Disinterestedness and Desire in Kant's Aesthetics Author(s): Paul Guyer Source: The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, Vol. 36, No. 4 (Summer, 1978), pp. 449- 460 Published by: Blackwell Publishing on behalf of The American Society for Aesthetics Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/430485 Accessed: 11/11/2008 19:13

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http://www.jstor.org PAUL GUYER

Disinterestednessand Desire in Kants Aesthetics

SOME PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES arouse our spatial and temporal forms of things, as suspicion because of the nature of their opposed to both such material properties of arguments, even though their conclusions objects as their color or tone as well as such do not actually conflict with widely held be- more abstract properties as their content, liefs. Thus, for instance, Descartes's method meaning, or conceptual significance. This of clear and distinct ideas concludes by war- opinion conflicts with such natural beliefs ranting a fairly ordinary set of empirical as that the beauty of a sunset lies in its beliefs, but because of such problems as magnificent display of colors, or that of a the obscurity of its criterion for clearness Pieta in its deep expression of emotion. If and distinctness and its foundation in argu- Kant's basic principles really do conflict ments for the existence of a non-deceitful with such intuitions, then his theory of taste God, it can hardly persuade us to accept surely would merit our suspicion. those beliefs. Some theories, however, suffer Kant's interpretation of the disinterested- in our estimation because, quite apart from ness of judgments of taste also discourages the plausibility of their foundational con- our serious consideration of his theory. Kant cepts and arguments, or even despite such asserts that such judgments - judgments plausibility, their conclusions conflict with that particular objects are beautiful - and well-entrenched beliefs and intuitions. the experiences on which they are based are Kant's theory of aesthetic judgment, at least free of any connection to interest, either as traditionally interpreted, is such a theory. antecedent to or consequent upon the judg- To be sure, his Critique of Judgmentl has ment. That is, aesthetic judgments must not had many admirers and much influence. only be made independently of any prior But a generally favorable appreciation of interest in the existence of their objects, but the basic theory of this work has been hin- "also in themselves ground no interest at dered, I think, by the fact that some of its all" (?2, 205n.). And this seems a damning most prominent conclusions are apparently conclusion. It may be true that, as Kant in profound conflict with some of our most says, "One must not be in the least pre- widely held views about the nature and possessed in favor of the existence of a significance of our experience of natural thing, but must be quite indifferent in this beauty and artistic accomplishment. regard, in order tol play the part of a judge Thus, Kant took it to be a key conclusion in matters of taste" (?2, 205). It is cer- of his theory of taste that the only proper tainly true that if one is already disposed in objects of aesthetic appreciation are the favor of an object for a reason such as its monetary value or a personal attachment PAUL GUYER is assistant professor of philosophy at to its creator, one cannot make a fair assess- the University of Pittsburgh. ment of its aesthetic merits without ignor- 450 G U Y E R ing these dispositions; and it may sometimes Such doctrines as that only form is aes- be the case that one cannot ignore them, thetically significant, that beauty can gen- and so cannot make a fair judgment of erate no interest, and that natural beauty taste. But that the beauty of an object can- is more significant than artistic beauty, pro- not engender a genuine desire or concern duce much of our discomfort with Kant's for it, for further experience of it, for its aesthetics. In fact, however, a proper inter- maintenance and preservation, even, cir- pretation of Kant's basic theory of aesthetic cumstances permitting, for ownership of it response and judgment can show that some - in short, an interest in it - is absurd. of Kant's most disagreeable beliefs - in- Rather, we all assume that the beauty of cluding those just mentioned - are not an object is one of the best reasons we could really consequences of it at all. In some have for taking an interest in it, and we cases, such as that of Kant's formalist pref- justify a wide range of desires and activ- erence of design to color or composition to ities - such as wanting to visit museums, tone (?14, 225), his opinions are in no way travelling to do so, and spending money to direct consequences of his theory, whatever gain admission to them - simply by ref- he himself may have thought. In others, erence to the beauty (or other aesthetic such as the case of the thesis that aesthetic merits) of objects. If Kant's theory of taste judgment can create no interest, the actual is in fundamental conflict with this, surely consequences of Kant's theory are not quite it must be wrong. what they appear to be, nor quite what he Nor do our difficulties with Kant's theory takes them to be. of disinterestedness end with its apparent Obviously, I cannot demonstrate all of denial that the experience of beauty can this in a single paper.2 This article will be have any direct effect on our desires, or confined to one problem in Kant's theory generate any interest in the existence of of the disinterestedness of aesthetic judg- beautiful objects. For in attempting to ment. I will argue that if Kant's thesis that compensate for his exclusion of any direct the judgment of beauty itself grounds no connection between the judgment of taste interest in its object is interpreted so as to and any interest in the existence of beauti- conflict with our ordinary beliefs about the ful things with a theory of an indirect at- reasonable consequences of aesthetic experi- tachment between the two, Kant only com- ence, then it does not actually follow from mits another assault on our beliefs, this time Kant's theory of aesthetic judgment, but our beliefs about the significance of art. He