices. In the eyes of horseshoe crabs. places, whole series of paragraphs consist of The foregoing developments in electron­ nothing more than consecutive one-sentence ics, remote systems, and bionics have made descriptions of various weapons and systems, possible the electronic battlefield, or perhaps descriptions useless to amateur and expert one should say battlefields, because Dickson alike. Here, for instance, is Sir Arthur’s entire discusses two meanings of this signal phrase. mention of one weapon: “In the United The first meaning, EB I for short, refers to States they also produce a smaller anti-ship- the development, improvement, and use of BOOKS AND IDEAS 83 unattended ground sensors, and is, perhaps, the author. For the author is a journalist not íot so worrisome, although it is not nice. The a scientist, a civilian and not an insider with uecond meaning, EB II as the concept is clearances, information, and experience con- ragged in Dicksons book, refers to automat- cerning many of the topics on which he jd war, such as the electromechanical battle touches. That may seem another good reason zones suggested in a widely reported and not to read the book or take it seriously. quoted speech by General William C. West- But Dickson raises questions that deserve moreland on 14 October 1969. The great diff- at least to be discussed and, if possible, an- erence between EB I on the one hand, and swered: some about fallibility of systems, EB II—Blipkrieg, the author calls it—on the some about ethical responsibility in this Dther, is that in the latter version sensors are “new” warfare, and some about its legality. iinked directly to weapons so that humans do “Will the electronic battlefield work well not necessarily factor into the detection-re- enough to insure that there will be no acci- sponse sequence. The sensor beeps; the gun, dental, automated attacks on Americans or bomb, mine, or missile booms. allied troops, no electronic My Lais?” he asks. Dickson objects to this line of technologi- Who is responsible when things go wrong— cal evolution and military revolution for sev- or right as the case may be—in remote war­ leral reasons. First, he believes that EB fare conducted by machines? What is the le­ technology is making conventional warfare gality of deploying sensor-weapon systems more lethal, which offends his humanistic that cannot discriminate reliably between values. Second, he resents that EB technolo­ combatants and noncombatants? gy has been funded in bits and pieces, rather Fallibility, responsibility, legality—these than as a line item or project in the defense are reasonable questions concerning the budget, for that has made it possible to keep effects of the electronic battlefield on con­ the public from questioning EB’s ultimate ventional warfare. Dickson deserves credit effects on warfare, or even finding out much for raising them even in the present form of about it—all of which violates his democratic investigative journalism. and joumalistic ethics. Finally, Dickson ex­ presses his outrage at the idea that the final F in a l l y . and together, these books pose a sin­ lesson of Vietnam for American military men gle point to consider, one raised most elo- may be that it was inefficient and that mili­ quently in recent years by Elting Morison in tary professionals may turn to the technology Men, Machines, and Modern Times. The of the electronic battlefield for redress. point: how men do affects what they do. Many people who should read this book Thus, it is essential to employ technology probably will not, and that is too bad. Dick­ with all deliberation. It is easy to forfeit or to son’s veneer of reason does not entirely hide avoid deliberate evaluation and decision on his emotional and negative reaction to trends questions such as those Dickson asks. It is in military technology. That will, to some difficult to live with the unintended conse- readers, seem justification enough for dis- quences, the unexpected results of failure to carding the book or ignoring the concems of manage machines. Na vai War College WHITHER ZIONISM? Dr . L ewis B. W are HAVE come to believe—at least since the ber of discrete, yet subtlely interrelated es publication by the great psychoanalyst says which attempt to show the evolution oi IErik H. Erikson of his superb biographies of the Zionist world-view as an antidote tc Luther and Gandhi—that there is much to negative Jewish ego-symbols that have long recommend the complementariness of his- determined the problematic nature of the tory and psychology. Dr. Jay Gonen’s book, relations between Jewish and non-Jewish so- A Psychohistory of Zionism, f is another ciety. In particular, Dr. Gonen devotes his among recent studies that confirms my origi­ attention to the symbolism of the schnorrer nal prejudice. Only I am chagrined as a (the beggar), the luftmensch (the dreamer), professional historian that psychologists tend and the goy (the Gentile). to write better history than historians write To schnorr, says the author, is to beg from psychology. If I were to venture an answer Jew and Gentile alike at the expense of the for this phenomenon, I might be forced to schnorrer’s dignity and self-esteem. In the conclude somewhat enviously that psycholo­ hierarchy of negative Jewish ego-symbols, gy possesses a more precise set of theoretical the highest form of schnorring is the kind of constructs with which to explore certain rela- begging which the Court Jew, the stadtlan, tionships that concern both our disciplines: does with the Gentile authorities on behalf of especially those between symbols and their the Jewish community. But, as the author elaboration as discernible historical patterns. points out, the prestige that the stadtlan re- From the theoretical point of view, Dr. ceives from Jews in no way compensates for Gonen does not hide the fact that he is apply- the resulting deprivation of his own psyche. ing a Freudian bias to the study of Zionism. Similarly, the schnorrer can also be a luft­ This is as it should be since, of all the theorists mensch, the pathological dreamer of grandi- of modern psychology, only Freud has ose dreams, who hopes that by some managed to combine a rigorously scientific miraculous intervention his fantasies of view of man’s inner relationship to his uni- power and independence vis-à-vis non-Jew­ verse with the flexibility of interpretation re- ish authority will be realized and, in so doing, quired to render artistically man’s release him from the burden of self-hatred. world-view in terms of symbols. To this end Central to the characterology of both the author undertakes his study with a num- schnorrers and luftmenschen is that in the

