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The Advisor May 7 Working Copy May 7, 2005 www.mnstci.iraq.centcom.mil Official Weekly Command Information Report for the Multi-National Security Transition Command - Iraq On the move ‘Defenders of Iraq’ take up new Ramadi post Vol. 2 Issue 19 May 7, 2005 General: Zarqawi losing support By John D. Banusiewicz a firefight in Rawah or was receiving treatment at the hospital. We were American Forces Press Service simply told that a group of insur- MNSTC-I gents were there, and the Marines Commanding General WASHINGTON – Any remaining and soldiers responded, circled the U.S. Army support among Iraqis for fugitive hospital, and went in." No evidence Lt. Gen. David H. Petraeus Jordanian terrorist Abu Musab al- of Zarqawi's presence at the hospi- Zarqawi is fading as his network's tal was found, he noted. Command Sergeant Major attacks continue to take aim at their U.S. Marine Corps country's security forces and civil- The general said forces involved in Sgt. Maj. Ronnie L. Edwards ians, the director of operations for the search for Zarqawi respond any the Joint Staff said at a Pentagon time they receive a tip that might Public Affairs Officer news conference May 5. lead his way. "And as you might U.S. Army imagine, with a $25 million reward Lt. Col. Frederick Wellman U.S. Marine Corps Lt. Gen. James on his head, we get a lot of tips and T. Conway, who commanded the a lot of rumors of Zarqawi sightings," Deputy Public Affairs Officers 1st Marine Expeditionary Force dur- Conway said. The general noted he U.S. Army Capt. Larry George ing two combat tours in Iraq, said was "absolutely confident" that the he's "absolutely confident" that if terrorist leader would be captured or U.S. Army Zarqawi stays in Iraq, he'll be cap- killed. Capt. Tim Jeffers tured or killed. Conway said the capture in Pakistan Operations NCO "And I might add that I think his of Abu Faraj al-Libbi, operations U.S. Army stock is running pretty thin with the chief for Osama bin Laden's al Sgt. 1st Class Allen R. Thomas Iraqi people," Conway said. "He Qaeda terror network, was accom- continues to take credit for some of plished with no U.S. military involve- Editor these massive attacks where Iraqis - ment. U.S. Army - Iraqi civilians in particular -- are Sgt. Lorie Jewell killed in large numbers. And it's our "I think that the Pakistani people belief, and I think some of the trends should be delighted that their secu- CPATT Public Affairs Liaison are starting to indicate, that there's a rity forces have completed such a Ann Bertucci saturation point that the Iraqi citi- sophisticated operation," the general zens are starting to get to." Iraqi said. "Remember, this guy tried to The Advisor is an authorized publication for citizens more frequently are provid- kill their president twice. He was members of the U.S. Defense Department and ing authorities with tips helpful in their No. 1 terrorist, and now their multinational partners. fighting the insurgency, he noted. commandos have taken him down Contents of this paper are not necessarily the and put him behind bars." official views of the U.S. government, multinational partners or the U.S. Dept. of Conway addressed reports that Defense. The editorial content of this publication Zarqawi narrowly avoided capture Conway said that with Libbi now in is the responsibility of the Multi-National Security during a recent raid on a hospital in custody, other terrorists have some- Transition Command - Iraq Public Affairs Office . Ramadi and that the terrorist mas- thing to think about. "I think it should Direct questions and comments to: termind might have been at the hos- send a strong message to bin Laden [email protected] pital because he is ill or injured. and his followers that you are not going to rest in peace as long as MNSTC-I PAO APO AE 09316 "(The raid) was not based, neces- this global war on terrorism is in DPN: 318-852-1334 sarily, upon information that Zarqawi search of you and your compatri- was there," Conway told reporters. ots," he said. "We will hunt you to To subscribe to The Advisor, "We have not been able to confirm your dying days and either capture visit us online at: www.mnstci.iraq.centcom.mil/advisor that Zarqawi was either wounded in you, or kill you if you resist." Cover: Iraqi Sgt. Maj. Ali Celan Rhadi, 2nd Battalion, 1st Brigade, 7th Iraqi Divi- “All that is necessary for the triumph of evil is sion, marches his soldiers to the trucks in preparation for the unit’s deployment to that good men do nothing.” — Edmund Burke (1729-1797) Ramadi May 5. Photo by U.S. Army Capt. Larry George May 7, 2005 Multi-National Security Transition Command—Iraq The Advisor 2 Iraqi