that if, by means of a special Kantian no- grounds an indirect and "intellectual" inter- tion of "interest," it is understood so as to est in beauty on an analogy between aes- follow from Kant's basic theory, then it thetic response and moral feeling, by means does not actually conflict with our usual of practical reason's interest in the existence beliefs about interest in beauty. To put the of objects conforming to the conditions of point another way, Kant's explanation of our wholly disinterested delight, and then aesthetic response does imply that we can- maintains that this foundation justifies not take a certain form of interest in beauti- interest in the beauty of nature but not of ful objects, but this does not mean that we art. This conclusion is expressed in his be- must look beyond the phenomenon of aes- lief that "virtuosi of taste are not merely thetic response itself to explain our desires often, but rather customarily, vain, selfish, with respect to natural and artistic beauty. and given to injurious passions," and thus In fact, far from precluding such desires, "interest in the beautiful of art . . . affords Kant's own explanation of our pleasure in no proof of a manner of thinking attached the beautiful shows why they arise, and that or even inclined to the morally good," is one of its great virtues. whereas "an immediate interest in the My claim, then, is that, in the only sense beauty of nature is always a mark of a good in which it does follow from his theory of soul," and thus a sound basis for an intellec- taste, Kant's thesis that the judgment of tual interest (?42, 298). beauty grounds no interest in its object is Disinterestedness and Desire 451 not incompatible with the supposition that the beginning of the Second Moment, the experience of beauty can naturally and where he argues that if anyone is conscious directly generate certain desires with respect that his delight in an object is without any to beautiful objects. Thus, it is simply not interest, he "cannot but estimate [the ob- necessary for Kant to resort to a theory of ject] except as containing a ground of de- indirect and "intellectual" interest in beauty light for everyone." More specifically, to explain such desires, and his claim that . . . since the delight is not grounded on any natural but not artistic beauty can generate inclination of the subject (nor on any other con- such an interest may be ignored. But even sidered interest), but rather the judging subject if it is not - even if Kant's basic theory of feels himself completely free with respect to the aesthetic response can be supplemented by delight that he directs to the object, he can find no conditions, to which his own a theory of a further intellectual or moral private subject alone might be party, as ground for his delight, interest in beauty - it can also be shown and consequently must regard it as grounded in that his distinction between natural and that which he may presuppose in everyone . . . artistic beauty in this regard is unjustified; Accordingly he will speak of the beautiful as if on Kant's own account, paradigmatic cases beauty were a property of the object . . . (?6, of artistic beauty have just as much claim 211). to our intellectual interest as cases of nat- But while it is quite plausible to suppose ural beauty. As this point can only be made that if one cannot find any private grounds with an excursus into Kant's theory of for one's pleasure in an object, one will take genius, however, its treatment must be re- that pleasure to be publicly valid, this para- served for another occasion.3 graph does not employ a plausible concept of interest. It simply equates interest with I any partial or private ground for delight. Does the disinterestedness of aesthetic The requirement that aesthetic judgment judgment entail that the experience of a be disinterested is then trivial, for it is beautiful object can create no interest in merely equivalent to the requirement that its existence? Kant's discussion of disinter- it be intersubjectively valid. No inde- estedness in the First Moment of the Ana- pendent criterion of disinterestedness is lytic of the Beautiful includes the assertion implied here. of such a view. But this discussion is neither In ?2 of the First Moment, however, Kant clear nor convincing; and when we support does offer a more informative account of its contentions by the more powerful argu- disinterestedness. In this section, which he ments of the Second Moment of the Ana- presents as the beginning of the argument lytic and an appropriate definition of in- of the Analytic of the Beautiful, Kant de- terest, we shall see that the thesis that aes- fines an interest as a kind of pleasure, thetic judgment creates no interest in its namely any "delight which we connect with object can have only limited force. the representation of the existence of an Kant starts his analysis of taste with the object" - or, as it is sometimes translated, "quality" of disinterestedness "because it is with the representation of the "real exist- this which the aesthetic judgment on the ence" of an object (?2, 204) .4 Interest is beautiful first regards" (?1, 203n.). It is not also more simply defined as "pleasure in the clear that this remark actually offers a good existence of an object" (?41, 296). And reason for beginning the analysis with dis- pleasure in the existence of an object is interestedness, but it does suggest that con- contrasted with pleasure in the "mere repre- sidering whether one's pleasure in a given sentation of it" (205). Apparenltly, then, an object is interested or not is the first step to interested pleasure is pleasure in the actual be taken in deciding whether or not that existence of an object, and a disinterested feeling of pleasure licenses calling the ob- pleasure is pleasure in its mere representa- ject beautiful, that is, in making a particu- tion, "no matter how indifferent I may be lar judgment of taste. Kant displays the to the real existence of the object of this criterial significance of disinterestedness at representation." 452 GU Y ER