tJay Y. Gonen, A Psychohistory of Zionism (New York: Mason/ Charter, 1976, $15.00), 374 pages. 84 BOOKS AND IDEAS 85 wider context of Jewish history in the Dias- author to be an apologia pro vita sua. Only on pora the real enemy remains forever thegoy, rare occasions, when General Dayan is not mot the acquiescent Jew. And in the constant engrossed in justifying his policies, does he struggle against the Gentile’s anti-Semitism, give the reader some insights into his role in Imany of the Gentile’s values are assimilated the shaping of Israel’s contemporary history. |to the Jewish character. It is to this assimila- One such occasion is the tripartite negotia- tion and its deleterious effects on the Jewish tion between Israel, France, and Great Brit- jpsyche that Zionism responds as a political, ain that led to the 1956 Suez Campaign. social, and cultural program that holds out Dayan, Ben-Gurion, and Shimon Peres psychological redemption to an entire peo- played dominant roles in these talks, and the ple. Dr. Gonen’s task, therefore, is to trace author is at his best when analyzing the psychologically the working out of this re- political motives of each partner for securing demptive process through Zionism fforn its President Gamai Abdel Nasser’s downfall af- historical inception to its final expression in ter the Egyptian leader nationalized the Israeli nationhood. Suez Canal. The hitherto unknown story of If I were to criticize this admirable book, I these discussions makes fascinating reading would do so on exactly this point: that Dr. and lends credence to the book as a historical Gonen does not treat the historical process as document, even if the author eschews well as he treats certain isolated historical proper use of citations and source meth- instances. Consequently, the book lacks an odology. overall focus on the development of the in- However, it is not the historical Moshe terrelationship between symbols and their Dayan that this reviewer sought in his au­ sociopolitical expression as implied in the ap- tobiography but Dayan, the elusive man. pearance of a new and unique Israeli people The author himself is not prone to self-reve- with its own world-view. Hence, it might lation. Nevertheless, a sensitive reader will have been more accurate to call the book a uncover, with careful scrutiny of the text, psychosymbology rather than a psychohisto- some personal characteristics that shed light ry of Zionism. Be that as it may, these minor on Dayan’s thoughts and self-perceptions. Of criticisms ought not detract from the worth interest are three important personal incli- of this compelling, well-written study for all nations: first, Dayan romanticized the Be- serious students of Middle Eastern affairs. douin; second, he sentimentalized the life of the kibbutznik; and third, he revealed an overwhelming passion for the pursuit of ar- chaeology. From the psychological point of view, Day­ an’s inclinations are not only relevant but ap- U n FORTUNATELY, the phcable in the main to many Israelis. same recommendation cannot be made for Romanticizing the Bedouin allows the Israeli Moshe Dayan’s autobiography, Moshe Day- to simplify the relationship between Jew and an: Story ofMy Life. t Though not badly writ- Arab by putting the relationship on the levei ten, the book is uneven in presentation and, of paternal stewardship. In this way all Arabs like most books of its type, is meant by the are reduced to the simple, noble unsophisti-

t Moshe Dayan, Moshe Dayan: Story ofMy Life (New York: William Morrow, 1976, $15.00), 640 pages. 86 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW cation of the Bedouin whose virtues must be tions on the environment. In essence, Dayan: protected from contamination by civiliza- the sabra is reacting to the negative image oi tion. If all Arabs can be psychologically the passive, acquiescent Jew of the Diaspora. Bedouinized, they may therefore be stereo- Last, we remark Dayan’s passion for dig- typed, rendering all their actions immediate- ging up the remnants of ancient Israelitic ly intelligible to the stereotyper. In the civilization. Once again, were we to refer to process, the Arab’s personality becomes to Dr. Gonen’s evaluation, we would discover the Jew static, fossilized, and thoroughly pre- that here is another aspect of the same phe- dictable. Thus, Arabs are viewed as a deper- nomenon: in the evolution of all young na- sonalized collectivity which, in the interests tionalisms there exists a felt need to recreate of Jewish self-defense, must be preserved in- a continuity with the past. Zionism, being no tact. This attitude, adopted by many Israelis, exception to this rule, looks back to a Golden reflects a typical colonial response to a colo- Age when Jews lived a Jewish life in Palestine nized people which, by justifying the colo- in order tojustify the role Jewish nationalism nizers unshakable belief that only he has played in giving this ancient mythical “understands” the native, permits the rela- unity modem political expression. In the tionship between the patron and client to be course of events, history is rewritten to ac- viewed in black-and-white terms. Dayan, for commodate old and new perceptions, and one, seems to be happy among Arabs only myths are resurrected or reinvented. More when he is sharing a nomad’s desert hospital- important for Zionism is the pervasive power ity. of such mythmaking in overcoming the hold Dayan is his most expansive when he recol- that the Diaspora exercises on the Jewish lects how wonderful it was to be a young mind. In discovering a vibrant Jewish civili­ kibbutznik, tilling the soil long before he at- zation that ruled in Palestine, Israelis rein- tained a position of national responsibility. In force a sense of self-mastery necessary for the the Zionist hierarchy of values, the coloniza- continued survival of the state while, simul- tion of Palestine is equated with the redemp- taneously, they become better equipped psy­ tion of the Jewish people from rootless chologically to cope with the negative cosmopolitanism and degradation in the ego-symbols generated by life in exile. Diaspora. Collective development of the land, in particular, is meant to restore to the Jews psychological self-esteem and encour- age, through a common effort, confidence, reliance, and devotion to the cause of self- DAN KURZMAN’S book, mastery. The first generation of Palestinian- The Bravest Battle,\ exhibits many of the born Jews, to which Dayan belongs, was so- same attitudes. It claims to be an authentic cialized to these values. The outcome was to narrative of the Warsaw Ghetto uprising of create, as Dr. Gonen points out, a “cute but 1943, where a handful of Jewish resistance thorny” sabra who saw little profit in intellec- fighters went to a certain death defending tualization. Rather, the sabra prefers practi- their coreligionists from inevitable deporta- cal Solutions, is impatient for success, and tion to the infamous Nazi extermination possesses the chutzpah to impose his Solu­ camps. The story exposes an appalling hu-

