MENA-OECD Ministerial Conference Highlights in Pictures

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23 November 2009 – Marrakech, Morocco MENA-OECD Ministerial Conference Highlights in pictures www.oecd.org/mena/ministerial2009 H.E. Mr. Nizar Baraka, Moroccan Minister Delegate to the Prime Minister in charge of Economic and General Affairs, and Mr. Angel Gurrìa, OECD Secretary-General during the signing ceremony of the OECD Declaration on International Investment and Multinational Enterprises. H.E. Mr. Nizar Baraka, Moroccan Minister Delegate to the Prime Minister in charge of Economic and General Affairs, and Mr. Angel Gurrìa, OECD Secretary-General during the signing ceremony of the OECD Declaration on International Investment and Multinational Enterprises. H.E. Mr. Nizar Baraka, Moroccan Minister Delegate to the Prime Minister in charge of Economic and General Affairs, and Mr. Angel Gurrìa, OECD Secretary-General during the signing ceremony of the OECD Declaration on International Investment and Multinational Enterprises. H.E. Mr. Nizar Baraka, Moroccan Minister Delegate to the Prime Minister in charge of Economic and General Affairs, speaks to the press. H.E. Mr. Abbas El Fassi, Moroccan Prime Minister, arrives at the Palais des Congrès de la Palmeraie Mr. Marcos Bonturi, Deputy Chief of Staff of the OECD Secretary-General, Mr. Angel Gurrìa, OECD Secretary-General , and H.E. Mr. Nizar Baraka, Moroccan Minister Delegate to the Prime Minister in charge of Economic and General Affairs Her Royal Highness Princess Mathilde of Belgium, His Royal Highness Prince Philippe of Belgium and H.E. Mr. Abbas El Fassi, Prime Minister of Morocco Mr. Angel Gurrìa, OECD Secretary-General, and His Royal Highness Prince Philippe of Belgium High-level government and private sector representatives gather during the Ministerial panel on public governance High-level government and private sector representatives gather during the Ministerial panel on investment and business climate. H.E. Mr. Nizar Baraka, Moroccan Minister Delegate to the Prime Minister in charge of Economic and General Affairs, Ms. Carolyn Ervin, OECD Director of Enterprise and Financial Affairs, Mr. Anthony O’Sullivan, Head of the OECD Private Sector Development Division, and Mr. Alexander Böhmer, Head of the MENA-OECD Investment Programme H.E. Mr. Nizar Baraka, Moroccan Minister Delegate to the Prime Minister in charge of Economic and General Affairs, Ms. Carolyn Ervin, OECD Director of Enterprise and Financial Affairs, Mr. Rolf Alter, OECD Director of Public Governance, HE. Mr. Mohamed Abbou, Moroccan Minister Delegate to the Prime Minister in charge Public Sector Modernisation.

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