DOCSLIB.ORG

The Special Norms Thesis:Why Congress's Constitutional Decision-Making Should Be Disciplined by More Than the Usual Norms of P

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
The Special Norms Thesis:Why Congress's Constitutional Decision-Making Should Be Disciplined by More Than the Usual Norms of P Rosen.40.6.7 (Do Not Delete) 7/15/2019 4:45 PM THE SPECIAL NORMS THESIS: WHY CONGRESS’S CONSTITUTIONAL DECISION-MAKING SHOULD BE DISCIPLINED BY MORE THAN THE USUAL NORMS OF POLITICS Mark D. Rosen† TABLE OF CONTENTS INTRODUCTION .............................................................................................................. 2771 I. THE DOMAIN OF CONGRESS’S CONSTITUTIONAL DECISION-MAKING .............. 2777 A. The ‘May’ Question .................................................................................... 2777 B. The ‘Whether’ and ‘What’ Questions ...................................................... 2778 1. General Properties of the Whether and What Questions ......... 2779 2. Institution-Tending ....................................................................... 2779 a. Enabling Constitutional Institutions .............................. 2780 b. Building-out Constitutional Institutions ....................... 2781 c. Protecting Constitutional Institutions ............................ 2783 3. Rights-Tending .............................................................................. 2783 a. Adequately Realizing Constitutional Rights .................. 2784 b. Resolving Conflicts ............................................................ 2784 II. NORMS ..................................................................................................................... 2786 A. What They Are, and How They Arise ..................................................... 2786 B. Application to the Special Norms Thesis ................................................. 2787 † University Distinguished Professor, IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law. This Article has benefitted from the feedback from many readers and discussants, including Chris Schmidt, Steve Heyman, Kathy Baker, Sheldon Nahmod, Carolyn Shapiro, Alan Erbsen, Joel Goldstein, Doug NeJaime, and Evan Zoldan. 2769 Rosen.40.6.7 (Do Not Delete) 7/15/2019 4:45 PM 2770 CARDOZO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 40:2769 C. Judicial Temperament, Reflective Equilibrium, and Norm Generation .................................................................................................. 2789 D. Implications for the Special Norms Thesis .............................................. 2792 III. WHY CONGRESS’S CONSTITUTIONAL DECISION-MAKING SHOULD BE DISCIPLINED BY SPECIAL NORMS .......................................................................... 2793 A. The Argument from Considered Judgment (First Argument)............... 2794 1. What the First Argument Requires, and What it is Capable of Establishing..................................................................................... 2794 a. The First Argument ........................................................... 2795 B. The Argument from Exclusion (Second Argument) ............................... 2797 1. The High Equivalence Thesis ....................................................... 2797 2. The Low Equivalence Thesis ........................................................ 2800 a. Legitimacy Deficit .............................................................. 2801 3. The Special Norms Thesis ............................................................ 2805 C. The Argument from Legitimacy (Third Argument) ............................... 2805 D. The Argument from Political Fraternity (Fourth Argument) ............... 2806 E. The Argument from Identity (Fifth Argument) ...................................... 2808 F. What the Five Arguments Do and Do Not Establish ............................. 2811 IV. CONTENTS OF THE SPECIAL NORMS APPLICABLE TO CONGRESS ........................ 2812 A. The Norm of Proactivity ............................................................................ 2813 B. The Norm of Explicitness .......................................................................... 2814 1. Quality ............................................................................................. 2815 2. Institutional Capacity for Responsible Constitutional Decision- Making ............................................................................................ 2815 3. Institutional Demands .................................................................. 2817 C. The Norm of Tempered Politics ................................................................ 2820 1. Reciprocity ...................................................................................... 2821 a. Two Interpretive Leaps ..................................................... 2822 b. Holism ................................................................................. 2824 2. Communicative Exchange ............................................................ 2826 a. Openness-to-Being-Influenced ....................................... 2827 b. Aim-to-Influence ............................................................... 2828 3. Justifications for Reciprocity and Communicative Exchange ......................................................................................... 2830 a. Political Fraternity ............................................................. 2831 Rosen.40.6.7 (Do Not Delete) 7/15/2019 4:45 PM 2019] SPECIAL NORMS THESIS 2771 b. Enhancing Legitimacy by Facilitating Consensus ......... 2831 c. Other Benefits of Consensus ............................................ 2833 d. Jointly Determining Our Political Identity .................... 