fDan Kurzman, The Bravest Battle: The 28 Days of the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising (New York: Putnam’s Sons, 1976 $10.00), 386 pages. BOOKS AND IDEAS 87 knan brutishness vvhich all of us would do they can demonstrate superior military jwell to understand. Sadly, Kurzmans rendi- prowess against insurmountable odds. His ttion of this tragic episode in human history story is, therefore, meant to project an image only serves to cheapen its moral value for the of the Jewish people as capable of defending ireader. His wTiting is, first of all, profoundly itself against persecution, the ancient expres- ahistorical and, second, is designed to pro- sion of which is the Masada episode in Jewish mote the story of the uprising for propagan- history when a group of Hebrew zealots distic purposes. This is readily apparent from chose to die rather than surrender their the novelistic style of the book; the author mountain stronghold to the Roman army. provides the resistance fighters with improb- Masada has, consequently, become the rally- able dialogues as he attempts to reconstruct ing cry of Jews in the face of Arab threats of the day-to-day fighting through the eyes of annihilation and a justification for Israeli the participants. Since the vast majority of militarism. the fighters died in the ghetto and the docu- Perhaps a more telling manifestation of ments on vvhich the author’s account is based the Masada complex is to be found among are rarely cited, the overall eflFect is a travesty the members of the Jewish Defense League of fact that detracts from the gallant and he- in the United States, whose slogan “never roic example of these men and women. again” indicates Jewish determination to re- In order to intensify his narrative Kurz- sist to the last drop of blood the destructive man indulges in unacceptable stereotyping. impulses of the Gentile world. The major The Germans are portrayed as pure Nazi flaw of Kurzman’s book is that he succeeds in types, Prussian in demeanor, Teutonic in making free use of all these potent psycho- looks, and slaves to Hitler’s racial theories logical symbols not in the interests of advanc- while the Jews tend to be Semitic in appear- ing historical understanding of Jewish history ance, passive and weak in character, and and human compassion for the sufferings of quick to compromise for one more day of life; the Jews but to encourage the hardening of all, of course, except the resistance fighters, the relationship between Jews and non-Jews who are the only ones to grasp the magni­ into mutually suspicious and inflexible atti- tude of the situation. The author’s intent is to tudes. prove that Jews are not cowards. Moreover, Maxwell AFB, Alabama

The soul of a civilization is its religion, and it dies with its faith. Wil l and A riel D lrant The Age of fíeason Begins (1961) POTPOURRI

Development of Strategic Air Command: 1946- As it stands now, Development of SAC is more 1976 by J. C. Hopkins with the assistance of the raw material of history than history in its own Sheldon A. Goldberg. Offutt AFB, Nebraska: Hq right. All the essential facts are there waiting to be Strategic Air Command, Office of the Historian, arranged in a more convenient and readable form 21 March 1976, 186 pages, $3.90. by some enterprising writer. Indeed, this is a func- tion of the work, which has been designed to serve The Office of the Historian at Strategic Air as “a valuable reference work for those interested Command Headquarters has taken the occasion in the strategic arena.” of the countrys bicentennial, which also happens Those who plan to use the book for this purpose to be SAC’s thirtieth anniversary, to produce this would be well advised to double-check the facts first complete, authoritative account of the devel­ before using them, for there are some minor inac- opment of SAC. curacies. For example, the authors continue to It would be hard to think of another organiza- write of SAC bases in “French Morocco,” long tion that has been as instrumental in safeguarding after that country had achieved its independence the security of our Republic during the past three from France. decades, so this work is a welcome bicentennial Another class of readers will find the book a joy production. The book is soft bound but extensive- to own. Also, anyone who ever served in SAC will ly illustrated, partly in color. For a noncommer- want the book for its wealth of anecdotes and inci- cial product, it is both dignified and attractive. dents. Basically, Development of Strategic Air Com­ Captain Steven E. Cady mand: 1946-1976 contains statistics on personnel, Lorírtg AFB, Maine weapon systems, and organizations as well as a narrative of major events. Unfortunately, the organization is chronological rather than themat- ic. For each of the 30 years covered, the following The Imperial Years: The United States since 1939 information is presented: personnel, tactical air- by Alonzo L. Hamby. New York: Weybright craft, aircraft units, active bases, command lead- and Talley, 1976, x + 429 pages, $14.95. ership, organization, and operations. There are, of course, obvious disadvantages to In his initial pages Alonzo Hamby sets forth two such an arrangement. In order to find an event or interesting propositions. First he admits to pos- a fact, one must know the date beforehand or be sessing no absolute truth and then claims his work resigned to flipping through the appropriate cate- is not a textbook. With its focus on politics and gory, year after year, until the material is discov- presidents, however, it comes close to being the ered. This drawback is compounded by the latter. But the danger is averted by his illumina- absence of an index or a table of contents. tion of the crushing egoism of Lyndon Johnson There are plans to revise and bring the book up and Richard M. Nixon and a fluid writing style. to date periodically, and the publisher welcomes The book’s virtue may be that it is not offered suggestions for its improvement. One suggestion to college students but to informed Americans would be to supplement the chronological presen- searching for perspectives. To this end, Hamby’s tation with some thematic appendices so that the work is remarkable. It demonstrates military progression of events in key areas would be easier realities and subordinates them to sharp apprais- to trace. als of social and economic reality.