Kant supports his claim that aesthetic distinction between existence and repre- pleasure is disinterested with a traditional sentation, or some further analysis of in- sort of example.5 Asked whether a palace terest, it cannot be clear that any pleasure before me is beautiful, I might say no, on connected in any way with the actual ex- the ground that I do not care for things istence of an object is an interest, or that made merely to be gaped at, or that a good an interest is any kind of pleasure at all. restaurant would please me more, or I might (Nothing in Kant's example necessitates dismiss the building by condemning the defining interest as itself a kind of pleasure, vanity of the great who exploit the popu- rather than as a kind of ground or reason lace to build such things. However, all such for pleasure, which would be more responses are irrelevant to the question of natural.) 6 beauty. Obviously, they manifest utilitarian The definition of interest as any delight or moral concerns, rather than a purely connected with the existence of an object, aesthetic concern with the beauty of the then, involves an obscure distinction be- building itself. And according to Kant, each tween existence and representation and a of the irrelevant replies manifests a concern vague conception of the connection between with the real existence of the object rather pleasure and existence. If Kant's assertions than with its mere representation. This is that pleasure in the beautiful is not found- why they are irrelevant to aesthetic judg- ed on any interest, and that it creates none, ment. The example seems meant to supply are based solely on the argument of ?2 - evidence for interpreting interest as delight and both assertions are made by the end of connected with real existence, and pleasure this section, which contains no more argu- in the beautiful as delight connected with ment than what I have described - then mere representation, as well as for the thesis their justification is far from clear. that aesthetic judgment is disinterested. Kant's development of the theme of dis- Kant's argument, however, is unconvinc- interestedness in the next two sections does ing. While we all undoubtedly do find it not advance our understanding of either intuitively correct to dismiss those replies just what the contrast between representa- to the question of beauty which Kant sug- tion and real existence involves or just what gests we reject, it is not obvious that any connection between pleasure and real ex- contrast between existence and mere repre- istence must actually be proscribed in the sentation must be our basis for doing so. case of taste. These sections contrast aes- We may contrast the utility of an object thetic response with the two basic categories with its beauty, or the moral justifiability of interested pleasure, the pleasure of sens- of a building's having been built in the way ory gratification in agreeable objects (?3, it was with the beauty of the structure that 207), and the pleasure of esteem or ap- resulted, but it is not obvious that we must proval (?5, 210) of objects which are good distinguish between existence and represen- either for something or in themselves (?4, tation to make such distinctions. On the 207). Pleasure in the beautiful differs from face of it, at least, distinguishing between mere pleasure in sensation because the for- such properties as beauty and utility, or mer is disinterested and the latter is inter- such interests as the aesthetic and the moral, ested. But the reason why mere sensory is enough to explain Kant's example. gratification in the agreeable is interested, Nor is it clear what Kant's distinction according to Kant, is that the object of actually amounts to, or what it would mean such pleasure for a kind of pleasure to be connected to through sensation excites a desire for objects of representation rather than existence; it the same sort; thus, the delight presupposes not certainly seems that our pleasure - our the mere judgment on such an object, but the actually taking pleasure - in the beauty of relation of its existence to my condition, insofar the palace depends as much on its existence as [the latter] is affected by it (?3, 207). as does any possible pleasure in its utility. No contrast with the beautiful is explicitly Without either some further analysis of the made, but we can only infer that it, unlike Disinterestedness and Desire 453

the agreeable, does not provoke such a de- existence of something. Indeed, one might sire, and that it is disinterested for that suppose that just because pleasure in the reason. This argument, however, is unsatis- good may be had through a "mere concept," factory for two reasons. First, it is not ob- it does not require the real existence of vious that a delight in the existence of a anything. particular object is identical with a desire Still, there is a link between pleasure and for experience of further objects of the real existence in the case of the good. The same sort, or even entailed by such a desire; concept of a good is the concept of a pos- so it is not clear that the desire which Kant sible end, that is, something for the sake describes as being aroused by the agreeable of which we might act. It thus implies "the must be connected with an interest as he has relation of reason to (at least possible) defined it. This argument does not clarify willing, and consequently contains a delight the notion of taking pleasure in the ex- in the existence [Dasein] of an object or an istence of something, nor does it establish action, that is, some interest" (?4, 207). The that the pleasure in the beautiful is not concept of a good is a concept of a thing such a pleasure. Secondly, insofar as it con- which offers some reason to will it, because trasts pleasure in the beautiful and that in this concept either promises pleasure in its the agreeable by reference to the fact that existence or represents it as morally desir- the latter creates a desire for the existence able (in which case pleasure will follow of certain objects, this section presupposes from willing it). But to will an object just rather than proves that the experience of is to will its existence; to will is to try to beauty does not provoke any such desire or actualize a concept. Thus, the concept of interest. the good is connected to the notion of the In ?3, then, Kant does not show that the existence of an object, and pleasure in a pleasure in the beautiful presupposes no good