2834 e. Enhancing Legitimacy Where Consensus is Not Possible ................................................................................ 2835 V. FOUR OBJECTIONS .................................................................................................. 2835 A. The Status Quo Objection ......................................................................... 2836 B. The No Stopping Point Objection ............................................................. 2839 1. First Version ................................................................................... 2840 2. Second Version .............................................................................. 2841 3. Third Version ................................................................................. 2842 C. The Mismatch Objection ........................................................................... 2845 D. The Theory of the Second Best Objection ................................................ 2847 1. Norm-Scofflaws ............................................................................. 2848 2. Intractable Conflict ........................................................................ 2851 a. The Objection’s Limited Reach ....................................... 2851 b. Where the Special Norms Thesis is Inapplicable .......... 2853 3. Unworkably Complex ................................................................... 2854 CONCLUSION: THE FINAL ACCOUNTING ..................................................................... 2855 INTRODUCTION Even if we accept that the most basic rules of fair play do not apply to our nation’s political representatives when they battle one another in the ordinary lawmaking process, we should demand more when they engage in constitutional decision-making.1 This Article explains why our constitutional system demands different rules of engagement when constitutional questions are at issue, and exactly what we should expect of members of Congress in these situations. Congress does a surprisingly large amount of constitutional decision-making: it is the main ingredient of some important lawmaking (such as determining whether a governmental interest is 1 This Article’s thesis does not depend upon the behavioral standards of ordinary politics being as low as they presently seem to be, but only on there being a gap between the standards that apply to ordinary politics and constitutional decision-making. See infra Part III, note 150. Rosen.40.6.7 (Do Not Delete) 7/15/2019 4:45 PM 2772 CARDOZO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 40:2769 sufficiently important to justify regulating speech), and a key component of many of Congress’s non-legislative responsibilities (such as deciding whether to impeach a government official, or to move forward with a president’s nominations).2 The Constitution itself differentiates between statutory and constitutional lawmaking by specifying a special procedure for the latter in Article V.3 This Article’s Special Norms Thesis extends this basic approach to the much more common practice of constitutional decision-making by Congress outside the amendment process.4 This Article’s central claim is that the existence of Special Norms for constitutional decision-making is implicit in the widely shared understanding of what a constitution is and the work it performs in a large, heterogeneous modern democracy.5 Special Norms are necessary to adequately legitimate governmental authority, to establish the type of political fraternity that modern democracies seek, and to decide a constitutional democracy’s foundational political identity.6 But while Special Norms are appropriate for constitutional decision-making, they should not apply to all of Congress’s decision-making. Extending the Special Norms to everything is not only impractical but would reflect a misunderstanding of what ordinary politics consists.7 2 See infra Part I. 3 See U.S. CONST. art. V. 4 Like Bruce Ackerman’s We the People trilogy, this Article distinguishes between constitutionalism and ordinary politics, and focuses on constitutional practices outside of Article V. But our projects are otherwise
Load more

Recommended publications
  • UNCLASSIFIED US Department of State Case No. F-2016-07895 Doc
    Obtained via FOIA by Judicial Watch, Inc. UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No. F-2016-07895 Doc No. C06162980 Date: 09/26/2018 Re: Office of Civil Rights To: Cheryl Mills RELEASE IN PART 86 86 Subject: Re: Office of Civil Rights He could but I doubt he would. UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No. F-2016-07895 Doc No. C06162980 Date: 09/26/2018 Obtained via FOIA by Judicial Watch, Inc. UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No. F-2016-07895 Doc No. C06162981 Date: 09/26/2018 Can I call Harold Koh and Eric Goosby? To: Cheryl Mills ...______ ____, RELEASE IN PART 86 B6 Subject: Can I call Harold Koh and Eric Goosby? I'll be home in ten minutes if you want to talk. UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No. F-2016-07895 Doc No. C06162981 Date: 09/26/2018 Obtained via FOIA by Judicial Watch, Inc. UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No. F-2016-07895 Doc No. C06162982 Date: 09/26/2018 Office of Civil Rights From: Cheryl Mills RELEASE IN PART 86 86 To: Hillary Clinton [email protected] Subject: Office of Civil Rights Before I mention to D as something perhaps worth exploring- do you think this is a role he can fulfill? Office of Civil Rights At the Department of State, diversity is not just aworthy cause: it is abusiness necessity. Diversity of experience and background helps Department employees in the work of diplomacy. The Secretary believes that diversity is extremely important in making the State Department an employer of choice.