88 BOOKS AND IDEAS 89

As a historian the author is refreshingly direct. forces, the author reviews events that led to the He emphasizes that he and his fellows write from introduction of a United Nations force onto Cy­ preconceived beliefs and proceed from honest prus in 1964. Then follows a discussion of the orga- personal riewpoints. He openlv espouses the lib­ nization and operation of UNFICYP. Having laid eral tradition, eschews the brittle rashness of mod- this background, Moskos turns to the heart of his ish radicalism, and damns totalitarianism. project: an analysis of the attitudes, prior training, If there is any weakness in Hamby’s work, it and military background of the soldiers them- stems from these very perspectives. Like many selves and the ways in which these factors affected historians, he lacks a gut comprehension of the their performance in Cyprus. depths of the Depression, which forever shaped As the basis for his analysis and evaluation, Mos­ minds like NLxon’s and Gerald Fords. He fails to kos uses the “constabulary ethic,” based on two understand that decade in the fifties when it principies—impartiality and the absolute mini- seemed that our own special fears of poverty mum use of force in the performance of peace­ would be laid to rest. He fails to grasp the sense keeping duties. He concludes that the soldiers of unlimited power we possessed. which felt so who composed UNFICYP—whether professionals comfortable because we were so virtuous. from Britain, Canada, and Ireland or reservists To the progeny of World War II, who, like from Denmark, Finland, and Sweden—demon- Hamby, carne of age in the early sixties, it must strated adherence to this ethic to an exceptionally have seemed that there had been an American high degree. Empire and the imperial years. To the children of Contrary to conventional wisdom, Moskoss em- the Depression, it seemed that our elders, Tru- pirical findings demonstrate that: man, Eisenhower, and even the upstart Kennedy, (1) there is no correlation between prior training were leading us toward the realization of our mul- and the performance of the constabulary task; tifaceted republican dreams. Alas, neither is true. (2) no correlation exists between a favorable atti- Perhaps, though, we have moved toward a more tude toward international organizations and per­ sober national maturity. formance of duties; The informed .American could find no better (3) participation in international peacekeeping book than Hamby's if he wishes a quick appraisal forces does not foster internationalist values; and of the last four decades. Should he then wish to (4) soldiers from major powers, habituated to pursue the matter further, Hamby offers a com­ conventional military operations, are as capable of plete bibliographic essay. Of course, the college adhering to the standards demanded of peace- student could also benefit from reflecting on this keepers as are those from neutral States. work. The single most striking aspect of the UNFICYP Dr. Lawrenee C. Allin force was the almost universal development of the Uni ver sity of Maine constabulary ethic among troops who differed in attitudes toward international organizations, in prior training for such a role, and in military back­ Peace Soldiers: The Sociology of a United Nations ground. As the author States, “the constabulary Military Force by Charles C. Moskos, Jr. Chica­ ethic was primarily engendered by on-duty, in- go: University of Chicago Press, 1976, xi + 168 the-field peacekeeping experience.” pages, $11.00. One of the central questions Moskos addressed was whether military professionalism is compati- Despite the fact that since 1956 almost 300,000 ble with the constabulary ethic. His answer is a troops have served in peacekeeping operations resounding yes. In fact, he concludes, by inculcat- under United Nations auspices, Peace Soldiers ing the concept of civilian control of the military represents the first complete field study of such a and the employment of military forces for politi­ force. Its subject is the United Nations Force in cal objectives, modern military professionalism Cyprus (UNFICYP) in 1969 and 1970. Dr. Charles enhances rather than reduces the performance of Moskos, one of the nation's foremost military soci- peacekeeping duties and adherence to the con­ ologists, does not focus on the political, financial, stabulary ethic on which such duties must be or legal aspects of peacekeeping operations. Rath- based. er, he studies the social factors that affect peace­ Short, well-written, and absorbing, Peace Sol­ keeping soldiers in the performance of this diers is worth reading not merely for its insight nontraditional military role. into one peacekeeping operation but also for what After a brief look at the history of peacekeeping its author suggests about the employment of a 90 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW type of military force that may be increasingly training of the raiders and outstanding leadership important in the future. overcame intelligence lapses. Captain Robert C. Ehrhart, USAF In sum, Benjamin Schemmer has added a fine Department of History book to the shelves of military history. The Raid USAF Academy is well worth reading by professionals and laymen alike, not solely for the fine story of a clandestine military operation but also for the human qualities portrayed. The Raid by Benjamin F. Schemmer. New York: Lieutenant Colonel Peyton E. Cook, USAF (Ret) Harper & Row, 1976, 326 pages, $10.00. Sewanee Academy, Tennessee The mission into North Vietnam in November 1970 to free prisoners brought a thrill to the hearts of many Americans. There was also disap- pointment because no prisoners were rescued. Until the publication of The Raid, the Son Tay mission remained cloaked in mystery and sur- rounded by secrecy. After the initial flurry of pub- The Shepherd by Frederick Forsyth. New York: licity, it was as if darkness closed around the entire Viking, 1976, 123 pages, $4.95. episode. Because there was no lasting news value, the media relegated the story to the back pages On Christmas Eve 1957, a young Royal Air and then quickly dropped it altogether. The De- Force fighter pilot leaves Germany on a routine fense Department was reluctant to discuss the op- flight back to his home base in eastern England, eration because no prisoners had been returned his mind very much on home and the holiday and because of the unusual air tactics employed. leave that lies ahead. Over the North Sea his Vam- Six years ago the importance of such an opera- pire jet suffers a complete electrical failure: with tion was lost on the media, but it was not lost on no radio, no navigational instruments, a rapidly the North Vietnamese. If the United States could dwindling fuel supply, and the inevitable fog roll- launch an audacious raid into heavily defended ing in across the Norfolk coast, it seems certain territory on one occasion with no losses, then the that this pilot will, like so many others, meet death capability existed for more such missions—per- in the freezing brutality of the North Sea. Only a haps with successful results. The prisoners were miracle can save him—or a shepherd. concentrated into Hanoi and their conditions im- Frederick Forsyth’s The Shepherd is a haunting proved. The Son Tay raid had the effect of aiding short novel of “the shepherd” who guides this the prisoners and frightening the North Viet­ young pilot to safety. It is quite unlike his interna- namese. tional bestsellers, The Day of the Jackal or The Author Benjamin Schemmer has done an excel- Odessa File, except in its authenticity, since the lent job of reconstructing the story of the Son Tay author draws on his own experiences as a National mission from its inception through its completion. Service fighter pilot in the RAF of the late 1950s. His prose is lively and well-paced, in large part The power and beauty of this story and the many due to his