is connected to its real existence, interest in its object, and that it is not a either as an incentive for willing existence pleasure in any way connected with the lat- or as a consequence of such willing. So ter's existence. Nor does he actually prove pleasure linked to a concept of a good is that either aesthetic experience or judgment connected to real existence as well, and is can create no interest in the existence of an interest on Kant's definition. objects. In ?4, Kant advances his case even But from this it simply does not follow less. He contrasts the beautiful and the that when a feeling of pleasure cannot be good by arguing that the latter pleases "by linked to an object by a mere concept, that means of reason through a mere concept." pleasure is not connected in any way with Thus, "to find something good, I must the real existence of the object, or that it is always know what sort of thing the object not an interest. In the case of the good, a should be, that is, have a concept of it"; prior promise of pleasure in the existence but to find something beautiful, Kant as- of an object - given by a concept of it - serts, no concept is necessary. Thus, he is a reason for willing its existence. If maintains that an object can please as pleasure in the beautiful is not linked to either useful or morally good only if it is its object by any such concept - which subsumed under some concept (of use or is all that Kant asserts in ?4 - then no such moral requirement), but that such beauti- promise may be given, and there may be no ful things as "flowers, free drawings, . . . prior incentive for willing the existence of [and] foliage signify nothing, depend on no a beautiful object, at least under any deter- determinate concepts, and yet please" (?4, minate conceptualization or description of 207). The basic contrast which this section it. But this does not entail that pleasure makes, in other words, turns on the factor in the beautiful does not depend in some of connection to a concept rather than on way on the existence of its object. Nor does connection to real existence. Yet it is surely it imply that once an object is found beau- not evident that a pleasure which requires tiful, we cannot desire its continued exist- a concept must be a pleasure in the real ence, and act toward this end - in an ordi- 454 GUYER nary sense, take an interest in a beautiful beauty be founded on a feeling of pleasure object. for which "universal subjective validity" - Neither ?3 nor ?4, then, clearly estab- or intersubjective validity - can reasonably lishes that pleasure in the beautiful is not be claimed, and argues that if our pleasure connected with the existence of an object, in a beautiful object is explained as due to nor that the experience of a beautiful ob- the fact that the manifold of sensibility ject cannot create an interest in its exist- which it provides occasions a harmony be- ence. Kant claims that interest or delight in tween imagination and understanding real existence "always has relation to the without any determinate concept being faculty of desire, either as its determining applied to the object, this condition will ground or as necessarily connected with its be fulfilled. Kant first attempts to deduce determining ground" (?2, 204), and so by the requirement of universal validity from separating interest and aesthetic response the disinterestedness of aesthetic judgment he clearly means to deny that the latter it- (?6, 211). Such an inference, however, is self has any effect on the faculty of desire. either circular, if an interest is simply But ?3 merely implies that the experience identical to any source of partiality, or in- of a beautiful object does not create a de- valid, if interest is not so defined. More- bsire for experience of a type of object, over, such an inference might also be which does not entail that it can produce thought of as an attempt to derive norma- no desire for the existence of the particular tive conclusions from factual premises.7 For object actually experienced. And ?4 only these reasons, it is better to regard the suggests that a beautiful object cannot be claim that aesthetic judgment requires in- seen as desirable (or pleasurable) through tersubjective validity as a fundamental the medium of a concept, which does not premise of Kant's theory, supported not by imply that it must be without any effect at arguments within the theory, but by an all on desire. extra-systematic appeal to what we all The First Moment of the Analytic of the recognize to be the correct use of the lin- Beautiful thus establishes no clear contrast guistic form ". . . is beautiful." Kant makes between representation and real existence, such an appeal in ?7 (212-213); and in ?7, nor does it prove that pleasure in the beau- unlike ?2, Kant makes his appeal to our tiful has no interest as its consequence. In intuitions without the damaging introduc- fact, if his discussion of disinterestedness is tion of any such mechanism as his own his true starting-point, then Kant's attempt contrast between representation and exist- to construct any aesthetic theory, let alone ence. I will assume that this condition on one with counter-intuitive conclusions, is judgments of taste is familiar, and turn to doomed to failure. If, however, we take the Kant's explanation of aesthetic response as Second Moment rather than the First as a pleasure due to the harmony of our the basis of the Analytic, and treat the higher cognitive faculties. It is on this thesis of disinterestedness as a consequence aspect of Kant's theory that the interpre- rather than as a premise of Kant's theory tation of disinterestedness as anything more of aesthetic response, two gains will result. than mere impartiality must depend, and First, we will then be able to see how the from which any explanation of the disin- requirement that aesthetic judgment be terestedness of aesthetic response must disinterested can in fact be defended. Sec- emerge. ondly, we will also see just how limited Kant's explanation of pleasure in the the force of Kant's claim that such a judg- beautiful is founded on a general theory of ment creates no interest must be. pleasure according to which the "attain- ment of every aim is accompanied with a of II feeling pleasure" (vi, 187; cf. ?22, 242), but which also supposes that such pleasure In the Second Moment, Kant both lays is actually felt only when the attainment down the requirement that a judgment of of the objective in some way appears con- Disinterestedness and Desire 455