    [Show full text]
  • Globalizing Constitutional Moments? a Reflection on the Japanese Article 9 Debate
    University of New South Wales Law Research Series GLOBALIZING CONSTITUTIONAL MOMENTS? A REFLECTION ON THE JAPANESE ARTICLE 9 DEBATE ROSALIND DIXON AND GUY BALDWIN [2017] UNSWLRS 74 UNSW Law UNSW Sydney NSW 2052 Australia E: [email protected] W: http://www.law.unsw.edu.au/research/faculty-publications AustLII: http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/UNSWLRS/ SSRN: http://www.ssrn.com/link/UNSW-LEG.html GLOBALIZING CONSTITUTIONAL MOMENTS? A REFLECTION ON THE JAPANESE ARTICLE 9 DEBATE Rosalind Dixon* & Guy Baldwin** US scholars have developed a rich toolkit for analyzing informal, as well as formal, processes of constitutional change. A leading example is Bruce Ackerman’s theory of “constitutional moments”. Comparative constitutional scholars, in contrast, have given relatively little attention to the legitimacy of informal modes of constitutional change. This article contributes to filling this gap in our understanding of informal constitutional change outside the US, by analyzing recent attempts by Shinzo Abe’s LDP government informally to amend or “reinterpret” Japan’s pacifist Constitution. Attention to the Japanese experience in this context reveals superficial indications of an actual constitutional moment, but also a lack of true democratic support for such change. This, the article suggests, further helps reveal an important, though largely unstated, precondition for the application of Ackerman’s theory – i.e. that there must be meaningful competition between political parties, in the legislature and at national elections, before informal constitutional change can legitimately occur. Bruce Ackerman has famously suggested that the US Constitution can be amended by both formal and informal constitutional means.1 Basing his analysis on US history, Ackerman argues that several transformative constitutional changes have occurred outside the text of the Constitution, and the formal requirements for amendment under Article V.
    [Show full text]
  • Case 1:17-Cv-00458-RA Document 37 Filed 06/16/17 Page 1 of 6
    Case 1:17-cv-00458-RA Document 37 Filed 06/16/17 Page 1 of 6 UNITED ST ATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK CITIZENS FOR RESPONSIBILITY AND ETHICS IN WASHINGTON, RESTAURANT OPPORTUNITIES 17 Civ. 458 (RA) CENTER (ROC) UNITED, INC., JILL PHANEUF, AND ERIC GOODE, Plaintiffs, - v - DONALD J. TRUMP, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Defendant. MOTION FOR LEA VE TO FILE BRIEF OF SCHOLAR SETH BARRETT TILLMAN AS AMICUS CURIAE IN SUPPORT OF THE DEFENDANT Robert W. Ray Thompson & Knight LLP 900 Third A venue 20th Floor New York, NY 10022 Tel. No.: 212-751-3347 [email protected] Josh Blackman Admission pro hac vice pending 1303 San Jacinto Street Houston, TX 77002 Tel. No.: 202-294-9003 [email protected] Counsel ofRecord Case 1:17-cv-00458-RA Document 37 Filed 06/16/17 Page 2 of 6 Scholar Seth Barrett Tillman, an American national, is a member of the regular full time faculty in the Maynooth University Depaiiment of Law, Ireland. Tillman hereby moves, through counsel, for leave to file the accompanying amicus brief (attached hereto as Exhibit A) in the above-captioned case in support of Defendants' Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 35). Plaintiffs consented to the filing of this brief. Defendant took no position. Fifteen years ago, then-Judge Ali to identified three different types of amici: Some friends of the court are entities with particular expertise not possessed by any party to the case. Others argue points deemed too far-reaching for emphasis by a party intent on winning a particular case.
    [Show full text]
  • Q & A: Rodearmel V. Clinton
    Q & A: Rodearmel v. Clinton Q: Why is Hillary Clinton ineligible to serve as Secretary of State? A: The Constitution’s “Disability Clause,” also known as the “Emoluments Clause” (Article 1, Section 6, Clause 2), states: No Senator or Representative shall, during the Time for which he was elected, be appointed to any civil Office under the Authority of the United States, which shall have been created, or the Emoluments whereof shall have been increased during such time. The Constitution thus prohibits members of Congress from being appointed to a civil office (such as a cabinet post) during the term for which they were elected (even if they have resigned), if the salary for that post was increased during that term. The salary for Secretary of State has been increased three times during Mrs. Clinton’s second elected term, therefore she is not eligible for that office until her term expires in January 2013. Q. Didn’t Congress fix this problem when it voted on December 10, 2008 to lower the Secretary of State’s salary to the level it was at the beginning of Mrs. Clinton’s second term? A. This “work-around” is not authorized by the Constitution. Other clauses do provide for removing a Constitutional ineligibility by Congressional action. For example, Art. 1, Sec. 9, Cl. 8 provides that “no Person holding any Office of Profit or Trust under them [the United States] shall, without the Consent of the Congress, accept of any present, Emolument, Office or Title, of any kind whatever, from any King, Prince, or foreign State” (emphasis added).