extensive use of interviews with partici- black and white line drawings by Lou Feck bring pants to supplement written documents. The au­ to life the old, deserted World War II airfields and thor has portrayed the human side of the the fogbanks of the English Fens as readily as the operation with great vividness. timelessness of space and the loneliness of the sin- Mr. Schemmer explores at length the contro- gle-seater fighter pilot. Eighth Air Force veterans versy over the quality of the intelligence provided and those with a more recent attachment to the planners. He gives the intelligence communi- Lakenheath or Woodbridge may well be moved ty generally good marks, questioning only the by the nostalgia the author evokes in such a short aforehand knowledge that there were no prison­ book. For me, it recalled impressions of Richard ers at Son Tay. This question he cannot answer to Hilary’s Last Enemy and John Gillespie Magee’s his own satisfaction. The mission could not have “High Flight.” As a Christmas story, it is worthy of been successful had not the general intelligence inclusion in any aviators Christmas stocking. been accurate; there were gaps and some misin- Squadron Leader John D. Brett, RAF formation, as there are in any military operation. Department of History The “fog of war” is always operative. The superior USAF Academy BOOKS AND IDEAS 91 LBJ: An Irreverent Chronicle by Booth Mooney. He could not follow his own prescription for New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1976, responding to public criticism. The only thing you 290 pages, $8.95. can do, he later told Richard Nixon, is “hunker down and take it like a jackass in a hailstorm.” He Booth Mooney, a sometimes Johnson aide and lashed out at the press, which he could not speechwriter, has written a very personal memoir manipulate; at his aides, who never seemed to of Lyndon Johnson. Drawing sparingly from the work hard enough; and finally at his brother Sam, public record, Mooney attempts to evoke the whom he rejected in a last pitiful outburst like a spirit of LBJ by recording his own memories and petty tyrant who could stand no “joshing,” no those of Johnson’s friends and enemies, aides and criticism, and no upstaging. associates. The book, then, is essentially a collec- It is at this point that the tale does not ring true. tion of anecdotes illustrating many facets of John­ Were Booth Mooney and speechwriter Peter son^ character. Benchley the only two men who escaped John­ The Johnson he recalls is a contradictory figure. son^ wrath and sarcasm? Did Johnson have no The public man was first a powerful and dedicated close friends, besides Lady Bird, with whom he majority leader, then the president who em- was on equal terms, to whom he could confide, ployed his highly developed political skills to and upon whom he could always count? There are enact one of the most impressive records of only hints of them in the story. The basic weak- domestic legislation in United States history. But ness of a memoir of this type rests in the author’s behind the bravado and machismo of the seem- limited perspective and inability to reach into ingly self-assured public servant was a man tor- those areas of the subject’s life of which he was not tured by deep-seated feelings of insecurity for a part. Still the book is interesting and gives valu- which he and his country paid dearly. able insights into the life of a human being who Mooney traces this insecurity to Johnson’s “Hill touched the lives of all living Americans but who Country” origins in central Texas. Johnson would to many remains only a caricature of the tall Tex- not have accepted Mooney’s bleak description of an. the area, for he drew strength from this land and Dr. Charles A. Endress its people and throughout his life felt himself to be Department of History a man of grassroots. At the same time his drive to Ângelo State University, Texas succeed was a struggle to escape from the nag- ging economic insecurity of his childhood and the intellectual wasteland of Blanco County. The tragedy, Mooney believes, was that Johnson never carne to terms with his background after he en- The Fire Carne By: The Riddle of the Great Siberi- tered the national arena. an Explosion by John Baxter and Thomas At- Despite his keen intelligence and political acu- kins. Garden City, New York: Doubleday, 1976, men, Johnson felt inferior among the class-con- 165 pages, $7.95. scious and highly educated members of the Democratic party’s eastern wing. Mooney relates Close to the rocky banks of the Podkamennaya that even after entering the nether world of the Tunguska River, in an insect-plagued lowland vice-presidency, Johnson put forth his best effort near the Arctic Circle and midway between the to be a loyal supporter and subordinate of Presi­ great Siberian water courses of the Lena and the dent John F. Kennedy. In return he was held in Yenisei, lies a mysteriously devastated miles-wide contempt by Robert Kennedy and the Kennedy section of the taiga forest. There, to this day, once- entourage. proud, thirty-inch pines, preserved by the perma- The Johnson presidency intensified both his frost, sprawl fanlike in ugly scorched death, their strengths and his weaknesses. As Johnson hit full trunks like macabre fingers, pointing to where the stride, the Great Society programs poured out of tire carne by. Congress under his forceful direction. As criticism It was at 7:17 A.M. in the early light of 30 June of his foreign policy began to mount, however, 1908. The searing heat and blinding flash were Johnson seemed unable to differentiate between companions to the annihilating blast. The shock those who were attempting to help him and those wave that followed in seconds collapsed ceilings, who never wished him well. Nor was he able to shattered Windows, and tossed people into the air understand that questions regarding policy were 40 miles away in Vanavara. Shock waves hit 375 not personal attacks. miles away in Kansk, where the Trans-Siberian 92 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW Express was nearly jolted from the rails, and work- their reports are in appendices. One resourceful ers on river rafts were flung into the swirling wa- Soviet researcher conducted an experiment, du- ter. A pillar of fire lit up the sky of central Sibéria plicating the area with wooden pegs for trees and for hundreds of miles. The vortex of the cataclys- using small explosive charges. Repeating the ex­ mic explosion sucked up dirt and debris into dark, periment many times and varying the height of ominous clouds that rose more than 12 miles and the charge, he concluded that an intruder from showered the region with black rain. But the space exploded about 16,000 feet above the Tun- showers did not extinguish the blazing forests guska swamp. The authors compare this to a ther- which raged for days. Early in July, the skies over monuclear airburst of some 30 megatons. much of Europe and Asia presented a spectacle After discarding the meteorite theory and some rivaling the aurora. bizarre possibilities (such as a body of antimatter, It was not until 1921 that the first scientific a contraterrene substance, or a tiny “black hole” investigations were made. The inhospitable re­ of superconcentrated particles), the authors sug- gion of permafrost, summer slush, and ferocious gest the possibility that the visitor was a spaceship mosquitoes yielded reluctantly to the first expedi- whose thermonuclear propulsion was malfunc- tion of Leonid Kulik. Then carne others. tioning. They believe that the crew of the massive The authors of this account review the findings craft was maneuvering to an unpopulated haven of the major investigators, but they rely heavily on in the emergency. They did not make it. the 1927 (second) expedition of Kulik and the Lieutenant Colonel Richard E. Hansen, USAF (Ret) 1926 venture of Suslov; translations of portions of Prattville, Alabama

