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Disinterestedness and Desire in Kant's Aesthetics Author(S): Paul Guyer Source: the Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, Vol Disinterestedness and Desire in Kant's Aesthetics Author(s): Paul Guyer Source: The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, Vol. 36, No. 4 (Summer, 1978), pp. 449- 460 Published by: Blackwell Publishing on behalf of The American Society for Aesthetics Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/430485 Accessed: 11/11/2008 19:13 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use. Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. 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The American Society for Aesthetics and Blackwell Publishing are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism. http://www.jstor.org PAUL GUYER Disinterestednessand Desire in Kants Aesthetics SOME PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES arouse our spatial and temporal forms of things, as suspicion because of the nature of their opposed to both such material properties of arguments, even though their conclusions objects as their color or tone as well as such do not actually conflict with widely held be- more abstract properties as their content, liefs. Thus, for instance, Descartes's method meaning, or conceptual significance. This of clear and distinct ideas concludes by war- opinion conflicts with such natural beliefs ranting a fairly ordinary set of empirical as that the beauty of a sunset lies in its beliefs, but because of such problems as magnificent display of colors, or that of a the obscurity of its criterion for clearness Pieta in its deep expression of emotion. If and distinctness and its foundation in argu- Kant's basic principles really do conflict ments for the existence of a non-deceitful with such intuitions, then his theory of taste God, it can hardly persuade us to accept surely would merit our suspicion. those beliefs. Some theories, however, suffer Kant's interpretation of the disinterested- in our estimation because, quite apart from ness of judgments of taste also discourages the plausibility of their foundational con- our serious consideration of his theory. Kant cepts and arguments, or even despite such asserts that such judgments - judgments plausibility, their conclusions conflict with that particular objects are beautiful - and well-entrenched beliefs and intuitions. the experiences on which they are based are Kant's theory of aesthetic judgment, at least free of any connection to interest, either as traditionally interpreted, is such a theory. antecedent to or consequent upon the judg- To be sure, his Critique of Judgmentl has ment. That is, aesthetic judgments must not had many admirers and much influence. only be made independently of any prior But a generally favorable appreciation of interest in the existence of their objects, but the basic theory of this work has been hin- "also in themselves ground no interest at dered, I think, by the fact that some of its all" (?2, 205n.). And this seems a damning most prominent conclusions are apparently conclusion. It may be true that, as Kant in profound conflict with some of our most says, "One must not be in the least pre- widely held views about the nature and possessed in favor of the existence of a significance of our experience of natural thing, but must be quite indifferent in this beauty and artistic accomplishment. regard, in order tol play the part of a judge Thus, Kant took it to be a key conclusion in matters of taste" (?2, 205). It is cer- of his theory of taste that the only proper tainly true that if one is already disposed in objects of aesthetic appreciation are the favor of an object for a reason such as its monetary value or a personal attachment PAUL GUYER is assistant professor of philosophy at to its creator, one cannot make a fair assess- the University of Pittsburgh. ment of its aesthetic merits without ignor- 450 G U Y E R ing these dispositions; and it may sometimes Such doctrines as that only form is aes- be the case that one cannot ignore them, thetically significant, that beauty can gen- and so cannot make a fair judgment of erate no interest, and that natural beauty taste. But that the beauty of an object can- is more significant than artistic beauty, pro- not engender a genuine desire or concern duce much of our discomfort with Kant's for it, for further experience of it, for its aesthetics. In fact, however, a proper inter- maintenance and preservation, even, cir- pretation of Kant's basic theory of aesthetic cumstances permitting, for ownership of it response and judgment can show that some - in short, an interest in it - is absurd. of Kant's most disagreeable beliefs - in- Rather, we all assume that the beauty of cluding those just mentioned - are not an object is one of the best reasons we could really consequences of it at all. In some have for taking an interest in it, and we cases, such as that of Kant's formalist pref- justify a wide range of desires and activ- erence of design to color or composition to ities - such as wanting to visit museums, tone (?14, 225), his opinions are in no way travelling to do so, and spending money to direct consequences of his theory, whatever gain admission to them - simply by ref- he himself may have thought. In others, erence to the beauty (or other aesthetic such as the case of the thesis that aesthetic merits) of objects. If Kant's theory of taste judgment can create no interest, the actual is in fundamental conflict with this, surely consequences of Kant's theory are not quite it must be wrong. what they appear to be, nor quite what he Nor do our difficulties with Kant's theory takes them to be. of disinterestedness end with its apparent Obviously, I cannot demonstrate all of denial that the experience of beauty can this in a single paper.2 This article will be have any direct effect on our desires, or confined to one problem in Kant's theory generate any interest in the existence of of the disinterestedness of aesthetic judg- beautiful objects. For in attempting to ment. I will argue that if Kant's thesis that compensate for his exclusion of any direct the judgment of beauty itself grounds no connection between the judgment of taste interest in its object is interpreted so as to and any interest in the existence of beauti- conflict with our ordinary beliefs about the ful things with a theory of an indirect at- reasonable consequences of aesthetic experi- tachment between the two, Kant only com- ence, then it does not actually follow from mits another assault on our beliefs, this time Kant's theory of aesthetic judgment, but our beliefs about the significance of art. He that if, by means of a special Kantian no- grounds an indirect and "intellectual" inter- tion of "interest," it is understood so as to est in beauty on an analogy between aes- follow from Kant's basic theory, then it thetic response and moral feeling, by means does not actually conflict with our usual of practical reason's interest in the existence beliefs about interest in beauty. To put the of objects conforming to the conditions of point another way, Kant's explanation of our wholly disinterested delight, and then aesthetic response does imply that we can- maintains that this foundation justifies not take a certain form of interest in beauti- interest in the beauty of nature but not of ful objects, but this does not mean that we art. This conclusion is expressed in his be- must look beyond the phenomenon of aes- lief that "virtuosi of taste are not merely thetic response itself to explain our desires often, but rather customarily, vain, selfish, with respect to natural and artistic beauty. and given to injurious passions," and thus In fact, far from precluding such desires, "interest in the beautiful of art . affords Kant's own explanation of our pleasure in no proof of a manner of thinking attached the beautiful shows why they arise, and that or even inclined to the morally good," is one of its great virtues. whereas "an immediate interest in the My claim, then, is that, in the only sense beauty of nature is always a mark of a good in which it does follow from his theory of soul," and thus a sound basis for an intellec- taste, Kant's thesis that the judgment of tual interest (?42, 298). beauty grounds no interest in its object is Disinterestedness and Desire 451 not incompatible with the supposition that the beginning of the Second Moment, the experience of beauty can naturally and where he argues that if anyone is conscious directly generate certain desires with respect that his delight in an object is without any to beautiful objects.
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