    [Show full text]
  • The Cycles of Separation-Of-Powers Jurisprudence
    University of Chicago Law School Chicago Unbound Journal Articles Faculty Scholarship 2016 The Cycles of Separation-of-Powers Jurisprudence Aziz Huq Jon D. Michaels Follow this and additional works at: https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/journal_articles Part of the Law Commons Recommended Citation Aziz Huq & Jon Michaels, "The Cycles of Separation-of-Powers Jurisprudence," 126 Yale Law Journal 346 (2016). This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Chicago Unbound. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal Articles by an authorized administrator of Chicago Unbound. For more information, please contact [email protected]. AZIZ Z. HUQ & JON D. MICHAELS The Cycles of Separation-of-Powers Jurisprudence abstract. The Supreme Court’s approach to the Constitution’s separation of powers is a puzzle. Although the Justices appear to agree on the doctrine’s goals, in almost every important line of cases the Court oscillates between hard-edged rules and open-textured standards. The Court’s seemingly erratic doctrinal shifts cannot be wholly explained by changes in the bench’s personnel or methodological fads. This Article isolates and analyzes pervasive doctrinal cycling between rules and standards as a distinctive element of separation-of-powers jurisprudence. We break from previous scholarship critical of the Court’s zigzagging, and instead consider whether purposeful cycling between rules and standards might be justified as a judicial strategy for im- plementing the separation of powers. We further develop a new theoretical account of the sepa- ration of powers where doctrinal cycling might be justified on two key assumptions: First, the separation of powers promotes a plurality of normative ends, and second, it does so in the con- text of a more heterogeneous institutional environment than a singular focus on the interplay of the three great branches would suggest.
    [Show full text]
  • The Emoluments Clause: an Anti-Federalist Intruder in a Federalis
    Hofstra Law Review Volume 24 | Issue 1 Article 2 1995 The molumeE nts Clause: An Anti-Federalist Intruder in a Federalist Constitution John F. O'Connor Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr Part of the Law Commons Recommended Citation O'Connor, John F. (1995) "The moE luments Clause: An Anti-Federalist Intruder in a Federalist Constitution," Hofstra Law Review: Vol. 24: Iss. 1, Article 2. Available at: http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol24/iss1/2 This document is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Hofstra Law Review by an authorized administrator of Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law. For more information, please contact [email protected]. O'Connor: The Emoluments Clause: An Anti-Federalist Intruder in a Federalis THE EMOLUMENTS CLAUSE: AN ANTI-FEDERALIST INTRUDER IN A FEDERALIST CONSTITUTION John F O'Connor* As to the exception that [Senators and Representatives] cannot be appointedto offices created by themselves, or the emoluments of which are by themselves increased, it is certainly of little consequence, since they may easily evade it .... Luther Martin' CONTENTS I. INTRODUCTION ................................ 91 II. THE PLAIN LANGUAGE OF THE EMOLUMENTS CLAUSE .... 94 A. "No Senator or Representative shall, during the Time for which he was elected"................... 95 1. "No Senator or Representative shall"............ 95 2. "During the Time for which he was elected" ...... 101 B. The Meaning of "Be Appointed".. ................ 104 C. "To any civil Office under the Authority of the United States" . ............................. 106 * Captain, United States Marine Corps.