Jacqueline Cochran, explaining how she became an internationally famous aviatrix, commented: I wanted to go higher than Rockefeller Center, which was being erected across the Street from Saks Fifth Avenue and was going to cut ofiF my view of the sky .... Flying got into my soul instantly but the answer as to why must be found somewhere back in the mystic maze of my birth and childhood and the circumstances of my earlier life. Whatever I am is elemental and the beginnings of it all have their roots in Sawdust Road. I might have been bom in a hovel, but I determined to travei with the wind and stars. BOOKS AND IDEAS 93 Comparative Analysis of the McNamara Era. BOOKS RECEIVED Albany: State University of New York Press, The books listed herein are those received since 1974. $13.00. the last list was published in our March-April 1977 Osur, Alan M. Blacks in the Army Air Forces dur- issue. Many of them have already been sent to ing World War II. Washington, D.C.: Govern­ reviewers, and their reports will be presented ment Printing Office, 1977. $2.40. later. Smith, Bradley F. Reaching Judgment at Nurem- berg. New York: Basic Books, 1976. $15.00. Tarr, Curtis W. Private Soldier: Life in the Army from 1943 to 1946. New York: Carlton Press, 1976. $6.75. I. AIR POWER Thompson, H. K., and Henry Strutz, editors. Doe- Homze, Edward L. Arming the Luftwaffe: The nitz at Nuremberg: A Reappraisal—War fíeich Air Ministry and the German Aircraft In- Crimes and the Military Professional. New dustry, 1919-1939. Lincoln: University of Ne- York: Amber, 1976. $10.00. braska Press, 1976. $14.95. Wynn, Neil A. The Afro-American and theSecond Morrow, John H., Jr. Building German Airpower: World War. New York: Holmes & Meier, 1976. 1909-1914. Knoxville: University of Tennessee $15.00. Press, 1976. $12.95. Winton, John. .Air Power at Sea, 1939-1945. New III. INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS York: Crowell, 1977. $12.95. Blair, John M. The ControlofOil. New York: Pan- H. MILITARY AFFAIRS theon Books, 1976. $15.00. Carlson, Sevinc. Indonesia’s Oil. Washington, Carver, Field Marshal Sir Michael, editor. The D.C.: Center for Strategic and International War Lords: Military Commanders of the 20th Studies, 1976. Century. Boston, Massachusetts: Little, Brown, Cline, Ray S. Secrets, Spies and Scholars: Blue- 1976. $17.95. print of the Essential CIA. Washington, D.C.: De Maiziere, Ulrich. Armed Forces in the NA TO Acropolis Books, 1976. $10.00. Alhance. Washington, D.C.: Center for Strate- Grigorenko, General Peter G. The Grigorenko Pa- gic and International Studies, 1976. pers: Writings by General P. G. Grigorenko & Emerson, Gloria. Winners and Losers: Battles, Re­ Documents on His Case. Boulder, Colorado: freais, Gains, Losses and Ruins from a Long Westview, 1976. $14.75. On the authors experi- War. New York: Random, 1976. $10.00. Jour- ences with the KGB. nalist’s report on the Vietnam war. Kun, Joseph C. Communist Indochina: Problems, Ireland, Bemard. Warships of the World: Major Policies and Superpower Involvement. Wash­ Classes. New York: Scribner’s, 1977. $7.95. ington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and Interna­ Irving, David. Hitlers War. New York: Viking, tional Studies, 1976. 1977. $17.50. Lewis, David .Sexpionage: The Exploitation ofSex Knorr, Klaus. Histórica! Dimensions of National by Soviet Intelligence. New York: Harcourt Security Problems. Lawrence: University Press Brace Jovanovich, 1976. $8.95. of Kansas, 1976. $6.95 paper. Mclnnes, Neil. Euro-Communism: The Third Lewin, Ronald. Slim: The Standardbearer. Ham- Schism of the Communist Movement. Beverly den, Connecticut: Shoestring Press, 1976. Hills, Califórnia: Sage, 1976. $3.00. $15.00. Nathan, James A., and James K. Oliver. United Marder, Arthur. Operation Menace: The Dakar States Foreign Policy and World Order. Boston, Expedition and the Dudley North Affair. New Massachusetts: Little, Brown, 1976. $10.95. York: Oxford University Press, 1976. $18.75. Pilpel, Robert H. Churchill in America, 1895- Merrill, James M. A Sailors Admirai: A Biography 1961: An Affectionate Portrait. New York: Har­ ofWilliam F. Halsey. New York: Crowell, 1976. court Brace Jovanovich, 1976. $10.00. $9.95. Rose, Lisle A. Roots ofTragedy, The United States Middlebrook, Martin. Convoy. New York: Mor­ and the Struggle for Asia, 1945-1953. Westport, row, 1976. $12.50. On an episode of the World Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1976. $15.95. War II Battle of the Atlantic. Stevens, Robert W. Vain Hopes, Grim Realities: Murdock, Clark A. Defense Policy Formation: A The Economic Consequences of the Vietnam War. New York: Franklin Watts, 1976. $5.95. Herzberg, Frederick. The Managerial Choice: Tl United States, Office of Strategic Services. War Be EfBcient and to Be Human. Homewood, II fíeport on the OSS, Vol. II. New York: Walker, linois: Dow, Jones & Irwin, 1976. $11.95. 1976. $12.95. Koning, Hans. A New Yorkerin Egypt. New York Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1976. $10.95. IV. GENERAL Murray, Francis. The Energy Independence Au Caplow, Theodore. How to fíun Any Organiza- thoríty. Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic tion. New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, and International Studies, 1976. 1976. $7.95. Richman, Barry M., and Richard N. Farmer. Lead Dreyfack, Raymond. Sure Fail: The Art of Mis- ership, Goals and Power in Higher Education: A management. New York: Morrow, 1976. $6.95. Contingency and Open-Systems Approach tc Gollattscheck, James F., et al. College Leadership Effective Management. San Francisco, Cali for Community Renewal. San Francisco, Cali­ fornia: Jossey-Bass Publishers, 1974. $12.95. fórnia: Jossey-Bass Publishers, 1976. $9.95. Wise, David. The American Police State: The Halperin, Morton H., and Robert Borosage. The Government against the PeopJe. New York: Lawless State: The Crimes of the US Intelli- Random, 1976. $10.00. Discussion of the activi- gence Agencies. Baltimore, Maryland: Pen- ties of the CIA, FBI, IRS, NSA, and other agen­ guin, 1976. $2.95. cies.