tingent rather than necessary (188). The "the cognitive faculties, which are set into First Introduction to the Critique of Judg- play by [a given] representation, are here ment suggests how this general theory is in a free play, since no definite concept re- applied to the case of aesthetic response. stricts them to a definite rule of cognition" In any act of judgment, the faculties of (?9, 217). Kant applies the term "free" to imagination and understanding are united. the imagination alone as well as to the har- Ordinarily, their connection is objective, mony between imagination and understand- and is recognized in the application of a ing; thus, the conclusion of the Analytic concept to an object. But we may also con- describes taste as a "faculty for estimating sider the relationship between these two an object in relation to the free lawfulness cognitive faculties from a merely subjective [Gesetzmdssigkeit]of the imagination" (?22, point of view, or notice "how one helps or 240). hinders the other in [a given] representa- Two points must be noted about this ex- tion, and thereby affects one's mental state"; planation of aesthetic response. First, while in this case, Kant maintains, the relation it links pleasure to the absence of constraint between imagination and understanding is by a concept, the imagination is not free of sensible [empfindbar] (FI, 223). To con- all constraints whatever. Kant's theory is nect this with Kant's theory of pleasure, that the imagination and understanding are and explain why it is in fact a feeling of disposed to the state of harmony by the pleasure which manifests a harmony be- manifold presented by an object, or, specifi- tween our cognitive faculties, we may define cally, by the form of an object. As Kant our objective in the use of these faculties argues, it is when in two ways: objectively, as finding a con- for a or as the imagination (as the faculty of intuitions a cept given object, subjectively, priori) is unintentionally set into harmony with finding the subjective condition for the the understanding (as the faculty of concepts) application of a concept, that is, as finding through a given representation, and a feeling of unity in the manifolds apprehended by pleasure thereby aroused, [that] the object must sensibility and presented by imagination be regarded as final for the reflective judgment (vii, 190) . to the understanding. Kant's theory of pleasure then implies that we feel pleasure That is, when the representation of an ob- when this latter goal of cognition is attained ject disposes the imagination and under- in the absence of its ordinary guarantee, standing to a harmonious state of free namely, the use of an empirical concept as play, we take pleasure in the beauty of that a rule for unifying a manifold, and is thus object. This harmony is "unintentional," in attained contingently. that it is not produced by following the This is just what the First Introduction rule provided by a particular concept, but describes as resulting, is otherwise similar to a normal state of ... if (even before it regards the comparison [of cognition. Thus, the harmony of the fac- an object] with others), the judgment, which has ulties, like an ordinary cognitive state, does no concept ready for the given intuition, unites depend upon a representation of an object, the imagination (which merely apprehends the or a manifold of sensibility, being furnished object) with the understanding (which presents a concept in general) and perceives a relation of to the mind. There is nothing in Kant's the two cognitive faculties, which in general con- account to suggest that this manifold is not stitutes the subjective, merely sensible condition furnished in the ordinary way - by the of the objective use of judgment-namely, the effect of an external object on the faculty of the two harmony faculties with each other of sensibility. The freedom of the imagina- (FI, 223-224). tion lies in its freedom from constraint by This harmony produces pleasure because it concepts, and not in any freedom from the is at least like the synthesis of a manifold, other usual circumstances of perception. In though without a determinate concept, and this regard, aesthetic response is as depend- is thus contingent. For the same reason, it ent upon the existence of an object as is may also be called free. As Kant puts it, ordinary cognition. (Naturally, this account 456 G U Y ER must be modified in order to accommodate claims that although pleasure in the beauti- the judgment of objects of taste which are ful resembles not or events, ordinary physical objects . . . such as neither that from the pathological ground literary works, and to take care of of agreeableness nor that from the intellectual such judgments of taste as are made in the ground of represented good . . . still it has in- course of the creation of works of art. In trinsic causality, namely, that of presenrving the fact, Kant eventually shows how to make condition of representation itself and the occu- such modifications, but not in his initial pation of the cognitive faculties without further purpose (p. 12, 222). exposition of his theory, where he takes as paradigmatic the aesthetic judgment of Like any other pleasure, our response to natural objects or else of such relatively the beautiful is accompanied with - in concrete objects of art as paintings and fact, Kant writes as if it were identical- particular musical performances.) with - a tendency to preserve the repre- Secondly, there is nothing in Kant's ex- sentation which occasions it. planation of our pleasure in the beautiful But if pleasure in the beautiful resembles which entails that it differs from other cases other pleasures in this regard, in spite of its of pleasure, except in the way in which it is various peculiarities, then several conclu- aroused and in the intersubjective validity sions follow. First, while the faculty of de- which it enjoys. Kant himself states that sire may not be involved in the origin of the agreeable, the beautiful, and