Army battalion relocates to Ramadi By U.S. Army Capt. Larry George MNSTC-I Public Affairs BAGHDAD, Iraq – They are formerly referred to as the “Defenders of Baghdad”, but in actuality these units are “Defenders of Iraq”. These broth- ers-in-arms, formed as a militia unit to provide security for the Jan. 30 elec- tions, began movement to Ramadi as the 2nd Battalion, 1st Brigade, 7th Iraqi Division. Approximately 300 soldiers departed the gates of Al Bakr College May 5 on a mission to defend the streets of Ramadi from insurgent forces and terrorism. Iraqi security forces are deploying throughout the nation in a concentrated effort to counter the in- surgency and bring law and order to every part of Iraq. Iraqi soldiers cheer and bid farewell to departing troops from the 2nd Battalion, 1st Brigade, 7th Iraqi Division, as they depart to Ramadi May 5. Photo by U.S. Army Capt. Larry George Although the unit was originally formed to provide localized security “Our efforts have produced a great “I told the whole battalion that they for a specific area in Baghdad, the group (of soldiers),” said Rhadi. “I am could be moving to Ramadi today, so soldiers appeared confident and moti- proud of them and I think this is that replacements would be prepared vated to relocate 70 miles west of the something from the heart.” if we needed them to load the trucks,” capital city. said Col. Khalid. “We had a good re- While moving half of a battalion and sult today and I am pleased.” “We are all in the same Army and its equipment was a huge undertak- country and we are looking forward to ing, the operation was very success- The 1st Battalion, 1st Brigade, 7th Iraqi the move to Ramadi,” said Iraqi Sgt. ful, according to Col. Khalid Salman Division conducted its movement to Maj. Ali Celan Rhadi, 2nd Battalion, 1st Shineair, commander, 2nd Battalion, Ramadi in April, but according to Iraqi Brigade, 7th Iraqi Division. 1st Brigade, 7th Iraqi Division. and Coalition officials, that deploy- ment was not as orderly Rhadi could be and efficient as the 2nd seen as a major Battalion’s efforts. force and influ- ence in the unit “This (operation) is during the morn- smooth,” said U.S. Marine ing preparations Capt. Wade Reaves, Iraqi to deploy. He Security Forces Liaision moved throughout Officer, 2nd Brigade Com- the college com- bat Team, 2nd Marine Ex- pound, directing peditionary Forces. “This and assisting sol- Iraqi unit wants to make diers in the load- things happen.” He con- ing of the trucks. tributed the successful Soldiers worked execution of the move- feverishly to load ment to the detailed coor- everything from dination and complete personal foot involvement of the Iraqi lockers to bed leadership. frames as they prepared to de- An Iraqi soldier carries a mattress frame to the truck in preparation for the unit’s deployment to Ramadi See ‘Relocate’ part before lunch. May 5. Photo by U.S. Army Capt. Larry George Page 4 May 7, 2005 Multi-National Security Transition Command—Iraq The Advisor 3 Relocate From Page 3 The Iraqi leadership planned, organized and executed the deployment with little involvement from Coalition forces. The 1st Iraqi Motor Trans- portation Regiment from Taji provided the sole vehicular support needed for both the equip- ment and personnel convoys. A total of 30 trucks and about 120 personnel supported both of the movements. The vehicle officer responsible for the equip- ment portion of the operation was quick to high- light the readiness and capabilities of his per- sonnel and equipment. He spoke proudly of his unit’s training, which has included convoy op- erations security, procedures for dealing with improvised explosive devices and contigency nd st th Iraqi Sgt. Maj. Ali Celan Rhadi, 2 Battalion, 1 Brigade, 7 Iraqi Division, supervises his sol- plans. diers as they load vehicles in preparation for their deployment to Ramadi. Photo by U.S. Army Capt. Larry George “I have trained my soldiers about everything especially the trucks and have even trained them on infan- movement in the near future. try skills,” said Lt. Alaa Yasur Fahed, vehicle officer, 1st Iraqi Motor Transportation Regiment. He compared his unit As remaining leaders and fellow soldiers of the battalion to a “miracle team” capable of handling any life-threatening bid farewell to the passing troops and the last truck de- or serious operation. parted the college gates, a light rain began to fall. The other half of the battalion will remain at the college “When it rains, it means good things will happen,” said base to continue training while plans are finalized for their Khalid. Control of An Numaniyah base now in Iraqi hands By U.S.
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