Military Service is an opportunity, a profession, and for many, a calling.... The calling of the military professional is unlike that of the scientist or of the lawyer, or minister, for while others may be asked to sacrifice comfort in the conduct of their duties, they are not—as you are—asked to risk their lives, if necessary, in the defense and Service of their nation. Military Service is public Service in its highest form. S ecretary of D ef en se H arold Brow n Remarks before the 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment Grafenwoehr, Federal Republic of Germany, 24 March 1977 the contributors

Major William L. Cogley 'MA.. Stanford University) is a political/economic analyst Lieutenant Colonel Hobert S. Dotson, with J-2 Division, Hq United Nations Com- AFRES, (USAFA; M.A., Harvard University) mand/United States Forces Korea. From is a budget examiner in the National Securi- 1972-76, he was Chief. Asian Studies Sec- ty Division of the Office of Management and tion, USAF Special Operations School. Oth­ Budget. His Air Force assignments includ- er assignments have been Director of ed: studv director for cost-effectiveness ap- Operational Intelligence, Hq 12AF and In- Ambassador John Patrick Walsh (Ph D.. plications to force-structure analyses of the telligence Officer. 366 and 35 Tactical The University of Chicago) is the State De­ tactical fighter force in the Air Force Office Fighter Wings. Major Cogley is a Distin- partment Adviser to the Commander of Air for Studies and Analysis; F-105 fighter pilot guished Craduate of Squadron Officer University. He is a Foreign Service Officer in Southeast Asia; and T-38 instructor pilot. School and has completed Armed Forces who has served in a variety of assignments Colonel Dotson is a Distinguished Graduate Staff College and Air Command and Staff at home and abroad, including being Am­ of Squadron Officer School. College. bassador to Kuwait. He was also an Interna­ tional Fellow at Harvard University.