    [Show full text]
  • Precedent, Three-Judge District Courts, and the Law of Democracy
    University of Kentucky UKnowledge Law Faculty Scholarly Articles Law Faculty Publications 1-2019 Precedent, Three-Judge District Courts, and the Law of Democracy Joshua A. Douglas University of Kentucky, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/law_facpub Part of the Election Law Commons Right click to open a feedback form in a new tab to let us know how this document benefits ou.y Repository Citation Douglas, Joshua A., "Precedent, Three-Judge District Courts, and the Law of Democracy" (2019). Law Faculty Scholarly Articles. 637. https://uknowledge.uky.edu/law_facpub/637 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Faculty Publications at UKnowledge. It has been accepted for inclusion in Law Faculty Scholarly Articles by an authorized administrator of UKnowledge. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Precedent, Three-Judge District Courts, and the Law of Democracy Notes/Citation Information Joshua A. Douglas, Precedent, Three-Judge District Courts, and the Law of Democracy, 107 Geo. L.J. 413 (2019). This article is available at UKnowledge: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/law_facpub/637 Precedent, Three-Judge District Courts, and the Law of Democracy JOSHUA A. DOUGLAS * & MICHAEL E. SOLIMINE** As recent partisan gerrymandering cases have shown, three-judge dis- trict courts play a unique and important role in how the federal judiciary considers signi®cant election law disputes. Yet two somewhat quirky pro- cedural questions involving these courts remain
    [Show full text]
  • Analyzing the United States Constitution in 90 Days
    A 90 Day Study of the United States Constitution For Kids and Adults February 21 – June 24, 2011 Featuring Essays by Constituting America National Youth Director Juliette Turner – U.S. Constitution for Kids Essays And Guest Constitutional Scholars Analyzing the Constitution in 90 Days Guest Constitutional Scholar Essayists Analyzing the Contitution in 90 Days - Constitutional Fun Facts for Kids Juliette Turner Constituting America National Youth Director Analyzing the Contitution in 90 Days - Constitutional Scholar Essayists David Addington Vice President for Domestic and Economic Policy The Heritage Foundation Steven H. Aden, Esq. Senior Counsel Alliance Defense Fund Prof. Bill Allen Michigan State University John S. Baker Professor of Law Emeritus Louisiana State University Law School Andrew Baskin, Attorney Director of Education & Volunteers The Constitutional Sources Project James D. Best Author of Tempest At Dawn David J. Bobb, Ph.D. Director and Lecturer in Politics Allan P. Kirby, Jr. Center for Constitutional Studies and Citizenship Hillsdale College Justin Butterfield Constitutional Attorney, Liberty Institute Robert Chapman-Smith Instructional Design Associate, Bill of Rights Institute Horace Cooper Legal Commentator and a Senior Fellow with the Heartland Institute Carol Crossed Owner and President Susan B. Anthony Birthplace Museum Cynthia Dunbar Asst. Prof. of Law Liberty University School of Law William Duncan Director, Marriage Law Foundation Scot Faulkner Executive Director The Dreyfuss Initiative Colin Hanna President, Let Freedom Ring Allison Hayward Vice President of Policy, Center for Competitive Politics Hadley Heath Senior Policy Analyst, Independent Women’s Forum Troy Kickler Founding Director of the North Carolina History Project Joerg W. Knipprath Professor of Law, Southwestern Law School David B.
    [Show full text]
  • Constitutionstudynewcover.Pdf
    Constituting America A 90 Day Study of the United States Constitution February 21 – June 24, 2011 Featuring Essays by Guest Constitutional Scholars Contributing Guest Constitutional Scholars David Addington Vice President for Domestic and Economic Policy The Heritage Foundation Steven H. Aden, Esq. Senior Counsel, Alliance Defense Fund Prof. Bill Allen Michigan State University John S. Baker Professor of Law Emeritus, Louisiana State University Law School Andrew Baskin, Attorney Director of Education & Volunteers The Constitutional Sources Project James D. Best Author of Tempest At Dawn David J. Bobb, Ph.D. Director and Lecturer in Politics Allan P. Kirby, Jr. Center for Constitutional Studies and Citizenship, Hillsdale College Justin Butterfield Constitutional Attorney, Liberty Institute Robert Chapman-Smith Instructional Design Associate, Bill of Rights Institute Horace Cooper Legal Commentator and a Senior Fellow with the Heartland Institute Carol Crossed Owner and President, Susan B. Anthony Birthplace Museum 2 Cynthia Dunbar Asst. Prof. of Law. Liberty University School of Law William Duncan Director, Marriage Law Foundation Scot Faulkner Executive Director, The Dreyfuss Initiative Colin Hanna President, Let Freedom Ring Allison Hayward Vice President of Policy, Center for Competitive Politics Hadley Heath Senior Policy Analyst, Independent Women’s Forum Troy Kickler Founding Director of the North Carolina History Project Joerg W. Knipprath Professor of Law, Southwestern Law School David B. Kopel Research Director, Advanced Constitutional
    [Show full text]
  • Political Entrenchment and Public Law Abstract