the good aesthetic response, this does not entail the are not the objects of three different kinds conclusion that such response is without of feelings, but rather only "denote three effect on desire. Rather, a tendency to pre- different relations of representations to the serve a mental state will ordinarily mani- feeling of pleasure and displeasure" (?5, fest itself as a kind of desire - namely, a 209-210). Pleasure has different objects be- desire to remain in a given condition. Thus, cause it may be caused in different ways the very nature of aesthetic response as a (by an object's physiological effect on the kind of pleasure, on Kant's own account, senses, by its subsumption under a concept leads to its connection with desire. Further, of the good or useful, or by its disposing if aesthetic response naturally produces a the imagination and understanding to their desire for its own preservation, then it is harmonious accord); but the feeling of also natural to think of it as leading to a pleasure is always the same, and, at the most desire for at least the continued existence general level, so is the form of its explana- of its object. For if the existence of a given tion. Pleasure in the beautiful, like pleasure object is the condition of our having a in any other object, is subject to Kant's representation or experience of it, then that transcendental characterization8of pleasure, existence will be a condition of our enjoying "in terms of the effect that the sensation of that representation. In that case, the tend- our state produces on our mind" (APV, ency to preserve one's state of mind - the ?60, 231) .9 Thus, according to the Anthro- enjoyment - will certainly extend to the pology, pleasure is "what directly prompts condition of that state of mind, or the de- me to maintain [my] state (to remain in sire will extend to the existence of the ob- it) ," or, in the words of the third Critique, ject; for if it is analytically true that to it is "the consciousness of the causality of a will an end is to will the necessary means representation in respect of the state of the to it (FMM, 417),1O then it should also be subject as one tending to preserve that true that to desire an end is to desire the state" (?10, 220). Indeed, Kant goes out means to it.11 But a desire for the continued of his way to make it clear that this char- existence of an object we have found beau- acterization applies to aesthetic response. tiful is certainly one thing we could mean The Anthropology offers its explanation as by an interest in the beautiful; thus, the subsuming both pleasure "through the fact that our response to beauty is pleasure senses" and that "through imagination must itself lead to an interest in the con- (taste)," and the Critique of Judgment tinued existence of its object. Disinterestedness and Desire 457

If this is so, then Kant's explanation of ence of an object is an interest only when aesthetic response entails rather than pre- that object can be represented as an object cludes the creation of an interest in its of desire under some concept, and thus by object. How could Kant deny this, let alone the faculty of reason. conclude that the complete disinterestedness Adopting this definition of interest allows of aesthetic response is actually a conse- us to interpret Kant's thesis of disinterested- quence of his theory of aesthetic response? ness without denying either our intuitions As long as we are confined to the definition about beauty or the implications of Kant's of interest which Kant offers in the Critique own theory of pleasure. For on this defini- of Judgment, there is no answer to this tion, Kant's explanation of aesthetic re- question. If, however, we consider the defi- sponse does indeed imply that our pleasure nition of interest employed in the Critique in the beautiful is neither an interest, nor of Practical Reason, we can see that Kant's caused by an interest, nor the cause of an denial of a consequent interest in beautiful interest. The key to Kant's theory is that objects is entailed by his explanation of aesthetic response is free of the constraint aesthetic response, although its significance of any determinate concept. Thus, it is not is then not quite what it appears to be. produced by the subsumption of the mani- fold under any determinate concept. More- over, aesthetic does III judgment not produce any determinate concepts to which pleasure In the second Critique, Kant defines an can be linked, or which can be used to interest as "an incentive of the will so far promise pleasure. It is Kant's thesis that "in as it is presented by reason" (CPR, 79). A their logical quantity all judgments of taste "determining ground of the will," which on are singular judgments" (?8, 215), that is, this definition is equivalent to an interest, is are valid only of the particular objects similarly defined as "the conception of an which occasion them, in spite of whatever object and its relation to the subject, where- general terms might occur in our expres- by the faculty of desire is determined to seek sion of the judgment. If no classification of its realization" (CPR, 21). Here, an in- an object by an empirical concept - for terest is not itself a feeling of pleasure, but instance, "rose" - produces our pleasure in rather a kind of concept of an object. A its beauty, then, Kant believes, we cannot feeling of pleasure is, in a way, a possible connect "the predicate of beauty with the incentive for the will, but for a will deter- concept of the object taken in its entire mined by reason, the feeling of pleasure logical sphere," or infer that any other ob- must be linked to a concept to serve as an ject properly identified as a rose, or sub- incentive. sumed under any other determinate concept Now, such an interest does preserve a applying to the given object, will share its connection between pleasure and existence. beauty. But if an interest is a concept of an A conception of an object promising pleas- object which presents it as an object of the ure in its existence is one kind of incentive will, or promises pleasure, then we cannot for the will, and as an incentive for the will, have an interest in the case of the beautiful. such a conception leads to the willing of an No concept which can be applied to