Major Harold F. Nufer, AFRES, (Ph.D., Tufts University) is an assistant professor of Dr. James H. Toner (Ph.D., University of political Science at Michigan Technological Notre Dame) is Assistant Professor of Gov­ University and an AFROTC liaison officer. ernment at Norwich University. He was a On active duty he instructed in AFROTC at fellow of the Inter-University Seminar on Tufts and part-time for the University of Armed Forces and Society and assistant Maryland at Tuy Hoa AB. RVN: he has also professor at Notre Dame. where he taught taught at Brigham Young University. A spe- international relations. Dr. Toner served as cialist in the Trust Territory of the Pacific an officer in the U.S. Army from 1968 to Islands (Micronesia). he is spending his cur- Dr. G. K. Burke (Ph.D., St. John's Universi­ 1972. In 1973, he was selected as a General rent sabbatical there. His book, Micronesia ty) is a private consultant dealing principally Douglas MacArthur Statesman Scholar. His under American Rule An EvaJuation of the with foreign relations and defense ques- articles and reviews have appeared in Arm\. Strategic Trusteeship 1 194 7-77). wil) be tions. He was an instructor in history at St. Military Review. Review of Politics, Inter­ published this year. Dr. Nufer. designated John's University. has studied at Oxford national Review of History and Political an “Outstanding Educator of America" in University. and is the author of other articles Science, and the Naval War College Re­ 1972, is a graduate of Air Command and in related areas. view. Staff College and Air War College.

95 aviation achievements. She was the first woman to pilot a bomber across the North Atlantic. Ceneral Henry H. Amold appoint- ed her director of women's flying training in the U.S.. and she was the first American woman to enter Japan at the end of the war. She has established and still holds more in- ternational speed. distance, and altitude records than any other person and has logged appro.vimately 15.000 hours at the Controls of airplanes of all types. Miss Coch­ ran. shown in the jet in which she set five records. is author of The Stars at Noon (1953), an autobiography.

Dr. Thomas H. Et/old (Ph.D., Yale Univer­ sity) is professor of strategy at the United Kenneth P. Werrell (USAFA; Ph.D . Duke States Naval War College. Previously. he University) is Associate Professor of History taught in the history department of Miami at Radford College. Virgínia. He served five University (Ohio). He is editor with F. Gil- years in the Air Force, including 3-1/2 years bert Chan of China in the 1920s: National- as a weather reconnaissance pilot in Japan. ism and Revolution. author of The Conduct In September. Dr Werrell wiü become Vis- o f American Foreign Relations: The Other i(ing Professor of History at the Army Com- Side of Diplomacy, and he has written mand and General Staff College at Fort many articles for professional historical and| Leavenworth, Kansas. military periodicals.

Martin H. A. Edmonds (M.A., University of Dr. Lewis B. Ware (Ph.D., Princeton Manchester) is Sênior Lecturer and De- University) is Associate Professor of Middle fence Lecturer in the Department of Poli- Eastem History and a member of the Docu- tics. University of Lancaster. England. He mentary Research Branch. Air University. has taught strategic studies and defense a- He has taught and done research at the nalysis since 196-1 and during 1972-73 was University of Tunis and in Cairo, as a Fellow Research Associate at the Institute of War of the American Research Center. Before and Peace Studies, Columbia University. coming to Maxwell, he was on the staff of Lieutenant Colonel Jacqueline Cochran Recent publications include War in the New York University and served as a con- (Mrs. Floyd B. Odlum), AFRES. a command Next Decade with R. Beaumont and "Ac- sultant to the International Research and pilot in the Civil Air Patrol, is a Business countability and the Military-Industrial Exchange Commission. Dr. Ware is a prize- executive and aviatrix, best known for her Complex." in The New Política] Economy. winning amateur photographer.

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The Air University Review Awards Committee has selected "The Di- plomacy of Apology: U.S. Bombings of Switzerland during World War II" by Dr. Jonathan A. Helmreich, Dean of Instruction, Allegheny Col- lege, Meadville, Pennsylvania, as the outstanding article in the May- June 1977 issue of Air University Review. EDITORIAL STAFF COLONEL CLENN E. W assON. USAF Editor Lieu t en a n í Colonel. David H. M kts, USAF Associate Editor Jack H. Mooney Managing Editor John a . W estcoti Art Director and Production Manager ENHlyl'E C a STON Associate Editor, Spanish Language Edition Lia Midosi May Pattekson Associate Editor, Portuguesa Language Edition WlLLlAM J. DEPAOLA Art Editor and Illustrator Rudolph w . mor can Financial and Administrativo Manager

ADVTSERS Colonel Arthiih S. Racen Hq Aerospace Defensc Command Major General John W Huston, Chief Office of Air Force History Colonel Eldon W. Downs Hq Air Force Instituto o) Technology Colonel Russell A. T uhner 11 Hq Air Force Logistics Command Dh. HaROLü M. Helfman Hq Air Force Systems Command Colonel Donald E. Blkcgrabl Hq Air Training Command Colonel Eli is C. Stewart. Jh. Hq Air University Liel t ena nt Colonel Thomas w . Stlrcess Hq Military Airlift Command Francis VV. J i.nnings SAF Office of Information Colonei John w . Walton Hq Slrategic Air Command Colonel Wil l ia m H. Mlyerholt Hq Tactical Air Command Colonei. John H. Pricl Hq United States Air Force Aeadcmy Professor I B. Holi.ly, Jk.. Duke University Major General, Air Forre Reserve

Addrevs inamiw ripls to Editor. \ir Lniversity Review D iv imo n . Hltli; 1211. Maxwell AFB. AL 161 12. Printed l>y Government Prmting Olfice. Addrev. snlisi ríplions to Snperintendent ol Documents. CiPO. Washington DC 204(12, yearlv $11.60 domes* lie. $1450 forcigri. single oopy $2.00, Air Force Rceuffing Puhlieation 50-2.______

AIR U N I VE R S IT Y

rcuicwSEPTEMBER-OCTOBER 1977