    C.400.LEVINSON-SACHS.482.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 11/18/15 1:10 PM daryl levinson & benjamin i. sachs Political Entrenchment and Public Law abstract. Courts and legal scholars have long been concerned with the problem of “entrenchment”—the ways that incumbents insulate themselves and their favored policies from the normal processes of democratic change. But this wide swath of case law and scholarship has focused nearly exclusively on formal entrenchment: the legal rules governing elections, the processes for enacting and repealing legislation, and the methods of constitutional adoption and amendment. This Article demonstrates that political actors also entrench themselves and their policies through an array of functional alternatives. By enacting substantive policies that strengthen political allies or weaken political opponents, by shifting the composition of the political community, or by altering the structure of political decision making, political actors can achieve the same entrenching results without resorting to the kinds of formal rule changes that raise red flags. Recognizing the continuity of formal and functional entrenchment forces us to consider why public law condemns the former while ignoring or pardoning the latter. Appreciating the prevalence of functional entrenchment also raises a broader set of questions about when impediments to political change should be viewed as democratically pathological and how we should distinguish entrenchment from ordinary democratic politics. authors. Daryl Levinson is the David Boies Professor
    [Show full text]
  • 218 Hon. Carol Shea-Porter Hon. Adam H. Putnam Hon
    218 EXTENSIONS OF REMARKS, Vol. 155, Pt. 1 January 6, 2009 INTRODUCTION OF THE VETERANS that the VA can work to ensure that local care Justice Canady kept his term limits pledge, HEALTH EQUITY ACT OF 2009 is available. It is time for the VA to go further and did not seek reelection to a fifth term in and for the government to live up to the prom- 2000. After leaving Congress, Justice Canady HON. CAROL SHEA-PORTER ises we’ve made to those who have served so returned to the practice of law, serving as OF NEW HAMPSHIRE honorably. counsel to Governor Jeb Bush. In 2002, Gov- IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES f ernor Bush appointed him to Florida’s Second District Court of Appeal. On August 27, 2008, Tuesday, January 6, 2009 HONORING FORMER U.S. REP- Governor Charlie Crist nominated Justice Can- Ms. SHEA-PORTER. Madam Speaker, RESENTATIVE CHARLES T. CAN- ady to the Florida Supreme Court. His nomi- today, I introduced The Veterans Health Eq- ADY UPON HIS INVESTITURE AS nation was confirmed and Justice Canady took uity Act of 2009. This legislation requires the A JUSTICE TO THE FLORIDA SU- his seat as the 82nd Associate Justice to the Department of Veterans Affairs to ensure that PREME COURT Florida Supreme Court on September 8, 2008, every State has a full-service veterans hos- and was sworn-in through a formal investiture pital, or access to equivalent care in-state. I HON. ADAM H. PUTNAM on December 3, 2008. have been calling for the VA to provide full- OF FLORIDA Former Congressman Charles T.
    [Show full text]
  • Political Entrenchment and Public Law
    DARYL LEVINSON & BENJAMIN I. SACHS Political Entrenchment and Public Law ABSTRACT. Courts and legal scholars have long been concerned with the problem of "entrenchment" -the ways that incumbents insulate themselves and their favored policies from the normal processes of democratic change. But this wide swath of case law and scholarship has focused nearly exclusively on formal entrenchment: the legal rules governing elections, the processes for enacting and repealing legislation, and the methods of constitutional adoption and amendment. This Article demonstrates that political actors also entrench themselves and their policies through an array of functional alternatives. By enacting substantive policies that strengthen political allies or weaken political opponents, by shifting the composition of the political community, or by altering the structure of political decision making, political actors can achieve the same entrenching results without resorting to the kinds of formal rule changes that raise red flags. Recognizing the continuity of formal and functional entrenchment forces us to consider why public law condemns the former while ignoring or pardoning the latter. Appreciating the prevalence of functional entrenchment also raises a broader set of questions about when impediments to political change should be viewed as democratically pathological and how we should distinguish entrenchment from ordinary democratic politics. AUTHORS. Daryl Levinson is the David Boies Professor of Law, NYU School of Law. Benjamin I. Sachs is the Kestnbaum Professor of Labor and Industry, Harvard Law School. For helpful comments and suggestions, the authors thank Will Baude, Adam Cox, Michael Farbiarz, Catherine Fisk, Heather Gerken, Jacob Gersen, Don Herzog, Sam Issacharoff, Michael Klarman, Rick Pildes, John Rappaport, Daphna Renan, Shalev Roisman, David Schleicher, David Skeel, and Adrian Vermeule, along with workshop participants at the NYU School of Law, the University of Chicago Law School, and the University of Virginia School of Law.
    [Show full text]