an object's actual existence. But more im- object can promise that we will take pleas- portantly, on this definition an interest is ure in its beauty, and no empirical concept not just any pleasure connected with the applicable to it can be used to formulate existence of an object, and not embodied an interest even subsequently to the ex- in just any representation of an object perience of the given case. which affects the faculty of desire. An in- The judgment of taste must be disinter- terest in an object is present only when ested, because it is free of any dependence there is a concept of it, by means of which on concepts, and an interest is nothing but a pleasure or the expectation of pleasure can certain kind of concept of objects - which be linked to it. And a desire for the exist- is to say, of a class of objects. This follows 458 G U Y E R from coupling the second Critique's defi- which can act as an incentive for the will nition of interest with Kant's explanation by promising pleasure in the existence of of aesthetic response. Alternatively, we any object which falls under it, and if a might now revise the third Critique's defi- pleasure which is produced by the effect nition of interest as a kind of pleasure, classi- of the actual representation of an object fying as an interest any pleasure in an ob- on the imagination and understanding can- ject dependent on the subsumption of that not be predicted by the use of any prior object under a determinate concept. We conceptual characterization of it, then no could then see the true form of the require- such concept can be used to formulate an ment that pleasure in the beautiful not be interest in beautiful objects. But a number pleasure in the real existence of an object, of claims which might seem to follow from but in its mere representation. This require- this do not. First, it does not follow that ment would not preclude any connection pleasure in a beautiful object will not, like between aesthetic response and the actual any other pleasure, produce a tendency existence of an object, but only demand towards, or desire for, its own continuation. that the existence of the object effect a feel- At best, it follows that the object of such a ing of pleasure without having to be seen desire cannot be represented as desirable as instantiating any particular concept. Aes- through a concept, but only through either thetic response would have to derive from an intuition of it, or some definite descrip- the mere contemplation of an object, not tion, formulated with general terms but from the recognition that an object of a understood to refer only to the particular certain sort exists or from the judgment that object. Secondly, if the physical existence it is an object with a certain network of of a given object is indeed a condition of causal and practical relations, consequences enjoying its representation - if, for in- of its empirical actuality. That is, what stance, no adequate reproduction of objects pleasure in the beautiful must be separated in a particular medium is possible - then from is not existence itself, but the kinds of the disinterestedness of aesthetic judgment judgments we typically make about the ex- does not preclude a perfectly natural desire istence of objects. Such judgments, as well for the continuation of that object's exist- as any pleasures they generate, require the ence. It only entails that such a desire is a application of determinate concepts to their desire for the existence of a particular ob- objects. But we must note that on this view ject (e.g., Leonardo's Last Supper), and not the separation of disinterested pleasure a desire for it as an object of a given type from real existence implies neither that aes- (paintings, or paintings of meals, or paint- thetic response is not directed to an actually ings with a particular formal organization) existent object nor incapable of producing - though that object will, of course, belong any concern for such, but only that, unlike to many types. Finally, while it might be both ordinary cognitive and practical re- the case that the independence of aesthetic sponses, it requires no judgment about the response from the subsumption of its objects existence and connections of its object. under any determinate concepts does pre- The disinterestedness of aesthetic judg- clude the development of determinate con- ment thus does not entail a total separation cepts - whether they be "rose" or "Haydn of aesthetic pleasure and desire, but only the quartets" - which, in virtue of past ex- independence of pleasure in beautiful ob- perience, can truly promise pleasure in any jects from desires that can be attached to object falling in the classes denoted by determinate general concepts. The force of them, and thus found an interest in the Kant's claim that aesthetic judgment pro- technical sense of the Critique of Practical duces no interest in its object is, however, Reason, nothing in this thesis suggests that quite limited when it is viewed as derived aesthetic response itself - under the simple from this theory - which, for the lack of description "pleasure in the beautiful" - any other support, it must be. If an interest cannot be something we desire, and some- is a determinate conception of an object thing which motivates some of our activities Disinterestedness and Desire 459 in the way that other objects of desire do. and the page number for the text in Volume V of Thus, twhile the impossibility of formulat- the above edition, and references to the latter are a certain kind of in- given by the abbreviation "FI" succeeded by the ing concept-connected page number for Volume XX of that edition. terest on the basis of aesthetic judgments References to the Foundation of the Metaphysics might be a consequence of Kant's explana- of Morals are given by "FMM," followed by the tion of aesthetic response, it does not fol- page number in Volume IV of the Akademie edi- low that aesthetic response itself cannot pro- tion, and those to the Critique of Practical Reason duce a natural desire for the ex- by "CPR," followed by the page number for perfectly Volume V; the latter are taken from the transla- istence of its nor that particular objects, it tion by Lewis White Beck (Indianapolis, 1956). cannot itself become the object of an equally Reference to the Anthropology from a Pragmatic natural - though certainly less determinate Point of View is given by "APV" and the page - desire. number for Volume VII of the Akademie edition; Without the definition of interest I have used the translation by Mary J. Gregor adopt- (The Hague, 1974). ed from the Critique of Practical Reason, 2 I have considered some problems with Kant's the Critique of Judgment can furnish no assertion of formalism in "Formalism and the argument at all for the thesis that the judg- Theory of Expression in Kant's Aesthetics," Kant- 1 ment of beauty can produce no interest in Studien 68, Heft (1977), 46-70. A much broader discussion of my interpretation of Kant's theory its object. With this definition, the third of taste is offered in my forthcoming book, Kant Critique can supply such an argument. But and the Claims of Taste (Harvard University Press). if the thesis is interpreted as deriving from aThis treatment may be found in my article this argument, it no longer does violence "Interest, Nature, and Art: A Problem in Kant's to our belief that the of Aesthetics," in The Review of Metaphysics, Volume ordinary beauty XXXI, Number 4 is itself a sufficient (June, 1978), 580-603. objects ground for 'See for instance the translation by J. C. Mere- the interest we take in them and the efforts dith (Oxford, 1911), p. 42. The translation by J. we devote to them. For it does not, as it H. Bernard (London, 1896), does not introduce appears to, mean that we must look outside the adjective "real." of the nature of aesthetic to ex- 6 Hume used the example of a palace, maintain- response that "the order and of much ing convenience a palace plain of what we ordinarily think of are no less essential to its beauty, than its mere as an interest in beautiful objects. Kant's figure and appearance" (A Treatise of Human theory does entail that the experience of Nature, Book II, Part I, Section viii) . But for the the beauty of particular objects cannot lead fact that Kant is not supposed to have been fa- to the formation of interests in the existence miliar with this work, we could take his example in ? 2 to be a polemical reference to Hume. But of determinate classes of objects. But if that Kant certainly would have been familiar with the is all it entails, and if it is only for the ex- example of a "magnificent building" used by planation of such interests that Kant's Henry Home, Lord Kames, in his Elements of theory of an intellectual interest in the Criticism (Part I, Ch. 1). beautiful must be R Donald Crawford has also argued that the invoked, then Kant's problems with Kant's argument in ? 2 prevent its theory of disinterestedness is less counter- analysis of disinterestedness from functioning as intuitive than has traditionally been sup- the real starting-point of Kant's theory of taste posed. And Kant's further theory of this (Kant's Aesthetic Theory [Madison, 1974], pp. 41- intellectual interest, with the attendant 50). But while he has argued against Kant's con- problem of its preference for natural over clusion that an aesthetic judgment cannot ground artistic beauty, can be safely excluded from an interest in its object (pp. 50-54) , he does not argue, as I that this the core of his theory of taste. will, thesis is not really a con- sequence of Kant's theory of aesthetic judgment except in a very limited sense. All references are to Kants l Gesammelte Schrif- 7A similar point is suggested by John Fisher and edited the ten, by Koniglichen Preussischen (now Jeffrey Maitland in "The Subjectivist Turn in Akademie der Deutschen) Wissenschaften (Berlin, Aesthetics: A Critical Analysis of Kant's Theory of Translations from 1902). the Critique of Judgment Appreciation," The Review of Metaphysics, Volume and the document known as its First Introduction XXVII, Number 4 (June, 1974), 741. are references to my own; the former are given by 8See FI, 230. Kant there says that the "trans- the Roman numeral for the section of the Intro- cendental explanation" [Erklarung] of pleasure duction, or the Arabic numeral for the text section, must be perfectly general, "whether it accompany 460 G U Y ER sensation, reflection, or the determination of the the latter pleasure "through the imagination" will," and then explains pleasure as "the condition rather than pleasure in reflective judgment), it is of the mind, in which a representation is in har- admissible evidence. mony with it, either merely to preserve this [con- 10Lewis White Beck has argued that the sig- the condition of dition] (for mutually assisting nificance of Kant's classification of this principle as faculties of mind in a it- representation preserves analytic is obscure (A Commentary to Kant's Cri- self) or to bring forth its object" (FI, 230-231). tique of Practical Reason [Chicago, 1960] p. 86). James Haden translates Kant as offering a "trans- That is certainly true, but does not affect my cendental definition" of pleasure (in his translation which is that it is a of Kant, The First Introduction to the Critique of present point, only clearly Judgment [Indianapolis, 1965], p. 34), but since Kantian assumption that the interest of the faculty Kant maintains that the effects of pleasure can be of desire extends from its object to that object's understood but the feeling itself cannot be analyzed necessary conditions. (FI, 232), it seems better to use the vaguer "ex- 11 At least, that is, where the nature of the means planation" to render Erklarung. does not conflict with any other desires or ob- 9 The use of the Anthropology in the interpre- jectives-a condition which should ordinarily be met tation of Kant's aesthetics may seem suspect, since in the case of objects of aesthetic appreciation. much of the material included in it antedates the This paper derives from an address delivered at development of Kant's mature aesthetic theory in the Ohio University Kant Conference in March, the years after 1787. But since the work was pub- 1977. I would like to thank Annette Baier, John M. lished by Kant himself in 1798, and since it in- Cooper, Pamela Foa, and the editorial staff of cludes Kant's mature distinction between sensory JAAC for comments helpful on the way to the gratification and pleasure in the beautiful (calling present version.